V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (RULE 126) possessing or using a firearm in violation of P.D. 1866.
ssessing or using a firearm in violation of P.D. 1866.—As regards the third assigned error, we
II. RULES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT
L. WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
G.R. Nos. 114224-25. April 26, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-defendant, vs. ROLANDO LUA Y NERI,
accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Witnesses; Time and again the Supreme
Court has ruled that the findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testified before the court.—The thrust of this appeal is laid on the credibility of
the witnesses. Time and again this court has ruled that the findings of the lower court respecting
the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which if
considered would materially affect the result of the case, this court will undauntedly sustain the
findings of the lower court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Frame-Up; In drug related cases, the accused would most
often raise the defense of being framed up, but for that defense to prosper, the evidence
adduced must be clear and convincing.—We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision
of the lower court. The appellant asseverates that the police arrested him at all cost to save face
and to project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such allegation is a mere
conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused would most often raise the
defense of being framed up. However, for that defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must
be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to
prove. In the absence of proof, the presumption is that the police officers regularly performed
their official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motive; Presumptions; It is settled that where there is no
evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated.—Moreover, the appellant failed to convincingly
show any ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to him
such grave offenses. It is settled that where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal
prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or
injury.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural
fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.—We are not convinced. The imputed inconsistencies
regarding the time when the arresting officers arrived at the appellant’s residence and the date
when the markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. This court finds the same too minor to matter, the same having been
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales we held that
testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to
strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Words and Phrases; Leprosy or Hansen’s disease
is a chronic granulomatous infection of humans which attacks superficial tissues, especially the
skin and peripheral nerves; In the case at bar, leprosy does not deter the accused from
do not find the same compelling enough to exculpate the appellant. Leprosy or Hansen’s
disease is a chronic granulomatous infection of humans which attacks superficial tissues,
especially the skin and peripheral nerves. The infection normally results in the loss of touch but
the patient does not really lose his motor functions. Only in severe cases do trauma and
secondary chronic infections lead to loss of digits or distal extremities. In the case at bar, the
appellant failed to show that he can no longer make use of his hands, thus rendering him
incapable of committing the offenses with which he is being charged. The disease does not
deter him from possessing nor of using a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Constitutional Law; Searches and
Seizures; Entrapment; Buy-Bust Operations; Where the arrest of the accused was lawful,
having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the fruit
of the crime as well as for the body search upon him, the same being incidental to a lawful
arrest.—Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as regards
admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted
by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was
lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for
the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime.
With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful
arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the
cylinder are admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a person is lawfully arrested outside his house, a
warrantless search of his house is unlawful.—As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the
appellant’s house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While
initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside
appellant’s house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under “search made incidental to a lawful arrest,” the same
being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or
that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at
bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be
said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
finding accused-appellant Rolando Lua y Neri guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A.
No. 6425 as amended, and of P.D. No. 1866.
Pursuant to OPLAN SATURN, a program addressing the growing drug problem in
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, a buy-bust operation was conducted by police
operatives for the entrapment of Rolando Lua.
At 12 o’clock noon of 30 March 1991, Lt. Norberto Surara, Commander of Bagong
Silang Police Sub-station, Caloocan City, and his men discussed plans to serve a
search warrant on alleged drug pusher Hilario Talavera and to conduct a buybust
operation against accused-appellant Rolando Lua alias “Chekwa.” To verify the report
on the illegal drug activities of appellant, Ulysses Orlino, a police informer, was
dispatched to the vicino of Lua. A few moments later, Orlino returned confirming the
report on appellant’s illegal operations near his residence at Bo. Sto. Niño, Tala,
Caloocan City. Two teams were formed, one to conduct the buy-bust operation, and
the other, to serve the search warrant on Hilario Talavera. Police Officers Constantino
Guerrero, Marino Puno, Jose Marte and Alfredo Antonio formed the buy-bust team.
Guerrero was designated as poseur-buyer. Before leaving the station Guerrero, in the
presence of SP03 Perfecto Sobejana and other police officers, marked with “X” and
his initials “C.G.” 3 P10-bills to be used in the entrapment of appellant.
Guerrero and his buy-bust team arrived at Bo. Sto. Niño at 4 o’clock in the
afternoon together with their informant Ulyssess Orlino. Orlino pointed to Guerrero the
appellant who was then outside the door of his house. The team strategically
positioned themselves near a neighboring house while Guerrero approached
accused-appellant Lua and said, ”Chekwa, pa score nga,” and simultaneously
handed him the 3 marked P10-bills. Appellant took the money and went inside his
house. Shortly after, he returned with 3 small tea bags of marijuana which he gave to
Police Officer Guerrero. At this juncture, Guerrero signaled to his companions to
close in. He then grabbed appellant by the hand after introducing himself as a police
officer and arrested him. Guerrero recovered the marked money from the other hand
of appellant.
When the rest of the team approached Guerrero and appellant Lua, PO Marino
Puno noticed something bulging from the waistline of appellant so he immediately
frisked him. Puno lifted Lua’s shirt and found a .38 cal. paltik in the latter’s
possession. Guerrero who was standing beside the accused grabbed the handgun
which had two (2) live bullets and an empty shell in the cylinder. When Lua was
asked where he kept the rest of the marijuana he unhesitatingly replied that they were
inside his house. Accompanied by the police operatives, appellant went inside his
house and in the presence of his wife pointed to the police officers a soapbox
containing a brick of dried marijuana. Puno showed the marijuana brick to those
around him including appellant’s household.
After the operation, appellant together with the pieces of evidence against him,
namely, 3 marked P10-bills with serial numbers RB886096, PF245345, QF260152; 3
tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams); marijuana brick inside a soapbox (209.00
grams); and, a .38 cal. paltik with two (2) live bullets and an empty shell, were
surrendered to the team leader, SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana, and Lt. Surara who were
both waiting at the barangay hall. SPO3 Sobejana and Patrolmen Guerrero, Puno,
Antonio and Marte jointly executed a sworn statement on their operation.
At six o’clock in the evening appellant Rolando Lua as well as the pieces of
evidence found in his possession were referred to PO3 Gilbert Dioso for investigation.
On 1 April 1991 PO3 Dioso prepared a referral letter to the National Bureau of
Investigation for laboratory examination and chemical analysis of the 3 tea bags and
the brick of marijuana wrapped in a newsprint and placed inside a plastic bag. The
following day, 2 April 1991, Dioso also prepared a referral letter to the Inquest Fiscal
of Caloocan City for proper evaluation and disposition of the cases against appellant.
On the same day the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Alicia
Liberato submitted her Reports Nos. DDM-91-249 and DDM-91-250 finding the
specimens positive for marijuana.
Parenthetically, on 6 July 1992, PNP Senior Superintendent Antonio T. Sierra,
Chief of the Firearms and Explosive Office, issued a certification that accused-
appellant Rolando Lua was not a licensed nor a registered firearm holder of any kind
and caliber after verifying the computerized master list of all licensed firearm holders.
Separate informations for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended,
and for violation of P.D. 1866 were filed against Rolando Lua.
The appellant has a different account of the events. He says that at around 4
o’clock in the afternoon of 30 March 1991 while sleeping in his house with his 3-year
old daughter he was awakened from his sleep when a certain Resty, a security guard
of the Tala Leprosarium, handcuffed him. He asked Resty why, but he received no
answer. According to appellant Resty was with three (3) other companions—Rodel
Ginco who was also a security guard at the Tala Leprosarium, Boy Mano who was a
civilian, and Police Officer Guerrero. Then he was boarded in an owner-type jeep and
brought to the other barangay in front of Hilario Talavera’s house. He also claims he
was transferred to a parked mobile car where he saw Edgardo Calanday inside the
car also handcuffed. From where he was sitting he could see the police operatives
walking to and fro inside Talavera’s house. Then they were brought to the
administration site outside the Tala Leprosarium where they stayed for an hour, after
which they were brought to the Bagong Silang Detachment where they were detained
for three (3) days.
Appellant’s neighbor, Catalino Hidacan, corroborated the testimony of appellant.
Hidacan testified that after the arrest the persons who nabbed the appellant returned
and entered the latter’s house. However, when they went out, they were already
carrying with them something wrapped in a newspaper while one of them was holding
a gun.
Appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court: (a) in sustaining the
prosecution and disregarding completely the testimony of defense witness Catalino
Hidacan; (b) in according probative weight to the testimonies of the police officers on
the disputable presumption that they regularly performed their duties thus
disregarding the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt; and, (c) in not taking judicial notice of his physical
condition when his hands were closed and clinched because of Hansen’s disease or
leprosy so that it is highly improbable to possess a firearm and violate P.D. 1866.
The thrust of this appeal is laid on the credibility of the witnesses. Time and again
this court has ruled that the findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the
latter which if considered would materially affect the result of the case, this court will
undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The
appellant asseverates that the police arrested him at all cost to save face and to
project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such allegation is a mere
conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused would most
often raise the defense of being framed up. However, for that defense to prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that
is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. In the absence of proof, the presumption is
that the police officers regularly performed their official duties. Moreover, the
appellant failed to convincingly show any ill motive on the part of prosecution
witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to him such grave offenses. It is settled that
where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated. He
would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or
injury.
Appellant would persuade us that the police narration of facts could not be freed
from material inconsistencies, thus the disputable presumption that the police officers
acted regularly in pursuance of their official duties must be rendered subordinate to
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
We are not convinced. The imputed inconsistencies regarding the time when the
arresting officers arrived at the appellant’s residence and the date when the markings
on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. This court finds the same too minor to matter, the same having been
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales we
held that testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of
memory which tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the guilt of the
accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of PO
Guerrero was sufficient to show that indeed appellant committed the offenses with
which he was charged. It was established that appellant sold and delivered prohibited
drug to PO Guerrero who acted as poseur-buyer knowing fully well that what he sold
and delivered was a prohibited drug.
As regards the third assigned error, we do not find the same compelling enough
to exculpate the appellant. Leprosy or Hansen’s disease is a chronic granulomatous
infection of humans which attacks superficial tissues, especially the skin and
peripheral nerves. The infection normally results in the loss of touch but the patient
does not really lose his motor functions. Only in severe cases do trauma and
secondary chronic infections lead to loss of digits or distal extremities. In the case at
bar, the appellant failed to show that he can no longer make use of his hands, thus
rendering him incapable of committing the offenses with which he is being charged.
The disease does not deter him from possessing nor of using a firearm in violation of
P.D. No. 1866.
Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as
regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-bust
operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment allowed by law.
The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in flagrante delicto.
Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of
marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the
body search made by Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in
the cylinder are admissible in evidence.
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant’s house, the trial
court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the
arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside
appellant’s house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a
search warrant. Such search cannot fall under “search made incidental to a lawful
arrest,” the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control
of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing
violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his
house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his
house was within his reach or control.
In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under which the penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage of R.A. 7659, which
took effect on 31 December 1993, amending certain sections of The Dangerous
Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or delivery of prohibited drug is prision
correccional to reclusion temporal if the quantity involved is less than 750 grams of
marijuana. Taking into account that appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent
and the said amendatory provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana
involved being only 5.3934 grams or less than 750 grams, the aforestated penalty
imposed under R.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, and following People v. Simon, the imposable penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto
mayor.
On the charge of illegal possession of firearms, we sustain the finding and
conclusion of the trial court. The prosecution has indubitably established the
existence of the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets, and the fact that appellant
did not have the necessary license or permit to possess the same. Accordingly, under
Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, the range of which is seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law, while the minimum shall not be
lower than the minimum likewise fixed by law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. For violating P.D. 1866,
accused-appellant ROLANDO LUA y NERI is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and 20 days
likewise of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; and, for violating Sec. 4, Art. II,
of R.A. 6425, as amended, the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to two (2) years, six (6)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as maximum, to be served
successively in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment
upon a showing that he agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the time of
such preventive imprisonment. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (RULE 126)
II. RULES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT
L. WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
3. Stop and Frisk
G.R. No. 200334. July 30, 2014.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee, vs. VICTOR
COGAED y ROMANA, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined
by implication in our Constitution.—The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by
implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; There must be a particular
description of the place and the things to be searched.—As a general rule, searches conducted
with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant
requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge. The existence
of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers. Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a
particular description of the place and the things to be searched.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; There are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.—There are instances when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even
without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.” The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ; 2.
Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” . . . ; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.
Customs search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Searches incidental
to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that
there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.—One of these jurisprudential
exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk.” “Stop and frisk” searches are often confused
with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a
lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted
within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
Same; Same; Same; “Stop and Frisk” Searches; The “stop and frisk” search should be
used “when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets
where unarguably there is no time to secure a search warrant.”—“Stop and frisk” searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990), was similar “to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either
to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.” This court stated that the “stop and
frisk” search should be used “[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the police officer who should observe facts that would
lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person.—It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt
the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected
be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon
one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; For warrantless searches, probable cause
was defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.”—For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined
as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.”
Same; Same; Same; “Stop and Frisk” Searches; The “stop and frisk” search was
originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.—Police
officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997): [A] “stop-
and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest
of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. (Emphasis supplied) The “stop and frisk” search was
originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As
in Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997), jurisprudence also allows “stop and frisk”
for cases involving dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; Rule 126, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.—Rule 126, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest,
there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Same; The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.—There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume
that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously
stated: Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed.
Same; Same; Same; For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it
is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police
officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or
her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not
amount to a reasonable search.—For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional
right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a
police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on
his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do
not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must
be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights.
The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.”—
The Constitution provides: Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise
known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967). This rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and
effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one’s person and one’s effects through Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy
and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with
the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the
compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have been
done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.
Squarely raised in this appeal  is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a
result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator
through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to
the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accused who
never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained
the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and
without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There
was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate “stop and frisk” action. The
alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and
without improper pressure or coercion.
 The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded
consistent with Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no possible
admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel, La Union, “received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer”
that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) “[would] be transporting
marijuana”  from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, La Union.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.”  PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel
Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel
bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
checkpoint.  The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac
indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.  SPO1 Taracatac
approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana
Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.  Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.  Cogaed
and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting
the bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin.  After this exchange, Cogaed
opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.  Cogaed
then muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,” which
translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag.”  “SPO1
Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station.”
Cogaed and Dayao “were still carrying their respective bags”  inside the station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.  Inside
Cogaed’s sack was “four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,”  and
inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.  PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.  Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and
found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.  The marijuana collected from
Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.  The marijuana from
Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.  The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag
weighed 5,092 grams.  A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed’s and
Dayao’s bags.
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,
“waiting for a jeepney to take him”  to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy
pesticide.  He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.
Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the
jeepney.  Dayao allegedly “asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things, which
included a travelling bag and a sack.”  Cogaed agreed because they were both going
to the market.  This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not
know.  SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their
conversation.  Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought
them to the police station.  These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness, Teodoro
Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.   II
    At the police station, Cogaed said that “SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head.”
The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao
were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No.
9165.  The information against them states:
That on or about the 25 th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA and SANTIAGO
DAYAO y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control,
custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of
seventeen thousand, four hundred twenty-nine and six-tenths (17,429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”).
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
Union.  Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.  The case was dismissed against
Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal
liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.
Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision  dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial
Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor
Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”) and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment,
and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
   
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
“Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
shown that he was about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the
passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.”
Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.
However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
“waived his right to object to such irregularity”  when “he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag.”
Cogaed appealed  the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.  The Court of Appeals found
that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when “[w]ithout any
prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag.”  Hence, this appeal
was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.
   For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid
search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence
obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough
evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to
the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through
the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
   
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether
searches and seizures are “reasonable.” As a general rule, searches conducted with
a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a
judge.  The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after
asking searching questions and answers.  Probable cause at this stage can only exist
if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches
done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless.  In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant.  This court has taken into account the “uniqueness
of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.”
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures
are:
1.     Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . . ;
2.     Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” . . . ;
3.     Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4.     Consented warrantless search;
5.     Customs search;
6.     Stop and frisk; and
7.     Exigent and emergency circumstances.  (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk.”
“Stop and frisk” searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests
under the Rules of Court.  Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime
be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and
within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as
well as to preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, “stop and frisk” searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals  was
similar “to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the identity of
a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information.”  This court stated that the “stop and frisk”
search should be used “[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a
search warrant.”
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where
the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police
officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the
suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,  the police officers were initially informed about a
place frequented by people abusing drugs.  When they arrived, one of the police
officers saw a man with “reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner.”
The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers.  These
observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.
These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers “to stop [the] petitioner
[and] investigate.”
In People v. Solayao,  police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.  This
man was also “wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.”  Upon seeing the
police, the man fled.  His flight added to the suspicion.  After stopping him, the police
officers found an unlicensed “homemade firearm”  in his possession.  This court ruled
that “[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.”  This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based
on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A
drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q        So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being
carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A        Not yet, Your Honor.
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q        If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you
have reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A        No, Your Honor.
   
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by
the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched.  Anything less than this would be an infringement
upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
 IV
Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,
one of the earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine
jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable
cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.  (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.”
Malacat v. Court of Appeals  clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to
be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.  It has to be a “genuine
reason”  to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him.  (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
  
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,  Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.  There should be
“presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.”  The Constitution prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave
the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was
true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin
Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V and-frisk.’”
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this
exception, unless there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that
the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.  (Emphasis supplied)
   The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing  and for the
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.  As in Manalili,  jurisprudence also allows
“stop and frisk” for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta.  In that case, an
informant told the police that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be bringing in drugs from
Baguio City by bus.  At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.
The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street  and identified her as
“Aling Rosa.”  The police apprehended “Aling Rosa,” and they alleged that she
allowed them to look inside her bag.  The bag contained marijuana leaves.
In Aruta,  this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.
There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure.  It was only the informant that prompted the police to
apprehend her.  The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
search.  Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the
police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.  Here, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as
somebody possessing drugs.  The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.  Like in the case at bar, the NBI
inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana
leaves.  The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal.  Aminnudin was
acquitted.
People v. Chua  also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the
police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in
“different karaoke bars in Angeles City.”  One night, the police received information
that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they
conducted a stakeout.  A car “arrived and parked”  at the hotel.  The informant told
the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.  The man alighted from
his car.  He was carrying a juice box.  The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was
holding.
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s
situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that “[t]here was no valid ‘stop-
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence
to be admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest
or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court:
 Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)      When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)      When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)      When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
   
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of
the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present
when the arrest was made.
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing,
or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, “two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”  Both elements were missing
when Cogaed was arrested.  There were no overt acts within plain view of the police
officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume
that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court
previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.  (Citations omitted)
  
Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his
private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be
discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q        Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the
contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A        Yes, ma’am.
Q        And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their
bags, is it not?
A        Yes, ma’am.
Q        So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A        None, ma’am.
Q        Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what
were the contents of the bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright
from them, is it not?
A        It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
Q        But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them
in opening the bags, is it not?
A        Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were
surprised.  (Emphasis supplied)
 
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s
responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:
COURT:
....
Q        Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A        When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed
that he was somewhat frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was
already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, “what’s that,” and
he answered, “I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry.”
    For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police
officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction
on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to
waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police
officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of
a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
  Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.  This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on
fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded
as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  It ensures that the
fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly
infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there
is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be
seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
 WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03394
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being
held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations. (People vs. Delos Reyes, 656
SCRA 417 [2011])

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of the accused, the search of
their persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from their
possession, are also considered unlawful and the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as fruit
of a poisonous tree. (Id.)

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 204589. November 19, 2014.* within the view of the arresting officer.—For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5
  (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
respondent.
of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot
pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Under Section
committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the Court of Appeals (CA)
be apprehended has committed it.
judgment, final order or resolution is a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.—Preliminarily, the Court notes that
Same; Same; Same; Stop-and-Frisk Searches; Words and Phrases; A stop and frisk was
this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
proper remedy to question the CA judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a
for weapon(s) or contraband.—Elucidating on what constitutes “stop-and-frisk” operation and
petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003), wrote: A stop and
the original case. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore
frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that the nature of an action is
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought.
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
—The Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice,
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search
particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is
Same; Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in
ample justification to treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
seizure and may be presented as evidence.—Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
petition and the character of the relief sought. Here, stripped of allegations of “grave abuse of
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
discretion,” the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
appropriate subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the
seizure.
demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.—Although it is true that the trial
court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and Phrases; Chain
and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-
of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses
controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative,
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.—Chain of custody means the duly recorded
denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
testimonies. But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
for destruction. The function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity
have affected the case.
and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-
Same; Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Searches
fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and
Incident to a Lawful Arrest; It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental
(2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.—A search as an incident to a lawful
arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears emphasis that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. Here, the MENDOZA, J.:
search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search.  
Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the
custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
Appeals (CA), in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
(Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for violation of Section 11, Article II of
Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two (2) elements must concur: (1) the person to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
 Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12)
to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the
Information, dated March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 10745-03. The accusatory portion of the Information indicting Sanchez
reads:
That on or about the 19 th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
“shabu,” a dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the
pretrial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the existence and due
execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory
examination; 2] certification issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); 3]
Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic sachet containing small
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
 
Version of the Prosecution
 
The prosecution’s version of the events as summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment7 on the petition is as follows:
Around 2:50 p.m. of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta
Marciano, a.k.a. “Intang,” was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer
Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and
CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to
conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from,
the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy
Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching
up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy
holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box.
Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent
plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle
driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI,
submitted a Certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of
Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted to this office for laboratory
examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet,
marked “RSC,” placed in a plastic pack, marked “Mar. 19, 2003.” (net wt.
= 0.1017 gm)…
Examinations conducted on the above mentioned specimen/s gave
POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY
SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued upon request for purpose of filing the
case.
 
Version of the Defense
 
In the present petition, Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented
a different version of the events that transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to
substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand.
He testified that on the date and time in question, he, together with a certain
Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where
they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4) armed
men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and
Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting
officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out
that he merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted
him and he was brought to the Imus Police Station where he was further
investigated. The police officer, however, let Darwin Reyes go. On cross-
examination, the accused admitted that it was the first time that he saw the police
officers at the time he was arrested. He also disclosed that he was previously
charged with the same offense before Branch 90 of this court which was already
dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in the said case are not the
same as those involved in this case.
 
The Ruling of the RTC
 
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that Sanchez was
caught in flagrante delicto, in actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police
operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the
said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box
Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1 Amposta)  because
there was no showing that he had been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify
against Sanchez. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting
accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12)
to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He
faulted the RTC for giving undue weight on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored
merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the said
arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to
establish his guilt.
 
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and
conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the conviction of the accused for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was
probable cause for the police officers to believe that Sanchez was then and there
committing a crime considering that he was seen leaving the residence of a notorious
drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were being
perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject
narcotic from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to write
that noncompliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and
photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecution’s cause since its
integrity and evidentiary value had been duly preserved. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case
No. 10745-03 finding accused-appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it
was denied by the CA in its November 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for “certiorari” under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored on the following:
GROUNDS
 
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HENCE, A SEARCH WARRANT WAS
NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE II OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE
SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
 
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search
on him were invalid due to the absence of probable cause on the part of the police
officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. He also contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item
inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt.
By way of Comment to the petition, the OSG prays for the affirmance of the
challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless
search and seizure of the subject narcotic were justified under the plain view doctrine
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
 
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA
judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review
on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez
therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition
for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal
spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment
are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. The
case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification
to treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that
the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition
and the character of the relief sought.18 Here, stripped of allegations of “grave abuse
of discretion,” the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction,
which are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be
impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this
rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule that the
assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative,
denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course
of their testimonies. But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the case. After going over the records of the case
at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and substance that have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the
guilt of Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a clear
case of an in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers
qualifies as a valid search following a lawful operation by the police officers.  The
law  enforcers  acted  on  the directive of their superior based on an information
that the owner of the residence where Sanchez came from was a notorious drug
dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said residence, the law enforcers had
probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that
illegal drug-related activities were perpetrated in the place where he came from
and seeing a match box held on one hand, the police officers’ action were
justified to inspect the same. The search therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful
seizure of the confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People v. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is
instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue of an information that a
person having been previously described by the informant, accosted Valdez and
upon inspection of the bag he was carrying, the police officers found the
information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the
 water jug and lunch box inside Valdez’s bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the
trial court’s ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being
committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is
true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the
search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant,
nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then
and there committing a crime.
The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant appeal as in this
case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified drug dealer, previously
tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards the
direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the seizure of the match
box containing shabu was a reasonable course of event that led to the valid
warrantless arrest since there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the
tricycle he was in. (Underscoring supplied)
 
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and
conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a lawful
arrest with the stop-and-frisk principle, a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused
view that one and the other were indistinct and identical. That confused view guided
the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner’s conviction. The Court must clear this
confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry stop-and-frisk search
is entirely different from and should not be confused with the search incidental to a
lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals:
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a
large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
x x x x
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a “stop-and-
frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,” as laid down
in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a “stop-and-frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a “stop-and-frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-
frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention  and  detection,  which  underlies  the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
 
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delicto arrest nor the stop-and-frisk
principle was applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure made by the
police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this
case shows that the search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1
Amposta’s testimony on direct examination is revelatory, viz.:
Pros. Villarin:
Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall where were you?
A: Yes, Mam.
Q: Where were you?
A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite.
Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite?
A: We were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
Q: Who were with you?
A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
Monzon.
Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?
A: Our superior gave us the information that there were tricycle drivers
buying drugs from “Intang” or Jacinta Marciano.
Q: What did you do after that?
A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta Marciano.
Q: After that what did you do?
A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of “Intang” and when the
passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d] them.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver and the
passenger alighted from the tricycle.
Q: What did you do after they alighted from the tricycle?
A: I saw the passenger holding a match box.
Q: What did you do after you saw the passenger holding a match box?
A: I asked him if I can see the contents of the match box.
Q: Did he allow you?
A: Yes, mam. He handed to me voluntarily the match box.
Court:
Q: Who, the driver or the passenger?
A: The passenger, sir.
Pros. Villarin:
Q: After that what did you find out?
A: I opened the match box and I found out that it contained a small
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.

A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It
bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the
conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.
Even casting aside the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case
on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police
operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him. It
appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up
with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; that he
noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see
the contents of the match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to
him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of
the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this case was that a
search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the
evidence produced by the search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the
warrantless search and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the
warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace
officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
x x x
 
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante
delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time
of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has
committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that
he had just committed, was committing, or was about to  commit  a  crime. Sanchez
was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug
peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite.
Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had
exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same
would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When
the police officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that
Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the
illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held to signify a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. The police officers in this case had no inkling
whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer.
Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was
conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police
officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from
her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words,
there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal
possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in this case was more imagined than
real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid “stop-and-frisk” search in the case at
bench. Elucidating on what constitutes “stop-and-frisk” operation and how it is to be
carried out, the Court in People v. Chua wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
 
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in
two cases. In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, a policeman chanced upon
Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared to be “high” on drugs as he was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached and asked what
he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to
accost Manalili to determine if he was actually “high” on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.
 In People v. Solayao,  the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop
and frisk the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken
actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that his companions fled
when they saw the policemen; and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on
an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming the
vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples is the presence of more
than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1
Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-
frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a
tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could
not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that
he had shabu  in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the
presence of the officer. There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of
the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was
no showing either that he tried to evade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he
attempted to flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts and the
surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable suspicion on
the part of the police officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed, where not a single suspicious
circumstance preceded the search on the accused, the Court ruled that the
questioned act of the police officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation.
Cogaed was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and travelling aboard
a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious behavior sufficient to justify
the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity. Worse, the
assessment of suspicion was made not by the police officer but by the jeepney driver,
who signaled to the police officer that Cogaed was “suspicious.” In view of the
illegality of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana confiscated from
the accused was held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure
of evidence in plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure
of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second,
subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed
to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box being then held by
Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In fact,
SPO1 Amposta had to demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in
order for him to open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and
its seizure without the requisite search warrant is in violation of the law and the
Constitution.
In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti  of the crime charged, the accused must
be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized
from Sanchez was the very same item presented during the trial of this case. The
Court notes that there were several lapses in the law enforcers’ handling of the seized
item which, when taken collectively, render the standards of chain of custody
seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The
function of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the chain of custody
requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence.
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain
of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it
was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO1
Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed the marking “RSC” on the seized drug;
and that he and the three other police officers brought Sanchez and the
subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their investigator. The
prosecution evidence did not disclose where the marking of the
confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who
was in possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the police station. A
reading of the Certification, dated March 20, 2003, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud
Rosales shows that a certain PO1 Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI
for laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of
the police investigator to whom SPO1 Amposta and his group turned over the
seized shabu. The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI
laboratory and the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized
marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were also
not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over
the identity of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence. The
prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering
the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the
incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision
and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate
release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and
to inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his continued confinement,
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who
has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. (Fajardo vs. People, 639 SCRA 194 [2011])

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. (Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista vs.
Lindo, 718 SCRA 321 [2014])

——o0o——
 
 G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997.
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The search was valid, being akin to a stop-
and-frisk; Stop-and-Frisk; Defined.—We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was
valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
Same; Same; Generally a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
—In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by
a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge.
Same; Same; Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence.—Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is
legally inadmissible in evidence as a “fruit of the poisonous tree,” falling under the exclusionary
rule.
Same; Same; Five Recognized Exceptions to the Rule Against Warrantless Search and
Seizure.—This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs.
Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and
seizure, viz.: “(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in
plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.”
Same; Same; Definition of Probable Cause.—In People vs. Encinada, the Court further
explained that “[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause
as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a
search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.”
Same; Same; Stop-and-frisk adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant.—Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case,
members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying
a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner’s bag one .38-cal. revolver with
two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade.
In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search
the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to
stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to
occur.
Same; Same; Court concurs with the Solicitor General’s contention that petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise
this issue or to object thereto during the trial.—Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor
General’s contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a
right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person
waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
Same; Same; Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.—
Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right.
In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to
raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded
for the first time on appeal.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Witnesses; Court has ruled that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals is
accorded great weight and respect.—Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as
in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances
have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Elements of Illegal Possession of Marijuana.—The
elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Same; Same; Evidence; Defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by the Court with
disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.—Furthermore, like the trial and the
appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this
case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or
present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was
lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as
early as April 26, 1988. Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was
no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court
with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant,
policemen should employ limited, flexible responses—like “stop-and-frisk”—which are
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being
ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No.
07266, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon.”
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged
by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is
a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.”
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charge.
With the agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a
P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a
decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana
residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
x x x      x x x      x x x.”
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the
defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent
Court promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial
court:
“ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against appellant.”
Respondent Court denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January
20, 1994, disposing:
“ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant’s motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby
DENIED.”
The Facts Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
“At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance
along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver
named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car
of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because
of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from
their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery
who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to
avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as
police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding
in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male
person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter
showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat.
Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat.
Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on
which he wrote ‘Evidence ‘A’ 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.’ The white sheet of paper
was marked as Exhibit ‘E-3.’ The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller
sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit ‘E-4’)
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana
residue (Exhibit ‘D’). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit ‘A’). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the
referral slip (Exhibit ‘D’) to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including
the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit ‘D.’
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral
slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o’clock in the evening of April 11,
1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit ‘D.’
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical
examinations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit ‘E’) Mrs. Pascual
referred to the subject specimen as ‘crushed marijuana leaves’ in her
Certification dated April 11, 1988
(Exhibit ‘F’). These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for
marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the
specimen. In this examination, she also found that the ‘crushed marijuana leaves’
gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit ‘G’).
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a
white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit ‘E’). She then wrote identification
notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit ‘E-1’)
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit ‘F’ from the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl.
Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan
City. (Exhibit ‘C’)”
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was
walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:
“At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN
MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City
Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver
of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were
under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the
tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point,
the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen
replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found
on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle
driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at
Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
 On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and
signalled the latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked
to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion.
The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper
trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt
and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the
policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen
later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was
brought outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by
the policemen to call his parents in order to ‘settle’ the case. The policemen who
led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his
parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his
parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was
brought in the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that
no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say
anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused
when he and the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched
on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on
his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April
11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the
accused at the Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said
that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants at the
police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.”
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several
pictures showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely
on the strength of the arresting officers’ testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas
were “neutral and disinterested” witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during
the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was
found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed
marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant’s defense that this charge was merely
“trumped up,” because the appellant neither took any legal action against the
allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of
Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court
was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged “serious”
discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that
the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the
narration. It further found petitioner’s contention—that he could not be convicted of
illegal possession of marijuana residue—to be without merit, because the forensic
chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
“I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused
(and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable
doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not
minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the
accused was framed for the purpose of extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence
presented is consistent with both innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution
which are inadmissible in evidence.”
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence
against him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial
and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession,
contending that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his
Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent,
counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no
waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a
stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as
the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
“x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.”

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person,
in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual
arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden
discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he
observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of
time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly
24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for
an officer of 30 years’ experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US
Supreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, gives this guarantee:
“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible
in evidence as a “fruit of the poisonous tree,” falling under the exclusionary rule:
“SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs.
Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
search and seizure, viz.: “(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.” In People vs.
Encinada,  the Court further explained that “[i]n these cases, the search and seizure
may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the
term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched.”
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said
case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who
was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner’s bag
one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .
22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court
said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular
hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit
of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were “high.” The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession:
“FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents
were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery, Caloocan City.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel
Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery then when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then
prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers
in a polite manner.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you
chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you
chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a
polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
 Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he
was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a
marijuana (sic) crushed residue.”
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General’s contention that petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed
to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more
particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not
deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present
case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise
its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised
below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers’ testimony contained “polluted,
irreconcilable and unexplained” contradictions which did not support petitioner’s
conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated
by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case,
we will not countenance a departure from this rule. We concur with Respondent
Court’s ruling:
“(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, We do not find them
substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People
vs. Avila, it was held that—‘As long as the witnesses concur on the material
points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the
essential veracity of their statements.’ ”
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty, the bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritu’s testimony is justified by tangible
evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas’ contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is
supported by the Joint Affidavit signed by both arresting policemen. The question of
whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner’s wallet or inside a plastic bag is
immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance.
Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in
petitioner’s possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not
destroy Espiritu’s credibility.
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession
of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
The substance found in petitioner’s possession was identified by NBI Forensic
Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner’s lack of authority to
possess these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable,
considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and
that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such
behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it
was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given
sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any
administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any evidence
other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and
unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as
early as April 26, 1988. Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety,
as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
No. 4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and
one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act
requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
“SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
“SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of
this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.” (Italics supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the
following penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:
“Sec. 8. x x x x
 The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use
Indian hemp.”

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6)
YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     
Note.—A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search
and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest. (People vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA
679 [1995])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 205926. July 2, 2015.
 
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y  GONZALES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants;
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause;
in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
“unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision.—Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength
of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such
warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs
that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; The law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.—The exclusionary rule
is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; For a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.—For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2)
elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, Section 5(b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had
in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5(a), the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry Searches);
Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a
judge to determine probable cause.—The Court finds respondent’s assertion that there was a
valid “stop and frisk” search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA
427 (2014), the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain “stop and frisk” searches: “Stop
and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern —based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer,
with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an
illicit act. x x x x Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the
earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is
that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of the police officers to inspect the same. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined
as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.”
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari   are the Decision dated October
20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment dated July 28, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No.
MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y  Gonzales (Comerciante) of
the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
 
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante
of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous
drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have
in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white
crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the
test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as “shabu,’’ a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o’clock in the evening of July 30,
2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3
Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on
their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising
at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance
of about 10 meters, two (2) men — later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick
Dasilla7 (Dasilla) — standing and showing “improper and unpleasant movements,”
with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may
contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla.
At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police
officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which
was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante’s failure to
file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and
ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain
“Barok,” who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla,
who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and
taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal
drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they
failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
The RTC’s Ruling
 
In a Judgment dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.
The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on
Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation,
the RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest,
considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the
said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the
RTC found that absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any
malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he
arrested Comerciante.
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
 
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante’s conviction. It
held that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of
Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and
that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to
the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might
be shabu, and thus, PO3 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then
and there.
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied
in a Resolution dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition.
 
The Issue Before the Court
 
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
affirmed Comerciante’s conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a
valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of
such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be
rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante’s warrantless arrest was validly
made pursuant to the “stop and frisk” rule, especially considering that he was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
The Court’s Ruling
 
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and
seizure becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of
the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
 The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of you do?
a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is A: We stopped ma’am.
Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma’am.
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped reaction of these two male persons?
while being transferred from one confinement to another. A: They were surprised, ma’am.
x x x x
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating as police officer?
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; A: They were surprised.
Q: When you say “nabigla” what was their reaction that made you say
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
that they were surprised?
officer.  On the other hand, Section 5(b) requires for its application that at the time of A: They were stunned.
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. A: I arrested them, ma’am. I invited them.
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission short, napakasimple lang ng tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything?
of an offense is absolutely required. Court:
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listen.
Pros. Silao:
Under Section 5(a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b),
Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala?
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Witness:
Wala po.
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could Pros. Silao:
have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers Court:
per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi
“improper and unpleasant movements,” with one of them handing plastic sachets to mo sa kanila?
Pros. Silao:
the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. PO3 Calag’s
Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
testimony on direct examination is revelatory: Witness:
Pros. Silao: Wala po.
Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, kindly tell the x x x x
court where were you? Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma’am. recover the plastic sachet?
x x x x A: From his hand ma’am.
Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? Q: Left or right hand?
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma’am. Pros. Silao:
Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo kung hindi mo
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma’am. matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? (Emphases
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what and underscoring supplied)
unusual incident that happened if any?
 
A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to
someone. On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3
x x x x Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two reasonable accuracy — especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while
male persons you already identified? aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour — miniscule
A: About ten (10) meters away ma’am. amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
particular act? attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the
A: They were quite facing me then.
former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily,
Q: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing
this Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City? the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma’am. latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle? his companion were showing “improper and unpleasant movements” as put by PO3
A: Eduardo Radan, ma’am. Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should
officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on be “presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.” The
illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Certainly, reliance
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in  
Section 5(b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e.,  that an offense had in fact just In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante’s acts of standing around with
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.
that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal
instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had activity which would constitute a “genuine reason” for PO3 Calag to conduct a “stop
been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the and frisk” search on the former. In this light, the “stop and frisk” search made on
arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not
obtain in this case. In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid “stop and frisk”
search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu  purportedly seized from him is
In this relation, the Court finds respondent’s assertion that there was a valid “stop rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
and frisk” search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, the Court Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti  of the crime charged,
had an opportunity to exhaustively explain “stop and frisk” searches: Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
Section 2 of the Constitution. Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET
The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present where the ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — SO ORDERED.
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
Notes.—Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
x x x x
unreasonable searches and seizures.” (People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 [2014])
Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v.
It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious
belongings; the process cannot be reversed. (Sanchez vs. People, 741 SCRA 294 [2014])
circumstances as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and  
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
——o0o——
officers to inspect the same.  
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.”
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not
have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a
genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
 V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (RULE 126) police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the
two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black
bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what
its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and
II. RULES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.
L. WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; In Flagrante Delicto; One of the instances a police
4. Search of a moving vehicle officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught
committing a crime.—It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing
G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003 a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught
KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. AGPANGA LIBNAO y committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
KITTEN, accused-appellant.
Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence; Evidence not formally offered can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The constitutional guarantee embodied in
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.—Appellant
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary
seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches and seizures.—These arguments
evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal
fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible. The contention is untenable.
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been
1987 Constitution, thus: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore,
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The constitutional guarantee is not
appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.—Again, appellant’s
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must
arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and
stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that
search warrants and warrants of arrest.
they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that
appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only
Same; Same; Exceptions to Warrant Requirement; Search of Moving Vehicles; Peace
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
officers in warrantless search of moving vehicles are limited to routine checks where the
The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant.
examination of the vehicles is limited to visual inspection.—Be that as it may, the requirement
Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be
that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not
inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the
absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of
same incident.
moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition
of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Alibis and Denials; The defense of denial and alibi has
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs
vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
Act.—Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s defense
search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable
of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer,
the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to
defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be
seizure and destruction.
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The sole proof presented in the lower court by
the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even
Same; Same; Same; Where the police had been conducting surveillance operations for
affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
three months in the area, which surveillance yielded the information that once a month, the two
accused transport drugs in big bulks, and at 10:00 one night, the police received a tip that the
two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle, the two being intercepted three hours
later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, and when asked who owned
and what its content was, both became uneasy, the warrantless search and seizure of the bag PUNO, J.:
was not illegal.—The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional
The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-
months in the area. The Surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425,
her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. For their conviction, each was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two
million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
“That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 o’clock dawn, in the
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell
marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately eight
(8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996,
intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac,
Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the
area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big
bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector
Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his
office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a
delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in
Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea,
PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the
checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and
PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated
inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused
Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the
two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers
invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same barangay. They brought
with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag
were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the
barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant,
her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of
leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were
suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the
two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt
without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have
one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were
present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu
conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were
marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.
For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga
testified that in the evening of October 19, 1996, she went to buy medicine for her
ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering
from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a
tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she
was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay
Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan
Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing
eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its
contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passenger’s seat inside
the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her
lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one
Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The
sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio
arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus No.
983. The incident was recorded in the company’s logbook. Gannod, however, was not
presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:
“WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they
are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she
assigned the following errors:
“1.The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the
defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and
search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
2.The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the
right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the
peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.
3.The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses which inconsistencies cast
doubt and make incredible the contention and version of the prosecution.
4.The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and
considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered amounting to ignorance of the law.”
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a
warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the
police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In
the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it
was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is
permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by
a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Searches
and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search
and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search
warrants and warrants of arrest.
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar
exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following,
instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag
carried by the accused; (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who
was observed to be acting suspiciously; (c) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; (d)
where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge
in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so; (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the
basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent
or spy—one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belong—that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country;  (g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that
the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-
buy operation, would be boarding MV Doña Virginia and probably carrying shabu with
him; (h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was
carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to
Manila; and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was
carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset.
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause.
The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three months in the area. The Surveillance yielded the information that once a month,
appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00
p.m. of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting
drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later,
riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained
the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both
became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of
appellant’s bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the
instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the
person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:
“Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x.” (emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when
police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her
right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she
argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant
and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote
the relevant portion of its decision:
“Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel
Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation
receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit “C”) is inadmissible because they were
not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the
postulate to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession
extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless
 to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the police invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and
interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the
issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecution’s Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
evidence, both accused can be convicted.” (emphasis supplied)
The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of
denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object
stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally
offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court
inadmissible.
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article
II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby
the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded
AFFIRMED.
and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the
SO ORDERED.
documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and
marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their Notes.—The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. (People
properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, vs. Gonzales, 365 SCRA 17 [2001])
appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on
the exhibits. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question. (Caballes vs. Court of
Appeals, 373 SCRA 221 [2002])
witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon
Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing
the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already ——o0o——
open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers’
failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly
rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to human experience.

Again, appellant’s arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she

mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the basic
elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility
of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-
accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence. The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the
guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses
regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different
persons may have different recollections of the same incident.

Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note
and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary
for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity with the appellant
and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.

To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify
falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this
case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of
the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.

Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s

defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been
 [ G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018 ]
MARCELO G. SALUDAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26
June 2014  and the Resolution dated. 15 October 2014  of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 01099, The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence
dated 15 September 2011  rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao
City in Criminal Case No. 65,734-09, finding petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high-powered firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (PD
1866).
The Antecedent Facts
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force
Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao
City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to
remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry
of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a
small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He
lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the
male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified
as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus
conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner
obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber
carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions;
(3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then
asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives.
Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by
SCAA Buco.
Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for
Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009, the latter found probable cause to
charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under PD 1866. The Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:
That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly, with intent to possess, had in his possession and
under his custody an improvised high powered firearm caliber .30 carbine
bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1) magazine loaded with
three (3) live ammunitions and one (1) "cacao" type hand grenade explosive;
without first securing the necessary license to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura
(Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine
National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5
November 2009  attesting that petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any
kind and caliber per verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified
petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine
inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA
Buco further elaborated on the search conducted:
Atty. Mamburam
Q And that check point, which was conducted along Ilang [R]oad, Davao
City, was by virtue of a memorandum?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept
a Metro Shuttle passenger bus and you requested all passengers to
alight?
A Yes.
Q All female passengers were left inside?
A Yes.Your Honor.
Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of
the passengers in the bus?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black
gray colored pack bag which was placed at the back portion of the bus?
A Yes.
Q You said that the bag was heavy?
A Yes.
Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s
inside the bus and that was the only thing or item inside the bus which
was heavy. Is that correct?
A There were many bags and they were heavy. When I asked who is the
owner of the bag because it was heavy but the bag was small, when I
asked, he said the content of the bag was a cellphone. But I noticed that
it was heavy.

xxxx
Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that
correct?
A Yes.
Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?
A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)
Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one
male passenger you pointed as the accused kept looking at you?
A Yes.
Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not
looking at you?
A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the]
window looking towards his bag.
xxxx
Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested
him to open the bag?
A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.
Q And, when he opened it?
A I saw the handle of the firearm. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct
examination, petitioner denied ownership of the bag. However, he also admitted to
answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to
open it after the latter sought for his permission:
ATTY. MAMBURAM
Q x x x [A]fter the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force
that you and your brother were seated at the back of the bus, can you
please tell us what happened next?
A A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag
and what were the contents of the bag.
Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?
A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.
Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task
force?
A I told him it was only a cellphone.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?
A My elder brother.
Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the
task force when, in fact, you were not the owner of the bag?
A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my
brother who were seated at the back.
xxxx
Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably
the content of the bag was cellphone, what happened next?
A He asked if he can open it.
Q And what was your reply?
A I told him yes, just open it.
xxxx
Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that
bag was your brother, what is the name of your brother?
A Roger Saluday.
Q Where is your brother Roger now?
A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009. (Emphasis
supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor
when the latter was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never
disclosed he was with his brother when he boarded the bus:
PROS. VELASCO
Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of
suving yourself considering you don't own the bag, did you not volunteer
to inform them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?
A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my
brother because I was also afraid of my brother.
Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you
had a brother at that time when you were boarding that bus,
correct?
A No, sir, I did not.
xxxx
Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you
confirm now that it was the conductor of that bus who pointed you as the
owner of the bag, correct?
A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at
the back. (Emphasis supplied)
The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to
present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial cm.ni, the parties submitted their
respective memoranda.
The Decision of the Trial Court
Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him
to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or
license. Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September
2011, petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal possession of high powered firearm,
ammunition and explosive. For the offense of illegal possession of high powered
firearm and ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of prision mayor in its minimum period. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. For the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged
misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the
search. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the
warrantless search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual findings
of the trial court can no longer be disturbed.
In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of
petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated
September 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 11 th Judicial Region, Branch 11,
Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65,734-09, finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high powered firearm,
ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:
(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition,
he is imposed an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to
seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum
term, in addition lo the fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00); and
(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  to which the OSG filed its
Comment. In its Resolution dated 15 October 2014, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issue
Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals as to warrant his conviction for the offenses charged.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. As a result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh
and sift through the evidence presented during trial. Further, factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect even
finality.
Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of highpowered firearm
and ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal possession of explosive under the same
law. The elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm,
ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. As regards the second and third
elements, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in
actual or constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive without the requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in
pertinent part:
In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has
no license or permit to own or possess the firearm ammunition and explosive by
presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms and
Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification issued by
the Chief, Records Section, FED of the PNP, stating that appellant "is not a
licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records of
this office."
Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the
veracity or truthfulness of the Certification. He claims that the officer who issued
it should have been the one presented so he would not be denied the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:
xxxx
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it
presented both.
xxxx
Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms,
ammunition and explosive. However, his denial flies in the face of the following
testimonies which he himself made:
xxxx
Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, op the contents of the bag. He
even allowed the police officer to open it Based on his actuations, there could be
no doubt that he owned the bag containing the firearm, ammunition and
explosive.
Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate.
Besides, the allegation that his brother owned the bag is uncorroborated and
self-serving.
As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession
of firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises questions of fact. Considering further
that the Court of Appeals merely echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the
Court finds no reason to disturb them.
As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on
four important points: one, that petitioner was a passenger of the bus flagged down
on 5 May 2009 at a militaty checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco
boarded and searched the bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as
the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of the bus; and four, that
the same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded with three
live ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not challenge the
chain of custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of
law and argues that they are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by
Task Force Davao was illegal.

The Court disagrees.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth
Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant.of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only.  Conversely, when a search is
"reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what
qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court,
which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction,  may shed light on the matter.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment
protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject ofFourth Amendment
protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private,
even m an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties
have attached great significance to the characterization oftbe telephone booth
trom which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued
that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has
maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or
not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected" deflects
attention from the problem presented by this cast. For the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that
would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's
right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of
privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered.
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
"search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To
illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court declared airport searches as outside the
protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of
privacy that society will regard as reasonable:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs. and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not
apply to routine airport procedures. (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described seaport searches as reasonable
searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's
right to privacy:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done
without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
xxxx
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related
functions and deemed agents of govemment, Marti is inapplicable in the present
case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
xxxx
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-
ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of
the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities
had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner
did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.
In People v. Breis, the Court also justitied a bus search owing to the reduced
expectation of privacy of the riding public:
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IOl Mangili did not exceed his authority in the
performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IOl Mangili laid nary a finger
on Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of
authority. The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The
expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at
 that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their
belongings, and the search of moving vehicles has been uphold.
Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding
the case. Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a
particular activity may diminish this expectation.  In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, a common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to
the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The
Court held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing
them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights." In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, a compulsory right of
way was found improper for the failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege
that the passageway they sought to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial to
the owner of the servient. estate. The Court thus explained, "[c]onsidering that the
petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably
maintain a strict standard of security within  its premises. Otherwise, the convenience,
privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised." Similarly,
shopping malls install metal detectors and body scanners, and require bag inspection
as a requisite tor entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of the mall
owner can compromise public safety.
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the
same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the
State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter
those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security .measures by an
owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power
for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is.
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the
public.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a
military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro
Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual
and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical
inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further
be required to open their bags and tuggagesConsidering the reasonableness of the
bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant.
As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that
petitioner consented to the search, thereby making the seized items admissible in
evidence. Petitioner contends otherwise and insists that his failure to object cannot be
construed as an implied waiver.
Petitioner is wrong.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be
voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the
following character stics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a
public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively
looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (g) the
nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (i) the possibly vulnen1ble subjective state of the person consenting.
In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals; the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the ]atter agreed. According to the Court,
petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla, the
Court found the accused to have spontaneously perfonned affirmative acts of volition
by opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted
to a clear waiver of his right. In People v. Omaweng, the police officers asked the
accused if they could see the contents of his bag, to which the accused said "you can
see the contents but those are only clothings." The policemen then asked if they
could open and see it, and the accused answered "you can see it." The Court held
there was a valid consented search.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA
Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered
"yes, just open it" based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by
petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014,
the Court of Appeals aptly held:
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the
accused if they could see the contents of his bag and he answered "you can see
the contents but those are only clothings." When asked if they could open and
see it, he said "you can see it." In the present case, accused-appellant told the
member of the task force that "it was only a cellphone" when asked who owns
the bag and what are its contents. When asked by the member of the task force if
he could open it, accusedappellant told him "yes, just open it." Hence, as
in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellants right against warrantless
search.
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on
the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a
warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A
reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include
searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places. In
contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for
reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include
search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented
search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following
guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected
to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard,
metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals.
Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the
must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099
can validly be refused entry into the terminal. are AFFIRMED.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security SO ORDERED.
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of
information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow fot an inspection of the person
and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon
receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
on board. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective
passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same
routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the
person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is
able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be
flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can
board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers andtheir bags or
luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the
bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the
search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for
public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result
from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other
similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities,
persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third,
as to the purpose of the search, it must be contined to ensuring public safety. Fourth,
as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be
put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their tenninals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that
category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts
passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these
guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at
the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search.
Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they

applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of
taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can
no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight
from the vehicle.