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"Idowhatido": Case Study On - A Book by Raghuram Rajan
"Idowhatido": Case Study On - A Book by Raghuram Rajan
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK NAME: “I DO WHAT I DO”
-BY RAGHURAM RAJAN
Raghuram Rajan was born on 3 February 1963 in Bhopal, India. He started his career
with a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from the Indian Institute of
Technology Delhi. Following the decision to leave the sphere of electromagnetic
fields and waves in favour of the oscillations of the economy and financial markets,
Raghu joined the doctoral programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), where he received a PhD for his thesis ʻEssays on Banking’. Four years later, at
the age of just 32, he became a full professor of finance at the University of Chicago
The book has had increased media attention and uptake in part due to Dr. Rajan's
much respected views on the economy and the political climate, but, also because of
Rajan's view on the demonetization exercise undertaken by the Government of India
in October 2016. The demonetization exercise had mixed views from economists,
with a majority (including Rajan) subscribing to the view that the short term pains
inflicted would not justify any purported longer term gains. With that said, Dr Rajan
himself is of the view that the data available currently is not fully substantive to
determine if the program could be deemed a success. He has further gone on to call
that rather than demonetization as an exercise, better end to end income and asset
tracking mechanisms, including the usage of biometric systems such as Aadhaar will
be instrumental in battling 'black money
“I Do What I Do”, Rajan explains clearly his logic for not lowering the policy interest
rate despite the clamour of the industry. The general belief is that lower interest
rates increase demand since people are tempted to borrow to consume which leads
to higher growth, although if inflation is high the same spending fetches less.
Inflation leads people to buy goods because of the expectation that prices will go
even higher and this leads to an association made between inflation and growth. But
Rajan points out that when people get used to higher inflation rates, trusting in
inflation for growth could lead to an upward spiralling of prices which could be
hazardous. He therefore favours low and steady inflation rates to keep demand
stable instead of focusing overly on growth. The shock treatment to lower inflation
used in the US in 1981 would likely do enormous damage and the process of keeping
inflation in check over the long term is the best.
Rajan states his position clearly and one could presume that although it was not
publicly articulated, the earlier governors used the same logic of not lowering
interest rates; one recollects that in 2012 there was an open rift between P
Chidambaram the UPA finance minister and RBI governor D Subba Rao the finance
minister pressurizing the RBI to reduce rates but the RBI governor refusing to budge.
Raghuram Rajan was chief economic advisor at that time and may have been taken
to be with the government, but he acted differently when he became governor of
the Reserve Bank of India himself.
Beginning with ‘strong government’ I gather that Rajan actually means a ‘strong
state’ from this statement: “a strong government is also one that provides an
effective and fair administration through clean, motivated, and competent
administrators who can deliver good governance.”
Fukuyama’s second pillar, ‘rule of law’ is culturally bound and provides a basic stable
code of conduct that should not be violated by either government or the citizenry.
The state’s actions are constrained by a widely understood code of moral and
righteous behaviour, enforced by religious, cultural, or judicial authority and largely
bound by religious beliefs and social conventions; the notion of dharma, for instance,
could broadly be regarded as the traditional code by with righteous behaviour is
judged in India. The third pillar, ‘democratic accountability’, means that the
government has to be popularly accepted, the people having the right to throw out
unpopular, corrupt or incompetent leaders.
Before going on to look at how Fukuyama’s three pillars translate in the Indian
context it is pertinent to look at the fourth pillar erected by Rajan which pertains to
the free market. In elaborating upon it Rajan asks why, since unlike democracy which
treats individuals equally, each one having a vote, and the free market (contrarily)
empowers consumers based on how much money they have and their wherewithal,
the average voter in a democracy does not vote to dispossess the rich and powerful.
The answer offered is that the voter sees the rich as having come out of a
transparent market and their wealth as owing to they being better managers; if
(sometimes) the property rights of the rich do not get widespread support in
emerging markets it is because they are seen as having acquired their wealth
dishonestly.
The overall effectiveness of the four pillars in India rests on India being a
democracy Rajan affirms that India took to democracy as a ‘duck takes to water’ and
compares the country to others where democracy has not been as successful. But
here is what he says about the meaning of democracy: “A vibrant, accountable
democracy does not only imply that people cast their vote freely every five years. It
requires the full mix of a raucous investigative press, public debate uninhibited by
political correctness, many political parties representing varied constituencies, and a
variety of non-governmental organisations organising and representing interests.”
Since so much of Rajan’s argument depends on India being a true democracy, the
question to be put here is this: while all people have votes and there is an unfettered
press, is there public debate in India in which representatives of all classes
participate? Where there is lack of a free debate, the tendency is to look at the state
and blame it for inhibiting debate. But India is different; the level playing field
implied by ‘public debate’ is inhibited by the ancient social structures corresponding
to hierarchy. Only a small educated class participates in public debates, even as it
pretends to represent ‘opinion’.
Once doubt is admitted over India being a true democracy in which public debate
happens we find many of Rajan’s other suppositions collapsing as well. Since ‘rule of
law’ is equated with dharma and dharma is itself a relativistic system in which
right/wrong are related in some way to vocation/birth it may not be compatible with
a truly democratic system in which all people are equal before the law. (‘All people
are equal before God’, on the other hand, translates very well into democratic
values.)
Further, Rajan relies on Fukuyama and offers this argument: “The caste system led to
division of labour, which ensured that entire populations could never be devoted
totally to the war effort. So through much of history, war was never as harsh, or
military competition between states as fierce, as in China. As a result, the historical
pressure for Indian states to develop strong governments that intruded into every
facet of society was muted. At the same time, however, the codes of just behaviour
for rulers emanating from ancient Indian scriptures served to constrain any arbitrary
exercise of power by Indian rulers. India, therefore, had weaker government,
constrained further by rule of law.”
This may be true but ‘rule of law’ that functions well in hierarchical society may be
incompatible with democratic values. If this argument is extended, the growing
weakness of the state in the past few decades could be attributed to the ‘small
pressure upon the Indian state to intrude into every facet of society.’
The more one reads Rajan the more does one feel that his political diagnosis does
not take India’s specificities into account. Even his explanation for why voters do not
dispossess the rich and powerful seems out of place. It could simply be that dharma
or ‘rule of law’ in India promotes a tendency not to intrude. Dharma appeals more to
inner conviction than to external manifestations, which might have led to more
‘intrusions’.
Raghuram Rajan as governor of RBI followed a path not very different from that of
his predecessors but one still wonders if someone with his kind of credentials (and
association with an international agency like the IMF) is the right choice to head
India’s central bank since it is imperative that India’s financial autonomy should not
be compromised. Rajan had earlier authored a paper arguing that failed states
should invite outsiders/foreigners who have been holding positions in multilateral
agencies (UN, IMF, aid agencies etc.) to rule, indicating that the autonomy of a
nation is less central to him than its management.
Whatever the truth in the matter, someone like Rajan with an academic background
in the West but with a small understanding of India would tend to advocate
‘universalist’ economic principles without taking local issues into account. As an
instance, he (like Montek Singh Ahluwalia, also formerly of the IMF) advocates cash
transfers instead of strengthening public services. Rajan dismisses the refrain that
the poor will drink away the money transferred into their accounts and argues that
they could build capabilities through education and healthcare. ‘Drink’ could be an
overestimated bogey but one wonders if a study has been made to ascertain if the
poor are not paying for unnecessary medical treatment or low quality private
education, with no possibility of their exploitation coming to light. The poor are
socially lower placed than doctors and teachers, which means that they may not be
able to make the demands that a middle-class consumer would. These are issues a
local might understand but perhaps not someone from Chicago or Harvard. If public
services are not delivered, the poor could go to a political representative but not if
private enterprise is the culprit.