CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
DE LEON v ESGUERRA
Facts: In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M.
De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel
S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor
was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated
December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al.,
as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
Esguerra no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace
petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended
on February 25, 1987.
HELD: NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one
year deadline under the Provisional Constitution, the same must be
deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading:
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.”
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
By that date, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent
OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8, 1987 by the
respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and
effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of
the votes thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what
was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
FACTS:The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic
partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Prior to the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder,
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale may be consummated with RenongBerhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec.10, Par. 2,Art.XII, of the 1987 C is a self-executing provision.
W/N the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
W/N the submission of matching bid is premature
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
HELD:
 It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium.
 In its plain& ordinary meaning, “patrimony” = heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when
it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51%
of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
 It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules,
the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under
the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
 There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist
that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
RenongBerhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent
GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:GSIS, MHC, COP & OGCC are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MPHC to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the MHC at
P44.00 per share and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS:On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed
with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision
of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
ISSUES:
- W/N the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
- W/N Sec. 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted
by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution
- W/N the 2nd impeachment complaint is barred under Sec. 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution
HELD: This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lismota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific
limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on Nov. 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the 2nd impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on Oct. 23, 2003 is barred
under par. 5, sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
GONZALES V COMELEC
FACTS: The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously.
The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase
the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180.
The second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general
elections.
And the third, proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as
to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives
to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, became R.A. No. 4913 providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections. The
petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that
the Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention.
ISSUES:
- Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
- W/N Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?
HELD: YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to
amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making
power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention
to propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people —
as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to
make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same,
it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional
limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught,
contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of
men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is
stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite
the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC
FACTS:Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested
in running as candidates in the 1971 ConCon, filed separate petitions
for declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality of RA 6132,
claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2
which called for the Constitutional Convention to propose
Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution,
restating entirely the provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that “xxx
any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx”
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
4914.
ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132
to implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
Assembly?
HELD: YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a
Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power
to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does
not exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its
comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly)
may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of
the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and
compensation of its member.
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. 6132 are as follows:
1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV
of the Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional amendments
or call a convention for the purpose by 3⁄4 votes of each house in joint
session assembled but voting separately.
2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective
exercise of the principal power by necessary implication.3.
Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only
as a Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and4. Congress as a
legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to
fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: A ConCon was called upon to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, RA 6132. The Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1, amending Sec. 1, Art. 5 of theConsti so as
to lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Sec. 3
that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification
for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 ConCon
on other portions of the amended Sec. or on other portions of the entire
Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the
other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in
contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the
said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of
the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
ISSUE: Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention constitutional?
HELD: NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith are null and
void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned
plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of
the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV
that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification
of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not
denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention.
Presiding already from the fact that under Sec. 3 of the questioned
resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the
voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be
required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are
other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on
the proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the
fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be
minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of
foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at
all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to
provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it
may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies
in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and
aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently
determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which
presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper
submission.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
FACTS: President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(“Barangay”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers.
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the
provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting and
canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-
plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring
therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be
submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his
(President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a
plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction,
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting said
Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise
the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution,
hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to
propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National
Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan
arguing that:
1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution,2. A referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period
of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, 4. To lift martial
law, the President need not consult the people via referendum, and
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC,
maintains that:
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of
the court3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power4. The
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUES:
1. Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
2. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential
Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial?
3. Does the President possess the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the
ratification of his proposal, in the absence of an interim
National Assembly?
4. Is the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments within the time frame allowed therefore a
sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose of executing
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
2. It is a judicial question.
3. YES.
If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the function of that assembly to propose amendments
to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This is not to say that the President has converted
his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation,
the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President
to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from
that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are
mere agents of the people.
4. YES.
Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that “it shall be held
not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment or
revision.” The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of
three weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. The issues are not new. They are the
issues of the day, and the people have been living withthem since the
proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding,
the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in
previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with
other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution.
On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or
the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least(3%) of its
registered voters. The LG also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The LG's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Leg. Dept.) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Exec. Dept.) and by adding Art. XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The LG
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should
submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters'
ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the LG filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative.
HELD: NO. The court declared that LG's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Consti.that the initiative must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one
of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the LG invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x xx as
signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.
The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not
as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who
can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes
before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of
the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in
the LG's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets
had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is
first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.