Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v.

SOLE and Triumph

International (Phils), Inc.
G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010

Facts:
The Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International (union) and Triumph
International (Phils.), Inc. (company) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that expired
on July 18, 1999. The union seasonably submitted proposals to the company for its
renegotiation. Among these proposals were economic demands for a wage increase of P180.00
a day, spread over three (3) years. However, the parties failed to agree on the wage and a
deadlock was reached as a result.
The Union filed a Notice of Strike before the National Council ad Mediation Board (NCMB). The
latter failed to resolve the deadlock. This was followed by the subsequent filing of the Notice of
Lockout by the company due to the alleged work slowdown. The union went on strike three
days later.
Pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and resolved the bargaining deadlock by awarding a wage increase of P48.00 distributed over
three years. The union’s other economic demands and non-economic proposals were all
denied. However, he ruled that the legality of the union officers’ dismissal properly falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Labor Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion on not deciding the
illegal dismissal issue

Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the Labor Secretary abused his discretion, when he did not
resolve the dismissal issue on the mistaken reading that this issue falls within the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter. Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an
extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may
have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that
in the meanwhile may have taken place.
In the present case, what the Labor Secretary refused to rule upon was the dismissal from
employment that resulted from the strike. Article 264 significantly dwells on this exact subject
matter by defining the circumstances when a union officer or member may be declared to have
lost his employment. This was an issue that arose from the strike and was, in fact, submitted to
the Labor Secretary, through the union’s motion for the issuance of an order for immediate
reinstatement of the dismissed officers and the company’s opposition to the motion. Thus, the
dismissal issue was properly brought before the Labor Secretary and this development in fact
gave rise to his mistaken ruling that the matter is legally within the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter to decide.