480 ple, rely heavily on standard treatments of Bishop John Hughes and the Public School Society in New York to set the stage for the development of Catholic schooling, although it is not clear that the situation in New York wasa paradigm of nationa! developments. The use of second- ary sources also causes other problems, as in Neufeldt’s misdating of the 1869 Cincinnati “Bible War” and Sullivan's emphasis on the 1876 decree of the Con- gregation of the Inquisition promoting Catholic schoo! development in America without any mention of the “Fourteen Propositions” of Archbishop Satolli, the papal legate to the United States, which in 1892 recommended cooperation with the public schools in the hope of coopting them. Primary sources indicate a more complex pattern of relationships between religion and schooling, but one which is probably more reflective of the situations which actually occurred, Undocumented assertions seriously flaw Seymour Itzkoll’s essay on religious pluralism and publiceducation. Without reference to sources, the author asserts that the question of public funding for denominational schooling was settled by the 1840s, which does not square with the documentable struggle of Catholics fora share of public monies ia cities such as Cincinnati until almost the turn of the cen- tury. Likewise, it is questionable wheth- er liberal secularism, as the author asserts, or a resurgence of nativism, as is held by other historians, was responsible for the political climate which resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Pierce vs. the Soci- ety of Sisters. Finally, thestatement that the fundamentalist founders of the new Christian schools, whom Itzkoff calls “the new schismatics,”.are motivated by their “hatred of established social and moral life” is both undocumentable and lack- ing in scholarly objectivity. Such poten- tially explosive topics as the relation of religion and American education demand dispassionate scholarship firmly ground- ed in serious research, rather than emo- tionally charged rhetoric. In spite of such flaws, the study has much to command it. A number of the essaysare both informational and thought BOOKS {Vol. 12 pone While the Ground covered is oad, the very breadth is an advantage tothe reader interested in the question of retigion and morality in American edu- cation and searching for a place to begin his or her own reflection. Given the prom- inence of the question in recent months, and the likelihood that the debate will con- tinue well into the future, this collection of essays is one whick both teachers and administrators might read profitably in their search to develop personal and insti- ‘tutional strategies for the teaching of reli- gion and ethics. —F. Michael Perko, S.J., Assistant Professor of Foundations, Loyola Uni- versity Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Essays on Mor- al Development, Vol. 1. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1981. Pp. ix. 441, $21.95. R.S. Peters published an article in the June 1975 issue of Phi Delta Kappanenti- tled “Why Doesn’t Lawrence Kohlberg, Do His Homework?” In this essay Peters insists that Kohlberg has not answered his critics, that he keeps his prolific pen working but fails to revise his theory, even in the face of much thoughtful criticism. This lack of revision is again evident in The Philosophy of Moral Development. In fact, all of the essays in the book have been previously published, and there is noattempt on Kohlberg’s part torespond to issues raised by his academic peers. For instance, the now-famous “Is to Ought” essay is reprinted basically in its original form, even after Peters, William Alston, and others have called attention to specific flaws in KohIberg’s treatment of the nat- uralistic fallacy. Likewise, what T. S. Eliot once remarked about Dante, that he could nev- er be accused of having an original idea in his head, equally applies to Kohlberg. Kohibergis quite gifted at “giving the his- tory of psychology in fifteen minutes,” as he once attempted in a lecture, but that history, which is the basis of his philoso-1981-82] phy/psychology of moral development, ee bedfellows. Kohlberg bor- rows much of his methodology and his cognitive moral/psychological position from Piaget His version of moral philos- ophy is straight from the work of Kant and John Rawls. His philosophical anthropology is derived from John Dew- ey and George Herbert Mead. And, last- ly, Kohlberg throws in a bit of the Socratic/Platonic tradition. How Dew- ey’s philosophical anthropology, the importance of human interaction in growth, can be squared with the Platonic emphasis ona rather static, yet transcen- dent, notion of human development is beyond me. Also, Kantand Rawlsaresim- ilar, yet different. Kohlberg notes the sim- ilarity, but not the difference. For exam- ple, Rawls’ principle of justice, at least one version of it, isquite utilitarian, a posi- tion Kant would not have been comfort- able with. “Realisticeclecticism,” as Clive Beck refers to it, is one thing, Kohlberg’s potpourri is another. Let us, then, take a brief look at Kohl- berg’s philosophical formalism and his justification for the esteem he gives to the principleof justice. Kohlberg claims that moral judgments are universal in two sens- es: 1) that cach stage of moral develop- ment follows an invariant sequence, and 2) that accompanying each stage are the same moral variables, obligation and duty, for instance. Kohlberg believes that as one develops to a so-called “higher” stage of moral development, one develops to a “better” stage. There is no logical reason why “higher” implies “better.” What is “better” is a matter of preference on Kohl- berg’s part. Kohlberg’s position on this matter is not entirely consistent. He assumes that moral judgments are “better” in a con- tent-bound manner—“better,” accord- ing to Kohlberg, is synonymous with more just. Thus, moral judgment is not totally distinguished by the formal characteris- tics of universality and prescriptiveness as Kohlberg contends. Also, these char- acteristics do not even separate moral judgments from other judgments, aesthet- ic ones, for example. Likewise Kohlberg’s view of justice has EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 481 three aspects. 1) Justice is viewed as the fundamental disposition to be developed. 2) Justice is synonymous with the belief that all individuals have equal human worth. 3) Justice ought to lead to the bet- terment of man’s welfare. What Kohl- berg needs to make clear is the connec- tion between justice and other moral dispositions, such as freedom, for instance. Hescems to be merely assuming that jus- tice is the prime moral disposition to be cultivated, and since there are compet- ing moral theories to Kohlbere’s posi- tion, he needs to indicate more jus- tification for his moral program. Kohlberg’s conception of justice is sus- ceptible tosimilar criticisms as the Kant- ian view of morality, for neither view indi- cates ways to resoive conflicting moral dilemmas. If a scientist signs a contract which includes the publishing of his work, his moral obligation is to publish it. according to one version of Kantian morality. But if he discovers that his experiments may be used ina destructive manner, he has a moral obligation not to publish them. Kantian moral principles show no way of resolving this conflict. Likewise with Kohlberg’s principle of jus- tice. Consider the case of the wife whose mother has suffered a severe stroke and is permanently paralyzed. Does the prin- ciple of justice indicate that she take care of her mother? If her husband declines to come to his mother-in-law’s aid, what does the principle of justice entail? Which per- son has priority, the mother or the hus- band? Kohiberg’s principle of justice is too broad to be of sufficient help. Thereare, of course, many: other prob- lems with Kohlberg’s philosophy of mor: al development. What follows, though, will be a constructive attempt to suggest that Kohlberg’s philosophical/ psychological contentions are important if Kohlberg is willing to “clear the ground” a bit regarding his position. 1) Kohiberg needs to recognize that his seven stages of moral growth, the last stage being specifically religious, are clo- ser to moral “trends” than to specific cog- nitive/moral structures. There is some empirical research which indicates the validity of the “trend” perspective. pecti 2) Kohlberg needs to abandon his con-482 tention of the icreversbility of human ugh thesiages. Itis only log- ical that different individuals are at dil- ferent moral stages regarding various moral dilemmas. The person who steals a towel while attending a business con- vention is tot sectasidyatthe firststage nent. of moral lopment '3) The Harvard psychologist also needs tq admit the efficacy of other moral sys- tems and other versions of the principle Of justice in certain circumstances. For instance, utilitarianism is quite an appro- priate ‘basis for the establishment of affirmative action programs. ' 4) Kohlberg also must realize that there isa “relative” hierarchy of moral princi- ples, nota. “universal” moral principle whichis.the basis of his philosophy of mor- al development. Freedom, justice and juality, for example, are three such com- ing moral principles. They interrelate ta one another, yet-a society needs to decide. which principle to emphasize. It isevident that equality and not justice has ‘been emphasized in recent years. 5) Lastly, Kohlberg must admit that morality is nat merely cognitive process. This insight does not necessarily lead to theindoctrination, complete relativism or irrationality Kohlberg suggests. Existen- tialisnvand formalism are not the only two alternatives. “Moral choice™ is not syn- onymous with the development of “mor- al judgment.” Choosing implies a normative structure. Kohlberg’s theory would have had:more appeal if he had done his homewatk. —Robert Craig, Philosophy Dept., Towa State University Michael. Matthews. The Marxist The- ory of Schooling: A Study of Episte- mology and Education. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc., 1980. Pp. x, 214. $30.00. Observe the cat. Some people claim to beableto predict the configuration of the tail simply by observing its ears and eyes. For instance, narrow eyes plus laid back ears indicate an erect tail with tip point- BOOKS [Vol. :2 ing forward. And so it goes—the pri- mary sense organs influencing the shape of the tail. This example is analogous to Matthews’ main argument that by observ- ing the economic mode of production we canaccurately anticipate the shape of the schooling in a particular society. Early in the work we are introduced to Piato, Hume, Galileo, and other nota- bles whocontributed in one way or anoth- er to theories of knowledge formation. Insofar as modern educators debate what we know and. how we'come to know it, they are more orless covering ground pre~ viously trod by pre-modern thinkers. Even though Matthews eventually assumes a Marxist position, he carefully points out that every school of epistemological thought contributes.something to the problem. In the end, however, the author emphatically rejects empiricist epistemol- see ‘in favor of historical materialism. ris Outcome ultimately derives from the central theme of the book, i.e., the para- snount importance of using scientific prac- tices and principles when tackling epis- temodlogical questions. Matthews pats forth Imre Lakatos’ ten iheses as the touchstones for testing the fruth of rival beliefs. These theses include such titles as ‘no belief isan island”, “ex- amine the track-record”, “three is not a crowd”, and “truth is at a discount” {chapter 5). Thus, the method of inquiry utilized in the physical sciences can be of greai benefit when applied to issues in the socialsciences and education, mainly because these methods attempt to get behind the iffusions to discover the reali- ty. And so, coincidentally, does:the his- torical materialism developed: by Marx. ‘Whereas the empiricist states that the world is exactly as it seems to be, the mate- rialist cautions against believing first imipressions, Hence, we begin to search forthe underlying reasons behind a thing, usually by examining its history and the events surrounding its production. To illustrate this point in the area of cduca- tion Matthews cites the growth of IQ test- ing. Ostensibly a scientific way-of mea- suring individual intelligence, this “racket” is actually a scheme to “further the process of ruling-class contre! andCopyright © 2002 EBSCO Publishing