PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MALIMIT

November 14, 1996

Facts:
Respondent was charged and subsequently convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide. In this case, respondent was identified by witnesses to have been the person who
entered the store of the victim, killed the victim, and took his wallet. Respondent filed an appeal
stating that the court erred in holding the wallet as admissible evidence as it was obtained in
violation of his rights. The wallet was found when, while under custodial investigation,
respondent pointed to its location to the police. The accused states he was not informed of his
right against self-incrimination.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s right against self-incrimination was violated

Ruling:
No. The right against self-incrimination is not applicable in this case. In Holt vs. United
States, it is stated that the right against self-incrimination is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him. It is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the accused's own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not
apply to physical evidence
 PEOPLE V. RONDERO

FACTS:
The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied
hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in
her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several
circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison
with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as
blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the
acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his
counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination
under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can
be admitted as evidence against him?

HELD:
Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from
the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness
and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in
their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
 MARCELO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of
mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an
emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus
operandi of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post
Office.

On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents
in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of
Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo
Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry
Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Esquerra Building is
located between Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel
to each other. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete,
and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag.
Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and
Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra
Building. The two are separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the
mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito
Marcelo.

The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a
travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile, the
NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car
and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail
bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two
accused.Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal
delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery
jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.

The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also
brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail
found in their possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati
Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they
were not able to find him there.

The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the
addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their
letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some letters
contained money.

Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the
letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative
Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin,
they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters
confiscated from them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letters are inadmissible as evidence.

HELD: No. The Suprem Court held that the letters remain admissible as evidence. They were
validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that
petitioner’s admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion
on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence
of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly
seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of
petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and
Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the
signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and
other prosecution witnesses.
 BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring
the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave
and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present
petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Issue:

Whether or not Right to self-incrimination can be availed before the Blue Ribbon Committee

Ruling:

No. The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal
their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They
know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case
of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the
outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to
incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before
the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
 PEOPLE VS. GALLARDE
G.R. No. 133025 February 17, 2000

Facts:

In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchera,Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco,
Renato, Edwin,all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen,
Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan.

The searchers found Gallarde squattingwith his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from
Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil.

On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. During
the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial conference.
On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision
convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because
of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for
reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

Ruling:

No. We cannot agree with the trial courts rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of
GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while
[GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even
without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence
of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against
himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to
expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
 COMELEC vs HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE
G.R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60 February 17, 2003
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista and then incumbent Mayor Atty. Frederico
Poblete were the candidates who ran for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite.
On July 8, 1998, Bautista filed with the COMELEC a complaint against Poblete and others for violating
Section 261(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code(OEB) for vote buying, this was supported by
affidavits of 44 witnesses attesting to the said activity. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Thereafter, a complaint was filed with the Prosecutor's Office
as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate
Informations against said witnesses for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the OEB.

On appeal, COMELEC en banc declared that the said witnesses were exempted from criminal
prosecution in accordance to Section 28(4) of R.A. 6646 otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987 which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give information
and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the
COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite
denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are granted immunity from criminal prosecution persons who
voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling.

RULING:

YES. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting
those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was
bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and
denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the
latter.

However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the
latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn "vote-sellers" who denounce the vote-buying that they
could be liable for perjury or false-testimony should they not tell the truth.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may
otherwise be provided by law. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their
respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This
authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime.
 
 JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

FACTS:
Complainants, Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido, alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo(live-in
partner of Absin and son of Charito) was picked up by several police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
Thereafter, an errand boy gave a number to the complainants to which when they called said number
instructed them to go to Gorordo Police Station where they met a person named James who wanted Php
100,000(which was lowered to 40,000) in return for the release of Ariel.

Subsequently, the complainants went to the NBI wherein the NBI formed an entrapment
operation. Through such operation, the officers were able to get Jaime Dela Cruz through the use of mark-
money. Dela Cruz was then brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI wherein he was required to
submit his urine sample for a drug test which resulted positive.

According to Dela Cruz, in his testimony, he refused the drug test and requested his lawyer to be
present but such request from him was denied by the NBI. RTC ruled Dela Cruz guilty of violation
Section 15 of R.A. 9165 The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 as all the elements were
present that the accused was arrested, second, the accused was subjected to drug test, and lastly,
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
RTC, citing that extracting urine from one's body is merely a mechanical act which falls outside the
concept of custodial investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the drug test that was conducted on the petitioner was legal.

RULING:

NO. The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for
any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15
comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. To
make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in
the alleged act of extortion.
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to
all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.