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Journal of The Experimental Analysis of Behavior Number July
Journal of The Experimental Analysis of Behavior Number July
Journal of The Experimental Analysis of Behavior Number July
IS THE MIND IN THE BRAIN? A REVIEW OF: OUT OF OUR HEADS: WHY YOU ARE NOT
YOUR BRAIN, AND OTHER LESSONS FROM THE BIOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
BY ALVA NOË (2009)
HOWARD RACHLIN
STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY
Key words: behaviorism, brain, consciousness, enacted mind, extended cognition, internal
representation, mind, teleological behaviorism, thinking
Noë’s book is part of a movement in the The deepest and most complex reason for behav-
iorism’s decline in influence is its commitment to
philosophy of mind called enacted mind, or the thesis that behavior can be explained without
extended cognition. He argues that the mind is reference to non-behavioral mental (cognitive,
not the brain or part of the brain. He believes representational, or interpretative) activity. Behavior
that the mind cannot be understood except in can be explained just by reference to its ‘‘functional’’
terms of the interaction of a whole organism (Skinner’s term) relation to or co-variation with the
environment and to the animal’s history of environ-
with the external environment, especially the mental interaction. . . .
social environment. This view bears many
resemblances to behaviorism, especially with Unfortunately, for behaviorism, it’s hard to imagine
regard to what the mind is not. Nevertheless, a more restrictive rule for psychology than one
Noë is vague about what he believes the mind which prohibits hypotheses about representational
storage and processing.
is. He speaks of the world as ‘‘showing up’’ and
of our knowledge of our own minds as
differing from our knowledge of the minds Such a self-imposed constraint on behavior-
of others, but he does not say exactly where al thinking, Graham believes, must be inade-
this showing up takes place and what the quate to explain most of what is interesting
and important about human behavior – that is,
difference between our knowledge of our own
the mind. He suggests that a path toward
minds and the minds of others consists of. For
behaviorism’s revival would be to incorporate
him, the brain, as the mechanism underlying
neuroeconomics:
behavior, remains an important component of
mental activity; for him, brain, behavior, and Behaviorism may do well to purchase some of
world together constitute consciousness. I neuroeconomic’s conceptual currency, especially
argue that this way of looking at consciousness since some advocates of the program see themselves
retains elements of the Cartesian philosophy as behaviorists in spirit if not stereotypical let-
ter. . ..One assumption in neuroeconomics is that
that Noë wants to reject and would deflect the full explanations of organism/environmental inter-
attention of psychologists from the true causes actions will combine facts about such things as
of behavior in temporal and social histories of reinforcement schedules with appeal to neurocom-
reinforcement. putational modeling and to the neurochemistry and
Many if not most modern philosophers in neurobiology of reinforcement.
the U.S. and Great Britain believe that
behaviorism, as a philosophy, is dead. Accord- This is a purchase that many modern
ing to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy behaviorists seem to feel is worth making – as
(Graham, 2010): witness the presence of an editor for behav-
ioral neuroscience on the board of this
This research was supported by grant DA02652021
journal, the flagship for behavioral research.
from the National Institute of Drug Abuse. The content The book under review, by a philosopher of
is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not mind, part of a modern movement in philos-
necessarily represent the official views of the National ophy called enacted mind, extended cognition, or
Institutes of Health. embodied mind, may be seen by behaviorists as
Address correspondence to Howard Rachlin, Psychol-
ogy Department, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, offering a rationale for the postulation of
NY 11794-2500 (e-mail: howard.rachlin@sunysb.edu). events in the brain (‘‘neuroeconomics’’) as
doi: 10.1901/jeab.2012.98-131 part of the triumvirate: ‘‘. . .brain, body, and
131
132 HOWARD RACHLIN
world,’’ which ‘‘together maintain living con- world around us. The subject of experience is not a
sciousness.’’ (p. 42). However, it is necessary to bit of your body. You are not your brain. (p. 7)
recognize that, unlike behaviorists, Noë is not
primarily interested in explaining behavior— This sounds a lot like behaviorism. The
he is interested in explaining mental events, quotes could have come from Skinner. How-
particularly consciousness. Once conscious- ever, the word behaviorism and the word Skinner
ness is understood, he believes, the mind will appear nowhere in the book. This absence is a
be understood. He says, ‘‘The problem of pity given the many strains of behavioral
consciousness, as I am thinking of it here, is thought in the book, but understandable
that of understanding our nature as human considering the suspicion and downright
beings who think, who feel, and for whom a hostility to behaviorism among philosophers.
world shows up’’ (p. 9, italics added). Thought Although the main thrust of the book is
and feeling, and presumably sensation, per- towards behavior, especially social behavior,
ception, imagination, are conceived as parts of consciousness is not, for Noë, a purely
consciousness. behavioral concept. Like Graham (2010),
Dissatisfaction with neural representations Noë implies that a science of consciousness
as explanations of mental events, as well as the as behavior cannot stand as such, that such a
divorce of the mind (in such identity theories) science would be incomplete without under-
from its biological function, has led Noë to standing what it means for a world to ‘‘show
expand his concept of the mind outward from up’’ for a person.
the brain to overt behavior, including social Noë rejects ‘‘neural identity theory,’’ the
behavior. Thus, like many modern behavior- identification of consciousness with neural
ists, Noë is interested in both the interior events—either particular neural firings
(neuroeconomics) and the exterior (overt (Churchland, 1986) or complex mechanisms
behavior) of the organism. But, unlike mod- extending across several brain areas (Tononi &
ern behaviorists, his object is to develop a Edelman, 1998). But he also rejects, at least
philosophy of mind and not to predict, implicitly, what might be called, behavioral
control, or explain overt behavior as such. As identity theory—the identification of conscious-
we shall see, this difference is crucial. ness with patterns of overt individual and
Noë’s central idea is that consciousness is social behavior.
primarily something that occurs not in the The general theme that consciousness is
head but in the world. Here are some quotes: both behavior of the whole organism and
behavior of part of the organism is repeated
After decades of concerted effort on the part of throughout the book:
neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers,
only one proposition about how the brain makes My central claim in this book is that to understand
us conscious—how it gives rise to sensation, feeling, consciousness—the fact that we think and feel and
subjectivity—has emerged unchallenged: we don’t that a world shows up for us—we need to look at a
have a clue. (p. xi). larger system of which the brain is only one element.
Consciousness is not something the brain achieves
Consciousness is not something that happens inside on its own. Consciousness requires the joint
us. It is something we do or make. Better: it is operation of brain, body, and world. Indeed,
something we achieve. Consciousness is more like consciousness is an achievement of the whole
dancing than it is like digestion. . .. The idea that the animal in its environmental context. (p. 10, italics
only genuinely scientific study of consciousness added).
would be one that identifies consciousness with
events in the nervous system is a bit of outdated One of the central claims of this book is that. . .we
reductionism. (p. xii, italics added). ought to focus not on the brain alone but on the
brain in context—that is, on the brain in the natural
In this book I argue that mind science, like biology setting of the person or animal. (p. 70).
more generally, must give pride of place to the
whole living being. (p. xv). Brain, body, and world—each plays a critical role in
making us the kind of beings we are. (p. 184)
. . .to understand consciousness in humans and
animals, we must look not inward, into the recesses
of our insides; rather, we need to look to the ways in
You could as well say that consciousness
which each of us, as a whole animal, carries on the requires the joint operation of heart, body and
process of living in and with and in response to the world, or hand, body and world, or digestive
REVIEW OF OUT OF OUR HEADS 133
system, body and world. The body, as Noë terns and the outer environment. If the
himself emphasizes, includes the brain. Then criterion for a physical activity being a con-
why is the brain taken out, so to speak, and scious activity is closeness to its causal source,
given a causal role alongside of and in it would be the outer environment rather than
addition to the body? Certainly brain damage the brain that satisfies that criterion, and
can produce profound effects on behavior, which is therefore most usefully considered
including effects on the features Noë attri- to be the locus of consciousness as well as all
butes to consciousness. The brain is a vital mental events.
organ. But so are the heart, liver, lungs, and The typical philosophical defense of con-
digestive system; damage to any of them also sciousness as an internal activity is introspec-
produces profound effects on behavior. No tive —we just know it to be the case. Noë is not
one can deny that the brain is a vital immune to such claims. ‘‘Mere behavior,’’ he
mechanism or claim that its study is not of says (p. 26) ‘‘is at best an unreliable guide to
crucial importance to society, of greater how things are for a person.’’ ‘‘How things
importance probably than the study of overt are,’’ like ‘‘showing up,’’ is undefined by Noë.
behavior. In some (I think rare) cases brain ‘‘How things are’’ and ‘‘showing up,’’ the
research may suggest directions for behavioral ultimate differentia, for Noë, between my
research (although the opposite is much more knowledge of my own mind and my knowledge
frequently the case). However, as brain re- of yours, are based on introspective reports.
search progresses we are moving not one inch But, as Skinner (1957) and Wittgenstein
toward the understanding of consciousness (1958), a philosopher Noë clearly admires,
and not one inch toward the development of a have argued, introspective reports are not
‘‘science of mental life,’’ in George Miller’s actually reports of anything at all. We do not
(1962) words. On the other hand, behaviorists, go around reporting on our internal states
especially as they study self-control and social
(saying, ‘‘I am happy,’’ for instance) for no
cooperation (patterns of behavior extended
reason, any more than we go around reporting
over time and social space), are developing a
about the external world (saying,‘‘The grass is
science of mental life.
green’’) for no reason. Both kinds of ‘‘reports’’
Some modern neuroscientists and philoso-
presume a listener and a situation of social
phers of mind (for example, Searle, 1997)
claim that brain activity is not actually identical interaction and mutual reinforcement. When
to mental activity but rather ‘‘causes’’ or ‘‘gives we say, ‘‘I am happy,’’ we are predicting some
rise to’’ mental activity. They believe that aspect of our behavior in the immediate
consciousness and neural activity are more or future. And the evidence for this assertion,
less abstract levels of description of the same for the person doing the reporting, is no
thing, just as the molecular structure of an I- different in principle than it is for the listener.
beam and its tensile strength are different If the introspector’s history of reinforcement
levels of description of the I-beam. Conscious- (‘‘mere behavior’’) were known to the listener
ness for them is merely an abstract way of as well as it is known to the introspector, the
describing activity in the brain. But if mental listener would know better than the introspec-
(or conscious) activity is an abstract descrip- tor, more directly and fundamentally than the
tion of neural activity (physical activity, after introspector, what the state of the introspec-
all) why is it any more plausible that the tor’s mind was. A child may say ‘‘I am happy.’’
physical activity occurs inside the head than But a mother may say, ‘‘No you’re not,’’ with
that it occurs in overt behavior? Voluntary perfect validity. I may honestly say, ‘‘I am
behavior is most clearly and distinctly (to use happy’’ and my wife of 50 years may say, ‘‘No
Descartes’ criteria) caused by its consequences you’re not,’’ also with perfect validity. Intro-
in the temporal and social environment. Even spection is not a royal road to our own minds.
the most complex temporally and socially More than a hundred years of study of such
extended patterns of overt behavior evolve reports, beginning with Wundt, have told us as
over a person’s lifetime just as complex little about consciousness as has the study of
structures such as the eye evolve over genera- the brain. The road from ‘‘mere’’ behavior to
tions; the selection process rests in the our own consciousness lies in the temporal
feedback contingencies between those pat- and social contexts of our own overt behav-
134 HOWARD RACHLIN
ior—contexts that are in principle as available ed in the waltz itself (if you were a choreog-
to others as they are to us. rapher for instance) it would be foolish to do
Noë correctly criticizes the notion that so. Noë makes this perfectly clear over and
consciousness must occur wholly in the brain over again. The very title of the book implies
as a remnant of Cartesian psychology in that when a dance ‘‘shows up’’ it shows up in
modern philosophy. Nevertheless, Noë be- the overt behavior of the dancers, not inside
lieves that a world somehow ‘‘shows up’’ in their heads, and still less anywhere else inside
consciousness. In Descartes’ dualistic theory, a their bodies.
rose would show up in consciousness (the To take another example, a baseball game
innate idea of a rose would wake up, as it were) normally consists of 18 people hitting, pitch-
as a consequence of a real rose acting on the ing, fielding, running bases, etc. A baseball
sense organs and the information being game shows up on the field where it is played
transmitted through the pineal gland in the and nowhere else. Moreover, each of the
brain to the incorporeal soul. In modern players is playing the game from the first pitch
neurocognitive theories, which Noë traces to the last even while she is standing stock still
back to their origin in Descartes, ‘‘showing in the outfield, even while she is sitting on the
up’’ could be taken as the formation of an bench while a teammate bats. On another
internal representation. But Noë skillfully and field in England a game of cricket may be
persuasively argues against the usefulness of showing up at the same time. Another player
the concept of internal representations. Out of may be standing stock still in that outfield in
Our Heads never clarifies what it means for a the exact same stance as the baseball player
world to ‘‘show up.’’ here in the US. Yet, even though they are
Let us therefore consider for ourselves what doing the exact same thing, even though their
‘‘showing up’’ could possibly mean. Since Noë behavior at the moment is exactly the same,
rejects Cartesian dualism, ‘‘showing up’’ does the games they are playing are obviously
not seem to mean showing up in a nonphys- different. What counts for the game that
ical, spiritual consciousness. Since Noë also shows up is not what any one player is doing
rejects neural identity theory, ‘‘showing up’’ at this very moment but what she is doing in its
could not mean showing up wholly within the temporal and social contexts. If the question
nervous system. Noë says that consciousness is you are asking is what shows up, where does it
like a dance (rather than like digestion). We show up and when does it show up, the
may ask then, when and where does a dance context is more important than the individual
show up? When does a square dance or a waltz act.
show up? A waltz shows up when music in However, whereas dances, baseball games,
three-quarter time is being played and people and even the movements of clock hands are
are moving together in a certain way. The like consciousness in certain ways, they are not
concept of a dance has fuzzy edges but it is conscious acts. Noë’s point, in contrasting
usually easy to discriminate between situations dancing to digestion, is that a dance (like
where a waltz has shown up and situations consciousness) is behavior of our whole bodies
where it hasn’t. The place where a waltz shows in the context of their external temporal and
up is on the dance floor. The dance does not social environments rather than behavior of
exist in any identifiable form inside the heads something within our bodies in the context of
of the dancers—not in their brains, and not in other internal events. A dance is clearly a
their peripheral nervous systems. To imagine behavioral pattern. According to Noë, con-
that a dance shows up anywhere inside the sciousness is like dancing in the sense that both
dancers is like imagining that the time shows are behavior of our whole bodies. Then what is
up inside a clock. Certainly there is a the difference between dancing and conscious-
mechanism inside the dancers (or the clock), ness that makes one ‘‘merely’’ a behavioral
and they could not be dancing (or indicating pattern and the other a mental event? This is
the time) unless the mechanism was in what Noë never makes clear. The difference
working order. Moreover, by exploring the cannot be that consciousness is internal
innards of the dancers, a future brain scientist whereas dancing is external because their
might conceivably be able to infer that they common externality is precisely the sense in
were waltzing. But if you were mainly interest- which Noë claims they are alike. The differ-
REVIEW OF OUT OF OUR HEADS 135
ence cannot be that consciousness could not pictures to herself before, during and after
occur without a complex neural mechanism the game?1
because dancing also could not occur without 5. The overt behavioral pattern that contains
a complex neural mechanism. Then what is it? her answer—her making an appointment
Suppose you were passing by a ballfield to play, her preparations beforehand, the
where a baseball game was occurring (was character of her actions on the field, what
showing up) and you called to a player in the she says to others about the game, what
outfield and asked her, ‘‘Do you know that you they say to her and her verbal and
are playing baseball?’’ That would be a stupid nonverbal behavior afterward?
question but it would not be a meaningless 6. Or is it better after all to eliminate all
one. The player might reply, ‘‘You idiot, of mental terms from our scientific vocabu-
course I know I’m playing baseball.’’ Obvious- lary?
ly, she knows that she is playing baseball at the Noë implicitly rejects #6. Let us reject #6 as
same time as she is playing it. She knew it well. I believe that it is the acceptance of #6 by
before she answered your question and after behaviorists that has led to the marginalization
she answered it. At some point before the of behaviorism within academic experimental
game she probably knew that she was going to psychology and its demonization within phi-
play baseball and after the game she will know losophy. Noë explicitly rejects #1, #2, and #3.
that she was playing baseball. Her knowledge He does not consider #4, a concept of mind
shows up not only in her answer to your accepted by many behaviorists. I believe that
question, but also in her behavior prior to the the area between #3 and #5, covert muscular
game, and her behavior after the game, movement, is much too narrow to contain all
perhaps long after. The game that shows up of our mental lives. It has all the disadvantages
on the field is an abstract concept—the same of #3 without any of the complexity that, it
for players and spectators. When they talk would seem, a theory of mind would require.
about the game afterwards they are all talking But this is not the place to argue the point.
about the same thing. (Similarly, a dance, even (See Rachlin, 2012, especially ‘‘Response to
a solo dance is the same dance for the dancer Schlinger’’ for such an argument).
as it is for the spectators.) However, the Noë seems to reject #5. Of the six alterna-
knowledge of the game is different for the tives I list, only #5 implies that, in principle,
pitcher, the outfielder, and the spectator. First, the outfielder has no better access to her own
the behavior that constitutes the knowledge is mind than does a hypothetical observer, close
different for each of them; second, the to her, who could observe all of her actions. In
behavior that constitutes that knowledge starts fact, #5 implies that an observer may know the
in advance of the actual game and ends long outfielder’s mental state better than she
after it is over. herself does since the observer’s view is more
The outfielder’s answer to your question is objective and comprehensive than hers. Noë
not by itself her knowledge. As Noë might say, does assert that the minds of others may be
it is mere behavior; it is knowledge only in a known to us on the basis of our interactions
certain context. The crucial question, the with them. He says (p. 32), ‘‘That my wife and
question that Noë does not clearly answer, is children and parents are thinking, feeling
what is that context? Is it: beings, that a world shows up for them—that
they are not mere automata—is something
1. An event or a series of events in a that only insanity could ever allow me to
nonphysical mind located deep within her question.’’ But there is that word, ‘‘mere’’
brain? again. What would be so ‘‘mere’’ about an
2. Neural activity in a specific area of her automaton that behaved exactly the way Noë’s
brain? wife and children behave? The extra require-
3. A more complex ‘‘field’’ of neural activity ment (that a world ‘‘show up’’ for them) seems
together with neural feedback from her 1
Note that #4 must identify mind with the unob-
actions? served movements themselves, not private perception of
4. Covert behavior: Her unobservable muscu- the movements through proprioception. Otherwise #4
lar movements and what she says and becomes identical with #2 or #3.
136 HOWARD RACHLIN