Game Theory ~Tutorial #1 verse 2 Tonight you and your lend Barbra are going to party. The bg problem i what colour should you wear? ‘Suppose that both of you can choose among blue, geen, red and yellow suits. You prefer blue to green, {a7een to red, and red to yellow, and te situation you dsve masts when Barbara wears the same colour asyou. Special, fyou choose your bue suit and Barbara wears afferent colour, then Your payot i; if you choose your green suit and Barbara ges fora different colour, then your pays 3. Silay, red ‘and yellow vel a payoff of2 and 1, respectively. Finally if Barbara happens to choose the same colour as ‘you~something you want to avoid then your payoff eo, ‘Sarbara prefers eto yellow, yellow to blue, and blue to green. Moreover, he aio des wearing the same colour as you. The payoffs forthe game are summarised in thetabe below. 8. What are your pure and mised strategy sets? What are Barbara's? What are the2ure and med strategy spaces ofthe game? 1b. Represent the gem in mtr form, isthe game solvable by (erated) elimination of strictly dominated strategies? ‘Which pure strategies are rationalisable for you and Barbara? Choose 2 ratinaliable outcome and construct a belie hierarchy that justifies (¢ Whatis the set of Nash equiva forthe game? xereise2 Insome bird species, males canbe flthful or phlanderers and females can be coy or loo. Coy females insist on along courtzhip before copulatng, whereas lose females do ot. Faith males tolerate a lon. courtship and hel ear thel young, whereas phianderers donot wait and donot help, let ve the value of having an offspring to either a male ora female, 2r>O be the total cost of rearing an offpring and w> 0 be the cos of prolonged courtship to both males and females. The normal form matrix isshown below. Foul Male Pianderer 4. Find the Nash equibria forthe game adtinal assumptions on payots are need)exercise 3 “Tomorrow there wil bea reunion of your high school lass. The clas consisted of 30 students indexed by 2, 30. Every has exactly one favourite cassmate, namely #1, and one least prefered classmate, rarely. Student 1's least prefered classmate is 30, and student 30's favourite classmate is. -Allstudente must decide whether to attend the reunion or nt. students favourte casemate attends ‘the reunion, then ' payoff wil inreas by 3 fs least preferred classmate participates, then F's pay will decreate by 3. The presence of athe lssmates wil not affect = pay. Finally, saying at home aways elds payot of 2 |. Which pure strategies are atonaisablefor each player? What would change fone student ld not have favour classmate? Whats the set of Nash equllla forts game? (Assume that all students haveboth favourte sida lest prefered classmate) exercise 4 ‘Alce and Bob are hing over 2 contested resource. Both players can either behave hzukishly or dvs. If both choose Dove, they share the resource equally both choose Hawk, they engageln aight suffer a ost; fnaly, when a player chooses Dove and the opponent chooses Hawk, the tr keaps almost ‘everyting for him o eral. The payoff for the game are gven inthe matri. below. Bob aa] ies st awe a {Find the Nash equiva for the game an the corresponding payot vector. . Letobe the event in which Alice and Bob both play Oove i. o-{Dove,Dove). nk fashion, et ‘b-(Dove, Maw), e(Howk, Dove, and d-(Howk Hows) Suppose that there fsan ura containing 1 ball labeled o balls abled, 4 balls abled cand 1 ball labeled ¢. The composton ofthe ur common knowledge among Alice and Bob. Now considera thi party who random plks 2 ball fom the urn. The thd pati then instructed to tll Alize and 8ob the strateay that chance has chosen for them toplay, without revealing which bal was picked. Ths, Alize knows en that ether the event ain which she is told toplay Dove has occured or ee the event in which shes ol to ply Haw, Similar, Bob ‘knows onl that ether the event yin which hes told to play Dove has occuredor else the event 8 inwhich he is told to play Hawk More formal, Alice's and Bob's information partitions are ((ob\{64)) and (e400), respective, ‘how tat optimal forthe payers to follow the third part instructions Very thatthe pay pair that Ake and Bob get by playing this corelated eqllium le inthe convex lof the Nach st Find the set of cortelated equllbafr the game. What ae the soclaly optimal quia (Le. the correlated equilibria that maximise the sum of players! payots)?me