Villanova University

Inter-Provincial Water Conflicts in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis

Author(s): Adil Khan and Nazakat Awan
Source: Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter
2020), pp. 42-53
Published by: Villanova University

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.33428/jsoutasiamiddeas.43.2.0042

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 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 43, No.2, Winter 2020

Inter-Provincial Water
Conflicts in Pakistan:
A Critical Analysis
Adil Khan*
Nazakat Awan**

Introduction
Human history is predominantly a history of wars and conflicts. These
wars and conflicts were the outcome of unlimited desires of mankind to
conquer and control the natural resources. Water remained one of these
natural resources which caused a number of wars. Most of the great
civilizations emerged and flourished around the great rivers like Sindh,
Euphrates, Nile and Ganges etc.
Water, which once was used for irrigation and domestic purpose only,
with the passage of time, has become a very important component of
industrial growth in the modern world. Production of different
commodities requires the consumption of water also. ‘The scale of water
consumption for producing different commodities is increasing with rapid
industrial expansion. For example in order to produce one litter of
petroleum, one container of vegetables, one kilogram of paper and one ton
of woollen cloth, it is necessary to consume ten litters, forty litters, hundred
litters and six hundred litters of water, respectively’1.This exponential
growth of water usage in addition to water scarcity due to a number of

*Adil Khan. is serving as a lecturer in the Department of Pakistan Studies, Hazara

University Mansehra He earned his PhD in Politics and International Relations from the
International Islamic University, lamabad, Pakistan. His interests are democratization and
Pakistani politics.
**Nazakat Awan is a lecturer in the department of English, at Hazara University
Mansehra. He is pursuing his PhD in linguistics from National University of Modern
Languages, Islamabad. his recent publication entitled ‘Hybridity and linguistic pluralism: a
study of university academic discourse’ is published in Global Social Science Review,
Islamabad, Pakistan.
1
Encyclopedia Britannica Macrop/Edia, (Chicago: Helen Hemming Way, 1973-74, Vol.: 19).

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climatic factors has given birth to a range of new conflicts. These conflicts
range from inter-state to intra-state conflicts.
he history of water related conflicts in sub-continent predates partition of
Indo-Pak. The first water related conflict in Western India, which now
constitute Pakistan, emerged in the post-World War I period among Punjab,
Sindh, Bhawalpur and Bekaner states over the water sharing mechanism of
river Indus.2 The upper and lower riparian regions relied on different
arguments to win more water share. The upper riparian, Punjab,
demanded more share on the basis of its greater contribution to the overall
economy, whereas, the lower riparian, Sindh, demanded this share on the
basis of its greater needs. The conflict was ultimately managed by the
British Government acting as neutral arbitrator and facilitating negotiations
among the conflicting parties.3
Water related conflicts in the post partition period once again emerged
not only at interstate level, between India and Pakistan, but also at the
domestic intrastate level, among the federating units of Pakistan. The Indus
Water Treaty (TWT) in 1960 to some extent resolved interstate conflict
between India and Pakistan, but it gave birth to a new controversy in West
Pakistan, at intrastate level, as Pakistan lost its right on the waters of three
major rivers; Sutlej, Bias and Ravi, resulting in a great imbalance of
demand and supply of water. This imbalance and the resulting conflict not
only negatively affected the economic growth in Pakistan but it also had
serious implications for the federal structure.
This article explores the causes of inter-provincial water conflicts,
critically analyzes the arguments posed by various federating units,
evaluates the performance of various commissions formed over the period
since independence to resolve these conflicts, and finally explores the
implications of inter-provincial water conflicts for the federation of
Pakistan. This paper is organized broadly into four sections. The first
section includes discussion on overall demand of water in Pakistan and the
volume available to satiate this demand. The second section is a critical
analysis of the causes of inter-provincial water conflicts. The third section
comprises debates on major water related issues and an evaluation of the
performance of various commissions formed to address the water conflicts
among federating units. The fourth and concluding section is an attempt to

2
Michal-Aloys Arthur (1967), The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition, (Yale
University Press) P.99.
3
Altaf Memon, (2002), An Overview of History and Impacts of Water Issue in Pakistan,
(accessed from http://www.worldsindhi.com).

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develop linkage between water related conflicts and their implications for
national economy as well as federal structure of Pakistan.

I
Since independence, demand of water increased over the years in
Pakistan, whereas the volume of water available to satiate this demand
decreased. The Growth of industry, the losing of waters of three rivers as a
result of IWT, and a rapid increase in population are the main factors
responsible for this disequilibrium in demand and supply. A snapshot of
per capita availability of water at the time of independence and in the year
2017 better explains this disequilibrium. At the time of independence per
capita availability of water was 5000m3 whereas, this volume shrunk to
only 1000m3 presently. Keeping in view these figures, Benchmark Water
Scarcity Indicators declares Pakistan’s current estimated per capita water
availability and places it in the high water stress category.4 In the context of
this growing scarcity of water availability in Pakistan, this section provides
an overview of existing water availability and water demand equilibrium.
Despite its utmost significance the issue remained afocus of a very few
studies. One important study was conducted by Shamsul Mulk and
Muhtadullah in 1991. The study suggested that by the year 2000 the water
shortfall would reach to 40.3 MAF, whereas, its projection to 2025 would
lead to an overall shortfall of 150.8 MAF. Table 1 summarizes the findings
of this study.

Table: 1 Water Requirements and Availability

Year 2000 2013 2025
Population (Millions) 148 207 267
Water Requirement (MAF)
Irrigation 143.1 206.4 -
Non-irrigation 5.9 8.7 -
Total Requirements 149.0 215.1 277.4*
Water Availability**
Total Surface and Groundwater 108.7 107.3 126.6
Shortfall 40.3 107.8 150.8
*Extrapolated **At Watercourse head
Source: Mulk, Shamsul, and Khalid Mohtadullah (1991) Water Resources Management Policies in
Pakistan. Paper presented in International Workshop on Water Resource Management. Washington,
D. C.: USA.

4
Agriculture, Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-2010, (http://www.finance.gov.pk/sur-
vey/chapter_10_02_agriculture.pdf.)

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 Another important study conducted by WAPDA in 2009 asserted that:
“...with increased population, Pakistan is moving towards a situation of water shortage.
The per capita surface water availability was 5260 cubic meters in 1951 when popula-
tion was 34 million. In 2010 when Pakistan had an estimated population of 172 million
people it was reduced to 1038 m3.”5

WAPDA stressed in the same report that construction of new water

reserves is indispensible in order to meet the growing demands of water
and electricity. It was further advocated that the 10% annual increase in
demand of electricity requires Kalabagh Dam and other water reserves to
be built on emergency basis. If not taken seriously the issue may not only
hurt the economic growth but may also lead to famine and hunger.
The issue is further aggravated due to lack of accurate measure of existing
water availability in Pakistan. One such example is that of a report of
Technical Committee on Water Resources, appointed by the president of
Pakistan in 2003. The Committee failed to reach a consensus of available
surplus water. WAPDA gave a figure of 3.95 MAF, seven members gave a
figure of 32.72 MAF, one gave a figure of -11.60 MAF, and Chairman gave
a figure of -0.25 MAF. These figures reflect how even the technical experts
differ on the available water volume for storage. This difference indicates
the failure of developing accurate tools to measure the available water
resources.6 These differences on the available water volume for storage
have caused conflicts among federating units on a number of occasions
since independence. The one recent example is that of 2010 when Punjab
and Sindh came on a collision course, on two occasions, on water distri-
bution and the issue was finally referred to the Prime Minister. Thus,
consistent increase in water demands in the federating units as well as
failure to meet these demands by building new water reserves by the
federal government is causing water stress in the federation. This water
stress is one of the main causes of growing disharmony among the
federating units. The next section deals with the causes of growing water
conflicts among the federating units.

II
As stated in the previous section growing imbalance between demand
and supply of water since independence in 1947 is one of the major causes
of growing tension among federating units of Pakistan. The focus of this
section is to investigate the nature and causes of interprovincial water
5
WAPDA 2009 Feasibility Report (http://www.scribd.com/doc/2787/wapda.).
6
PILDAT, Inter-Provincial Water Issues in Pakistan, January 2011, p. 9.

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conflicts. These causes range from technical to political. The overlapping
of provincial identity with water politics, relative sense of deprivation,
mutual distrust and lack of harmony among federating units has served as
major impediments to develop a consensus or viable solution to water
apportionment practices, acceptable to all units, in Pakistan.
Though water conflicts in Western India predated its partition in 1947,
The Indus Water Treaty served as a new impetus to these conflicts in post
freedom period. The treaty was perceived as unjust, in favour of India, by
some experts on the grounds that it gave full control of three eastern rivers
to India whereas some rights, use for drinking water, non-consumptive use,
cultivation and hydropower development rights, on the three western
rivers were also given to it. It was also argued that by giving supply flows
to India, Pakistan was compelled to depend on water reservoirs only.7
Another perception that emerged in the post IWT period was regarding the
representation of smaller units in the commission formed to negotiate the
treaty. As the Pakistani commission was dominated by Punjab, therefore,
the smaller units alleged that the responsibility of concluding a treaty in
favour of India also rests on Punjab, which lost three of its five rivers to
India. The assertion led some elites in Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh to declare
that Punjab has no legitimate right on waters of Indus.8 Thus, a treaty that
resolved inter-state water conflicts between India and Pakistan, created
imbalance in demand and supply of water in Pakistan, and gave birth to
intra-state conflicts among its federating units.
Mutual distrust and a prevailing relative sense of deprivation, particularly
among the smaller federating units, are the two other factors that hindered
resolution of water conflicts at intrastate level. For the most part of its
history Pakistan remained a state under the stern clutches of civil-military
bureaucracy. Authoritarian regimes had always favoured an over
centralized system. The dominance of central and northern Punjab in civil-
military establishment bred a feeling in the smaller units where centralized
system was equated with the Punjab dominated system. This Punjabi
dominance led to a feeling of distrust towards Punjab. On all issues
including water apportionment as well as building of water reserves the
smaller units feel that Punjab is trying to serve its interests at the cost of the
smaller units. The presence of this distrust and endemic relative sense of
deprivation has hindered the resolution of water related conflicts among
the federating units in Pakistan.

7
Ibid, p.14.
8
Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, interviewed at his office in GPGC, Mansehra.

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 The Resolution of any conflict also depends on the flexibility of the
contending parties. In the case of Pakistan the unit-centre conflict on
building of new water reserves is further aggravated due to conservatism in
dealing with the problem, by the central government, and inflexibility, by
federating units, in changing their position. The central government’s
narrative of “Big is Best” has been not only rejected by smaller units but it
has also been challenged by water and strategic experts. It is argued that
big dams are strategically more vulnerable and in case of war can serve as
self-made bombs used against one’s own self. One of very important
studies was conducted by Umer Asghar Khan with a particular focus on the
politics surrounding Kala Bagh Dam. He argued that building of mega
water reservoirs is now out of fashion; due to their high construction cost,
security risks, high maintenance cost, silting issues and limited life span.
The world is moving towards smaller water reservoirs as well as proper and
efficient water management.9 The Pakistani establishment is not ready to
buy this argument and continuously insisted on building of Kala Bagh Dam
whereas the smaller provinces out-rightly rejected the idea of building this
dam and had showed their resolve to resist it at any cost. This one example
is evidence of the fact of flexibility, on the parts of units, and conservatism,
on the part of centre, is responsible for aggravating water issues in Pakistan.

III
The inter-provincial water conflicts predate partition of Indo-Pakistan
subcontinent. The controversy over water distribution of Indus River
System (IRS) between provinces started in 1921 when the Indian British
Government started to ameliorate the developing irrigation system with
construction of new dams, barrages, head works and canals. The lower
riparians showed their concerns over those developing projects in fear of
reduction in their water share. Various commissions and committees were
formed by colonial government to resolve these conflicts. These included
The Tripartite Agreement (1921), The Indus Discharge Committee (1921), Sutlej
Valley Project Inquiry Committee (1932), Andersen Committee (1935), and Rao
Commission 1945. After the inception of Pakistan a number of attempts were
made by the federal government to resolve the water conflicts which
emerged as a result of Post-IWT scenario. This section will overview these
efforts as well as highlight the most important water issues and conflicting
stance of different units on water apportionment practices in Pakistan.

9
http://www.pakissan.com/2002/english/issues/water.water.no.where.html

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 Implementation of IWT caused water shortage in Sindh Sagar and Chej
Doabs resulting in emergence of water conflicts between lower riparian
and upper riparian regions in One Unit. A water allocation and rates
committee was announced by the Government of Pakistan to resolve the
issue in the two regions of West Pakistan (One Unit) in May 1968 which
was known as Akhtar Hussain Committee as Akhtar Hussain was its
chairman. The main task of the committee was to “review barrage water
allocation, reservoir release pattern, drawdown levels and use of
groundwater in relation to surface water deliveries”.10 The Committee
submitted its report on June 1970 without any effect as the One Unit was
dissolved splitting it into four provinces. On October 15, 1970 the
Government of Pakistan constituted another committee to settle the inter-
provincial water disputes under the chairmanship of Justice Fazle Akbar, a
former justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan. The committee had to
recommend apportionment of water allocations of groundwater and its
coordinate use with flow supplies and reasonable water requirements of the
provinces for agriculture, industrial and other uses. The committee
submitted its report to the government in 1971. In order to resolve the
dispute an ad hoc order was issued regarding distribution of waters stored
by Chashma Barrage and later Terbela reservoir among the provinces. This
ad hoc distribution of waters of these reservoirs remained intact until
coming into effect of another inter-provincial water agreement i.e. Water
Apportionment Accord 1991, which is presently in effect. From 1971 to
1991 two other commissions Chief Justice Commission (1977) and Haleem
Commission (1983) were also constituted without winning the confidence
of the four provinces.
Failure of various commissions to satisfy all the stakeholders from 1968
to 1991 finally led to a comprehensive effort, Water Apportionment Accord
1991, by the federal government which was signed by all the four
provinces. The Accord was approved subsequently by Council of
Common Interest (CCI) on March 21, 1991. The main clauses of Water
Apportionment Accord 1991 were:11
• It supersedes all previous sharing arrangements and agreements
arrived at in this regard.
• It protects the existing uses of canal water in each province.

10
Naseeruddin Mehmood, Inter-Provincial Water Apportionment Practices: A Study of Pakistan,
MPhil Dissertation, Hazara University, Mansehra, 2016, pp.75-79.
11
Ibid.

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 • It apportions the balance river supplies including flood surpluses and
future storage amongst the provinces.
• It recognizes the need for constructing new storages wherever
feasible on the Indus and other rivers for planned future agriculture
development.
• It also recognizes the need for certain minimum escape to sea below
Kotri to check sea intrusion for which further studies are to be
undertaken.
• It lays down the procedures for sharing shortage and surpluses on all
Pakistan bases.
• The need to establish an Indus River System Authority for
implementation of the Accord was recognized and accepted. It would
have representation from all the four Provinces.
• The balance river supplies including flood supplies and future
storages are allocated as: 37% for Punjab, 37% for Sindh, 14% for
K.PK and12% for Baluchistan.

Table: 2 Water Distributions under Water Apportionment Accord-1991

Water Shares Balance
Province Total Supply Shares
Kharif Rabi
(%)*
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.94 37

Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76 37

KPK 3.48 2.30 5.78 14

Baluchistan 2.85 1.02 3.87 12

Civil** Canals 1.80 1.20 3.00 -

Total 77.34 37.01 114.35 100

Source: B.A Malik, ‘Save Water Save Pakistan’, 2011, p. 70.

*Including flood flows and future storage.
**Un-gauged civil canals in KPK.

All the four provinces agreed on Water Apportionment Accord (1991),

yet when it came to its implementation new conflicts and controversies
emerged. Construction of new dams, minimum escape to sea and mode of

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sharing water shortages were some of the major areas of conflict among the
provinces in the post WAA period. The federal governments and Punjab’s
assertion of building new dams on Indus, particularly Kala Bagh Dam, is
rejected by Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.12 Sindh and Punjab have
conflicting opinions on the minimum available volume of water
downstream Kotri. Where Punjab claims that enough water would be
available for minimum escape to sea below Kotri after building additional
water storages, Sindh rejects this claim. The later asserts that any new
storage would dry up minimum required escape, causing sea intrusion, and
would destroy the production ability of lands in Sindh. Although it was
decided to undertake a new study to check the efficacy of the two contra-
dictory claims, this study could not be commissioned despite passage of
twenty six years due to lack of consensus on its Terms of References
(TORs). Another important issue regarding sharing of water shortages also
remained a major area of contention between Punjab and Sindh. Pakistan
faced serious water shortages during 1994-95, 1997-98 and 1999-2003. The
two provinces during these shortage periods entered into conflicting
positions on water shortage sharing. Sindh accused Punjab of stealing its
share of water during these periods. Apart from the above mentioned
conflicts, surrounding interpretation of WAA, there are some other issues
which remained a source of contention among the federating units. The
most notable among these are controversial Greater Thal-Canal Project in
Punjab and Withdrawal from Chashma-Jhelum Link Canal. Sindh alleged
Punjab of depriving it from its water share by building these canals whereas
Punjab argues that Thal-Canal Project would rely on only rainwater and
these projects would not affect flow of waters to lower riparian Sindh.13
A study into interprovincial water conflicts is evidence that despite
formation of a number of commissions and committees the state machinery
failed in building trust among federating units. This failure hindered a
conclusion of an agreed upon agreement for appropriate water
apportionment transaction. Although Water Apportionment Accord of
1991 was a major achievement in this regard its operational part again was
surrounded by disagreements and controversies. It is, therefore, pertinent

12
Sindh argues that building of KBD would help Punjab to divert water of Indus towards
Punjab leading to water shortage in Sindh, whereas, KPK rejected the proposal on the
grounds that the construction of this dam would lead to drowning of Nowshera and may
damage their agricultural lands up to Mardan.
13
Naseeruddin Mehmood, pp. 91-95

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to deliberate on the positions held by different stakeholders on existing
water apportionment practices.
Sindh holds the position that its water is being stolen by Punjab and it is,
therefore, deprived of its share as was committed in WAA (1991). This
deprivation led to not only water shortage but also penetration of sea water
in its mainland causing salinity and water lodging of lower Indus
agricultural land areas.14 Sindh claims its sole right on Indus and water
withdrawal at Chashma-Jhelum and Tonsa-Pujnad, during water shortage
periods, is declared as water theft and violation on WAA (1991). Sindh also
objects to construction of new water storages on the Indus that these dams
would cut flow of water to Sindh which is already facing water shortage.15
Baluchistan being a low riparian to Sindh has similar grievances towards
Sindh as that of Sindh towards Punjab. Baluchistan draws water from two
canals, namely Pat Feeder and Kirthar which carry water from Guddu and
Sukkur barrages. Sindh as being upper riparian of Baluchistan usually
releases less water in these two canals than its due share justifying that
Baluchistan’s share has already been used by Punjab. Baluchistan shares its
position with Sindh on construction of new water reservoirs on Indus. It
also objects to any cuts in water flow of the Indus.16
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa challenges the fundamental premise of water
shortage. It has been argued by most of intelligentsia in KPK that the actual
problem is not water shortage but water mismanagement. The canal system
in Punjab is 150 years old and is responsible for water wastage. KPK stands
up with Sindh and Baluchistan on construction of new water storages partic-
ularly the Kala Bagh Dam. Its opposition to KBD is based on different
grounds though. These include flood threats to the Peshawar and Nowshera
valley, dread of water logging and salinity in Pabi, Swabi and Mardan,
submergence of fertile cultivable lands and dislocation of the population.
Punjab, being the largest populated province, stands out at a different
position from rest of the three provinces. Being the largest contributor in
national agricultural products it demands more water share and calls to
address the issue of water shortage.17 It argues that IWT was signed by the

14
Rasool Bakhsh Palijo,(2011), Sindh-Punjab Water Dispute, Hyderabad: Centre for Peace
and Civil Society (CPCS), p. 12.
15
IRSA, Staff Report 2011.
16
Naseeruddin Mehmood, p. 102.
17
Punjab contributes 80% of the total agriculture production of Pakistan and over 90% of
the agriculture output comes from those command areas irrigated by Indus river system.
More than 50% of the work force relies on the agriculture sector and it accounts for 70% of
export revenues in GNP.

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federation of Pakistan and loss of three rivers must be considered as joint
loss, thus, there is need of developing new mechanisms to share waters of
the remaining three rivers. It rejects Sindh’s outright claim on the Indus.
Punjab is the only province that demands for construction of new water
reservoirs claiming that the objections of smaller provinces are either the
result of ignorance or politicization of the issue.

IV
As it is evident from the discussion in section III that the divergent views
of all the federating units on water resource management and water
apportionment practices has pushed Pakistan into the zone of water
stressed countries. The federal government failed not only to resolve inter-
provincial water conflicts but it also failed to deal with the issue of water
shortage. Lack of political will, rampant corruption, and ignorance to
understand the gravity of the problem may lead Pakistan to hunger and
starvation. This concluding section is an attempt to analyze the
implications of water shortage for the federation of Pakistan as well as to
suggest measures to deal with the issue.
The nature of federation in Pakistan and inter-provincial water conflicts,
have reciprocal implications for each other. Where overly centralized
federal structure has strengthened the centrifugal tendency, and a resulting
mistrust to understand the position of centre or other province in water
related conflicts, in federating units (particularly the smaller ones) similarly,
the perceived or real, injustice in water apportionment practices has not
only generated anti-centre sentiments but it has also strengthened the
notion of ‘Me versus the Rest’. The foundational narrative upon which a
successful federation is formed is that of harmony of interests among
regions which compel them to voluntarily enter into a federal structure.
With such arrangements where this harmony of interests is lacking it
becomes difficult to keep the units together. Pakistan has already faced the
result of such arrangement in 1971. It is, therefore, pertinent for the central
government to overcome the existing trust deficit among federating units
towards each other, as well as, towards the centre. Water scarcity is one of
the most important issues which may cause the federation of Pakistan to
cripple in the future. Literature around the globe, and water war thesis in
particular, suggests that water may become a major source of violent
conflicts not only across the borders but also among different regions
within a state in the near future. In order to avoid water wars it is important
to take the issue on priority basis.

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 One important mechanism to resolve conflicts is engagement of
communities in active dialogues. There is need of encouraging debates on
water issues. The central government must try to engage the stakeholders in
all the federating units in active dialogue for resolution of water conflicts (a
proactive role of the Council of Common Interest and parliamentary
committees may provide a platform for such dialogues). There is also need of
funding research on these issues in academia and bridging the research-policy
gaps. Apart from these there is need of a political will to resolve the issue of
water scarcity. Pakistan predominantly relies on traditional agriculture
techniques. The farmers are mostly ignorant about modern techniques and
cause wastage of fresh water. In order to avoid this wastage there is need of
adopting modern techniques. Mass awareness campaigns and educating
farmers about these techniques may also help to a greater extent.
Another problem with traditional mindset is that people believe that
what nature has bestowed to them is never going to end. This attitude is
responsible for degradation of the environment, in general, and water
wastage in particular. It is, therefore, very important to make the people
realize that each drop of water counts. Civil society including NGO’s,
Media, academia, religious scholars, and everyone else who have a
particular constituency or social support, need to be convinced to play their
part in changing the traditional orientation of the people about nature.
School textbooks can be one important source of sensitizing the new
generations on the issues revolving water wastage at domestic level.
Most of the efforts for resolution of inter-provincial conflicts primarily
focused on the technical side of the issue, i.e. measuring water availability,
its scarcity and devising apportionment formulas, ignoring the overlapping
of water issues with identity issues. This overlapping is very much visible
when even technical experts come with markedly different measures of
water availability and requirements in different units. All this make the
problem more complex. In order to address this, a more comprehensive
policy is required which could incorporate the economic, sociological,
cultural and regional aspects of the issue. There is need of conducting
objective studies and enhancing the technical skills to produce accurate and
precise results in terms of measuring water availability, forecasting rain
volumes and floods and preserving ability of surplus water. Similarly, new
technologies must be introduced for irrigation and efficient extraction of
ground water.

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