Challenge To Constitutionality of A State Statute: Homeless

Challenge to Constitutionality of a State Statute Print
This form must be completed by a party filing a petition, motion or other pleading challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute. The completed form must be filed with the court in which the cause is
pending as required by Section 402.010 (a-1), Texas Government Code.
Cause Number (For Clerk Use Only): 05-20-00128-CV Court (For Clerk Use Only):
Styled: In re: Gallagher

(e.g., John Smith v. All American Insurance Co.; in re Mary Ann Jones; In the Matter of the Estate of George Jackson)
Contact information for party* challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. (*If party is not a person, provide
contact information for party, party's representative or attorney.)
Name: Rev. Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush Telephone: 7203698172
Address: Homeless Fax:
City/State/Zip: Dallas State Bar No. (if applicable):
Email: Mahatmajapa@gmail.com
Person completing this form is: Attorney for Party Unrepresented Party Other:
Identify the type of pleading you have filed challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
Petition Answer Motion (Specify type):

✔ Other: Brief
Is the Attorney General of the State of Texas a party to or counsel in this cause?
Yes ✔ No
List the state statute(s) being challenged in your pleading and provide a summary of the basis for your
challenge. (Additional pages may be attached if necessary.)
Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45
I am Challenging the Texas Name Change Code, as applied by Collin County and the Dallas County Courts, under Tex. Code
Title 5 Chapter 110, TX RFRA.
see Brief.
9/5/13
Index
Case Law
Barshop v. Medina Under Wat. Cons. Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996)........ p24, 25, 26 27
Cruz v. Beto, 405 US 319 (1972)........ p20
Dallas County v. Crestview Corners Car Wash, 370 S.W.3d 25, 56 (Tex. App. Dallas 2012, pet.
denied)....... p3
Davis v. Guam, 17-15719 (9th Cir. 2019)........ p24
Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F.Supp. 246 (M.D. Paul 1964)........ p22
Gallagher v. Austin Police Department, 1:16cv00527 (WD TX 2017)........ p4, 18
Horvath v. City of Leander, 18-51011 (5th Cir 2020)........ p18
In re: Arnett, 148 Cal. App. 4th 654 (Cal. Ct. 2007)........ p11
In re: Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App. 2002)......... p12, 13
In re: Erickson, 547 S.W.2d (Tex. App. 1977)........ p15, 16, 17
In re: Evett's Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781 (1965). ....... p7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19
In re: Kirson Barnes, 13-13-00685-CV (Tx. App. 2015)........ p17
In re: Marriage of JB and HB, 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010)........ p14
In re: Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2004)........ p18
In re: Nanelle Serio, 03-14-00786-cv (Tex. App. 2014)........ p13
In the interest of RR, Jr. and VR, Children, 02-08-00061-cv (Tex. App. 2009)........ p24
Masterpiece v. CCRC, 584 US __(2018).......p21
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896)........ P23
Texas v. Florida, 306 US 398 (1939)........ p12

United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925)........ p21
Van-Kush v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1:20cv00906 (DDC 2020)........ p4, 18
Statute and Constitution
1, 3, 10, 20, 24
Tex. Const. Art.I, §3…….. p
1, 3, 9, 10, 20, 24
Tex. Const. Art.I, §6…….. p
Tex. Const. Art.I, §13…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24
Tex. Const. Art.I, §15…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24
Tex. Const. Art.I, §16…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24
Tex. Code Ann. §110.001(1)…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14
Tex. Code Ann. §110.002…….. p1, 3, 8, 10, 21
Tex. Code Ann. §110.003…….. p1, 3, 10, 21
Tex. Code Ann. §110.004……… p7, 20
Tex. Code Ann. §110.005…….. p1, 3, 10, 14, 27
Tex. Code Ann. §110.008…….. p1, 3, 10, 14
Tex. Code. Title 5 Chapter 110…….. p6, 8
Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45…….. p1
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.102…….. p9
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.103(a)....... p1
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.104…….. p7
22, 23
U.S. Code Ann. §552a…….. p
U.S. Const. Amd. 1…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14
U.S. Const. Amd. 9…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

1, 3, 10, 14
U.S. Const. Amd. 14…….. p
Books and Websites
…….. p
https://thelawdictionary.org/residence 12
Kingdom of this World (2017)…….. p23

Table of Contents
I. Statement of Facts…….. p1
II. Statement of the Case…….. p2
III. Issues Presented…….. p3-8

a. Religious Right to Change Name
b. Collin County's Participation
IV. Summary of the Argument…….. p8
V. Argument……. p8-11
VI. Body…….. p11-27

a. Jurisdiction/Residence
b. Law
c. Religion
d. Race/Ethnicity
VII. Conclusion…….. p27
Attached is the Appendix, including:
Constitutional Challenge Form

Judge's Order
Associate Judge's Order
DPS/FBI Background Check
Tex. Code Title 5 Chapter 110
Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45
Tex. Bill of Rights
Tex. Code Constitutional Challenge to Statute
5th Appeals Court of Texas
05-20-00128-CV
In Re: Ryan Gallagher,
Name change to:
Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush
1723 Candleglow st
Castle Rock, Co 80109
There are no other parties to this case. There has been no trial either.
Brief
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal of the Order issued by the Dallas District Court as a Violation of Religious
Rights. This is a Constitutional Challenge to the Texas name change Code as applied.
To see this is in the Public Interest please see the Affidavit for Petition (RR) and the attached
Petition of Public Interest (RR) a collection of signatures attached to the Court Reporter's
record.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103. ORDER. (a) The court shall order a change of name under this
subchapter ...if the change is in the interest or to the benefit of the petitioner and in the interest
of the public.
Certificate of Criminal History Record Information (CR41) p587, Dec 16th, 2019 see 587-594 for
State Required DPS and FBI Background Checks showing that I am not a Felon, I am not on
Probation, I am not fresh out of Prison, on Parole. Nothing. I meet State Requirements.
I am challenging Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45 of the Texas State Code, Under TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 16 (No Attainder); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 (Right to practice Religion according to
Conscience); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 ( Equal Protection); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 (Due
Process); Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 13 & 15; art. II, § 1; art. V, § 10; TX. Code Ann. §110.001(1)
(Free Exercise);TX. Code Ann. §110.002 (Applies to all State Law and Judicial Orders); TX.
Code Ann. §110.003 (Religious Freedom Protected); TX. Code Ann. §110.005 (Remedies); TX.
Code Ann. §110.008 (Sovereign Immunity Waived). as well as the U.S. CONST. 1st
Amendment of the U.S. CONST. 14th Amendment and the U.S. CONST. 9th Amendment.
Attainder may only be granted like Gun Rights being Revoked from Felons, there can be no
denial of Rights in State or Federal Law. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103(a) is legal Attainder, this
instant case is illegal attainder activated to combat my Religion.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1
Dec 10th, 2018 I was married to Tamika Battle/Kemp in the Dallas County Court, see Response
Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th, 2019 see page 129 and 130 for
Marriage Certificate and picture of my Wife and I being Married in the Dallas County
Courthouse, see In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5 line9-22 my wife and I
decided that we would not take each other's names, but choose a new name. My wife chose the
last name Van Kush for us. Meaning "from Kush" or "of Kush" as a symbol of our devotion to
Shiva in our marriage, see In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p4 line17-25, also
Affidavit of Religion (CR43) p596, Dec 18th, 2019 this shows my Mom having signed an
Affidavit about my Religious practice regarding the Magical Properties of herbs from the age of
14. Religious Purpose of Name Change (CR7) p35-46, Aug 1st, 2019 explains the background,
and connection of Hinduism to the East India Trade Company and Christopher Columbus. Also
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, (1916) (page 46) outlines Colonial Territory which again ties the
US and India together.
I filed the case in the Dallas County district Court and it was assigned to Judge Wysocki, see
Petition to Change the Name of an Adult (CR5) p10, Aug 14, 2019 see page 10 and 11 During
the time I submitted the Original Petition my wife and I were living at the Salvation Army, so it
took a while to get the Fingerprints and everything because there is no fee waiver. In December
there was a hearing with an Associate Judge,see Associate Judge's Report (CR33) p426, Nov
19th, 2019 see page 426, it simply states "Petitioner Ryan Gallagher made an appearance on
today's date, and his request to legally change his name is denied." with no legal reason. Bob
Davis appeared at the hearing, it was the first time I actually have ever seen or met him in
person in any of these proceedings, and he came to argue that I was not a Resident of Dallas,
and that I was trying to escape Obligations attached to my current name by changing my name.
Before the hearing he told me he had never been to a name change hearing in his life, and later
I found that there is not another easily found public record of this ever happening to anyone else
in Dallas History. It has likely never happened. The Judge denied the name change giving no
reason, but I had not yet gotten the Background check mailed back to me, I had submitted my
Fingerprints at that time though, see Notice/Letter to Judge (CR26) p403, Nov 18th, 2019 see
404-408 to see that I submitted Fingerprints and paid for DPS and FBI Background checks. The
case was listed as "Closed" even though I had appealed the order. I discussed it with the Court
manager and she said it was a mistake and not a reflection of the Court's attitude towards the
case and corrected it, but at the time there was clear animus towards me.
Dec 15/16th, at this time I discovered the connection between the Whelesses and the Nowaks,
alerted Judge Cynthia Wheless, and she recused herself from the Collin County cases.
The Background check was then delivered to the Court and Jan 6th we had the hearing with
Ashley Wysocki. At this hearing the County argued that they simply wanted my name change to
apply to all cases associated with myself to protect them from "Starting over the Vexatious
Litigant Motion" in the Collin County Court, they wanted it to apply to State and Federal, and I
agreed. They also attempted to refer to the Collin County cases from which just days earlier
Cynthia Wheless had recused herself. The Judge then denied the name change with no reason
2
given, see "The Court is denying the request to change the name… that is my ruling" I n Re:
Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p13 line3-7
I later found that Ashley Wysocki's husband helped Andrea Thompson get elected as Judge,
and she was the Judge who heard the Vexatious Litigant motion 17 days later, appointed after
Cynthia Wheless recused herself, see In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p11
line1-17 and p12 line5-8; effectively applying the Vexatious Litigant Declaration not just ex post
facto but before the hearing happened. And I just want to point out, if anyone is harassing
anyone, these people are harassing me, pretending I am harassing them while they do it. I
simply want to have my Religious Rights Adjudicated, and they continue to try to Obfuscate the
whole situation, and I have been Homeless recently so it has not been easy to do everything I
need to do for the Courts. I just met Bob Davis at this hearing because I was not able to appear
at the 1 single hearing we had in 2017. A hearing where I never appeared but was Sanctioned,
in violation of the Court's right to Sanction those "appearing before it".
III. ISSUES PRESENTED

Dallas County v. Crestview Corners Car Wash, 370 S.W.3d 25, 56 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
pet. denied)
A. RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO CHANGE NAME
In this Case I am requesting that the State allow me to change my Christian Name, Ryan
Alexander Gallagher, on IDs and other various forms of State Documentation, to my Hindu
Name: Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush. In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p4
line17-25. I am a Hindu Shaivite, a Religion from the Kush Mountain Range and Ganges River
(Similar to how there are Christian's in America, but Christianity comes from Israel and
Syrio-Palestine; Bethlehem, Nazarath, Jericho, etc). Names often change because of Religion.
My Grandma on my Dad's side has the last name "Christenson" which came with Christian
conversion at some point in the History of Denmark. Her home town is called "Antioch", named
because the Citizens there were the biggest Christian's in the area and were mocked being
called "Antioch" and it stuck, see Evidence of Religious Nature of Name Change (CR23) p244
and p361, Oct 30, 2019 page 361 and 362 show the issue of "Christian Names" i n both Texas
and US Courts.
I, § 16 (No Attainder); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 (Right to practice Religion according to
Conscience); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 (Equal Protection); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ( Due
(Free Exercise);TX. Code Ann. §110.002 ( Applies to all State Law and Judicial Orders); TX.
Code Ann. §110.003 ( Religious Freedom Protected); TX. Code Ann. §110.005 (Remedies); TX.
Code Ann. §110.008 ( Sovereign Immunity Waived). as well as the U.S. CONST. 1st
Amendment of the U.S. CONST. 14th Amendment and the U.S. CONST. 9th Amendment.
3
denial of Rights in State or Federal Law. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103(a) is legal Attainder, this
instant case is illegal attainder, activated to combat my Religion.
Religion has far out existed Law and these Laws can not stop a Religious Name Change:
1) By charging a fee
2) By unexplained Denial
3) As a Mechanism of Constitutional Judicial Function
4) By attacking Religion
"Plaintiff appears to be an ordained minister of the Universal Life Church and runs a religiously
oriented business of selling seeds, herbs, fruits, and vegetables. Plaintiff states that he "is a
Hindu and practices Neurospirituality," which appears to involve the use of nootropics. Plaintiff's
examples of these substances include syneperine, tryptophan, and holy basil seeds, which,
according to Plaintiff, "are grown for Lord Krishna, and are definitely not illegal." "- Gallagher v.
Austin Police Department 1:16-cv-00527 (WD TX 2017); VAN-KUSH v. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 1:20-cv-00906 (D.D.C. 2020)
See Court Clerk Records:
Memorandum of History (CR37) p443-470, Dec 12th, 2019 has a detailed analysis of Botanical
Religious Practice.
Affidavit of Religion (CR43) p596, Dec 18th, 2019 this shows my Mom having signed an
Affidavit about my Religious practice regarding the Magical Properties of herbs from the age of
14.
Petition to Change the Name of an Adult (CR5) p10, Aug 14, 2019 see page 10 and 11 In this
name Change, on p10 of the Clerk's Record, you will see that I was also recently Married, and
this name change is for Marriage Reasons also. Which itself is a Religious Reason. It also lists
on p11 of the Clerk's record, same document, my Heritage, Hispanic-White, as I am ¼ Mexican,
and Hispanic White is now the Majority in Texas. Texas is a State with a Hispanic White
Majority.
Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th, 2019 see page 129 and
130 for Marriage Certificate and picture of my Wife and I being Married in the Dallas County
Courthouse. In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5 line9-22
Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th, 2019 see page 136 for
Birth Certificate, Box 15a shows that my Mom, Tracy Lopez, is of Hispanic Origin. Box 15b
shows she is of Mexican Descent. Page 137 and 138 and 139 is my Families Heritage. Native
American/Mexican, other Native mixed in, Spanish/Potuguese, and South European. In Re:
4
Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5 line9-22
Motion for Court to Recognize Heritage (CR27) p409, Nov 18th, 2019 see page 409 to see my
Explanation of my National Heritage to the Court.
Evidence of Religious Nature of Name Change (CR23) p244 and p361, Oct 30, 2019 page 361
and 362 show the issue of "Christian Names" in both Texas and US Courts.
Religious Nature of Name Change (CR25) p369, Nov 11th, 2019 see page 369 for Texas
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Notice of Ministry (CR36) p429, Dec 12th, 2019 see page 429-442. Page 429 Explains the
meaning of the name Rev. Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush. Page 430 Explains Traditions of our
Religion. Page 431 and 432 show the similarity between the Christian Wine Eucharist during
Alcohol Prohibition and our own Eucharist in Texas. Page 433 is my Original Ministry Certificate
from 2009. See pages 434-436 I have since founded my own Temple, FEIN#37-194939 and
this is our Tax Exempt Ruling letter from the Director of Rulings and Agreements from the IRS in
the Treasury Dept. Pages 437-442 is a Document called "Explaining Shiva to the Western Mind"
explaining Shaivism.
This appeal comes on various Grounds, first and most obvious is clear Error.
See Court Clerk's Record:
Notice/Letter to Judge (CR26) p403, Nov 18th, 2019 see 404-408 to see that I submitted
Fingerprints and paid for DPS and FBI Background checks.
Motion for De Novo Review (CR31) p422, Nov 19th, 2019 see page 422 to see an Explanation
of Mistakes made by the Lower Court. This was during the time I was still waiting for the DPS
and FBI to return my background check.
Notice of De Novo Appeal to Referring Court…(CR32) p424, Nov 19th, 2019

Same as 31.
Associate Judge's Report (CR33) p426, Nov 19th, 2019 see page 426, it simply states
"Petitioner Ryan Gallagher made an appearance on today's date, and his request to legally
change his name is denied." with no legal reason.
B. COLLIN COUNTY'S PARTICIPATION: Pre Ex Post Facto application of Law
"We're just wanting to make sure that this name change doesn't come back and start us back to
zero on the beginnings of the Vexatious Litigation" I n Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript
5
(RR) p12 line18-20 this is the only argument Collin County actually makes throughout the whole
Hearing. And in Chapter 45 of Texas Code I see nothing about this. And a simple Google
Search of Judge Ashley Wysocki shows she is married to the Wysocki from the O'Neil Wysocki
Law firm, who in another simple Google search can be seen to have helped Judge Andrea
Thompson from Collin County, who was days later ruling on the case Collin County is referring
to. Collin County fails to recognize, they will not be starting over. Under Tex. Civ. Code Title 5,
Chapter 110 they need to stop. They need to cease and desist.
Second, the Dallas County District Court likely made this decision under some form of Coercion
as they allowed Collin County to be present at all hearings in this In Re case, allowed them to
object, and even ruled in their favor and gave them more than they asked for, as if you read the
transcript you will find that they were simply requesting that the name change apply to all my
cases, which I agreed with.
And that brings us to the Issue of Collin County's arguments themselves. First, they argued that
I was a Resident of Colorado, was from Colorado, and that Dallas had no Jurisdiction.
See Clerk's Record:
Collin County's Response To Petition to Change Name (CR12) p79, Oct 15th, 2019 see page
79, I., "Name Change of Out of State Petitioner… Dallas County is not his Residence…" it
then goes on to say I have SWORN on the Record that I am a Resident of Colorado, when that
is simply a Mailing Address where my Mom Currently lives, as I have been Homeless recently.
The filing continued, after that to repeatedly call me a Resident of Colorado. "I have receipts
from Dallas. I have Residence Letters from Dallas. I'm a Resident of Dallas" -In Re: Gallagher,
DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p7 line1-3
Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th, 2019 see page 132 for
Collin County School Transcript from Mckinney Boyd Highschool, I was born and raised in DFW.
See page 141-166 for records of living at Dallas Life, less than a Mile from the 5th COA for most
of 2017 and 2018. See page 136 for Birth Certificate, the top says Dallas Health Department. I
was born at Dallas Presby, we lived in Mesquite until I was 2 years old, then we moved to
Stonebridge in McKinney. My Parents got divorced in Kindergarten, we preferred to live with our
Mom and my Dad is an Alcoholic. There are Collin County Court Records of all of this
somewhere, from around 1999 which is around when I was in Kindergarten. My Dad still lives at
1010 Lakewood, Mckinney, TX and runs a Company called Dallas Print or Executive Press in
Richardson and Tyler. My Mom's last Residence in Collin County was 609 Riviera Dr, Mckinney,
TX. I have had various addresses around Texas. In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript
(RR) p5 line9-22
Further Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR15) p167, Oct 17th, 2019 see page
169-172 for Tyler Texas Newspaper Article about my Great Grandma Ona Henry who was a
real life "Rosie the Riveter" who went to Aviation School to learn to fix Planes during WWII, and
my Aunt Christie Lopez has worked for American Airlines in Dallas her whole life. My Mom's
6
entire Family lives in East Texas, Dallas, Grand Prairie and Arlington. My Great Grandma Ona
Henry's maiden name was Alexander, and I was given the middle name Alexander for her.
Sasha means Alexander is Russian, Shai means fate. My middle name is already Alexander,
Sasha is not even a massive change. This evidence shows that not only am I a Resident of
Dallas, in Texas. My whole family is Texan. In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5
line9-22
I am clearly Texan, and a Resident of Dallas. I can further prove this for the court if needed.
"In early England the surname was relatively unimportant, the given name being considered the
more important of the two. Thus, in Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E.
947, 948, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 1167, Judge Vann cites the case of a man with eight sons, each with
a different surname and none with the surname of the father. After noting that the common law
was not too precise in the case of surnames (a grant to John, son of William, was good), he
states "for the Christian name, this ought to be perfect."
The unimportance of the surname is further reflected in the common law rule that a man may
lawfully change his surname at will, "and this without the intervention of either the sovereign, the
courts, or Parliament." 21 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.) 311. However, the Christian
name could be changed only upon confirmation (with the consent of the bishop and for good
cause shown) or by Act of Parliament. Note (1950) 24 Tul.L. Rev. 496, 497." - In Re Evett's
Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App. 1965)
But once I proved I was a Dallas Resident, born and raised here, with a Collin County
Highschool Transcript (where I lived from the ages of 2-18, as well as a few other places after
Parents divorced) and Rent Receipts from Dallas for the past 3 years…
They decided to argue that I was changing my name to "slip away" or get out of old court cases.
This argument is superseded by Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.104
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.104 LIABILITIES AND RIGHTS UNAFFECTED. A change of name
under this subchapter does not release a person from liability incurred in that person's previous
name or defeat any right the person had in the person's previous name.
That section states that changing your name does not remove Rights or Obligations of your
previous name.
So they asked that I apply my name change to all my cases. I agreed, and the Judge denied the
name change. See In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p7 line18-24, p8 line 2-9
zero on the beginnings of the Vexatious Litigation" In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript
Hearing. And in Chapter 45 of Texas Code I see nothing about this. This is worse than an ex
7
pplication of Law. And a simple Google Search of Judge Ashley Wysocki shows she
post facto a
is married to the Wysocki from the O'Neil Wysocki Law firm, who in another simple Google
search can be seen to have helped Judge Andrea Thompson from Collin County, who was days
later ruling on the case Collin County is referring to. Collin County fails to recognize, they will not
be starting over. Under Texas Code Title 5, Chapter 110 they need to stop. They need to cease
and desist.
In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p11 line1-17 and p12 line5-8 this shows that the
Judge whose orders they are defending actually recused herself, in this point in the transcript
Collin County referring to actions of a Recused Judge, in which the Attorneys from Collin County
attempted to have me jailed for contempt of the Recused Judge's order (before recusal) and
impose a $500 per day fee for any lawsuit I had open for actions they had taken against me.
After she Recused herself they decided to change their action to a Vexatious Litigant motion for
me filing cases about Collin County violating my Religious Rights.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
My primary argument is in line with the underlying case,the name change. I have met all state
requirements and even agreed to extra requirements Collin County asked for, and the Judge
denied the name change with no legal reason. I have a Religious Right to change my name.
But I am also arguing that Collin County, and Dallas County, by their actions in the lower court,
are attacking my Religion, and fundamentally my Right to Self Determination and Self
Identification see Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th, 2019 see
page 136 for Birth Certificate, Box 15a shows that my Mom, Tracy Lopez, is of Hispanic Origin.
Box 15b shows she is of Mexican Descent. Page 137 and 138 and 139 is my Families Heritage.
Native American/Mexican, other Native mixed in, Spanish/Potuguese, and South European.
See In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5 line9-22
I am Hispanic-White, I am a Texan, I live in Dallas, my name is Rev. Ryan Sasha-Shai Van
Kush.
V. ARGUMENT
"The Court is denying the request to change the name… that is my ruling" I n Re: Gallagher,
DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p13 line3-7 shows that the Court denied the name change with
absolutely no Consideration for the name change Laws clearly outlined in Tex. Fam.Code Ann.
§ 45.104 or really any Law at all, and not on accident, but in an attempt to block any litigation
involving myself and my Religion. TxCode Title 5 Chapter 110.
8
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.102 REQUIREMENTS OF PETITION.
(a) A petition to change the name of an adult must be verified and include:
(1) the present name and place of residence of the petitioner;
(2) the full name requested for the petitioner;
(3) the reason the change in name is requested;
(4) whether the petitioner has been the subject of a final felony conviction;
(5) whether the petitioner is subject to the registration requirements of Chapter 62, Code of
Criminal Procedure; and
(6) a legible and complete set of the petitioner's fingerprints on a fingerprint card format
acceptable to the Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) The petition must include each of the following or a reasonable explanation why the required
information is not included:
(1) the petitioner's:
(A) full name;
(B) sex;
(C) race;
(D) date of birth;
(E) driver's license number for any driver's license issued in the 10 years preceding the date of
the petition;
(F) social security number; and
(G) assigned FBI number, state identification number, if known, or any other reference number
in a criminal history record system that identifies the petitioner;
(2) any offense above the grade of Class C misdemeanor for which the petitioner has been
charged; and
9
(3) the case number and the court if a warrant was issued or a charging instrument was filed or
presented for an offense listed in Subsection (b)(2).
I met all State requirements for name change, and there is a Public Interest in allowing name
changes for Religious purposes, both under TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 and TX. Code Ann.
§110.001(1) (Free Exercise); as well as the U.S. CONST. 1st Amendment of the U.S. CONST.
14th Amendment and the U.S. CONST. 9th Amendment. I am not a Felon, I am not in Prison,
on Parole, or Probation or anything. I have met all State Requirements.
See Clerk's Record:
Notice/Letter to Judge (CR26) p403, Nov 18th, 2019 see page 404-408 for Fingerprints sent by
me to the DPS and FBI to get a Certified Background Check, which I had to pay for in my
financial situation.
zero on the beginnings of the Vexatious Litigation" In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript
Hearing. And in Chapter 45 of Texas Code I see nothing about this. This is worse than an ex
pplication of Law. And a simple Google Search of Judge Ashley Wysocki shows she
post facto a
is married to the Wysocki from the O'Neil Wysocki Law firm, who in another simple Google
search can be seen to have helped Judge Andrea Thompson from Collin County, who was days
later ruling on the case Collin County is referring to. Collin County fails to recognize, they will not
be starting over. Under Texas Code Title 5, Chapter 110 they need to stop. They need to cease
and desist.
In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p11 line1-17 and p12 line5-8 this shows that the
Judge whose orders they are defending actually recused herself, in this point in the transcript
Collin County referring to actions of a Recused Judge, in which the Attorneys from Collin County
attempted to have me jailed for contempt of the Recused Judge's order (before recusal) and
impose a $500 per day fee for any lawsuit I had open for actions they had taken against me.
After she Recused herself they decided to change their action to a Vexatious Litigant motion for
me filing cases about Collin County violating my Religious Rights.
I, § 16 (No Attainder); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 ( Right to practice Religion according to
Conscience); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 (Equal Protection); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ( Due
(Free Exercise);TX. Code Ann. §110.002 ( Applies to all State Law and Judicial Orders); TX.
10
Code Ann. §110.003 (Religious Freedom Protected); TX. Code Ann. §110.005 (Remedies); TX.
Code Ann. §110.008 (Sovereign Immunity Waived). as well as the U.S. CONST. 1st
Amendment of the U.S. CONST. 14th Amendment a nd the U.S. CONST. 9th Amendment.
denial of Rights in State or Federal Law. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103(a) i s legal Attainder, this
instant case is illegal attainder, activated to combat my Religion.
VI. Body
"One's name is a signboard to the world. It is one of the most permanent of possessions; it
remains when everything else is lost; it is owned by those who possess nothing else. A name is
the Only efficient means to describe someone to contemporaries and to posterity. When one
dies it is the only part that lives on in the world. [Citation.]" In re Marriage of Gulsvig (Iowa 1993)
498 N.W.2d 725, 730 (dis. opn. of Snell, J.).)” - In Re Arnett, 148 Cal. App. 4th 654 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007)
A. JURISDICTION/RESIDENCE
"MR. GALLAGHER: That's --

THE COURT: -- Castle Rock --
MR. GALLAGHER: That's a mailing address.
THE COURT: -- Colorado?
MR. GALLAGHER: That's a mailing address.
That's my mailing address. I don't have an address. I'm homeless. That's my mom's address,
and that's where I can get things sent to me. And I also have a letter of residency if necessary.
THE COURT: Is this something that was filed?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes -- no, this is a more recent one, but I do have them filed also -- in the
past. This is a recent one that was just from yesterday or the day before from The Salvation
Army --
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: -- showing that I live in Tex -- Dallas. But in the coherent evidence of
residency, there's a bunch more. There's plenty of receipts from Dallas Life. There's residency
letters. There's – we got married in this court. Me and my wife, we got married in this -- not in
this courtroom but this courthouse, like, right down the hall." In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008
Transcript (RR) p6 line1-24
11
Response/Objection to County (CR9) p74-75, this document contains information about my
mailing address, as well as a Citation of Black's Law "Walker v. Walker, 1 Mo. App. 404,
Residence means a fixed and permanent abode or dwelling-place for the time being as
contradistinguished from a mere temporary locality of existence. So does "inhabitancy;" and the
two are distinguishable in this respect from "domicile" In re: Wrigley, 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 134. As
they are used in the New York Code of Procedure, the terms "residence" and "resident" mean
legal Residence; and legal Residence is the place of a man's fixed Habitation. Where his
Political rights are to be exercised and where he is liable to Taxation. Houghton v. Ault, 10 How.
Practice. (N.Y.) 77. A distinction is recognized between legal and actual residence. A person
may be a legal Resident of one place and an actual Resident of another. He may abide in one
State or Country without surrendering his legal Residence in another, if he so intends. His legal
Residence may be merely ideal, but his actual Residence must be substantial. He may not
actually abide at his legal Residence at all, but his actual Residence must be his abiding place.
Tipton v. Tipton, 87 KY 243 8 S.W. 440; Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa, 30; Fitzgerald v. Arel, 03 Iowa,
101 18 N.W. 713, 50 Am. Rep. 733; Ludlow v.Szold, 00 Iowa, 175, 57 N.W. 070", see
https://thelawdictionary.org/residence/
This definition of Residence is supported by a US Supreme Court case involving Texas, called
Texas v. Florida, which states "While one's statements may supply evidence of the intention
requisite to establish domicile at a given place of Residence, they cannot supply the fact of
Residence there, and they are of slight weight when they conflict with the fact. This is the more
so where, as here, the statements are shown to have been inspired by the desire to establish a
nominal Residence for Tax Purposes, different from the Residence in Fact. P. 306 U.S. 425. In
such circumstances, the actual fact of the place of Residence and the person's real attitude and
intention with respect to it as disclosed by his course of conduct are the controlling factors in
ascertaining his domicile. When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences,
he must abide by the consequences, whether intended or not." -Texas v. Florida, 306 US 398
(1939)
First to the point of Jurisdiction I believe that In re: Brilliant ( Jurisdiction), In Re Marriage of JB
and HB (Abuse of Judicial Discretion) and In re: Nanelle Serio (Abuse of Judicial Discretion) are
the best place for the court to look for Jurisdictional guidance in my case:
" A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party contests the trial court's authority to
determine the subject matter of the cause of action. See, *684 e.g., State v. Benavides, 772
S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). The petitioner has the burden to
allege facts that affirmatively show the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Texas
Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd.,852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). A respondent may
assert in the plea that another court has exclusive jurisdiction or that the petitioner has made
fraudulent allegations for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. See Michol O'Connor,
O'Connor's Texas Rules * Civil Trials 2002, Commentaries 175, 176-77 (2002). Subject matter
jurisdiction presents a question of law which we review de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,
12
964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998), cert. denied,526 U.S. 1144, 119 S. Ct. 2018, 143 L. Ed. 2d
1030 (1999). In deciding whether to grant or deny a plea to the jurisdiction, the court need not
look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to
resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex.2000).
Where the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction, a liberal
construction of the pleadings in favor of jurisdiction is appropriate. Continental Coffee Products
Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex.1996); Peek v. Equipment Service Co. of San
Antonio,779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989)." In Re Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App. 2002)
"To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion
and that relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 226
S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). Because a trial court’s temporary orders
are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate way to challenge them. See In re Derzapf, 219
S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Thus, the remaining consideration is
whether the court’s issuance of the temporary order was an abuse of discretion under section
156.006(b) of the Texas Family Code." In re: Nanelle Serio, 03-14-00786-CV (Tex. App.
2014)
"To obtain mandamus relief from the order striking its intervention, the State must meet two
requirements. It must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the State
has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36
(Tex.2004) (orig.proceeding); see also Walker v. Packer,827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992)
(orig.proceeding). In its mandamus petition, the State contends that the trial court clearly
abused its discretion by striking the State's intervention sua sponte and without sufficient cause.
The State further contends that its remedy by appeal is inadequate.
We agree with the State that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the State's
intervention sua sponte. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides, "Any party may intervene
by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court for sufficient cause on the motion
of any party." TEX.R. CIV. P. 60 (emphasis added). The court abuses its discretion by striking
an intervention in the absence of a motion to strike. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe
Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990); Prototype Mach. Co. v. Boulware, 292 S.W.3d
169, 172 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.); Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 573,
586 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (en banc); Flores v. Melo-Palacios, 921 S.W.2d
399, 404 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied). Because appellee did not file a motion to
strike the State's intervention, the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
The foregoing analysis also disposes of appellee's argument that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by striking the State's intervention because the office of the attorney general has no
justiciable interest in the case. Lack of a justiciable interest to intervene must be raised by a
motion to strike or the defense is waived. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs., N.A., 972
S.W.2d 26, 31 *661 (Tex.1998); see also Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657. Thus,
13
appellee cannot defend the trial court's action by arguing that the State (which is the actual
intervenor, not the office of the attorney general) lacks a justiciable interest in the case.
The trial court's order striking the State's petition in intervention potentially interferes with the
State's important right to be heard on the constitutionality of its statutes and its statutory right to
pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM.CODE ANN. § 37.006(b) (Vernon 2008) (requiring attorney general to be given notice of
any proceeding in which a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional); id. § 51.014(a)(8)
(authorizing interlocutory appeal from denial of plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit);
see also Wilson v. Andrews,10 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex.1999) (attorney general intervened to
defend statute, moved for summary judgment, and pursued appeal to Texas Supreme Court);
Kern v. Taney,11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 559 (Ct.Com.Pl.2010) (Pennsylvania attorney general
intervened and participated in hearing regarding court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
same-sex divorce case). When the right to participate in litigation is wrongfully denied,
mandamus relief is likely to be appropriate. See In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,184 S.W.3d
718 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus and ordering court of appeals to allow
insurer to participate in appeal so that insurer, which had superseded judgment, could defend its
own interests). Mandamus relief will also yield the benefit of sparing the parties and the public
the time and expense of divorce proceedings in a court that might lack subject-matter
jurisdiction to proceed. Cf. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex.2007)
(orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus relief from denial of Southwestern Bell's plea to the
jurisdiction); Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Tex. 1995)
(orig.proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to correct erroneous assertion of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant). Because this is an issue that is likely to arise in other
cases, prompt *662 appellate resolution of the subject-matter-jurisdiction question will have
broad public benefits." - In Re Marriage of JB and HB, 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010)
B. LAW
The case most similar to mine out of all the cases I can find in the Texas record is In re: Evett's
Appeal, in the case she is filing for a name change and her husband is there with her. "Marion
Faye Evetts, joined by her husband, J. B. Evetts, Jr., appeals from the action of the trial court in
denying her application to change her surname to Herron...Appellant, joined by her husband,
filed her application for change of name in Jim Wells County, the county of her residence, as
required by Art. 5928, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats." --In Re Evett's Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.
App. 1965). She is changing her name to her Former Married name of Herron which her
children are named, but her new husband is keeping his name. In my case, my Wife was at the
hearing and I am changing my name first, because once my name is changed, I am the man so
she can easily change hers. In Re: Evett's Appeal, being a case from Texas in the 1960s gets
into the Subject of Men and Women and the "Gender Roles". In Hinduism we do not subject
Women as in many other Religions. And we will need to file for her also after me, as she wants
to change her first name to that of the Goddess Kali.
14
In Re: Evett's Appeal is also very informative about the History of name changes, and goes from
Common Law, granularly down to Texas:
"Frequently, a man who desires to change his name does so by means of a royal license, or by
Act of Parliament, or by a deed poll duly enrolled in court and advertised. But such formalities
are unnecessary and are resorted to merely for the purpose of giving notoriety to the change of
name and preserving evidence of it. 16 Halisbury's Laws of England (2d ed., 1950), 639. But the
modern Englishman who wishes to change his Christian name must still do so at confirmation or
by Act of Parliament. Id.
The common law of England was transferred to this country, and its doctrines are said to apply
when not abrogated by statute. See Art. 1, Vernon's Ann.Civ. Stats. The common law rules with
respect to change of name seem to be followed generally in the United States, although, for
name-changing purposes, we make no distinction between Christian names and surnames. In
re Leibowitz, 49 F. Supp. 953 (D.C., Ill.); Smith v. United States Casualty Co., supra; Evans v.
Brendle, 173 N.C. 149, 91 S.E. 723; In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 958; Dwight,
Proper Names, 20 Yale L.J. 387 (1911).
It appears that throughout our history inhabitants of this country have freely exercised their
common-law right to change their names. There seem to have been three principal reasons for
changing names: (1) the transformation of old names due to frontier illiteracy or local habits of
pronunciation; (2) the adoption of surnames, generally English, by Indians and, after the Civil
War, by newly-freed slaves; and (3) the adoption of English names, or the anglicization of
foreign names, by immigrants and the descendants of immigrants. 15 Encyc.Britannica, Names,
p. 1159.
Many states, including Texas, have adopted statutes prescribing a procedure for change of
name. 30 Am.Jr., Name (1941), p. 610, § 28. But it is generally held that these statutes do not
abrogate the common law rule which allows a person to change his name without resort to legal
procedure. They merely provide a method for recording the change. Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark.
377, 247 S.W.2d 1015; Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 203; *784 Degerberg v.
McCormick, 184 A.2d 468 (Del.Ch.); Reinken v. Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639; Petition of
Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216; Note, 16 N.C.L.Rev. 187, 189-190; 65 C.J.S., Names,
§ 11, p. 22." -In Re Evett's Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App. 1965)
In In Re: Evett's Appeal it shows that under Common Law a name was something you
personally chose to go by. There was not even a written Texas Statute at the time (to the extent
there is now), but clearly we should acknowledge In Re: Evett's Appeal' s clarity on the nature of
a Human name and the strict Definition of "Christian name", which would be the first name if we
were completely under Common Law alone. For a deeper look at Evett w e an refer to In Re
Erickson t his is a case where a Feminist in Texas was not aware she could keep her maiden
name, so filed to do so, and the Trial Court denied it citing State Customs, her Husband being
15
the man, and the appearance of Illicit Co-Inhabitance ""[f]or good cause shown the court shall
order a change of name as requested if it finds that the change is in the interest or to the benefit
of the petitioner." Generally, the grant of an application for change of name is a matter of judicial
discretion and should be granted unless there exists some wrongful, fraudulent, or capricious
purpose. See Petition of Hauptly,262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); In re Reben,342 A.2d
688 (Me.1975); In re Evett's Appeal,392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1965, writ
ref'd). See generally 65 C.J.S. Names § 11(2) (1966).". The appeals court used Evett for
Guidance, reiterating that the Court may deny a name change for various reasons, including
Fraud, but decided that this case did not meet those standards, and they reversed.
"This is an appeal from an order denying a change of name. Marguerite Lynn Erickson,
appellant, filed an application in the district court seeking to have her married name, Erickson,
changed back to her maiden name, McGregor. In her application she stated that she was
unaware that she could retain her maiden name upon marriage and that she is a "feminist" who
strongly believes that equality between men and women is symbolized by a retention of such
party's surname in marriage. She also stated that her profession requires her to maintain her
identity separate from that of her husband. The court denied the change of *359 name stating in
its findings of fact and law that: (1) the appellant's husband had a vested right in the subject
matter of the petition and, therefore, was a necessary party; (2) the petition failed to state
sufficient legal or equitable grounds for the grant; (3) there is no statutory or case law
authorizing a married woman to change her name from that of her husband; and (4) to grant the
change of name would give "the appearance of an illicit co-habitation against the morals of
society," that it would not be in the best interest of their minor children, and that without
evidence of some advantage in her professional capacity, the grant "would be detrimental to the
institution of the home and family life and contrary to the common law and customs of this
state."
An application for a change of name by an adult is controlled by sections 32.21 and 32.22 of the
Texas Family Code. Section 32.21 requires that the applicant petition the district court stating
the present name and address of the petitioner, the requested name, and the reason for which a
change is desired. Section 32.21 does not require the spouse, or anyone else, be made a party.
Section 32.22 states that "[f]or good cause shown the court shall order a change of name as
requested if it finds that the change is in the interest or to the benefit of the petitioner."
Generally, the grant of an application for change of name is a matter of judicial discretion and
should be granted unless there exists some wrongful, fraudulent, or capricious purpose. See
Petition of Hauptly,262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); In re Reben,342 A.2d 688 (Me.1975);
In re Evett's Appeal,392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd). See
generally 65 C.J.S. Names § 11(2) (1966).
In this case the record contains no evidence that any difficulties will arise from the granting of
appellant's application. She testified that her family, including her husband, had been apprised
of her intention, that they were all in agreement, and that no difficulties would be created. This
testimony was clear, direct, and positive, free from contradiction and as such, should have been
16
taken as true as a matter of law. Cochran v. Wool Growers Central Storage Co.,140 Tex. 184,
166 S.W.2d 904, 908 (1942). We cannot say from the evidence as presented that to grant
appellant's request will result in "the appearance of an illicit co-habitation against the morals of
society," and be "detrimental to the institution of the home and family life," or that it will be
against the best interest of the children.
It is enough that for her own proper reasons, appellant conscientiously feels the necessity of
being known and referred to by her previous name. To deny her this right would be a violation of
equal protection under the law by creating an invalid classification based on sex. See Mercer v.
Board of Trustees, North Forest Independent School Dist., 538 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.
—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n. r. e.).
We would not like to be understood as holding that a person has the absolute right to change
his name by court order. In re Evett's Appeal, supra. Although the petitioner is ordinarily the only
party before the court, the trial judge may appropriately inquire into matters, other than sex,
which would authorize him to refuse to give legal sanction to a change of name. For example,
inquiry may appropriately be made as to whether the petitioner has judgments against him or
has been a bankrupt. A change of name may be considered inappropriate if desired for the
purpose of concealing an adverse credit rating, a criminal record, or to otherwise work a fraud.
Imposition by assuming the name of a celebrity or other well-known entity for commercial
purposes may negate the right to a legal change of name. In short, the *360 court may inquire
into such matters as may be reasonably necessary to protect the family from disruption and the
public from imposition, fraud, or improper purpose. A follower of traditional social propriety may
not understand appellant's motives in this case; however, her motives are legitimate to her, and
she believes it in her "interest" and to her "benefit" to use her maiden name. It is the opinion of
this court, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to deny appellant's application for change
of name. The order of the trial court is reversed, and appellant's application for change of name
is granted.“ -In Re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App. 1977)
Most Religious name changes in Texas seem to be in Prison, so to bring Evett into modern
case law we can look at In Re: Kirson Barnes where a Texas Prisoner cites 2 cases to support
his name change "See Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir.2000) (“[Hakim] obtained
from the State of Florida a legal name change to his Muslim name.”); Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86,
87 (4th Cir.1990) (“[Ali's] name change is official under North Carolina law.”)."- IN RE: Kirson
Barnes 13–13–00685–CV (Tx App 2015)
In Barnes the name change is denied citing Chapter 45 of the Texas code, which says a
currently incarcerated Felon can not change their name “final felony conviction” prohibits a
petitioner in Texas such as Barnes, who is still incarcerated, from seeking a name change.
See also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103(a)."
IN RE: Kirson Barnes 13–13–00685–CV (Tx App 2015); Salahuddin v. Carlson, 523 F. Supp.
314 (E.D. Va. 1981); Rahman v. Stephenson, 626 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); In Re Name
Change Petition of Mullin, 892 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); In Re Change of Name of
17
Picollo, 668 N.W.2d 712 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003)
Another example of use of Judicial Discretion is in In Re Mayol where a foreign refugee in
America changed his name at a refugee camp and was unable to prove who he was before the
name change (the one he wanted to change back to) so was not allowed to change his name
this is another case where the court follows chapter 45. But I have clearly proved who I am to
the Court, so this can not be applied to deny my name change. This would be a case in Collin
County's favor.
"James Mayol, appellant, appeals from an order denying a change of name. Appellant *104 filed
an application for a name change in district court seeking to have his name, James Mayol,
changed back to his birth name, Barnabas Akech Malou. The trial court denied the change of
name noting that appellant failed to produce documentation establishing the correct identity of
James Mayol. In his sole point of error, appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his
petition for change of name because he presented sufficient documentation to establish the
identity of appellant as James Mayol. We affirm." -In Re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.
2004)
C. RELIGION
"Plaintiff appears to be an ordained minister of the Universal Life Church and runs a religiously
oriented business of selling seeds, herbs, fruits, and vegetables. Plaintiff states that he "is a
Hindu and practices Neurospirituality," which appears to involve the use of nootropics. Plaintiff's
examples of these substances include syneperine, tryptophan, and holy basil seeds, which,
according to Plaintiff, "are grown for Lord Krishna, and are definitely not illegal." - Gallagher v.
Austin Police Department 1:16-cv-00527 (WD TX 2017); VAN-KUSH v. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 1:20-cv-00906 (D.D.C. 2020)
There are no examples, as far as I can find, of a Non-Incarcerated person bringing, or needing
to bring, a Religious claim in a name change proceeding. Similarly, I can not find an example of
a Government entity objecting to a name change, and a Judge giving no legal reasoning. So to
get to the point of Religion, we can look at the Horvath case which was Decided Jan 2020, but
will have more meaning now with the Corona Virus having broke out into America. In Horvath
there is an Ordained Minister, and I myself am also an Ordained minister, challenging
Government Regulation that violates Religious Rights "Brett Horvath is an ordained Baptist
minister and objects to vaccination as a tenet of his religion... Under Smith, government may
regulate religious activity, without having to satisfy strict scrutiny, so long as the regulation is a
“neutral law of general applicability.” 494 U.S. at 879. That rule does not apply, however, where
government grants exemptions to some but not to others. Religious liberty deserves better than
that—even under Smith. Based on the record in this case, it is far from clear that the city’s policy
is a “neutral law of general applicability.” There are factual disputes that make summary
judgment inappropriate. I would accordingly vacate the judgment as to the Free Exercise claim
18
against the city and remand for further proceedings." -HORVATH v. CITY OF
LEANDER,18-51011 (5th Cir 2020)
Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.001. DEFINITIONS. (a) In this chapter:

(1) "Free exercise of religion" means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by
sincere religious belief. In determining whether an act or refusal to act is substantially motivated
by sincere religious belief under this chapter, it is not necessary to determine that the act or
refusal to act is motivated by a central part or central requirement of the person's sincere
religious belief.
In Horvath t he Government actions were found to be burdening Religion, and Collin County is
also burdening Religion, they do not even hide that this is all about my Religion. Collin County
did not make this Evett b ased claim because they probably didn't know about it, Bob Davis said
this was his first name change case and I have no idea why he is showing up at my Family
Court hearings, but if their argument is going to be interpreted fairly we can say that Evett is
actually in their favor to an extent. In Evett the name change is dismissed due to a pending
Lawsuit… but, the Court used Case Law stating that Courts may deny name changes for fraud,
and it was determined she may be trying to trick the Insurance or Pension in the underlying Suit
into thinking she never remarried:
"Counsel for Southwestern participated in the hearing of appellant's application, but no brief has
been filed on behalf of Southwestern in this Court.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge said, "Gentlemen, I don't want to be in the
position to affect a lawsuit in some other court. I am going to deny the application for change of
name."
...
The trial judge concluded that it would not be to the best interest of appellant to grant her
application for change of name, and that the change of name applied for is unnecessary to
protect any of the legal rights of appellant.
…
A person's right to change his name by court order is not absolute. Thus, it is generally held that
an application for a change of name may properly be denied where the change is sought for a
fraudulent purpose, or where the change of name will result in the invasion of the rights of
others. Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200. And even in the absence of a showing of
fraud or the invasion of rights of another, the court may be justified in denying an application for
a change of name. In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 958. That is, under statutes
prescribing procedures for change of name, an order changing the name of an applicant is a
matter of judicial discretion, and not of right. Ex parte Taylor, Tex.Civ. App., 322 S.W.2d 309, no
wr. hist.; Plass v. Leithold, Tex.Civ.App., 381 S.W.2d 580, no wr. hist.; 38 Am.Jur., Name, p.
610, § 29." -In Re Evett's Appeal, 392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App. 1965)
Collin County makes no such claims of fraud and there are none to make. They claim that I am
19
attempting to escape Obligations of my old name, but that is overcome by something that did
hapter 45.
not exist during Evett, C
"The rule -- Chapter 45, the -- I forget which exact rule it is, but it says liability is unaffected. You
cannot get out of anything by changing your name; that's not what it does. And my wife is also
here, and she will be changing her name also. It is our religion, and we're doing it 'cause we're
married and we're changing our name together." I n Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR)
p5 lines16-22
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.104 LIABILITIES AND RIGHTS UNAFFECTED. A change of name
under this subchapter does not release a person from liability incurred in that person's previous
name or defeat any right the person had in the person's previous name.
"MS. THOMPSON: -- and in Collin County; therefore, we objected to this. If you decide
to grant the name change, then we request that he be ordered to provide you with a list
of the lawsuits that he's filed in all the different courts and provide notice to all of those
courts of the name change so that --
MR. GALLAGHER: I agree." In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p7
line18-24
"MR. GALLAGHER: I would like that also. I would like all the court cases to be changed
to my new name. And me and Bob did come to an agreement, which is -- 'cause Bob
Davis was the original attorney in the injunction. And me -- we came to an agreement in
an e-mail that I would do that and then he came in and said I was trying to slip out of
something, which it can't even be done." I n Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR)
p8 line2-9
And Evett i s in their favor to an extent with Chapter 45 bringing in more clarity, but Chapter 45 is
not their only burden and they are not bringing any kind of Barnes claim. For a deeper look at
the concept in Horvath we should look at Beto v. Cruz which states that Buddhism is 600 years
older than Christianity, as Jesus was year 0 so Buddhism, Hinduism, etc, which are B.C.
religions, are older than Christianity. Religion is older than Law, so must be considered when
enforcing Law: "If Cruz was a Buddhist and if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of
pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to
conventional religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination by the State against the
Buddhist religion, established 600 B.C., long before the Christian era. The First Amendment,
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, Torcaso v. Watkins,367 U.S.
488, 492-493, prohibits government from making a law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.
If the allegations of this complaint are assumed to be true, as they must be on the motion to
dismiss, Texas has violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments." - Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319 (1972)
20
Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.002. APPLICATION.
(a) This chapter applies to any ordinance, rule, order, decision, practice, or other exercise of
governmental authority.
(b) This chapter applies to an act of a government agency, in the exercise of governmental
authority, granting or refusing to grant a government benefit to an individual.
(c) This chapter applies to each law of this state unless the law is expressly made exempt from
the application of this chapter by reference to this chapter.
To truly appreciate the modern atmosphere, we need to look at a US Supreme Court that relied
heavily on the Zorach case from Texas, a case called Masterpiece which was a case where a
Christian Cakeshop owner refused to use his artistic skills to bake a gay Wedding cake. The
Colorado Civil Rights Commission took the side of the gay couple and commenced a Hostile
attack on the Christian baker from their Government posts: "The State’s interest could have
been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite
religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. But the official expressions of hostility to
religion in some of the commissioners’ comments were inconsistent with that requirement, and
the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other
bakers suggests the same. Pp. 16–18."
370 P. 3d 272, reversed."-Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights

Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
Sec. 110.003. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROTECTED.

(a) Subject to Subsection (b), a government agency may not substantially burden a person's
free exercise of religion.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply if the government agency demonstrates that the application of
the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
D. RACE/ETHNICITY
"It is now judicially determined that the mere color of the skin of the individual does not afford a
practical test as to whether he is eligible to American citizenship, as that differs greatly among
persons of the same race, "even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations
from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette; the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued
persons of the brown or yellow races." Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197, 43 S. Ct. 65,
69 (67 L. Ed. 199)." -United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925)
Asked: What do you say to the White man who looks around and sees his cities being burned,
feels his own self threatened, what do you say to him?
21
"I say that he should look in to the situation and discover the cause of the activity that results in
burned down buildings and the spontaneous outbursts that you call riots and other people call
uprisings... Organizing themselves outside the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, and
to move to remove and destroy these parties and establish new Political Machinery... The
reason the whole situation is taking a turn towards violence, is because the Government is not
being responsive to the legitimate demands... The people we are organizing at this time are
people who have never been organized before, they have never belonged to the NAACP or to
CORE..." -Eldridge Cleaver
"Petitioner is a member of a group which call themselves "Muslims", at the head of which there
is an individual who calls himself "Muhammad" (referred to *247 during the hearing as a
messenger of Allah). Whether it is properly within the term "religion" is a controverted issue. It
has been aptly described by the Second Circuit in Piercé v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 844 (1963), as
"the `Muslim Brotherhood' a self-organized and self-styled group having as its avowed object
the study and furtherance of Islam, but which also had overtones of secrecy and intrigue",[1]
and the Seventh Circuit in Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166 (1963) refers to "certain social
studies which show that the Black Muslim Movement, despite its pretext of a religious facade, is
an organization that, outside of prison walls, has for its object the overthrow of the white race,
and inside prison walls, has an impressive history of inciting riots and violence." For the
purposes of this case, however, Respondent took the position that he was willing to assume that
the Nation of Islam, to which the Petitioner adheres, is a religion (Transcript of Hearing, Page
66). In the present proceeding, moreover, no purpose would be served by attempting to decide
this issue since considered in the light most favorable to Petitioner, his cause of action cannot
be sustained... Certainly with the administration of a large prison population committed to a
limited personnel, the responsible prison authorities must be vested with discretion in the
admission of persons to the institution and in the persons approved for correspondence. It
cannot be dictated by the prisoners and as to the present issue, is reasonable, justifiable and
definitely not arbitrary or capricious. I find that Desmond has been accorded every right to which
he was entitled consistent with the proper administration of the institution by the authorities."
-Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964)
The purpose of Recording a Name Change is Simply for Government and Public Record. To
add more clarity to this subject, I ask the Court to look at Federal Information Law:
5 U.S. Code§ 552a.Records maintained on individuals

(e) Agency Requirements.—Each agency that maintains a system of reco rds shall—
(2) collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual when
the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual’s rights, benefits, and
privileges under Federal programs;
(f) Agency Rules.—In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency that
maintains a system of records shall promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements
(including general notice) of section 553 of this title, which shall—
22
(4) establish procedures for reviewing a request from an individual concerning the amendment
of any record or information pertaining to the individual, for making a determination on the
request, for an appeal within the agency of an initial adverse agency determination, and for
whatever additional means may be necessary for each individual to be able to exercise fully his
rights under this section;
Part of this denial is the Court denying me the Right to change my Race on the Public Record to
"Hispanic-White". I am in fact Hispanic-White, and I want the Public Record, and Information by
the Government to Reflect that. These descriptions are used in the book Kingdom of this
World, page 72 Quadroons, Octoroons, Sacatra, and Griffe; Farrar, Straus and Giroux
(2017) to identify individuals of varying mixtures of race. A Quadroon was half mulatto and half
white, or one fourth black. An octoroon was the child of a quadroon and a white, so their blood
was one fourth black at most. However, oftentimes any black blood in a person's lineage was
enough to identify them as black, and/or a slave. A Griffe was half black and half mulatto, so
they were at least three fourths black. A Sacatra was half Griffe and half black.
Other identifications used included Metif (same as Octoroon), Meamelouc (half white and half
Metif), Quarteron (half Meamelouc and half white), Sangmele (half quarteron and half white),
and Mango (half Griffe and half black). This was the origin of the black stereotype "Sambo" - as
Sambo was the word for a child of a mulatto and a black, or a Griffe child. In Spanish the word
Guerro means "White Mexican" and that is what Mexicans call me, but most Mexican Nationals
automatically assume I know Spanish fluently and I have to tell people "No Habla Espanol" all
the time and am usually the only White Skinned person wherever I go. Motion for Court to
Recognize Heritage (CR27) p409, Nov 18th, 2019 see page 409 to see my Explanation of my
National Heritage to the Court. I am not Legally White, my last name right now is Gallagher and
I am only ⅛, 12.5% Irish. Response Coherent Evidence of Residency (CR14) p115, Oct 17th,
2019 see page 136 for Birth Certificate, Box 15a shows that my Mom, Tracy Lopez, is of
Hispanic Origin. Box 15b shows she is of Mexican Descent. Page 137 and 138 and 139 is my
Families Heritage. Native American/Mexican, other Native mixed in, Spanish/Potuguese, and
South European. In Re: Gallagher, DF-19-16008 Transcript (RR) p5 line9-22
"That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Louisiana, of
mixed descent, in the proportion of seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that
the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was entitled to every
recognition, right, privilege and immunity secured to the citizens of the United States of the
white race by its Constitution and Lawsuits...Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races
may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been
universally recognized as within the police power of the State. State v. Gibson, 36 Indiana
389.Arnold's" -Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
"We reasoned that the voter qualification at issue “tie[d] voter eligibility to descent from an ethnic
group;” the qualification “referenced blood quantum to determine descent” much like the
Hawaiian law invalidated in Rice; and the statute implementing the classification referenced
23
race. Id. As in Rice, the CNMI law left no reasonable explanation for the voting qualifications
except that voter eligibility was race-based." -Davis v. Guam, 17-15719 (9th Cir. 2019)
"Some tribes do not have written rolls. Others have rolls that list only persons that were
members as of a certain date.” Id., 888 P.2d at 125; accord In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d
786, 791, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42–43 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Likewise, the ICWA contains no blood
quantum requirement; rather, each tribe has its own criteria. See Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan
J. Siebers, ICWA: Myths and Mistaken Application, 83 Mich. Bar. J. 12, 21 (2004)." -In the
Interest of R.R., Jr. and V.R., Children, 02-08-00061-CV (Tex. App. 2009)
And Evett, Horvath, Beto, a nd Masterpiece bring us to the Constitutional Claim. I am

challenging Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45 of the Texas State Code, Under TEX. CONST. art. I, §
16 (No Attainder); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 ( Right to practice Religion according to Conscience);
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 ( Equal Protection); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ( Due Process); Tex.
Const. art. I, §§ 13 & 15; art. II, § 1; art. V, § 10; TX. Code Ann. §110.001(1) (Free Exercise);TX.
Code Ann. §110.002 ( Applies to all State Law and Judicial Orders); TX. Code Ann. §110.003
(Religious Freedom Protected); TX. Code Ann. §110.005 ( Remedies); TX. Code Ann. §110.008
(Sovereign Immunity Waived). as well as the U.S. CONST. 1st Amendment of the U.S. CONST.
14th Amendment and the U.S. CONST. 9th Amendment. Attainder may only be granted like
Gun Rights being Revoked from Felons, there can be no denial of Rights in State or Federal
Law. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 45.103(a) is legal Attainder, this instant case is illegal attainder,
activated to combat my Religion.
"The permit system established by the Act gives preference to "existing users." The Act defines
"existing users" as those persons who withdrew and beneficially used underground water from
the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993. Id. § 1.03(10). The Authority will grant regular permits
only to existing users who properly file a declaration of historical use and who can establish, by
convincing evidence, beneficial use of the water withdrawn between June 1, 1972 and May 31,
1993. Id. § 1.16. The Act requires existing users to file this declaration of historical use on or
before March 1, 1994. Id.Until regular permits are granted, existing users can withdraw and
beneficially use water, provided it is not wasted. Id. § 1.17.
…
If the Act is constitutional under any possible state of facts, we should presume that such facts
exist without making a separate investigation of the facts or attempting to decide whether the
Legislature has reached a correct conclusion with respect to the facts. Id.; see also Corsicana
Cotton Mills v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 352, 71 S.W.2d 247, 250 (1934). Thus, in our review of this
24
Act, we focus on the entire record presented to us rather than simply relying upon the fact
findings of the district court.
…
Legislative intent supports our conclusion. To determine legislative intent, we examine the old
law, the evil to be corrected, and the object to be obtained. Crimmins v. Lowry,691 S.W.2d 582,
584 (Tex.1985); see also Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280
(Tex.1994)....A contrary conclusion would require the fallacious reasoning that the Legislature
intended the provisions favoring existing users to be subject to an impossible condition in the
event of a delay in implementing the Act. Courts should not read a statute to create such an
absurd result. McKinney v. Blankenship,154 Tex. 632, 282 S.W.2d 691, 698 (1955).
…
An analysis of the constitutionality of a statute begins with a presumption of validity. HL Farm
Corp. v. Self,877 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex.1994); Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695
S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.1985); Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Beaumont Barber
College, Inc.,454 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.1970). When possible, we are to interpret legislative
enactments in a manner to avoid constitutional infirmities. See Texas State Bd. of Barber
Examiners, 454 S.W.2d at 732; Smith v. Patterson,111 Tex. 535, 242 S.W. 749, 750 (1922). We
must resolve any ambiguities in the Act mindful of our obligation to reject interpretations which
defeat the purpose of the legislation as long as another reasonable interpretation exists.
Citizens Bank v. First State Bank, 580 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.1979).
This Court has recognized that "[a] too literal construction of a statute, which would prevent the
enforcement of it according to its true intent, should be avoided." State v. Dyer,145 Tex. 586,
200 S.W.2d 813, 815 (1947). A court must attempt to ascertain what the Legislature intended
and interpret the statute accordingly. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 889 S.W.2d at 280. In keeping
with this principle, statutory language that appears to impose a mandatory duty may be
interpreted to be only directory when necessary to fulfill the legislative intent of the statute.
Chisholm v. Bewley Mills,155 Tex. 400, 287 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1956)(statute requiring filing of
claim against state within thirty days held directory, not mandatory); Thomas v. Groebl, 147 Tex.
70, 212 S.W.2d 625, 630 (1948)(provision requiring annual renewal *630 of certificate of
exemption from poll tax held directory).
In Stephenson v. Stephenson, 22 S.W. 150 (Tex.1893), we held that a statute requiring

transcripts to be filed with the newly created courts of civil appeals within ninety days after the
notice of appeal did not apply to certain litigants. The litigant in Stephenson had tendered his
transcript more than ninety days after the notice of appeal because the courts of civil appeals
had not yet become operational. This Court, relying on legislative intent, interpreted the Act to
allow the transcript to be filed ninety days from the time the appellate court clerk began
operations. Id. at 151.
…
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. Generally, a classification under an equal protection challenge must
only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Richards v. LULAC,868 S.W.2d 306,
310-11 (Tex.1993); Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 559. However, classifications impinging upon the
25
exercise of a fundamental right or distinguishing between individuals on a suspect basis, such
as race or national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Richards,868 S.W.2d at 311.
…
The United States Supreme Court generally uses the rational basis test for equal protection
challenges to economic or property regulation. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,427 U.S. 297,
303-04, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976). See also generally Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732, 83 S. Ct. 1028, 1032, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri,342 U.S. 421, 424, 72 S. Ct. 405, 407-08, 96 L. Ed. 469 (1952)(regulations
causing financial burdens for which no compensation is paid are not constitutionally infirm as
long as there is a rational basis). In Dukes, the United States Supreme Court applied a rational
basis test to an ordinance that prohibited street vendors from operating in the French Quarter
except for the two vendors who had operated there for more than eight years. This New Orleans
ordinance, like the Edwards Aquifer Act, classified economic rights on the basis of the past use
of the rights.
…
Similarly, Texas cases have applied a rational basis test to uphold the constitutionality of zoning
ordinances and other regulations *632 that affect economic rights. Lombardo v. City of Dallas,
124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475, 482-85 (1934); McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36,
73 S.W.2d 487, 487 (1934); see also Lens Express, Inc. v. Ewald, 907 S.W.2d 64, 68-69
(Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no writ); Town of Sunnyvale v. Mayhew, 905 S.W.2d 234, 266
(Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, writ requested). In accordance with these precedents, we conclude
that the rational basis test applies to Plaintiffs' equal protection claims.
…
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. This guarantee, similar to the federal due process clause, contains
both a procedural component and a substantive component. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 525;
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977). Plaintiffs contend that the Act
violates both components.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the Act will deprive them of their property without procedural due
course of law. They allege that the Authority will make decisions regarding their property that
will not be subject to any type of judicial review. We disagree with Plaintiffs' claim that the Act
does not provide for judicial review.
...
Plaintiffs' final constitutional challenge is that the Act violates the open courts, right to trial by
jury, and separation of powers provisions of the Texas Constitution to the extent that the Act
would require a person desiring to appeal the imposition of an administrative penalty to pay the
penalty prior to taking the appeal. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 13 & 15; art. II, § 1; art. V, § 10. We
have held that provisions in statutes requiring prepayment of administrative penalties as a
prerequisite to judicial review are unconstitutional. Flag-Redfern, 852 S.W.2d at 485; Texas
Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 449-450. However, we expressly recognized in Texas Ass'n of
Business that an administrative agency can be constitutionally granted the right to collect
assessed penalties, as long as the payment of the penalties is not tied to the right to judicial
26
review. 852 S.W.2d at 449-50; see also Central Appraisal Dist. of Rockwall County v. Lall,924
S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1996)" -Barshop v. Medina Under. Wat. Cons. Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618
(Tex. 1996)
VII. Conclusion
Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.005. REMEDIES.

(a) Any person, other than a government agency, who successfully asserts a claim or defense
under this chapter is entitled to recover:
(1) declaratory relief under Chapter 37;
(2) injunctive relief to prevent the threatened violation or continued violation;
(3) compensatory damages for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses; and
(4) reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses incurred in bringing
the action.
(b) Compensatory damages awarded under Subsection (a)(3) may not exceed $10,000 for each
entire, distinct controversy, without regard to the number of members or other persons within a
religious group who claim injury as a result of the government agency's exercise of
governmental authority. A claimant is not entitled to recover exemplary damages under this
chapter.
1. The Judge Obviously didn't want to rule against Collin County, as she gave no legal
reasoning for her ruling
2. Collin County should have remained in the audience and not joined in the hearings
3. TX Code Title 5 Chapter 110 needs to be weighed against these actions
4. The Court needs to review the Record to see I met all State requirements, and there is a
compelling Public Interest
pplication of Law must
5. The Lower court ruling must be overruled, the Pre Ex Post Facto a
be invalidated and the name change granted
S/_Ryan_Gallagher___
Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher
Mahatmajapa@gmail.com
1723 Candleglow
Castle Rock, Co 80109
27

Challenge To Constitutionality of A State Statute: Homeless

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Challenge To Constitutionality of A State Statute: Homeless

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Challenge to Constitutionality of a State Statute Print

Styled: In re: Gallagher

Petition Answer Motion (Specify type):

Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45

Cruz v. Beto, 405 US 319 (1972)........ ​p20

Davis v. Guam, 17-15719 (9th Cir. 2019)........ ​p24

Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F.Supp. 246 (M.D. Paul 1964)........ ​p22

Gallagher v. Austin Police Department, 1:16cv00527 (WD TX 2017)........ ​p4, 18

Horvath v. City of Leander, 18-51011 (5th Cir 2020)........ ​p18

In re: Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App. 2002).........​ ​p12, 13

In re: Erickson, 547 S.W.2d (Tex. App. 1977)........ ​p15, 16, 17

In re: Kirson Barnes, 13-13-00685-CV (Tx. App. 2015)​........ ​p17

In re: Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2004)........ ​p18

In re: Nanelle Serio, 03-14-00786-cv (Tex. App. 2014)........ ​p13

Masterpiece v. CCRC, 584 US __(2018).......​p21

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896)........​ ​P23

Texas v. Florida, 306 US 398 (1939)........ ​p12

Van-Kush v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1:20cv00906 (DDC 2020)........ ​p4, 18

Statute and Constitution

Tex. Const. Art.I, §13…….. ​p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Const. Art.I, §15…….. ​p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Const. Art.I, §16……..​ ​p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Code Ann. §110.001(1)…….. ​p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

Tex. Code Ann. §110.002…….. ​p1, 3, 8, 10, 21

Tex. Code Ann. §110.003……..​ p1, 3, 10, 21

Tex. Code Ann. §110.004………​ ​p7, 20

Tex. Code Ann. §110.005……..​ p1, 3, 10, 14, 27

Tex. Code Ann. §110.008…….. ​p1, 3, 10, 14

Tex. Code. Title 5 Chapter 110……..​ ​p6, 8

Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45​…….. ​p1

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.102…….. ​p9

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.103(a)....... ​p1

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.104…….. ​p7

U.S. Const. Amd. 1……..​ p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

U.S. Const. Amd. 9……..​ p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

Books and Websites

Kingdom of this World​ ​(2017)…….. ​p23

I. Statement of Facts…….. ​p1

II. Statement of the Case…….. ​p2

III. Issues Presented…….. ​p3-8

IV. Summary of the Argument…….. ​p8

VI. Body…….. ​p11-27

VII. Conclusion…….. ​p27

Attached is the Appendix, including:

Constitutional Challenge Form

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

A. RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO CHANGE NAME

See Court Clerk Records:

Notice of De Novo Appeal to Referring Court…(CR32)​ p424, Nov 19th, 2019

B. COLLIN COUNTY'S PARTICIPATION: ​Pre Ex Post Facto application of Law

IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

(1) the present name and place of residence of the petitioner;

(2) the full name requested for the petitioner;

(3) the reason the change in name is requested;

(1) the petitioner's:

(A) full name;

(D) date of birth;

(F) social security number; and

"MR. GALLAGHER: That's --

Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.001. DEFINITIONS.​ ​(a) In this chapter:

370 P. 3d 272, reversed."​-Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights

Cruz v. Beto, 405 US 319 (1972)........ p20

Davis v. Guam, 17-15719 (9th Cir. 2019)........ p24

Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F.Supp. 246 (M.D. Paul 1964)........ p22

Gallagher v. Austin Police Department, 1:16cv00527 (WD TX 2017)........ p4, 18

Horvath v. City of Leander, 18-51011 (5th Cir 2020)........ p18

In re: Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App. 2002)......... p12, 13

In re: Erickson, 547 S.W.2d (Tex. App. 1977)........ p15, 16, 17

In re: Kirson Barnes, 13-13-00685-CV (Tx. App. 2015)........ p17

In re: Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2004)........ p18

In re: Nanelle Serio, 03-14-00786-cv (Tex. App. 2014)........ p13

Masterpiece v. CCRC, 584 US __(2018).......p21

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896)........ P23

Texas v. Florida, 306 US 398 (1939)........ p12

Van-Kush v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1:20cv00906 (DDC 2020)........ p4, 18

Tex. Const. Art.I, §13…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Const. Art.I, §15…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Const. Art.I, §16…….. p1, 3, 10, 20, 24

Tex. Code Ann. §110.001(1)…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

Tex. Code Ann. §110.002…….. p1, 3, 8, 10, 21

Tex. Code Ann. §110.003…….. p1, 3, 10, 21

Tex. Code Ann. §110.004……… p7, 20

Tex. Code Ann. §110.005…….. p1, 3, 10, 14, 27

Tex. Code Ann. §110.008…….. p1, 3, 10, 14

Tex. Code. Title 5 Chapter 110…….. p6, 8

Tex. Fam. Code Chapter 45…….. p1

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.102…….. p9

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.103(a)....... p1

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §45.104…….. p7

U.S. Const. Amd. 1…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

U.S. Const. Amd. 9…….. p1, 3, 9, 10, 14

Kingdom of this World (2017)…….. p23

I. Statement of Facts…….. p1

II. Statement of the Case…….. p2

III. Issues Presented…….. p3-8

IV. Summary of the Argument…….. p8

VI. Body…….. p11-27

VII. Conclusion…….. p27

Notice of De Novo Appeal to Referring Court…(CR32) p424, Nov 19th, 2019

B. COLLIN COUNTY'S PARTICIPATION: Pre Ex Post Facto application of Law

Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.001. DEFINITIONS. (a) In this chapter:

370 P. 3d 272, reversed."-Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights

Sec. 110.003. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROTECTED.

5 U.S. Code§ 552a.Records maintained on individuals

And Evett, Horvath, Beto, a nd Masterpiece bring us to the Constitutional Claim. I am

Tex. Code Ann. Sec. 110.005. REMEDIES.