PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ v. ATTY.

DAVID LIM QUECO KHO +

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:
This case for disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez (Vazquez) against respondent Atty. David
Lim Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his verified Complaint[1] filed with this Court on 11 July 2012, Vazquez alleges that
Atty. Kho violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood.[2]" He further claims that respondent transgressed
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3]

FACTS

Vazquez and Atty. Kho were both members of the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
(Coalition), an accredited party-list group that participated in the national elections of 10 May 2010. The Complaint
arose from an allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination for the
Coalition. Complainant contested the truth of the statement made under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born
Filipino citizen.[4]

In his Complaint, Vazquez asserted that respondent was a Chinese national. He reasoned that when Atty. Kho was
born on 29 April 1947 to a Chinese father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim Queco), respondent's
citizenship followed that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. Moreover, Vazquez argued that
since respondent has elected Filipino citizenship, the act presupposed that the person electing was either an alien, of
doubtful status, or a national of two countries.[5]

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the Court through its First Division issued a Resolution [6] dated 26 November 2012
requiring Atty. Kho to file his comment on the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the Notice. Alleging he
received the Court's Resolution on 18 February 2013, he filed his Comment[7] on 27 February 2013. As to the
alleged falsity of his statement, Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his Filipina mother
was not yet married to his Chinese father, and that his parents only got married on 8 February 1977 or some 30 years
after his birth. He then averred that according to the 1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed that of his Filipina
mother, and thus he was a natural-born Filipino citizen.[8]

On the matter of his electing Filipino citizenship, respondent explained that since he was already a natural-born
Filipino, his subsequent election of Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect on
his citizenship. Having established his natural-born status, he concluded that he had not committed any falsehood in
his Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination, and that complainant had no cause of action to have him disbarred. [9]

Apart from defending his natural-born status, Atty. Kho also moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of
forum shopping. He claimed that Vazquez had filed three (3) cases in which the latter raised the issue of
respondent's citizenship: (1) the present disbarment case; (2) a quo warranto proceeding with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and (3) a criminal complaint for perjury lodged with the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Atty. Kho alleged that both the quo warranto and the perjury cases had already been
dismissed by the HRET[10] and the City Prosecutor respectively.[11] Finally, he raised jurisdictional questions, arguing
that the proper remedy to attack his citizenship was not a disbarment case, but rather quo warranto.[12]

In answer to respondent's Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to Comment[13] on 11 March 2013. He
claimed therein that at the time of election of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25 February 1970, the latter's
mother was already a Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to respondent's father who was Chinese.
Complainant also opposed respondent's assertion that the latter's parents were not yet married when he was born on
29 April 1947.[14] Complainant further cited respondent's Certificate of Live Birth, which stated that the latter's
parents were married at the time he was born.[15]

That being so, complainant averred that at the time Atty. Kho was born, his mother was already a Chinese national.
Thus, complainant concluded that respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective, since the latter's
parents were both Chinese at the time of his election.[16] Furthermore, complainant alleged that the marriage of
respondent's parents on 8 February 1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance of legitimacy to his prior election of
Filipino citizenship. Lastly, complainant denied the forum shopping charge, saying the three cases he had filed
against respondent had different causes of action and were based on different grounds.[17]

On 8 April 2013, the Court issued a Resolution referring the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[18] At the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), the case was docketed as CBD Case No. 13-3885. Commissioner Victor Pablo C. Trinidad
(Commissioner Trinidad) was designated as investigating commissioner. In a Notice dated 14 August 2013, he set
the case for mandatory conference/hearing on 19 September 2013 and ordered the parties to submit their mandatory
conference briefs.[19]

With both parties present at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing, Commissioner Trinidad ordered them to
submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for
report and recommendation.[20] Only the respondent submitted a conference brief[21] and position paper.[22]

IBP'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On 3 November 2013, Commissioner Trinidad promulgated his Report and Recommendation (Report) [23] finding
Atty. Kho "innocent of the charges" and recommended that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Upon
weighing the evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad found no merit to the allegation that
respondent had committed dishonesty and deceitfulness when he indicated in his verified Certificate of Acceptance
of Nomination that he was a natural-born citizen.[24]

Commissioner Trinidad said that respondent Atty. Kho, as a natural-born Filipino citizen, fell under the category of
someone who was born of a Filipino mother before 17 January 1973, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.[25] On the matter of jurisdiction, the IBP-CBD said that it had jurisdiction to hear the
matter, since the issue was whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the relevant provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Although it acknowledged that citizenship cannot be attacked collaterally, it ruled that it
had to make a finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on that very matter. The IBP-CBD clarified
though, that its ruling was limited and "cannot strip or sustain the respondent of his citizenship." [26]

Lastly, the IBP-CBD found Vazquez guilty of forum shopping since in all the three cases he had filed, he was
questioning whether or not respondent was a natural-born citizen. It said that the actions filed by complainant
involved the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances, as well as identical subject matter and
issues.[27]

On 10 August 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-519, which adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case against Atty.
Kho.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

We adopt and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss the instant administrative case
against respondent for lack of merit.

This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's oath that he shall do no falsehood and that
he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a violation
occurred when respondent declared in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Although the question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack, [28] the Court
acknowledges the IBP-CBD's pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding thereon, since the alleged
dishonesty hinged on this issue.
We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity.[29] A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the lack of any
ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and,
hence, must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Administrative Complaint for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility filed against Atty. David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GESMUNDO, J.:

The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator is not the proper remedy for assailing the legal
propriety of an adverse decision, order, resolution or recommendation, in the case of administrative complaints
against lawyers. More importantly, the reckless practice of filing baseless administrative complaints against fellow
lawyers undeniably degrades rather than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession.

The Antecedents:

Before the Court is a Verified Complaint1 filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against Atty. Jose
Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent)2 who was then a Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
allegedly committing the following acts:

2. Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
1 Bar Discipline, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public [O]fficials and Employees;
2. Violation of Canon[s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer
2 Sanctions of the Commission on Bar Discipline;
2. Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action for serious violations of duties owed to the
3 Courts and the Legal Profession committed by a lawyer, despite repeated notice, and contrary to the mandate of
his office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
2. Gross Ignorance of the Law;
4
2. All the foregoing were aggravated by: a) pattern of misconduct; b) multiple offenses; [c)] substantial experience
5 in the practice of law; and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his office as Commissioner of the Honorable Commission
on Bar Discipline.[3

The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Lucille G. Sillo (Sillo) against complainant
before the IBP, docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3457. The case was assigned to respondent for investigation and
report.

On August 15, 2014, the respondent issued a Report and Recommendation 4 recommending that complainant be
reprimanded for the impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior to the calling of their case for
mediation conference, and for the abusive, offensive or improper language used in the pleadings she filed in the said
case.

The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors (Board) in its
Resolution No. XXI-2015-074, dated January 31, 2015.5

Hence, this administrative complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 67136 when he failed to
act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days
from the submission of the last pleading.7

Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated
statements made in her pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457; and that he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of
complainant's statement in her position paper to give the wrong impression before the IBP-Board of
Governors (Board) that the introductory heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby violating
Rules 1.018 and 1.029 of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01,10 3.02,11 and 3.0412 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.13

Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance for deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary
action against a lawyer for serious violation of duties owed to the Court and the legal profession despite several
notices. She alleged that as early as December 2013, respondent was aware that Atty. Alan R. Bulawan committed
forum shopping and other grave malpractices but respondent refused to institute disciplinary action reasoning that
there should first be a verified complaint before he could act on it. Complainant claimed that respondent's inaction
was a violation of Section 1,14 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1315 of the IBP's By-Laws.16

Lastly, complainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of the rules on privileged communication, on
evidence, on the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to dismiss the present administrative case
outright because it had no merit and when he ignored the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.17

In his Answer,18 respondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false and an unfortunate
misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also an act of harassment. He countered that it was
complainant who caused the delay of the resolution of the case because of the numerous motions and pleadings she
filed. Also, the report and recommendation was based on facts, law and jurisprudence which was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board. If complainant felt aggrieved by the report and recommendation, she could have filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Board's January 31, 2015 Resolution.

In Reply,19 complainant claimed that the only proof that the report and recommendation was adopted and approved
by the Board was the Notice of Resolution; and when she asked for a copy of the transcript and resolution of the
case, she was informed by the head of the records section that it was confidential and that she should file a
manifestation to secure a copy. Furthermore, complainant argued that it was respondent who was guilty of singling
her out when he reprimanded her for alleged belligerence in her pleadings and papers, and maintained that
respondent was grossly ignorant, inefficient and had no regard for due process of law.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation,20 the Commission recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
It ratiocinated that complainant's allegations while seemingly couched as acts of misconduct, actually assails the
report and recommendation of respondent as investigating commissioner in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The
Commission stated that it would be irregular and improper to review such findings because it would be tantamount
to reopening matters and issues that have been passed upon and approved by the IBP Board. The Commission
agreed with the respondent that if complainant felt aggrieved by such findings, her option would have been to file a
motion for reconsideration or some other appropriate remedy, but not an administrative case against the
investigating commissioner.

On August 27, 2016, the Board, in its Resolution No. XXII-2016-468, adopted the Commission's report and
recommendation dismissing the complaint.

Undeterred, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration [21 insisting that respondent, as an investigating
commissioner, has an accountability to the legal profession separate and distinct from that of the IBP Board and
such accountability is not a mere administrative matter inside the IBP-Commission. Complainant insisted that
respondent could be held accountable independently of the Board or the staff assigned to him when he issued a late
report and recommendation and issued it without the mandatory conference being held, and with no actual
admissions or stipulations of facts and no definition of issues. Complainant averred that respondent cannot choose
his deadline for submitting a report and recommendation, and his failure to decide a case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency. 22

Complainant posited that respondent could be held administratively liable because he was a quasi-judicial officer
performing functions delegated by the Court, hence, a public officer. 23

On February 23, 2017, respondent filed his Comment 24 stating that the complainant's motion for reconsideration was
a mere rehash of the arguments raised in her complaint and position paper. Respondent reiterated that he
immediately acted on the administrative case filed against complainant as soon as he received the records of the
case; and that the cause of delay was due to the several motions filed by complainant instead of just filing the
required position paper. The respondent emphasized that the report and recommendation was a product of a
conscientious study of all the pleadings submitted by the parties and application of the law and jurisprudence.

Respondent added that complainant's inordinate liberty in calling him "grossly ignorant" and "grossly inefficient" at
practically every tum or page of her pleadings notably characterizes her penchant for name-calling her adversaries.
He believed that he was clearly being harassed and singled out considering that his report and recommendation was
approved by the majority members of the Board.

In its Resolution No. XXII-2017-112025 dated May 27, 2017, the Board denied the motion for reconsideration.

On February 5, 2018, the IBP transmitted before the Court the records of the case for final disposition.26

The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the same manner as
judges and other government officials; and (2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering
an alleged adverse judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the IBP.

The Court's Ruling

On the Respondent's Ascription of Liability in the Same Manner as Judges or Other Government Officials
Due to His Position as Commissioner on Bar Discipline:

In order to have a meaningful understanding of the nature of the functions and accountabilities of an IBP
Commissioner, it is necessary to first identify the character of the IBP as an organization. To do this, the Court
deems it imperative to dig deep and trace its legislative and jurisprudential background.

The IBP's existence traces its roots to Sec. 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which stated that:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. (emphases supplied)

In view of this provision, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6397 27 which gave this Court the facility to initiate the
integration process of the Philippine Bar; the provisions of which read:

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court  may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified wherein Sec. 5(5) of Art. X enumerated the powers of this Court,
thus:

Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
(emphasis supplied)

Finally, the legal quandary pertaining to the integration of the Philippine Bar culminated in the promulgation of In
the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines28 where the Court upheld the integration of the
Philippine Bar on the ground that it was sanctioned by Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution.

Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 18129 was enacted formally creating the IBP
and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:

Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers appertaining to
a juridical person, particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be contracted with; to hold real and
personal property as may be necessary for corporate purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and
otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and receive public and private donations and contributions; to accept and
receive real and personal property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy and collect membership dues and special
assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at pleasure; to have offices and conduct its
affairs in the Greater Manila Area and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent
with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such
acts and things as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the purposes for which it was
organized. (emphasis supplied)

Significantly, Section 630 of P.D. No. 181 still recognized this Court's constitutional power to promulgate rules
concerning the IBP, and such power of the Court was also institutionalized and carried into the present Constitution
in which Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII now reads

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (emphasis supplied)

Now, given the IBP's statutory and jurisprudential background, the Court proceeds to answer the question: What
branch of government created the IBP? More importantly: Is the IBP strictly a public office or a private
institution?

To answer both questions, the Court highlights its observations regarding the important segments of the legal history
which led to the grant of the IBP's juridical personality, viz:

Firstly, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions gave the Court and the Legislature the concurrent power to regulate
the practice of law. In other words, the overlapping and coequal powers of both branches of government to regulate
the practice of law became the initial bases for the IBP's establishment.

Secondly, Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6397 used the phraseology "to effect the integration" which means that Congress,
though it also had the power to enact laws affecting the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution,
had acknowledged the Court's rightful (and primary) prerogative to adopt measures to raise the standard of the legal
profession.[31 At that time, only this Court had the power to "promulgate" rules concerning the practice of law while
Congress may only "repeal, alter or supplement" these promulgated rules. That may be the apparent reason why
Congress only appropriated (and allowed for subsequent appropriations of) the necessary funds to assist this Court
in attaining the objective of initiating the integration of the Philippine Bar.

Thirdly, the Court had ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar to: a) assist in the administration of justice; b)
foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public
service and conduct; c) safeguard the professional interests of its members; d) cultivate among its members a spirit
of cordiality and brotherhood; e) provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating
thereto; f) encourage and foster legal education; g) promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive
and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; h) enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively; i) render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; j) protect lawyers and
litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; k) discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; l)
shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; m) have
an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; n) prevent the unauthorized practice of law,
and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; o) establish welfare funds for
families of disabled and deceased lawyers; p) provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; q) distribute
educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; r) devise and maintain
a program of continuing legal education for practicing attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country; s) enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules; t) create law
centers and establish law libraries for legal research; u) conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights
and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and v) generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the
solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.32

Fourthly, P.D. No. 181 endowed the IBP with the attributes of perpetual succession and, more importantly, "all legal
powers appertaining to a juridical person." It means that the IBP had corporate attributes which gave it the ability to
pursue desired activities on its own, subject only to the Court's administrative supervision.

Lastly, the present Constitution's acknowledgment of the "integrated bar" as one of the subjects of this Court's power
to promulgate rules relative to the practice of law cements the IBP's existence as a juridical person.

The aforementioned observations indubitably establish that the collaborative enactments of the Court, the Congress
(and the President exercising legislative powers in the case of P.D. No. 181), and the present Constitution all
contributed to the emergence of the IBP's juridical personality. Due to this peculiar manner of creation, it now
becomes reasonable for the Court to conclude that the IBP is a sui generis public33institution deliberately
organized, by both the legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the present and past
Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession. At this juncture, the Court needs to determine whether
the IBP's officers, especially the IBP Commissioners, are considered as public officers under the purview of the law.

Presently, the IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers coming from both the public and private sectors
who are authorized to practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 4 34 of the IBP's By-Laws allows only
private practitioners to occupy any position in its organization. This means that only individuals engaged in the
private practice are authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP. Hence,
the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private practitioners performing public
functions delegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law.
This was aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada35 where the Court declared that

The [IBP CBD] derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from this
Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence,
in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD]
should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court. (emphasis supplied)

Even if the afore-cited case did not expound in what way the IBP-Commission is to be "guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court," it can be reasonably inferred that the IBP-CBD's delegated function of
entertaining complaints against lawyers is public in nature; but the responsible officer performing such
function is a private individual—not a public officer. Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners
are not "public officers" in context of Sec. 3(b)36 of R.A. No. 6713, Art. 203 the Revised Penal Code, 37 Sec.
4(e)38 R.A. No. 9485,39 or even Sec. 2(b)40 of R.A. No. 3019.41 Especially in the context of R.A. No. 6713, they are
not "public officials" as they are not elective or appointive officials of the  "government" as defined by Sec. 3(a)42 of
the same law. Moreover, it is also obvious that IBP Commissioners cannot be held liable for violation of Sec.
15(1),43 Art. VIII of the Constitution because they are neither members of the Judiciary in the context of the
Constitution or statutory provisions organizing lower collegiate and trial courts nor quasi-judicial officers in the
context of applicable laws creating quasi-judicial agencies. Finally, IBP Commissioners cannot be held
administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance in the framework of administrative law
because they cannot strictly be considered as being "employed" with the government or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality including government-owned or controlled corporations. 44

Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively liable for violation of the
rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of law. Even if they are not "public
officers" in the context of their employment relationship with the government, they are still "officers of the court"
and "servants of the law" who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others.45 Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed them
under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held administratively
liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers—not as government officials.

On the Alleged Delay of the Resolution of CBD Case No. 12-3457:

Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD provides that "[t]he only pleadings allowed are verified
complaint, verified answer and verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a
resolution."46 Such restrictive enumeration is consistent with the summary nature of disciplinary proceedings as well
as the basic tenets of practical expediency encouraged by Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution which mandates
this Court to adopt such rules for a "simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases."
Relatedly, this is also the reason why a party has to first ask for a leave of court before filing any pleading which is
not expressly sanctioned by applicable rules of procedure. Such practice is intended to alert litigants that the
resolution of unsanctioned motions and other pleadings seeking for affirmative reliefs is discretionary on the part of
the courts (including quasi-judicial bodies or investigatory administrative agencies). This is because these
unsanctioned pleadings clutter up court (or any administrative quasi-adjudicative or investigative body) records and
tend to impede the speedy disposition of cases.

Concomitantly, it is settled that considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. 47 Here, preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced
by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other or that which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 48 Conversely, bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.49

In this case, the source of the complainant's main gripe against the respondent is the supposed delay in the resolution
of the following motions as alleged50 in the complaint, to wit:                             

Motion/Pleading Filed Approximate  Days Remarks

Unresolved
Motion for the Issuance of a Subpoena Ignored by previous  Commissioner, denied
Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad 529 days by current Commissioner
Testificandum
Respondent's interrogatories to Complanant Ignored by previous  Commissioner, denied
529 days
Lucille Sillo by current Commissioner
Ignored by previous Commissioner and
granted by current Commissioner on the
ground that "complaints for  disbarment,
Motion to Sever 349 days
suspension or for discipline of attorneys are
to be instituted before this Commission by
filing six (6) copies of a verified Complaint"
Ignored by previous Commissioner and
deemed by current Commissioner as follows
Motion to Inhibit 384 days "Let it be placed on record that
Commissioner Irving  C. Corvera may now
be  deemed to have inhibited himself xxx"

These charted allegations show that the complainant had filed several pleadings which are not among those that are
explicitly enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD. The rule uses the term "only"
which is patently indicative that the enumeration is tightly restrictive. Clearly, the respondent had no positive
duty at all to act on these unsanctioned pleadings, especially in a manner favorable to the complainant. The
complainant cannot blame respondent for not acting on prohibited or unsanctioned pleadings. Her insistence in
having the aforementioned motions resolved despite not being mentioned as among the pleadings allowed by Sec. 1,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD actually contributed to the delay of the whole proceedings in
CBD Case No. 12-3457.

Even if the Court were to consider the aforementioned pleadings as not prohibited for the sake of argument, the
complainant never attached in her complaint or adduced during the hearings before the IBP-Commission certified
true copies of the same documents to show the dates of actual filing so the periods to act on them may be fairly
reckoned. She also failed to submit copies of respondent's supposed resolutions denying or granting these motions to
show the date on when they were actually rendered or issued. These material omissions leave this Court unable to
verify with certainty or to determine with practical accuracy the existence of delay. The only basis of the
complainant in imputing delay on the part of the respondent was her Position Paper 51 which merely alleged the
existence of her motions in CBD Case No. 12-3457 and their supposedly tarried resolution. Undeniably, the
complainant failed to offer any preponderant proof of respondent's supposed delay in the resolutions of her motions
in CBD Case No. 12-3457 and merely relied on bare allegations and factual conclusions to support her
administrative complaint. Clearly, the quantum of proof required in disbarment or administrative disciplinary cases
was not satisfied by the complainant. Therefore, contrary to the complainant's hasty imputation of delay, it only
appears that respondent merely disregarded the unsanctioned pleadings filed pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules
of Procedure of the IBP-CBD and prudently proceeded to render the report and recommendation thereby belying the
allegations of nonfeasance.

At any rate, the Court evinces its observation that the complainant's charge of delay in the resolution of the subject
unsanctioned pleadings of the complainant appears to be a mere retaliation on the adverse Resolution No. XXI-205-
074 dated January 31, 2015 in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Court had already declared that an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available.52 Similarly, an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for an adverse
decision, order or resolution of an administrative adjudicator deemed by a complaining party as erroneous;
especially when there are other remedies under the ordinary course of law such as a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, a party who has lost his or right to appeal a decision, resolution or order of a court or quasi-judicial body
(including administrative offices or agencies empowered to conduct investigations) cannot re-litigate the same
matters in another administrative case filed against the adjudicator.

On the Respondent's Comments Against the Complainant in the Report and Recommendation for Her
Behavior:

The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a lawyer may think highly of his [or her] intellectual
endowment."53 Such observation is but a moderate and fair commentary to remind members of the legal profession
to espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients and with their fellow lawyers but also against
their adversaries.

The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have thought so highly of herself that...she finds it necessary
to declare that [Sillo's words] are not words a graduate of the only Pontifical University in Asia and a law school ran
by monks would use," is merely a fair and realistic observation. Clearly, an academic slur implicating incompetence
on a person's intellectual capabilities due to his or her scholastic background simply amounts to an intemperate
language on the complainant's part. It finds no place in decent legal argumentation and debate. Besides, lawyers
should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms (especially those which are fair or mild) against
them as litigation is inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties. Hence, it was proper on the
part of Commissioner Limpingco to recommend for the dismissal of the complainant's charges of impropriety for the
respondent merely made a fair comment.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional

colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to
conducting oneself with courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary process into an avenue for
childish bickering and trivial catfights. Realistically, filing harassment administrative complaints definitely causes
undue anxiety and considerable psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it should be understood
that the aforementioned Canon proscribes the filing of frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members
of the legal profession to prevent exploitative lawyers from abusing the disciplinary process. Besides, an important
portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should be the guiding beacon of every member of the legal profession states: "I
will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same."

Here, the Court cannot help but notice that even a cursory reading of the complainant's pleadings exhibits her
propensity for filing baseless complaints and penchant for hurling denigrating allegations against her adversaries.
Moreover, the instant affidavit complaint contains a smorgasbord of violations ascribed to the respondent which the
complainant had inaccurately and miserably failed to substantiate. Worse, the complaint's pointless perplexity was
compounded by convoluted allegations which made it laborious for the Court to make coherent sense. Accordingly,
the Court deems it proper to sternly warn the complainant and her collaborating counsel, Atty. Barboza, to refrain
from filing and maintaining baseless administrative suits against fellow lawyers under pain of administrative
sanctions.

Final Note

Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries
with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary purpose of administrative disciplinary
proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from
being corrupted by unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why lawyers
should always set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication
during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court AGREES with the Report and Recommendation of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Committee on Bar Discipline adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
– Board of Governors, and DISMISSES the administrative complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.

Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo and her collaborating counsel Atty.
Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the disciplinary proceedings thru filing and maintaining
frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the Bar. A repetition of the same or commission of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Martires,  JJ., concur.

[ A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018 ]

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS REPRESENTED BY REBECCA V. LABRADOR,

COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Letter[1] dated April 21, 2014, filed by respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos who seeks
judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that respondent was administratively charged by complainant San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc.
for representing conflicting interests and for using the title "Judge"[2] despite having been found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct in the consolidated cases of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[3]

The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements
Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case[, docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-021082-0822 (NHA-80-309),]
against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protection Act
(P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without
disclosing it as a school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for
SJHAI's conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated respondent's services as counsel and
engaged another lawyer to represent the association.

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014
entitled "San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.

In her Report dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:

... Respondent failed to observe [the] candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the
Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member
but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling
the implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co.[,] Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co.[,] Inc., Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent
proceeded to represent the former.

...

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn't controverted by the Complainant which was
his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that
should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him.[4]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent
should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold the dignity and integrity beyond
reproach.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which [the Court] noted in [its] [R]esolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of
Appeals[5] and the Court[6] and even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C.
No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in
several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation,[7] respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez
against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment
case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was
exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge[,]" respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition, he had
ceased to attach the title to his name.[8] (Italics supplied)
In a Decision[9] dated June 15, 2005, the Court found merit in the complaint, and thus, held respondent guilty of
violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, 3.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting
in his disbarment from the practice of law:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondent's record as a member
of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis in the original)

The Court En Banc ruled in this wise:

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation
of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading
for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any
misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the
billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into
believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the
privilege.

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency
of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would
have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.

In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant.
We ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Rornanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent,
in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this
case. ... Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling
in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case
could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of
a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule. ...

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and
serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the
pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other
privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra), hereby orders the
FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may
be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title
"Judge" is one of such privileges.

xxxx

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was
stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[12] In A.C. No. 4783, he got
off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the
tenets of his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect
to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office
and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently
warranted.[13] (Additional emphasis and italics supplied)
Aggrieved, respondent filed on July 16, 2005 a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Plea for Human Compassion,
[14]
 praying that the penalty imposed be reduced from disbarment to suspension for three (3) to six (6) months. The
Court denied the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[15] dated August 23, 2005.

On April 16, 2006, respondent wrote a letter[16] addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Court, begging that compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court and that his
disbarment be lifted. The same was, however, denied in a Resolution[17] dated June 20, 2006.

Unperturbed, respondent wrote letters dated June 12, 2007[18] and January 17, 2010[19] addressed to the Court,
praying for the Court's understanding, kindness and compassion to grant his reinstatement as a lawyer. The
aforementioned letters were denied for lack of merit in Resolutions dated August 14, 2007[20] and May 31,
2011[21] respectively.

Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, respondent filed the instant Letter once more
praying for the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.

In a Resolution[22] dated June 25, 2014, the Court referred the aforementioned letter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation[23] dated November 18, 2016 submitted by the OBC, the Court, in a
Resolution[24] dated January 10, 2017, directed respondent to show proof that he is worthy of being reinstated to the
Philippine Bar by submitting pieces of documentary and/or testimonial evidence, including but not limited to letters
and attestations from reputable members of the society, all vouching for his good moral character.

In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent submitted forty (40) letters from
people, all vouching for his good moral character:

Relationship to Testimony/ies in favor

Name Date of Letter
respondent of respondent
Respondent is a person
1) Jaime B. Trinidad March 7, 2017[25] Friend of good moral
character since 1990.
2) Teodoro Adriatico Dominguez
(Marketing Director, Philippines & Sea
Ayerst Philippines, Ayerst International; Respondent is kind,
Director, Senior Citizens Assn. of Bgy. BF; friendly, very
Past Coordinator, Member of the Lay March 9, 2017[26] Tennis buddy approachable, quick to
Ministers Resurrection of Our Lord Parish, help with free legal
BFHP; Past Grand Knight, F. Navigator, Dist. advice/counsel.
Deputy Knights of Columbus Council 7147;
U.P. Pan Xenia; and UTOPIA, Ateneo)
Respondent graciously
rendered free legal
3) Carolina L. Nielsen March 20, 2017[27] Neighbor
advice to her and her
family.
4) Arnaldo C. Cuasay Undated[28] Brother-in-law After his disbarment,
respondent dedicated
his life to taking care
of his sick wife, who
eventually died a few
years after.
 Respondent also
provided support to his
children's education
and other needs as well
as helping relatives
and friends.
Respondent also
provided community
services in Muntinlupa
and his hometown in
Cebu.
Respondent served as a
5) Atty. Manuel Lasema, Jr. former president of the
(Founder, Former Chairman and President, Las Piñas City Bar
Las Piñas City Bar Association, Inc.; Former Association.
Director, Secretary and Vice President, IBP
March 28, 2017[29] Colleague
PPLLM Chapter; Former Professor of Law, Respondent
FEU Institute of Law; Third Placer, 1984 Bar implemented various
Examinations; and Partner, Lasema Cueva- seminars, dialogues
Mercader Law Offices) and other Bar
activities.
Respondent is the
adviser of the PBT.
Respondent advised
PBT Board members
regarding urgent
problems affecting
company operations.
6) Patricia C. Sison and Marie Louise Kahn
Magsaysay
Undated Statement[30] Clients Respondent also
(Chairman) and President, Philipine Ballet
provided PBT with
Theatre, Inc. (PBT)
appropriate guidelines
regarding the manner
in which they should
conduct their duties
affecting PBT's legal
and financial
obligations.
Respondent is a person
7) Francisco C. Cornejo of good moral
March 24, 2017[31] Friend
(President, U.P. Alumni Association) character, especially in
his business dealings.
8) Dr. Artemio I. Panganiban, Jr. Respondent is a person
(President, Professional Academy of the March 9, 2017[32] Friend of good moral
Philippines) character since 1968.
9) Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay March 20, 2017[33] Colleague Respondent and
(Chairman and President, Asian+ Council of Magpantay served
Leaders, Administrators, Deans and Educators together in the
in Business) Federation of
Homeowners
Association Executive
Board in the mid and
end of the 1990s, and
in their Church and 
community service 
 with the Knights of
Columbus in mid
2000, until the present.
Respondent is a fellow
10) Maximo A. Ricohermoso
Rotarian at the Rotary
(President, Rotary Club of Mandaue North;
Club of Mandaue
and Chairman, Seaweed Industry Association March 10, 2017[34] Colleague
North, Mandaue City,
of the Philippines, Inc.)
Cebu, since the early
 
1980s.
Respondent helps his
11) Arsenio M. Bartolome III
PWD brother-in-law,
(First Chairman/President, Bases Conversion
March 8, 2017[35] Colleague Mr. Manuel H. Reyes,
Development Authority; and Former
in his business
President, Philippine National Bank)
transactions.
Respondent was his
co-employee in the
Legal Department of
FNCB Finance.
12) Rodigilio M. Oriino
(Former President, Rotary Club of Uptown March 13, 2017[36] Co-employee Respondent has not
Manila) done any wrong doing
that will affect his
good moral character
and profession as a
lawyer.
13) Epimaco M. Densing, Jr.
(Former Chapter President, Philippine
Respondent is a friend
Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
for over 20 years,
Cagayan de Oro Chapter; Charter Chapter
Undated[37] Friend whom he knows as a
President, Government Association of CPAs,
person of good moral
Cebu Chapter; and Former Chapter Head,
character.
Brotherhood of Christian Businessmen &
Professionals, Paranaque Chapter)
Respondent was
employed as one of the
lawyers in the
Collection  Department
of FNCB Finance, of
which Marcelo was
then a Vice President.
14) Mamerto A. Marcelo, Jr. Undated[38] Colleague
Later on, Marcelo
hired respondent as a
legal consultant in a
telecommunications
company the former
later worked with.
Respondent is known
15) Atty. Eleuterio P. Ong Vaño
to Atty. Vaño as a
(Former National President, Philippine March 14, 2017[39] Friend
respectable person of
Association of Real Estate Boards, Inc.)
good moral character.
Respondent is "one
16) Domingo L. Mapa March 7, 2017[40] with [them]"[41] in
(President, Santos Ventura Hocorma Colleague pursuing their
Foundation, Inc.)   advocacies in their
scholarship program.
 Caringal hired
respondent as Vice
President for
Administration of his
17) Ernesto M. Caringal
company even after he
(President, Abcar International Construction March 7, 2017[42] Colleague
was disbarred in 2005
Corporation)
because Caringal
believes respondent is
a person of good moral
character.
Respondent rendered
voluntary service as
Adviser-Consultant of
18) Rolando L. Sianghio the Directors of the
March 14, 2017[43] Colleague
(President, Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation) Habitat for Humanity
and i-Homes in their
programs for housing
for the poor.
Respondent is Ravelo's
business partner in the
sourcing and supply of
nickel and chromite
raw ores from
19) PSSupt. Marino Ravelo
March 10, 2017[44] Business Partner Zambales to their local
(Retired PDEA Director)
customers.

Respondent has never

been involved in any
shady business deals.
Respondent was the
former law firm
partner of Atty. Gale,
prior to respondent's
appointment as RTC
judge.
20) Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale Former partner in law
March 14, 2017[45]
(Legal Counselor & Consultant) firm
Respondent is honest
and of good moral
character in his public
and private dealings
even after he was
disbarred.
21) Godofredo D. Asunto Asunto availed of
(President, Waterfun Condominium Bldg. 1 respondent's legal
March 8, 2017[46] Colleague
Inc. (Homeowners Association); and Retired services in resolving
Bank Executive) his collection cases.
In view of his good
values to the
profession, Respondent
was recommended by
22) Rosalind E. Hagedorn March 9, 2017[47] Colleague
Hagedorn to act as
legal counsel of her
valued clients and
friends.
23) Antonio A. Navarro III March 9, 2017[48] Friend Respondent was
known to Navarro as a
 person of good moral
character since  1988
up to the present.
Respondent was
known to Yap as a
Community
24) Peter A. Yap March 10, 2017[49] person of good moral
 Friend
character since 1975
up to the present.
Respondent worked
with Ocampo in a
power project
25) Teodora S. Ocampo installation in 2000.
(Professor, De La Salle University)
March 12, 2017[50] Colleague
Sender claims she
  found respondent to be
an ethical, trustworthy
and a person of high
integrity.
26) Valentin T. Banda Respondent's
(Retired Bank Officer, Philippine Veterans March 12, 2017[51] Friend disbarment has turned
Bank) him into a new person.
Respondent has been
active in the
27) Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez March 13, 2017[52] Friend
community affairs
while staying in Cebu.
Atty. Gonzaga, Jr.,
stated that he has not
heard that respondent
Former partner in law was involved in any
28) Atty. Ramon C. Gonzaga, Jr. March 18, 2017[53]
firm charge or complaint,
morally or otherwise,
even after he was
disbarred.
Respondent is of good
moral character.

Respondent stayed in
29) Efren Z. Palugod [54] touch with Palugod
March 8, 2017 Friend
(Chairman Plaza Loans Corporation) whenever respondent
would go to Cebu
every now and then for
his coal supply
business.
Despite being
disbarred, respondent
involved himself in
worthwhile activities
30) Rodolfo G. Pelayo as senior citizen and
March 7, 2017[55] Colleague
(Chairman, Power & Synergy, Inc.) offered his services as
business consultant to
their company, Power
& Synergy, Inc. and
friends.
31) Sol Owen G. Figues Undated[56] Friend Respondent should be
reinstated as a lawyer
again in order for him
 to "cotinue his [G]ood
Samaritan work to the
common people that
seeks justice and
guidance in times of
trouble and grief."[57]
Respondent was
known to Navarro as a
32) Col. Jose Ely D. Alberto GSC (INF) March 24,
Acquaintance person of good moral
(Internal Auditor, Philippine Army)  2017[58]
character since  2000
up to the present.
Respondent has
integrity,
independence, industry
and  diligence.

33) Atty. Albert L. Hontanosas March 8, 2017[59] Friend Respondent should be

given a second chance
to serve the Filipino
masses as
a bonafide member of
the Philippine Bar.
Respondent provides
34) Antonio E. De Borja free legal assistance to
(Former Councilor, Baliwag, Bulacan; and the poor, who were
March 17, 2017[60] Friend
President, Early Riser Assembly, Baliwag, victims of injustice,
Bulacan) through his son who is
also a lawyer.
Respondent is a person
35) Tomas Barba Tan
March 9, 2017[61] Client of good moral
(President, Cebu Adconsultants, Inc.)
character.
Respondent is very
dependable, fair and a
very respectable
person both on the
tennis courts in
Paranaque City where
they are both members
until now and inside
36) Engr. Daniel D. Villacarlos
the court of law when
(Operations Manager, Hi-Tri Development March 11, 2017[62] Friend
he was still active as
Corp.)
an excellent and
reputable lawyer.

Respondent's conduct
of sportsmanship in BF
Homes Tennis Club
and as a person is
exemplary.
Respondent is known
to Bufi as kind,
37) Roy Bufi
March 9, 2017[63] Friend generous and is very
(President, The Bas Corporation)
professional when it
comes to work.
38) Remigio R. Viola March 13, 2017[64] Former colleague Respondent is his
(Retired Municipal Administrator, business consultant
 because respondent is
Municipality of Baliwag, Bulacan)
known to Viola for
being a community
 
leader.
Respondent is a strong
supporter of their
social and civic
activities to provide
39) Leonardo U. Lindo March 20, 2017[65] Friend
free medical services
to the less fortunate
members of the
society.
In 2003, respondent
handled their case
against Metrobank and
won the case for them.
40) Felipe De Sagun Undated[66] Friend
Respondent is
trustworthy, reliable
and honest.
The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[67] It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. [68] The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see
to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a
duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only
as a matter of justice.[69]

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration
his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she
was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[70]

Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and
a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.[71]

The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that
judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of
public confidence in the courts. [Thus,] [t]he Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable." [72]

In the case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing
for Judicial Clemency,[73] the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to
wit:
 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.[74] These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty[75] to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.[76]

4. There must be a showing of promise[77] (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or

contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.[78]

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,[79] the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered
that 15 years had already elapsed from the time he was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge
his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejia is already of advanced years,
has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also noted that he had made a significant contribution by putting
up the Mejia Law Joumal containing his religious and social writing; and the religious organization named "El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty.
Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred. [80]

In Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA,[81] the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do
soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the
disbarred lawyer's sincere admission of guilty and repeated pleas for compassion.[82]

In Valencia v. Atty. Antiniw,[83] the Court rejnstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying
a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his
disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw's disbarment, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished
record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary. [84]

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the
time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred
attorneys' sincere realization and acknowledgment of guilt.[85]

Here, while more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on June 15, 2005, respondent's present
appeal has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline above.

The Court is not persuaded by respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly asks for
forgiveness for his transgressions in his letters to the Court, respondent continues to insist on his honest belief that
there was no conflict of interest notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary. Respondent asserted in all his
letters to the Court that:

I also did not [do] and I do not deny the fact that in the year 1985, I filed ONLY a single motion for the issuance of
an alias writ of execution on behalf of said San Jose Homeowners Association against the Durano & Co., Inc. before
the HLURB in a case for completion of development under P.D. 957, and that later in the year 1996, I handled
another HLURB case for the respondents Durano/Rodriguez in the said case filed by the San Jose Homeowners
Association, for the declaration of the school site lot as an open space, on the basis of my firm belief that I was
given a prior consent to do so by the said association, pursuant to its Board Resolution, dated March 14, 1987, a
copy of which is attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "A" and also because of my honest belief
that there was no conflict of interest situation obtaining under the circumstances, as those cases are totally
unrelated [and] distinct from each other, pursuant to the jurisprudences that I had cited in my ANSWER in
this disbarment case.[86] (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by respondent all claim that respondent is a person of good moral character
without explaining why or submitting proof in support thereof. The only ostensible proof of reformation that
respondent has presented are the following:

1. The Letter dated March 7, 2017 signed by Domingo L. Mapa, President of Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc., averring that respondent is "one with [them] in pursuing [their] advocacies
in [their] scholarship x x x;"[87]

2. The Letter dated March 13, 2017 signed by Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez, claiming that respondent has been
active in community affairs while staying in Cebu;[88]

3. The undated Letter signed by Sol Owen G. Figues, humbly asking that respondent be reinstated again in
order for him to "continue his [G]ood Samaritan work to the common people that seeks justice and
guidance in times of trouble and grief;"[89]

4. The undated Letter of Arnaldo C. Cuasay, the brother-in-law of respondent, stating that after his
disbarment, respondent provided community services in Muntinlupa and in his hometown in Cebu; [90]

5. The Letter dated March 14, 2017 signed by Rolando L. Sianghio, President of Lacto Asia Pacific
Corporation, stating that respondent rendered voluntary service as Adviser-Consultant of the Directors of
the Habitat for Humanity in their programs for housing for the poor;[91]

6. The Letter dated March 17, 2017 signed by Antonio E. De Borja, a friend of respondent, where Borja
claimed that respondent provides free legal assistance to the poor, who were victims of injustice, through
his son who is also a lawyer;[92]

7. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Leonardo U. Lindo, a friend of respondent, which stated that
respondent is "[a strong supporter of their] social [and] civic activities to provide free medical services to
the less fortunate members of the society;"[93]

8. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay, Chairman and President of
Asian+ Council of Leaders, Administrators, Deans and Educators in Business, stating that he personally
knows respondent having served together in their church and community service with the Knights of
Columbus in the mid-2000s until the present;[94] and

9. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Carolina L. Nielsen, a neighbor of respondent, where she
claimed that respondent "[graciously rendered free legal advice to her and her family.]"[95]

Still, aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities
by which respondent had served the members of his community or church, provided free legal assistance to the poor
and supported social and civic activities to provide free medical services to the. less fortunate, hence, insufficient to
demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.

The other testimonials which respondent submitted, particularly that of Ernesto M. Caringal, President of Abcar
International Construction Corporation, who stated that "[he hired respondent as Vice President for Administration
of his company even after] he was disbarred in 2005,"[96] and that of Police Senior Superintendent Marino Ravelo
(Ret.), who stated that "[he is the business partner of respondent] in the sourcing and supply of nickel and chromite
raw ores from Zambales to [their] local customers,"[97] all relate to respondent's means of livelihood after he was
disbarred; hence, these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement
subsequent to his disbarment. If at all, these testimonials contradict respondent's claim that he and his family were
having financial difficulties due to his disbarment, to wit:

Since then up to now, I and my family had been marginally surviving and still continue to survive, from out of the
measly funds that I have been able to borrow from our relatives and my former clients (who, of course I don't expect
to continue lending to me indefinitely) to whom I promised to repay my debts upon the resumption of my law
practice.[98]
To add, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he -
now being 71 years of age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied with.[99]

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or reputational in
cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a
previous case, "in considering [a lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court
is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of
sympathy or pity."[100]

The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has failed to prove that he has complied with the above-discussed
guidelines for reinstatement to the practice of law. The Court, therefore, denies his petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part, relation to a party.