Article 351.

Premature Marriage
Persons liable
1. A widow who is married within 301
days from the date of the death of
her husband, or before having
delivered if she is pregnant at the
time of his death;
2. A woman who, her marriage having
been annulled or dissolved, married
before her delivery or before the
expiration of the period of 301 days
after the date of the legal separation.
TITLE XIII. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Crimes against honor
1. Libel by means of writings or similar
means (Art. 355);
2. Threatening to publish and offer to
prevent such publication for a
compensation (Art. 356);
3. Prohibited publication of acts
referred to in the course of official
proceedings (Art. 357);

4. Slander (Art. 358);

The Supreme Court has already taken into
account the reason why such marriage
within 301 days is made criminal, that is,
because of the probability that there might
be a confusion regarding the paternity of
the child who would be born. If this reason
does not exist because the former husband
is impotent, or was shown to be sterile such
that the woman has had no child with him,
that belief of the woman that after all there
could be no confusion even if she would
marry within 301 days may be taken as
evidence of good faith and that would
negate criminal intent.
Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage
ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions
of the Marriage Law.
The offender under Art. 352 must be
authorized to solemnize marriages.
5. Slander by deed (Art. 359);
6. Incriminating innocent person (Art.
363);
7. Intriguing against honor (Art. 364).
Article 353. Definition of Libel
A libel is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstances tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Elements:
1. There must be an imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance;

The offender is punished under the 2. The imputation must be made

Marriage Law. publicly;

A clergyman who performed a marriage 3. It must be malicious;

ceremony, not knowing that one of the
contracting parties is a minor, is not liable.
4. The imputation must be directed at a
natural or juridical person, or one
who is dead;
5. The imputation must tend to cause
the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed.
Distinction between malice in fact and
malice in law
Malice in fact is the malice which the law
presumes from every statement whose
tenor is defamatory. It does not need proof.
The mere fact that the utterance or
statement is defamatory negates a legal
presumption of malice.
In the crime of libel, which includes oral
defamation, there is no need for the
prosecution to present evidence of malice.
It is enough that the alleged defamatory or
libelous statement be presented to the court
verbatim. It is the court which will prove
whether it is defamatory or not. If the tenor
of the utterance or statement is defamatory,
the legal presumption of malice arises even
without proof.
Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the
malice in law has been rebutted.
Otherwise, there is no need to adduce
evidence of malice in fact. So, while malice
in law does not require evidence, malice in
fact requires evidence.
Malice in law can be negated by evidence
that, in fact, the alleged libelous or
defamatory utterance was made with good
motives and justifiable ends or by the fact
that the utterance was privileged in
character.
In law, however, the privileged character of
a defamatory statement may be absolute or
qualified.
When the privileged character is said to be
absolute, the statement will not be
actionable whether criminal or civil because
that means the law does not allow
prosecution on an action based thereon.
Illustration:
As regards the statements made by
Congressmen while they are deliberating or
discussing in Congress, when the privileged
character is qualified, proof of malice in fact
will be admitted to take the place of malice
in law. When the defamatory statement or
utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice
in law is negated. The utterance or
statement would not be actionable because
malice in law does not exist. Therefore, for
the complainant to prosecute the accused
for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has
to prove that the accused was actuated with
malice (malice in fact) in making the
statement.
When a libel is addressed to several
persons, unless they are identified in the
same libel, even if there are several
persons offended by the libelous utterance
or statement, there will only be one count of
libel.
If the offended parties in the libel were
distinctly identified, even though the libel
was committed at one and the same time,
there will be as many libels as there are
persons dishonored.
Illustration:
If a person uttered that “All the Marcoses
are thieves," there will only be one libel
because these particular Marcoses
regarded as thieves are not specifically
identified.
If the offender said, “All the Marcoses – the
father, mother and daughter are thieves.”
There will be three counts of libel because
each person libeled is distinctly dishonored.
If you do not know the particular persons
libeled, you cannot consider one libel as
giving rise to several counts of libel. In
order that one defamatory utterance or
imputation may be considered as having
dishonored more than one person, those
persons dishonored must be identified.
Otherwise, there will only be one count of
libel.
Note that in libel, the person defamed need
not be expressly identified. It is enough that
he could possibly be identified because
“innuendos may also be a basis for
prosecution for libel. As a matter of fact,
even a compliment which is undeserved,
has been held to be libelous.
The crime is libel is the defamation is in
writing or printed media.
The crime is slander or oral defamation if it
is not printed.
Even if what was imputed is true, the crime
of libel is committed unless one acted with
good motives or justifiable end. Poof of
truth of a defamatory imputation is not even
admissible in evidence, unless what was
imputed pertains to an act which constitutes
a crime and when the person to whom the
imputation was made is a public officer and
the imputation pertains to the performance
of official duty. Other than these, the
imputation is not admissible.
When proof of truth is admissible
1. When the act or omission imputed
constitutes a crime regardless of
whether the offended party is a
private individual or a public officer;
2. When the offended party is a
government employee, even if the
act or omission imputed does not
constitute a crime, provided if its
related to the discharged of his
official duties.
Requisites of defense in defamation
1. If it appears that the matter charged
as libelous is true;
2. It was published with good motives;
3. It was for justifiable ends.
If a crime is a private crime, it cannot be
prosecuted de officio. A complaint from the
offended party is necessary.
Cases:
Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348, No. L-
58681 May 31, 1982
Petitioner’s contention should be
sustained. Well settled is the rule that
parties, counsel and witnesses are
exempted from liability in libel or slander
cases for words otherwise defamatory,
uttered or published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided the statements are
pertinent or relevant to the case. And, as to
the degree of relevancy or pertinency
necessary to make alleged defamatory
matter privilege, the courts are inclined to
be liberal The matter to which the privilege
does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevance and impropriety.
(People vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046). In the
case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say:
“I doubt how did you become a doctor”
when Dr. Macaspac would not answer the
question as to who prepared the document
presented to her, and when the witness
repeatedly evaded the question by saying
that she did not understand the word
“made.”
Mercado vs. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 116 SCRA 93, No. L-38753 August
25, 1982
The privilege against being
prosecuted for libel may be lost by proof of
malice.—Justice Malcolm, however, is
careful to point out that qualified privilege,
and this is one such instance, may be “lost
by proof of malice.” His opinion continues: “
‘A communication made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without
this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable.’ (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B.,
344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3
W.R., 474, 85 E.C.L., 344.)” He then gave
what was referred to by him as a “pertinent
illustration of the application of qualified
privilege,” namely, “a complaint made in
good faith and without malice in regard to
the character or conduct of a public official
when addressed to an officer or a board
having some interest or duty in the matter.
Even when the statements are found to be
false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still
cover the mistake of the individual.
To avoid being prosecuted for libel
for communication given to a superior
officer regarding a subordinate’s alleged
corrupt acts, the statement must be made
under an honest sense of duty, and not on a
self-seeking basis.—But the statements
must be made under an honest sense of
duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons
have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public
affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral
in its nature and this person in good faith
believes he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact
that the communication is made in
intemperate terms. A further element of the
law of privilege concerns the person to
whom the complaint should be made. The
rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest
mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will
not take the case out of the privilege.
Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699, No. L-
47880 April 30, 1979
In order to obviate controversies as
to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information
should contain allegations as to whether, at
the time the offense was committed, the
offended party was a public officer or a
private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible,
the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise
be alleged. That allegation would be a sine
qua non if the circumstance as to where the
libel was printed and first published is used
as the basis of the venue of the action.
Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 171, May 30,
1986
Lacsa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
161 SCRA 427, No. L-74907 May 23, 1988
The disputed portion of the article
which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was
claimed to be libelous never singled out
plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news
report merely stated that the victim had
been arrested by members of a special
police unit brought into the area by Pablo
Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the
report, referring as it does to an official act
performed by an elective public official, is
within the realm of privilege and protected
by the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and press.
Six decades ago, in the case of U.S.
vs. O’Connell, the Court laid down the test
for libelous meaning: xxx xxx xxx Defendant
has imputed nothing wrong to the
complainants in certain and express terms.
But this is not necessary. Words calculated
to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false
charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander. A charge is sufficient if the
words are calculated to induce the hearers
to suppose and understand that the person
or persons against whom they were uttered
were guilty of certain offenses, or are
sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or to hold the person or persons
up to public ridicule. Said Chief Justice
Shaw of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts: The rule is a sound one that
the law cannot shut its eyes to what all the
rest of the world can see; and let the
slanderer disguise his language, and wrap
up his meaning in ambiguous givings out,
as he will, and it shall not avail him,
because courts will understand language, in
whatever form it is used, as all mankind
understands it.” (Carter vs. Andrews [1834],
16 Pick. [Mass.], 1.) Said another court
much more recently: “The test of libelous
meanings is not the analysis of a sentence
into component phrases with the meticulous
care of the grammarian or stylist, but the
import conveyed by the entirely of the
language to the ordinary reader.” (Miller vs.
O’Connell, City Ct., 57 L.J., 1768, Sept. 12,
1917.)
Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Noel, 167
SCRA 255, No. L-76565 November 9,
1988
No libel has been committed in the
instant case because the published work
alleged to contain libelous statements
appears simply expository in character,
matter-of-fact, and unemotional in tone and
tenor, without any evidence of malevolent
intent, either on the part of the author or the
publisher of the article.—Coming now to the
principal issue of whether or not the
complaint states a valid cause of action, the
Court finds that libel has not here been
committed; the civil suit for damages must
fail. It is axiomatic in actions for damages
for libel that the published work alleged to
contain libelous material must be examined
and viewed as a whole. We have
accordingly examined in its entirety the
subject article "A Changing of the Guard"
which is in essence a popular essay on the
general nature and character of Mindanao
politics and the recent emergence of a new
political leader in the province of Lanao del
Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not
focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his
family. Save in the excerpts complained
about and quoted above, the name of the
Mindalano family or clan is not mentioned or
alluded to in the essay. The identification of
Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or
incidental in the course of the development
of the theme of the article. The language
utilized by the article in general and the
above excerpts in particular appears simply
declaratory or expository in character,
matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and
tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications
or nuances appear detectable at all,
however closely one may scrutinize the
above excerpts. We find in the quoted
excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent
either on the part of the author or the
publisher of the article here involved.
Article 354. Requirement for publicity. —
Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in
the following cases:
1. A private communication made by
any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in
good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
Article 355. Libel by Means of Writings
or Similar Means
A libel may be committed by means of –
1. Writing;
2. Printing;
3. Lithography;
4. Engraving;

5. Radio;
6. Photograph;
7. Painting;
8. Theatrical exhibition;
9. Cinematographic exhibition; or
10. Any similar means.
Article 356. Threatening to Publish and
Offer to Prevent Such Publication for A
Compensation
Acts punished
1. Threatening another to publish a
libel concerning him, or his parents,
spouse, child, or other members of
his family;
2. Offering to prevent the publication of
such libel for compensation or
money consideration.
Blackmail – In its metaphorical sense,
blackmail may be defined as any unlawful
extortion of money by threats of accusation
or exposure. Two words are expressive of
the crime – hush money. (US v. Eguia, et
al., 38 Phil. 857) Blackmail is possible in
(1) light threats under Article 283; and (2)
threatening to publish, or offering to prevent
the publication of, a libel for compensation,
under Article 356.
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA
110, G.R. No. 45031 October 21, 1991
Malice is presumed in every
defamatory imputation.—Generally, malice
is presumed (malice in law) in every
defamatory imputation. This presumption,
however, does not arise if the
communication is privileged under Article
354.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 354
refer to qualifiedly privileged
communications. The character of the
privilege is a matter of defense which may
be lost by positive proof of express malice.
In other words, the onus of proving actual
malice is placed on the plaintiff who must
then convince the court that the offender
was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this
is accomplished, the defense of privilege is
unavailing.
Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA
692, G.R. No. 120715 March 29, 1996
In libel cases, the question is not
what the writer of an alleged libel means,
but what the words used by him mean.
Here, the defamatory character of the words
used by the petitioner are shown by the very
recitals thereof in the questioned article. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove
it. Petitioner used the following words and
phrases in describing the private
complainant: “mandurugas,” “mag-ingat sa
panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,”
“may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang ating
pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy na
kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirang
puri,” etc.
Test to determine the defamatory
character of words used.—Jurisprudence
has laid down a test to determine the
defamatory character of words used in the
following manner, viz: “Words calculated to
induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false
charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander. A charge is sufficient if the
words are calculated to induce the hearers
to suppose and understand that the person
or persons against whom they were uttered
were guilty of certain offenses, or are
sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or to hold the person or persons
up to public ridicule. x x x.”
Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA
460, G.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999
 A person cannot claim to have been
the source of only a few statements in an
article and point to other parties as the
source of the rest when he admits that he
was correctly identified as the spokesperson
during the interview.—Petitioner claims he
was “unfairly singled out” as the source of
the statements in the article when any
member of the 38 complainant-families
could have been the source of the alleged
libelous statements. x x x It is true petitioner
did not directly admit that he was the source
of the statements in the questioned article.
What he said in his sworn statement was
that the contents of the article are true in
almost all respects, thus: x x x This was
likewise what he stated in his testimony in
court both on direct and on cross-
examination. However, by claiming that
what he had told the reporter was made by
him in the performance of a civic duty,
petitioner in effect admitted authorship of
the article and not only of the statements
attributed to him therein, to wit: x x x
Petitioner cannot claim to have been the
source of only a few statements in the
article in question and point to the other
parties as the source of the rest, when he
admits that he was correctly identified as
the spokesperson of the families during the
interview.
Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325
SCRA 540, G.R. No. 124245 February 15,
2000
It is a settled principle in this
jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege
remains regardless of the defamatory tenor
and the presence of malice if the same are
relevant, pertinent or material to the cause
in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the
person making these statements such as a
judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby
incur the risk of being found liable thereon in
a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages. The doctrine that
statements made during the course of
judicial proceedings enjoy the shield of
absolute privilege was first categorically
established in the case of Sison vs. David.
Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107, G.R.
Nos. 115239-40 March 2, 2000
In libel cases against public officials,
for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory
statement must relate to official conduct,
even if the defamatory statement is false,
unless the public official concerned proves
that the statement was made with actual
malice.—This Court has ruled in a plethora
of cases that in libel cases against public
officials, for liability to arise, the alleged
defamatory statement must relate to official
conduct, even if the defamatory statement is
false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with
actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
was false or not. Here petitioner failed to
prove actual malice on the part of the
private respondents.
Figueroa vs. People, 498 SCRA 298, G.R.
No. 159813 August 9, 2006
Defamation means injuring a
person’s character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements;
Defamation, which includes libel and
slander, means injuring a person’s
character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements.—Defamation,
which includes libel and slander, means
injuring a person’s character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem,
respect, goodwill or confidence in the
complainant or to excite derogatory feelings
or opinions about him. It is the publication of
anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him into disrepute.
Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA
541, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 October
19, 2004
To be liable for libel, the following
elements must be shown to exist: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and (d) existence of malice. There could be
no dispute as to the existence of the first
three elements of libel in the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person
against another is considered defamatory if
it ascribes to the latter the commission of a
crime; the possession of a vice or defect,
whether real or imaginary; or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put
him in contempt, or which tends to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.—An
allegation made by a person against
another is considered defamatory if it
ascribes to the latter the commission of a
crime; the possession of a vice or defect,
whether real or imaginary; or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put
him in contempt, or which tends to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. Brillante’s
statements during the January 7, 1988
press conference and in the open letter
explicitly referred to reprehensible acts
allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and
their associates, such as the use of goons
to threaten Binay’s opponents in the
election and the plotting of Syjuco’s
assassination.
Buatis, Jr. vs. People, 485 SCRA 275,
G.R. No. 142509 March 24, 2006
For the purpose of determining the
meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v.
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52 (1914), to wit: In Tawney
vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109
Minn., 341), the court had the following to
say on this point: “In determining whether
the specified matter is libelous per se, two
rules of construction are conspicuously
applicable: (1) That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the
plain and ordinary sense in which the public
would naturally understand what was
uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to
be libelous must be construed as a whole.”
In applying these rules to the language of
an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
subtle or ingenious explanation offered by
the publisher on being called to account.
The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the
readers, and they not having been assisted
by the offered explanation in reading the
article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be, from the
words used in the publication. Gauging from
the above–mentioned tests, the words used
in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by
petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In
using words such as “lousy,” “inutile,”
“carabao English,” “stupidity,” and “satan,”
the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion
on the character, integrity and reputa- tion
of respondent as a lawyer which exposed
him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need
be adduced to prove it. As the CA said,
these very words of petitioner have caused
respondent to public ridicule as even his
own family have told him: “Ginagawa ka
lang gago dito.”
When the imputation is defamatory,
the prosecution need not prove malice on
the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner’s
imputation is malicious (malice in law).—
Any of the imputations covered by Article
353 is defamatory; and, under the general
rule laid down in Article 354, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown. Thus, when the imputation is
defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of petitioner (malice in
fact), for the law already presumes that
petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice
in law). A reading of petitioner’s subject
letter-reply showed that he malevolently
castigated respondent for writing such a
demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was
nothing in the said letter which showed
petitioner’s good intention and justifiable
motive for writing the same in order to
overcome the legal inference of malice.
Fortich vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
152, G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997
While the imputation of a vice or
defect on the petitioner’s character might
have been apparent from the second to the
last paragraph of the memorandum, the
imputation was never really made publicly.
—Firstly, the assailed letter was obviously
part and parcel of the initial investigation
surrounding the non-remittance of
collections by petitioner. The right hand
caption of the memorandum clearly shows
the phrase “Inter-office Memorandum,”
implying confidentiality. Secondly, petitioner
was unable to prove that the letter was
circulated or publicized, much less read by
officers of the corporation other than those
involved in the investigation or those directly
supervising the petitioner’s work. While
imputation of a vice or defect on the
petitioner’s character might have been
apparent from the second to the last
paragraph of the memorandum, the
imputation was never really made publicly.
Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals,
235 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 110662 August
4, 1994
Unauthorized tape recordings of
telephone conversations not admissible in
evidence.—Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An
Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy
of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. Clearly,
respondents trial court and the Court of
Appeals failed to consider the provisions of
the law in admitting in evidence the cassette
tapes in question. Absent a clear showing
that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is man-datory under Rep. Act No.
4200.
Vicario vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA
25, G.R. No. 124491 June 1, 1999
Libel is defined as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance
tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Thus, the elements of libel are: (a)
imputation of a discreditable act or condition
to another; (b) publication of the imputation;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)
existence of malice.
A person’s liability for libel need not,
admittedly, stem from the fact that he was
the original publisher of the discreditable
act.—A person’s liability for libel need not,
admittedly, stem from the fact that he was
the original publisher of the discreditable
act. The maker of a libelous republication or
repetition, although not liable for the results
of the primary publication, is liable for the
consequence of a subsequent publication
which he makes or participates in making. It
is no justification that the defamatory matter
is previously published by a third person,
provided malice is present.
Article 357. Prohibited Publication of
Acts Referred to in the Course of Official
Proceedings
Elements
1. Offender is a reporter, editor or
manager of a newspaper, daily or
magazine;
2. He publishes facts connected with
the private life of another;
3. Such facts are offensive to the
honor, virtue and reputation of said
person.
The provisions of Article 357 constitute the
so-called "Gag Law."
Article 358. Slander
Slander is oral defamation. There are tow
kinds of oral defamation:
(1) Simple slander; and
(2) Grave slander, when it is of a
serious and insulting nature.
Cases:
Reyes vs. People, 27 SCRA 686, Nos. L-
21528 March 28, 1969
Where the expression “putang ina
mo“is not considered slanderous. The
words, “Agustin, putang ina mo” is a
common ‘expression in the dialect that is
often employed not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sence by
the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtue of a mother. In the instant case, it
should be viewed as part of the threats
voiced by appellant against the complainant
evidently to make the same more emphatic.
Victorio vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA
645, G.R. Nos. 32836-37 May 31, 1989
To determine whether the offense
committed is serious or slight oral
defamation, the Court adopted the following
guidelines: “x x x We are to be guided by a
doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, ‘x x
x not upon their sense and grammatical
meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time.’
Calling Atty. Ruiz “estapador” attributes to
the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and
insulting imputation. ___ In the instant case,
appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered
the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio
Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty. Ruiz,
“estapador”, which attributes to the latter the
crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite
v. People, supra, “no amount of sophistry
will take these statements out of the
compass of grave oral defamation x x x. No
circumstances need to be shown to upgrade
the slander.”
People vs. Orcullo, 111 SCRA 609, No. L-
57103 January 30, 1982
Calling a married woman a
prostitute, meaning of.—Thus, to call a
married woman a prostitute is not merely to
proclaim her an adulteress, a violator of her
marital vows: it is to charge her of having
committed an offense against public morals,
of moral degeneracy far exceeding that
involved in the maintenance of adulterous
relations.
Imputation of a crime of prostitution
against a woman can be prosecuted de
oficio.—Indeed, the words quoted in the
information are indubitably an imputation of
the crime of prostitution which can be
prosecuted de oficio.
Article 359. Slander by Deed
Elements
1. Offender performs any act not
included in any other crime against
honor;
2. Such act is performed in the
presence of other person or
persons;
3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the offended party.
Slander by deed refers to performance of an
act, not use of words.
Two kinds of slander by deed
1. Simple slander by deed; and
2. Grave slander by deed, that is,
which is of a serious nature.
Whether a certain slanderous act
constitutes slander by deed of a serious
nature or not, depends on the social
standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was
committed, the occasion, etc.
Cases:
Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609, G.R.
No. 27923 November 18, 1991
Slander is oral defamation while libel
is defamation in writing. In both, there is a
public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. In determining whether
the offense has been committed, the
defamatory words are to be construed in
their entirety, and should be taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons
reading or hearing them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in
another sense. In short, the language used
must be understood “in its plain and popular
sense—to read the sentences as would the
man on the street.” The intent or purpose
then of the speaker or writer is not relevant.
Madrona, Sr. vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1, G.R.
No. 39120 November 21, 1991
The rule is settled that in
determining whether certain utterances are
defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons hearing (or reading,
as in libel) them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another
sense. In short, the language used must be
understood “in its plain and popular sense—
to read the sentences as would the man on
the street.” The intent or purpose then of the
speaker or writer is not relevant Thus, at the
stage of the case before the court below,
the explanation of private respondent
should not prevail over what the utterances
convey to an ordinary listener.
People vs. Motita, 59 OG 3020, April 30,
1966
Accused placed a mirror between
the legs of complainant in a public place to
reflect her private parts. The crowd laughed.
- Slander by deed because it was
committed to create contempt or ridicule
upon the offended party. Slander by deed is
committed when annoyance is attended
with publicity, dishonor or contempt. If the
annoyance was attended by those
circumstances mentioned in rape, the crime
would be acts of lasciviousness.
Section Two. — General provisions
Art. 360. Persons responsible. — Any
person who shall publish, exhibit, or
cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the
same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet,
or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the court of first instance
of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of
the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila, or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one
of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published:
Provided, further, That the civil action shall
be filed in the same court where the criminal
action is filed and vice versa: Provided,
furthermore, That the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: And, provided,
finally, That this amendment shall not apply
to cases of written defamations, the civil
and/or criminal actions which have been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of
this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action
for written defamations as provided for in
the chapter shall be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province or
city, or by the municipal court of the city or
capital of the province where such action
may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which
consists in the imputation of a crime which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be
brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint expressly filed by the offended
party. (As amended by R.A. 1289, approved
June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved June
19, 1965).
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every
criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may
be given in evidence to the court and if it
appears that the matter charged as libelous
is true, and, moreover, that it was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act
or omission not constituting a crime shall
not be admitted, unless the imputation shall
have been made against Government
employees with respect to facts related to
the discharge of their official duties. library
In such cases if the defendant proves the
truth of the imputation made by him, he
shall be acquitted.
Art. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous
remarks or comments connected with
the matter privileged under the
provisions of Article 354, if made with
malice, shall not exempt the author
thereof nor the editor or managing editor
of a newspaper from criminal liability.
Article 363. Incriminating Innocent
Persons
Elements
1. Offender performs an act;
2. By such an act, he incriminates or
imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime;
3. Such act does not constitute perjury.
This crime cannot be committed through
verbal incriminatory statements. It is
defined as an act and, therefore, to commit
this crime, more than a mere utterance is
required.
If the incriminating machination is made
orally, the crime may be slander or oral
defamation.
If the incriminatory machination was made
in writing and under oath, the crime may be
perjury if there is a willful falsity of the
statements made.
If the statement in writing is not under oath,
the crime may be falsification if the crime is
a material matter made in a written
statement which is required by law to have
been rendered.
As far as this crime is concerned, this has
been interpreted to be possible only in the
so-called planting of evidence.
Cases:
People vs. Alagao, et al., 16 SCRA 879,
No. L-20721 April 30, 1966
For a criminal complaint or
information to charge the commission of a
complex crime, the allegations contained
therein do not necessarily have to charge a
complex crime as defined by law. It is
sufficient that the information contains
allegations which state that one offense was
a necessary means to commit the other.
The information in question in the present
case contains allegations properly charging
the commission of the complex crime of in-
criminatory machinations through unlawful
arrest, and the court a quo committed error
when it ordered its dismissal.
Huggland vs. Lantin, 326 SCRA 620, A.M.
No. MTJ-98-1153 February 29, 2000
Respondent’s court, the Municipal
Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales, had
only a preliminary jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 3886. After the preliminary
investigation was conducted, and
respondent judge had recommended the
filing of the corresponding information and
forwarded the record of the case to the
Provincial Prosecutor, the Court lost its
preliminary jurisdiction over the case. The
case was finally brought within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales with the filing of the
information on 28 August 1995. Clearly
then, respondent Judge should have known
that he had absolutely no power or authority
to cancel the hold departure order which he
issued in the course of the preliminary
investigation. In the first place, he never had
that authority from the inception of the case.
In the conduct of the preliminary
investigation a judge exercises a non-
judicial function, an exception to his general
duties. This is because a preliminary
investigation is basically an executive
function (People v. Navarro, 270 SCRA 393
[1997]). Consequently, his findings are
subject to review by the Provincial
Prosecutor, whose findings in turn may, in
appropriate cases, be reviewed by the
Secretary of Justice.
Article 364. Intriguing against Honor
This crime is committed by any person
who shall make any intrigue which has
for its principal purpose to blemish the
honor or reputation of another person.
Intriguing against honor is referred to as
gossiping. The offender, without
ascertaining the truth of a defamatory
utterance, repeats the same and pass it on
to another, to the damage of the offended
party. Who started the defamatory news is
unknown.
Distinction between intriguing against honor
and slander:
When the source of the defamatory
utterance is unknown and the offender
simply repeats or passes the same, the
crime is intriguing against honor.
If the offender made the utterance, where
the source of the defamatory nature of the
utterance is known, and offender makes a
republication thereof, even though he
repeats the libelous statement as coming
from another, as long as the source is
identified, the crime committed by that
offender is slander.
Distinction between intriguing against honor
and incriminating an innocent person:
In intriguing against honor, the offender
resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of
blemishing the honor or reputation of
another person.
In incriminating an innocent person, the
offender performs an act by which he
directly incriminates or imputes to an
innocent person the commission of a crime.

Cases:
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
145 SCRA 112, No. L-69809 October 16,
1986
Hence, the phrase “device or
arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200,
although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would
be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting
or recording a telephone conversation.
A person calling another by phone
may safely presume that the other may
have an extension line and runs the risk of
being heard by a 3rd party.—An extension
telephone is an instrument which is very
common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire
to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the
other end of the line probably has an
extension teiephone and he runs the risk of
a third party iistening as in the case of a
party line or a telephone unit which shares
its line with another.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA
590, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in
the private communication. The statute’s
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private
conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.—The
unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional
Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy
to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Betguen vs. Masangcay, 238 SCRA 475,
Adm. Case No. P-93-822 December 1,
1994
Article 364 of the Revised Penal
Code defines “intriguing against honor” as
any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor and reputation
of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls
under the coverage of crimes involving
moral turpitude, the latter term having been
defined as “an act of baseness, vileness,
depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellow man, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty and good
morals” (Tak Ng vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 [1959]).
TITLE XVI. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Article 365. Imprudence and Negligence
Quasi-offenses punished
1. Committing through reckless
imprudence any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a
grave or less grave felony or light
felony;

2. Committing through simple
imprudence or negligence an act
which would otherwise constitute a
grave or a less serious felony;
3. Causing damage to the property of
another through reckless
imprudence or simple imprudence or
negligence;
4. Causing through simple imprudence
or negligence some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
Distinction between reckless imprudence
and negligence:
The two are distinguished only as to
whether the danger that would be
impending is easily perceivable or not. If
the danger that may result from the criminal
negligence is clearly perceivable, the
imprudence is reckless. If it could hardly be
perceived, the criminal negligence would
only be simple.
There is no more issue on whether culpa is
a crime in itself or only a mode of incurring
criminal liability. It is practically settled that
criminal negligence is only a modality in
incurring criminal liability. This is so
because under Article 3, a felony may result
from dolo or culpa.
Since this is the mode of incurring criminal
liability, if there is only one carelessness,
even if there are several results, the
accused may only be prosecuted under one
count for the criminal negligence. So there
would only be one information to be filed,
even if the negligence may bring about
resulting injuries which are slight.
Do not separate the accusation from the
slight physical injuries from the other
material result of the negligence.
If the criminal negligence resulted, for
example, in homicide, serious physical
injuries and slight physical injuries, do not
join only the homicide and serious physical
injuries in one information for the slight
physical injuries. You are not complexing
slight when you join it in the same
information. It is just that you are not
splitting the criminal negligence because
the real basis of the criminal liability is the
negligence.
If you split the criminal negligence, that is
where double jeopardy would arise.
Cases:
Gaid vs. People, 584 SCRA 489, G.R.
No. 171636 April 7, 2009
Negligence has been defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. The elements of
simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack
of precaution the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate or the danger is
not clearly manifest. The standard test in
determining whether a person is negligent
in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another
is this: could a prudent man, in the position
of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
Reodica vs. Court of Appeals, 292
SCRA 87, G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
 Felonies are committed not only by
means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by
means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when
the wrongful act is performed with
deliberate intent; and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since
public censure is classified under Article 25
of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale
provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a
penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows
that the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is a light
felony.
Dayap vs. Sendiong, 577 SCRA 134,
G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009
The offense with which petitioner
was charged is reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, less serious physical
injuries and damage to property, a complex
crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave
or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it
is applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3
as “acts or omissions punishable by law”
committed either by means of deceit (dolo)
or fault (culpa). Thus, the penalty
imposable upon petitioner, were he to be
found guilty, is prision correccional in its
medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 4 years) and maximum period (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, 635
SCRA 191, G.R. No. 172716 November
17, 2010
The confusion bedeviling the
question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing
single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); and (2) when an
offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of
the penalty for the most serious crime. In
contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
“the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,” a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Court hold that prosecutions under
Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties,
the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short,
there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.
People vs. Cano, 17 SCRA 237, No. L-
19660 May 24, 1966
The information alleges that,
through reckless negligence of the
defendant, the bus driven by him hit
another bus causing upon some of its
passengers, serious physical injuries, upon
others less serious physical injuries and
upon still others slight physical injuries, in
addition to damage to property. Such
information does not purport to complex the
offense of slight physical injuries with
reckless negligence with that of damage to
property and serious and less serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.
Ibabao vs. People, 132 SCRA 216, No.
L-36957 September 28, 1984
We find merit in petitioner’s
contention, however, that the increased
penalty is inapplicable to him because the
failure to give aid to the injured on the spot
has not been alleged in the Information. So
far as we have been able to ascertain, this
question has not been definitely passed
upon by this Court. But, we agree with the
then Court of Appeals when it ruled in
People vs. Beduya that “the failure to
render assistance, constitutes a qualifying
circumstances because the presence thereof
raises the penalty by one degree (like
treachery which qualifies homicide to
murder). The same must be alleged in the
information to apprise the defendant of this
charge unlike an ordinary aggravating
circumstance which even if not alleged in
the information, can be taken into account
if proved at the trial without objection.”
Buerano vs. Court of Appeals, 115
SCRA 82, No. L-30269 July 19, 1982
Conviction of accused in the charge
of slight and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence constitutes
double jeopardy to the charge of the crime
of damage to property through reckless
imprudence. He stressed that “if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act
resulted into homicide and physical injuries,
then the same consequence must perforce
follow where the same reckless act caused
merely damage to property—not death—
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular
collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motor
vehicle arising from the same mishap.”
Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
378, No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
The test for determining whether or
not a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would
a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on
the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Applying the above
tests to the case at bar, we find the
petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The
appellate court in finding the petitioner
guilty said: “The accused should have
stepped on the brakes when she saw the
car going in the opposite direction followed
by another which overtook the first by
passing towards its left. She should not only
have swerved the car she was driving to the
right but should have also tried to stop or
lessen her speed so that she would not
bump into the pedestrian who was crossing
at the time but also the jeepney which was
then parked along the street.” The course
of action suggested by the appellate court
would seem reasonable were it not for the
fact that such suggestion did not take into
account the amount of time afforded
petitioner to react to the situation she was
in. For it is undeniable that the suggested
course of action presupposes sufficient time
for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of
the different courses of action would result
in the least possible harm to herself and to
others. Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no
evidence was presented by the prosecution
with respect to the relative distances of
petitioner to the parked jeepney and the
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would
tend to prove that petitioner did have
sufficient time to reflect on the
consequences of her instant decision to
swerve her car to the right without stepping
on her brakes.
Carillo vs. People, 229 SCRA 386, G.R.
No. 86890 January 21, 1994
Petitioner should serve the interest
of his patient with the greatest of solicitude
giving them always his best talent and skill.
Once summoned, petitioner
anaesthesiologist could not be readily
found. When he finally appeared at 10:30 in
the evening, he was evidently in a bad
temper, commenting critically on the
dextrose bottles before ordering their
removal. This circumstance indicated he
was not disposed to attend to this
unexpected call, in violation of the canons
of his profession that as a physician, he
should serve the interest of his patient “with
the greatest of solicitude, giving them
always his best talent and skill.”
Simple negligence is defined as a
mere lack of prevision in a situation where
either the threatened harm is not immediate
or the danger not openly visible.—As early
as in People v. Vistan, the Court defined
simple negligence, penalized under what is
now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
as “a mere lack of prevision in a situation
where either the threatened harm is not
immediate or the danger not openly visible.”
Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen
of the offense of simple negligence is the
failure to exercise the diligence necessitated
or called for by the situation which was not
immediately life-destructive but which
culminated, in the present case, in the
death of a human being three (3) days
later. Such failure to exercise the necessary
degree of care and diligence is a negative
ingredient of the offense charged.
People vs. Belbes, 334 SCRA 161, G.R.
No. 124670 June 21, 2000
Appellant’s claim of self-defense
could not prosper. The evidence on record,
however, reveals an incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in Article 11,
paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal
Code. A person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
But we must stress there are two requisites
for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due
performance of such right or office. In the
instant case, only the first requisite is
present; admittedly appellant acted in the
performance of his duty. However, the
second requisite is lacking, for the killing
need not be a necessary consequence of
the performance of his duty.
Loney vs. People, 482 SCRA 194, G.R.
No. 152644 February 10, 2006
Mala in se cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes; What makes the former a
felony is the criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa) while what make the
latter crime are special laws enacting them.
—On petitioners’ claim that the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs”
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a
mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942). What makes the former
a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.