Appellate Practice and Brief Making - Case Digests Compilation

New Trial or Reconsideration
1. Yarcia
Abe Industries, Inc. vs. CA
162 SCRA 48 (1998)
Facts:
 Respondent Erlinda Leonardo, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, filed
a complaint for recovery of property against the petitioners before the RTC. RTC rendered a
decision in her favor on October 29, 1985.
 The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 1985. RTC gave due course and
ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate court on November 25, 1985.
 Respondent filed with the RTC a motion for partial execution of the decision pending appeal
on November 19, 1985 which was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that the appeal
had been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case.
 The RTC issued a special order grating the partial execution of the decision pending appeal
on December 19, 1985.
 CA sustained RTC’s special order, it held that since the petitioners received a copy of the
lower court’s decision on November 7, 1985, “the appeal was not deemed perfected until the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal on or November 22, 1985 to be
precise.” Hence, it concluded that since the respondent filed her motion for partial execution
pending appeal on November 19, 1985, the lower court was still competent to entertain the
motion
Issue:
Whether or not the CA’s erred in its decision?
Held:
The SC agreed with the appellate court’s decision but not with the reason it adduced in
support thereof. It held that if one party has already perfected his appeal, the clause "upon the
expiration of the last day to appeal by any party" obviously no longer applies to him, but only to the
other party whose period to appeal has not yet expired.
Thus, in the instant case, since the petitioners had already perfected their appeal on
November 15, 1985, although they had until November 22, 1985 within which to file their appeal, the
latter date had become immaterial. However, the other party received the decision on November 4,
1985, hence she had until November 19, 1985 within which to appeal. Her motion for execution
pending appeal which was filed on November 19, 1985 was therefore filed on time. Had she filed the
motion on November 22, 1985 it would have been filed late
M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 1

2. Vallejos
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an
order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on
the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received
on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court,
the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners file their notice of appeal on time?
Held:
Yes, To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40,
Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

3. Torres
MENDOZA vs BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents Renato Macapagal and Corazon Macapagal
entered into a written contract, entitled “Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng Tirahang Bahay” whereby
for and in consideration of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner undertook to construct a
residential house for the private respondents under the terms and conditions therein provided for.
The construction of the house was attended by some misunderstandings between the parties, with
the petitioner claiming that he is entitled to certain amounts which the private respondents refused to
pay, and the latter in turn alleging that the petitioner should pay them damages for having
abandoned the job. Petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against the
private respondents. After the private respondents filed their answer to the complaint, a pre-trial was
conducted in which the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Before any trial was
conducted, however, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the same does not state a cause of action. The petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion
to dismiss. The respondent Judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the respondent judge for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is erred in dismissing the complaint.
Held:
The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim that the motion for
reconsideration was defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply with the requirements of
the Rules of Court regarding such a motion. We fail to see how a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same having called the attention of the trial court to
a point which the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. The requirement which
the petitioner failed to observe in filing his motion for reconsideration was the failure to attach an
affidavit of merit to the same. Private respondents argue that a motion for reconsideration is
equivalent to a motion for new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when the motion for new trial is
filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to the motion. Once again, private respondents
misinterpreted the rules. While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial if based on a ground for new trial, the so-called “motion for reconsideration” which is not
called as such in Rule 37 is the term commonly used to refer to a motion for new trial under
subdivision (c) of Section 1 Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial is based
on any off the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section 1 of Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed for a motion for new rial or
motion for reconsideration under subdivision (c) of the same section.

4. Tamayo
MOISES LLANTERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-28421 July 20, 1981
Facts:
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision,
situated in Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267Title over the said tract of
land was originally registered under the Torrens system as far back as July 8, 1914.
On January 7, 1959, the Corporation instituted an action for recovery of possession against
petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It alleged that on March 23, 1957 petitioner, through
force, strategy and stealth, and without its consent, entered into, occupied and subsequently
constructed his house on a 200-square-meter portion of the land at Barrio North, Tatalon, Quezon
City, covered by the title of the Corporation.Petitioner, in his Answer, claimed that he bought the land
on October 29, 1956 from Felicidad Campos, whose title thereto could be traced back to
TelesforoDeudor, the first known "owner" of the property. On June 21, 1959, the trial Court rendered
judgment ordering petitioner or any person claiming under him, to remove his house and other
constructions from the property in question; to surrender possession thereof to the Corporation; to
pay P20.00 a month from April 23, 1957 until possession is restored; and to pay the costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, that Court affirmed the Decision of the trial Court.
Petitioner received a copy of the same on May 30, 1967. Through counsel, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on June 14, 1967 by registered mail, but erroneously placed as docket number
thereof, CA-G.R. No. 26772-R (J. M. Tuason& Co., Inc., vs. Paciencia P. Bayang), instead of CA-
G.R. No. 27311-R. The Motion was attached to the expediente of the former case. There being no
Motion for Reconsideration of record in CA-G.R. No. 27311-R, the judgment against petitioner
became final, an entry of judgment was made, and the records of the case were remanded to the
Lower Court for execution. The Petitioner moved to set aside the entry of judgment on the ground
that, except for the mistake in docket number, reconsideration was timely filed so that the Decision
had not yet become final. On November 11, 1967, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion,
Issues:
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not resolving that the date of mailing is the date of filing.
2. WON the Court of Appeals erred in entering the judgment in Ca -G.R. No. 27311-R as final
and executory.
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the entry of judgment in CA G.R. No.
27311-R.
Ruling:
NO.
Petitioner's Motion, although seasonably presented from the foregoing standpoint, bore an
erroneous docket number. For this reason, it could not be attached to the expediente of the correct
case. To all intents and purposes, the Motion was legally inexistent. Thus, the Court of Appeals
committed no error in remanding the case to the Court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Petitioner's counsel's oversight cannot be considered excusable. He had prepared the Motion for
Reconsideration in the latter suit a month before. Both Motions were not being prepared at
approximately the same time, as contended, such that a mistake could have been committed, and if
it had been, it was excusable for having been sheer negligence. This is one case where petitioner
has to bear the adverse consequences of his counsel's act, for, it has been held, a client is bound by
his lawyer's inexcusable negligence. No abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid at the door of
respondent Court when it declared its judgment final.

5. Robledo
G.R. No. L-49223 May 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner, vs.

HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ, ROGELIO MARAVILES, and QUEZON CITY SHERIFF, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, hereafter simply referred to as PCIB,
defendant in Civil Case No. Q-23275 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. The action was
instituted by one of its depositors, Rogelio Maraviles, for the recovery of damages resulting from the
dishonor of two (2) of his checks on account of the negligence of employees of PCIB.
The law firm of Ledesma, Saludo & Associates appeared for PCIB in the suit, and gave its address
as 3rd Floor, LTR Building, 5548 South Superhighway, Makati, Metro Manila. 4 Holding office in the
same LTR Building, at the ground floor, was a corporation known as Commercial Exponent
Philippines, Inc., COMMEX, for short.
The case submitted for decision, and on June 28, 1978, rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ordering
the payment to him by PCIB of P20,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
arguing that the award of damages was exorbitant, & offering the explanation that the lawyer
personally handling the case suddenly resigned & failed to include the case in the list of his pending
cases w/ their respective status to the firm, thus the present case was not reassigned in time for
another lawyer to attend the hearing.
Maraviles opposed, on the grounds that (1) that judgment had already become final, notice thereof
having been served on PCIB, thru COMMEX (a corporation in located on the ground floor of the
same building as the law firm – w/c was on the third floor), & the 15-day period to appeal had
already lapsed when PCIB's motion for reconsideration was filed on Aug. 15, 1978; & (2) Mangohig's
(the lawyer handling the case) failure to include the case in his report did not constitute excusable
negligence warranting relief, & clients are bound by their counsel's mistakes.
PCIB responded, arguing that there was no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for
reconsideration, this being required only when the motion for new trial was based on grounds other
than excessive award of damages.
Maraviles pointed out that an affidavit of merits was in fact indispensable because PCIB's lawyers
were invoking excusable negligence as ground to set aside the Order of June 23, 1978 considering
the case submitted for decision.
The Trial Court denied PCIB's motion for reconsideration
By Order dated September 20, 1978, the Court decreed the issuance of a writ of execution at
Maraviles instance, "judgment ** being already final and executory."
Now, the records do not show when and how notice of the Order of September 18, 1978 (denying
PCIB's motion for reconsideration) was served on PCIB's lawyers. These lawyers do not state this
material fact anywhere in their pleadings. Be this as it may, as aforestated they filed with the Trial

Court on September 25, 1978 a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, a record on appeal. And on the
same day they also filed a second Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that service of notice of the
judgment should be reckoned not as of July 15, 1978 (when COMMEX received it), but July 17,
1978 when COMMEX gave the notice to PCIB's lawyers).
ISSUE:
Whether there was a need to append an affidavit of merits to its MR.
RULING:
Yes. A motion for new trial grounded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence should
thus ordinarily be accompanied by two (2) affidavits: one, setting forth the facts and circumstances
alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and the other, an
affidavit of merits, setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's meritorious
cause of action or defense.
Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, etc., is unaccompanied by either or
both affidavits, the motion is pro forma a scrap of paper, as it were, and will not interrupt the running
of the period of appeal. 29 But where, as here, the motion for new trial is founded not only on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also on the ground of "award of excessive
damages," 30 as to which no affidavit of fraud, etc., or of merits is required, what being required of the
movant being to "point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating
the invoked ground, the motion cannot be denied as pro forma simply because no affidavit of merits
is appended thereto, provided there be a specification of the findings or conclusions of the judgment
alleged to be erroneous because awarding excessive damages. The tenability of the grounds is
dependent upon different premises. The untenability of one does not of itself, render the other
unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

6. Regala
G.R. No. 159695 September 15, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON ASUNCION, et. al.
Facts:
Respondents Gonzales Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe Asuncion applied for the
registration of the titles of nine parcels of land which they claimed they acquired by inheritance,
accretion and through open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under color of title for
at least thirty years. The applicant and other oppositors entered into a compromise agreement which
the trial court approved. The Solicitor General filed a motion for consideration. However, the trial
court dismissed the motion on the ground that the Solicitor General was in effect seeking a new trial
and that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of merit required by
the Rules. The Solicitor General then filed a notice of appeal, but the same was dismissed due to
filing out of time. The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking
the annulment of the orders of the trial court. The petition was dismissed due to lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General was in effect one
for a new trial and was pro forma.
Held:
No. The motion for consideration filed by the Solicitor General is not a motion for new trial,
nor a pro forma.
The arguments raised by the Solicitor General in the motion for reconsideration were: (1) that
the trial court deprived petitioner of its right to present evidence; and, (2) that the decision was
tainted with serious errors of law and fact. These arguments are not the causes allowed by the Rules
for new trial, thus the motion for reconsideration filed cannot be considered as such.
The Court also ruled that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma. The Solicitor
General merely stresses that the findings of the trial court is contrary to law. Moreover, mere
reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for
reconsideration pro forma.
In this case, the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal within the 15 days fresh period
from the date he received the denial. Hence, the notice was not filed out of time and the appeal must
be given due course.

7. Ramos
G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013
REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA and FERDINAND TADEJA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
On the strength of their co-accused Plaridel Tadeja's extrajudicial confession, taken after his
apprehension on 29 November 2006, petitioners pray for the reopening of the homicide case against
them. Their prayer is for the reception of newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that this Court's
Decision affirming their conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening of the homicide case against them is proper, in view of the
extrajudicial confession of the accused after Court’s decision has already become final and
executory.
HELD:
No. The petitioners’ motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the trial
court is not proper.
Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk
of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed
by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
This is the reason why we have consistently denied petitioners’ motions for reconsideration
of this Court’s Decision and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by
the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction
already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this Court
denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial
may no longer be entertained.
Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the
spot report of the police on Plaridel’s apprehension.
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.58

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The
confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and
even gave testimony as to his defense. 59 It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by
the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water.
Clearly, they did not truth during trial. Whatever their reasons were, the inevitable conclusion
is that Plaridel’s version in his extrajudicial confession is not newly discovered evidence that can be
a ground for a new trial within the contemplation of the rules.
Courts are bound to apply the rules they have laid down in order to facilitate their duty to dispense
justice. Thus, their motion to reopen the case must fail.

8. Pilotin
SJS Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015
Facts:
The Supreme Court, on November 24, 2014, declared Ordinance No. 8187 as
unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued stay of Pandacan Oil Terminals. The Court
set the timelines for the relocation and transfer of the terminals. Among the the interveners who filed
their respective motions regarding said decision, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (SHELL) filed
a Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:
1.Erroneous reliance on the factual pronouncements in G.R. No. 156052 entitled "Social
Justice Society v. Atienza," which, it argues, were completely unsupported by competent
evidence;
2.Adoption of "imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by the

petitioners," which it also raises as totally unsupported by evidence because the petitions,
which involve factual issues, were wrongfully filed with this Court;
3.Conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the conditions in 2001 and the
present setup with respect to the oil depots operations; and
4.Failure to dismiss the petitions despite the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187, which, it
maintains, has rendered the cases moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.
Ruling:
No. The Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.
It bears stressing that these cases were called in session several times to give the members
of the Court time to study and present their respective positions. Before the Decision was finally
promulgated, the Court had thoroughly deliberated on the arguments of the parties, including the
basic issues herein raised - the rationale for upholding the position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052,
on one hand, and the safety measures adopted by the intervenors, including the alleged "imagined
fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by the petitioners," on the other; the argument of
whether or not the petition should have been filed with the trial court or at least referred to the Court
of Appeals to receive evidence; and the issue on whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No.
8283 has rendered the instant petitions moot and academic. And for failure to reconcile diverse
views on several issues, a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion was written.
The grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the issues already passed upon by the
Court, there is no need to "cut and paste" pertinent portions of the Decision or re-write the ponencia
in accordance with the outline of the instant motion.

On the effect and disposition of Motion for Reconsideration, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the
obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the
same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and
submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments
advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the
first time, these being, as above stated, deemed waived because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for
reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e.,
the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to and
pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed
upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration
or modification of the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to
require consideration, etc.

9. Ortizo
EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 196231-32, January 28, 2014
Facts:
Several cases were filed against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Mendoza. The copy
of the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ decision finding Mendoza guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed the penalty of dismissal was received by Mendoza. He filed a Motion for reconsideration.
Pending the final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, he hijacked a tourist bus and held 21
foreign tourists and 4 Filipinos on board as hostages. The hostage-taking resulted in the death of
Mendoza and several others on board the bus. President Aquino directed the DOJ and DILG to
conduct a joint thorough investigation on the incident. The report found the Ombudsman and
Gonzales accountable for their gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case of
Mendoza. Their failure to promptly resolve the MR without justification and despite repeated pleas
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. The investigation committee recommended
referral of finding to the OP.
Sulit on the other hand was charged for culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, for entering a plea bargaining agreement with Major General Garcia in a plunder and
money laundering case, which is a ground for removal under Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 and was
also recommended to the president for dismissal.
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales and Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit filed a petition

challenging the constitutionality of Section 8 (2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Sec. 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. On MR, the Court votes to grant Gonzales
petition and to declare said provision as unconstitutional with respect to the office of the
ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not Gonzales should be guilty for gross neglect of duty.
Held:
No. Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty since he acted on the case forwarded
to him within 9 days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP relied on the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza’s MR within 5 days. The
Court said that even if the provision is mandatory, the period it required cannot apply to Gonzales
since he is a Deputy Ombudsman and not an ordinary Hearing Officer. The period of resolving the
case does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed.
The Court declared Section 8 as unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the

President over a Deputy Ombudsman but maintain the validity as far as Sulit is concerned. The
Court did not consider office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman.

10. Olaguer
SYIACO V ONG

11. Obnamia
YBIERNAS VS. TANCO-GABALDON, G.R. NO. 178925, JUNE 1, 2011, SECOND DIVISION,
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions which
granted respondents’ motion for new trial of a case for quieting of title and damages in petitioners’
favor in a summary judgment by the trial court.
Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros
Occidental. On April 28, 1988, she executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of her heirs, Dionisio
Ybiernas (Dionisio) and petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles.
On July 5, 1989, the Deed and the Bacolod City RTC Order for registration were annotated on its
title.
However, on October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay
Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC, Pasig City a Complaint for sum of money of ₱6,000,000.00,
and damages against Estrella and three individuals, allegingto be guilty of fraud when they
misrepresented to respondents their ownership of a parcel of land in Quezon City.1avvphi1
Pasig City RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a
bond. The sheriff levied the property and on November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was
annotated on the title.
Dionisio filed, on January 14, 1992, an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of
ownership to them. Respondents, however, filed an indemnity bond thus, the sheriff refused to lift
the levy.
Pasig City RTC resolved in favor of respondents to collect ₱6,000,000.00, plus legal interest
and damages from Estrella, et al. However, respondents elevated the case up to this Court,
questioning the interest rate which was denied in a November 20, 2002 Minute Resolution, final and
executory on April 14, 2003.
Meanwhile, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners Valentin Ybiernas and
Violeta Ybiernas. On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the Bacolod City RTC a Complaint for
Quieting of Title and Damages,claiming that the levy was invalid and the annotation of the RTC
Order and the Deed serves as notice to the whole world that the property is no longer owned by
Estrella.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, respondents contended that petitioners were guilty of
forum-shopping.
During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the existence of the RTC Bacolod City
Order for annotation.

On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment which was initially denied
in the Order dated December 23, 2004 but was granted upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
in the decision dated December 27, 2005.
The summary judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the levy on attachment is
declared invalid and entries thereof ordered cancelled and dissolved.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal which was granted by the RTC. While pending in the
CA, respondents filed a motion for new trial, claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that
Cadastral Case No. 10 did not exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached
were the affidavit of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in Bacolod City in behalf of
the law office representing respondents, and the certifications by Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr., Clerk
of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City; by Atty. Mehafee G. Sideno, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 47, and by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC Archives Division of the National
Archives Office. Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence.
In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that partial summary judgment which could
not be the subject of a motion for new trial, and existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted
fact which could not be questioned in a motion for new trial.
The CA granted respondents’ motion for new trialhaving satisfied all the elements for the
filing of a Motion for New Trial and in the higher interest of substantial justice, hence, the case be
REMANDED to the Court a quo for said purpose.
At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a proper subject of an
appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case, having completely disposed of
all the issues except as to the amount of damages. The CA concluded that respondents properly
availed of a motion for new trial because such remedy could be availed of at any time after the
appeal from the lower court had been perfected and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case.
According to the CA, respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after
the trial of the case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held that
respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10; they only
admitted the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 in Cadastral Case No. 10.
On July 16, 2007, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the questioned RTC decision is a proper subject of an appeal and a motion
for new trial to question admitted facts and for newly discovered evidence?
RULING:
Yes. We find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. New trial is a
remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice." Thus, the
Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly
discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the
sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that

such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the
alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
Appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts (Rule 40)
12. Marcos
Silverio Jr. V CA AND Silverio-Dee---Intelocutory order prohibited from being appealed.
FACTS:
The controversy arises from the settlement of the estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio.
The surviving spouse, Silverio Sr. filed an intestate proceedings for the settlement of her estate.
However, this was opposed by Silverio Jr. by filing a petition to remove Silverio Sr. as administrator
of the estate and for his appointment as the new administrator. The tirial court granted his petition.
Nelia Silverio-Dee opposed that order by filing a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile,
Silverio Jr. filed an urgent motion prohibiting any person to occupy the real property in the estate of
the late Beatriz located in Forbes Park, Makati.
In the May 31, 2005 RTC Order- issued an Ominibus Order affirming the appointment of
Silverio Jr. as the new administrator. This also denied Silverio-Dee’s motion for reconsideration. The
said order also directed Silverio-dee to vacate the said property.
Silverio-Dee received the Omnibus Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of
Appeal and Record on Appeal, on June 16, 2005, she filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ominibus Order. This was denied by the RTC in an Order dated Decemeber 12, 2005, the same
was received by her on Decemeber 22, 2005.
ISSUE:
WON an appeal from the Order (RTC 12 December 20005 Order) denying a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order is allowed.
RULING:
Not allowed. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when
declared by the Rules to be appealable. Furthermore, under the same section, one of the
enumerated items where no appeal may be taken from is an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65.
In this case, the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is considered as an interlocutory order.
As defined, an interlocutory order is “one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon,” hence, it is not a final order or determination of the case. The ROC
is clear that an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, since the Omnibus Order is not one, for it only ordered the vacating of Dee-Silverio from
the real property, not a final determination of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the
estate or their rights therein. The appeal from that Omnibus Motion is therefore not allowed under
the Rules of Court.

Silverio-Dee should have filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which is the proper
remedy in this case. Nevertheless, she has now lost this remedy given that the Omnibus Order was
received by way her on Jan. 8, 2005, a great lapse from the 60-day period day had already
happened.
(Note: Not exactly cited by the SC that an ‘’interlocutory order” is in the enumeration of not
appealable items in Sec. 1, Rule 41.)
13. Marasigan
Andrew James McBurnie vs. Ganzon, G.R. No. 178034, October 17, 2013
Ponente: REYES, J.:
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Court of Appeals' decision granting motion
to reduce appeal and assailing denial of motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Andrew James McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against the respondents. He claimed he signed a five-year employment agreement
with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-President. Sometime in November, 1999, he got into an
accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recovering from his injuries. While in
Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because
the project did not push through. On the other hand, the respondents opposed the complaint,
contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a company for
the management of hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment, and
thus entitled to receive from the respondents’salary and benefits for the unexpired term of their
employment contract,moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the
total monetary award.The respondents appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC to reduce bond
however it was denied and ordered respondents to pay additional bond together with the other
requirements under the NLRC Rules of Procedure within a non-extendable period of 10 days from
the receipt thereof, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed. Motion for reconsideration but it was
denied and was again orderedto pay additional bond. Instead of complying, respondents filedpetition
for certiorari and prohibition with the prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. A 60- day TRO was issued. Likewise, a motion for reconsideration was denied.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals petition for Certiorari with prayers for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted. Petitioner
assailed the issuance of writ before Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition on the ground of
McBurnie’s failure to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and to sufficiently show that
the CA committed any reversible error.In the meantime, the CA ruled on the merits of the assailed
decision and rendered its allowing the respondents’ motion to reduce appeal bond and directing the
NLRC to give due course to their appeal. Petitioner’s motion forreconsideration wasdenied hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in acceptance of thethird motion for reconsideration?
Ruling:
The Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a general
rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that "no second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rule
rests on the basic tenet of immutability of judgments. "At some point, a decision becomes final and
executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end.
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of
settled exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3,
Rule 15 thereof, provides:
Sec. 3.Second motion for reconsideration. ― The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Court’s declaration.
The Court has then entertained and granted second motions for reconsideration "in the higher
interest of substantial justice," as allowed under the Internal Rules when the assailed decision is
"legally erroneous," "patently unjust" and "potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
With the issue of the suspension of the period to perfect the appeal upon the filing of a motion to
reduce bond. The Court provides the two conditions emphasized in Garcia v. KJ Commercial for the
grant of such motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount, shall suffice to suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal from the labor
arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. To require the full amount of the bond within the 10-day reglementary
period would only render nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to seek a reduction
of the bond. The filing of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal

14. Manzano
FRANCISCO V. PERMSKUL
173 SCRA 324
FACTS:
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for
a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract,
the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On
May 31, 1985, the private respondentvacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission
of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985,
sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit
after deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of
P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed in toto. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petition for review was denied the
same with motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Whether or not, memorandum decision violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Whether or not, memorandum decision complied with the requirements set forth both as to
the form prescribed and the occasions
RULING:
1. NO. Memorandum decision does not violate Article VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution states
that:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
2. YES. Memorandum decision complied with the requirements set forth under the law and the
interim rules.

According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court
should be revoked for noncompliance with the above-quoted constitutional mandate. He asks that
the case be remanded to the regional trial court for a full-blown hearing on the merits, to be followed
by a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his
part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P.
Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals which sustained the said
law.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may
adopt by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or
resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not
indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term “memorandum decision” in Section
40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this
jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed
cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision
or final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of
fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in
the above provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by
an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of
law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. The Court has deliberated extensively on
the challenge posed against the memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into
account the salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed
restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion that
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as
a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to
be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by
remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
Hence, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both
as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed
judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Petition is DENIED.

15. Macatangay
CASOLITA VS CA
(275 SCRA 257)
FACTS:
Private respondent ATROP, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioners with the RTC of Manila for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land which is owned by ATROP, Inc.
Petitioner Casolita, through his counsel, Atty. Jose L. Aguilar, filed his answer alleging that
he and his family had been in continuous possession of the land since 1953, having been
designated as caretaker by the supposed "real owners" Ramon LeQuina and Portia Pueo.
The other petitioners, represented by Atty. Benito Gatpatan, Jr. filed their answer adopting
and incorporating the allegations of Casolita in his answer to the complaint.
After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of ATROP, Inc., ordering the defendants to vacate
the premises. Atty. Aguilar received a copy of the decision but failed to file a notice of appeal. Atty.
Gatpatan, Jr., on the other hand, filed a notice of appeal.
In its omnibus motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of a writ of execution,
ATROP, Inc. argued that as far as petitioner Casolita was concerned, the decision had become final
and executory because his counsel, Atty. Aguilar, received a copy of the decision without filing a
notice of appeal. As to the other petitioners who filed the notice of appeal, the same was fatally
defective for they did not serve the same to the counsel of Atrop, Inc. The lower court granted the
omnibus motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Atty. Alfredo C. Baylon, Jr. thereafter filed a notice of appearance as "counsel for all the
defendants" and moved for the reconsideration of the lower court’s order dismissing the appeal,
alleging that the dismissal of the notice of appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution violated
the principle of due process, as it amounted to a denial of justice. He contended that petitioners
Casolita and companions were not properly notified of the decision since Atty. Aguilar had withdrawn
as counsel due to poor health; hence, the decision had not become final and executory. The lower
court denied the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit appeal.
The petitioners through Atty. Baylon filed in the Court of Appeals a petition seeking the
annulment of the two orders of the lower court, one granting the omnibus motion to dismiss and the
other denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in denying their petition based on their failure to furnish private respondent with
a copy of the notice of appeal. Such omission, they insist, was a mere technicality which should be
cast aside to attain substantial justice.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in upholding the lower courts denial of Casolitas
motion for reconsideration, motion to admit appeal and notice of appeal on the ground that Atty.
Baylon was not Casolitas counsel of record.
RULING:
No. The contention lacks merit. Under the previous rule, an appeal may be taken "by serving
upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal." This provision was amended
by Batas PambansaBlg. 129, particularly Section 39 thereof, by deleting the need to file an appeal
bond and record on appeal, except in multiple appeals and in special proceedings, and by fixing the
period of appeal to fifteen (15) days. The entire original record of the case instead is transmitted to
the appellate court. Appeals from final judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are now taken
to public respondent Court of Appeals by simply filing a notice of appeal. The simplification of the
procedure for elevating to a higher court final judgments or orders of the lower courts
correspondingly underscored the importance of the notice of appeal. The adverse party may only be
apprised initially of the pendency of an appeal by the notice of appeal. To deprive him of such notice
is tantamount to depriving him of his right to be informed that the judgment in his favor is being
challenged. This requirement should be complied with so that he may be afforded the opportunity to
register his opposition to the notice of appeal if he so desires. And service of the notice of appeal
upon him may not be dispensed with on the basis of the appellants whims and caprices, as in this
case.
Respondent court neither committed an error nor abused its discretion in upholding the lower
courts denial of Casolitas motion for reconsideration, motion to admit appeal and notice of appeal on
the ground that Atty. Baylon was not Casolitas counsel of record. The records show that Atty. Aguilar
was petitioner Casolitas counsel of record. Even Atty. Gatpatan Jr. impliedly recognized his separate
representation when he adopted the allegations in the answer filed for said petitioner by Atty.
Aguilar. That Atty. Aguilar was the counsel of petitioner Casolita was noted by the lower court in its
Order of November 10, 1993. This was buttressed by the fact that Casolita was furnished a copy of
the decision through said counsel of record. The failure of Atty. Aguilar to file a notice of appeal
binds Casolita which failure the latter cannot now disown on the basis of his bare allegation and self-
serving pronouncement that the former was ill. A client is bound by his counsels mistakes and
negligence. And neither may Atty. Baylons unsupported claim that petitioner Casolita was in Cavite
at the time the decision of the lower court can be given credence. Indeed, the unrebutted
observation of private respondent cast serious doubt over Atty. Baylons unsubstantiated claims.
The motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was filed by counsel not of record, no proper
substitution having been made.
It is a settled rule that a lawyer may not simply withdraw his appearance in a case without a
formal petition filed in the case. Substitution of counsel must be made in accordance with Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, to wit: "Sec. 26. Change of Attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time
from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of the client, should the
court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the
docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party.
There having no proper substitution of counsel, Atty. Baylon, as correctly noted by the lower
court, has no personality in the case.

More, it is difficult to conceive that Casolita, did not learn of the adverse judgment, when
copy thereof was received by Gatpatan. Gatpatan has been collaborating with Aguilar, in the instant
case, and is a personal friend of Casolita. In fact, Gatpatan is a neighbor of Casolita. In fact,
Gatpatan, Aguilar, and Casolita had been acting in unison, all throughout the lengthy trial of the
instant case.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. While the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to this rule.
As regards petitioners residual contention that the decision of the lower court and the notice
to vacate contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992, which petitioners addressed for the first time in their
memorandum, the same does not deserve serious consideration. It is a rule that issues not properly
brought and ventilated below may not be raised for the first time on appeal, save in exceptional
circumstances none of which, however, obtain in this case.

16. Linaban
CASALLA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision dated November 17, 1998, and the
resolution dated May 25, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37031, denying petitioners
appeal as well as motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Facts:
Petitioner Lamberto Casalla issued two (2) Bank of Commerce checks in payment of the obligation
of his wife, TERESITA CASALLA, to private respondent MILAGROS SANTOS-ESTEVANES, in
order to avert a court litigation. The two (2) checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank
for reason of insufficiency of funds.
Subsequently, private respondent filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 11844 and
11845 and raffled to Branch 68 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City.
On September 22, 1994, the MTC of Pasig City rendered a decision convicting the accused
(petitioner herein) of the crime charged on two (2) counts. Said decision was affirmed with
modification that appropriate subsidiary imprisonment be imposed on the accused in case of
insolvency.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the court a quo, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
February 8, 1995.
In an Order dated February 9, 1995, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration on
account of the absence of a notice of hearing and because the issues raised therein have already
been passed upon in its decision
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing applies in petitioners motion for reconsideration?
Held:
Under the present rules, the notice of hearing is expressly made a requirement.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro forma; hence, it did

not suspend the running of the prescriptive period and the period had lapsed before the petition was
filed. Hencepetitioners second motion was not only a prohibited pleading but it was also filed out of
time.
Additionally, petitioners act of filling a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Court of Appeals
was improper because under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken
from order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration and an order of execution. Instead, the
proper recourse is a special civil action under Rule 65 which is petition for certiorari.
Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit.
17. Isidoro
Enriquez vs. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Victorina Tigle filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein petitioner Melba
Moncal Enriquez before the MCTC of Bayawan-Basay, Negros Oriental. She bought a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 377, located at Tinego, Bayawan, Negros Oriental from EngraciaMacaraya. Prior
to the sale, Enriquez was staying at said lot by mere tolerance of Macaraya. Enriquez was given an
option to buy said lot but she refused to exercise it. After the sale, Tigle then made demands on
Enriquez to vacate the property, but Enriquez adamantly refused.
Enriquez seasonably appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City. In its order of February 16, 1998,
the RTC directed respective counsel for the parties to submit within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this order their respective memoranda and/or briefs. ] The RTC stated that upon expiration of the
period to submit memoranda, it shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings in the court of origin and/or such brief(s) as may have been filed.
The counsel for Enriquez failed to comply with the order to submit a memorandum. RTC issued
the following order:
For failure of defendant-appellant to file and submit a memorandum within the reglementary period
as required by Rule 40, Section 7 (b), her appeal is dismissed.Enriquez then moved for
reconsideration, manifesting that she was adopting her position paper in the MCTC as her
memorandum.
RTC denied Enriquezs motion on the ground that the records does (sic) not show of such
manifestation.
Enriquez then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which docketed her petition. The
appellate court found the primary issue to be procedural in character, namely: the correctness of the
order of the RTC dismissing herein petitioners appeal for failure to file her memorandum on appeal.
CA then dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The appellate court held that under Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (the
filing of a memorandum) is a mandatory obligation on the part of the appellant, such that, the failure
to do so warrants a concomitant dismissal of the appeal. CA also denied the MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in sustaining the order of the RTC
which dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to file memorandum on appeal?
HELD:

No. In rules of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or
is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected is mandatory.
As private respondent points out, in appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellants brief
is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the merits. This is
because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or
memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well
as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to resolve an
unassigned error, which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a
plain or clerical error.
18. Gaudia
G.R. No. 165697
Antonio Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 166481
Clarita P. Navarro vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
Facts:
MBTC had caused the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which Antonio had
earlier constituted on the subject properties as security for a loan he allegedly obtained from
MBTC. In December of that year, the properties were sold at public auction where MBTC, as the
lone bidder, was issued a certificate of sale.
Clarita brought before the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure sale on the allegation that the properties involved belonged to her and
Antonio’s conjugal partnership property as the same were acquired during their marriage and that
Antonio, with the connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had secured the registration thereof in
their names without her knowledge. She pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the
properties to MBTC in 1993 likewise without her knowledge.
CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was already barred
by laches, pointing out that it had taken Clarita 11 long years since the issuance of the TCTs on
1988 before she actually sought to annul the mortgage contract. The decision had attained finality
without a motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom.
Clarita instituted a subsequent action but this time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs
covering the same properties and for reconveyance and damages this time predicated on the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC which rendered the earlier decision for her failure to include Belen as an
indispensable party therein and that laches will not lie in an action for declaration of nullity of
contracts as it is imprescriptible.
Issue:
WON the subsequent action will prosper.
Ruling:
No, CA’s earlier decision will stand as Clarita is now barred by laches because of her
unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the prosecution of her claim in court- a conduct that warranted

the presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right, had resolved to abandon or declined to
assert the same.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the
statute of limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first
instance has already been settled by the CA. The Court takes notice that the decision rendered in
that case had already become final without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal
being taken therefrom. Thus, the Court is left with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability
of the said decision.
19. Dig
BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. JOHNTANSIPEK
GR No. 181235, July 22, 2009
FACTS:
J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. for the
construction of a Duty Free shop in Mandaue City.All payments were received by JOCI directly or
through its authorized collector, John Tansipek, except for one—payment made through a Philippine
National Bank check amounting to PHP4,050,136.51. Tansipek endorsed the check and deposited it
to his account in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). PCIB allowed the said deposit
even if Tansipek did not have the authority to do so and the check was crossed for the deposit to
payee’s account only. PCIBrefused to pay the full amount of the checkto JOCI.JOCI then filed a civil
caseagainst PCIB before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for the full payment of the check
and other damages. On the other hand, PCIB filed a third-party complaint against Tansipek.
Tansipek failed to file his Answer on time and was, therefore, declared in default by the RTC.
His Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was likewise denied. He filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the
Court of Appeals (CA)assailing the Default Order and the denial of the MR. Both the Petition and the
MR were denied by the CA.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of JOCI. On the third-party complaint, the RTC ruled in
favor of PCIB and ordered Tansipek to pay all amounts that PCIB had to pay to JOCI. Tansipek filed
an appeal with the CA alleging that the RTC erred in depriving him of his day in court and of
constitutional, substantive and procedural due process. The CA found that it was an error for the
RTC to have acted on PCIB’s motion to declare respondent Tansipek in default.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the proper remedy was to file an MR or a Motion to Lift Order of Default
2. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing its decision promulgated eight years prior
RULING:
1. Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and not an MR.P ursuant to
Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, “a party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of

default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.”
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion because the former
should be verified and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and
meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect,
and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
2. Yes, the CA erred in reversing the decision it rendered eight years prior to the new decision.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the
case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself
aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. In People vs. Pinuila, the Supreme Court defined “law
of the case” as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or
succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all
matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case
on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein.
The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default had already been adjudicated in Tansipek’s
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. As such, this issue cannot be readjudicated in Tansipek’s appeal
of the decision of the RTC on the main case. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of
the case, whether or not said decision is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal
infirmities and errors it may contain.

Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts (Rule 41)
20. Caberto
A.M. 07-7-12 SC
AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT
RULE 41
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
 An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
 An interlocutory order;
 An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
 An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or

compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
 An order of execution;
 A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
 An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
as provided in Rule 65.
RULE 45
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the

Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
RULE 58
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined. If it shall
appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The
court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with the
provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case
is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order
shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the
total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the
original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said
period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect,
and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was
issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order
shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbyan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a
writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.
RULE 65
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the

petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration
of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
21. Bernardino
Makati Insurance Co. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 167403, August 6, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint] against private respondents Rubills International, Inc.,
Tong Woon Shipping PTE., LTD., and Asian Terminals, Inc. for damages arising from breach of
contract of carriage.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference. For the failure of petitioners
counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference on 19 November 2001, RTC Presiding
Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes (Judge Reyes) dismissed the case without prejudice.
On 29 November 2001, petitioner received the Order dated 19 November 2001 dismissing its case.
On 4 December 2001, petitioner filed its Verified Motion for Reconsideration alleging that sickness
prevented its counsel from attending the pre-trial conference. On 3 July 2002, petitioner received
Judge Reyess Order dated 17 June 2002 denying its Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
On 17 July 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, which was promptly opposed by private
respondents for having been filed out of time. Petitioner countered that its failure to file the Notice of
Appeal on time was due to its counsels inadvertence in computing the appeal period. The

inadvertence was allegedly due to the fact that its Verified Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
registered mail, and the messenger who mailed it failed to attach to the records of the case the
postal receipt showing the date the said motion was mailed. Petitioners counsel, therefore, was
unable to determine correctly when petitioners period to appeal was interrupted by the filing of its
Verified Motion for Reconsideration and how many more days were left in said period when its
Motion was denied.
On 23 September 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Notice of Appeal, alleging it had no
intention to delay the resolution of the case; it had a meritorious case; and its Notice of Appeal
should be granted pursuant to the dictum that courts should not place undue importance on
technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was filed out of time.
HELD:
YES. On 2 October 2002, Judge Reyes issued his Order dismissing petitioners Notice of Appeal for
being filed three days beyond the 15-day reglementary period. In so ruling, Judge Reyes held that
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 vis--vis Section 2, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, the period
to appeal is interrupted by a timely motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Verified Motion for
Reconsideration five days after receiving the Order dismissing the case without prejudice. Excluding
the day the said motion was filed, petitioner had only 11 days left to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner
received the Order of 17 June 2002 denying its Verified Motion for Reconsideration on 3 July 2002.
Accordingly, it had only until 14 July 2002 to file a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner, however, filed its
Notice of Appeal on 17 July 2002.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

22. Bachiller
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK (now known as Maybank Philippines, Inc.) vs SPOUSES JOSE and
SALVACION CORDOVA
G.R. No. 169314, March 14, 2008
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration (MR).
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in its February 18, 2002 Decision, dismissed petitioners’ complaint
for rescission of a contract of lease but granted respondents counterclaim. When petitioner received
a copy of the decision on March 15, 2002, timely filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 2002 [the first
notice of appeal].
Also dissatisfied with the decision, respondents moved for its reconsideration which the trial court
reconsidered and amended its February 18, 2002 disposition increasing the amount of damages
awarded to respondents. On August 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial
court denied petitioners motion. Petitioner filed another Notice of Appeal on October 23, 2002 [the
second notice of appeal].
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal contending that the motion was denied by the
trial court. Also argued that petitioner only had one (1) day left to file the second notice when it
received the order denying the MR, already consumed the 15-day reglementary period when it filed
the MR. The February 18, 2002 Decision was vacated, revised and replaced by the July 2, 2002
Order, hence, the first notice of appeal became ineffective and invalid.
The CA deny the motion. When respondents moved for its reconsideration, the appellate court
granted respondents motion and dismissed the appeal. Petitioners motion for the reconsideration
was further denied by the CA.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal and in declaring that Maybanks
first notice of appeal had become ineffective and invalid while its second notice of appeal had not
been perfected on time.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal and in declaring that Maybanks first notice
of appeal had become ineffective and invalid while its second notice of appeal had not been
perfected on time.
Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
In this case, petitioners appeal is deemed perfected when it timely filed its first notice of appeal. Its
appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not need to file a second notice of appeal even if the
trial court granted the other party’s motion for reconsideration and modified the decision to increase
the monetary award. Petitioner did not have to file another notice of appeal, having given notice of its
intention to appeal the original decision.
The filing of a second notice of appeal from the modified decision is a superfluity, if not a useless
ceremony. It doesn’t matter whether the second notice is timely filed or not. The filing of a belated
second notice of appeal does not affect or foreclose its already perfected appeal. Petitioners filing of
the motion does not have the effect of a waiver of the second notice of appeal. It’s a pointless
formality which does not prejudice the already perfected appeal.
When the appeal is perfected as to petitioners filing of the first notice in due time, the trial court,
insofar as the petitioner is concerned, loses its jurisdiction over the case except to issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal the issue of the correctness of the decision is the subject of the perfected appeal.’
The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to reverse the February 18, 2002 Decision, as modified by
the July 2, 2002 Order, which would have meant petitioners abandonment of its appeal. petitioner,
with its appeal already perfected, cannot withdraw the same for the purpose of reviving the
jurisdiction of the trial court and enabling it to take another course of action calling for the exercise of
that jurisdiction. This is because by filing the notice of appeal, petitioner insofar as it is concerned
has perfected its appeal to the CA, and it should be in that court where he may pursue any further
remedy. Such first appeal should be the one docketed by the appellate court.

23. Aspili
G.R. No. 183616 June 29, 2010
JULIETA PANOLINO, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPHINE L. TAJALA, Respondent
FACTS:
On June 19, 2007, DENR-RD (1) denied for lack merit the application of Julieta Panolino
(petitioner), which was opposed by respondent Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of
land in Sultan Kudarat, (2) directed petitioner to vacate the contested property and remove at her
expense whatever improvements she may have introduced thereon, and (3) advised respondent to
file her free patent application over the contested property within sixty days.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007, of which she filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 11, 2007. Her motion was denied by Order of September 6, 2007, copy of
which she received on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of RD, stating
that she was appealing the decision and order to the Office of the DENR Secretary. By Order of
October 16, 2007, RD denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period. The RD explained that petitioner should have filed her appeal on September 13, 2007 as she
had only one day left of the 15-day reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant to DENR A.O. No.
87, s. 1990, stating, among others that:
SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals. (a) xxx appeals from the decisions/orders of the DENR
Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the
decision/order complained of by the party adversely affected, xxx (b) If a motion for reconsideration
of the decision/order of the Regional Office is filed and such motion for reconsideration is denied, the
movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal,
reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the
aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to
perfect his appeal. xxx

SECTION 6. Applicability of the Rules of Court. – The Rules of Court shall apply when not
inconsistent with the provisions hereof.
Invoking the rule enunciated in Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., petitioner argued
that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days from her receipt on September 12, 2007, or until
September 27, 2007. Her motion was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, she having bypassed the Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of the President
before resorting to judicial action. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the "fresh period rule" laid down in Neypes applies to petitioner’s case.
HELD:
No. The fresh period rule as enshrined in the Neypes case is not applicable to the petitioner.
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule"
shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41
(appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42
(appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or
order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly
provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal "during
the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if
the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified in Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case of petitioner whose motion
for reconsideration was denied.

24. Alipio
Emelinda V. Abedes vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 174373, Oct 15, 2007
Facts: Sometime in 1996, respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed an action before the RTC of Pasig
City against Wilfredo P. Abedes (Wilfredo), husband of herein petitioner Emelinda V. Abedes,
seeking support for her daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga (Danielle Ann). The case was docketed as
JDRC Case No. 3866. On 10 October 2000, a Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the
natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by the RTC of Pasig City to support
Danielle Ann, with a fixed amount of P10,000.00 per month. Since no appeal was interposed by the
parties, the judgment became final and executory. Respondent Relia Quizon Arciga filed a Motion
for Execution. Notwithstanding the adverse claim, on 12 September 2003, a Notice of Sheriff's Sale
was made announcing the sale to the public and to the highest bidder of all the rights, claims, and
shares of Wilfredo in the property covered by TCT No. 292139. For such purpose, a public auction
was scheduled to be held on 20 October 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by her attorney-in-fact Wilfredo, filed a Complaint for Injunction
with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and Damages before
the RTC of Tarlac City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9556. In her Complaint, petitioner
alleged that unless the sale at public auction is enjoined, she will stand to suffer permanent damage
for the loss of her property without valuable consideration and in violation of the process of law. She
further sought the cancellation of Entries No. 42-7961 and No. 42-10782 annotated on TCT No.
292139 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Tarlac. Moreover, she sought to recover moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
After due hearing, on 14 October 2003, the RTC of Tarlac City issued a Temporary Restraining
Order. It was convinced that irreparable damage and injury to petitioner would result, should
respondent Sheriff Ronberto B. Valino proceed with the public auction of the property covered by
TCT No. 292139. Further, the RTC conducted a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and granted the same on 7 November 2003 effectively preserving the status
quo.
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals said that the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
govern the property relations between petitioner and Wilfredo, notwithstanding the fact that their
marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. It found legal bearings on Article

105of the Family Code, which mandates that its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships already established between spouses before the effectivity of the
Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 255. It found that there were no vested rights that would
preclude the application of Article 105 on the property regime of petitioner and Wilfredo. As the
Family Code establishes the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage is conjugal,
the property covered by TCT No. 292139, not having been shown otherwise is, thus,
conjugal.Following the foregoing line of ratiocination, the Court of Appeals held that the property
covered by TCT No. 292139 may be levied upon in execution for the support of Danielle Ann. In
so concluding, it relied on Articles 122and 197 of the Family Code which charges the support of
illegitimate children against the conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent has statutory jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and
whether or not petitioner is barred by estoppel from questioning public respondents jurisdiction.
Held:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or

quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy of petitioner from the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a
petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. To draw a distinction,
an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment
complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. We have underscored
that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Hence, the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy
is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.
Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to file an appeal is 15 days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
filed in due time, after notice of the judgment on said motion.
In the case at bar, the Resolution of the appellate court, dated 19 July 2006, which denied
reconsideration of its Decision dated 23 December 2005, was received by petitioner on 2 August
2005. She had until 17 August 2005 within which to perfect her appeal. However, none was made.
Instead, she comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage her lost appeal.
Evidently, appeal was available to petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances. Petitioner was, therefore, unsuccessful in satisfying the rudiments for the writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue. Petitioner was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedyin the ordinary course of law.
Parenthetically, it must be emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f)of the Rules of Court, which
governs the procedure in the Supreme Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, as in this
case, merits an outright dismissal.
Patently, the petition must fail.

25. Acosta
Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals (CA)
G.R. NO. 137761, April 6, 2000
Facts of the case:
The case pertains to the appeal of Spouses Jose and Anita Alesna, private respondents who filed a
civil action for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 27)against Petitioners Gabriel Lazaro and the heirs of
Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner Gabriel Lazaro. The CA dismissed the appeal
in a Resolution dated June 17, 1998 for failure of herein private respondents to pay the required
docket fees within the prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued its first assailed Resolution dated July
31, 1998 granting their Motion for Reconsideration and reinstating the appeal.
Subsequently, the petitioners also filed their own Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
Resolution. As earlier stated, the CA denied their Motion.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not timely Payment of CA Docket Fees is a valid ground for the dismissal of an appeal?
Ruling:
The court granted the petition, the decisions of the Court of Appeals on July 31, 1998 and December
28, 1998 are ruled out. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
(Branch 27) in Civil Case No.4058 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
As provided in the Rules of Court, under Section 4 of Rule 41, All fees like Appellate court docket
and other lawful fees should be paidwithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to
the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted
to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
Relatively, Section 1 (c) of Rule 50 provides that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has

been held that failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final
and executory. Verily, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right
must comply with the statute or the rule.
In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the required docket fees within the
reglementary period. In fact, the Court notes that they paid the fees only after the CA had dismissed
the appeal, or six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Clearly, existing jurisprudence and
the Rules mandate that the appeal should be dismissed.
26. Yarcia
Republic vs. CA
G.R. No. 163504 (May 6, 2005)
Facts:
 RTC granted the petition of Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc in In the Matter of Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente Jomoc.
 The Republic, thru the OSG, filed a Notice of Appeal.
 The RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal, noting that no record of appeal was filed and
served as required by and pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding.
 The Republics Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC.
 The Republics filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, contending that the declaration of
presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
 The CA denied the Republics petition.
Issue:
Whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding?
Held:
No.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law,
contains the following provision, inter alia x xx Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Titles shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
technical rules. x xx there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is therefore,
a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.

27. Vallejos
Elepante vs. Madayag 196 SCRA 399 (1991) GR 93559
Facts:
On April 15, 1990, at around 3AM, Major Romeo Elepante of the Philippine Navy (Marines) was
awakened at his house by a platoon of armed soldiers led by Captain Doctor, informing him that he
was invited by the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the NCR Defence
Command, where he was subsequently detained. On May 11, 1990, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus.
On May 15, the Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the Judge Madayag Executive Judge of
the RTC of Makati, to hear and decide the case. The case was heard with the conformity of the
parties’ lawyers.
In the hearing on Mary 24, 1990, Maj. Elepante claims that there was no warrant for his arrest. He
was investigated for 5 days, and confined as prisoner at Fort Bonifacio without any formal charges
filed against him. Except for a photocopy of an order of arrest and confinement dated April 14, 1990
issued by Col. Jorge Agcaoili, Adjutant General of the AFP, no other documentary or testimonial
evidence were presented in this case.
The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit.
It also opined that Maj. Elepante was arrested because of his involvement in several coup attempts.
Article 70 of the Articles of War provides that it is the Chief of Staff of the AFP who can order his
release
The court also cited that military procedure does not require a formal charge to be filed before a
military officer may be arrested and confined on orders of his commanding officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the appeal for habeas corpus.
Held:
NO, the court did not err in dismissing the appeal for habeas corpus. Section 18 of Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court, explicitly provides, viz:

Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected
by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.
To perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal is required to be filed with the Clerk of Court or Judge who
rendered the judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules of Court). In computing the forty-eight
(48) hour period of appeal, the date on which the decision was promulgated and/or served is not
counted and the period starts to run the following day unless the same by a Sunday or legal holiday
in which case the period of appeal is to be considered from the succeeding day.
In the case at bar, counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990 a copy of the trial court’s decision
dated May 24, 1990. Clearly when he filed the instant petition on June 11, 1990, thirteen (13) days
had lapsed, so it was filed outside the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary period. This being so, the
decision sought to be reviewed is already final so that the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the
instant petition.
28. Torres
SESBRENO vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondents Hermio Rodis, Sr., together with Douglas Sandiego and Ricardo Silverio, Sr.,
was charged with estafa before the RTC Cebu. Respondent moved to quash the information on the
ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), not the regular courts, had jurisdiction
over the offense. The trial court denied the motion and private respondent elevated the case to the
Immediate Appellate Court. The appellate court dismissed the petition after finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Thus, private respondent filed a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was denied. Hence, trial ensued in the criminal case. However, after the
prosecution had rested its case, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to
evidence based on the core proposition that there was no criminal offense of estafa from the non-
payment of a money market placement. The motion alleged that herein petitioner had also filed a
similar complaint against Elizabeth de Villa involving the same money market placement before the
City Fiscal of Cebu; but, upon review of the complaint, then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza
directed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that a money market placement partook of the
nature of a loan and therefore no criminal liability for estafa could arise from non-payment thereof.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the IAC assailing the trial court order as tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The appellate court rendered a decision upholding
private respondent’s contention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent can be held liable for estafa.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a money market transaction partakes of the nature of a
loan and therefore “non-payment thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion.” Citing Yam vs Malik, 94 SCRA 30 (1979), the Court of Appeals
noted that private respondent Philfinance was not obliged under the money market transaction to
return the same money he or the corporation received from the petitioner. In fact, the Court of

Appeals noted that petitioner admitted on the witness stand that he had “invested” his money; that
“he was not concerned about the same money because what is important is the same amount will be
returned to me plus its earnings, because naturally when you give the money with the same serial
numbers will not be returned to you,” and that private respondent would be “held liable to me in case
of their failure to account” for the investment.
29. Tamayo
FELIZARDO S. OBANDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 139760 dated October 5, 2001
Facts:
Jose Figueras died testate on January 8, 1964, leaving as heirs Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras,
his second wife, and Francisco and Eduardo Figueras, his two legitimate children by his first wife,
Rosario Francisco. Sometime in June 1965, Francisco Figueras instituted Special Proceeding No.
61567, a petition for probate of the last will and testament of Jose Figueras.
Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras died on May 11, 1979. Petitioner Felizardo Obando instituted on
May 25, 1979 a petition for probate of the last will and testament of Alegria which was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 123948 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila. Felizardo claimed that
he and his brother, Juan, are the children of Alegrias sister, Susan Strebel, and that they have been
named as heirs in Alegrias will. The two probate proceedings were consolidated before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17. Eduardo Figueras and Felizardo Obando were appointed as co-
administrators of the consolidated estates of the deceased spouses. On April 11, 1991, Felizardo
filed with the probate court a motion for the removal of Eduardo Figueras as his co-administrator, on
the ground that he was suffering from a heart ailment which prevented him from going to court; that
Eduardo failed to prevent the foreclosure of the estates property in Marikina and failed to account for
rentals received on behalf of the estate; that Eduardo instituted ejectment proceedings against a
lessee of the estate without naming Felizardo as co-administrator; and that Eduardo was convicted
of the crime of rebellion.
The National Bureau of Investigation found that the last will and testament of Alegria was a forgery.
This finding was affirmed by the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory. Hence, on July 26, 1990,
criminal charges for falsfication were filed against petitioners Felizardo and Juan Obando who were
thereafter convicted of falsification. In turn, Eduardo Figueras and intervenor Fritz Strebel filed on
June 29, 1991, a motion to remove Felizardo as co-administrator, citing as ground Felizardos failure
to account for the rentals received from the Community of Learners, a lessee of the estate, in the
amount of P313,000.00; and the conviction of Felizardo and Juan Obando for falsifying the last will
and testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras.
In an Order dated December 17, 1997, the probate court denied the motion to remove Eduardo
Figueras, and granted the motion to remove Felizardo Obando as administrator.Felizardo filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which was denied on February 5, 1998. Further,
the probate court dismissed Special Proceeding No. 123948, the petition for probate of the last will
and testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, on the ground that the same was forged.
Felizardo filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which the probate court denied for being
actually a second motion for reconsideration. The probate court also denied Felizardos motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing Special Proceeding No. 123948.
Issues:
1. WON the CA can be ordered to give due course to the appeal and elevate the same to the
SC.

2. WON the petitioners’ Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal were filed and submitted on
time.
3. WON the MRs on Dec. 17, Feb. 5, April 6 and Aug. 27 were Pro-Forma Motions.
4. WON the petitioners were entitled to appeal as a matter of fact.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The Rules of Court are explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed.
In this case, petitioners filed not only a second motion for reconsideration, but a third motion
for reconsideration as well. Since the period to appeal began to run from the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration, consequently, petitioners Notice of Appeal filed six months
later was correctly denied by the probate court for being late.
2. No.
3. No.
The period to appeal already expired. They filed not only one but three Motions for
Reconsideration. A second Motion for Reconsideration, as a matter of fact, is not allowed
(Rule 37, Section 5). Since a second Motion for Reconsideration is not allowed, then
necessarily, its filing did not toll the running of the period to appeal, with more reason would
a 3rd Motion for Reconsideration. To Us, the April 6, 1998 Order, mentioning finality of the
Order of dismissal of the Petition for Probate, together with Felizardos removal as co-
administrator, was validly issued. Likewise, the remedy of certiorari was no longer available
to petitioners.
4. No.
It is well-settled that the special civil action for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive. The Court of Appeals committed neither reversible error nor
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus.

30. Robledo
G.R. No. 140974. July 11, 2001]RAMON ORO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE GERARDO D. DIAZ,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; and DONATO
MANEJERO, respondents.
FACTS:
The private respondent is a tenant of the petitioner over a landholding located at Badiangan,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines;
When the private respondent maliciously failed to pay his rentals for crop years 1988 and 1989, the
petitioner brought an action before the Department Of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
for the collection of said rentals;
Throughout the course and/or pendency of the said DARAB Case, the private respondent did not
pay rentals until the same was decided and finally executed sometime in 1998 the private
respondent was made to pay the past due rentals from 1988 to 1998 without interests and damages;
The petitioner filed an action for Damages before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch 68, Dumangas, Iloilo, Philippines, which case was presided by the respondent judge;
Motion to dismiss filed by the private respondent, and before trial, the respondent judge dismissed
the complaint of the petitioner;
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and after hearing of the same, the respondent judge
denied the said motion;
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal thereafter; however, the respondent judge denied the said notice of
appeal on the ground that the period to appeal had already expired.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the notice of appeal.
RULING:
For the disapproval of his Notice of Appeal, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion to public
respondent. Being pro forma, did not interrupt the running of the period within which to file an
appeal.

The e Court emphasizes that the power of the trial court to disallow or disapprove a notice of appeal
for being filed out of time is expressly recognized. Section 13, Rule 41 of Rules of Court, explicitly
provides:
Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal.- Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to
the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio, or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having
been taken out of time.
However, even if petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is not considered pro forma in which case
the running of the 15-day reglementary period is effectively interrupted -- still, the trial court was
correct in ruling that the Notice of Appeal had been filed out of time.
On August 19, 1999, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, he had three (3) days or until August 22, 1999 to file a notice of
appeal. Unfortunately, he was able to do so only on August 26, 1999, or four (4) days late.
The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the
appeal is filed on time.[10] If the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond the reglementary period,
the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the same in accordance with Section 13 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court was correct in disallowing the Notice of Appeal, also because it was directed at an
Order denying a motion for reconsideration, instead of at the judgment or final order disposing the
case. Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court proscribes the filing of an appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration. That provision reads:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
be appealable.
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
x x x x x x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. Rather, it
is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. [11]Hence, its requirements must be strictly
complied with.[12] Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders final
the decision sought to be appSealed.
Moreover, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
essential; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

31. Regala
G.R. No. 141209 September 17, 2001
Antonia Hufana, et. al. vs. William Ong Genato
Facts:
The cases stemmed from a complaint filed by William Genato before the trial court for
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land originally owned by Oakland
Development Corporation. The trial court ruled in favor of Genato. On appeal, Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Such decision became final and executory.
A Petition for Prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction was filed before the Supreme Court by the petitioners, alleging that they are
owners/buyers of the mortgaged property. The petition was assigned to the Special First Division of
CA. The latter again ruled in favor Genato, upholding the validity of the mortgage and rendering
Oakland liable to Genato. Said decision attained finality when the appeal and motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality by the Supreme Court.
Genato then filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution of Judgment before the trial court.
Oakland and petitioners opposed, citing the decision of HLURB which rendered the mortgage void
but the indebtedness valid. The trial court allowed the motion for execution but limiting the properties
to one parcel only and exempting the portions bought and occupied by the petitioners. The trial court
rendered such decision applying the decision of HLURB that the contract of mortgage is void.
Genato filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court with CA. CA then reversed the trial
court’s decision on the ground that validity of the mortgage was already decided by the CA and that
subsequent ruling of the HLURB cannot contravene decision from a higher court.
One of the issues raised by the petitioners is that the resolution of the trial court is an
interlocutory order not subject to appeal. Hence, CA erred in giving due course to the appeal. On the
other hand, Genato claimed that the resolution is a final order that is appealable under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the trial court is appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
Held:

Yes. The resolution of the trial court is appealable before the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.
It is true that interlocutory orders are not appealable and the proper remedy for the aggrieved
party is to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rule. However, the resolution of the
trial court is not a mere interlocutory order, but a final order that is appealable. The resolution
partially granted and partially denied the motion filed by Genato using the decision of the HLURB.
The resolution even stated that it was anchored on the subsequent decision of HLURB which was
considered by the trial court as supervening event. Clearly, it resolved matters that delved on the
merits of the claims of both parties. It resolved issues determinative of the final outcome of the case.
Ergo, appeal is the proper remedy to be sought for the trial court’s resolution.
The Court also affirmed the decision of the CA stating that the subsequent decision of
HLURB cannot contravene the decision of a higher court. It must be noted that decision of HLURB
are reviewable by CA. hence, decision of HLURB, even if subsequent, cannot supersede decision of
an appellate court. Further, it should also be given emphasis that the decision of CA regarding
validity of the mortgage had long been final and executory.

32. Ramos
COSMOS BOTTLING CORP. vs. NAGRAMA
G.R. No. 164403
March 4, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Cosmos Bottling Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

manufacturing, bottling and selling soft drinks. Respondent Pablo Nagrama, Jr. was initially
employed by petitioner as a maintenance mechanic on June 24, 1993 at the Cosmos Plant in
Cauayan, Isabela. On September 17, 1996, he was elected by the local union as chief shop steward.
Respondent was designated by petitioner as waste water treatment operator effective September
27, 1999. Petitioner hired Clean Flow Philippines, Inc. to conduct training seminars to acquaint
petitioner’s personnel on the operations of the water treatment plant. Respondent was instructed to
attend the seminar to be held on September 27-30, 1999.He failed to attend the first two (2) days of
the seminar. In a letter by his immediate supervisor, Josephine D. Calacien, dated September 29,
1999, respondent was informed that charges of abandonment of duty and gross insubordination had
been lodged against him. He was required to submit his written explanation. Respondent filed his
explanation on September 30, 1999. He contended that he had to attend to an administrative
hearing for fellow unionists which were held at Santiago, Isabela; that before he went, he first
secured permission from the plant controller. He averred that as a union official, he is obligated to
attend to the problems of his fellow union members.Hearing was held on the twin charges against
him. Respondent and officers of petitioner corporation testified. On October 29, 1999, he was
formally terminated from service.Respondent filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, contending
that he was illegally dismissed and that petitioner had committed unfair labor practices. On August 4,
1999, Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olarirez rendered judgment sustaining the legality of the dismissal of
respondent. Invoking Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the Labor Arbiter considered the
letter as a judicial admission of guilt. The Arbiter also ruled that the charge of unfair labor practice
was without merit because it was not sufficiently shown that he was dismissed for his union
activities.Respondent appealed the matter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a
Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On April 6,
2004, the CA reversed the NLRC ruling and granted the reliefs sought.
ISSUE:
WON Court Of Appeals violated the Doctrine of Conclusive Finality.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and stated that it is not applicable in this case. SC
stated that The doctrine of conclusive finality is defined as the comity that courts extend to the
executive branch and the recognition of the expertise of administrative agencies in dealing with

particular questions of fact. Simply put, the appellate court may defer to the factual findings of the
administrative agency due to comity. However, the prevailing doctrine with respect to administrative
findings of fact has no conclusive finality. Rather, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies when supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even
finality by the appellate courts. In Ignacio v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., the Court held:
Factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported by evidence on
record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court. As long as their
decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the
evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare
its finality.This was reiterated in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission: The Supreme Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of
the NLRC, particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when supported by substantial
evidence. The reason for this is that a quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC has acquired a unique
expertise because its jurisdiction is confined to specific matters. Whether or not petitioners actually
paid the balance of the sickness wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the absence of
proof that the labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abused their discretion, the Court shall deem
conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding.The doctrine of
conclusive finality and doctrine of great respect and finality both apply to factual findings of
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function. The former has no evidentiary
requirement while the latter must be supported by substantial evidence. The former is based on
comity, the latter is based on the doctrine that administrative agencies possess specialized
knowledge and expertise in their respective fields. The former is not used in the Philippine legal
system while the latter is the established standard. Appellate courts may still review the factual
findings of administrative agencies. The CA may resolve factual issues by express mandate of law.
Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended, expressly provides:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
Despite the respect given by the appellate courts to administrative findings of fact, the CA is
empowered to resolve factual issues. A mere doctrine espousing comity cannot overcome the
statutory mandate of the CA to resolve factual issues. Moreover, neither the doctrine of conclusive
finality nor the doctrine of great respect and finality has direct application to the case at bar. The CA
did not simply review the decision of the NLRC. The CA took cognizance of a special civil action of
certiorari. Verily, the CA did not per se review the facts found or the law applied by the NLRC. The
CA reviewed the discretion of the NLRC. By the very nature of a petition for certiorari, the appellate
court reviews the exercise of jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. In the case at bar, Nagrama, as
petitioner, alleged that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of the

Labor Arbiter. In a petition for certiorari, the correctness of the legal conclusions of the tribunal is not
in issue per se. Rather, it is the exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal. As often repeated by this
Court, for the special civil action of certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying
the proceeding. The sole purpose of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A special civil
action of certiorari does not include correction of public respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings thereon.
33. Pilotin
Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday Holding, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004
Facts:
On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49. Subsequently, on
February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday
Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo
Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement
with Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of
Del Monte Philippines, Inc.; (2) that it had done so on the strength of the representations of Lorenzo,
in his capacity either as chairman of the board or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and
Macondray; (3) that Macondray had thereafter been appointed -- allegedly upon the insistence of
Lapanday -- as broker, for the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that
pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a
P10,000,000 bank loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite
demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire
contracts.
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.
On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their
respective Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch 36.
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a
cause of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law, the trial court opined that upon
the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the right to institute the
Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to
the court-appointed assignee.
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later denied
on July 26, 1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999 Orders of the trial court. On
September 29, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution requiring petitioner to explain why its Petition
should not be dismissed outright, on the ground that the questioned Orders should have been
elevated by ordinary appeal.
On January 10, 2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case
was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to the general rule

that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available. Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzo
challenged this ruling through a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 10, 2000. The CA heard
the Motion for Reconsideration in oral arguments on April 7, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 is the
proper remedy.
Ruling:
No. The Petition is unmeritorious.
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of
Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in
Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the
litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case
completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against
a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is
excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall
be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctable through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on
the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case,
such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action
that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for
certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or
final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was
timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to
correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly
available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive,
not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

34. Ortizo
DANILO PAREL VS. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO
G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011
Facts:
A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon against Danilo
with the RTC Baguio. Simeon alleged that he was the owner of a two-story house at Forbes Park
National Reservation in Baguio City and that he allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground
floor. When Simeon needed the whole house back, he informed Danilo to vacate the place. While
Danilo’s parents acceded to his demand, Danilo remained in the house despite repeated demands
to surrender the premises. Thus, Simeon instituted an action for recovery of possession and
damages.
Danilo offered a different version of events. He maintained that the land on which Simeon’s
house was constructed was in his father’s name. Thus Danilos’ father and Simeon were co-owners
of the house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.
RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. On Simeon’s appeal, CA reversed RTC Decision ordering
Danilo to surrender possession of the ground floor to Simeon and to pay P2000/month for the
occupancy from April 1988 until the former actually vacates.
Danilo challenged the CA Decision via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC. The
Court affirmed CA decision. Simeon filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Danilo filed his
comment and prayed that the monthly rental he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to
March 1994 only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994. The RTC issued a Writ of
Execution to enforce the decision of the Court. Danilo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. The RTC ordered that the decision has already become final
and executory and the defendant is bound by the said decision.
Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the
judgment against Danilo. Simeon filed his Comment that RTC and CA correctly ruled that the prayer
for a reduction of back rentals should be denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Writ of Executions may be appealed.
Held:

Yes. The Writ of Execution in this case may be appealed.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter
of right. However, the case of Banaga vs. Majaducon enumerates instances where a writ of
execution may be appealed:
1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;

2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4. It appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remins room for interpretation
thereof; or
6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court/ that mode of
elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. The fact that Danilo left the property is a change in the situation of the
parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the
circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. The RTC should have afforded the parties the
opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay rentals
before issuing the writ.
The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact
and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its
judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of
the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The CA’s decision is SET ASIDE. RTC Bagiuo is
ordered to determine the actual date petitioner left the subject premises.’

35. Olaguer
TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA. DE BIASCAN V BIASCAN

36. Obnamia
REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA, G.R. NO. 186053, NOVEMBER 15, 2010, THIRD DIVISION, CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe
(Zenaida), filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for cancellation
of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.
She was born on October 31, 1987in Malolos to Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina
who were married on February 18, 1987. Her father later died. On July 19, 1989, Zenaida married
Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.
As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, Zenaida caused the
late registration of her birth under the surname of Hakamada.She and Hakamada later divorced.
On May 29, 1996, Zenaida married Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted
respondent by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001, and was
filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006.
In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the
surname Nishina, hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that the second certificate
bearing the surname Hakamada, be cancelled; and that her surname Nishina in the original
certificate be changed to Watanabepursuant to the adoption decree.
RTC granted respondents’ petition and directed Malolos Civil Registry to cause the
necessary actions.
A copy of the October 8, 2007 Order was received on December 13, 2007, which filed on
behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that
petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by

the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order

appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require . In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an
appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. (A.M. No. 01-1-03- SC, June 19,
2001)
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied)
xxxx
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. x x x.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with

respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed
in due time.
xxxx
Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in
proceedings where multiple appeals may arise,
CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal because the petition before the RTC is classified as a

special proceeding thus, petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within 30 days from receipt, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its
appeal.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a record on appeal should be filed before the RTC?
RULING:
No. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondents’ petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry. The
appeal of petitioners before the appellate court is reinstated.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments
in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:
SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An

interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment

rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the

distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a

deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a

deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination
in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be
allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a
motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special

proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the
original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.

37. Marcos
Parel V. Heirs of Prudencio—Instances where a writ of execution may be appealed
FACTS:
Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Parel. He
contended that his wife was the eldest sister of Parel’s father, and that he and his wife allowed Parel
and his parents to live on the ground floor of the house. Prudencio, later on,demanded the the whole
house back. The Parents of Parel acceded, but Parel refused to leave the house. According to Parel,
his father and Prudencio were co-owners of the property, the land was his father’s property and his
father and Prudencio made a deal that the latter would construct a house on that land since his
father had no money to build a house on that land.
RTC- ruled in favor of Parel that there was co-ownership over the property.
CA- reversed. Declared that Prudencio as the new owner of the house, and ordered Parel to
pay 2,OOO PESOS for use/occupancy from April 1988 until he actually vacates the property. Parel
went to the Supreme Court via appeal on certiorari under Rule 45. The SC affimed CA’s ruling.
Prudencio moved for a writ of execution of the SC’s decision. Parel filed his comment on
Prudencio’s motion that he should pay rental from April 1988 to March 1994, since he has vacated th
premises by April 1994.
Feb. 2008 RTC- issued the writ of execution. Parel filed a motion for reconsideration.
However, the RTC denied the motion, stating that SC’s decision was now final and excutory and
therefore, cannot be modified.
Parel filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO/ Injuction.
ISSUE:
WON the rentals should be deducted by the Court.
Ruling:
Yes, despite the SC’s decision was already final and executory.
The Court explained that Parel should have brought to the Court’s attention the date when
he actually left the premises at an earlier time. And that the RTC correctly ruled that the judgment of
the SC was already final and executory. However, it would be inequitable to order Parel to pay

monthly rentals until he actually vacates when it had not been determined when he actually vacated
the house. Otherwise, he would be paying rentals indefinitely.
The Court cited the case of Banaga V. Majacudon which enumerated the instances where a
writ of execution may be appealed: A writ of execution varies the judgment; execution is sought to
be enforced against property exempt from execution; the controversy has never been the subject to
the judgment of the court; the terms of the judgment are not clear enough; and lastly, when there
has been a change in the situation of the parties making the execution inequitable or unjust. In
these exceptional circumstances, the considerations of justice and equity dictate that appeal may be
made available to a party aggrieved elevating the question to a higher court which may be made
either by petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, writ of error or certiotari. The case at bar, the
last instance was the one cited by the Court in warranting the deduction of rentals, the fact that Parel
left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make the
execution inequitable and unjust. The Court reiterated that the RTC should have given the parties
should have been afforded opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which
Parel should pay renatals before issuing a writ of execution. Should Parel failed to substantiate his
claim that he left the premises in April 1994, the period to pay should be until June 19, 200, the date
he informed the CA that he had left the premises.

Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals (Rule 42)
38. Marasigan
Canton v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 152898, February 12, 2007
Nature: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolutions which dismissed the petition filed
by Sofia Canton as represented by co-administrators of her estate, Domingo L. Antigua, Rogelio Uy,
and Juan V. Bolo (collectively, petitioners) for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Facts:
Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP) identified the area disputed in the present case as part of
the South Cebu Reclamation Project. Consequently, MCDP, with the assistance of the Squatters
Prevention Encroachment Elimination Division (SPEED) of the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu City,
removed the barbed wire fence from the disputed area on the ground that it was an illegal
construction for lack of necessary permit. Petitioners filed a case for forcible entry, against MCDP
and the City of Cebu before the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu which ruled in favor of the
petitioners MCDP filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court
reversed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution which dismissed the petition outright:
For failure of the petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the complaint, answer, parties
position papers filed with the Municipal Trial Court, and parties appeal memoranda filed with the
Regional Trial Court, in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present petition for review is dismissed outright, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration However, petitioners did not submit copies of the
complaint and answer filed with the Municipal Trial Court, and neither did petitioners submit copies
of the appeal memoranda filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in outright dismissing the petition because copies of the
complaint, answer, parties’ position papers filed with the Municipal Trial Court and parties appeal
memoranda filed with the Regional Trial Court were not attached?
Ruling:

No. The Court held that is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or
material portions of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition. Petitioners
discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled. The
Court of Appeals has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission
of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the
[Court of Appeals] to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the
petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to
comply with the submission of documents which should accompany the petition, it shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents
combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the
attachment requirement justified the dismissal of her petition.
Furthermore, the Court held that Rules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not to frustrate,
justice. However, petitioners and their counsel should bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a
natural right. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. A party who seeks to appeal must comply with the
laws requirements; otherwise, he forfeits his privilege. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to
relieve a litigant of an injustice which is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

39. Manzano
YU V. TATAD
G.R. NO. 170979 February 9, 2011
FACTS:
An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC based on the
complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang,. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC
convicted the petitioner. Fourteen (14) days later, , the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the
RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime
for which she was convicted.
Respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merit. Petitioner filed
a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals
she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for
new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. Respondent Judge
ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance. The prosecution filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in
criminal case. The prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. The
petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when
she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal
cases.
RULING:

Yes. The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory
privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) as amended, Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen

(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time
a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance
of the period begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a

fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes
no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39
of BP 129 categorically states that the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, the
Court also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded,
mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions
insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a

motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation
that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases
under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for
review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals
in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Were we to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a
litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation
that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants.
The petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

40. Macatangay
YALONG VS PEOPLE
GR NO. 187174 AUGUST 28, 2013
FACTS:
On or about April 2, 2002 at Batangas City, Philippines, the above-named accused, well-
knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna
Branch, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Major
LucilaYlagan, Export and Industry Bank Check No. 0002578833 dated May 3, 2002 in the amount of
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P450,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on
account or for value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee bank, the
same was dishonored on the ground of “Account Closed,” which in effect is even more than a
dishonor for insufficiency of funds. Despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make
good her check by making proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full
directly to Major Lucila Ylagan, accused failed and refused to do so. Upon arraignment, Yalong
pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge.
During trial, Ylagan testified that sometime on April 2, 2002, Yalong borrowed from her the
amount of P450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in cash
and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated check dated May 3, 2002 in the similar
amount of P450,000.00 (subject check). However, when Ylagan presented the subject check for
payment on August 27, 2002, it was dishonored and returned to her for the reason “Account
Closed.” As verbal and written demands made on Yalong to pay her loan proved futile, Ylagan was
constrained to file the instant criminal case.
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan to
issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check belonged to
her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was
already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.
MTCC rendered its judgment, finding Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of BP 22. The MTCC found all the elements of the crime charged to have been duly
established. It did not give credence to Yalong’s defense that she did not own the checking account
and that she was not the one who issued the subject check. Further, it observed that Yalong failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has completely paid the loan and thus, such
defense must likewise fail.

Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of Arrest
which the MTCC treated as an original motion for reconsideration. The said motion was, however,
denied.
Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied due course, considering
that the judgment against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence.
Dissatisfied, Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of Appeal which was
dismissed on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies available to her under the law when she:
(a) failed to appear without justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the MTCC Decision;
(b) did not surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation; (c) did not file a motion for
leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law; and (d) remained at large. Yalong moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied in an Order dated October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong
filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail before the Regional Trial Court.
RTC denied Yalong’s certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in

absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation on October 6,
2006 and yet failed to appear thereat. Furthermore, the RTC observed that Yalong did not make any
effort to surrender within the time allowed by the rules and thus, lost the remedies available to her
under the law.
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration which was eventually denied. As such, on June 26,
2008, she filed the subject petition for review before the CA.
CA dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground that the “Order of the RTC was
issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – where appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC and not a petition for review is the proper remedy.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of improper
appeal.
RULING:
Yes. The petition is bereft of merit. While the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the
inappropriate filing of a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike
its converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a petition for
review), Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the latter court. The said provision reads:
SEC.2. Modes of appeal. – (a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in

cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and
that the latter court rendered a Resolution dated April 2, 2008 dismissing the same. It is fundamental
that a petition for certiorari is an original action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took
cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence,
based on the above-cited rule, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a
petition for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with

the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby
bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong’s contention that a petition for review may
be treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of the former already include the required
contents of the latter cannot be given credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain distinct
procedures which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with one
another. For one, a notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed
decision, judgment or final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of
appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong’s filing of the subject petition for
review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is considered
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be sure, the rules on
appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid
unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial
business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable
considerations, which are not present in the instant case. As it stands, the subject petition for review
was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the CA.
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong’s appeal still remains
dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential
and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of
BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals
(Rule 43)
41. Linaban
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC~Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases
[A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-10-12]
RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO

GOVERN DEATH PENALTY CASES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court

submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the Proposed Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure To Govern Death Penalty Cases, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The amendments shall take effect on October 15, 2004 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than September 30, 2004.
September 28, 2004.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ., on leave.
AMENDED RULES
TO GOVERN REVIEW OF
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, and Rule 124, Sections 12 and 13, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, are amended as follows:
Rule 122

Sec. 3. How appeal taken.—
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice
of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more, serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed
the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as
provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
x x x
Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. — In all cases where the
death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court
of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than
fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after
the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (10a)
x x x
Rule 124
Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. —The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or
hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three
months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. 12(a)
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. —
(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed,
the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the
same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more

severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court
of Appeals.
42. Isidoro
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC
(Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission)
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC provides that the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate
rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies in order to prevent cluttering the dockets of the courts
with appeals and/or petitions for certiorari.
It provides thatall decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under
Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Under the said Resolution, all decisions and final orders of the rehabilitation court, regardless of
whether they are issued before or after the approval of the rehabilitation court, shall be brought on
appeal to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC is as a clarification on the proper mode of appeal of cases which were formerly
under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, such as those cases involving
corporate rehabilitation. Now, there is no more need to file a notice of appeal and record on appeal.
An appeal may now be perfected by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the decision or final order of the trial court, directly to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

43. GaudiaG.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, et al. vs. GO, Respondent
Facts:
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI
allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation
(MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land owned by MSDC.
Go offered to buy a parcel of the property and a Contract to Sell was signed by the parties.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property nor
did it release the title to Go. Go demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement
but FEPI balked. FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who
opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Further, FEPI’s hands were tied by a cease and desist order
issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
When FEPI failed to return Go’s payment for the purchase price, Go filed a complaint of
Estafa against the petitioners for misrepresenting that FEPI is the absolute owner of the properties.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa
finding that there is no misrepresentation on several grounds. On appeal, the DOJ reversed the City
Prosecutors resolution. Petitioners then filed an appeal under Rule 43 to the CA to overturn the
ruling of the DOJ.
CA opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of
appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or
officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive
and not a quasi-judicial function.
Issue: WON a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the
Secretary of Justice.
Ruling.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-
judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not
among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius.
The Court do not agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary investigation is a
quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial

function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause.
In Bautista v. CA, it was held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding as the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
44. Dig
JESUS GONZALES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al.
GR No. 139131, September 27, 2002
FACTS:
Jesus Gonzales was a utility worker assigned at the Pharmacy Section of the Philippine
Children’s Medical Center (PCMC), a government-owned and controlled corporation. In March 1998,
petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave and without explaining the reason for
his absence to his superiors.
Gonzales was sent with a letter-notice directing him to report for work within three days from
receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls. Despite the written letter-
notice, Gonzales failed to report for work, thus, constraining PCMC to drop him from the rolls. He
appealed the PCMC decision to the Civil Service Commission, but the latter dismissed the appeal
and upheld the action taken by PCMC. Gonzales’s motion for reconsideration(MR) was denied. He
filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA)but was denied for failure to attach
certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers; the subsequent MR
was similarly denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave error in dismissing Gonzales’s appeal for failure to
attach certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court (SC) held in Cadayona vs. CA, that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying
the petition should be certified true copies. Comparing this provision with its counterpart provision in
Rule 42, on petitions for review from the regional trial court to the CA, the SC noted that under the
latter, only the judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be certified true copies or
duplicate originals.
The SC further emphasized that, in an appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and
in an original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required
to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. It could
not find any reason why a stricter requirement should be made for petitions under Rule 43, which
governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the CA. A contrary

ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Relative to the case, the SC noted that Gonzales had actually attached certified true copies
of the documents supporting his MR. This means that submission of a required document with the
MR constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.
45. Caberto
JARO VS. CA 377 SCRA 282
FACTS:
On November 12, 1992, Rosario Vda. de Pelaez (respondent for brevity) filed a complaint for
prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Provincial Adjudicator Board, ,
Quezon (Provincial Adjudicator for brevity).
Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late Rosenda Reyes y Padua (Rosenda for brevity)
was the original owner of a parcel of coconut land covered by TCT No. T-79099 with an area of
3.0896 hectares, situated in Barangay Mangilag Norte, Candelaria, Quezon. Rosenda allegedly
instituted respondent and her husband, the late Igmedio Pelaez, as tenants of the land.
In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes (Ricardo for brevity), the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner
who, respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land. When petitioner purchased
the land from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to remain on the land allegedly with the
understanding that petitioner could remove respondents house at any time if petitioner so desired.
In his Answer, petitioner countered that respondent is not and had never been a tenant of the land
for respondent never shared in the harvests nor was respondent given any share as payment for her
work.
The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. However noting the affidavits
presented as evidence were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were material to the
resolution of the case.
On , the DARAB issued its decision reversing the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB
found substantial evidence to show that respondent is indeed a tenant of the land in question.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal on certiorari with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1,
Rule XIV of the DARABs New Rules of Procedure. However the Court of Appeals outrightly
DISMISS the same for failure to comply the form as require as required by Supreme Court Revised
Adm. Circ. No. 1-95; and the annexes to the petition are certified as true xerox copy by counsel for
the petitioner, and not by the proper public official who has custody of the records, in violation of the
same Circular and Adm. Circ. No. 3-96.
Petitioner filed his Amended Petition. On , upon verification that his petition had been dismissed,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Amended Petition but the Court of

Appeals issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Amended
Petition of petitioner.
ISSUE:IS PETITIONER ENTITLED TO AN ANNULMENT OF THE IMPUGNED DECISION AND

RESOLUTIONS OF THE DARAB AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that without in any way implying that the DARAB decision and
resolution are void, the Court of Appeals dismissal of the amended petition on purely technical
grounds was unwarranted.
The terms certified true copy and duplicate original as found in paragraph 6 (c) of Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 were clarified in Administrative Circular No. 3-96 which further
provided that:
1. The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy of the decision, judgment,
resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in the
court or adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same. The certified true copy thereof shall
be such other copy furnished to a party at his instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the
authorized officers or representatives of the issuing entity as herein before specified.
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities or the corresponding
officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other
official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy. For this purpose, all courts,
offices or agencies furnishing such copies which may be used in accordance with Paragraph (3) of
Revised Circular No. 1-88 shall make arrangements for and designate the personnel who shall be
charged with the implementation of this requirement.
xxx
5. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the documents required by Paragraph (3)
of Circular No. 1-88 to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements therefor as detailed in
the preceding paragraphs. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such annexes and the
dismissal of the case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court
is fully satisfied that the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party, despite due
diligence on his part, and that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to
make such other disposition as it may deem just and equitable.
To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two reasons. First, the appeal was not in the
form of a petition for review as required by Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
Second, the annexes attached to the petition were neither duplicate originals nor were they certified
true copies. The annexes were only certified as true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not by
the authority or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in contravention of
Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
While he Supreme Court ruled agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition deserved
to be dismissed, the amended petition filed by petitioner should have been given due course.
Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form, accompanied by annexes, all of which
were certified true copies by the DARAB. This is more than substantial compliance.
Section 6 of Rule 43 does not require that all of the supporting papers or annexes accompanying the
petition should be certified true copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory is to attach the
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgment or final orders of the lower
courts. Not only did petitioner attach to his amended petition and motion for reconsideration certified

true copies of the assailed DARAB decision and resolution, petitioner also attached certified true
copies of other supporting documents. Petitioner on his own initiative complied with the required
attachments when he filed the amended petition.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an
appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz[28] and
Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission [29],the Supreme Court ruled that the
subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to
comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each
case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements.
We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling
that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.
46. Bernardino
Zaragoza v. Nobleza, G.R. No. 144560, May 13, 2004
FACTS:
Florentino Zaragoza (Zaragoza) filed a complaint for the Termination of Leasehold Relationship
against Respondent Pedro Nobleza (Nobleza). The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board and Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ruled in favor of Nobleza. Zaragoza filed a
Motion for Extension to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Said Motion for
Extension was granted by CA for a non-extendible period of 15 days ending on March 30, 2000.
Zaragosa‘s petition for review which was filed through registered mail, however, was denied by CA
for having been mailed on April 12, 2000, 13 days after March 30.
ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural rules should be applied liberally in order that Zaragoza will not be
deprived of his right to use and enjoy his real property
HELD:
Since the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, the failure of Zaragoza to so perfect his appeal rendered the questioned
decision final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not
part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the
failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Only under exceptionally meritorious
circumstances may a departure from an otherwise stringent rule be allowed.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of a factual setting which warrants a liberal application of the
rules on the period of appeal. Having been extended an additional fifteen (15) day period within
which to file his petition for review, it was incumbent upon Zaragoza to strictly comply with such
deadline. That he paid the appropriate docket fee upon filing his Motion for Extension of Time with
the appellate court does not help his cause any. The inevitable consequence of his grave
inadvertence is to render the DARAB‘s decision dismissing the case final and executory.

47. Bachiller
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
Petition for certiorari from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
FACTS:
Private respondent started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. He was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax
(VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
When the mother of Amelita passed away, she took over the management of the business and
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees. She then
made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer
allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as
an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home. Hence, there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and petitioner.

The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to
the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and its decision is appealable to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
HELD:
Petition REMANDED to CA.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The NLRC decisions are appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under this Rule, the special original action is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, lack or
excess of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7902, provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxx (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
In this case, the special civil action of certiorari is and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

48. Aspili
G.R. No. 158071 April 2, 2009
JOSE SANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), Respondents
FACTS:
On August 16, 1986, petitioner Jose S. Santos retired from DAR after rendering almost 21
years of service. On January 2, 1989, petitioner was re-employed in the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. In 1997, petitioner initiated moves to avail of early retirement. However,
GSIS informed petitioner that he could no longer retire under R.A. 660 but he could do so under R.A.
8291, under which petitioner is entitled to a reduced benefit of ₱81,557.20. This computation did not
consider petitioner’s 20.91553 years of service with the DAR prior to his previous retirement.
Petitioner appealed to respondent GSIS Committee on Claims (respondent), which was denied.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS Board of Trustees a complaint against respondent; it denied
the complaint.
In the meantime, on March 20, 2000, petitioner was compulsorily retired for reaching the age
of sixty-five.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the Board of Trustees. He
attached documentary evidence to his motion which showed several retirees who were later on
reemployed after their first retirement and were allowed to choose the law under which they can
again retire. Thus, like them, he should also be allowed to retire under the law of his choice. The
GSIS Board of Trustees denied his motion for reconsideration on March 27, 2001.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. CA rendered the herein challenged decision dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground that the issue raises only questions of law, hence the proper remedy for
petitioner is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the same. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy is petition for review under Rule 43, which is within the
jurisdiction of the CA or petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
HELD:
The proper remedy is petition for review under Rule 43, which clearly states that “This Rule
shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of xxx any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the xxx Government Service Insurance
System, xxx and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law xxx An appeal under this Rule may be taken
to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain
state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the
falsity of the allegations of facts.
Thus, the question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is undoubtedly
a question of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that he has
previously retired from the government under a particular statute and that he was re-employed by
the government. These facts are admitted and there is no need for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented.
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2)
(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction "all cases
in which only an error or question of law is involved." It should not be overlooked, however, that the
same provision vesting jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein is prefaced by the
statement that it may "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide," the judgments or final orders of lower courts in the cases therein
enumerated. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid
general rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review solely on a
question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this Court.
Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the reglementary period to appeal
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As such, a
question of fact or question of law alone or a mix question of fact and law may be appealed to the
CA via Rule 43.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, "[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law." Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even
only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.

49. Alipio
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina
G.R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014
Facts: Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc. (Ecobel) through its Chairman, Josephine
Boright (Boright), applied for a medium term loan financial facility with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) Investment Management Group (or Finance Group) to finance the
construction of its condominium project in Ermita, Manila (project). The loan application was denied
due to the following grounds: (a) the collateral was insufficient; (b) Ecobel did not have the needed
track record in property development; and (c) the loan was sought during the Asian financial crisis.
Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel, this time, applied for asurety bond with the GSIS to guarantee
the re-payment of the principal loan obligation to be procured with the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB). Ecobel's application was approved. In a Memorandum dated January 27, 1998, respondent
Alex M. Valencerina (Valencerina), then Vice-President for Marketing and Support Services of the
GSIS General Insurance Group (GIG), submitted Ecobel's Guarantee Payment Bond application for
evaluation and endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee (INCOM). In the said Memorandum,
Valencerina made it appear that Ecobel's application was fully secured by reinsurance and real
estate collaterals, and that its approval was urgent considering Ecobel's limited time to avail of the
loan from the funder. Such memorandum was coursed through GIG Senior Vice-President, Amalio
A. Mallari (Mallari), who scribbled thereon his own endorsement, stating "Strongly reco. based on
info and collaterals herein stated."
Later, however, or on November 19, 1998, GSIS issued a memorandum suspending the processing
and issuance of guaranty payment bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a cancellation notice
to Ecobel for Mallari's signature, but was told that the subject bond could no longer be cancelled
because it was already a "done deal."Thus, upon the request of Mallari, Valencerina signed a
Certification dated January 14, 1999, stating that the subject bond: (a) was genuine and authentic;
(b) constituted a valid and binding obligation on the part of GSIS; and (c) may eventually be
transferred to Bear, Stearns International, Ltd. (BSIL), Aon Financial Products, Inc. or any of their
assignees, subject to the prior written or fascsimile notification to the GSIS by the current obligee,
PVB, and that confirmation or approval from GSIS is not required. Said certification further stated
that GSIS had no counterclaim, defense or right of set-off with respect to the subject bond, provided
that drawing conditions (covered in a separate certification) have been satisfied. Ecobel defaulted in
the payment of its loan, prompting BSIL to serve upon it a notice of default and its intention to
recover the repayment amount under the terms of their loan agreement and the subject bond. The
GSIS was similarly advised. PVB Executive President and Chief Operating Officer Florencio Z.

Sioson declared that PVB did not accept the proposal for it to be named obligee under the subject
bond and that there was no contract between Ecobel and PVB. The GSIS conducted an
investigation on the circumstances surrounding the processing and issuance of the subject bond and
forwarded its report to the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB),which then conducted its own fact-finding investigation. On May 31, 2000, the
FFIB issued a Fact Finding Report, recommending the filing of appropriate criminal and
administrative charges against the concerned GSIS officials including Valencerina. Accordingly, an
administrative case was filed against the said officials for Gross Neglect of Duty, and Inefficiency
and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties before the OMB.
The OMB ruled that Valencerina, among others, guilty of gross neglect of duty, and inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties,and ordered his dismissal from service.
Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction to the CA
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Held:There is merit in the petition.
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Section 7, Rule III), as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the office's
decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of course
and shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order
of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the afore-quoted provision, it is clear that the OMB's June 8, 2005 Order imposing the
penalty of removal on Valencerina was immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his
appeal.The general rule on appeals from quasi-judicial bodies stated under Section 12, Rule 43 of
the Rules which provides that "[t]he appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms
as it may deem just" would not apply in this case.

50. Acosta
Moran, Jr. v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 192957, September29, 2014
Facts of the case:
Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. a buyer in good faith filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc on February 2, 2004.The case is
relevant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 also otherwise known as the Consumer Act of
the Philippines. Filedin DTI Administrative Case No. 04-17, the complaint against private
respondent for product malfunction/imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to complainant.
CAO rendered a Decision favoring of complainant dated September 23, 2005 and ordered the
private respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment of costs
of litigation and administrative fines enumerated as follows:
o To refund the purchase price of the subject vehicle in the amount of three million three
hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (P3,375,000.00).
o To pay complainant the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as costs of litigation.
o To pay an administrative fine in the amount of P10,000.00 payable at 4th flr.DTI Cashier,
361 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City.
PGA Cars, private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision on October 19, 2005 but the
CAO denied the motion. Subsequently, the private respondent appealed to the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the quasi-judicial agency however, the DTI Secretary
dismissed the appeal of the private respondent who then filed an appeal with the herein public
respondent OP.
On April 3, 2007, the OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary's Resolution, and
dismissed the complaint. The OP ruled that the DTI erred in holding the private respondent liable for
product defects which issue was never raised by the complainant and because the private
respondent was not the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer of the subject BMW car but only
its seller. As such, it could not be held liable especially since none of the circumstances under
Article 98[10] of RA 7394 were present in the case. The OP further ruled that the private respondent

could also not be held liable for product imperfections because the product was never proven to be
unfit or inadequate under the conditions laid down by law.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals(CA) correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari because
petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal?
Whether or not the Office of the President (OP) have proper jurisdiction to entertain the appeal?
Ruling:
The court ordered that the petition for review on certiorari to be granted. The Decision dated April 3,
2007 and Order dated October 22, 2008 of the Office of the President are hereby declared void.
Consequently, the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary is hereby upheld.
In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate
judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner's application for an ITH. E.O.
No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.
Relatively, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the
DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent
should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.
In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OP's lack of jurisdiction,
complainant Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy.
Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary had become FINAL
and EXECUTORY with private respondent's failure to appeal the same within the 15-day
reglementary period.

51. Yarcia
Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Keppel Philippines Mining, Inc.

G.R. No. 138500 (September 16, 2005)
Facts:
 Viva Shipping Lines, Inc filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation before the RTC of
Lucena City.
 The RTC initially denied the petition for failure to comply with requirements in Rule 4,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. Viva
Shipping Lines then filed an Amended Petition.
 RTC found that Viva Shipping Lines’ Amended Petition to be "sufficient in form and
substance," and issued a stay order.20 It stayed the enforcement of all monetary and judicial
claims against Viva Shipping Lines, and prohibited Viva Shipping Lines from selling,
encumbering, transferring, or disposing of any of its properties except in the ordinary course
of business.
 Before the initial hearing, Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc., and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank) filed their respective comments and oppositions to Viva Shipping
Lines’ Amended Petition.
 During the initial hearing, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) moved for
additional time to write its opposition to Viva Shipping Lines’ Amended PetitionPilipinas Shell
later filed its Comment/Opposition with Formal Notice of Claim.
 The Regional Trial Court found that Viva Shipping Lines’ assets all appeared to be non-
performing. Further, it noted that Viva Shipping Lines failed to show any evidence of consent
to sell real properties belonging to its sister company.
 Aggrieved, Viva Shipping Lines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed Viva Shipping Lines’ Petition for Review.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the failure of Viva Shipping Lines to implead its
creditors as respondents, "there are no respondents who may be required to file a comment
on the petition, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 43. Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied.
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Viva Shipping Line’s Petition for Review on
procedural grounds?
Held:

No. The petition is denied.
Corporate rehabilitation is a remedy for corporations, partnerships, and associations "who
[foresee] the impossibility of meeting [their] debts when they respectively fall due."A corporation
under rehabilitation continues with its corporate life and activities to achieve solvency, or a position
where the corporation is able to pay its obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of
business. Solvency is a state where the businesses’ liabilities are less than its assets.
The controversy in this case arose from petitioner’s failure to comply with appellate
procedural rules in corporate rehabilitation cases. Petitioner now pleads this court to apply the policy
of liberality in constructing the rules of procedure.
We observe that during the corporate rehabilitation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court
already exercised the liberality contemplated by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation. The Regional Trial Court initially dismissed Viva Shipping Lines’ Petition but allowed
the filing of an amended petition. Later on, the same court issued a stay order when there were
sufficient grounds to believe that the Amended Petition complied with Rule 4, Section 2 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. Petitioner was not penalized for its non-compliance
with the court’s order to produce relevant documents or for its non-submission of a memorandum.
New Frontier Sugar doctrinally requires compliance with the procedural rules for appealing
corporate rehabilitation decisions. It is true that Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that
the "[r]ules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." However, this provision does not
negate the entire Rules of Court by providing a license to disregard all the other provisions. Resort to
liberal construction must be rational and well-grounded, and its factual bases must be so clear such
that they outweigh the intent or purpose of an apparent reading of the rules.
Petitioner did not comply with some of these requirements. First, it did not implead its
creditors as respondents. Instead, petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule 43. Second, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on
some of its creditors, specifically, its former employees. Finally, it did not serve a copy of the Petition
on the Regional Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition as a consequence of
non-compliance with procedural rules. Rule 43, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit of costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

52. Vallejos
ROBERTO B. REBLORA, vs. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195842 June 18, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy born on May 22, 1944. Prior to entering military
service, he rendered civilian government service as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) from 6 January 1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered
military service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy and was called to active duty
effective August 26, 1974.
On 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active service, the petitioner
was compulsorily retired from the military. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in
the Philippine Navy. Petitioner chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive
in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3) yearsworth thereof for the first three
years after his retirement.
The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the latter the sum of
P722,297.16 as advance lump, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s civilian government
service at the DILG. Petitioner disagreed and insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit
should include the period of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he
entered military service for a total of four (4) years and five (5) months.
the petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional
retirement benefit. The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the
age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-one (31) years in active service, inclusive of his four years in
the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638.
Verily, the COA found that, applying the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was not
actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount of P77,807.16.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA remained steadfast on their resolution.
Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the present Rule 45
petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme Court via Rule 45.
Held:

The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and
resolutions of the COA are reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such
cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed by
Supreme Court.
53. Torres
SPOUSES GADITANO vs San Miguel Corporation
FACTS:
Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who were engaged
in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer products from
San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn
against Argovan’s Asia Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment,
the check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written
demands, petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for
violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.
Petitioners maintained that their checking account was funded under an automatic transfer
arrangement, whereby funds from their joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically
transferred to their checking account with said bank whenever a check they issued was presented
for payment. Petitioners narrated that Fatima Padua borrowed ₱30,000.00 from Florida. Fatima
delivered Allied Bank Check payable to Florida in the amount of ₱378,000.00. Said check was
crossed and issued by AOWA Electronics. Florida pointed out that the amount of the check was in
excess of the loan but she was assured by Fatima that the check was in order and the proceeds
would be used for the payroll of AOWA Electronics. Thus, Florida deposited said check to her joint
AsiaTrust Savings Account which she maintained with her husband, Argovan. The check was
cleared and petitioners’ joint savings account was subsequently credited with the sum of
₱378,000.00. Florida initially paid ₱83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew ₱295,000.00 from her
joint savings account and turned over the amount to Fatima. Fatima in turn paid her loan to Florida.
Gregorio Guevarra, the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised Florida that the Allied Bank
Check for ₱378,000.00, the same check handed to her by Fatima, was not cleared due to a material
alteration in the name of the payee. Guevarra explained further that the check was allegedly drawn
payable to LG Collins Electronics, and not to her, contrary to Fatima’s representation. AsiaTrust
Bank then garnished the ₱378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners without any court
order. Consequently, the check issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against
AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra
unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been
extinguished by payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 and estafa.

The Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending
resolution of Civil Case. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the
Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit.
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the Resolutions of
the Office of the Prosecutor. The DOJ dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the DOJ Secretary denied. SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of
the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the
ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.
In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, we stressed that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to
appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power of control and supervision over said
Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such
prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it
may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of
jurisdiction.
Also, in Tan v. Matsuura, we held that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ,
this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect
to the DOJ’s findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as
when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is
ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the
prosecutor’s suspension of the criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged prejudicial
question.

Ordinary Appealed Cases (Rule 44)
54. Tamayo
ADELIA S. MENDOZA vs. UCPB
G.R. NO. 165575 dated February 2, 2011
Facts:
This is a petition for review oncertiorari of the Court of Appeals’ Resolutiondated July 2, 2004, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79796, and its Resolution dated September 9,2004, denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appealsdismissed the Appellants’ Brief filed by petitioners for failure to
comply with therequirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
CivilProcedure.On November 5, 2001, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact ofpetitioner Alice
Malleta, filed a Complaint for annulment of titles, foreclosureproceedings and certificate of sale with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa CityFourth Judicial Region.On April 15, 2003, the RTC of Lipa
City, Branch 12 issued anOrder dismissing the case.
Thereafter, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Orders to the Court of Appeals, and filed an
Appellant’s Brief on April 5, 2004. On May 20, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on
the groundthat the Appellant’s Brief failed to comply with the requirements under Section 13,Rule 44
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent contended that theAppellant’s Brief contained only
the following topics: (1) Prefaratory Statement; (2)Statement of Facts and Antecedent Proceedings;
(3) Parties; (4) Statement of theCase; (5) Issues; (6) Arguments/Discussion; and (7) Prayer. The
Appellants’ Briefdid not have the following items: (1) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a
digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabeticallyarranged,
textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they arecited; (2) an assignment of
errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references to the pageof the report at which the case begins and
page of the report on which the citation isfound; (4) page references to the record in the Statement
of Facts and Statement ofthe Case.On July 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
dismissing theappeal for failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules ofCivil
Procedure.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their
Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
the said brief did not have a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references to the
record in the Statement of Facts.
Ruling:

The petition is without merit.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it ismerely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and inaccordance with the provisions of law. An
appeal being a purely statutory right, anappealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules ofCourt.
In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, such as this case,Section 13, Rule 44
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the contents ofan Appellant’s Brief, thus:
“Sec. 13.Contents of appellant’s brief.
Theappellant’s brief shall contain, inthe order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments andpage references, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks andstatutes cited with references to the pages
where they are cited;
(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall beseparately, distinctly and

concisely stated without repetition and numberedconsecutively;
(c)Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement ofthe nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings andorders of the court, the nature of the
judgment and any other matters necessary toan understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to therecord;
(d)Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in anarrative form of the
facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversytogether with the substance of the proof
relating thereto in sufficient detail to makeit clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted tothe court for its
judgment;
(f)Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on eachassignment of error with page
references to the record. The authorities relied uponshall be cited by the page of the report at which
the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
(g)Under the heading “Relief,” a specification of the order or judgment whichthe appellant seeks; and
(h)In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant’s brief shallcontain, as an appendix, a
copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.”
In this case, the Appellants’ Brief of petitioners did not have a subject index. Theimportance of a
subject index should not be underestimated. De Liano v. Court of Appeals declared that the subject
index functions like a table of contents,facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready
reference.
Moreover, the Appellants’ Brief had no assignment of errors, but petitionersinsist that it is embodied
in the “Issues” of the brief. The requirement under Section13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure for an “assignment of errors” inparagraph (b) thereof is different from a “statement of
theissuesof fact or law” inparagraph (e) thereof.Further, the Court of Appeals found that the
Statement of Facts was notsupported by page references to the record.The assignment of errors
and page references to the record in the statement offacts are important in an Appellant’s Brief as
the absencethereof is a basis for thedismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997
Rules of CivilProcedure.Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the

properand prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals. Rules of procedureexist for a
noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberalconstruction would be to defeat
such purpose. The Court of Appeals noted in itsResolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration that despite ampleopportunity, petitioners never attempted to file an amended
appellants’ briefcorrecting the deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately clung to their argumentthat
their Appellants’ Brief substantially complied with the rules.Such obstinacy isincongruous with their
plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal.
55. Robledo
G.R. No. 173987 February 25, 2012
PADILLA MERCADO, ZULUETA MERCADO, BONIFACIA MERCADO, DAMIAN MERCADO and

EMMANUEL MERCADO BASCUG, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA and LOURDES ESPINA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Subject of the instant controversy is a 338 square meter parcel of land located at the Poblacion of
the then Municipality of Maasin (now a city), in the Province of Southern Leyte.
On May 8, 2000, herein petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Certificate of
Title and Damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-3147.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs of the late spouses Santiago and
Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners of the subject parcel of land; after the death of Santiago
and Sofronia, petitioners inherited the disputed lot, possessing the same as owners; sometime in
1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the subject parcel of land, alleging that they
bought the same from one Josefa Mercado Espina (Josefa) who, in turn, previously bought the same
in 1939 from a certain Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh; that Genivera supposedly purchased the
same property from one Escolastico Mercado in 1937 who, in turn, allegedly bought it from Santiago
Mercado. Petitioners further alleged that in 1962, Josefa, through fraudulent machinations, was able
to obtain a title (Original Certificate of Title No. 35) over the subject property in her name. They
prayed that the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of herein respondents be nullified and
that petitioners be declared as the owners of the disputed lot. They asked that the court award them
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
On June 29, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the complainant to state the assessed value of the
property, that petitioners' cause of action is barred by prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title,
and that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action against respondents who are buyers
in good faith.3

The RTC denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Respondents then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the above orders of
the RTC.
CA denied due course and dismissed respondents' petition for certiorari. Respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated October 21, 2003
Petitioners, by leave of court, filed an Amended Complaint to include the assessed value of the
subject property.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on grounds of prescription, laches,

indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of action. 6
RTC issued an Order7 denying respondents' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Respondents

filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in its Order dated April 19, 2004. 8
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA praying that the February 18, 2004
and April 19, 2004 Orders of the RTC be set aside and petitioners' complaint dismissed.
The CA ruled that respondents' title has become indefeasible and incontrovertible by lapse of time
and that petitioners' action is already barred by prescription.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to respondents’ second
motion to dismiss
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the Regional Trial Court to dismiss
the case and enjoining it from proceeding with the case on the ground of indefeasibility of
title, prescription and/or laches
RULING:
1. there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioners'
Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in
their Comment to respondents' petition for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter was raised.
2.the CA correctly ruled that petitioners' Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for
dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.17
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Thus,
the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Based on the above discussions, the Court no longer finds any need to resolve the other issues
raised in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The April 27, 2005 Decision and July
12, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84537 are AFFIRMED.
56. Regala
G.R. No. 136308 January 23, 2001
Elaine Del Rosario vs. Melinda Bonga
Facts:
Respondent Melinda Bonga sold her 2-door residential apartment to petitioner Elaine del
Rosario for P330,000.00. However, Bonga claimed that del Rosario violated their contract when the
latter occupied one unit not included in the contract and rented out the unit supposed to be occupied
as indicated in the contract. Further, del Rosario failed to settle the remaining balance of
P200,000.00. Hence, Bonga is praying before the trial court for the rescission of the contract. On the
other hand, del Rosario denied that Bonga owned the unfurnished unit and that she refused to pay
the balance. The trial court ruled in favor of Bonga and rendered the contract rescinded.
On appeal, del Rosario raised that Bonga has no title to the subject property, hence, the sale
was void and she has no right to rescind the contract. Court of Appeals held that del Rosario’s
argument was not raised on trial court and cannot be raised first time on appeal. Del Rosario
claimed that such was not a new issue but rather a mere shifting of emphasis.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged absence of title is a new issue raised first time on appeal.
Held:
Yes. The argument of del Rosario that Bonga has no title over the subject property is a new
issue not raised on the trial court and not a mere shifting of emphasis.
On her appeal, del Rosario instantly abandoned her theories and defenses raised before the
trial court. She merely relied her appeal on the argument that Bonga has no title over the subject
property for being in violation of buying an awarded property by NHA within the 5 year period absent
written consent and authority from the agency.
It is a fundamental rule that questions or issues not raised in the initial stage of the case,
before the lower or trial court, cannot be raised first time on appeal. The Court agrees with the

findings of the CA that such argument was not mentioned or raised in the evidence presented, more
so any proof of her allegation. Hence, the denial of petitioner’s appeal.
57. Ramos
LIANGA LUMBER CO. V. LIANGA TIMBER CO.
G.R. No. L-38685
March 31, 1977
FACTS:
Petitioner Lianga Lumber Company is the licensee of a timber concession in Agusan; while
private respondent Lianga Timber Co., Inc., is the licensee of another timber concession in Lianga,
Surigao.On October 13, 1959, the petitioners filed a complaint against the private respondent
alleging that on or about September 13, 1959, defendant corporation, thru its agents, entered into
the above-described concession of plaintiff, more particularly the place known as SitioTagabaca, Los
Arcos, at a place located south of the seat of actual logging operations of the plaintiff, and outside
the limits of defendant's concession and began marking trees therein, and on or about September
18, 1959 defendant posted armed men on the said sitio and thru force, intimidation and threats,
prevented the laborers of plaintiff from entering said place and logging therein. These acts of
defendant were committed with the peaceful objection of the plaintiff and its agents.Private
respondent filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaims alleging, among others, thatthe allegations
contained in paragraph 7 of plaintiffs' complaint, the truth being that subject-area is within
defendant's concession and is a territorial part of the Province of Surigao. By reason of plaintiffs'
repeated unlawful, surreptitious and stealthy logging operation in defendant's concession area,
defendant suffered losses. The plaintiffs came to SC asking for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant corporation which illegally entered a portion of the area covered by their
ordinary timber license, particularly, the place called Tagabaca of Los Arcos, Agusan. SC ruled
against the defendant and thereafter issued the requested writ of prelim. Injunction. Likewise the trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent the appealed to the CA. Unfortunately, CA
ruled against the private respondent. Thereafter, the private respondent filed an MR to the CA which
the latter again denied, Subsequently, a 2 nd MR was filed but was again denied by the CA. Petitioner
opposed the 2nd MR alleging that (1) that said motion was filed on April 12, 1971, two (2) days
beyond the period granted by the court, the due date being April 10, 1971, for private respondent
received on March 31, 1971 the respondent Court's Resolution, dated March 30, 1971, giving said
private respondent ten (10) days from notice thereof within which to file said second motion for
reconsideration; and (2) the grounds of said motion are, in substance, a rehash of what private
respondent had already raised in its brief. The CA thereafter reversed its earlier decision in ordering
the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and ruled in favor of the private

respondent, it was called the Enriquez Resolution. However, on April 30, 1973, the respondent Court
of Appeals issued a Resolution (penned by Acting Presiding Justice Juan P. Enriquez and concurred
in by Justices Manuel P. Barcelona and Emilio A. Gancayco), reversing the Esguerra Resolution of
June 15, 1972 and declaring, as in its original decision of February 19, 1971, that the forest area in
dispute is part of the concession of the petitioners and awarding the amount of P32,863.62 as actual
damages. It was the called the Gancayco Resolution. The private respondent then filed an filed their
Motion for Rehearing or Reconsideration of the aforesaid Gancayco Resolution of February 19,
1974, praying that this Resolution be set aside and vacated, and that the Decision dated February
19, 1971 or the Enriquez Resolution of April 30, 1973 be revived. Private respondent filed its
opposition thereto. On May 9, 1974, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the other appealed
Resolution denying petitioners' motion for rehearing or reconsideration by Minute Resolution. Hence,
the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the SC does not have the power to to revive the original decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's judgment.
HELD:
NO. SC have the power to do so. such power is necessarily implied from the authority conferred
upon this Court by the Constitution and by the law to revive, revise, reverse, modify or affirm the final
judgment or a decision of inferior courts. Moreover, the Court need not actually revive the original
decision of the Court of Appeals of February 19, 1971. By reversing the Resolution of February 19,
1974 (the Gancayco Resolution), the Court can just as well merely affirm the decision of the trial
court and virtually treat the Esguerra Resolution and the Enriquez Resolution as non-existing, the
same having been superseded in contemplation of law by the Gancayco Resolution. Stated
otherwise, what is before the SC for review only are the Gancayco Resolutions of February 19, 1974
and May 9, 1974, and since it is SC’s conclusion that the same are erroneous, the necessary
consequence is that SC must as they do affirm the decision of the trial court, just like in any other
ordinary case where SC reverse the Court of Appeals in favor of the trial court's judgment. SC the
prefer to treat the present action as an appeal thru petition for review, rather than as an original
action for certiorari.

58. Pilotin
Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on

November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years
old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July
8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then
on, lived with his father.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case
No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that
her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than
one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29,
1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment
was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The trial court also
granted custody of the children to Filipina.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified
that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila,
owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing
with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the

different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell
on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma
and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the
first time Fernando maltreated her.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity;
(3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in
its decision dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property
and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction
of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites
as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism;
(2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina
alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter.
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9,
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence
required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the
finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were
living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court
which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated November 21, 1996. She then filed an appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s raising of new issue for the first time in the appeal should be
accepted.
Ruling:
In this case, yes.
Although it has been repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of instances,
the Court had relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in
themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. The Court held that
certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a
particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the
case at bar requires to address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to
arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however,
that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their
effects according to existing law.
59. Ortizo
MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION VS. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP.
G.R. No. 158332, February 11, 2008
Facts:
Remington sued Marinduque Mining for payment of P921,755.95 worth of construction

materials and other merchandise. The complaint was filed in RTC Manila and was amended four
times to implead co-defendants PNB, Nonoc Mining, DBP, Asset Privatization Trust, Island Cement
Corp. and petitioner Maricalum Mining, on the ground that they are assignees/transferees or real
and personal properties, chattels, machineries and other assets of Marinduque Mining. Petitioner
was impleaded because the properties of Marinduque Mining, which were foreclosed by PNB and
DBP, were transferred to petitioner.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Remington ordering defendants to pay
jointly and severally P921,755.95. Petitioner and its co-defendants filed an appeal with was
dismissed by CA. DBP and PNB filed before the SC separate appeals. On its own, petitioner also
attempted to institute an appeal with SC by filing a Motion for an extension of 30 days within which to
file a petition for review on certiorari and to pay legal fees. However, the Court denied its motion in a
Resolution for lack of an affidavit of Service. Petitioner also sought to intervene is PNB v. CA but the
Court disallowed due to the tardiness of its motion.
Respondent Remington then filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution solely against
petitioner Maricalum Mining. Over petitioner’s objection, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution,
on the basis of which certain bank accounts of petitioner were garnished. Petitioner filed with the CA
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
In the Interregnum, the Court rendered in a Decision in the case of DBP vs. CA and PNB vs.
CA, dismissing the complaint of Remington which both has become final. Thus , citing the cases of
DBP and PNB, petitioner filed a Manifestation urging it to dismiss the claim of private respondent
and annul the RTC Order (writ of execution). The CA denied petitioner’s MR.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court’s decision in DBP vs. CA and PNB vs. CA inured to the benefit of
petitioner which was not a party to either case, as to bar execution of the RTC’s decision.
Held:
Yes. The dismissal of the Complaint in DBP vs. CA and PNB vs. CA constitutes a
supervening event. No vested right accrued from the RTC decision in favor of Remington, thus no
ministerial duty impelled the CA to allow execution.
It is a well-settled rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal has
the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Indeed, one party’s appeal from a judgment
will not inure to the benefit of a co-party who failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment
will continue to run its course until it becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one
exception stands out: where both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is
deemed to be the vicarious appeal of the other.
Private respondent has no cause of action against DBP, PNB, and their transferees,
including petitioner, for they are corporate entities separate and distinct from Marinduque Mining,
and cannot be held liable for the latter’s obligation to private respondent.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. Decisions of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC
Orders are ANNULLED.

60. Olaguer
MARTIRES C CHUA

Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court (Rule 45)
61. Obnamia
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, December 4, 2007, EN BANC

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the Subcommittee on the
Revision of Rule 65 submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed
amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.
This Resolution shall take effect on December 27. 2007 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
December 4, 2007.

RULE 41
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
be appealable.
a. An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
b. An interlocutory order;
c. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

d. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
e. An order of execution;
f. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
g. An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
as provided in Rule 65.
RULE 45
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
RULE 58
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined. If it shall
appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The
court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with the
provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case
is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order
shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the
total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the
original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said
period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect,

and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was
issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order
shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbyan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a
writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall
decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.
RULE 65
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the
petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further
proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a
petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration
of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
62. Marcos
Conejos v. CA & Plania
FACTS:
Plania brought an action for specific performance/rescission with damages against Conejos
alleging that they entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby they agreed that each of them
would pay half of the purchase price of a lot situation in Cebu City, and upon full payment they would
equally divide the lot and register in their own names. However, Conejos did not do such obligation
as she refused to divide the lot and register the same in their individual namanes. This prompted
Plania to bring the matter to the Barangay. In the meantime, Plania paid Borromeo Estate(Seller) for
his one-half portion of the lot. Plania authorized Conejos to sell his property, which the latter did but
without remitting the proceeds to Palania. Conejos promised to pay her portion but still reneged in
doing so. Hence, Plania instituted this action before MTCC. As for her answer, Conejos alleged that
they mutually abandoned the MOA.
MTCC- dimissed the complaint. MOA had been duly abandoned by the parties had it not
been abandoned, the Deed of Sale should have been issued in the name Conejos and Plania, and
not in Conejos name only.
RTC- Reversed MTCC’s judgment. MOA could not be unilaterally abandoned by Conejos. It
also noted that since Plania authorized Conejos to sell his property, which Conejos did, the latter
should reimburse Plania or to turn over her portion of the lot to Plania.
Conejos moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. She filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, the said court affirmed the decision. She filed a motion for reconsideration
of the CA’s order but it was also denied. Hence, she filed a petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON THE RESORT TO PETITION FOR CERTIORI IS PROPER.
RULING:

NOT PROPER. It should be dismissed for being a wrong mode of appeal. Conejos should have
resorted to a petition for review on certiorari(Rule 45) to the Supreme Court, and not a special civil
action of certiorari. When she received the notice of denial of the CA’s resolution denying her MR on
June 13 2001, she had 15 days until June 28 to file a petition for review with the SC. However, she
filed a Petition for certiorari on August 13 2001, 1 month and 25 days after the lapse of the period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Doctine: A special action for certiorari cannot be a substitute for failure to appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period, such cannot be used for an appeal which a petitioner already lost. Certiorari
lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. In the case at bar, the arguments cited by Conejos are without merit, the trial and
appellate courts did not abuse their discretion.
63. Marasigan
People v. CA, 389 SCRA
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:
Nature: consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:
Nercy M. Demeterio, Excel Mangubat, Ma. Lourdes Deutsch alias Lyn, and the spouses
NumerianoRabadon and LeonilaBurlaos were charged with Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code in an Information selling to Milagros (Lala) G. Wilson a portion of beach
property knowing that said portion offered for sale was under the coverage of CARP Law and
assuring upon the vendee that said property is free from all liens, encumbrances and the documents
or papers thereto were all in order, then the prosecution filed a motion to discharge Mangubat,
Demeterio and the spouses Rabadon and Burlaos, to become state witnesses. The trial court
granted the said motion but only with respect to the spouses Rabadon and Burlaos. The trial court
rendered a decision finding Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat to have conspired with one another
to deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa.Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat interposed
a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial courts judgment.Wilson then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals Hence, these consolidated
petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition by Demeterio and Mangubat was filed late and should therefore be
dismissed?
Ruling:
A perusal of the statement of material dates in the said petition indicates that the petitioners received
a copy of the Court of Appeals decision as early as November 25, 1997.However, they filed their
Motion for Reconsideration only on March 26, 1998, or four (4) months from the receipt of the
decision, way beyond fifteen (15) days period within which to file a motion for reconsideration[59] or

an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.[60] Comparatively, a party is given sixty (60) days to petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.[61] It is clear, therefore, that the decision of the Court of Appeals has
long become final and executory as against Demeterio and Mangubat. For they allowed one
hundred and twenty (120) days to lapse before they filed their motion for reconsideration. Thus,
denial of their petition is in order. The Court held that they have lost their remedy of appeal.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 132396 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
petition in G.R. No. 134553 is likewise DENIED for lack of merit and for being filed out of time.The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1997, is AFFIRMED.
64. Manzano
OAMINAL V. CASTILLO
413 SCRA 189
FACTS:
On 09 March 2000, Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against Respondents with the
Regional Trial Court RTCof Ozamis City Branch 35. On 30 May 2000, the summons together with
the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of Respondent Mrs. Castillo. On 06 June
2000, respondents filed their ‘Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally
Defective’ alleging that the Sheriffs Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court or substituted service of summons.On 19 October 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no answer was filed by
the latter. Respondents forthwith filed the following: Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion
to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim; Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The said motion
was anchored on the premise that petitioner’s complaint was barred by improper venue and litis
pendent. Fuethermore, respondent filed an Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim. Judge denied
respondents’s Motion to Dismiss, admitted their Answer, and set the pre-trial of the case.
Respondents filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration with the Accompanying
Plea to Reset. The motion requested that it be set for consideration and approval by the trial court.
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner. On September 11, 2001, respondents filed with
the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial
court had validly acquired jurisdiction over them.
On September 20, 2001, the appellate court issued a TRO to enjoin the lower court from
issuing a writ of execution to enforce the latter’s decision. The CA ruled that the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on
them. It based its finding on the Sheriffs Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had

been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was resorted to.
Thus, the appellate court set aside the trial court’s Decision and dismissed without prejudice.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not, there is a proper service of summons and the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over respondents; and
(2) Whether or not, the Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was proper.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is a proper services of summons and the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by
the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of
the former. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Personal service of summons is
preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be
promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements
have been complied with.
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following

circumstances: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts
were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s
office or regular place of business.It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer’s return.
In the present case, the Sheriffs Return failed to state that efforts had been made to
personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return indicate that it was
impossible to do so within a reasonable time. However, nothing in the records shows that
respondents denied actual receipt of the summons through their secretary.
Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and
respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they
filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer
with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial.
The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial court’s
jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot after failing to obtain the relief prayed for
repudiate the very same authority they have invoked.
(2) YES. Petition for certiorari was proper
Petitioner contends that the certiorari Petition filed by respondents before the CA was
improper, because other remedies in the ordinary course of law were available to them. Thus, he
argues that the CA erred when it took cognizance of and granted the Petition.

Well-settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a court has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court additionally requires that “no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” must be available. It is axiomatic that the
availability of the right of appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari.
Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review under Rule
45. Such move is in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of substantial justice, especially (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary period for filing a
petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of the relief sought.
The present case satisfies all the above requisites. The Petition for certiorari before the CA
was filed within the reglementary period of appeal. A review of the records shows that respondents
filed their Petition on September 11, 200 four days after they had received the RTC Decision. Verily,
there were still 11 days to go before the lapse of the period for filing an appeal. Aside from charging
grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction, they likewise assigned as errors the order and the
judgment of default as well as the RTC’s allegedly unconscionable and iniquitous award of liquidated
damages. We find the latter issue particularly significant, considering that the trial court awarded
P1,500,000 as liquidated damages without the benefit of a hearing and out of an obligation
impugned by respondents because of petitioner’s failure to pay. Hence, there are enough reasons to
treat the Petition for certiorari as a petition for review.
As much as possible, suits should be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. For this
reason, courts have repeatedly been admonished against default orders and judgments that lay
more emphasis on procedural niceties at the expense of substantial justice. Not being based upon
the merits of the controversy, such issuances may indeed amount to a considerable injustice
resulting in serious consequences on the part of the defendant. Thus, it is necessary to examine
carefully the grounds upon which these orders and judgments are sought to be set aside.
The Petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED.

65. Macatangay
REPUBLIC VS CA
G.R. No. 119393. April 26, 2000]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila a petition entitled,
"In the Matter of the Petition for Correction of entry in the Birth Certificate of the Minor Child Michael
Esmeralda Peuker, Robert Peuker and Maria Luz Trumpeta Esmeralda, petitioners"
The trial court set the case for hearing on March 29, 1989. However, the petition was not called
on said date because the court personnel staged a mass leave on that day. Thus, private
respondent's counsel asked the court officer-in-charge to reset the initial hearing to April 17, 1989.
But petitioner's counsel (office of the Solicitor General), pleading non-availability on said date, asked
the court officer-in-charge to reset the hearing to May 2, 1989.
On April 17, 1989, despite prior opposition by the OSG to said date of hearing, the trial court
heard the case. Private respondents marked and submitted in evidence the following: (a) affidavit of
publication of the order setting the case for hearing on March 29, 1989; (b) February 27, 1989 issue
of Manila Standard; (c) March 6, 1989 issue of Manila Standard; and (d) March 13, 1989 issue of
Manila Standard, containing the order fixing the date of hearing of the petition.
On May 2, 1989, the Court personnel went on mass leave again.
The next day, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion that it had not received a copy of the
petition and moved that private respondents be required to furnish the OSG a copy of the petition.
On February 16, 1990, the trial court admitted all the exhibits formally offered by private respondents
and directed the latter to furnish the OSG a copy of the petition. On April 24, 1990, the OSG
received copy of the petition and its annexes.

On May 15, 1990, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to correct the record of birth of Michael Esmeralda Pueker by deleting
the entry which states: 'May 1, 1980 - Pres. Roxas, Capiz' under Item No. 12. "DATE AND PLACE
OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS".
Believing that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law and evidence, the OSG filed a notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contended that the trial court committed serious error
and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for correction of entry for lack of merit
and want of jurisdiction. It averred that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition as
it is defective in form and substance for failure to implead the local civil registrar, and for lack of
publication.
In their brief, private respondents pointed out that petitioner raised only a question of law. Thus,
they moved for the dismissal of the appeal based on the alleged wrong choice of mode of appeal by
petitioner. In its reply brief, petitioner argued that while its appeal might have raised only a question
of law, the assailed decision, being a final judgment of the regional trial court, is within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 9 of the Batas Pambansa 129
(entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground of
wrong venue. The appellate court ruled that the appeal should have been addressed to the Supreme
Court, considering that what was being raised was only a question of law. The Court of Appeals
explained that it has indeed exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments of the Regional
Trial Courts. However, those do not include matters falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court such as the power to review final judgments of lower courts in all questions in which
only an error or question of law is involved. Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging
that the appellate court gravely erred in dismissing its appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal.
RULING:
Petitioner's contention is bereft of merit.
We agree with the appellate court's ruling that if an appeal is taken from the regional trial court
to the Court of Appeals and appellant raises only a question of law, the appeal should be dismissed.
The reason is that issues purely of law are exclusively reviewable by this Court. When an appeal is
taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode, it
shall be dismissed.2 Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90; Incorporated now in Sections 5(f) and 6, Rule
56 in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, if an appeal by
notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter court,
the appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.3 Murillo v. Consul, UDK-9748, March 1, 1990; Cai�a v. People, 213 SCRA 309, 313
(1992); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 193-194 (1996).
In the case at bar, the procedure resorted to by petitioner is incorrect. Petitioner merely filed a
notice of appeal which is directed to the Court of Appeals, and raised therein only a question of law.
But, to reiterate, the Court of Appeals does not exercise jurisdiction over appeals from the regional
trial courts which raise purely a question of law. Appeals of this nature should be elevated to the
Supreme Court. Petitioner should have filed directly with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But it chose to file its notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner's appeal.

66. Linaban
IMMACULATE CONCEPCION ACADEMY VS. CAMILON
Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the dismissal of the respondent but with modification
holding petitioners liable to pay the respondent separation pay as a measure of social justice.
Facts:
Petitioner Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA) is an educational corporation with principal

address at Malihan Street, Poblacion, Dasmariiias, Cavite. Respondent Evelyn Camilon was its
employee for 12 years. She was ICA’s Chief Accountant and Administrator from June 2000 until her
dismissal.
Due to some irregularities in payments of tuition and school fees and its deposits with its accounts in
Rural Bank of Dasmarinas, petitioner placed respondent under suspension pending investigation
and later on terminated her services after finding that respondent was negligent and remiss in her
duties.
Respondent filed a complaint 8 for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, declaring
ICA guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC.
NLRC rendered a decision finding respondent’s dismissal and preventive suspension legal.
Respondent appealed to the CA. CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the NLRC but with
the modification that petitioners are held liable to pay separation pay to the respondent, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to separation pay?
Held:

No. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employee's fault, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.
It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause.Respondent was guilty of gross and
habitual negligence when she failed to regularly pre-audit the report of the school cashier, check the
entries therein and keep custody of the petty cash fund. Had respondent been assiduously doing her
job, the unaccounted school funds would havebeen discovered right away.
Besides, respondent did not appeal or file a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the CA
which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding her grossly and habitually negligent in her duties. It is
axiomatic that a party who does not appeal or file a petition for certiorari is not entitled to any
affirmative relief. An appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.
Petition is granted.
67. Isidoro
HEIRS OF PACIANO YABAO, Represented by REMEDIOS CHAN, Petitioners, vs.PAZ LENTEJAS

VAN DER KOLK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 207266 June 25, 2014
FACTS:
The Heirs of Yabao prayed that they be declared the co-owners and possessors of a parcel
of land designated as Lot 2473 located in Brgy. Capoocan, Calbayog City (subject lot);that
possession thereof be restored to them; and that Van der Kolk be ordered to pay them attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses as well as reasonable rental of ₱2,000.00 per month. On April 2, 2001, Van
der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismissthe complaint anchored on the following grounds: 1] lack of
jurisdiction by the MTCC over her person due to defective service of summons; and 2] lack of cause
of action. Van der Kolk alleged that the service of summons should have been made in accordance
with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because she was not actually residing in the
Philippines. She contended that the predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of Yabao had executed a
joint affidavit on July 16, 1980, wherein they renounced their hereditary rights over the subject lot
and declared that Faustina Yabao, mother of Van der Kolk, as its true owner.
The Heirs of Yabao filed their opposition to the said motion and moved to declare Van der
Kolk in default contending that the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period and no answer had been filed.The MTCC then issued a Resolution denying the motion to
dismiss and holding that there was proper service of summons. It also denied the motion to declare
defendant in default, stating that the motion to dismiss was seasonably filed. The MTCC further
directed Van der Kolk to file an answer within 10 days from receipt of the aforesaid resolution.Van
der Kolk, through her new counsel, Atty. Eduardo Tibo (Atty. Tibo) then filed her Answer to the
complaint which was appended to the Motion for AllowanceTo Belatedly File Defendant’s
Answer.Finally, the MTCC rendered its Decision, declaring Van der Kolk in default giving the reason
that her non-filing of an answer within the fresh 10-day period was deliberately calculated to delay

the early termination of the case and resolving the case on the merits taking into account only the
allegations of the complaint.
Aggrieved, Van der Kolk appealed the MTCC decision before the Regional Trial Court, in
which he received the notice requiring her to file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such
receipt or until November 6, 2007. On November 5, 2007, Atty. Tibo moved for additional time of 30
days from November 6, 2007 alleging that he could not seasonably file the said pleading due to
heavy pressures of work.The RTC considered the reasons advanced by her counsel in the motion
for extension of time as not compelling enough to warrant a relaxation or suspension of the
requirements of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 thus the dismissal of the petition.
Unfazed, Van der Kolk filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA rendered the
assailed decision granting the petition "on grounds not raised herein but disclosed by the
records."21 It stated that the MTCC erred in granting the reliefs prayed for by the Heirs of Yabao
because they were not warranted by their complaint. According to the CA, the MTCC should have
required the Heirs of Yabao to present evidence ex parte, after it had declared Van der Kolk in
default, to prove the allegations in the complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in holding that the MTCC should have required them to present
evidence ex parte to substantiate their claims
2. Whether or not MTCC and RTC erred in dismissing the appeal for respondent’s failure to file
her memorandum on appeal within the reglemantary period
HELD:
The Court agrees with the CA that the MTCC erred when it granted the reliefs prayed by the
Heirs of Yabao because the same were not warranted by the allegations in the complaint. The Court
notes that the allegations pertinent to the petitioners’ cause of action, particularly on their claim of
ownership and right to possession over Lot 2473, were not supported by any document annexed to
the complaint. Mere assertions, as what the petitioners proffered, do not suffice. Ownership by the
heirs cannot be established by mere lip service and bare allegations in the complaint. As in all
matters, a party must establish his/her averments in the complaint by sufficient evidence necessary
to prove such claim. In the case at bench, the respondents, as plaintiffs in the MTCC, merely alleged
that they are the heirs of PacianoYabao without presenting any proof why they are the latter’s heirs
and in what degree or capacity.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and
to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires.28
The rule is that the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of
default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff.29 In this case, Van der Kolk filed the answer
beyond the reglementary period but before she was declared in default, and there was no showing
that she intended to delay the prompt disposition of the case. Consequently, her Answer should
have been admitted.
The MTCC must be reminded that it is the policy of the law that every litigant should be afforded the
opportunity to have his case be tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by
default are frowned upon.30 It must be emphasized that a case is best decided when all contending
parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in
support of their positions. By giving the parties the chance to be heard fully, the demands of clue

process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual
findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.
68. Gaudia
G.R. No. 188364 February 11, 2015
K & G MINING CORPORATION (KGMC), Petitioner,

vs.
ACOJE MINING COMPANY, INCORPORATED and ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
Facts:
KGMC questioned the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) signed by the
President in favor of the respondent was irregularly issued for the latter’s failure to comply with the
requirements Department Administrative Order No. 82 for not filing their application before the
appropriate DENR Regional Office. As a result, respondents mining claims now overlapped with
petitioner’s existing mining claims approved by the DENR.
The conflict was brought to a panel of arbitrators of Mines and Geosicnces Bureau where it
ruled in favor of KGMC. On appeal, the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) reversed the ruling of the
Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB citing that the DAO did not expressly prohibit the non-filing in the
DENR Regional Offices.
KGMC filed before the CA a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. CA
denied extension because decisions of the MAB are appealable via a petition for review under Rule
43 and not by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Even assuming that certiorari is an
available remedy, the reglementary period for its filing has already prescribed.
Issue:

WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper action in appealing the decision of
MAB.
Ruling:
No, it is an established doctrine that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal
and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. MAB’s decision have effectively
lapsed into finality due to the simple negligence of KGMC’s counsel in allowing the reglementary
period to lapse without perfecting an appeal beyond the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The attempt to resuscitate the lost appeal by filing a Petition for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Certiorari was likewise ineffective. The special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of
review and is a remedy of last recourse. It lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. "Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or
negligence."
69. Dig
CITY OF MANILA, et al. vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, et al.
GR No. 175723, February 4, 2014
FACTS:
The City of Manila, through its treasurer, Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against several business establishments including SM Mart,
Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils.,
Inc., and Jollimart Philippines Corp. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents pursuant to the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered
the local business taxes that the City were authorized to collect under the same Code. Because
payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private
respondents were constrained to pay more than PHP19 million assessment under protest.
In 2004, SM Mart, Inc., et al, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City a
complaint for therefund or recovery of illegally and/or erroneously-collected local business tax,
arguing that several provisions of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under
the Local Government Code on double taxation. They further averred that the City's Ordinance No.
8011, which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM, had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
The RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since
the motion for reconsideration (MR) filed by the City of Manila was denied, it then filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
orders of the RTC. The CA dismissed the City of Manila's petition for certiorari saying that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax
refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). A petition for

certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the proper remedy was to file an instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
2. Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
1. The City of Manila should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
rules of Court. The Supreme court held that the City of Manila availed of the wrong remedy
when it filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in assailing the
resolutions of the CA dismissing their petition and the MR of such dismissal. The CA
resolutions are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is
settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, the City of Manila should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case.The Sc also reminded the City of Manila of the equally-settled
rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action
based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.(Nonetheless, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, the SCdeemed it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari since the present petition
was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the
issue on jurisdiction.)
2. The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. The power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have
the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction
over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to
transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the SC has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason& Co., Inc. vs. Jaramillo, et al., that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue
the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This principle was
affirmed in De Jesus vs. Court of Appeals, where the SC stated that "a court may issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal
or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court."

Petition for Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings (Rule 38)
70. Linaban
DEMETRIOU VS. CA238 SCRA 158
FACTS:
Petitioners brought an action in the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Tabaco, Albay which ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a new owner's
duplicate certificate of title to private respondent. Their petition was, however, denied due course on
the ground that the fraud alleged therein was not extrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud
which did not justify setting aside the final decision of the trial court.
Alleged in the petition, that petitioners are the co-owners (to the extent of 2/3) of Lot No. 7651-A of
the subdivision survey PSD-05-005263 (a portion of Lot 7651 Cad. 221 Tabaco Cadastre) situated at
Poblacion, Tabaco, Albay; that petitioners acquired two-thirds of the Property from Miriam Catherine
Ralla by virtue of two deeds of absolute sale both executed on 11 July 1985, at the time of the sale
of the Property to the petitioners, there was a ten-year lease contract over the property which was
scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for this reason, the petitioners decided to await the termination
of the lease before registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name; that soon after the
expiration of the lease contract, sometime in the first week of August 1991, the father of the
petitioners went to the Register of Deeds to have the deed of sale registered and to obtain a new title
in the name of the petitioners; that to his great surprise and shockthe father of petitioners learned
from the Register of Deeds that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay,
Branch 16,
The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in the possession of the petitioner had been
declared of no further force and effect and that a new second owner's duplicate copy of said title has
been issued to the private respondent, subsequent investigation by the petitioners disclosed that on

Sept. 20, 1990 private respondent filed a petition with the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 and
docketed as CAD Case No. T-1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently alleged that "the owner's
duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878 was lost and/or destroyed while in
the possession and custody of herein petitioner as per her Affidavit of Loss and despite earnest effort
to locate said title, the same have been fruitless”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reconstituted title by the private respondent warrants the invalidation of final
judgment on the ground of fraud.
RULING:
The supreme court ruled that the appellate court is certainly right in holding that the use of a false
affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant the invalidation of a final judgment. The
use of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private respondent is similar to the use during trial or
forged instruments or perjured testimony. In the leading case of Palanca v. Republic, it was held that
the use of a forged instrument constituted only intrinsic fraud for while perhaps it prevented a fair
and just determination of a case, the use of such instrument or testimony did not prevent the
adverse party from presenting his case fully and fairly. In the case at bar, petitioners were not really
kept out of the proceedings because of the fraudulent acts of the private respondent. They could
have rebutted or opposed the use of the affidavit and shown its falsity since they were theoretically
parties in the case to whom notice had been duly given.
71. Bernardino
Service Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139
FACTS:
On February 25, 1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Branch L. an action for
replevin and damages against private respondent . After private respondent had filed his answer, a
pre-trial conference was set by the lower court of which the counsels were duly notified and they
were, furthermore. commissioned to secure the presence of the parties they represented. Both
private respondent and his counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and, as prayed for by counsel for
petitioner, private respondent was declared as in default.
The lower court then rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. On December 10, 1985, after said
decision had become final, the lower court granted the motion for execution filed by petitioner.
On December 24, 1985, private respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the petition for relief on the grounds that the petition was filed out of time; that it
failed to indicate a good and substantial defense; that it failed to show the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon as basis for the petition; and that it was not filed in the same court
and in the same cause as required by Section 3 of Rule 38. Private respondent filed an opposition to
said motion to dismiss.
On March 21, 1986, the lower court (Branch XII) issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for
lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court was correct in dismissing respondent’s petition for relief.
HELD:

YES. Although private respondent correctly states that "after the decision in Civil Case No. 85-29444
had already become final and executory, and appeal was no longer available and feasible under the
ordinary course of law, petition for relief from judgment is the most available remedy," he did not
comply with the provision of Section 2 of Rule 38 which reads:
Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.- When
a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of
First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
In the case at bar, private respondent filed his petition for relief also with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, but he did not file it in the same case; he filed it in another case, No. 85- 34098. Branch XII
of the lower court to which Civil Case No. 85-34098 was assigned could not take cognizance of the
petition for relief, because it was not the same branch of the court which rendered the judgment from
which relief was sought. It was Branch L of the lower court which could properly take cognizance of
said petition and which, if it found the allegations thereof to be true, could order the judgment
complained of to be set aside and proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted (Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 38).
72. Bachiller
ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO
R. MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 169914, April 18, 2008
Petitions arising from the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
FACTS:
Banking on Supreme Court's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to
PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before the Court a
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying
that:
(1) Respondents, their officers, agents, successors, representatives or persons or entities

acting on their behalf, to formally award the NAIA-APT III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and
to execute and formalize with Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement
embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project and
directing Respondents to cease and desist from awarding the NAIA-IPT Project to third
parties or negotiating into any concession contract with third parties.
(2) A Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining Respondents, their officers, agents,
successors or representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf from negotiating,
re-bidding, awarding or otherwise entering into any concession contract with PIATCO and
other third parties for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project.

AEDC bases its Petition on the following grounds:
I. Petitioner AEDC, being the recognizedandunchallengedoriginal proponent, has the

exclusive, clearandvestedstatutory rightto the award of the NAIA-IPT III project;
II. Respondents have a statutoryduty to protectpetitioner AEDC as the unchallengedoriginal

proponentas a result of the SupremeCourt’s nullification of the awardof the NAIA-IPT III
PROJECT to PIATCO; and
III. Respondents have no legal basis or authority to take over the NAIA-IPT III project to the
exclusion of petitioner AEDC, or to award the project to third parties.
At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and unchallenged original
proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the
award thereof. However, the Petition of AEDC should be dismissed for lack of merit, being as it is,
substantially and procedurally flawed.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition suffered from procedural defects.
HELD:Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The said Petition suffers from procedural defects.
It is true that a judicial compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof;
and that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the decision approving
it. However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are unsubstantiated. There is no proof that the
DOTC and PIATCO willfully and deliberately suppressed and kept the information on the execution
of the ARCA from AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party
making such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The burden of proof
lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. In this jurisdiction,
fraud is never presumed.
Moreover, a judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in
accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from judgment. Section
3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
According to Suprme Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,as applied to a judgment based on

compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for
relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement
was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date
that it was approved by the court.

In this case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the
parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on 30 April 1999, yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged
fraud which vitiated its consent thereto in its Petition before this Court filed on 20 October 2005,
more than six years later.
It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to the Joint Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-thought and a desperate attempt to escape the legal
implications thereof, including the barring of its present Petition on the ground of res judicata.
It is also irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted in Agan that the
award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the Government eventually took such a
position, which this Court subsequently upheld, does not affect AEDC's commitments and
obligations under its judicially-approved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which
AEDC signed willingly, knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel.
In addition, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the Government's position
since Civil Case No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of AEDC. The Government then espoused that
AEDC is not entitled to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The Government still maintains the
exact same position presently. That the Government eventually reversed its position on the validity
of its award of the project to PIATCO is not inconsistent with its position that neither should AEDC be
awarded the project.
73. Aspili
G.R. No. 165544 October 2, 2009
ROMEO SAMONTE, Petitioner,

vs.
S.F. NAGUIAT, INC., Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Samonte is the President and General Manager of SB Traders, a corporation

engaged in the business of retailing motor oils and lubricants. It purchases Mobil products on credit
basis from one of Mobil Oil Philippines' authorized dealers in Bulacan, herein private respondent SF
Naguiat, Inc., with an express agreement to pay within a period of 60 days from date of delivery.
In September 2000, the private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against SB Traders and the petitioner, alleging that SB Traders incurred an obligation to pay the total
sum of ₱1,105,143.27 arising from the sale of Mobil Oil products.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference. Hence, trial ensued where the public respondent allowed the ex parte presentation of
the private respondent's evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court. The public respondent rendered
judgment in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner failed to appeal the said decision.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground that a
corporation had a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and therefore, he cannot
be held solidarily liable for obligations contracted by corporation. This petition was eventually denied.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order but the same was denied on the
grounds that the motion failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure and that it failed to raise an issue which would warrant
a modification or reversal of the order.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction reiterating the grounds stated in his petition for
relief from judgment filed with the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner
thereafter filed MR, but was likewise dismissed. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court committed an irreversible error in dismissing herein Petitioner's Petition
for Certiorari and subsequently thereafter, in denying his Motion for Reconsideration thereto for lack
of merit.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner therewith.
In so ruling, the CA found that the records showed that petitioner failed to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal from the RTC Decision dated May 25, 2001 causing the said decision
to become final and executory; that when petitioner filed the petition for relief from judgment,
petitioner did not offer any reason for his failure to appeal; there was no assertion that the RTC
decision was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The CA
noted that the petition was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting petitioner's good and
substantial defense as required by law. It also agreed with the RTC's observation that petitioner did
not assail the proceedings conducted below, but merely questioned the validity of the dispositive
portion of the RTC decision, thus, the petition for relief from judgment was fatally flawed and should
have been dismissed outright.
The CA added that notwithstanding such defect, the RTC proceeded with hearing the
petition perhaps as an act of grace giving petitioner one last chance to protect his interest and
present evidence in support of his arguments, but petitioner opted to dispense with the presentation
of evidence in support of the said petition; that petitioner could not claim that he was denied his day
in court or claim that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA then said that once a
judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party shall not be deprived of
the fruits of victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provide the requirements for a petition for
relief from judgment, thus:
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
SEC. 3. Time for filing of petition; contents and verification.— A petition for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns

of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any
person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The
rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure,
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by
counsel.
In his Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the RTC, petitioner alleged that the
petition was filed on the ground that the RTC made serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating
the evidence presented. He then proceeded to discuss the errors of judgment committed by the RTC
in rendering its decision.
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of
fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment,
does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal.
The arguments raised by petitioner in his petition for relief from judgment, i.e., he cannot be
held civilly liable for obligations he, as corporate president thereof, has incurred in behalf of the
corporation which is vested with a personality separate and distinct from its officers and
stockholders; and that he cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable for the obligations, are proper
issues which petitioner could have raised in a motion for reconsideration which he did not. The RTC,
in its Order denying the petition for relief, ruled:
Going by the tenor of the aforequoted Rule, it is the sense of this Court that the petition
under consideration cannot prosper, given the grounds therefor which should have been raised,
more appropriately, in a simple motion for reconsideration. It must be noted that the petitioner does
not assail the proceedings conducted by this Court which culminated in the rendition of the judgment
and issuance of the writ of execution rather; he questions only the validity of the dispositive portion
of the decision, an issue which, as already adverted to, should have been ventilated via a motion for
reconsideration.
In fact, the alleged errors committed by the RTC could also be corrected by means of an
appeal from the RTC decision. Petitioner did not also file an appeal causing the RTC decision to
become final and executory and the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. Notably, petitioner
never made any allegation in his petition for relief from judgment that the RTC decision was entered
against him through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The petition for relief did not
also show any reason for petitioner's failure to file an appeal after the receipt of the RTC decision
which the CA correctly observed in its assailed decision.

It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. For
the Court to allow the reopening or remand of the case after such a display of indifference to the
requirements of the Rules of Court would put a strain on the orderly administration of justice.
74. Alipio
Arcilla v. Arcilla, 138 SCRA 560
G.R. No. L-46674 September 16, 1985
Facts:
PetitionerLaurencioArcilla was among the several defendants in Civil Case No. 395-T, an action for
Annulment of Sale with Damages, filed by the herein private respondents.
On October 2, 1975, defendants (among whom is the petitioner herein) and their counsel did not
appear. Whereupon, on motion of plaintiffs' (now private respondents) counsel, defendants were
declared in default pursuant to Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court and the plaintiffs were
allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.On October 27, 1976, judgmentwas rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs. (1) Declaring the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by SegundaVda. de Arcilla in favor
of defendant LaureanoArcilla as null and void;(2) Declaring the eight (8) children of Segunda O. Vda.
de Arcilla (including defendant Laureano) as co-owners on equal shares of the one-half (1/2) portion
of that parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 00347 which was adjudicated to her in the
Extrajudicial Partition Settlement and as co- owner in eight (8) equal shares of the parcel of land
which was intended for her full usufruct, (3) Dismissing the complaint as against defendant
NemesioJubay.
On March 25, 1977, herein petitioner, as one of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 395-T, through
his new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default. The petition for relief from judgment is hereby
denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Issue:

Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Relief from judgment for having been filed out of time.
Held:
The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court on "Relief from Judgments, Orders
or Other Proceedings" state—
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.—
When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of
First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification. —A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be entertained by the
court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the
provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently, in assailing the lower court's dismissal of his petition for
relief for having been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to show that the said
petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do
so, instead he argues on the merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the same was
filed on time in the court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be dismissed.
Moreover, the courtagree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was filed late. The
court noted that the decision sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976. Petitioner,
through counsel, received a copy of the said decision on November 8, 1976, and he filed his petition
for relief from judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the same was filed beyond the period
allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As in previous cases, the Court holds and so rules that the instant
petition filed after the lapse of the reglementary period cannot be entertained.
Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner's main contention is that the order of default
was illegally and improperly issued because he was not notified of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975,
consequently, all subsequent proceedings including the judgment by default were all null and void.
While it is true that the natural presumption is that one always acts with due care and signs with full
knowledge of all the contents of a document for which he cannot repudiate the transactionthis
presumption referred to cannot apply in the case at bar when one of the parties is unable to read
and write the contract in a language not understood by one of the parties. In both cases, the person
enforcing the contract must show the terms thereof have been fully explained to the party. For the
reasons stated above, the Order of the lower court dated May 8, 1977 denying herein petitioner's
Petition for Relief should be affirmed.

75. Acosta
Ibabao vs. Court of Appeals (CA)
180 SCRA 70
Facts of the case:
The petitionAniceto Ibabao filed a petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court
of Appeals, relative to the increased penalty imposed on petitioner in the case People of the
Philippines vs. Aniceto Ibabaofor Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence for failure to lend aid to the
victim under CA-G.R. No. 12784-CR.
Ibabao was charged before the City Court of Davao, in Criminal Case No. 3091C, petitioner was
charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. One of the prosecution witnesses was Jose
Patalinghog, Jr. testified that at about 11:00 p.m., while he was at Bankerohan terminal, he clearly
saw an owner-type jeep with plate No. 57675 bump a person and did not stop and thereafter
reported the incident to the Matina Police Sub-Station. The Information did not allege that the
accused had failed to lend on the spot to the injured person such help as was in his hands to give.
In the case at bar, there appears no cogent or sufficient reason for the accused not to lend aid on
the spot to the fatally injured victim of the accident. As such, applying the foregoing provisions the
next penalty next higher in degree is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period shall be
followed. Furthermore, the heirs of the deceased are lawfully entitled to indemnity and moral
damages.
The accused is found guilty beyond rational doubt of the offense charged. And applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to undergo a prison term of from
one year eight months and twenty days of prision correccional as minimum to four years, two

months and one day of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs, with accessories
prescribed by law.
Said accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), plus moral damages in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue of the case:
o Whether or not the failure to lend aid to his victim justifies the imposition of the penalty next
higher in degree even though the circumstance was not clearly included in the Information
Ruling:
The court ruled that the penalty imposed is modified and petitioner-accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, also of prision correccional as
maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.
As provided in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, that any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.
The court favored the petitioner's contention, however, that the increased penalty is inapplicable to
him because the failure to give aid to the injured on the spot has not been alleged in the Information.
So far as we have been able to ascertain, this question has not been passed upon by this Court.

76. Yarcia
Quelman vs. VHF
G.R. No. 138500 (September 16, 2005)
Facts:
 VHF Philippines filed an ejectment suit against Andy Quelnan involving a condominium at
the Legaspi Towers 300 at Roxas Blvd, Manila before the MeTC of Manila.
 Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) rendered a decision in favor of VHF.
 Copy of the decision was send by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on
account of petitioner’s failure to claim.
 The MeTC decision became final and executory since no appeal have been taken by the
petitioner.
 A writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner’s wife.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order. He alleged that he was never
served with summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit.
 RTC granted petitioner’s petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision. It explained that
the petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an
appeal for the reason that petitioner’s wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint
in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble.
 The CA denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
 Respondent directly went to SC on a petition for review, which petition was remanded to CA.
 CA granted the petition, reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC decision, upon
finding that the petitioner’s petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the 60-day
mandatory period under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
 Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Issue:

Whether or not the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail under Rule
13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of the Rules?
Held:
Yes.
Section 3 of Rule 38 reads:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied
upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be.
Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60
days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months
from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Both
periods are also not extendible and never interrupted.12Strict compliance with these periods stems
from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were, a petition for
relief is actually the "last chance" given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And
failure to avail of such "last chance" within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal
77. Vallejos
Spouses Dela Cruz vs Spouses Andres
G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007
Facts:
Spouses Rolando Dela Cruz and Teresita Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title and/or
reconveyance with damages against spouses Feliciano Andres and Erlinda Austria and the Director
of Lands on July 28, 1993. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 523 and assigned to the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
The MCTC ordered the Director of Lands to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 11859 insofar as
the 410 square meters owned and occupied by petitioners were concerned. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40, reversed and set aside the decision of the MCTC.
On December 4, 2001, petitioners, assisted by Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67966.3 The appellate court dismissed
the petition since the Certification of NonForum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of
petitioners in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Petitioners moved
for reconsideration but it was denied.
Thereafter, Atty. Villarosa withdrew his appearance. On March 20, 2002, petitioners, assisted by
Atty. Guillermo M. Hernandez, Jr., requested for an extension of time to file their petition before this
Court. Later, they abandoned the motion and the case was declared closed and terminated.
On May 6, 2002, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for relief from judgment praying
that the dismissal of their petition for review be set aside since the gross negligence of their previous

counsel did not bind them.5 The appellate court, however, denied their petition. It ruled that
petitioners were bound by the action of their counsel as well as by his mistake or negligence. It
added that petitioners could not belatedly complain on petition or appeal about their counsel’s
incompetence since they could have easily dismissed him at the initial or trial stage if they were not
satisfied with his performance. Since petitioners slept on their rights, they had no one to blame but
themselves.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can avail of a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure from a judgment of the Court of Appeals due to their counsel’s negligence when he
signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping?
Held:
No, A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy.7 It may be availed of only after a judgment, final order or other proceeding was
taken against the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from judgment, meritorious defenses must be
accompanied by the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there being neither excusable
nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of due process, meritorious defenses cannot alone be
considered.
78. Torres
Purcon vs MRM Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a
seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3) months with a
monthly salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity that
required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the pressure of his
work. His contract was extended for anotherthree (3) months. On the second week of June 2002, he
felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he
was diagnosed with hernia. He was repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioners return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr.Alegre, the company physician,
who prescribed certain medication. Dr.Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When he
reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that there
was no vacancy for him. He consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internist-cardiologist of Philippine
Heart Center. After a thorough medical examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with
EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE
XIV.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioners ailment, hernia, is not work-
related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims. In fact, he was declared fit to
resume work by the company-designated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is
not to be considered a permanent disability as this is easily correctable by simple surgery. More
importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was notarized.
Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for utter lack of
merit. The Labor Arbiter explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as his hernia
was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he
was not accommodated due to lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did
not mean that he was suffering from disability.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. A motion or
reconsideration was filed but the same was dismissed. The NLRC Resolution became final and
executory.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals. However, the CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. The CA resolution became final and executory.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
denied the petition for the following reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit for
costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3) insufficient or
defective verification under Section 4, Rule 7.
The Court likewise held that petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. He was not able to convince this Court why the actions of the Labor Arbiter,
the NLRC and the CA, which have passed upon the same issue, should be reversed. Consequently,
on October 9, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from resolution denying his petition for review.
RULING:
No. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief
from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original
cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys,
and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the
Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by
this Court.

In Dela Cruz v. Andres, We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer, that a petition for relief
from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court
explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered
the decision, viz.:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under
the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior court. When a
judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented
from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in which
the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried
upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof.
When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of
First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal
and Regional Trial Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this
Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to
the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial
(Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason
that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of
law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The
late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of

devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken
mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel.
79. Tamayo
ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL vs ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. NO. 173379 dated December 1, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners
ZenaidaGuijabar, et al. Respondent alleged that petitioners were occupying, by mere tolerance.
Respondent claimed that petitioner AbubakarAfdal sold the property to him but that he allowed
petitioners to stay in the property. Respondent claimed that he demanded return of the property
because he needed its use but that they refused to heed the demand. According to the records,
there were three attempts to serve the summons and complaint on petitioners which were returned
with the following annotations (1) unsatisfied/given address cannot be located, (2) duly
served as evidenced by his signature of one Gary Acob (relative) and (3) d uly served
but refused to sign) without specifying to whom it was served. Petitioner failed to file an answer. The
MTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for relief in the MTC which they withdrew.
They filed the same motion in the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition holding that it didn’t have
jurisdiction.
Issues:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for relief from judgement.
Ruling:
No jurisdiction.

In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because itis a
prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with
the RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitionsfor relief from judgments of the
MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing thepetition for relief from judgment of the MTC.
The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 01 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the absence ofsummons to petitioners. An action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real actionand in personam. In an action in personam,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendantis necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. Any judgment of the courtwhich has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and onlywhen the
defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service beavailed of. In this case, the
indorsements failed to state that prompt and personalservice on petitioners was rendered
impossible. These requirements are indispensablebecause substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service. Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case
was it shownthat Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of summons was effected,
wasa person of suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners- residence. the processserver
failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his relationship to petitioners and to ascertainwhether he
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty todeliver it to petitioners or
at least notify them of said receipt of summons./n sum, petitioners were not validly served with
summons by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners and, thus, the MTC’s decision is void.
80. Robledo
G.R. No. 174411 July 2, 2014
CITY OF DAGUPAN, represented by the CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. LIM, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTER F. MARAMBA, represented vy her ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOHNNY FERRER, Respondent.
FACTS:
A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy which allows courts to
review a judgment tainted with neglect bordering on extrinsic fraud.
On December 20, 2003, petitioner city caused the demolition of the commercial fish center, allegedly
without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of taking over the property. 6 This prompted
Maramba, through her attorney-in-fact, Johnny Ferrer, to file a complaint for injunction and damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. 7
The complaint alleged that the demolition was unlawful and that the "complete demolition and
destruction ofthe previously existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five Million
(₱10,000,000.00) pesos."8 The word, "ten," was handwritten on top of the word, "five."
In the complaint’s prayer, Maramba asked for a judgment "ordering defendant corporation to pay
plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present value of the
commercial fish center completely demolished by public defendant." 9 The word, "million," was

handwritten on top of the word, "thousand," and an additional zero was handwritten at the end ofthe
numerical figure.
The handwritten intercalation was notexplained in any part of the records and in the proceedings.
The trial court decision,11 penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron, ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded
10 million as actual damages
Petitioner city filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied petitioner city’s motion for lack
of notice of time and place ofhearing, thus, "the motion for reconsideration is not entitled to judicial
cognizance."14 In a separate order on the same date, the trial court also granted Maramba’s motion
for execution and ordered that "a writ of execution [be] issue[d] in the aboveentitled case upon
submission of the certificate of finality."15
Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with prayer for preliminary injunction dated October 29,
2004, together with an affidavit of merit.16
On November 18, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner city’s petition for relief and ordered that the
writ ofexecution dated October 26, 2004 be implemented. 18 The court stressed that "[t]he negligence
of counsel binds the client."19Petitioner city filed for reconsideration.20
The trial court, through acting Judge Silverio Q. Castillo, granted the petition for relief and
consequently modified its July 30, 2004 decision. It reduced the award ofactual damages from 10
million to ₱75,000.00:
Maramba filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. She argued that Judge
Castillo"acted without jurisdiction as he ha[d] no authority or legal power to substantially amend
orcorrect a final and executory judgment. . . ." 22 Moreover, Judge Castillo gravely abused his
discretion "in granting the petition for relief filed by the other respondent city of Dagupan on the 83rd
day from receipt of the judgment or 26 days late." 23
The Court of Appeals24 granted Maramba’s petition for certiorari. It held that petitioner city’s motion
for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper 25 that did not toll the
period to appeal. Consequently, the July 30, 2004 decision penned by Judge Laron became final
and executory.26 The Court of Appeals also denied reconsideration, 27 prompting petitioner city to
elevate the case before this court.
Petitioner city emphasizes that its motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2004 decision was
timely filed, tolling the prescriptive period to appeal. Since this decision was not yet final, its
subsequent modification by the trial court was proper.
Petitioner city agrees that "judgments must be final at some definite date," but Rule 38 also provides
for relief from judgments, orders, and other proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is excusable negligence that
allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment;
The July 30, 2004 decision was set aside when the trial court granted petitioner city’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of its petition for relief from judgment. 53 While the Court of Appeals

found grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in issuing this August 25, 2005 order granting the
petition for relief on reconsideration, the Court of Appeals’ decision was timely appealed before this
court. Thus, there is no final and executory decision yet.
In any case, notwithstanding the doctrine of immutability of judgments, this court has set aside
procedural rules in "[t]he broader interests of justice and equity." 54
This court has relaxed procedural rules when a rigid application of these rules only hinders
substantial justice.65
As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed
one-day delay in the filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter ofcourse, should render the
CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision already final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is
incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer. This is in line with the Court’s observation that
the amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as well as the time of its accrual, were
incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect,
the Court deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure and thus, proceed to resolve these
substantive issues.68
In this case, petitioner city received a copy of the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision on August 11,
2004.74 Its motion for reconsideration filed on August 26, 2004 was filed within the 15-day period.
The purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time to study the motion for
reconsideration and give an opportunityto be heard — were satisfied when Maramba filed an
opposition to the motion.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from judgment.
Courts may set aside final and executory judgments provided that any of the grounds for their grant
are present.
The presence of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence" must be assessed from the
circumstances
Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as: "(1) where [the] reckless
or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when[the rule’s]
application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require."79 Certainly, excusable negligence must be proven.
Atty. Laforteza’s "mistake" was fatal considering that the trial court awarded a total amount of ₱11
million in favor of Maramba based merely on her testimony that "the actual costof the building
through continuous improvement is Five Million (5M) more or less"; 87 that her husband spent $1,760
for a round trip business travel to the Philippines to attend to the case; and that "for his
accommodation and car rental, her husband spent more or less, ₱10,000.00 including round trip
ticket."88
The time for filing a petition for relief is found under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sectionsof this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months

after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
The double period required under thisprovision is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied
with.99 Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementaryperiod will be
dismissed outright.100
The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from actual receipt of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed. 101
Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on August 11, 2004. It filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a copy of the October 21,
2004 trial court order denying its motion for reconsideration. Four days later or on October 29, 2004,
it filed its petition for relief from judgment.Thus, the petition for relief from judgment was considered
filed on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ June 15, 2006 decision and August
14, 2006 resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court orders dated August 25, 2005
and November 30, 2005 are AFFIRMED.
Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions (Rule 47)
81. Regala
G.R. No. L-12397 April 2, 1918
Florencia Anuran vs. Ana Aquino, et. Al.
Facts:
Ana Aquino, natural child of the deceased Ambrosio Aquino’s sister, in collusion with the
administrator of Ambrosio’s estate, fraudulently represented before the trial court that Ambrosio died
intestate leaving no heirs other than her. Ana knew that Ambrosio has a surviving spouse named
Florencia Anuran and that Ana is not a legitimate daughter of Ambrosio’s sister. The trial court
ordered the delivery of the estate to Ana. Few years later, Florencia found out what Ana did.
Florencia promptly entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that the
order be set aside. However, the trial court decline Florencia’s motion on the ground that the alleged
fraudulent order has been entered for more than 6 months from date of decision and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to entertain Ana’s motion to set aside the decision.
Florencia filed a separate action in which the trial court rendered the order null and void for
being procured under fraudulent collusion and ordered the transfer of properties to Florencia.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of trial court not to entertain Florencia’s motion is a bar to filing
of separate action for relief on the ground of fraud.

Held:
No. the dismissal of Florencia’s motion does not constitute res judicata.
The trial court properly dismissed the Florencia’s motion to enter appearance in the intestate
proceeding on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction because it was filed out of the six months
period from rendering of the decision. However, such dismissal is not a bar to a separate action for
relief on the ground of fraud.
A special summary remedy by original petition to the Supreme Court is provided for
aggrieved parties deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, in
which such default judgment may be summarily set aside if application is made within sixty days
after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment. In this case, Florencia made a timely filing of
the action upon knowledge of Ana’s fraudulent act.
Further, Ana’s contention of prescription will not apply. Section 43 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within four years
after the right of action accrues, but the right of action in such cases shall not be deemed to have
accrued until the discovery of the fraud. Clearly, the action was instituted by Florencia within the
prescribed period.
82. Ramos
DEMETRIOU V. CA
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994
FACTS:
Alleged in the petition, among other things, are that petitioners are the co-owners (to the
extent of 2/3) of Lot No. 7651-A of the subdivision survey PSD-05-005263 (a portion of Lot 7651
Cad. 221 Tabaco Cadastre) situated at Poblacion, Tabacco, Albay, containing an area of
one thousand ten (1,010) square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878 of the
register of Deeds of the Province of Albay in the name of Pablo Ralla, private respondent's
deceased father; that petitioners acquired two-thirds of the Property from Miriam Catherine Ralla by
virtue of two deeds of absolute sale both executed on 11 July 1985, the sale from Miriam Catherine
Ralla was reconfirmed by another Deed of Absolute Sale executed on July 1986, while the sale from
Joan Pauline R. Belista was ratified and confirmed by virtue of an order date 11 May 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi City; that at the time of the sale of the
Property to the petitioners, there was a ten-year lease contract over the property which was
scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for this reason, the petitioners decided to await the termination
of the lease before registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name; that soon after the
expiration of the lease contract, sometime in the first week of August 1991, the father of the
petitioners went to the Register of Deeds to have the deed of sale registered and to obtain new title
in the name of the petitioners; that to his great surprise and shock, the father of petitioners learned
from the Register of Deeds that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay,
Branch 16, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in the possession of the petitioner had
been declared of no further force and effect and that a new second owner's duplicate copy of said
title has been issued to the private respondent; that subsequent investigation by the petitioners
disclosed that on Sept. 20, 1990 private respondent filed a petition with the RTC of Tabaco, Albay,

Branch 16 and docketed as CAD Case No. T-1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently alleged
that "the owner's duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-65878 was lost and/or destroyed while in the possession and custody of herein petitioner as
per her Affidavit of Affidavit of Loss and despite earnest effort to locate said title, the same have
been fruitless, "that the representation of private respondent in her aforesaid petition and affidavit of
loss that the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate No. T-65878 was delivered to her mother
after the death of her father and that she lost the said copy during the devastation brought by
typhoon "Sisang" is patently false, fraudulent, and perjurious since she knew fully well or ought to
have known that 2/3 of the property covered by TCT No. T-65878 had already been sold to the
petitioners on July 11, 1985 and the owner's duplicate copy of the said title was delivered by private
respondent's brother, Gerardo Ralla, to the petitioners on the same day; that on the basis of the
fraudulent representation of the respondent Judge Rhodie A. Nidea, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, issued an order dated Dec. 7, 1990 ordering the
Register of Deeds to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of transfer certificate of title No. T-65878
with all the annotations and encumbrances thereon, which shall be of like faith and credit as the one
lost and declaring the lost or destroyed owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. T-65878 of no further
force and effect, and that pursuant to the order, the Register of Deeds issued a new second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 to the private respondent; that despite repeated demands by
petitioners and despite protracted attempts at settlement, private respondent refused to deliver or
turn over to the petitioners the second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 65878 issued pursuant to
the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea; that the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea has
become final and executory, that it was clearly issued on the basis of the false and fraudulent
representation of private respondent, hence, it is null and void and must be annulled and set aside,
and that because of private respondent's refusal to satisfy the petitioners' plainly valid and just claim,
the petitioners have been compelled to litigate and to hire counsel for a fee and to incur other
expenses of litigation.
ISSUE:
WON the use of a false affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant the invalidation
of a final judgment.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and stated that the use of the alleged false affidavit of
loss by private respondent is similar to the use during trial or forged instruments or perjured
testimony. In the leading case of Palanca v. Republic, it was held that the use of a forged instrument
constituted only intrinsic fraud for while perhaps it prevented a fair and just determination of a case,
the use of such instrument or testimony did not prevent the adverse party from presenting his case
fully and fairly. In the case at bar, petitioners were not really kept out of the proceedings because of
the fraudulent acts of the private respondent. They could have rebutted or opposed the use of the
affidavit and shown its falsity since they were theoretically parties in the case to whom notice had
been duly given.
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also
because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on
facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the
court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be
attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title,
considered lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted
certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for
annulment of judgment of the petitioners.

83. Pilotin
Arcelona v. CA, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are natural-
born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U. S.A. Petitioner Ruth
Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased Benedicto Arcelona, brother of
Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with their three sisters – Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-
Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-Cruz (hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) --
petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased
parents. The six Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences ownership over the fishpond.
On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between
CiprianoTandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of three (3) years but was
renewed up to February 2, 1984.
Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant

of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination
of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the
lessors, Olanday, et al.
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted Civil
Case D-7240 for peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages, with motion
for the issuance of an interlocutory order against Olanday, et al., before Respondent Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant

of the fishpond. On October 31, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent.
Olanday, et al. elevated the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which
affirmed with slight modification the decision of the trial court on May 31, 1985. On appeal, this Court
sustained the IAC decision in G.R. No. 71217. On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the
court of origin, private respondent was placed in possession of the entire property covered by TCT
34341.
Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff. The case was docketed
as CA GR SP No. 24846. On May 8, 1991, Respondent Court issued a resolution directing
petitioners to implead as party defendant the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 50,
Dagupan City. Respondent Court promulgated in due course the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Dissatisfied, petitioners lodged this petition for review before us on May 10, 1992.
Petitioners contend that Respondent Court of Appeals erred in decreeing the all-sweeping
and categorical pronouncement that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic
fraud, and in thereby ignoring various Supreme Court rulings that a final judgment may also be
annulled for a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; b) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
necessary or indispensable parties; and c) lack of due process. Petitioners argue that, being co-
owners of the subject property, they are indispensable parties. Inasmuch as they were not
impleaded in Civil Case D-7240, the questioned judgment of the lower court is void insofar as the
petitioners are concerned for want of jurisdiction over their persons and [for] lack of due process.
Petitioners do not see any reason why a person who was not made a party at all could not assail the
same proceedings involving his property and affecting his rights and interests.
Petitioners further maintain that since the case involves the personal status of the private
respondent, or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, then the
petitioners as non-residents are entitled to extra-territorial service, which is a due process
requirement. As they were never served with summons, to bar them [from] questioning the
proceedings of the lower court will be compounding injustice x xx. If a party to a case can assail the
proceedings for defective service of summons, the same right should be afforded to a person who
was not made a party at all.
Issue:
Whether or not extrinsic fraud is the only ground for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
No, the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the ground(s) for annulment of judgment to only
one, namely, extrinsic fraud.
It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies
available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the
time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six (6) months from the entry thereof;
second, a direct action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct
action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue
of its own recitals.
Extrinsic fraud is the ground to annul a voidable final judgment; the declaration of nullity of a
patently void final judgment, on the other, is based on grounds other than extrinsic fraud. To say,

then, that petitioners can avail themselves only of the ground of extrinsic fraud and no other is to fail
to appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of annulment/nullity.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Its exercise must strictly comply with the legal requisites;
otherwise, a challenge on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. Such
jurisdiction normally refers to jurisdiction over the subject. As an example, in a case involving the
issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title the original of which was lost, stolen or
destroyed, the court must strictly comply with the requisites of Section 109 of P.D. 1529; otherwise,
its jurisdiction may be attacked anytime.
The Court held that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.
84.Ortizo
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA VS. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Marietta and respondent Rodolfo were married and had eight children.
Respondent left their conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. Petitioner filed with
RTC Makati against respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and support pendent lite. At that time, petitioner was
renting a house in Las Pinas, Metro Manila. Parties executed a Compromise Agreement where
some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to petitioner and her children. The court rendered
judgment based on the agreement. Petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent resided in the
property adjudicated to them in Cavite.
When respondent intended to marry again, he filed with the RTC of Cavite a declaration of
nullity of his marriage with petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although respondent
knew that petitioner is residing in Cavite, he nevertheless alleged in his petition that petitioner was
residing at Las Pinas. The clerk of court issued summons to petitioner at the address stated in the
petition. The sheriff served summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on petitioner’s
son at his residence in Cavite.
Petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. Respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion to
Declare Defendant as in Default. During the hearing there was no appearance from petitioner and

the public prosecutor offered no objection. The trial court granted the motion and declared the
defendant in default and allowed petitioner to adduce evidence ex-parte. The trial court issued an
Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The Clerk of Court
issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order.
Petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 47 of the ROC for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite. Petitioner alleged that
respondent committed gross representations that petitioner was residing in Las Pinas, when in truth
and in fact, respondent knew that she was now residing in Cavite. The petitioner also alleged that
respondent cause the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her
son who failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. According to petitioner, the
Order of the Trial Court is null and void on the grounds that there is no jurisdiction over her person
and due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. The CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that she failed to allege in her petition that the ordinary remedies under Rule 38 of ROC are
no longer available through no fault of hers. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied. Thus this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the trial court in favor of respondent was null and void.
Held:
Yes, the Order of the trial court is null and void. CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure
to take note that the petition was not based only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner because of the sheriff to serve her the summons and copy of the
petition.
An original action in the CA under Rule 47 of ROC, to annul a judgment or final order or
resolution in civil actions of RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. The petitioner must allege that the ordinary remedies
under Rule 38 of ROC are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be
dismissed. Failure to avail of the remedies through her own fault or negligence before filing her
petition with CA, she cannot resort the remedy under Rule 47.
However, in a case where the petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the
RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant/respondent, like in this case, or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner
need not alleged in the petition that the ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of
her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.
Therefore, the petition is GRANTED.

85. Olaguer
RAMOS V COMBONG

86. Obnamia
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. VS. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, G.R.
NO. 142628, FEBRUARY 6, 2007, THIRD DIVISION, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court determining whether the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Petra Capistrano Piit (Petra) previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City which
measured 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield
Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square
meters, and Lot No. 2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters. Springfield developed these
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), thru its Municipal Officer, issued a
Notice of Coverage, placing the property under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra, the case was
docketed as DARAB Case No. X-305. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Salcedo,
Jr. declared the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The Regional
Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and
frivolous. Becoming final and executory, Springfield proceeded for its development.

The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision,
docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555 which was granted in Decision dated October 5, 1995 and gave
due course to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to
proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the property to the true and lawful
beneficiaries. DARAB ordered the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries
₱12,340,800.00corresponding to the value of the property developed into a subdivision.
On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 40, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its
subsequent proceedings for no notice and hearing with petitionersor without due process of law.
On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. They alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari.
In the assailed Decision dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling
that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.
However, the CA ordered the elevation of the DARAB records before it, declaring that it "overlooked
the fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the
DARAB decision which they claim to be patently void."But after receipt of the records, the CA simply
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution dated February 23, 2000 without
specifically resolving the issues raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC or CA may order the annulment of the final judgment by DARAB?
RULING:
It should be the CA. Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly
give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Consequently, the silence of B.P.
Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-
judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.
However, the petition is partly granted and the case remanded to the CA to resolve
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition in their MR.
The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of
the writ of prohibition, which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision
dated October 5, 1995. Despite recognizing the need to resolve petitioners' application for the writ of
prohibition in its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless summarily denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000, leaving the matter
hanging and unresolved.

The Court considered resolving the merits of petitioners' motion for reconsideration
concerning their application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the DARAB Decision dated
October 5, 1995. Thus, in a Resolution dated June 5, 2006, the Court directed the CA to transmit the
records of DARAB Case No. 0555, which was previously required by the CA to be forwarded to it per
Resolution dated December 20, 1999.43 However, as of even date, the CA has not complied with the
Court's Resolution. Withal, upon re-examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems
it more judicious to remand this case to the CA for immediate resolution of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, re: their application for the writ of prohibition.
Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB as
regards the nature of the subject property necessitates a review of the present case. In this regard,
the CA is in a better position to fully adjudicate the case for it can delve into the records to determine
the probative value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the
DARAB. In addition, the CA is empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit additional
documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial justice, and further order the
transmittal of the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it is an avowed policy of
the courts that cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.
87. Marcos
Intestate of Nimfa Sian V. PNB— Annulment of a final judgment or order of the RTC.
Facts:
Nimfa Sian filed a petition with the RTC for cancellation of mortgage lien annotated on her
title against PNB(now Maybank). Maybank filed a responsive pleading. PNB also filed a Motion for
Substitution and Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Maybank referred the case to it for handling since
the properties were already transferred to the former by dacion en pago, and for motion to dismiss,
the complaint had no certification against forum shopping.
During the pendency, Nimfa died and was substituted by her estate. The Estate filed a
rejoinder opposition to the MT dimiss and MF substitution.
The Estate filed a motion for Early Resolution of PNB’s MT dimiss and MF substitution.
Both parties PNB and the Estate filed a Joint Manifestation, where they manifest that that the
issue of WON PNB should be permitted to substitute Maybank will be submitted for the resolution of
the RTC without further oral argument, and the hearing schedules on Aug. 8, 2002 be cancelled.
(pertinent portion…
Aug. 15, 2002 RTC-- denied PNB’s MF substitution because of lack of documnent to
support dacion en pago. And it also denied the MT dismiss on the ground that a certification on non-
forum shopping appeared in the petition.

PNB filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion. The RTC denied the Motion
for Reconsideration. PNB then filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of judgment of the Aug 15
2002 Order of the RTC, and a TRO.
CA-- granted. It set aside the 15 Aug. 2002 RTC Order without prejudice to the original
action being refilled in the proper court. According to CA that case at bar is a cadastral case for
cancellation of mortgage lien, without any trial conducted and based on the pleadings submitted the
RTC Judge cannot render a judgment on the merits. PNB was denied of the opportunity to present
evidence against the claim of the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the 15 Aug. 2002 RTC Order should be annulled on the ground of denial of due process.
RULING:
Yes. The Rules of Court provides that annulment for a final judgment or orderof an RTC may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, however, jurisprudence
recognizes as additional ground, the denial of due process.
Arcelona v CA teaches that to set aside a final and executor judgment thre are three
remedies available to a litigant:
1) Petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the ROC on the grounds of
fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence which should be filed within 60
days from the time the petitiooner learns of the judgment but not more that 6
months from the entry thereof
2) Direct action to annul a judgmeent on the ground o extrinsic fraud.
3) Direction action for Certiorari or collateral attack a judgment that is void upon its
face or void by virtue of its own recitals.
*As ruled in Macabingbing a decision was set aside for being patently void
where a mere inspection is enough to demonstrate non-compliance with due
process of law.
In the case at bar the Joint Manifestation of the parties submitted for resolution without
further oral argument the pending incident which was the PNB’s motion for substitution, not the
pending petition for cancellation of mortgage liens as the trial court incorrectly understood. When the
trial court the granted the petition for cancellation, even the predescessor-in-interest of PNB,
Maybank had not been given the chance to file an Answer. Thus, rendering the Aug 15 2002 Order
of the RTC null and void.
The Estate argued that PNB could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment
due to its failure to appeal the trial courts Order dated August 15, 2002, this is argument is bereft or
merit. . For, since the Motion for Substitution of PNB was denied, PNB had no personality to assail
the said order.
The trial court order being null and void, it may be assailed at any time either collaterally or
in a direct action or by resisting the same in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches. In this case, laches had not set in.

88. Marasigan
Llamas v. CA, at al., G.R. No. 149588, September 29, 2009
Ponente: NACHURA, J.:
Nature: Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner-spouses Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas which denies the petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with
Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners. Petitioners are assailing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City convicting them of the offense Other Forms of Swindling punishable
under Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Facts:
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the
crime of other forms of swindling in the Information alleging that petitionerssell said property to one
Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property After trial on the merits,
the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court, the appellate court
further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Petitioners filed before Court, petition for review.
The Court, however, denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the material dates. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration judgment of conviction became final and executorysince it subsequently
denied.Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first
time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Thereafter, petitioners instituted the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the
appellate courts decisions. The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition but
reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are not barred from raising such question of jurisdiction at any time
and in fact maintain that respondent courts had no jurisdiction in law and enlightening doctrines to try
and decide this case?
Ruling:
In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine
this case. petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending in the
trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss the present
motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners advanced age, the length of time this
case has been pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of petitioners
conviction, the Court resolves to grant pro hacvicethe motion for reconsideration.
The Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid
application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided. It is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.
The Court notes that the case was allowed to run its course as a petition for certiorari, such that, it
said Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on
certiorari x xx. Likewise, in its February 10, 2003 Resolution, the Court said, It appearing that Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas, in his own behalf and as counsel for petitioners, has failed to file their reply to
the Solicitor Generals comment on the petition for review on certiorari within the extended period x
Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although captioned differently,
was indeed one for certiorari.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED

89. Manzano
REPUBLIC . TAFPA, INC.
G.R. NO. 165333 February 03, 2010
FACTS:
On November 27, 1995, respondent Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs

Association, Inc. (TAFPA) and DENR, Regional Office (RO) No. IX, represented by its then Regional
Executive Director (RED), Cipriano B. Paet, entered into a contract for community organizing
activities, social investigation, and information education campaign at the San Isidro Tinago
Reforestation Sub-Project in Sergio Osmea, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent later submitted
to the Office of the RED its Accomplishment Reports and Requests for Billing on July 8, 1998 for
accomplishments covering the 4th, 5th, and 6th Quarters and on June 7, 1999 for the 7th Quarter.
On November 22, 1999, Atty. Orlando V. Kong issued a Memorandum clarifying that the
delay contemplated in the contract that would warrant the imposition of the stipulated penalty
referred to the failure to undertake the primary community organizing activities such as community
planning workshops, assemblies, meetings/seminars, social development, and technical trainings,
consultations with community members and leaders and not to the non-submission of reports.
However, instead of paying respondents claims, the matter was referred to the Program Director,
National Forestation Development Office (NFDO), DENR, seeking its position on whether to impose
penalty on the billings of respondent.
On December 15, 1999, respondent filed with the RTC, Zamboanga City, a special civil
action for Mandamus with Prayer for Damages praying that after notice and hearing, a writ be issued

commanding the RED of the DENR to pay respondent P802,350.64, representing the latters unpaid
claims, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and legal interest on
the principal sum demanded. The RTC subsequently treated the case as one for specific
performance rather than an action for mandamus, since the allegations in the complaint clearly
reflected that respondents cause of action was based on a contract.
After the DENR filed its answer, the case was set for pre-trial. Respondent then filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The DENR through counsel, was furnished a copy of the
motion, but filed no opposition or comment. On June 8, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) deputized Atty. Julie as special counsel to assist the Solicitor General in the subject
case. Atty. Julie was further directed to advise the OSG from time to time of the progress of the case
and furnish the said Office with all copies of orders, pleadings, and motions. The RTC issued an
Order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
the respondent and against the petitioner. Petitioner, through its deputized counsel, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied.
The RTC made an Entry of Final Judgment stating, among other things, that the decision
dated March 16, 2001 had, on January 31, 2002, become final and executory, there being no appeal
filed by any party before any appellate court. Respondent thus filed an urgent motion for execution
with the RTC which was granted on March 14, 2002.
Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion asking the RTC to set aside the
March 16, 2001 Decision on the ground of lack of due process. On May 20, 2002, the RTC issued
an Order denying the motion.
OSG filed a Notice of Appeal, the RTC issued an Order disapproving the motion. On appeal
to the CA via a petition for Annulment of Judgment. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying
the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment
RULING:
No. CA is correct in denying the petition.
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted

indiscriminately by the court. It is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional
cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a
losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have
taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
It should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of

jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute

lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the CA has put to rest the issue of whether the RTC had
jurisdiction over respondents cause of action.
In this recourse, petitioner is no longer questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC based on the
above arguments. Petitioner now questions the propriety of the notice sent to the deputized counsel
of the OSG, arguing that notice to its deputized counsel is not notice to the OSG. Hence, absent
such notice, the decision of the RTC did not become final and executory. Moreover, the failure of the
RTC to serve the OSG copies of legal notices, orders, and judicial processes constitutes lack of due
process. What petitioner is seeking is for this Court to nullify the decision and orders of the
RTC via the present petition after petitioner has effectively lost its right to question the said decision
and orders, the same having become final and executory.
Verily, it was Atty. Julie who entered his appearance as counsel for DENR on January 18,
2000 and, as such, was the counsel on record. It was only later or on June 8, 2000 that the OSG,
through Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez, informed Atty. Julie that the latter had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case pending before the RTC. As such, being the
counsel on record, Atty. Julie had the authority to represent the petitioner, and it was but logical that
notices of court processes sent to him were sufficient to bind petitioner. Thus, the CA correctly
concluded that petitioners right to due process was not violated.
Respondent should not suffer for petitioners failure to avail itself of the appropriate remedies
provided for by law and the Rules. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the
case. Whether through inadvertence or negligence of its deputized counsel or the OSG itself, the
decision has already become final and executory. To conclude otherwise would run counter to the
basic principle of fair play. Besides, there would be no end to litigations if the parties who have
unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault
or inadvertence could have unfavorable decisions annulled by simply bringing an action for
annulment of judgment.
As regards petitioners remaining arguments, suffice it to say that this is not an appeal from
the decision and orders of the RTC, which to reiterate has become final and executory; the
correctness of the judgment is therefore not in issue. Accordingly, there is no need to address the
errors allegedly committed by the trial court in issuing the assailed orders.
Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

90. Macatangay
SPOUSES ARCENAS VS QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK
GR NO. 166819, JUNE 16,2010
FACTS:
On January 23, 2002, the spouses Dolores and Oscar Arcenas filed with the RTC of Roxas
City, an Action for Declaratory Relief against respondent Queen City Development Bank. The
Spouses Arcenas prayed for the declaration of their rights as lessors under the contract of lease.
Respondent bank filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim contending,
among others, that the action for declaratory relief was not proper, since the contract of lease had
already been violated. Respondent bank counterclaimed for the rescission of the contract of lease,
actual damages for its relocation and attorney’s fees.
RTC dismissed the action for declaratory relief and set the hearing on respondent bank’s
counterclaim for damages. The Spouses Arcenas’ motion for reconsideration was denied on June
23, 2002. Respondent bank later presented its evidence on its counterclaim.
On July 25, 2002, the Spouses Arcenas filed with RTC of Roxas City, another case against
respondent bank, this time for breach of the same contract of lease, docketed as Civil Case No. V-

072-07-2002 (the case subject of this petition), and was raffled off to the same branch where Civil
Case No. 006-01-2002 was pending. The Spouses Arcenas filed in Civil Case No. V-006-01-2002 a
motion for consolidation of the two civil cases which the RTC denied.
Respondent bank then filed in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 its Answer with Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaim. The RTC then set the case for pre-trial on April 30, 2003.
The Spouses Arcenas subsequently filed their Pre-Trial Brief with the proposed amicable
settlement which provided that respondent bank would continue to pay the agreed rentals until the
time the parties could find a substitute lessee. During the scheduled pre-trial conference, respondent
bank's counsel manifested its interest in the proposal but wanted to know the exact amount for
settlement; thus, the pre-trial was reset.
On August 18, 2003, the Spouses Arcenas filed, in Civil Case No.V-006-01-2002, a written
Proposed Settlement in the amount of P1,297,514.00. Respondent bank was asked to comment on
the proposed settlement.
During the September 9, 2003 pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002,
respondent bank's counsel manifested that the parties were in the process of settling the case
amicably. In an Order dated September 9, 2003, the RTC ordered the resetting of the pre-trial
conference to November 11, 2003, without prejudice to the filing of the compromise agreement that
the parties may finally execute before the scheduled pre-trial conference.
On November 11, 2003 the date set for the continuation of the pre-trial conference in Civil
Case No. V-072-07-2002 only respondent bank's counsel was present. On November 10, 2003, the
counsel for the Spouses Arcenas filed a Motion for Postponement of the pre-trial conference
because of conflict of schedule. Respondent bank's counsel objected to such postponement, as he
was not furnished a copy of the motion and the filing of such motion violated the three-day notice
rule on motions; thus, he moved that the Spouses Arcenas be declared non-suited. On the same
day, November 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order declaring the Spouses Arcenas non-suited and
set the presentation of respondent bank's evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. The
Order was received by the secretary of the Spouses' counsel on November 17, 2003.
On the January 8, 2004 scheduled hearing, despite due notice, the Spouses Arcenas and
their counsel failed to appear; thus, respondent bank presented evidence on its counterclaim, rested
its case and submitted the same for decision. On the same day, the RTC issued an Order submitting
the case for decision. The Order was received by the Spouses Arcenas on January 14, 2004.
On January 14, 2004, the Spouses Arcenas filed a Manifestation with Motion alleging that
their failure to file a motion to reconsider the Order dated November 11, 2003, declaring them non-
suited, and their failure to attend the January 8, 2004 hearing on respondent bank's counterclaim
was due to their mistaken belief that respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settlement on both
civil cases; that honest mistake and excusable negligence were grounds for lifting an order of non-
suit; thus, they prayed that the Orders dated November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 be
reconsidered.
On March 29, 2004, the Spouses Arcenas, as petitioners, filed with the CA a Petition for
annulment of order under Rule 47 seeking to annul the November 11, 2003 Order of non-suit issued
by the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 on the ground of extrinsic
fraud.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment
of order filed by therein petitioners, Spouses Oscar Arcenas and Dolores Arcenas, on the

ground that they failed to take other appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned final
order, since their inaction was not due to fault or negligence imputable to them.
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate the clear
existence of extrinsic fraud committed by the adverse party through its counsel, Atty. Manuel
Miraflores.
3. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum shopping considering the difference in the
nature of the remedies between the rule on appeal under Rule 41 and annulment of orders
under Rule 47.
RULING:
We find no merit in the petition.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for
annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial,
appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient
justification, she cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise,
she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
We found no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment.
The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference of Civil Case No. 072-07-2002 on November 11, 2003, and respondent bank was
allowed to present evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. Such Order was received by
the secretary of petitioner's counsel on November 17, 2003. Petitioner did not move to set aside the
RTC's order of non-suit. While petitioner's counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of
non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Notably, from
December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on January 8, 2004, petitioner did not take any remedial
action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In fact, petitioner and her
counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing wherein respondent bank
presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the case for decision.
It was only on January 14, 2004 when petitioner and her husband filed a pleading captioned
as Manifestation and Motion, wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of the Orders dated
November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further pre-trial conference. The RTC denied such
Manifestation and Motion in its Order dated March 9, 2004, as the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period, and such Order was received by petitioner on March 12, 2004. Petitioner then
filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on
the ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA denied the petition as petitioner failed to avail of the
appropriate remedies provided by the Rules to which we agree.
Petitioner argues that when respondent bank's counsel moved for the issuance of the Order
of non-suit against her and her husband during the November 11, 2003 hearing, extrinsic fraud was
committed on them since respondent bank's counsel concealed from the RTC that there was a
gentleman's agreement for the settlement of the subject civil cases.
We are not persuaded.
It bears stressing that when petitioner's counsel filed the Manifestation and Motion asking for
reconsideration of the Order declaring the Spouses Arcenas non-suited, the reason stated was
honest mistake or excusable negligence. To show such mistake, he explained that since there was a
pending negotiation for settlement in Civil Case Nos. V-006-01-2002 and V-072-07-2002, which
were both pending in the same court, and the parties had to come up with a settlement for the
hearing of Civil Case No. V-006-01-2002 scheduled on December 4, 2004, petitioner's counsel then

asked for the postponement of the scheduled November 11, 2003 hearing set for the pre-trial
conference of Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 one day before the said date, because of conflict of
schedule and since he had in mind the December 4, 2003 deadline to submit the settlement.
Notably, petitioner's counsel admitted that the date set for the submission of settlement in Civil Case
No. V-072-07-2002 was indeed November 11, 2003; and that his failure to attend the hearings and
to file a motion for reconsideration of the declaration of petitioner as non-suited was because of his
mistaken belief that respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settlement. There was nothing in the
Manifestation and Motion which alluded the commission of extrinsic fraud to respondent bank's
counsel.
Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent
bank's counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for
by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not
be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have
been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of
settlement. However, such promise was not an excuse for petitioner's counsel not to lift the order of
non-suit and to file a petition for relief.
Petitioner's claim that she was present when respondent bank's counsel moved for the
issuance of the order of non-suit against her was not proven by any evidence.
There was indeed a failure to show, to our satisfaction, that petitioner could not have availed
of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. Thus, she cannot resort to the remedy
under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
91. Linaban
GENATO INVESTMENTS V. BARRIENTOS
Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied
petitioner Genato Investment, Inc.’s Petition for Annulment of Judgment against the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC Caloocan).
Facts:
Due to alleged deficiency in real property taxes the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan City sold
at public auction Lot No. 13-B-1, in which private respondent Barrientos emerged as the highest
bidder.
The Office of the City Treasurer, through the City Treasurer of Caloocan, Evelina M. Garma issued a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser and, a Final Deed of Conveyance in favor of
private respondent.
Private respondent filed a petition with the RTC Caloocan praying for the consolidation of the
ownership of the property. RTC Caloocan issued an Order granting private respondent’s petition

Petitioner claimed that it was very much surprised at the auction sale of Lot 13-B-1 because it had
been religiously paying its real property taxes thereon up to 2012. Petitioner, filed with the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment. CA ruled that petition for Annulment of Judgment that petitioner
filed is not the proper remedy but an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was not afforded due process when she was not notified of the proceedings
instituted by respondent for the cancellation of her title
Held:
The auction sale of the land is null and void for lack of actual and personal notice to herein
petitioner.
On the substantive issue, the general rule is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be
disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it.
A final and executory decision may, however, be invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition to
Annul the same.
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The verified petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered. Thus, the only remedy left to petitioner in this case is a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which it, in fact, filed.
Petition granted.
92. Isidoro
Diona vs. Balangue
FACTS:
Respondents obtained a loan of P45K from petitioner payable in 6 months and secured by a
Real Estate Mortgageover their 202-sqm property located in Valenzuela and covered by TCT.‚When
the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with
the RTC a Complaint. Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A.
Balangue. On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of (Atty. Coroza) of the PAO, they filed a
Motion to Extend Period to Answer but respondents failed to file any. RTC declared them in default
and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.RTC granted petitioner's Complaint.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely
appeal. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. They had no
knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them. But on March 16,
2001, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17, 2000
Decision.

However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the
mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an auction sale conducted on November 7, 2001,
petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420k. Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued and
accordingly annotated.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution
Sale, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or
60% per annum). Their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest ballooned to
P652,000.00.RTC granted respondents' motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded
to 12% per annum. Then respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment
Obligationin the total amount of P126,650.00.
Displeased with the RTC's May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA rendered a Decision declaring that
the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time
pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest
to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated: Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed
for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that
portion as a nullity.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND

SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A
LOST APPEAL.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR

AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF
THE RTC, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND
ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF
JUDGMENT.
HELD:
The petition must fail.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process
and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47;

an exception to the final judgment rule;
grounds therefor.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only
under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the
party's own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of

justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest.
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of
due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals ,this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof,
its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process
of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond

the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to
and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:Due process considerations justify this requirement.
It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed
relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the
measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who
was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to
conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same
is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor
award unliquidated damages.
The raison d' Etre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed
that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he
known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in
the Complaint.No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard
defendant's right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the
mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair
play and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to
be heard thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgageexecuted by the parties
does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she
alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of P45, 000.00, with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum‚ and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5%
monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award
of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the
due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC
may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present
controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant [petitioner] was seeking
for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner's general
prayer for "[o]ther reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x xx. To repeat, the
court's grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,
supported by evidence, and covered by the party's cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the
awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the
same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with
applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,this Court held: In the case of Ruiz v. Court of
Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses
Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this
Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per annum as excessive and
unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate of interest to 1%
interest per month or 12% interest per annum.
It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid obligation.
Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest
patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as
applicable jurisprudence.
Respondents' former counsel was grossly

negligent in handling the case of his clients;
respondents did not lose ordinary remedies
of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through
their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly
negligent in their duty to maintain their client's cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their
client's property without due process of law.In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief
to a client who suffered thereby. ½l½l1
"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can
be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. Judging from how
respondents' former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly
negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due
process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile
counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents
for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer
would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.Here, "[r]espondents are plain and
ordinary people x xx who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law and legal
procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately
act as their interest may lawfully warrant and require.
As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents' principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to
their former counsel's gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTC's erroneous,
baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still
owe petitioner a large amount of money.

93. Gaudia
G.R. No. 188364 February 11, 2015
Republic of the Philippines through its trustee, the ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT) vs G
Holdings, Inc.
Facts:
A series of negotiations between the Republic and G Holdings culminated in the execution of

a purchase and sale agreement for the negotiated sale of 90% of the shares of stock of the
government-owned Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC). A disagreement on the matter of when
the installment payments should commence arose between the parties.
G Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the RTC against the
Republic to compel it to close the sale in accordance with the purchase and sale agreement. During
the pre-trial, the respective counsels of the parties manifested that the issue involved in the case
was one of law and submitted the case for decision where RTC ruled in favor of G Holdings.
No other judicial remedy was resorted to until the Republic, through APT, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the ground of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It characterized the

fashion by which the trial court handled the case as highly aberrant and peculiar because the court a
quo promulgated its decision prior to the submission of the Republics formal offer of evidence and
without ruling on the admissibility of the evidence offered by G Holdings. The Republic also asserted
that the failure of the Solicitor General to file the notice of appeal with the proper forum amounted to
extrinsic fraud which prevented it from appealing the case. Finding that the grounds necessary for
the annulment of judgment were inexistent, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Issue:
WON CA correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary action. It is restricted

exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules, namely, (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of
jurisdiction. The remedy may not be invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to
avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the concept
of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.
Second, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the Republic actually
concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. Hence, the
Republic effectively admits that the two grounds for which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked
to seek the annulment of a judgment want of jurisdiction over the parties and want of jurisdiction over
the subject matter do not exist. It only assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its
judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In the matter of extrinsic fraud, the circumstances of this case do not establish its existence.
It refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party is prevented from fully proving his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The Republic has not
proven, or even alleged, that G Holdings practiced deceit precluding it from fully and completely
presenting its case to the court. Since the prevailing party did not commit or participate in the
commission of fraud which prevented the other party from having his day in court, there was no
reason for the appellate court to annul the decision of the trial court. To render a judgment void, the
fraud must be committed by the adverse party and not by one’s own counsel.
Here, no fault had been ascribed to G Holdings and the proceedings in the trial court were
proper. The judgment has already attained finality as a result of the fault and inaction of the Solicitor
General. This was aggravated by the fact that this petition was filed by those who had no authority to
do so.

94. Dig
JESSIE MACALALAG vs. OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004
FACTS:
Pablo Aloro lodged a complaint for dishonesty against Jessie Macalalagwith the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas. This emanated from Aloro’s missing pension checks which allegedly were
taken and encashed by Macalalag for his personal benefit. Macalalag was directed to file his answer
but did not file any. Accordingly, the investigator was constrained to resolve the case on the basis
solely of the evidence furnished by Aloro. After investigation, Macalalagwas declared
administratively liable and ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
disqualification from government service. He sought for a consideration but the same was denied.
He appealed to the Supreme Court (SC) by way of a petition for review on certiorari, but the appeal
was dismissed. The adverse Ombudsman decision has thus attained finality.
Macalalag filed an action for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
ground of gross ignorance, negligence and incompetence of his former lawyer deprived him of his
day in court. The CA, however, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, stating that under
Section 9 (2) of BP 129, the CA has exclusive original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of
judgments of the regional trial courts. Nothing is mentioned therein about judgments of other courts,

much less of the Ombudsman or any quasi-judicial body. The case of Fabian vsDesiertovested the
CA only with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions which should be taken via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over actions for annulment of decisions
or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
RULING:
No. The CA has no jurisdiction over the case.RA 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989
provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are
appealable to the SC via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Fabian vsDesierto, the SC has declared
Section 27 of the Act to be unconstitutional since it expands the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without
its advice and consent. Hence, all appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases are instead to be taken to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In addition, RA 6770 is silent on the remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Tirol, Jr. vs Del Rosario, the SC has held
that since the Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives
and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, the right to appeal is not
to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal
or non-administrative cases. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
95. Caberto
ALABAN VS. CA
470 SCRA 697
FACTS:
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26
October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort
North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and
directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings.Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will
of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent,claiming that they are
the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice
to the other heirs.

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious.
Moreover, the RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the
motion to reopen.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002.
They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several
conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to
a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share.They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
In its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA declared
as baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud.
Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution,
but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
For his part, Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of
the RTCs Decision, since there was no showing that they were denied their day in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the RTC should be annulled on the ground of fraud as alleged by the
appellant-petitioner.
RULING:
No. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only
two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a
party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court.

96. Bernardino
Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, 542 SCRA 406
FACTS:
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land covered by a TCT located at Cogon District,
Cagayan de Oro. When he died, the property was inherited by his heirs. In February 1979, the
Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute sale of registered land in
favor of petitioner Maura So, over the property for P300,000. However, the three respondents and
Maura So failed to affix their signature on the document and it was not notarized.
Petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc heirs ignored the
demand. On February 24, 1983, petitioner filed a Complaint for specific performance against the
Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable deed of sale over the lot.
On February 28, 1983, the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favr of the spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King for
P200,000.
On February 12, 1988, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed
the decision with some modifications. The defendant heirs and the spouses Lim filed separate

petitions for review with the SC which were later consolidated. On August 2, 1991, the Court
rendered a Decision in these consolidated cases upholding petitioners better right over the property.
On February 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The respondents
opposed the motion on the ground that they did not participate in the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial and they were not parties to the case. The trial court granted the motion for execution.
MR was filed but was also likewise denied.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution and divesting all
the Jomoc Heirs of their titles over the property.
All the Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the said order of the RTC, but
was dismissed. The resolution became final and executory.
On March 12, 1992, respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against petitioner with
the RTC of Misamis oriental where respondents posited that since they did not sell their shares in
the property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by
the other heirs. The RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents.
In a resolution dated July 14, 1994, the RTC granted petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. On
November 14, 1994, acting jointly on petitioners’ MR and respondents’ Compliance/Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a resolution denying the MR.
On December 28, 1994, later substituted by her heirs, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment, which reinstated the RTC’s resolutions. This was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in not holding that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners argue that the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered the Resolution which
recognized respondents right to redeem the property because this, in effect, amended the Decision
of the Supreme Court in the previous two cases which sustained the sale of the property to Maura
So.
Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is
not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Ahd the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. The
error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial courts’ exercise of jurisdiction, not it lack of authority to
decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioners
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear
and decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant the petition for
annulment of judgment.
The complaint for legal redemption was dismissed, upholding the finality of the decision of the SC.

Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)
97. Bachiller
ALFREDO TAGLE, petitioner, vs.EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Formerly Philippine Commercial

International Bank) and the HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Order of the RTC, which denied petitioner Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession.
According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was constituted as
a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. He and his wife Arsenia never
mortgaged the subject property to respondent Equitable PCI Bank whether before or after the
subject property was constituted as their Family Home. It was Tagle, who was not the owner of the
subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI. Josefino was religiously paying

the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half thereof. When Josefino
died,petitioner Alfredo assume Josefino’s outstanding mortgage obligation.
On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly registered in
the name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney he
executed, to secure the obligation of the spouses with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI
foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property upon default in payment and upon the expiration of
the period of redemption, caused the consolidation and transfer of the title to the subject property in
its name. Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession of the subject property.
The RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion.
Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration which is
likewise denied by the RTC.
Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari
[and Prohibition] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking the nullification and the
setting aside of the denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. The appellate court resolved to
dismiss the petition. Alfredo moved for the reconsideration of the afore-quoted Resolution. The Court
of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is not the proper remedy
for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals.
Petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within
the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as
its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the present case, Alfredo’s petition in is already a disposition on the merits. Therefore, said
Resolution, as well as the Resolutions denying reconsideration thereof, issued by the Court of
Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of by the appellate court, and which, under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, are appealable to theSupreme Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s
petition. They were not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; and left nothing
more to be done by the appellate court. Consequently, the proper remedy available to petitioner
Alfredo then was to file before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and not a special civil
action for certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for certiorari is
wanting, that is, there must beno appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari
from the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a
petition for certiorari.

Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an
aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this
case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover, petitioner
Alfredo failed to show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule as to make
available to him a petition for certiorari in lieu of making an appeal.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. The special civil
action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is
available; especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the
choice of remedies.
Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an ordinary
appeal by certiorari, already a sufficient justification for dismissing the instant petition.
98. Aspili
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso
G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check
payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went
unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182, directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special
Panel in Manila for appropriate action.

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process,
their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They
insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of
laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners properly brought their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Supreme Court.
HELD:
No. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to
the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any
special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An
undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify
an exception to the policy.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot
and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking

any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs.
Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, provides that “the petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.”
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court
of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan

if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was
permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 7 "The sole office of the writ of certiorari," is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 9 The burden
of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely
alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the
petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases
involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or administrative.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see
how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the
Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the
other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction.
Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: “when the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
(2a)
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when
"any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court." 12 The main objective of mandamus
is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the
writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary
of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which they were unquestionably entitled.
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became

incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. Thus, Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration.
99. Alipio
Hon. Carlos O. Fortich vs. Hon. Renato Corona

G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998
Facts:
This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now
Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under
the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease
expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value
at P2.38 million.

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered
that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the
pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against
DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the
DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11,
1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of
137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction
against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering,
occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this
case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the
President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by
fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the
Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory
in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction
when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently
illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a
line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which

error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may
be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that
the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was
issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas)
jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an
error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus,
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion
of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act
may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must
be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with
the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We
have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et.
al., through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the
effectivity of Batas PambansaBilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has
been the judicial policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise

provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established
in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to

their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. The orderly administration
of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point
of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once
and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end
to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those
who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be
struck down.
3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while
an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially
so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is, forum shopping
exists where the elements of litispendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test
for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with
each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR
Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject
property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and
cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based
on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title,
used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two
cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were
instituted.

100. AcostaDauz v. Eliosida
1 SCRA 990 (1961)
Facts of the case:
On November 25, 1958, Gervacio Dauz, appellant was prosecuted before the justice of the peace of
Kidapawan, Cotabato for intentionally avoidingpaying license fees required under the local
Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956 the second, third and fourth quarter fees for the year 1958.
Gervacio Dauz has appealed directly to this Court from the decision of the Cotabato court of first
instance dismissing his petition for certiorari and prohibition. Gervacio Dauz filed a motion to quash
because the facts charged did not constitute a criminal offense. The justice of the peace denied the
motion. He instituted in the court of first instance this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending
that as he had paid the first quarter for the year 1958, the remedy of the Government was to collect
by civil action not a criminal prosecution the other quarter fees, plus the surcharges which the same
Ordinance had fixed. Judge Juan A. Sarenas, judge, dismissed the petition, explaining that
petitioner’s remedy was to appeal, if he should after hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice
of the peace court.

Issue of the case:
Whether or not the Judge erred in dismissing the petition regardless Dauzpaid the first quarter for
the 1958 as defense?
Ruling:
The court acted correctly. There is no doubt that the complaint alleged violation of the ordinance and
there is also no question that the ordinance provided the penalty of not more than P200.00 fine, or
imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both. The offense was within the original jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court. Whether or not Dauz’ having paid the first quarter for the 1958 constituted
a defense, is a matter which he should prove and discuss upon the trial on the merits, and if that
defense should fail, the way is open for him to appeal to the court of first instance.
101. Yarcia
PNB vs. The Intestate Estate of Francisco De Guzman

G.R. No. 182507 (June 16, 2010)
Facts:
 Respondent Gina De Guzman obtained P300,000.00 loan from Philippine National Bank
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in her name. She
acquired the property from her father thru a Deed of Absolute Sale. Gina’s sister, Rosalia De
Guzman, the beneficiary of the family home gave her consent to the mortgage.
 Rosalia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Cancellation of the Title,
Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages against Gina and PNB.
 RTC dismissed the case.
 The dismissal became final and executory since no appeal was taken from the RTC’s order.
 Respondent Intestate Estate filed another complaint also for for Declaration of Nullity of
Document, Cancellation of the Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and
Damages against Gina and petitioner, with essentially the same allegations.

 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
 The RTC denied the motion and ruled that since there was no determination of the merits of
the first case, the filing of the second complaint was not barred by res judicata.
 Petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping.
 RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.
 Petitioner filed another motion to dismiss raising the same ground which was denied by the
RTC.
 Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the three RTC orders, this time,
raising the following grounds: (a) res judicata; (b) forum-shopping; (c) lack of jurisdiction over
the person; and (d) complaint states no cause of action. RTC denied the omnibus motion for
lack of merit.
 Three years later, petitioner filed another Motion to Dismiss with leave of court alleging res
judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that no
further motion to dismiss shall be entertained.
 RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition is meritorious?
Held:
No. The petition has no merit.
The Court finds insufferable petitioner’s repeated filing of Motions to Dismiss raising the
same ground. In the three previous Motions to Dismiss and in an omnibus motion for
reconsideration, petitioner argued that the present case was barred by prior judgment and that there
was forum-shopping. Correspondingly, the issues had been repetitively passed upon and resolved
by the court a quo.
The motions were apparently filed for no other reason than to gain time and gamble on a
possible change of opinion of the court or the judge sitting on the case. The Motions to Dismiss were
filed in a span of five years, the first one having been filed on June 1, 2000 and the last the subject
motion on February 15, 2005, three years after petitioner filed its answer. In fact, since the first
Motion to Dismiss, three judges had already sat on the case and resolved the motions. By filing
these motions, petitioner had disrupted the court’s deliberation on the merits of the case. This
strategy cannot be tolerated as it will entail inevitable delay in the disposition of the case.

102. Vallejos
SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES, vs. FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 154462 January 19, 2011
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint2 for forcible entry, damages, and attorney’s fees filed by
respondents spouses Gualberto and Rene Cabahug Superales (spouses Superales) against the
spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
Summons together with a copy of the aforementioned Complaint was served on the spouses Leynes
on May 10, 2000, giving them ten (10) days from receipt within which to file their answer pursuant to
Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The 10-day period for the filing of the spouses
Leynes’ answer prescribed on May 20, 2000, a Saturday.
The spouses Leynes filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May 22, 2000, and their Motion to
Admit Belatedly Filed Answer with attached Answer with Counterclaim the day after, on May 23,

2000. The spouses Leynes explained that they were not able to file their Answer with Counterclaim
on May 20, 2000, even though there were court employees on duty that Saturday, because they had
to serve first a copy of said pleading on the spouses Superales’ counsel, whose office was located in
Davao City.
The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion for Judgment in which they prayed
that since the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer to the Complaint within the prescribed
period, then judgment could now be rendered. On May 29, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Judgment
denying the spouses Leynes’ Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and resolving Civil Case
entirely in the spouses Superales’ favor.
Aggrieved, the spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC Judgment to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) but the RTC affirmed the appealed MCTC Judgment.
On October 11, 2001, the spouses Superales filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution. The
spouses Leynes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals.
In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes’
petition outright for being the wrong remedy and for failure to state the material dates. On May 17,
2002, the spouses Leynes received a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 7, 2002
denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition . Thereafter, the spouses
Leynes filed the instant Petition for Certiorari charging the Court of Appeals, as well as the RTC and
the MCTC.
Issue:
Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy used by the petitioners?
Held:
No, We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s
remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for
certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be
used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As
provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based
on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party
adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.

103. Torres
LANDBANK vs UMANDAP
FACTS:
The spouses Joel and Felicidad Umandap were owners of an agricultural land in Sandoval and
Mendoza, Roxas, Palawan, with an area of 412.6745 hectares. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed 406.9003 hectares of the said land under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered to
compensate the spouses Umandap the amount of P2,512,879.88 for the land. The offer was later
raised to P3,392,952.78.
Since the spouses Umandap rejected the offer and the parties failed to agree on the appropriate
valuation, a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of just compensation was
commenced before the DARs Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) Conchita Minas.
Adjudicator Minas fixed the value of just compensation for the land at P23,909,608.86.
LBP, dissatisfied with the valuation, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan a Petition
for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation.The spouses Umandap filed a Motion to Dismiss
the petition, alleging that LBP had no cause of action against them and that the petition failed to

attach the proper certification against forum shopping. The RTC issued its Order dismissing the
petition on the ground that LBP failed to submit a proper certification against forum shopping. The
RTC held that since LBP’s Operation Center Manager for Region IV Atty. Delfin Macaraeg is neither
an officer nor a director of LBP, he is not qualified to sign the certification without a board resolution
delegating such authority to him.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto a certification signed by LBP President
Margarito B. Teves, confirming Atty. Macaraegs authority to sign the certification. The RTC denied
the Motion.LBP refiled the Petition, attaching the following: (1) a copy of a special power of attorney
executed by LBP Executive Vice President Alfonso B. Cruz designating Atty. Macaraeg as its duly
authorized representative to file the petition and sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping; and (2) a resolution by the LBP board of directors allowing executive vice presidents (a) to
file appropriate actions or petitions and sign their verifications and certifications against forum
shopping before the proper judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, and (b) to delegate such authority to
any group head, regional head or any other responsible officer.
The spouses Umandap filed a Motion to Dismiss anew, pointing out that Section 11, Rule XIII of the
1994 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure provides for
a 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from theDecision of the Adjudicator, and that the
refiled petition was filed beyond this period.
The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that even though the previous dismissal was without
prejudice, LBP nevertheless failed to refile the petition within the period allowed by the DARAB
Rules and thus, the Adjudicators Decision fixing the just compensation for the subject property
attained finality
LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. In nullifying the three
assailed Orders, the Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
initially dismissing the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation on the ground of
non-compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement.
The spouses Umandap filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals proceeded to rule that the Petition for
Certiorari before it should be dismissed.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision. The Court of Appeals denied the
Motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action re-filed within five days from receipt of the order denying motion for
reconsideration [of its dismissal], which action was originally filed on time but dismissed without
prejudice on ground of lack of defective certificate of non-forum shopping, is barred by prescription
or res judicata.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation was
done within five days from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing the
original petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the period within which a
complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did not
appear to have been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition, lead us to

assume a liberal construction of the pertinent rules. To be sure, LBPs intent to question the RARADs
valuation of the land became evident with the filing of the first petition for determination of just
compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB Rules. Although the first petition was
dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBPs refiling of essentially the same petition with a
proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier dismissal order had not attained finality
should have been accepted by the trial court.
104. Tamayo
JESUS C. CRISOLOGO vs JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 196894 dated March 3, 2014
Facts:
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (SpousesCrisologo) were the plaintiffs in
two (2) collection cases before RTC Branch 15, Davao City(RTC-Br. 15) , docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 26,810-98 and 26,811-98,against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. RespondentJEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation
(JEWM) was the successor-in-interest ofone Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case
before RTC, Branch8, Davao City(RTC-Br. 8), docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, againstthe
same defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated

October 15, 1998, between the parties herein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer
the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to
one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1,2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675
and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same
annotations as wellas the notice of lispendens in connection with the other pending cases filed
against So KengKok.

In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit ofThird Party Claim and the Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. In
an order, dated August 26, 2010, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo
posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution.
On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the dispositive portion of its Decision.
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti adCautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to
reconsider the above decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed prior to the rendition of
the judgment, a certificate, dated March 17, 2011, was issued declaring the January 10,
2011decision final and executory. On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition
filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of preliminary injunction subject of
the petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of discretion attributed
to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that the failure of
Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a
vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.
Issues:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action for Cancellation of Annotations may
proceed even without notice to and impleading the party/ies who caused the annotations, in
clear contravention of the rule on joinder of parties and basic due process.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very constrictive interpretation of the rules in

holding that a motion to intervene is the only way an otherwise real party in interest
could participate.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
4. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues raised by petitioners before it [had]
been mooted by theJanuary 10, 2011 decision of RTC Branch 14.
Ruling:
YES for all. In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that thecancellation of the
annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered withoutgiving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. Itwould, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required
to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of acertificate of title.The trial
court should have exercised prudence in denying SpousesCrisologo’s pleas to be recognized as
indispensable parties. In the words ofthe Court, “Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to
recognize Sps.Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion tointervene,
considering that a simple perusal of the certificates of title wouldshow Sps. Crisologo’s adverse
rights because their liens are annotated at the back of the titles.”The rule is that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only ifthere is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinarycourse of law.In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available
toSpouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be
correct in theiraverment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo inthe case
before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s recourse via Rule 65.This case, however, is an exception. In
many instances, the Court hasruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to promote,
notfrustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not tothwart but to facilitate
the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigidapplication may, for good and deserving reasons,
have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the
normal cause.

105. Robledo
G.R. No. 175977 August 19, 2013
HADJI PANGSAYAN T. ABDULRAHMAN, PETITIONER, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FOR MINDANAO AND GUIAMALUDIN A. SENDAD, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner was a Land Management Inspector of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. Private respondent reported the alleged
illegal activities of petitioner and Guialil Sayutin (Sayutin), an employee of CENRO 3-B Maganoy,
Maguindanao.6
According to private respondent, petitioner solicited from him the total amount of P₱5,450 7 as
consideration for the titling in private respondent’s name of lands located in South Upi,
Maguindanao, and covered by the homestead applications of Unos Pacutin and Ting Midtimbang.
On the other hand, Sayutin received documents belonging to private respondent from Ellen Alcoriza

(Alcoriza), records officer of CENRO Salimbao, Sultan Kudarat, without authority therefor. 8 Sayutin
later lost the aforesaid documents.9
The letter-complaint found its way to the Ombudsman. Instead of submitting a counter-affidavit in
compliance with the Ombudsman’s Order dated 17 July 1992, 10 petitioner filed a Manifestation11
dated11 August 1992. He manifested that private respondent had already executed an Affidavit of
Desistance.12 In that affidavit, private respondent indicated that he had forgiven petitioner after the
latter produced the missing documents and returned the money solicited together with incidental
expenses. Thus, petitioner prayed that he be dropped as respondent in the complaint.
Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of petitioner, Sayutin, and Alcoriza from service. It found
Sayutin and Alcoriza guilty of gross neglect of duty and petitioner of grave misconduct. As regards
the Manifestation and the attached Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner, the Ombudsman ruled
that these documents failed to controvert and, in fact, admitted the material allegations of the
complaint.14
A copy of the Resolution was ordered furnished to the DENR XII RED, who was directed to
implement the dismissal of petitioner, Sayutin, and Alcoriza, and to show proof of compliance within
10 days from receipt.15
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated 19 February
1999.16 He then filed a Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration, 17 attaching
thereto the Affidavit18 of private respondent, as well as the Joint-Affidavit 19 of Mama Sangeban, Jr.
(Sangeban) and Mario Tuhok (Tuhok), both dated 16 August 1999.
Under the mistaken notion that petitioner’s Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for
Reconsideration had yet to be resolved by the Ombudsman, the new DENR Region XII RED
ordered the retention of petitioner in the latter’s position pending the resolution of the second motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55737 21 assailing the
Ombudsman’s Resolution recommending his dismissal. In a Decision dated 28 June 2001, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.22 The Decision attained finality on 4 September 2001. 23
In a letter24 dated 15 March 2004, the DENR XII RED officer-in-charge inquired about the status of
the case of petitioner as the latter was then still reporting for work and even applying for a promotion.
On 31 March 2004, the Ombudsman issued an Order of Implementation 25 directing DENR XII RED
officer-in-charge Jim Sampulna to implement the dismissal from service of petitioner and to show
proof of compliance within 10 days from receipt.
Petitioner received a copy of the Order of Implementation on 13 August 2004. 26 On 16 August 2004,
he filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Status Quo Order 27 before the CA,
alleging that the Ombudsman had issued the Order of Implementation with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the Order of
Implementation should have been addressed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources as the head of office who had the power to appoint and dismiss him. 28 Petitioner also
questioned the Order of Implementation for being a direct order to dismiss. According to him, this
was beyond the authority of the Ombudsman, which was only empowered to recommend the
removal of erring public employees. 29 Finally, petitioner argued that while the Order of

Implementation was in the nature of an execution of judgment, which may not be stayed, the petition
presented an exception.30
CA issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for the following reasons: (1) failure to
implead private respondent; and (2) failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant
to the petition.31 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 August 2005. 32
CA issued the second assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 33 It ruled that it
could excuse the second infirmity, since it could very well require petitioner to submit additional
requirements necessary for the resolution of the petition. To excuse the first infirmity, however,
would render the petition non-adversarial. 34
The CA also found additional grounds to dismiss the appeal. Petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the Order of Implementation.
The CA likewise ruled that there are three essential dates that must be indicated in a petition for
certiorari: (1) when judgment or final order was received; (2) when the motion for reconsideration
was filed; and (3) when notice of denial thereof was received. 36 According to the CA, since petitioner
did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation before filing a petition for
certiorari, he also failed to comply with the requirement of stating the material dates in the petition. 37
ISSUE:
Whether the CA misapprehended facts by concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
RULING:
In this case, it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with Section 5,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the
petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded
in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not
against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
There are well-settled exceptions 48 to the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 49 However, none
of them finds application in this case, especially since questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
before the CA were different from those passed upon by the Ombudsman. The question raised
before the CA was the legality of the Order of Implementation. On the other hand, what was passed
upon by the Ombudsman was whether petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct.
Thus, when the recommendation to dismiss petitioner from service was issued by the Ombudsman
through the Resolution dated 14 March 1995, the recommendation was coursed through then DENR
XII RED Macorro Macumbal. Later, due to the query of the DENR XII RED officer-in-charge

regarding the status of the case of petitioner, the Order of Implementation dated 31 March 2004 was
directed to the former to effect petitioner's dismissal.
The Ombudsman was never informed of any change in the status of appointment of petitioner. Thus,
the Ombudsman had reason to believe that his employment continued to be under a contract of
service. Even if this belief was mistaken, we find that it does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
106. Regala
G.R. No. 167434 February 19, 2007
Spouses Ramon Nisce and Natividad Paras-Nisce, vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc
Facts:
Spouses Nisce obtained a loan with Equitable PCI Bank secured by Real Estate Mortgage
over two parcels of land. When Spouses Nisce failed to settle the loan, Equitable filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure. On the other hand, Spouses Nisce alleged that Equitable approved their
request to offset the balance of the loan to their dollar deposit account with the latter’s subsidiary,
Capital Asia Limited. Spouses Nisce also filed a petition for writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
Equitable to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure. Equitable opposed on the ground that
Spouses Nisce failed to prove the existence of the requisites to grant a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court granted the petition of Spouses Nisce and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Equitable to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure. Instead of appeal,
Equitable assailed the decision of the trial court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Spouses Nisce opposed, alleging that CA should dismiss the petition outright on the
ground that Equitable failed to file a motion for reconsideration which is a condition sine qua non to
the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of Equitable nullifying the order
issued by the trial court. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration of Spouses Nisce was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the bank before the CA is premature.
Held:
No. the petition for certiorari is not premature.
As a general rule, filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, the Rules provide for certain
exemptions wherein filing of motion for reconsideration is not a condition precedent and the
aggrieved party may file directly a petition for certiorari. One of the exemptions which applies in the
case at bar is “where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process.”
The Court ruled that Spouses Nisce failed to prove the existence of all the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There is no proof of a legal right and the injury sustained
or to be sustained by the Spouses. If a writ of preliminary injunction is issued despite absence of a
legal right and the injury sustained or to be sustained by the plaintiff, then the order is issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is a nullity. Hence, the
aggrieved party may directly file a petition for certiorari and prior filing of motion for reconsideration is
not a condition sine qua non.

107. Ramos
GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORP. V. ACUA
G.R. No. 140189
February 28, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation (GSMSC) is a manning

agency organized and existing under Philippine laws. It is the local agent of petitioner Ferry Casinos
Limited. Petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation is the surety company of petitioner
GSMSC.On October 7, 1993, respondents Jennifer Anne B. Acua, Haydee Anne B. Acua, Marites T.
Clarion, Marissa C. Enriquez, Graciela M. Torralba, and Mary Pamela A. Santiago filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against petitioners before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 93-10-1987. Respondents claim that: between the
months of March and April 1993, they were deployed by petitioner GSMSC to work as croupiers
(card dealers) for petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited under a six-month contract with monthly salaries
of US$356.45 plus fixed overtime pay of US$107 a month and vacation leave pay equivalent to two
months salary pro rata, except for respondent Jennifer Anne B. Acua who had a monthly salary of
US$250.56 plus fixed overtime pay of US$87.17 and vacation leave pay equivalent to two months
salary pro rata; sometime in July 1993, Sue Smits, the Casino Manager, informed them that their
services were no longer needed; considering that their plane tickets were already ready and they
were subjected to harassment, they had no alternative but to sign documents on July 11 and 12,

1993 specifying that they were the ones who terminated their employment; they were repatriated on
July 25, 1993. Petitioners denied the allegations of respondents and averred that respondents
voluntarily resigned from employment. They contend that: respondents were hired by petitioner Ferry
Casinos Limited through petitioner GSMSC to work as croupiers for a period of six months;
sometime in July 1993, respondents intimated their desire to resign; petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited
did not allow them to resign as the simultaneous loss of croupiers would paralyze casino operations;
respondents thereafter exhibited lukewarm attitude towards work, became defiant and rude;
consequently, petitioner Ferry Casinos Limited was forced to accede to respondents demands; and
respondents executed resignation letters and disembarked on July 27, 1993. On October 5, 1995,
the POEA decided the case against petitioners. The POEA ruled that the respondents were illegally
dismissed since petitioners failed to prove that respondents voluntarily resigned from employment. It
held that the alleged resignation letters are only declarations of release and quitclaim. Petitioners
appealed to the NLRC which, on January 15, 1997, set aside the decision of the POEA and
dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC held that the contested letters are not only
declarations of release and quitclaim but resignations as well. It further held that there is no concrete
evidence of undue pressure, force and duress in the execution of the resignation letters. The NLRC
gave credence to petitioners claim that respondents pre-terminated their contracts en
masse because two of the respondents, Haydee Anne B. Acua and Marites T. Clarion, are now
working in Singapore. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the
same in a Resolution dated April 30, 1997. On July 18, 1997, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari before us, docketed as G.R. No. 129673. On October 3, 1997, petitioners, in their
Comment, prayed for outright dismissal of the petition for: (a) failure of respondents to submit a
verified statement of the material dates to show that the petition was filed on time, and (b) filing a
certification on non-forum shopping signed only by their counsel. In addition, petitioners argued that
the issues raised are factual and there is no showing that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion. On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General, in lieu of Comment, manifested that he is
unable to sustain the position of the NLRC because the allegation that respondents voluntarily
resigned was not substantially established and respondents non-compliance with the formal
requirements of the petition should be waived since the petition is meritorious. The NLRC, in
compliance with our Resolution dated March 16, 1998, filed its own Comment praying for the
dismissal of the petition and the affirmance of its decision with finality. It argued that in reversing the
POEA, it focused its attention on the correct evaluation of the evidence on record which substantially
showed that petitioners did not dismiss respondents but that the latter resigned en masse on July
12, 1993. On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied it in a Resolution dated September 22, 1999.Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari
ISSUE: WON petitioners contention that the petition for certiorari should have merited outright
dismissal for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of including material dates.
HELD: YES as a general rule. In accordance with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
provides that there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b)
the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, (c) the
date when notice of the denial thereof was received. This requirement is for the purpose of
determining the timeliness of the petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law
renders the judgment final and executory. The same rule requires the pleader to submit a certificate
of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. Obviously, it is the plaintiff or
principal party, and not the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular
case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a
petition in that case. As a general rule, the Supreme Court stated that non-compliance therewith is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition however in the case before us, the failure to comply

with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are
evident from the records. A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the January 15, 1997
decision of the NLRC was received by respondents counsel on January 24, 1997. On February 19,
1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution
dated April 30, 1997. Respondents counsel received the resolution on May 30, 1997 and they filed
the petition for certiorari on July 18, 1997.In view of the retroactive application of procedural
laws, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03 which
took effect on September 1, 2000, is the governing provision. It provides that when a motion for
reconsideration is timely filed, the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion. While respondents motion for reconsideration was filed 16
days late, the NLRC nonetheless acted thereon and denied it on the basis of lack of merit. In
resolving the merits of the motion despite being filed out of time, the NLRC undoubtedly recognized
that it is not strictly bound by the technicalities of law and procedure. Thus, the 60-day period for
filing of a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the date of the receipt of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, i.e., May 30, 1997, and thus, the filing made on July 18,
1997 was well within the 60-day reglementary period.As regards the verification signed only by
respondents counsel, this procedural lapse could have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondents petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, it must be remembered that
the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective which is the goal of all rules of procedure - that is, to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. Needless to stress, rules of procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a
particular case from its operation. As the Court eloquently stated in the case of Aguam vs. Court of
Appeals: The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power
conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the
cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game
of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is
a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, in Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals, SC held that the procedural lapse of a partys counsel in
signing the certificate of non-forum shopping may be overlooked if the interests of substantial justice
would thereby be served. Further, SC held in Damasco vs. NLRC, that the certificate of non-forum
shopping was executed by the petitioners counsel, but nevertheless resolved the case on its merits
for the reason that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the equity and obligations of the parties to a laborcase.Indeed, where a decision may be
made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded

their due weight because labor determinations should not only be secundumrationem but
also secundumcaritatem. In this case, the Court of Appeals aptly found compelling reasons to
disregard respondents procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent injustice.
108. Pilotin
Chua vs. CA, G.R. No. 121438, October 23, 2000
Facts:
Fernando B. Morada owned Lot 832-B-1-C-2 located in Cebu City. His only heirs were his
wife, Aida N. Morada, and two minor children. After his death, the probate court presided by Judge
Leoncio P. Abarquez appointed Aida as administratrix of her husbands estate. On July 20, 1984, the
probate court allowed the sale of the lot for P200,000.00 to the spouses Precioso and Consolacion
Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida agreed to rescind the said sale. On January 20, 1988, the
probate court again issued an order allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be
used to pay the P200,000.00 already paid by the Enriquez spouses. On April 15, 1991, a Deed of
Absolute Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be
paid after the lot was cleared of squatters. On May 7, 1991, the court, after approving the sale to
Sanchez, directed Aida to submit an accounting within thirty days, deposit the proceeds of the sale
in a reputable bank in Cebu, and then inform the court of the name of the bank where the money
was deposited.

On July 16, 1991, after more than two months from the date of approval of the sale,
IntervenorSagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the sale alleging that the
sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of Fernando. He claimed that the lot could be sold for P1.5
million pesos. Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by Aida and her counsel
Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario Morelos, and Atty. Federico
Cabilao, another intervenor who represented undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land.
During the conference, Atty. Cabilao revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the
seller undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with the buyer shouldering
the expenses to clear the lot of its present occupants. Aida objected to Atty. Cabilaos statement. She
explained that the latters offer was made only after the sale to Sanchez was already approved by the
court.
On August 6, 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to
Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada
said that the courts order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and
executory, and that she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value. She
added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by the administratrix.
On November 15, 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale
and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier approved.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty.
Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million. However, on December 5, 1991, before Judge
Abarquez inhibited himself and before the case was re-raffled to Branch 12, the Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 19, issued a certification that the Order dated November 15, 1991 of Judge Abarquez
declaring the Deed of Sale dated April 15, 1991 executed by Aida Morada in favor of Sofia Sanchez
was void and without effect; and that the Order dated November 15, 1991 approving the sale to Atty.
Cabilao issued by Judge Abarquez had become final and executory since there was no motion for
reconsideration filed by the parties and no appeal was taken therefrom. Atty. Cabilao then filed a
motion for execution.On January 13, 1992, Judge Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, presiding over Branch
12 where the case was re-raffled, issued an Omnibus Order granting the motion for execution and
dismissing the urgent motion of Sanchez.
On January 29, 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer
of P1.6 million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The
motion was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the
sale to Atty. Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a compelling
reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the property was bought by Felix Uy Chua,
Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy Chua, the clients of Atty. Cabilao who are now petitioners
before this Court.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent
Judges Abarquez and Alio-Hormachelos abused their discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when they issued the questioned orders dated November 15, 1991, January 13, 1992 and February
25, 1992. The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the
Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, alleging that the proper remedy for
respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was already time-barred
and the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of the petition.
Issue:

Whether or not it is an error to bring the case before the Court of Appeals on certiorari under
Rule 65.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners misread the applicable law, rules and precedents.
A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may be
instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Both have original concurrent
jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While ordinarily, certiorari is
unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
109. Ortizo
MID-ISLANDS POWER GENERATION CORP. VS. CA, POWER ONE CORP

G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with urgent prayer for TRO against respondent
Power One. The issue raised was Power’s inability to fulfill its commitment to complete the project
within the set deadlines. Power One filed a Motion for Extension of time to file its Petition for
Certiorari with the CA and prayed for a 15-day extension. The Motion was granted. Petitioner argued
that the motion had been granted in violation of AM No. 07-7-12-SC. Petitioner argues that the
amendment of the Administrative Matter had already deleted the provision that allows an extension
of time to file a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in granting respondent Power One’s Motion for Extension.

Held:
Yes. When CA granted the motion for extension, it in effect disregarded and modified the SC
En Banc Resolution. The appellate court arrogated unto itself a power it did not possess. Petitions
for Certiorari must now be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. However, in other cases, SC ruled that the deletion of the
clause did not make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely
prohibited. Thus, motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Court’s sound discretion, and
only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
110. Olaguer
MID-ISLAND POWER GEN. CORP V CA

111. Obnamia
GADNANAN VS. SPOUSES TUBUNGAN, G.R. NO. 182185, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009, THIRD
DIVISION, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which set aside the Order and the Writ of Demolition of the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) for lack of jurisdiction, and also the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In 1985, petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. (Joaquin) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and
Ownership of a parcel of land against respondent Norberto Ga (Norberto) before the COSLAP. It
was re-filed on February 23, 2000 by Joaquin’s daughters, Girlie and Grecilda Ga.

On November 20, 2000, the COSLAP declared Joaquin and his heirs as the lawful owners.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied. On June 14, 2002, Norberto, together with
Antonio and Rosalinda Tubungan (respondents), filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Preliminary Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras.It assailed the
validity of the COSLAP decision and sought to enjoin the implementation of writs of execution and
demolition.
On March 3, 2005, Guimaras RTCdismissed the case. It held that it had no jurisdiction to
nullify the COSLAP decision, as it would be an interference with a co-equal and coordinate
body.Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before CAwhich wasgranted and ordered COSLAP
to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that respondents erred in filing a petition for
certiorari before RTC because they did not directly file it withCA. Nevertheless, suspension of the
rules on appeal was warranted, considering respondents’ substantive rights far outweighs any
procedural lapse.
Moreover, CA held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
since its jurisdiction over land disputes is limited only to those involving public lands or those
covered by a specific license or grant from the government. In this case, the records do not show
that the parcel of land is public land. Thus, the determination of ownership and possession of said lot
belonged to the regular courts.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in relaxing the rules on appeal considering respondents’
failure to avail the proper remedy before CA instead?
RULING:
No. We find no reversible error in the CA decision. The failure of respondents to properly appeal
from the COSLAP decision before the appellate court was not fatal to the petition for certiorarithat
they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court remained
available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.
In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners’
complaint. The disputed lot was not shown to be public land and the nature of the dispute is not
among those which fall under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Executive Order No. 561 enumerates
the instances when COSLAP may exercise adjudicatory functions. Administrative agencies like
COSLAP are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted
to it by its enabling statute. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute
or problem.
Thus, the COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public lands or lands of the
public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease
agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant.However, the lot subject of the instant
petition was not shown to fall under any of these categories of land and appears to be a private

unregistered land. Since the COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the land dispute between petitioners
and respondents, the judgment it rendered on the case is null and void.
A void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time. It is thus
clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of respondents’ petition for certiorari
as the judgment of the COSLAP could not have attained finality.
112. Marcos
Bank of Commerce V. Radio Philippines Network—Rule 65 Petition for Certiotari recognized

exceptions to its filing without a prior MR of the appealed order or judgment.
FACTS:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) and Bank of Commerce (Bancommerce) entered into a Purchase
and Assumption Agreement whereby the former will sell its specified assets and liabilities to the
latter. The Agreement is subject to the condition, as per requested by Bancommerce that it shall be
approved first by BSP, and that they shall set up an escrow fund deposit in Metrobank. BSP
approved the Agreement, and as agreed TRB place 50 million pesos in the escrow fund.

In the one case involving TBR and RPN, the SC ordered TRB to pay RPN damages in the
amount 9 million plus interest. RPN instead of pursuing a levy in execution of the said amount on
escrow fund in Metrobank, it filed a Supplemental Motion for Execution where TRB was described
as Bancommerce based on the assumption that TRB had been merged into Bancommerce.
Bancommerce opposed such Motion. It filed a Special Appearance with Opposition and
questioned RTC jurisdiction, and denying that there was a merger happened between
Bancommrce and TRB.
RTC- issued a writ of execution and ruled that there was a merger/consolidation in the guise
of purchase. This prompted Bancommerce to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
CA- denied the Petition for Certiorari. Ruled that the Agreement was a mere tool to
effectuate merger/consolidation.
RPN filed with RTC a motion to cause the issuance of an alias writ of execution against
Bancommerce based on the CA Decision. The RTC granted 8 such motion on Feb. 19, 2010 on the
premise that CA allowed the execution on the assets of Bancommerce acquired form TRB under the
Agreement.
Bancommerce sought reconsideration of the RTC Order. But since the RTC had already issued the
writ of execution, it filed a motion to qauash, followed by a supplemental motion. However, the RTC
issued the assailed August 18, 2010 Order denying Bancommerce pleas and ordering the
garnishment of monies and shares of stock of Bancommerce.
Aggrieved, this made Bancommerce to immediately elevated the RTC Order to the CA via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition based on the failure of RPN to a file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed order.
ISSUE:
WON the Petition for Certiorari should be granted despite no prior motion for reconsideration has
been filed. .
RULING: Yes.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may only be filed when
there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. Since a motion for
reconsideration is generally regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to first
take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal omission.
But in the case at bar, Bancommerce invoked certain recognized exceptions to the rule. It had to
forego the filing of the required motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order because
a) there was an urgent necessity for the CA to resolve the questions it raised and any further delay
would prejudice its interests; b) under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would have
been useless; c) Bancommerce had been deprived of its right to due process when the RTC issued
the challenged order ex parte, depriving it of an opportunity to object; and d) the issues raised were
purely of law.
The records amply show that Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized exceptions to the
need to file a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari. First. The filing of a

motion for reconsideration would be redundant since actually the RTC’s August 18, 2010 Order
amounts to a denial of Bancommerce motion for reconsideration of the February 19, 2010 Order
which granted the application for the issuance of the alias writ.
Significantly, the alias writ of execution itself, the quashal of which was sought by Bancommerce two
times (via a motion to quash the writ and a supplemental motion to quash the writ) derived its
existence from the RTC’s February 19, 2010 Order. Another motion for reconsideration would have
been superfluous. The RTC had not budge on those issues in the preceding incidents. There was no
point in repeatedly asking it to reconsider.
Second. An urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of the case by the CA existed because
any further delay would have greatly prejudiced Bancommerce. The Sheriff had been resolute and
relentless in trying to execute the judgment and dispose of the levied assets of Bancommerce.
Indeed, on April 22, 2010 the Sheriff started garnishing Bancommerce’s deposits in other banks,
including those in Banco de Oro-Salcedo-Legaspi Branch and in the Bank of the Philippine Islands
Ayala Paseo Branch.
Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s Lipa Branch cash on hand amounting to
₱1,520,000.00 and deposited the same with the Landbank. He also seized the bank’s computers,
printers, and monitors, causing the temporary cessation of its banking operations in that branch and
putting the bank in an unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly, Bancommerce had valid justifications
for skipping the technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
Rule 64
113. Marasigan
Reyes v. COA, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999
Ponente: PARDO, J.:
Nature:
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees, filed this
petition with the Supreme Court, as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of
Court, assailing the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the refund of the
government share in the fund to the employee-members, and the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.

Facts:
TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment
the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. It also provided additional benefits to
its members.The transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991 was
then suspended on the ground that there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC
officers and employees. Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R. A. 4537, 9 to which
TLRC may not qualify.TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued Resolution discontinuing the
collection of contributions for the Fund from both the TLRC and the members. Thereafterpetitioner a
member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Audit denied the appeal.The Commission ruled that the government's share in the
Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. Petitioner wrote
the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA’s Decision.Hence, this petition to review the
decision of the Commission on Audit.
Issue:
Whether or nota petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court t is
allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit?
Ruling:
The Court held that Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order
of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the
Commission of Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by
the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission
on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or
decision of the Commission on Audit.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commission on Audit.
114. Manzano
CHAVEZ V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162731-32 April 13, 2004
FACTS:
On 15 December 2003, petitioner filed with the COMELEC his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for the position of Senator in the national elections in May 2004. He alleges that he is one of
the senatorial candidates of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Respondent Francisco I. Chavez
filed his COC also for the position of Senator. He is running under the Alyansa ng Pag-asa, the
coalition of respondents REPORMA, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO and PROMDI.

REPORMA, represented by its President, Renato S. de Villa, filed with the COMELEC
a Petition seeking the cancellation of petitioner's COC and his disqualification as a candidate for
senator. On the same day, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, represented by its President, Raul S. Roco,
and PROMDI, represented by its President, Lito Osmeña, also filed a similar Petition with the
COMELEC. They were joined by REPORMA in their petition. Both Petitions contended that
petitioner's COC should be cancelled and that he should be disqualified from running as senator in
the May 2004 elections because: (1) petitioner filed his COC merely to cause confusion among the
voters, to the prejudice of Francisco I. Chavez; and (2) petitioner has no capacity to mount a
creditable nationwide campaign.
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that respondents REPORMA,

AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO and PROMDI have no legal personality to file their
respective Petitions. He pointed out that when respondents filed their Petitions on 22 December
2003, Francisco I. Chavez had not yet filed his COC with the COMELEC; hence, it is not he, but
Francisco I. Chavez who, by his later filing of his COC, should be declared as a nuisance candidate.
Petitioner further argued that as a veteran journalist and broadcaster, and as member of various
civic, religious, national and international organizations, he had the capacity to mount a nationwide
campaign.
The KBL filed an Intervention/ Comment to the Petitions and argued that petitioner cannot be
considered a nuisance candidate because he is a nominee of the KBL, a political party with a
significant number of followers nationwide. On 18 February 2004, the COMELEC issued the
assailed Joint Resolution declaring petitioner a nuisance candidate and disqualifying him from
running for senator in the May 2004 elections. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Calendar Appealed Case for
Hearing by the COMELEC En Banc. REPORMA, ASKYON DEMOKRATIKO, and PROMDI filed with
the COMELEC En Banc a Motion to Strike Out Petitioner's Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for
Reconsideration.
The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dismissing petitioner's Notice of Appeal and/or

Motion for Reconsideration because the same was not verified as required under Rules 7 and 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and declaring the Joint Resolution dated 18 February 2004 as
final and executory.
Petitioner filed the instant petition but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, there is an error with respect to the mode of review and the petition is lack of
merit
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner should have filed a petition under Rule 64 or a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not the present petition for
review under Rule 45. Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit (COA). In form, a petition under this Rule is akin to a Rule
43 petition in that errors of fact or law may be alleged therein.
Like Rule 43, Rule 64 provides that findings of fact of the Commission whose judgment, final
order or resolution is assailed, which are supported by substantial evidence are binding and shall not
be reviewable on appeal. A petition under Rule 64 must be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of

the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if allowed under the rules of procedure of the COMELEC or COA, shall interrupt the
thirty-day period. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition under Rule 64
within the remaining period, but in no case less than five (5) days from notice of denial.
A petition under Rule 64 must also be verified and must include the Commission concerned as a
party respondent. As distinguished therefrom, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 raises
as a ground lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, of any tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-judicial functions in performing the act
assailed therein.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order or resolution. A petition filed under Rule 65, like a Rule 64 petition, requires the
inclusion as a party respondent the tribunal which issued the assailed judgment, order or resolution.
Even if the Court treats the instant petition as one filed under Rule 64 or under Rule 65, the same
should still be denied for failure to show that the COMELEC committed errors of fact and/or law, or
that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in declaring that petitioner is a nuisance candidate and in ordering his
disqualification to run as senator in the forthcoming national elections in May, and the cancellation of
his COC.
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code authorizes the COMELEC, motu proprio, or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate and to refuse to give
due course to his or her COC or to cancel one already filed if it is shown that: (1) the candidate's
COC has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, (2) the COC has been filed
to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of names of the registered candidates, and (3)
where other circumstances show that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for office.
The Court RESOLVED to DENY the petition for pursuing the wrong mode of review and for lack of
merit.
115. Macatangay
JUMAMIL VS COMELEC
GR NO. 167989-93, MARCH 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Jumamil and private respondent Purog both ran for Mayor of the Municipality of
Victoria, Northern Samar, during the 10 May 2004 synchronized national & local elections. Petitioner
Centino and private respondent Verde were vice mayoralty candidates; whilst petitioners Castillo,
Millano & Francisco and private respondents Aliluyah, Medice, Subiaga & Aucente all ran for slots as
Board Members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Private respondents were all proclaimed winners.

Petitioners individually filed election protest cases which were later consolidated, before the RTC
of Allen, Northern Samar. Complainants cast doubt on the results of the elections, particularly
respecting 7/36 functioning precincts in the subject municipality.
Private respondents moved for dismissal. They included in their Answer with Affirmative
Defense & Counter-Protest/Counter-Claim a prayer for the conduct of a hearing and pre-trial prior to
the commencement of the revision process.
RTC issued a Resolution denying the motion to have the cases dismissed for lack of cause of
action as well as the prayer.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, private respondents elevated to the
COMELEC, via a Petition for Certiorari, the denial of their Motion to Dismiss and to conduct hearing,
as well as pre-trial, prior to the commencement of the revision of the ballots. They also asked for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
order to suspend the revision proceedings by the RTC.
In an Order dated 12 February 2005, the First Division of the COMELEC issued the writ prayed
for.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari, under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court founded on the
basic premise that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it effectively enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the conduct of the case.
On 13 November 2006, public respondent COMELEC filed its Comment to the subject Petitions.
In said pleading, the Commission argues that the assailed Order is not the kind contemplated by
Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The particular provision provides that:
SEC. 2. Mode of review. - A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of COMELEC is the kind contemplated by Rule 64.
RULING:
NO. In Ambil v. COMELEC, this Court took great pains to elucidate the meaning of "final
order or resolution" contemplated by the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC is
prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
‘SECTION 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.’
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory/quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be
a final decision/resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory

order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Sec 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A Motion for
Reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
The reliefs prayed for in the instant Petitions have already been addressed by COMELEC in
various Resolutions. The Petitions for Certiorari filed by private respondents have not only been
dismissed for lack of merit, the former also lifted the writs it had earlier issued. RTC was
unequivocally directed to proceed with deliberate dispatch with the revision of the contested and
counter-protested ballots in the subject election protest cases. Petitions DISMISSED.
116. Linaban
REPOL VS. COMELEC
The Case:
Petitioner Noel Y. Repol (“Repol”) filed this Petition for Certiorari1 on 21 January 2004 alleging that
the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) First Division2 committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Order dated 12 January 2004 (“Order”) in SPR Case No. 1-2004. The Order directed “the
parties to maintain the STATUS QUO ANTE, which is the condition prevailing before the issuance
and implementation of the questioned Order of the court a quo dated January 5, 2004 in Election
Case No. T-001 entitled, ‘Noel Y. Repol versus VioletoCeracas.
Facts:

Repol and private respondent VioletoCeracas (“Ceracas”) were candidates for Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, Ceracas was proclaimed as
the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more than Repol.
On 23 May 2001, Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan,
Samar.On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared Ceracas’s proclamation void and proclaimed
Repol the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar.Repol filed before the trial court a motion for
execution pending appeal. On 5 January 2004, the trial court granted Repol’s motion and issued a
writ of execution. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the trial court’s judgment to the COMELEC. On 6
January 2004, Repol took his oath of office as the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar.
During the pendency of Ceracas’s appeal with the COMELEC and without waiting for the trial court
to resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer
for temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the
writ of execution, docketed as SPR No. 1-2004.5 On 12 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division
issued the assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec is empowered to issue a status quo ante in effect of overturning the effective
enforcement of the writ of execution issued by RTC.
Held:
The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the
COMELEC en banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule is that, any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which
shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. Interlocutory orders merely rule on an
incidental issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be
done before it is finally decided on the merits.
However, the status quo ante Order of the comelec automatically ceases to have any effect after
February 1, 2004 since the comelec First Division did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction
instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their memoranda until 3 February 2004 on their
respective positions.
Clearly, the COMELEC First Division’s indecision on the matter not only worked injustice to Repol
but also failed to dispel the uncertainty beclouding the real choice of the electorate for municipal
mayor.
Hence, comelec First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial court’s
order granting execution pending appeal.
Petition granted.

117. Isidoro
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by
ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.

10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified
by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter 12 ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to
petitioners.
Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question the
notice and letter of respondents;
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech,
petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. TRO was affirmed.
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter
are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the
exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Respondents contentionthat the assailed notice and letter are reviewable
only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution.
HELD: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is
applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster
of jurisdiction. As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
118. Gaudia
G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012
LUISK LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANASvs.COMELEC, et al.
Facts:
Two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a
"Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 2010
Elections. The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the party’s
acting secretary-general and nominating the petitioners as the party’s representatives. The other

Manifestationwas submitted by the respondents wherein party president Villanueva authorized
CIBAC secretary general Jose to file the said Manifestation..
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners were unauthorized, respondents seeks to nullify
the Certificate filed by Derla to the COMELEC. COMELEC granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents’ faction as the
true nominees of CIBAC because Derla was unable to prove her authority to file the said Certificate,
contrary to respondents’ presentation of overwhelming evidence.
Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in accordance with Rules 64 and 65
in recognizing the authority given to Jose which falls in an intra-corporate matter, exclusively
cognizable by special commercial courts.
Issue:
WON petitioners’ contention is correct.
Ruling:
No. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed
specifically by Rule 64 of the ROC, under Sec. 2 and 3:
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on

Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately
succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof,which provides for the allowable period within which to file
petitions for certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus,
while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be
equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days
from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly
provides for only 30 days.
Petitioners filed the present Petition outside the required period. In Pates v. Commission on
Elections and Domingo v. Commission on Elections, it was established that the fresh-period rule
used in Rule 65 does not similarly apply to the timeliness of petitions under Rule 64. The petition
Pates wasdismissed on the sole ground that it was belatedly filed on the reason that our Constitution
accords to the prompt determination of election results.In this case, petitioners do not even attempt
to explain why the Petition was filed out of time. Clearly, they are aware of the applicable period for
filing, as they themselves invoke the remedy under Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65. But even if
this Court were to apply liberality and take cognizance of the late Petition, the arguments therein are
flawed. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination
of party-list representatives.

Even as petitioners insisted on the purely intra-corporate nature, they submitted their
Certificate of Nomination and Manifestation of Intent to participate in the party-list elections.
Precisely, petitioners were seeking the COMELEC’s approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they invoke its authority under the Party-List System Act.
Their submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
Rule 46
119. Dig
LEOPOLDO V. MENDOZA vs.COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
GR No. 148505, February 20, 2007
FACTS:
Leopoldo Mendoza was employed as a checker by the Overseas Merchandising Inspection

Company Ltd. (OMIC). However, from March 1 to December 18, 1993, however, OMIC did not give
him any work assignment due to his union activities. Thus, he filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), a complaint for constructive dismissal and non-payment of backwages. OMIC

denied the allegation it was Mendoza who showed disinterest in his work and stopped reporting to
the office. Even so, received his salary and bonus up to January 13, 1994, negating his claim that he
was illegally dismissed from employment.
Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda dismissed the charge for unfair labor practice against OMIC but
found that Mendoza was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor
arbiter and dismissed the complaint. Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration (MR) was also denied by
the NRLC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) but the CA dismissed
the petition for Mendoza’s failure to pay the docket and other legal fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his petition for
his failure to pay the required docket fees
RULING:
No. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that requirements for
the filing of a petition. One of which is the payment of docket fees: The petitioner shall pay the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of
PHP500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Thus, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case unless the docket
fees are paid. It is clear that non-compliance with any of the requirements under Section 3, Rule 46
warrants the dismissal of a petition.
While the Rules of Court must be faithfully followed, they may be relaxed for persuasive and
weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedures. In the instant case, however, Mendoza has not shown any reason which
justifies relaxation of the Rules. As such, the rule on the dismissal of a petition for non-complianceof
the requirements set forth under the Rules must be adhered to.
120. Caberto
VITAL-GOZON VS. CA
212 SCRA 235
FACTS:
In the early months of 1987 — and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987
by President Corazon Aquino — reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health
commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.

At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the Clinics of the
National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978.
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he would
be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion by no less than two
ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization
Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it
was docketed as CSC Case No. 4 which later on ruled in her favor. Which CSC declares the
demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null
and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National Children's Hospital was not
abolished and the position therein remained intact although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics
was changed to "Chief of Medical Professional Staff" with substantially the same functions and
responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed
to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the Constitution.
Consequently, the resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National
Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon
referred "de la Fuente's claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for
appropriate advice and/or action .
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any
indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensive
that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the General
Fund, Dr. de al Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its
judgment.
He was however "told to file in court a petition

for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court
— to enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of "mandamus and
damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget
Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the Civil Service
Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.
RULING:
Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdictionof Regional Trial Courts in civil cases,
contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not
use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide
claims for moral, exemplary andother classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question
is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is
untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to doan act
subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not
being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus which is certainly not the case.

Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the provision
governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, the Batasang
Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as well as
the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Appeals original
jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance of
auxiliary writs or processes, the Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court should
exercise all the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action of
mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the petitioner in the action in
appropriate cases.
121. Bernardino
Zapanta v. Co King Kr, G.R. No. 191694, December 3, 2014
FACTS:
On September 7, 2000, respondent Co King Ki filed a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioners,
Ernesto, Marciano and one Lawrence Smith before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga.

On December 27, 2007, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered a Decision in
favor of respondent, declaring defendants as illegal occupants and not tenants of the subject
property, and directing them to vacate the same.
On June 30, 2008, defendants’ new counsel Atty. Marc Terry C. Perez filed a Notice of Appeal and
Formal Entry of Appearance, attaching therewith the Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Rolando
Miranda as defendants’ counsel. Respondent moved to dismiss said appeal for being filed out of
time.
On September 18, 2008, the PARAD issued an Order, denying the notice of appeal filed by
defendants for having been filed out of time. Invoking the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure, the PARAD opined that the period within which
defendants should have interposed their appeal expired on June 23, 2008. Thus, the notice of
appeal filed by the defendants on June30, 2008 was filed out of time.
After their Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the PARAD, Petitioners, together with Ernesto
and Marciano, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on January 9, 2009.
On November 20, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution, dismissing the petition for certiorari because
petitioners failed to append a clearly legible duplicate original/certified true copy of the assailed
PARAD Order dated September 18, 2008 and PARAD Joint Order dated November 17, 2008 in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
basis of a strict application of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
HELD:
NO. In this case, petitioners received a copy of the December 27, 2007 Decision on February 15,
2008. They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on February 29, 2008 or 14 days from their
receipt of a copy of the Decision. On June 18, 2008, they received the Order/Resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners only had one more day or until June 19, 2008
within which to file their Notice of Appeal before the PARAD. However, it is evident that their new
counsel Atty. Perez belatedly filed said Notice of Appeal on June 30, 2008. Clearly, petitioners’
Notice of Appeal in this case was filed out of time.23
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of
the court or tribunal which rendered the decision, it is required, however, that said appeal must have
been filed on time. It bears reiterating that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory
privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules
allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly
followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision.
Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such
rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not
to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help

provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the
correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.
122. Bachiller
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND
MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:

Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected thereon located at the
comer of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon City. Reicon and respondent
Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. entered into a Contract of Lease, whereby Reicon
leased the subject property to Diamond for a period of twenty (20) years for a monthly rental of
₱75,000.00. However, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee Foods Corporation
and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises.
Starting June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due and the checks it had issued
were all dishonored. Thus, Reicon demand payment of the accrued rentals and terminated the
Contract. Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions
of the subject property.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga,
Andrew, and a certain Mary Palangdao, defendants herein before the Regional Trial Court alleging
that the Contract did not provide for its unilateral termination by either of the parties. It also alleged
that the act of defendants in entering into separate contracts, despite the existence of their Contract,
constitutes unlawful interference and prayed that the separate contracts of lease entered with
Jollibee and Maybunga, be declared invalid and illegal.
Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over its person;
(b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person on the part of Diamond; and
( c) lack of cause of action.
Also, Jollibee filed a separate motion to dismiss.
The Regional Trial Court denied Reicon's and Jollibee's motion to dismiss. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition based on the following
grounds:
(a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and
(b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13
of the Rules.
Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of
Diamond.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally Filed before the CA, provide
as follows:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition
shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise

statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon
for the relief prayed for.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. - The court shall acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
In this case, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in
its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed
its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in
serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the
respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
Certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered
as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence,
at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be
said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
In ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial court's jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant may be made when said party specifically objects to the service of
summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant,
however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of the complainant's
initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the court's jurisdiction
over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do
with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action.
Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court's service of summons - same as the CA's service of its
resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition - which remains material to the matter of
the court's acquisition jurisdiction over the defendant's/respondents' person.
Appeals in Criminal Cases (Rules 122, 124 and 125)
123. Aspili
G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013
REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA and FERDINAND TADEJA, Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
On the strength of their co-accused Plaridel Tadeja's extrajudicial confession, taken after his
apprehension on 29 November 2006, petitioners pray for the reopening of the homicide case against
them. Their prayer is for the reception of newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that this Court's
Decision affirming their conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening of the homicide case against them is proper, in view of the
extrajudicial confession of the accused after Court’s decision has already become final and
executory.
HELD:
No. The petitioners’ motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the trial
court is not proper.
Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk
of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed
by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
This is the reason why we have consistently denied petitioners’ motions for reconsideration
of this Court’s Decision and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by
the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction
already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this Court
denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial
may no longer be entertained.
Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the
spot report of the police on Plaridel’s apprehension.
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.58
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The
confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and
even gave testimony as to his defense. 59 It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by
the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water.

Clearly, they did not truth during trial. Whatever their reasons were, the inevitable conclusion
is that Plaridel’s version in his extrajudicial confession is not newly discovered evidence that can be
a ground for a new trial within the contemplation of the rules.
Courts are bound to apply the rules they have laid down in order to facilitate their duty to dispense
justice. Thus, their motion to reopen the case must fail.
124. Alipio
Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon
G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the
justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In
default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.
Facts:
While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon
(Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the
Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed
by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the
navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also
mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out
the machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but
could not catch up with Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the
hospital where he succumbed.
Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested
that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the
abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of
two distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like
a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed
instrument like a knife.
In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he
was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they
did not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that
they had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their
way home from Barangay TanodVirgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had
stabbed each other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him
by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from
his property.
The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno
and Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School,
together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching
the dance, a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.
On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman
Licup with homicide.
On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA committed reversible error in
affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had
stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered
evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
Issues:
1. Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-discovered evidence that would
create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
2. Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
3. Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil indemnity of only P50,000.00 is
correct.

Rulings:
1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered
evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial
court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court.
Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with
crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the
public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the
other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such
evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted. (Emphasis is mine).
We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered
because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial
by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of
Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial
of criminal responsibility.
2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They
thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the
application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts
should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits
of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the
imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or
capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the
petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal.
3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are
always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings
moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require
neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral
sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at
P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.
125. Acosta
Flores v. People
GR. No. 181354, February 27, 2013
Facts of the case:

The case on hand is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
Criminal Case No. 16946.The accused and petitioner Simon A. Flores was foundguilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicidebefore the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan rejected
Flores’ claim that the shooting was justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the
consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle
(M16) which resulted in his death.
The accused is a public officer as the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in
the performance of his official functions feloniously and with intent to kill Jesus Avenido using an M-
16 Armalite Rifle inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, which
caused his instantdeath.
Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial.
Dr. Ruben Escueta testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of
Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought to
him.Based on the Autopsy Report,it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the
different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the
clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the
abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right
flank towards the umbilicus. The victim died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to
laceration of the liver.
Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused’s Motion for
Reconsideration.Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not
contain a notice of hearing.Flores filed the present petition before this Court because the
Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural laws
and jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores raises the following
Issue of the case:
o Whether the Sandiganbayan, erred in not giving due credit to petitioner’s claim of self-
defense and committed serious but reversible errors in arriving at its findings and
conclusions
Ruling:
As provided in Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the notice of hearing shall be addressed to
all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a
mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and
executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that
were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is
justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective,
indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his
motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was
properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The continuous shooting by Flores which caused the

fatal gunshot wounds were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful
aggression from Jesus as the latter was already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the
shoulder.Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
126. Yarcia
Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 96027-28 (March 8, 2005)
Facts:
 Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino’s security detail upon
his arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged,

together with several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing
of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China
Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of
Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.
 On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010-10011 acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The
Court thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-
trial of the cases.
 The Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the petitioners guilty as
principals of the crime of murder.
 In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in
turn, requested the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make
a thorough review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case.
 The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorney’s Office, now want to present the findings of
the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and
the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.
Issue:
Whether or not the report is a newly discovered evidence which would entitle the petitioners
to a new trial?
Held:
No.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense
during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather
recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.23 If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of
the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.25 Also, new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
127. Vallejos
ROLEX RODRIGUEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 192799 October 24, 2012
Facts:

RTC convicted Rolex Rodriguez of Unfair Competition. After promulgation of sentence, he filed for a
motion for reconsideration before the RTC on last day of the reglementary period to appeal.
Fourteen days after receipt of the RTC denying his motion for reconsideration, he filed his Notice of
Appeal. Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under
Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (29 days after promulgation).
Rodriguez asserted that the fresh period rule should be applied after the motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the fresh period rule should apply
Held:
Yes, It is now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case,
where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which
is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such
denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal. Verily, the application of the statutory privilege
of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same statutory privilege as
litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from
receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and
incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil
cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases―under the spirit and rationale in
Neypes―greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period rule,” with more reason that it
should equally grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to
liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”
128. Torres
People vs Torres
FACTS:

Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly
blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his
belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the possession of his belt-bag but the latter’s
brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all of them
brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in different
parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the neck. When Espino was already
sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries and immediately fled. Espino
was rushed to the hospital butwas pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr.Salen concluded that Espino died of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladedinstruments.
The back portion of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds which
proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds, Dr.Salen opined
that there weremore than one assailant.
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September
21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, MerlitaHilario. They proceeded to the house oftheir friend,
Marilou Garcia, in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session which lasted until
they fell asleep. They did not leave their friend’s house until the following morning when they went
home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers got
involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of someone.Merlita and Marilou corroborated
appellant’s alibi in their respective testimonies.
The RTC concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino. It held him guilty of
murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in
the Information and duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy
among the accused attended the crime.
Hence, appellant appealed to the CA. The CA modified the ruling of the RTC and found appellant
guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left
undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the
proscription against double jeopardy.
RULING:
An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties." "[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review
of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant." In other words, when appellant appealed the
RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the
prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as
may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in
jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide
as charged in the Information instead of murder.
Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
"Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the

robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing ismerely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery’."
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the primary intention of
appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented
by the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant’s brother
and co-accused, Ronnie, blocked Espino’s car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street.
When Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for
possession of the belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused
joined the fray and stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the
pavementfrom his stab wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victim’s wallet,
beltbag, wristwatch and jewelry then fled together.
129. Tamayo
EDGARDO GEROCHE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 179080 dated November 26, 2014

Facts:
On the evening of May 14, 1989, Baleriano Limbagawoke when Edigardo Geroche, Roberto

Gardeand Generoso Marfil suddenly entered into his housennd without search warrant began to
search the place for firearms but instead food and took away his airgun. Limbag sustained injuries
due to this. The perpetrators were charged with Violation of Domicile and Less Serious Physical
Injuries pursuant to the RPC.
The RTC acquitted them for the charge of Violation of Domicile due to lack of merit but found them
guilty of the latter charge.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and found them acquitted for Less Serious Physical
Injuries but guilty of Violation of Domicile due to an admission that they were barangay captain and
members of the CA
Issues:
1. WON the CA’s decision/conviction amounts to Double Jeopardy.

2. WON they were guilty of Violation of Domicile.
Ruling:
1. No.
An appeal is considered to be a review of the entire case and tantamount to a waiver against
the defense of Double Jeopardy, hence giving the CA jurisdiction.
2. Yes.
It was manifested on their pleadings that there was no denial that Geroche was a Barangay
Captain and the others to be members of the CAFGU, hence, in consonance with the
element of Violation of Domicile – that the accused is a public officer or employee.
130. Robledo
G.R. No. 192727 January 9, 2013

RAUL B. ESCALANTE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION and
EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, Respondents.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations that were filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Samar against the petitioner, charging him for violation of Section 261
(q) of BP 881 (Election Gun Ban) and Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.1866, 3 as amended
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). The first Information 4 dated August 23, 1995,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2074 accuses MAYOR RAUL ESCALANTE for VIOLATION OF
SECTION 261, PARAGRAPH (Q) OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED BY
SECTION 32, REPUBLIC ACT 7166.
That the above-named accused, during the Election Period of the May 8, 1995 Election, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) .45
caliber pistol, without first having obtained the proper license and/or permit from the Comelec.
The second Information6 dated June 16, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3824, reads:
The two cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC as the crimes charged against the
petitioner arose from the same incident. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to both
charges.8
During the pre-trial conference, the petitioner admitted the following facts: first, that he was not
issued any license to possess any firearm; and second, that April 3, 1995 fell within the election gun
ban period imposed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). 9
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
RTC rendered a judgment 16 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
The petitioner appealed to the CA, asserting that the RTC erred in convicting him for the crimes
charged since the prosecution failed to establish the following: (1) the existence of the firearm which
is the corpus delicti; and (2) the absence of a license or permit for the firearm.
The CA rendered the herein assailed decision 18 which affirmed in toto the May 23, 2003 Judgment
of the RTC. The CA held that there was no necessity on the part of the prosecution to prove that the
petitioner had no license or permit to possess a firearm since the same had already been admitted
by the petitioner during the trial.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the June 24, 2008 Decision of the CA, maintaining that
the prosecution failed to substantiate the elements of the crimes charged against him. Additionally,
the petitioner averred that Criminal Case No. 3824 for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions should be dismissed pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agote v. Judge
Lorenzo19 which declared that an accused is not liable for illegal possession of firearm if the firearm
was used in the commission of an offense such as a violation of the election gun ban.
CA issued a resolution20 which partly granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The CA ruled that under prevailing jurisprudence there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearm if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime.
On April 7, 2009, the petitioner, with leave of court, filed a "Second Partial Motion for
Reconsideration of Judgment for Violation of the Omnibus Election Code only". On May 5, 2010, the
CA issued a resolution denying the second partial motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
Undaunted, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE
APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF COMELEC GUN BAN IS ABSENT.22
RULING:
The petition is dismissed.
The petitioner committed a serious procedural faux pas by filing before this Court a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review under
Rule 45, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 23
The period to file a petition for review on certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed
from or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 24
Here, the petitioner received a copy of the CA’s May 5, 2010 Resolution, which denied his second
motion for reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he only had until June 4, 2010 to file a petition for
Thus, the petitioner’s failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary period
rendered the CA’s June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final and
executory.
The Court notes, however, that the lower courts erred in imposing the applicable penalty against the
petitioner. Finding the petitioner guilty of the offense of violation of election gun ban, the RTC
imposed upon him the straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment. The penalty imposed by the
RTC was affirmed by the CA. Section 264 of BP 881, in part, reads:
Sec. 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be
subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to
deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law 31 provides:

Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.1â
Nevertheless, considering that the CA’s June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution had
already attained finality on account of the petitioner’s failure to timely file a petition for review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, the Court may no longer modify the penalty imposed by the lower courts no
matter how obvious the error may be. "Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land."32
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Decision dated June 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 4, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27673 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
131. Regala
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal, Jr. vs. People

Facts:
Marlon Villanueva was pronounced dead when brought to the hospital. Based on the
examination of attending physician, he suffered from hazing which caused his death. The
prosecution presented several witnesses and Dungo and Sibal were pointed as the persons
responsible for Villanueva’s death. Both Dungo and Sibal denied their participation on Villanueva’s
hazing. The RTC rendered Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime violating the Anti-Hazing Law on the
ground that despite absence of evidence to prove direct participation on the assault of Villanueva,
prosecution had proven that the two brought the latter to the resort for the hazing. CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Dungo and Sibal filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari is the proper appeal to be resorted in the
case at bar.
Held:
No. In the case at bar, the proper mode of appeal is ordinary appeal which may be done by a
notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
The penalty imposed in this case to Dungo and Sibal is reclusion perpetua. They can simply
file a notice of appeal with CA in order to allow them to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court. Appeal in criminal cases deals with the whole case for review of any question which
includes those not raised by the parties. Under the Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, the Court has
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction in all criminal cases with penalty imposed of reclusion perpetua
or higher.
Though accused may file appeal by petition for review on certiorari to the Court via Rule 45
under the Rules of Court, said petition may only raise question of law, not as a matter of right but
only based on sound judicial discretion of the Court. The accused filed a petition for review on
certiorari but the petition raised question on conspiracy which is a question of fact that cannot be
raised on said petition. The accused should have had filed an ordinary appeal. Nevertheless, the
Court decided to open the whole case for review considering the novelty of the issue presented.
132. Ramos
PEOPLE V. MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227
July 20, 2011

FACTS:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old
at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust
team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers
who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase. Around 7
o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to
Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers
approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo
saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a
sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the
appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has
been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as
he was leaving the place.The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence
of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a
big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two
pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.After the operation, and in the presence of
the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the
appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one
small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred
pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a
crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two (2)
pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally
received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of
the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the
examination. The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence
of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two
sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of
Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. Eventually, the cases
were consolidated and tried jointly. Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against
him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.In its Omnibus Judgmentdated September 14, 2005, the
RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON decisions of the trial courts are accorded great weight and respect more so if affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and stated that the rule is that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.
133. Pilotin
Garces v. People, G.R No. 173858, July 17, 2007
Facts:

In an Information dated December 10, 1992, RosendoPacursa, SenandoGarces, Antonio
Pira, Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner Ernesto Garces, were charged with Forcible Abduction with
Rape.
On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was on her way to
the chapel when the five accused suddenly appeared and approached her. RosendoPacursa
covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed. He then brought her
inside a nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard outside.Inside the barn,
Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail. Thereafter, Pacursa
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while, they heard people shouting and calling
the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered the barn, covered AAAs mouth,
then dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident.Upon reaching the
house of FlorentinoGarces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards, AAAs relatives found her
crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was disheveled. They brought her home but when
asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in a state of shock. After a while,
she was able to recount the incident.
RosendoPacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as
their defense.Pacursa testified that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the
incident. On the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. to
watch a televised basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to have a talk with
him so he led her to the tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no one might see them. They
were alone by the door of the barn talking, embracing and kissing. They only parted ways when he
saw the relatives of AAA. He denied having sexual intercourse with her. After the incident, he
received a letter from AAA asking him to elope.On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and
Aurelio Pira, testified that they were watching a televised basketball game at the house of Antonio
Pira, Jr. at the time the alleged rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of Forcible
Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to the crime. Antonio
Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.Both Pacursa and petitioner
appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However, Pacursa subsequently withdrew his
appeal.On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari.Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to
show that he covered the mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit since it has been established that Pacursa
forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her.
The trial court found complainants testimony to be credible, consistent and unwavering even during
cross-examination.
Regarding the letter she wrote to Pacursa asking him to elope with her, she explained that
she felt uncertain at that time and was trying to avoid the possible trouble or scandal the incident
might bring upon her, which was found plausible. In pursuing the case, she had to transfer to
another school because of the threats of her assailants and their persistence in settling the case.
Furthermore, no improper motive was shown why she would accuse and testify against Pacursa who
was her boyfriend, and the other accused, who are her relatives.
Prosecution witness Grace Liberto likewise corroborated the testimony of complainant when
she testified that she saw the latter crying, wearing only one slipper, and her hair disheveled,

immediately after the incident. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Herminio Venus also showed that
there was a laceration in complainants private parts possibly caused by sexual contact.
Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
because the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of
rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. Based on the evidence presented, the
accused intended to rape the victim when he took her to the tobacco barn. Hence, forcible abduction
is absorbed in the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Supreme court that Pacursa is only guilty of simple rape
can be applied to him despite his withdrawal of appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and appli-cable to the
latter.
Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Court’s ruling that the crime committed is
simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall apply to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.
134. Ortizo

JOSE “PEPE” SANICO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
Facts:
Sanico was charged with trespassing and theft of minerals in the MCTC-Cebu. After trial he
was convicted with violation of the Mining Act but acquitted them of trespassing. Sanico’s counsel
filed a Notice of Appeal of MCTC decision. The RTC ordered him to file his memorandum of appeal
to which Sanico did not comply. Upon motion of the complainant the RTC dismissed his Notice of
Appeal. Another lawyer filed his MR stating that Sanico was preoccupied with the condition of his
wife and the former lawyer was suffering from a medical condition that is why they were not able to
submit a Memorandum of Appeal. CA ruled that Sanico was bound by the mistakes of his counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-filing of the Memorandum of Appeal merits the dismissal of his
appeal by the RTC.
Held:
No. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases because RTC has the duty to
decide the appeal on the basis of the entire record of the case. Hence, the dismissal of the
petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum of appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner
was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his
memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore,
an outright denial of due process.
135. Olaguer

PEOPLE V ROCHA
136. Obnamia

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSvs.HON. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 171208, September 7, 2007, EN
BANC, CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
The present petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court involves jurisdiction over an
election offense.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City an Information against respondent Ma. Leonisa Genovia, for violation of Section 261
(z) (3) of the Omnibus Election Code which penalizesvoting in substitution for another with/without
consent. That on or about July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, accusedmisrepresented herself to be Emely Genovia and voted in substitution in Precinct
No. 779-A, Barangay 60, Caloocan City.
Under Section 264 of the Code, violation of any election offense is punishable with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to
deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found
guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed
upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding officials have
been found guilty. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction citing Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine regardless of other imposable
accessory penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, or value amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial court’s dismissal order, 4 inviting attention to
Section 268 of Code:
SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall
be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases. (Underscoring supplied)

RTC denied the COMELEC’s motion for "lack of merit."Hence, the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject election offense.
RULING:
Yes. The petition is granted and the RTC is ordered to reinstate the case.
Section 268 of Omnibus Election Code is construed as an exception to BP Blg. 129, the
general law on jurisdiction of courts.
Section 32 of BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction of first-level courts – the metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts – does not cover criminal cases which, by
specific provision of law, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts (and of the
Sandiganbayan).
As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code
specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of the Code "except those relating to the offense of failure to
register or failure to vote."
In fine, while BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts’ jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of
less than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
any criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein
mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
Procedure in the Court of Appeals

137. Marcos
Dimarucot V. people—Instance when Notice to the Appellant by the CA when dismissing an appeal
may be disposed.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dimarucot has been convicted of the crime of Frustarted Murder by the RTC of
Malolos Bulucan. Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner thru his counsel de
parte requested and was granted additional period of twenty (20) days within which to file said brief. This
was followed by three (3) successive motions for extension which were all granted by the CA. On
August 29, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of the appellant to file his
brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration his counsel admitting that he was at fault in
failing to file the appellants brief due to personal problems emanating from his [counsel’s] wife had
recent surgical operation. It was thus prayed that the CA allow petitioner to file his appellants brief
which counsel undertook to submit within seven (7) days or until October 4, 2007.
In a Resolution dated August 29, 2007, CA found the allegations of petitioner unpersuasive
and considering that the intended appellants brief was not at all filed on October 4, 2007, denied the
motion for reconsideration. As per Entry of Judgment, the Resolution of August 29, 2007 became
final and executory on January 4, 2008.
On May 8, 2008, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) To Reconsider August 29, 2007
Resolution, (2) To Expunge The Same From Book Of Entries Of Judgment, and (3) To Give
Accused-Appellant A Final Period Of Thirty Days To File Appellants Brief. Petitioner reiterated that
his failure to file the appeal brief was solely the fault of his lawyer who is reportedly suffering from
personal problems and depression. He also cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30,
2008) and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema)
In the assailed Resolution dated July 23, 2008, the CA denied the omnibus motion holding
that petitioner is bound by the mistakes and negligence of his counsel, such personal problems of a
counsel emanating from his wifes surgical operation are not considered mistake and/or negligence
contemplated under the law as to warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of petitioners appeal for
failure to file appellants brief.
ISSUE:
WON the Petitioner should be allowed to appeal.
RULING:
No. Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, that
the Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the
appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
It is clear that a criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to the
appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the
appellant means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal
should not be dismissed.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show
cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants brief. The purpose of such
a notice is to give an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not
be dismissed because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not
the reasons, if given, are satisfactory. Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the
failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to him and non-
compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the accused for failure
to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the
appellate court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant has
filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he
stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion
after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was
dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to
have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his
abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal.
Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by petitioner and his counsel of the
reglementary periods for filing motions and perfecting appeal. During the trial stage, petitioners
motion to admit and demurrer to evidence was denied as it was not seasonably filed. Before the
CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no less than four (4) motions for extension to file brief, which was
never filed nor attached in the motion for reconsideration of the August 29, 2007 Resolution
dismissing the appeal. The last extension given expired on June 6, 2007, without any brief submitted
by petitioner or his counsel. And even when he filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, still no
appellants brief was attached by petitioner. Neither did petitioner file any petition before this Court
questioning the validity of the August 29, 2007 resolution and the November 27, 2007 denial of his
motion for reconsideration. The dismissal of his appeal having become final, it was indeed too late in
the day for petitioner to file the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, which was four (4) months after the
finality of the resolution dismissing the appeal.
Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer beset with personal
problems and emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the
client. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the
outright deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find
no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. [19]

138. Marasigan
Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
Ponente: CARPIO, J.:
Nature: The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce respondent Ponce ; and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delictand was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
second Informationfor placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases,
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, in a petition for certiorari Petitioner then sought from the MeTC the suspension
of proceedings in second case including the arraignment, invoking petition for certiorari as a
prejudicial question.theMeTC proceeded with the arraignmentwithout acting on petitioner’s motion,
and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
MeTC then issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari relying on the arrest order against petitioner which the RTC grantednarrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintainpetition for certiorari arising from
the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in second case.
Thus, without reaching the merits of petition for certiorari›S.C.A. 2803 , the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner’s reconsideration was likewise deniedHence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in petition for certiorari ›S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366› second case?
Ruling:
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of
his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals
to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motuproprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The mischief in the RTC’s
treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of
his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
The RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition
with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for
which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Thus, petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him
of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

139. Manzano
VILLENA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 184091 JANUARY 31, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners are police officers indicted for the crime of robbery (extortion) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City. After arraignment, where the accused all pled not
guilty, and pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners failed to appear before the trial court to
adduce evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared before the court to
present his evidence.
On August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision convicting petitioners, together with PO2
Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao, and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged. During the
promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to appear despite proper
notices to them at their addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners, the promulgation was
made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against them.
Petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos, filed their separate
notices of appeal before the RTC. In the said notices, they explained that they failed to attend the
promulgation of judgment because they did not receive any notice thereof because they were
transferred to another police station. RTC denied due course to petitioners notices of appeal.
PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Reconsider the November 20, 2007
Order. Petitioners likewise filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration. Resolving the said motions, the
RTC issued its Order dated February 8, 2008, granting the prayer for reconsideration of PO3
Macalinao, giving his notice of appeal due course. However, the said Order denied herein petitioners
motion, for failure to adduce any valid excuse or compelling justification for the reconsideration,
reversal, and setting aside of the November 20, 2007 Order.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA, dismissed the petition for not being accompanied with
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned Orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the appeal is perfected and the petitioners lost their standing in relation to
their right to file an appeal.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and
that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the
party filing the notice of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing
in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear
during the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to
surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the

court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for
a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
shall lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment(a) the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of
these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation
of judgment. If the trial court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be
allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified
and allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of conviction.
This Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
The petition is DENIED.

140. Macatangay
PEOPLE VS MADSALI
GR NO. 179570, FEBRUARY 04 2010
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon
Dama were fetching water in a cave when suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and
carrying a badong (bolo) and a gun, hacked Dama and threatened to shoot and kill them. When Inon
Dama left the place to report the incident, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and
told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her
back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. During the entire time
that AAA was being sexually abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left
the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house
of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her
if she would attempt to escape.
Nine days after the abduction, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by
Imam. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents.
After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap. While detained, AAA did not try to
escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her
captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention,
Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she
was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and
threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's
abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the house of Egap from July 2, 1994 until
December 15, 1994. On December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron
claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. During the period of
their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily
and out of her own free will. The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The
defense further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not
pay the dowry (dower) in the amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's parents.
RTC found Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with
rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious
illegal detention.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court.
However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo, the case was transferred to the CA. The
CA rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case
Nos. 12281 and 12309.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in ignoring the implication of the 5 month inaction by the private
complainant’s mother in reporting the alleged abduction and illegal detention of her daughter.
2. Whether or not CA erred in ignoring the unrebutted testimony of the private complainant’s own
father.

RULING:
No. Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility
of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. True enough, when Egap learned that AAA’s
mother did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and shot her at the back. BBB's
delay in reporting the incident for five months should not be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, AAA testified that she had never seen her father since
she was a child, as her father had abandoned them. BBB testified that she and her husband had
been separated for a long time, and she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC
left their place in March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the last time she saw him. It is very
surprising that CCC, after his long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC
would like to impress upon this Court that he has maintained constant communication with his
family; however, no single witness was presented to corroborate this claim.
Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness, attested that the parents of
AAA and Sajiron were not present during the marriage, thus controverting CCC's allegation that he
was present and gave consent to the marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented
as an accused witness, recanted his earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding, the
same cannot be given credit. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts.
Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as
AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to the accused a crime so grave and subject herself
and her family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged non-
payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to expose the truth, vindicate her
honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves. Neither is the Court convinced of the “sweetheart
theory.”
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the
single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the
accused's conviction.
However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA finding Sajiron and Maron
guilty of abduction and rape. Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the
crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age,
civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with
lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would
readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction, because
the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been
attended with lewd design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the
information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term “kidnap or detain,” the
information specifically used the terms “take” and “carry away.” To “kidnap” is to carry away by
unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away. Whereas,
to “take” is to get into one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or
strategem. Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the
information, was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and
detaining AAA.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual
recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information. Crime charged is determined by the
information's accusatory portion and not by its denomination. The accusatory portion of the
information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and
brought to the forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and
intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised

Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any
other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4)
in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged
AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving
him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained
from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In the present case, although AAA was
not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to
physically drag her to the forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her
life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible
abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron
cooperated to prevent AAA from resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and
putting a piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and stood guard to make sure that no one
would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against AAA. Maron did not
endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought
AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. We also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention.
Prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Penalty for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A.
No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” which was

approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the penalty of death
is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency of his
case and his subsequent unexplained absence during the promulgation of the decision convicting
him of the crime charged has divested him of the right to avail himself of any remedy that may be
available to him, including his right to appeal. The judgment against him became final and executory
upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment.
Damages: AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil
indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape. In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages
of P75,000.00 pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleadings
or proof other than the fact of rape.
For serious illegal detention, the trial court's award of P50,000 civil indemnity to AAA. AAA is
entitled to moral damages of 50,000.00. The baby having been conceived sometime in July 1994,
which was at or about the time of the commission of the rape, logically deduced that Sajiron is the
father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, he is civilly liable for the support of his
offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject
to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in
accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code.

141. Linaban
PEOPLE VS. MIRANDILLA
Facts:
On the eve of Barangay Fiesta on December 2, 2000 in Barangay San Francisco, LegazpiAlbay,
AAA was grabbed with a knife pointed at her thrust by Felipe Mirandilla with the aid of his
companions, and was brought to Gallera de Legazpi where she was raped. The morning after, on
the same house, Mirandilla raped her again. Mirandilla along with AAA drove to Bogtong, Legazpi,
and reached a nipa hut where AAA was thrown inside and got rape again. Her detainment and the
rape continues as they went from places to places until one afternoon, AAA was able to escape and
ran to a house of a certain Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station on January 11,
2001.
The RTC, in its decision, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of
rape through sexual assault.
On review, the CA found Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape four
counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention
with rape?
Held:
In special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, no matter how may rapes had been committed,
the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are
regarded as a signle indivisible offense as in fact, R.A. 7659 punishes these acts with only one
single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how
many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties.
Under the Rules, the Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or
reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new
trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.”
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable orunfavorable to the appellant.
Appeal is denied.

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New Trial or Reconsideration

Abe Industries, Inc. vs. CA

162 SCRA 48 (1998)

Whether or not the CA’s erred in its decision?

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 1

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

Whether or not the petitioners file their notice of appeal on time?

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 2

Whether or not respondent Judge is erred in dismissing the complaint.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 3

MOISES LLANTERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-28421 July 20, 1981

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 4

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 5

G.R. No. L-49223 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner, vs.

The Trial Court denied PCIB's motion for reconsideration

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 6

Whether there was a need to append an affidavit of merits to its MR.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 7

G.R. No. 159695 September 15, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON ASUNCION, et. al.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 8

G.R. No. 145336 February 20, 2013

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 9

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 10

SJS Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015

2.Adoption of "imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by the

Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.

No. The Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 11

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 12

EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196231-32, January 28, 2014

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales and Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit filed a petition

Whether or not Gonzales should be guilty for gross neglect of duty.

The Court declared Section 8 as unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 13

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 14

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 15

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 16

Silverio Jr. V CA AND Silverio-Dee---Intelocutory order prohibited from being appealed.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 17

Ponente: REYES, J.:

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 18

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 19

173 SCRA 324

Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 20

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 21

(275 SCRA 257)

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 22

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 23

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 24

CASALLA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 25

Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit.

M.L. DEL MUNDO ROBLEDO | 26

G.R. No. 165697

Antonio Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.