Failure Analysis of Deployment Mechanism of a

Satellite Solar Array

Yi Yang Liyang Xie
School of Mechanical Engineering and Automation School of Mechanical Engineering and Automation
Northeastern University Northeastern University
Shenyang, China Shenyang, China
emperor2000yang@163.com
Jianing Wu
Shaoze Yan Department of Precision Instruments and Mechanology
Department of Precision Instruments and Mechanology Tsinghua University
Tsinghua University Beijing, China
Beijing, China

Abstract—The reliability issue of a solar array deployment January 1990 to October 2008[3]: within 30 days after launch,
mechanism was analyzed with FMECA and FTA. The main the number of failures caused by solar array failures takes
failure modes, their effects and criticalities were illustrated. A 25% of the total number of satellite failures, 17% of which are
fault tree was built. Both qualitative analysis and the quantitative
caused by solar array deployment failures. Because of the
analysis of the fault tree were performed. The probability of the
significant effect of the solar arrays and the lack of the
top event, the structural importance and the critical importance
coefficients of different basic events were calculated. According
published research of relevant reliability study and failure
to the analyses, the main reasons of the satellite solar array analysis, the study of this important issue is now highly
deployment mechanism failure and the list of the critical necessary.
components were presented, and the effects of different failures
were classified according to the severity and the criticality of the
faults. Recommendations for improving solar arrays’ reliability
were provided for reliability design and structure improvement
of the satellite solar array deployment mechanism.

Keywords-solar arrays; deployment mechanism; FTA; FMECA;

reliability

I. INTRODUCTION
Solar arrays consist of numbers of solar panels, which
exchange solar energy to electricity and provide electricity to
satellites in the space. The most widely-used solar array type
now is the foldable solar arrays with rigid panels [1]. Figure 1
shows the example of the solar array with 3 rigid panels and
its working procedure. The solar array processes the Figure 1. The structure and the working process of the typical solar array[1]
procedures of folding, unlocking, deploying and locking after
II. FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
the launch of spacecrafts. Because the solar array carries the
OF SOLAR ARRAY DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
responsibility of providing energy to satellites, whether it
could deploy and perform well influences the success of Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA)
satellites launch. dates back to the 1950s. It is first applied to the analysis of
There have been many spacecraft failure events caused the operating system of fighters[4]. This analysis method
by the solar array deployment failures [2]. According to the could be considered as the combination of the failure mode
failure statistical analysis of 1584 on-orbit satellites from and effects analysis (FMEA) and the criticality analysis (CA).

978-1-61284-666-8/11$26.00 2011 IEEE 931

 It is a method to provide improving or preventive measures,
and further to improve the reliability of products by
analyzing the criticality of the effects or the consequences of
the components’ potential failures[5].
A. FMEA of Solar Array Deployment Mechanism
a. System Definition
The solar array consists of the following components: (1)
solar panels; (2) yoke; (3) folding & releasing device; (4)
deployment & locking device (hinges); (5) synchronization
mechanism (close contact loop); (6) ignition circuit.
The input signal of solar array system is deployment order
signal.
Figure 3. Reliability block diagram of the solar array[1]
b. Functional Block Diagram
Figure 2 shows the functional block diagram of the solar e. Severity Classification
array. Table 1 shows the severity classification applied to the
solar array deployment mechanism.

TABLE I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE SEVERITY

Level Final effect Explanation
ĉ Catastrophic Cause the loss of satellites
Cause the satellite system damaged, or
Ċ Critical
cause the missions failed
Cause the satellite missions degraded or
ċ Marginal
delayed
Figure 2. Functional block diagram of the solar array Č Negligible Not pertain to any category above

c. Operation Phases f. FMEA

The deployment process of solar array has three phases: the By analyzing and studying the references [1, 6-9], the
unlocking procedure, the deployment procedure and the information about the effect and the severity of failures is filled
locking procedure. into the form of FMEA as table 2. Due to the limitation of
space, the FMEA table just represents the information of some
d. Reliability Block Diagram
main components of the solar array.
Figure 3 shows the reliability block diagram of the solar
array.

TABLE II. FMEA TABLE

Effect
Numb Effect to the Severity
Title Failure mode Cause
er Partial effect upper Final effect level
mechanism
Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Caging pin Locking device
A. fracture Fatigue deployed working position for long time. May cause the Ċ
failure failure
Caging failure of the satellite.
1
pins Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Caging pin Locking device
B. deformation Impact deployed working position for long time. May cause the ċ
failure failure
failure of the satellite.
Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
A. strength Locking device
Fatigue Spring failure deployed working position for long time. May cause the ċ
failure failure
failure of the satellite.
2 Springs
Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Locking device
B. fracture Fatigue Spring failure deployed working position for long time. May cause the Ċ
failure
failure of the satellite.
Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Position-limit Hinge locking
A. deformation Impact deployed working position for long time. May cause the ċ
failure failure
3 Baffles failure of the satellite.
Position-limit Hinge locking Cause the solar array lock failure, may cause one solar
B. fracture Fatigue Ċ
failure failure array failure, and further affect the normal function of the

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 satellite system.
A. receiver Electronic Control system Unlocking Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the satellite loss of
ĉ
Singal failure component failure failure failure energy and further satellite failure.
4
device B. transmitter Electronic Control system Unlocking Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the satellite loss of
ĉ
failure component failure failure failure energy and further satellite failure.
Failure to cut Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the power supply
Design or Unlocking Deployment
5 Cutters the pressing reduce or even cause the loss of energy, and further cause ĉ
manufacture fault failure failure
pole satellite failure.
Lubricant aging; Deployment Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the power supply
Deployment
6 Hinges Deadlocking space particles components reduce or even cause the satellite loss of energy, and Ċ
failure
intrusion deadlocking further cause satellite failure.
Lubricant aging; Cause one solar array fail to fully deploy and the power
Cable CCL Deployment
7 Deadlocking space particles supply reduce, and even cause the failure of one solar Ċ
pulleys deadlocking failure
intrusion array.
Lubricant aging; Cause one solar array fail to fully deploy and the power
Coupled CCL Deployment
8 Deadlocking space particles supply reduce, and even cause the failure of one solar Ċ
wheels deadlocking failure
intrusion array.
The solar array Cause a solar array fail to deploy at the planned time and
Torsion Insufficient Design or Reduction of
9 fail to fully location, and fail to maintain the deployed working ċ
springs driving torque manufacture fault power supply
deploy position. May cause the failure of the satellite.
The solar array Cause the solar array fail to deploy to the working
A. insufficient Design or CCL cable
fail to fully position, cannot fully deploy or lock, reduce the power ċ
preload manufacture fault slack
deploy supply, and may cause other failures.
The solar array Cause the solar array fail to deploy to the working
Plastic CCL cable
10 Cables B. deformation fail to fully position, cannot fully deploy or lock, reduce the power ċ
deformation slack
deploy supply, and may cause other failures.
The solar array The solar array Cause the solar array fail to deploy to the working
C. fracture fatigue fail to fully fail to fully position or fail to deploy synchronously, even cause the ĉ
deploy deploy failure of the solar array and the satellite.
Cannot insert Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Solar Locking hole
11 Deformation Impact the caging pin deployed working position for long time. May cause the Ċ
panels out of shape
into the hole failure of the satellite.

B. CA of Solar Array Deployment Mechanism Product criticality Cr is the probability of product failure
a. Criticality Classification under specific severity level, operation stage and working
Table 3 shows the criticality classification applied to the patterns[7]. Its value is the sum of the failure criticalities Cmj
solar array deployment mechanism. under all the severity levels, Cr can be calculated as:
TABLE III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE CRITICALITY n n
Cr = ¦ Cmj = ¦ λ pα j β j t (2-2)
Level Criticality definition Failure mode criticality Cm
j =1 j =1
A Frequent ˚1×10-3
B Probable 1×10-4̚1×10-3 In the formula, j is the j-th product failure mode under
C Occasional 1×10-5̚1×10-4 specific severity; n is probable product failure mode number
D Remote 1×10-6̚1×10-5 under specific severity; Ȝp, Įj, ȕj, t are the same as (2-1).
E Imporbable ˘1×10-6
Because of the complex failure mechanism and the cost of
b. Criticality Analysis the spacecraft mechanism reliability analysis, such experiment
The calculation of the quantitative analysis for FMECA of large amount samples is impossible. And because of secrecy
calls for the data of basic failure rate Ȝp, conditional probability or other reasons, it is difficult to obtain data like the failure rate
ȕ and failure mode ratio Į. On the basis of all the data above, of every solar array component. Therefore, we recommend
the failure mode criticality Cm is calculated. The failure mode “Experts Grading Method” from the point of engineering
criticality Cm means the probability of one failure mode under practicability and convenience. Considering the failure rates of
specific severity, and it is part of product criticality under solar array components are very low, we use the failure
specific severity[7]. The Cm of the j-th failure mode can be probability level evaluation standard in the reference [10]. This
calculated as: standard, as table 4 shows, is one of the most widely-used
international standards. After the evaluation of every failure,
Cmj = ȜpĮjȕjt (2-1) finished the CA table and calculated the failure mode criticality
In the formula, Ȝp is the product failure rate; Įj is the Cm and product criticality Cr of every failure.
frequency ratio of the j-th failure mode; ȕj is the conditional
TABLE IV. EVALUATION STANDARD
probability of the j-th failure mode; t is the mission phase
Level Standard Level Standard
duration.
1 1ppm 6 5000ppm
2 50ppm 7 10000ppm
3 100ppm 8 50000ppm
4 500ppm 9 100000ppm
5 1000ppm 10 500000ppm

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 TABLE V. CA TABLE
Criticality calculation
Numb Criticality
Title Failure mode Failure rate Effect probability Failure Working Failure mode Product
er code
Ȝp(10-6h-1) of failure rate ȕ mode rate Į time t criticality Cm severity Cr
A. fracture 100 1.000 0.400 1.00 4.000E-05 4.000E-05/Ċ Ċ/ C
1 Caging pins
B. deformation 500 0.700 0.600 1.00 2.100E-04 2.100E-04/ċ ċ/B
A. strength failure 1000 0.700 0.900 1.00 6.300E-04 5.000E-06/Ċ ċ/ B
2 Springs
B. fracture 50 1.000 0.100 1.00 5.000E-06 6.300E-04/ċ Ċ/ D
A. deformation 1000 0.600 0.900 1.00 5.400E-04 9.500E-06/Ċ ċ/ B
3 Baffles
B. fracture 100 0.950 0.100 1.00 9.500E-06 5.400E-04/ċ Ċ/ D
A. receiver failure 50 1.000 0.500 1.00 2.500E-05 ĉ/C
4 Signal device 5.000E-05/ĉ
B. transmitter failure 50 1.000 0.500 1.00 2.500E-05 ĉ/C
5 Cutters Failure to cut the pressing poles 100 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.000E-04 1.000E-04/ĉ ĉ/B
6 Hinges Deadlocking 100 1.000 0.250 1.00 2.500E-05 2.500E-05/Ċ Ċ/ C
7 Cable pulleys Deadlocking 500 1.000 0.200 1.00 1.000E-04 1.000E-04/Ċ Ċ/B
8 Coupled wheels Deadlocking 100 1.000 0.150 1.00 1.500E-05 1.500E-05/Ċ Ċ/C
9. Torsion springs Insufficient driving torque 1000 0.900 1.000 1.00 9.000E-04 9.000E-04/Ċ Ċ/ B
A. insufficient preload 1000 0.900 0.450 1.00 4.050E-04 ċ/ B
5.000E-06/ĉ
10 Cables B. deformation 1000 0.800 0.450 1.00 3.600E-04 ċ/ B
7.650E-04/ċ
C. fracture 50 1.000 0.100 1.00 5.000E-06 ĉ/D
11 Solar panels Deformation 1000 0.950 1.000 1.00 9.500E-04 9.500E-04/Ċ Ċ/ B

c. Criticality Matrix III. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF SOLAR ARRAY

DEPLOYMENT
Figure 4 shows the criticality matrix with every failure
criticality code in it. The matrix represents the importance of Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an important method to
every failure according to its severity and criticality. evaluate the reliability and safety of a complex system[4]. This
method focuses on one incident that hopes not to happen. It
System: solar array ȕ=1ˈt=1
A finds direct and indirect reasons that result in this incident with
1E-3 step-by-step analysis from top to bottom. The analysis needs to
B 1B,2A,3A, 7,9,11 5 build the logical connection and present the fault tree diagram,
1E-4 10A,10B
coupled with quantitative analysis. This method can be used by
Criticality

C 1A, 8,6 4A, 4B

1E-5 designers, operators and supervisors to analyze the system
D 2B, 3B, 10c failures efficiently [5].
1E-6
E A. Fault Tree Model of the Solar Array Deployment
1E-7 Mechanism
Č ċ Ċ ĉ
Severity The solar array deployment failure includes unlocking
Figure 4. Matrix of criticality failure, deployment failure and locking failure. Because all the
C. Solar Array Deployment Mechanism FMECA Conclusion procedures complete in a short time, the failure rate has nothing
to do with the working time of the satellite. Therefore, the
At the final analysis procedure of FMECA, we filled the ĉ,
analysis does not concern about the elements of erosion,
Ċ failure mode list with the ĉ, Ċ criticality failures. Then we
abrasion, fatigue and so on [6].
figured out the critical components of the solar array
deployment mechanism. The components can be put in the Figure 5 shows the fault tree model, and table 6 shows the
order of the effect on the reliability of the solar array: cutters, contents of the code of the fault tree. We use Xi to indicate the
signal device, solar panels, torsion springs, cable pulleys, basic events as table 7.
cables, caging pins and so on.
By analyzing table 2 and the reliability block diagram, we
can find that “fracture” of the caging pins, “fracture” of the
springs, “fracture” of the baffles, “failure to cut the pressing
poles” of the cutters, “deadlocking” of the hinges,
“deadlocking” of the cable pulleys, “deadlocking” of the
coupled wheels, “fracture” of the cables and “deformation” of
the solar panels are single point failures.

Figure 5. Fault tree of the solar array

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 TABLE VI. EVENT NUMBERS AND THE MEANINGS Nk § ·
P (T ) = FS (t ) = ¦ ¨ ∏ Fi (t ) ¸ (3-1)
Code Content Code Content ¨
j =1 © i∈K j
¸
T
The solar array deployment
B311 Insufficient preload
¹
failure
A Unlocking failure B312 The cable deformation
In the formula, P(T) is the probability of the top event Fs(t);
B Deployment failure B32 The cable fracture Fi(t) is the probability of the i-th basic event in the j-th minimal
Position-limit & locking cut set at the time of t; Kj is the j-th minimal cut set; Nk is the
C B41 The lubricant aging
failure
A1 The cutter failure B42 Space particles intrusion number of minimal cut sets.
The caging pin cannot insert
A2 Control failure C1 In this fault tree quantitative analysis, the probability of top
into the hole
A21 The transmitter failure C2 The locking devices failure event can be calculated by substituting the probabilities of the
A22 The receiver failure C3 The baffles failure
B1 The hinge deadlocking C11 The solar panels deformation basic events into formula (3-1):
B2 The CCL deadlocking C12 The caging pin deformation
B3 The CCL cables failure C21 The caging pin fracture 19 § ·
The friction coefficient P (T ) = ¦ ¨ ∏ Fi (t ) ¸ = 0.0092
B4 C22 The springs failure ¨
j =1 © i∈K j
¸
increase ¹
Insufficient torque of the
B5 C221 The springs strength failure Therefore, the probability of solar array reliability is:
torsion springs
The cable pulleys
B21 C222 The springs fracture
deadlocking P = 1- P(T) = 1-0.0092=0.9908
The coupled wheels
B22 C31 The baffles deformation
deadlocking b. Structural Importance
B31 The cable slack C32 The baffles fracture
Structural importance indicates the change of the
probability of the top event caused by the failure of the i-th
TABLE VII. XI TYPE BOTTOM EVENTS
component [7]. The definition is:
Original code Xi Original code Xi
A1 X1 B42 X11 ∂g (t )
A21 X2 B5 X12 PI i = Δg i ( t ) = (3-2)
A22 X3 C11 X13
∂Fi (t )
B1 X4 C12 X14 In the formula, gi(t) is the structural importance of the i-th
B21 X5 C21 X15
B22 X6 C221 X16 component; g(t) is the probability of the top event; Fi(t) is the
B311 X7 C222 X17 failure probability of the i-th component.
B312 X8 C31 X18
B32 X9 C32 X19 The probability of the top event g(t) is calculated as˖
B41 X10
19
g (t ) = 1 − ∏ [1 − Fi (t )] (3-3)
i =1
B. FTA Qualitative Analysis of the Solar Array Deployment
From (3-2), (3-3), we can calculate the structural
Mechanism
importance of the basic events X1~X19 as:
FTA qualitative analysis includes finding out all the 19
possible fault modes that cause the top event and all the PI i = ∏ [1 − F (t )]
j =1, j ≠i
j
(3-4)
minimal cut sets. There are two methods to obtain the minimal
cut sets: the top down substitution and the bottom up The probability importance of every component can be
substitution[11]. We use the bottom up substitution to find all calculated by substituting the data into the formulas. And we
the FTA minimal cut sets as follows: {X1}, {X2}, {X3}, ggg, can rank the failures according to the probability importance.
{X17}, {X18}, {X19}. c. Critical Importance Coefficient
C. FTA Quantitative Analysis of the Solar Array Deployment The Critical importance coefficient of the i-th component is
Mechanism the ratio of the change rate of the failure probability of the i-th
a. Probability of the Top Event component to the change rate of the top event probability [7].
For large complex fault tree, the minimal cut sets and the The definition is:
minimal path sets are huge due to the huge basic events. Due Fi (t ) ∂g (t )
to the calculation capability and the limitation of the memory I i (t ) = (3-5)
g (t ) ∂Fi (t )
of computers, it is difficult to calculate the accurate answer of
In the formula, Ii(t) is the critical importance coefficient of
the probability of top event. Besides, because that the
the i-th component; g(t) is the probability of the top event; Fi(t)
statistical data is not very accurate, and because the significant
is the failure probability of the i-th component.
digits of the probability of bottom events are usually 1 or 2
digits, the accurate calculation in practical engineering is We can know from (3-4) that the critical importance
usually unnecessary[7]. The probability of the top event can be coefficient of the basic events X1~X19 is:
calculated as:

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 Fi (t ) 19
(3-6) (X12); the cable deformation (X8); the spring strength failure
Ii = 19 ∏ [1 − F (t )]
j
(X16); the baffles deformation (X18); insufficient preload of the
1 − ∏ [1 − F j (t )] j =1, j ≠i
j =1
cables (X7).
Substitute the data into the formula above, we can find the By comparison, we find out that the result of FTA of the
quantitative relationship of every basic event and further solar array deployment mechanism and the result of FMECA is
analyze the main reasons of solar array deployment failure by basically consistent, which could prove that the procedure and
ranking Ii (i=1, 2, … , 19) according to the calculation. the result of the two analyses are accurate.
By substituting the data into the probability importance
Based on the result of FMECA and FTA, different failures
formula (3-4) and the critical importance coefficient formula
are ranked according to their effects on the solar array. The
(3-6), we can get the order of the importance coefficient:
critical components list can be drawn from the results of the
(X7ˈX8ˈX12ˈX13ˈX16ˈX18)˚(X10ˈX11)˚(X5ˈX14)˚ two aspects of analysis. Table 8 lists some components that
(X1ˈX4ˈX6ˈX15ˈX19)˚(X2ˈX3ˈX9ˈX17) significantly affect the system. The table represents the relevant
improvement measures and design suggestions in order to
Therefore, we find out the main events that cause the
reduce the failure rate, which can contribute to the
failure of the solar array deployment. They are: the solar panels
improvement of the reliability of the solar array system.
deformation (X13); insufficient torque of the torsion springs

TABLE VIII. LIST OF THE CRITICAL COMPONENTS

Criticality
Code Title Failure mode Cause Suggested methods
code
Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the power supply Simplify or optimize the structure; improve the
Fail to cut the
5 Cutters reduce or even the loss of energy, and further cause ĉ/B reliability and the manufacturing precision of the
pressing poles
satellite failure. components.
Cause the solar array cannot lock and maintain the
Solar Use more reliable solar panel materials; strengthen
11 Deformation deployed working position for long time. May cause Ċ/B
panels the structure of the solar panel.
the failure of the satellite.
Cause a solar array fail to deploy at the planned time Improve the function of the spring material; use
Torsion Insufficient
9 and location, and fail to maintain the deployed working Ċ/B parallel spring structure; the preload of springs is
springs torque
position. May cause the failure of the satellite. suggested to be 20% more than the calculation result.
A. transmitter Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the satellite loss of Improve the reliability and the function of the
ĉ/C
Signal failure energy and further satellite failure. electronic components.
4
device B. receiver Cause the solar array fail to deploy, the satellite loss of Improve the reliability and the function of the
ĉ/C
failure energy and further satellite failure. electronic components.

IV. CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This article provides an example of FMECA and FTA of a
solar array deployment mechanism. Different failures are
ranked according to their criticality and severity, and the
critical components list is presented. Based on the analyses, we
can find that the cutter is the most important component with
the greatest effect for the system, and the followings are solar
panels, torsion springs, signal device, cable pulleys, and cables
and so on. Finally, improvement measures and design
suggestions are presented in order to reduce the failure rate and
improve the reliability of the solar array system.
By comparison, we can find that FMECA is good at
describing the effect of the component failures on the system;
while FTA is good at finding all possible initiating faults and
This work was supposed by National 863 Program (Grant
No. 2009AA04Z401); National Natural Science Foundation of
China (Grant No. 50875149)
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