SANTIAGO VS. RAFANAN
BAYOT
FACTS:
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized
several documents on different dates and failed to: a)
make the proper notation regarding the Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) of the complainant; b) enter the
details of the notarized documents in the notarial
register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he
had notarized.
On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having
administered the oath but believed that non-notation of
the Resident Certificates as well as not entering the
details of the notarized documents in the notarial
register was allowed. Notation of Resident Certificates
are applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits
related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He further asserted that this was
a popular practice among notaries public in Nueva
Ecija, some of whom were older practitioners.
ISSUE: What is the rule on registry of notarial
documents?
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. The Notarial Law is
explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before them has presented
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification. They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to
enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to
give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding
to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the
page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is
recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result
in the revocation of their commission as notaries
public.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply
neglected, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.
Notaries public entering into their commissions are
presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.
It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were
doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering
the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit
on the part of Atty. Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is
imposed with a warning that similar infractions in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
DIRECTOR VS.
FACTS:
Adelino Ledesma, a counsel de parte for one of the
parties in a case pending before the sala of Judge
Rafael Climaco, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
de parte in light of his appointment as an election
registrar. Judge Climaco, instead of granting his
withdrawal, appointed him as counsel de oficio of the
two defendants in the criminal case. Ledesma then
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio but it
was denied,. Hence, he instituted this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's withdrawal as counsel.
HELD:
No. Membership in the Bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standards. Law
is a profession and not a trade or craft.Those enrolled
in its ranks aid the courts in the administration of
justice. As such, an attorney may be called or
appointed as counsel de oficio to aid indigents for the
realization of their constitutional right to counsel
especially in criminal cases like this where a person
may be convicted not because of his or her guilt but
because he or she lacks competent legal
representation.
Assuming Ledesma's good faith, his appointment as
an election registrar cannot be availed of now when
granting his withdrawal will result to the delay in the
administration of justice. It is to be noted that the
proceedings has been delayed at least eight times at
the defense's instance, resulting to undue
inconvenience to the parties involved.
What is easily discernible in this case is the petitioner's
reluctance to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio. Petitioner is
admonished for not being mindful of his obligation
where he is expected to exercise due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation, to the case of his
clients. He must be reminded that a member of the bar
is a vanguard in the bastion of justice and is therefore
expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience
and a little less self-interest.
IN RE LUIS B. TAGORDA
FACTS:
Atty. Tagorda, in his card written in Spanish and
Ilocano,noted his capability as a lawyer such as
executing a deed of sale, collection of loans, etc. Also,
in his letter addrssed to a lieutenant of barrio in his
home municipality, he also advertised his profession
as a lawyer and even asked a favor to disseminate this
information to the barrio people in any of their
meetings or social gatherings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the advertisement of Atty.
Tagorda through the card and letter is wrong and be
punished.
RULING:  not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must
Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect
advertising and stirring up litigation were violative of
the Code of Ethics. Still, the most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. It becomes
the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms
the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It
is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It
lowers the standards of that profession. It works
against the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully
inclined citizens. The commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify permanent elimination from
the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation
that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the
future. Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.
KHAN VS. SIMBILLO
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
was published which reads:“Annulment of Marriage
Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the
Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs.
Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband,
Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos
provided thecase will not involve separation of property
and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published.An administrative
complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for
investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved
to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although
the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the
advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against
him but argued that he should not be charged. He said
that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t
served in any wayby the prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 &
Rule3.01.
HELD:
Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a
profession in which the primary duty is public service
and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary
consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers
should subordinate their primary interest.Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage
specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of business is
be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears
must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a
lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper,
magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published the contents of which are likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar.
DACANAY VS. BAKER & MCKENZIE
FACTS:
[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the
ten lawyers, asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the
release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International,
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his
reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
“and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead
of another law office.” Not having received any reply,
he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie
is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30
cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practicing under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or
associates of Baker & McKenzie.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien
law firm, could practice law in the Philippines.
HELD:
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law
under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
RATIO:
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules
of Court).
[R]espondents’ use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constituted a representation that being
associated with the firm they could “render legal
services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment”. This was unethical because Baker &
McKenzie was not authorized to practice law here.

ALI V. BUBONG
FACTS:
Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong was holding position in the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City. An administrative
complaint was charged against him for illegal exaction,
indiscriminate issuance of TCTs and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against the respondents
relative for violation of Anti-Squatting Law. The LRA
absolved him but the through the recommendation of
the Sec. of Justice, Pres. Ramos issued an
administrative order dismissing the respondent for
gross misconduct for the imprudent issuance of TCTs
and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law. Due to outcome of the
administrative case against respondent, the petitioner
sought for the disbarment of the former because it has
become obvious that respondent had proven himself
unfit to be further entrusted with duties of an attorney
and is a serious threat to the integrity of legal
profession. The respondent denied the allegations
against him. After investigation, the IBP recommended
for the suspension of the respondent. Upon the death
of the petitioner, his heirs moved for the withdrawal of
the deceased petition for disbarment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be disbarred
for grave misconduct committed while he was in
government service
HELD:
Yes.The CPR does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the govt service. Canon
6.02 provides that a lawyer in govt service shall not
use his public position to promote or advance his
private interest, not allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar.
HUYSSEN VS. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation officer, received US$20,000 from
complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing
that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa
and failing to return the same, respondent denied
misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he
gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa.
He failed however to substantiate such denial.
Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money
could not immediately be returned to the complainant,
and promised her several times that he would repay
her out of his personal funds. He even issued personal
post-dated checks on this, but which later bounced.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility and merits the
penalty of disbarment?
HELD:
Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not
convincing. It is settled that denial, which is inherently
a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by
a strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence,
respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he
made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to
prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts
therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also,
why would respondent issue his personal checks to
cover the return of the money to complainant if said
amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau
of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to
the inescapable conclusion that respondent received
the money from complainant and appropriated the
same for his personal use.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in
private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the
fraud by taking advantage of his position with the
Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has
caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said
office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral
turpitude. Respondent's acts are more despicable, for
not only did he misappropriate the money of
complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts
with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to
cover up his misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of
law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise,
the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and
high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among
other acts, gross misconduct in office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount he received from the complainant with legal
interest from his receipt of the money until payment.
The case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action.
TRIESTE, SR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of
Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan
with 12 counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of
the Anti-Graft Law for having financial or pecuniary
interest in a business, contract or transaction in
connection with which said accused intervened or took
part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited
by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of
construction materials by the municipality from Trigen
Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the
accused is the president, incorporator, director and
major stockholder.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged
decision, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve
criminal cases.
After the petition for review was filed, petitioner filed an
urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan.
There having no objection coming from the Solicitor
General, the petition was granted, hence lifting the
preventive suspension. A supplemental petition was
also filed by petitioner.
The former Solicitor General filed a consolidated
comment to the original petition and to the
supplemental petition filed by the petitioner. He argued
the dismissal of the petition (the urgent petition to lift
the order of the Sandiganbayan) on the ground that the
same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-
reviewable.
In the briefs, however, the new Solicitor General, filed
a “Manifestation For Acquittal,” concluding that: (1)
petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen; (2)
Sales of stocks need not be reported to Sec; (3)
Prosecution failed to prove charges; (4) No evidence to
prove petitioner approved payment; (5) Testimonial
and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner
signed vouchers after payment; etc.
ISSUE: WON the Solicitor General made a
conscientious study and thorough analysis in the case.
HELD:
Yes. Considering the correct facts now brought to the
attention of the Court by the SolGen and in view of the
reassessment made by the Office of the issues and the
evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a
similar view that the affirmance of the decision
appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The
conscientious study and thorough ananlysis made by
the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly
reflects its consciousness of its role as the People’s
Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that
the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it
has the task of having the guilty punished.
This court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the
submitted recommendation that the decision and
resolution in question of the respondent
Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of
justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment
of acquittal.
ENRIQUEZ V. GIMENEZ
FACTS:
On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor of Bauan,
Batangas wrote a letter to Julio Enriquez, Sr.
(petitioner) engaging his services as counsel for the
municipality in its contemplated action against the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. This is
after the fact that the provincial fiscal of the
municipality declined to represent such in an action to
be brought againt NWSA to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act creating it. On 28 June 1956
the petitioner accepted the offer and filed the
necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. Petitioner requested a reimbursement of
P40.00 for docket fee and P500.00 as initial attorney’s
fee. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General, herein
respondent, disallowed in audit the petitioner’s claim
for initial attorney’s fee but offered no objection to the
refund of docket fee.
ISSUE: WON the Auditor General erred in disallowing
the reimbursement of the initial attorney’s fee.
RULING:
No. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the
part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions
enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not
constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification. And unlike a practising lawyer who has
the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse
the performance of his action and functions on grounds
not provided for by law without violating his oath of
office, where he swore, among other, “that he will well
and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the
duties of the office or position upon which he is about
to enter….”
 PCGG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In 1991, PCGG filed a motion to disqualify
Mendoza, because of his participation in the
liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank)
is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be
sequestered from the Lucio Tan group. PCGG invoked
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion.
According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not
take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank. And Mendoza’s appearance as counsel
was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he
retired in 1986.
ISSUE: WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to Estelito Mendoza
HELD:
No. It does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan
decision is affirmed. The matter, or the act of Mendoza
as Solicitor General is advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of
Genbank. This is not the “matter” contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the CPR. The matter involved in the
liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the
matter invoked in the PCGG case against the Lucio
Tan group. The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03
should be substantial and important. The role of
Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered
insubstantial.
IN RE: LANUEVO
FACTS:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about
the startling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for
one reason or another, before the bar results were
released that year and that there are grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects that
underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to the
release of results. The Court checked the records of
the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades
in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, and
Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with
office code no. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Each of the five examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his
subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in
his particular and/or was on the borderline of passing.
The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang alias Roman
Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did noy
obtain a passing average in the 1971 Bar
Examinations.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five
examiners having re-evaluated or re-checked the
notebook to him by the Bar Confidant.
As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that
Ramon Galang was charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the
same University. Confronted with this information,
respondent Galang declared that he does not
remember having been charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in that case.
It must also be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar Examinations,
Lanuevo gained possession of few properties,
including that of a house in V+BF Homes, which was
never declared in his declaration of assets and
liabilities. But Lanuevo’s statement of assets and
liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but
were examined as parts of the records of the court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the
examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam notebook.
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the court his pending
case.
RULING:
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to
convince the examiners to individually re-examine the
grades of Galang to help him pass even without the
authority of the Court.
2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963,
1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,
1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal
case in court. That the concealment of an attorney of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, in his application to take the Bar
Exam is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law as well-settled. He is therefore unworthy
of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
BUGARING VS. ESPAOL
FACTS:
Atty. Rexie Efren A. Bugaring was counsel for Royal
Bechtel Builders against Spouses Luis and Beatriz
Alvaran on a case for annulment Certificates of Title,
Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order.
In one of the hearings, he was cited for contempt for
allegedly bringing an assistant in court todocument the
hearing on video tape and being disrespectful to the
court. That while Atty. Concepcion, a respondent
called on his lawyer, Atty. Barzaga to proceed on
behalf of hisclient, Atty. Bugaring insisted that he be
allowed to present his documentary evidence. He
would then interrupt the court by insisting that he be
allowed to present his evidence. The Court told him a
few times to listen and yet he would speak up, often in
a sarcastic manner anytime he feels like. He
alsomentioned about he is more rather knowledgeable
on the rules of Court. He also accused the Judge
ofbeing antagonistic towards his client.
HELD:
Atty. Bugaring was cited for contempt, sentenced to
three days in jail with a fine of P 3,000. However,
appellate court ordered that P 1,000 be returned as it
exceeds the P 2,000 limit.
RATIO: The Court agrees with the appellate court. It
contends that a lawyer should not be carried away in
espousing his client’s cause. He should not forget that
he is an officer of the court, bound to extend every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice pursuant to
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He should not therefore misuse therules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts
in the administration of justice. Any conduct which
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.
CASTILLO V CASTILLO
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo
(Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her
subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed
the Petition, and contended that her marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any
license therefor, and neither of them was a member of
the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it
was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's
marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married
Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to
Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need
not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The
RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly,
RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her
first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage.
In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the
law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated,
and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled
that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
ISSUE: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage.
RULING:
NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this
is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC
declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves
to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent
marriage to Renato is valid.
RATIO:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at
the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil
Code. The children of the parties were also born while
the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and
1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages,
in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first
paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are
Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a
voidable marriage in the following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no
marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable
marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a
competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable
marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot
be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership
and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction,
while in voidable marriage there is conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish
the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in
the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon,
and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no
express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the
Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza,
and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after
3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity
of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage. A second marriage
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of
nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
REPUBLIC vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.
DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to
just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes
an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay.
NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under
Rule 45 as an appeal to the ruling of the CA against
the Republic and lifting the trial court’s order of default
against Kenrick for failure to file an answer to the
Republic’s complaint.
FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some
parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) claiming
ownership over those lands. Its encroachment resulted
to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square
meters of prime land. Kenrick justified its action by
presenting TCTs issued in its name and which
allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the name
of Alfonso Concepcion.
When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds
reported that it has no record of them and that their
ascendant title, allegedly in the name of Concepcion,
was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG filed a
complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation
of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against
Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer
which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre
Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located
and be served with summons, the trial court ordered
the issuance of an alias summons by publication
against him.
While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles.
During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was summoned and
testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president,
Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature appearing above
Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized
anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not know
who finally signed it.
Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick
and Concepcion in default for failure to file a valid
answer because the person who signed it was not the
counsel for the respondents. Thus, the answer was
effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7
of the ROC, an unsigned pleading is a mere scrap of
paper and produced no legal effect.
RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled
Kenrick’s answer “to be a sham and false and intended
to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also ordered that
the answer be stricken from the records, declared
Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to present
its evidence ex parte.
Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after
which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.
Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So,
it elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari.
CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s
petition for certiorari and lifted the trial court’s order of
default against Kenrick Then, it ordered the trial court
to proceed to trial with dispatch. It ruled so because it
found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative
hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected
to cross-examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’
acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that
he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody
in his stead.
Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid
answer on the ground that its pleading was unsigned
by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading
must be “signed by the party or counsel representing
him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and
authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and may
not be delegated to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance
by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is a good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay.  Under the Rules of Court,
it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who
can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of
the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot
do so in favor of one who is not.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts
to signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims
Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void.
There was no way it could have been cured or ratified
by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998
Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to
the signing of the answer by another “as long as it
conformed to his draft.” We give no value whatsoever
to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given
blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer
was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned
pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default
and the Republic was rightly allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the
rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the
defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been
disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their
own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of
justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in
arbitrariness and injustice[1].
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of
Appeals is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while
the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure[2]. In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the
acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be
made to account for his possible misconduct.
PETITION GRANTED
LIJAUCO VS. ATTY. TERRADO
FACTS:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint
was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco
against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of
an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorneys fees. According to the
complainant, she engaged the services of respondent
sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development
Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house
and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT
No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject
of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-
2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to
appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect
her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she
subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-
2610. Respondent denied the accusations against him.
He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from
complainant was payment for legal services for the
recovery of the deposit with Planters Development
Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Terrado violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD: Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months
effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that
any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
He is further ordered to RETURN, within 30 days from
notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant
Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof
of his compliance within 3 days therefrom.
RATIO:
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to
other individuals as commission/referral fees
respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law. Worse, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading
assurance that complainant can still recover after
Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA vs. CA, et al.
Every lawyer pledges to act with “candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.
FACTS:
The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria
(Victoria) an extended period to file the petition,
conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of
the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law
that a motion for extension of time must be filed before
the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
Where a motion for extension of time is filed beyond
the period of appeal, the same is of no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend, and the
judgment or order to be appealed from the will have
become final and executory.
In the case at bar, an examination of the records
reveals that the reglementary period to appeal had in
fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of
Victoria’s motion for extension of time on April 10,
2001. The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA Certiorari
Petition shows that the same was received by counsel
for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria
had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an
appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.
In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria,
with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul Basar (Atty.
Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari and in his subsequent Petition respecting the
timeliness of his appeal and the status of the
Resolutions of the CA.
Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty.
Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of
the Decision, why they should not be held in contempt
of court and disciplinarily dealt with for violation of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable
in contempt of court and for misconduct
HELD:
As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act
with ―candor, fairness and good faith to the court.‖
Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
conduct of litigation and in his relations with his client,
the opposing part and his counsel, and the court
before which he pleads his client’s cause.
Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility
obligates lawyers to ―observe the rules of procedure
and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by
misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from a
final and executor Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
chose to disregard the fundamental tenets of the legal
profession. In fact, from his explanation, he was well
aware that the reglementary period for appeal from the
Decision of the RTC had already lapsed, but he
nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on
certiorari.
ALLIED BANK CORPORATION vs. CA
Topic. Other unethical conduct
Case. Petition for certiorari assailing CA decision
dismissing Galanida
FACTS: Allied Bank Corporation (ABC) hired Galanida
as accountant book-keeper with conditions that the
Bank has right to transfer employees whenever public
necessity requires. Galanida every now and then got
transferred and promoted. One day, ABC sought his
transfer to Bacolod. Galanida refused through a letter
arguing that the transfer would impede his family
relationships in Cebu. Thereafter, Galanida filed a
complaint in the Labor Arbiter for constructive
dismissal. ABC transferred Galanida to Tagbiliran
citing its Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure
which provides that refusal to transfer is
insubordination and insubordination is punishable by
suspension to dismissal. Galanida retaliated in a letter
asserting discrimination and favoritism practices by the
management. Bank Memo fired him.
Labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of Galanida
citing Dosch v. NLRC which supposedly pens that
“refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such as that of being away from the family.”
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed
Labor Arbiter decision via same Dosch case. CA
affirmed the same.
ISSUE: Was Galanida illegally dismissed? -No
RATIO: No because the dismissal was within ABC’s
power and there appears to be no discrimination in the
action as transfers in the bank are routine.
Doctrine. Relevant discussion in line with Legal
Research pertains to the citation of Dosch. The
present court asserts that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC,
and CA misquoted the decision in Dosch. The above
cited phrase, the court says, was lifted from the
syllabus of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA). The Court in Dosch did not rule anything of
the kind as proposed by the SCRA. SCRA does not
reflect the opinion of the Court as they are mere works
of reporters and lawyers beyond the Judiciary’s ambit.
Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should not
misquote or misrepresent court decision texts. Having
cited these portions of the report, the lawyers in Labor
Arbiter, NLRC, and CA violated said provision.
INSULAR LIFE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS.
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
The company sent letters to each striker stating its
recognition of theemployees right to strike, but should
the latter wish to return to work,they may do so. The
letter listed benefits for those who wished towork.
Some were persuaded by the letter, but others
continued withthe strike. There were also occasions
where management personneltried to break through
the picket lines. The company also offered freecoffee
as bribe to abandon the strike. There was also
discriminationin selecting which employees were
rehired.
The employers are guilty of ULP. The seemingly
innocentletters, when taken together with all the other
acts clearly show theintent to interfere with the right to
collective bargaining. Theincentives in the letters as
well as threats of reprisals upon failure tocomply
cannot be read otherwise than union busting. Such
actsundermine all that the union wishes to do for the
benefit of theemployees.
The test applied to determine whether the individual
actsconstitute ULP was totality of conduct. Factors to
be taken intoconsideration are:-history of relations
between employees and employer;-anti-union bias;-
any other plan of coercion and interference.
ADEZ REALTY INC. VS CA
FACTS:
ALTERATION OF FACTUAL FINDINGS: DISBARRED
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty.
Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he
appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty.
Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.
He claimed that the inserted words were written by his
client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of
the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and
unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the
latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he
would not risk committing the act for which he was
found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the
Judicial and Bar Council to the President for
appointment as regional trial judge.
MOTION TO LIFT DISBARMENT: LEARNED HIS
LESSON WELL
Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that
he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson
from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had
done, and in all candor promised that if given another
chance he would live up to the exacting demands of
the legal profession. He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso
Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael
Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR,
Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta
B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and
Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B.
Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-
Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge,
RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br.
84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br.
86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-
Br. 35, Quezon City
ISSUE: Should the disbarment be lifted?
HELD:
3 YEARS- ENOUGH TO REDEEM HIMSELF AND
PROOF HIS WORTH IN PRACTICE
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for
three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect
on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove
once more that he is worthy to practice law and be
capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession.
His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready
once more to meet the exacting standards the legal
profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly,
the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay.
However he should be sternly warned that —
THE WARNING: ADHERENCE TO RIGID
STANDARDS
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right, but a
bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M.
DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he
is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon
payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is
effective immediately.
ALONSO VS. VILLAMOR
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of
the municipality of Placer. They wrote a letter
addressed to the plaintiff who at that time was the
priest incharge of the church. The contents of the letter
basically stated that there was anorder from the
provincial fiscal saying that cemeteries, convents, and
otherbuildings erected on land belonging to the town
belong to the town. As such, theyare notifying the
priest that all revenues and products of the church
must be turnedover to the treasury of the municipality.
All alms given by churchgoers anddevotees to the
image of St. Vicente lodged in the church should also
be turned intothe municipal treasury. Two weeks later,
the defendants took possession of the church and all
of thepersonal properties contained therein. The
plaintiff, as the priest and as the personin charge
thereof, made protests that went unheeded. Hence, an
action wasbrought by him to recover from the
defendants the value of the articles and therental value
of the church. The lower court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff. In the defendants’ appeal, one of thedefenses
presented was that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest. Thedefendants assert that the court erred in
permitting the action o be brought andcontinued in the
name of the plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the
name of thebishop of the diocese within which the
church was located or in the name of theRoman
Catholic Apostolic Church.
ISSUE:Whether or not the formal/technical defect raise
d by the defendant constitutesenough ground to
reverse the decision of the court
RULING/RATIO:
No, the Court allowed the substitution of the plaintiff as
the party in interest. Sec.503 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that “No judgment shall be revered
onformal or technical grounds, or for such error as has
not prejudiced real rights of the excepting party.” 
Sec. 110 of the same code also provides that in
furtherance.of  justice, the court is empowered to allow  not punish as for contempt of court an act which was
a party to amend any pleading orproceeding at any
stage of the action. In this case, it is undoubted that
the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The
plaintiff asserted the same inthe complaint, and
maintained that assertion all through the record. He
claimed nointerest whatsoever in the litigation. The
substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the
diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation
of the identity of another but is simply to make the form
express the substance that is already there. There is
nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their
forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
We reiterate the ruling of the Court in Alonso v.
Villamor: "A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be
won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts
its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested
rights in technicalities."
IN RE SOTTO
FACTS:
♦Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in
connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel
Parazo the statement was published in the Manila
Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The
court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should
not be charged with contempt of court.
♦Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the
statement but he contends that under section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this
Court has no power to impose correctional penalties
upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only
impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and
has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval
of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his
answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made
his statement in the press with the utmost good faith
and with no intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in
his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but
he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty
or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth
by the respondent in his defenses observe no
consideration.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt
of court? Yes
RATIO:
♦Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does
not punishable as such under the law and the inherent
powers of the court to punish for contempt
♦ That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle
uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last
resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice
are patterned after those of that country.
♦Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision
of the court in a pending case made in good faith may
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision.
♦Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on
the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and
still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he
is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices
from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of
this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act
No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case
of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has
to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I
regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake
of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the
only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To his
effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which
as its objects the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly,
very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the
Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence
the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
♦As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of
the court is under special obligation to be respectful in
his conduct and communication to the courts, he may
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He
is also required to show cause why he should not be
disbarred.
TORRES v. JAVIER
FACTS:
Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his
giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is not
covered by the absolute immunity or privileged
communication.
Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino
charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for malpractice,
gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or
violation of the lawyer’s oath for employing statements
and remarks on his pleadings which are false,
unsubstantiated, with malicious imputation, abusive,
offensive and improper with the character of an
attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was
preparing his pleadings considering that his wife was
included to the burglary exposed in the present case.
Also, he invokes that those statements he made are
privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial
proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively
liable for the alleged offensive statements he made in
his pleadings
HELD:
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for
reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course
of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long
as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject
inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A
matter, however, to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. That
matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case
material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may
become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the
offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his
emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein
Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This
excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is
representing his wife is not at all an excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice of
language is important in the preparation of pleadings.
In the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer — even
one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein
up his temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by
respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-
feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the
mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.