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Management of interruptible loads for power system security and operation

Conference Paper · August 2002

DOI: 10.1109/PESS.2002.1043477 · Source: IEEE Xplore

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Proceeding IEEE-PES Summer Meeting, Chicago, USA, 2002.
MANAGEMENT OF INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS IN POWER SYSTEM
SECURITY AND OPERATION
F. Casamatta, D. Lucarella R. Salvati, M. Sforna
Centro Elettrotecnico Sperimentale Gestore della Rete di Trasmissione
Italiano – CESI S.p.A. Nazionale – GRTN S.p.A.
Milano, Italy Roma, Italy
e-mail: lucarella@cesi.it e-mail: sforna.marino@grtn.it
Abstract – The paper critically analyzes the state of the art
of the procedures to ensure the security of power system
operation with respect to the introduction of Interruptible
Loads. A short overview of the existing international
approaches is presented. The potentiality of load curtailment
as an ancillary service is underlined. The benefits for the
power system in terms of increased exploitation of the
network capability - with particular attention to the increase
of Total Transfer Capacity (TTC) across network sections -
are emphasized.
A new definition of security is discussed as a consequence of
the use of Interruptible Loads not only into emergency
conditions but also during normal and alert operation, in
order to guarantee the N-1 criterion satisfaction. The
consequences of the introduction of Interruptible Loads are
detailed and some preliminary hints for the specific
situations of the Italian Power System are presented. The
results of a research activity on the possibility to use the load
curtailment approach to increase the TTC in the Italy-
Europe section are reported.
Keywords: Interruptible Loads, Dynamic Security
Assessment, Ancillary Services.
1. INTRODUCTION
The use of load for power system security and economy is
not a new item in research agendas [1]. In the past, both
Demand Side Management (DSM) and Load Shedding
(LS) have been used to provide reliable power system
operation under normal and emergency conditions. DSM
was specifically devoted to peak demand shaving [2] and
made use of particular tariff conditions. LS is still a world
wide used methodology for preventing power system
degradation to blackouts [3], [4].
In the new context set up by the Electrical Energy Market,
the role of load is under revision. Controlling load may
result in significant economical and security
improvements. Abnormally high market clearing prices
(“price spikes”) related to high demand and generation
shortage might have been avoided if sufficient load
elasticity had been available [5]. Another driving force for
incrementing load control is the necessity to enlarge the
number of actors in the market in order to make it really
competitive.
D. Cirio, S. Massucco
Department of Electrical Engineering
University of Genova
Genova, Italy
e-mail: massucco@unige.it
Competition among market actors is likely to result in
more stressed power systems [6]. As security will still
be a top goal for power system operation and control,
the system operator may use load as a resource in
providing ancillary services thus increasing system
reliability. Further possible applications of load control
are related to congestion management and available
transfer capacity. Load curtailment can be seen as an
alternative approach to generator rescheduling for
resolving or alleviating congestion [7].
The concept of security also including dynamic aspects
is a very important issue. Preventive or corrective
approaches can be adopted [8]. The corrective approach
may be often associated with the identification of
specific critical conditions such as those occurring in a
predetermined set of transmission lines named “critical
sections”. Once the specific event occurred, some
almost instantaneous action must follow. Load can
prove to be useful both in preventive and corrective
approaches.
The following sections deal with the possibility of load
to be used as an “ancillary service provider” for
maintaining system security in order to lead the power
system to a more secure state or to avoid its degradation
into an insecure or an emergency state.
2. LOAD CURTAILMENT: EXISTING
APPROACHES
2.1 The International perspective
There is great attention in considering load as a resource
for providing ancillary services [5], [9]. By considering
that load is composed by relatively small components
and that it is only required to partially contribute to
service provision, one can reasonably expect load to
provide an efficient service both in terms of speed of
response and reliable operation.
The candidate ancillary services that can be associated
to load curtailment are those related to the generation-
load balance. Although definitions may vary from
country to country, the following list should be
comprehensible for everybody: Regulation, Load
Following, Spinning Reserve, Supplemental Reserve,
Back-up Supply. Figure 1 clearly identifies the required
time span for each service.
It is reasonable to assume that loads respond more
rapidly to control center orders than large size
generators so that load can be used as an ancillary
service under contingency operation. The possible
aggregation of loads under some sort of “load
dispatcher” capable of cycling daily operation with
respect to some price signal and the intensive use of
advanced communication facilities may open
unexpected perspectives to load curtailment even in
normal operation.
Figure 1: Load as an ancillary service provider [5]
The needs originated by the liberalized market have
forced system operators to propose and to test programs
for load curtailment. Examples are offered by Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, California [10].
2.2 The Italian perspective
The Italian power system is characterized by a
significantly longitudinal structure that may generate
constrained cut-sets. Preventing cascading outages is
very important in this situation. This implies a particular
attention in avoiding too large power flows on specific
interconnection lines (“the critical sections”). An outage
on one of the transmission lines of a critical section may
seriously jeopardize system security because of
overloads on the remaining lines with transient
protection tripping and voltage collapse.
In the case that a peak demand is expected and/or
voltage problems are foreseen the service provided by
Interruptible Loads can be used under a few hour
advance notice. The service consists in curtailing a pre-
agreed quantity of load (or equivalently not connecting
it) for the whole duration of the peak. This contribution
avoids operating the start-up of costly units to match the
peak demand with adequate reserve margins and/or to
support voltage in particularly low voltage areas. The
system operator, once that the curtailment has been
decided, can manually operate it within few minutes.
In the case of unexpected events or of severe
mismatches between actual and foreseen demand, a very
short notice can be operated. For real-time curtailment
the response time to operator request must be within 1
second.
The availability of loads to be curtailed by GRTN (the
Italian ISO – Independent System Operator) under
specific circumstances has been recently implemented
and is currently under test. The following table
summarizes the 2001 situation in Italy for what concerns
the role of Interruptible Loads [11].
Table 1: Interruptible Loads: 2001 situation
Total curtailed
Interruptible Loads energy until
31.08.2001
Total MW Real-Time (*) Notified Number of MWh
(MW) (**) (MW) loads
941 500 441 54 19240
(*) Intervention within 200 ms
(**) Notification specified by GRTN within 24 hours
The Interruptible Loads reported in Table 1 are
predominantly located in the Northern regions.
According to the rules set by GRTN and following the
Government guidelines, they participate to an auction
and thus intrinsically provide a contribution to reserve.
The possibility of using load curtailment for
incrementing the Italy-Abroad transfer capacity has
been under test since the beginning of 2001. The next
section specifically investigates the possibilities for this
application of load curtailment.
3. INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS: THE SCENARIO
FOR THE ITALIAN SYSTEM
The electrical energy importation from abroad is
particularly important for the Italian Electrical Power
System. The interconnection is constituted by 15 tie
lines of which 6 are 380 kV lines and 9 are 220 kV
lines.
The necessity to guarantee a good level of competition
in the electricity market has led to operate the
interconnection lines under intensively loaded
conditions [12]. It is anyway of primary importance that
the interconnections be operated respecting the security
criteria widely adopted (typically the N-1 security
criterion).
The following are internationally agreed definitions as
worked out by ETSO (the Association of European
Transmission System Operators) [13].
The Total Transfer Capacity TTC is the maximum
power exchange program between two areas compatible
with operational security standards applicable at each
system if future network conditions, generation and load
patterns were perfectly known in advance. Taking into
consideration these security constraints, TTC represents
the maximum feasible power exchange, which can be
transmitted between two systems A and B reliably and
without affecting the system security: i.e. thermal limits,
voltage limits, stability limits.
The Transmission Reliability Margin TRM is a
security margin that copes with uncertainties on the
computed TTC values arising from: (a) Unintended
deviations of physical flows during operation due to the
physical functioning of load-frequency regulation; (b)
Emergency exchanges between TSOs to cope with
unexpected unbalanced situations in real time (c)
Inaccuracies, e.g. in data collection and measurements.
The Net Transfer Capacity NTC is defined as: NTC =
(TTC - TRM). NTC is the maximum exchange program
between two areas compatible with security standards
applicable in both areas and taking into account the
technical uncertainties on future network conditions.
The Available Transfer Capacity ATC is the transfer
capacity remaining between two interconnected areas
for further commercial activity over and above already
committed uses of the transmission networks. If NTF
denotes the Notified Transmission Flow (i.e. the
physical resulting from the sum of the firm transfer
contracts planned and confirmed at the day ahead time
frame), then ATC = (NTC - NTF).
The following Figure 2 schematically reports the above
definitions.
Figure 2: Definitions of Transfer Capacities
The GTC (Gross Transfer Capacity) is the overall
amount of power that may be theoretically transferred
only respecting the thermal capacity of the
interconnection lines.
Interconnections are usually exploited at much lower
values of GTC because of security limits. For example,
from the beginning of 2000 till very recently, the TTC
for the Italy-Abroad interconnection in winter
conditions has been set at 6,300 MW. The actual value
of TRM is 600 MW. The NTC is then equal to 5,700
MW [11]. See the following Table 2.
Table 2: Transfer capacities at the Italian
Interconnection referred to year 2001
Period GTC TTC TRM
[MVA] [MW] [MW]
Winter time 12316 6300 600
A reason for setting TRM at 600 MW is related to the
fact that in the case of a contingency occurrence in Italy
(for example the loss of a large generating unit) the
interconnection flow is almost immediately increased
because of the intervention of the primary frequency
control. Due to the actual ratio of the primary regulating
energies between Italy and the rest of Europe, the
increment is reasonably estimated only in about (85-
90)% of the lost generating capacity. The subsequent
slower intervention of the secondary frequency
regulation resets the interconnection flow to the pre-
contingency value. The internal generators assume the
burden of supplying the lost generator or some reserve
is to be used even operating an internal load-shedding.
The generalized tendency in increasing transfer
capability can be met by means of different actions that
are not immediately achievable. Examples of these
actions for possible scheduling in the future are: the
substitution of transmission facilities auxiliary
equipment, conductor upgrading, insertion of advanced
devices such as FACTS. An immediate opportunity is
offered by load curtailment.
The maximum TTC of 6,300 MW may then be
affordable still respecting the security criteria if an
automatically or manually operated procedure for load
disconnection is available in sufficient time. Following
any single contingency (or double, in the case of a
common cause affecting an existing double circuit line
between Italy and France) overloads must be cleared
within minutes (10 to 20) in order to avoid equipment
damage. In case of large overloads or stability problems
the clearing operation must be implemented in few
seconds.
In the period 2000-2001, 34 industrial loads for a total
amount of 200 MW, asked to be included within the
Interruptible Loads in order to get the economic benefits
of a lower energy price. Then some of the scheduled
interventions for upgrading the TTC have been achieved
and the actual NTC is set at 5,900 MW.
What above can be assumed as an interesting
experimental scenario for increasing the NTC from the
actual value of 5,900 MW (5,700 + 200) to 6,300 MW
and maybe even more.
4. ANALYSIS FOR ESTIMATING THE POSSIBLE
FUTURE ROLE OF INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS
4.1 A new security definition including Interruptible
Loads
The use of Interruptible Loads to increase the transfer
capacity or to reduce the reserve level requires a new
definition of system security. The classical security
states: Normal (1), Alert (2), Emergency (3),
Restoration (4) may be augmented in the following way:
Alleviated Normal state (1a): Non-interruptible overall
demand is met. Interruptible Loads are partially or
totally disconnected. No steady-state equipment
NTC
[MW] operating limits are violated. The security criteria are
5700 met.
Alleviated Alerted state (2a): Non-interruptible overall
demand is met. Interruptible Loads are partially or
totally disconnected. No steady-state equipment
operating limits are violated. Security criteria are not
satisfied.
4.2 An application
An analysis was devoted to evaluate the potential
contribution of Interruptible Loads to system security,
by considering increased transfer scenarios. In order to
proceed with the evaluation, a theoretical goal of a TTC
increment to about 7000 MW was assumed. This may
allow a preliminary estimation of the total amount of
load curtailment in case such a large transit might be
ever necessary.
A TTC-like analysis procedure was adopted with
reference to the Italy-Abroad interface. The guidelines
provided by ETSO [13] have been followed.
Investigations were carried out for those network
situations presenting security violations, in order to
verify if corrective control actions based on
Interruptible Loads might eliminate the violations. The
following items account for the basic steps of the
procedure for performing the investigation. The
simulated network is that of all Italy with some
equivalents for its Northern part.
a) Base cases
The starting point of the investigation has been provided
by a data base of actual situations recorded at GRTN
and considering realistic active power flow distributions
for the interconnection tie lines.
b) Generation patterns
The import limit conditions have been gradually
approached by incrementing the generated power in
order to cause additional flows. This is done by
decreasing the generation in Italy and correspondingly
reducing the load abroad (so as not to stress the foreign
network). Loads in the Italian system remain unchanged.
An important feature in TTC analyses is the definition
of the generation patterns (source-sink patterns), i.e. the
combination of generators to shut down or to decrement
in the importing area (Italy) and of generators to pump
up in the exporting area. In fact different generation
patterns may result into different TTC values.
For the case considered, the interface is geographically
and electrically quite spread, so that three main
corridors can be identified consisting of the
interconnection with France, Switzerland and Austria-
Slovenia respectively. Four strategies have been thus
chosen in order to obtain a flow increment biased on
each of the corridors or distributed proportionally to the
maximum capacity of each of them.
c) Security analysis
A security analysis has been performed for each new
situation by evaluating the effects of a predefined list of
contingencies. To obtain an acceptable accuracy for the
TTC value, the generation shift steps should be suitably
small. This implies the definition of the security criteria
that must be met (the N-1 criterion in this case).
Security is then evaluated with respect to a list of
contingencies. The contingencies to include in the list
are those which more likely affect security in a stressed
import scenario: fault and loss of single tie lines and of a
specific double circuit line with France, loss of large
generating units in Italy.
d) End of the procedure
If a contingency occurs and security violations arise, the
possibility of implementing corrective control actions is
investigated. Whenever the available control resources
cannot restore an acceptable operating condition
(“Alleviated Normal ” or “Alleviated Alerted”) the state
of the system is declared insecure and the power transfer
increase procedure stops. The transfer corresponding to
a limit condition represents the evaluated TTC. The
limit violations that may arise due to events in the
system are usually classified into three categories:
thermal limits, voltage limits, stability limits. Typical
conditions that classify a system operation as not secure
are: loss of synchronism, voltage collapse or instability,
line overloads, frequency collapse, cascade line
tripping, area separation.
The analysis has been carried on by means of SICRE
[14], a powerful simulator developed by CESI, typically
used in the context of DSA (Dynamic Security
Assessment) [15]. The violations have been individually
identified and further investigated by a suitable set up
research tool integrated into SICRE. Different security
violations may occur (even no violation at all) for the
same total transmission capacity.
The strategies for evaluating the limiting TTC have
been chosen in order to cause the maximum transfer on
each of the three corridors or a balanced share for all the
corridors proportional to the maximum capacity of each
of them. Data referring to a sample of daytime import
conditions of the winter 2000/2001 have been used for
the analysis. In case that the situation with the
incremented transfers already presents a violation in the
pre-contingency steady-state, the corresponding base
case is not taken into consideration for the further
analysis including load curtailment.
The corrective action following a contingency that
caused a security violation is requested to restore the
power system to an “alleviated” or to an “alleviated and
alerted” situation. For maximum rated current violation,
the corrective action must restore the line current within
its allowable value (Irated-max) (usually a 2% over the
above limit is accepted).
The possible corrective actions do not preliminary
consider automatically operated load-shedding. Thus,
the minimum time required by the operator to manually
operate the corrective action is estimated in 5-10
minutes.
The new TTC is evaluated by increasing the imported
power and operating the load disconnection.
4.3 Load curtailment strategies
Three different strategies have been tentatively adopted
in the study when load curtailment is required, i.e. when
rated maximum current is reached on one or more lines
of the interconnection following a contingency. In all of
the three strategies the choice of Interruptible Loads to
disconnect has been performed in a “heuristic” way by
considering those curtailments with maximum effect on
the violation (i.e. closeness and/or area location).
(a) Instantaneous reduction of abroad generation
corresponding to the load curtailed. Generators with
maximum influence on the transfer violation should
be disconnected. The proper changes in the import
and export set points for the frequency/power (f/P)
regulation should also be implemented at the same
time, with the new transfer set point at the old value
less the curtailed load. To achieve the best result,
 the simultaneous and coordinated disconnection of different strategies adopted to increase the power
the generators supplying the Interruptible Load transfer, i.e. with an increment focused on each corridor
before the contingency should be operated. This is or balanced as defined in Section 4.2). The second row
quite a theoretical approach as it implies wide and concerns the feasibility of the steady states obtained:
coordinated actions among different TSOs. “ok” means that a situation presents no limit violation,
(b) Instantaneous variation of the import level for the as far as the system remains intact. The third and fourth
f/P regulator of the Italian network and rows present the security analysis results (prior to
correspondingly a suitable change in the f/P control): the number of contingencies that proved
regulator of the Country that must compensate for dangerous and the maximum line overload caused by
the load curtailment. This strategy is practically them.
effective only after the f/P transient and still poses Tables 5 and 6 concern the corrective control actions
problems of coordination among TSOs. (Interruptible Load disconnection) undertaken to
(c) Instantaneous block of the Italian f/P regulator. In recover acceptable operating conditions (absence of
this way the Italian generation is maintained at its violations) following the contingencies. Results are
pre-load curtailment value and an export error in provided for the load curtailment strategies identified as
the f/P regulators abroad is introduced. As a (a) and (c) in Section 4.3. Strategy (b) is not shown as
consequence, the system frequency raises. The some preliminary considerations allow assuming that its
import from abroad is diminished by the ratio of the results at the end of the f/P transient are quite close to
primary regulating energies between Italy and the those of strategy (a).
rest of Europe: the decrease can be reasonably
Table 4: Results of the analyses performed on the stressed situations
estimated in about (85-90)% of the disconnected obtained from the base case 14.11.2000 at 10.15 am
load. Unlike the previous strategies, this one cannot Increment through corridor F CH A- Balanced
alleviate the power transit on a specific corridor SLO
with respect to the others, as the generation changes Steady state with import at ok ok ok ok
occur in all the rest of the European network and 7000 MW
the flow variations are distributed over the whole No. of contingencies violating 3 4 11 3
the N-1 criterion
Italy-Abroad interconnection.
Max overload 119 115 174 120
(% of Irated-max)
The maximum TTC can then be affordable still
respecting the security criteria if an automatically or For each strategy two study options are examined, i.e.
manually operated procedure for load disconnection is the availability of both limited and unlimited
available in sufficient time. interruptible load. The “limited” cases take into account
The load curtailments that have been considered for the the actual amounts of the load to curtail and their
theoretical analysis are divided according to a location, as reported in Table 3. As a consequence, the
geographical location (area 1, 2, 3 and 4 – with area 2 desired amount of load to disconnect is not always
having two sub areas) as reported in Table 3. sufficient to remove the violations: such cases are
declared as “Not feasible” (NF). The first row of figures
Table 3: Interruptible Loads available in different areas.
Area Load under potential Effectively available
in each table refers to the overall amount of
curtailment [MW] load [MW] disconnection employed to correct all the violations of
1 158 111 the contingency list.
2 359 + 394 251 + 276 Each table includes the detail of the maximum
3 390 273 curtailment needed for a single contingency, thus
4 400 280 providing an indication on the weight of the largest
Total 1701 1191 individual action. If the ratio between maximum and
overall values is large (close to one), it means that a
The total amount of Interruptible Loads is about 1700 single contingency is much more severe than the others,
MW but it is cautiously assumed that only 70% of this and vice versa if the ratio is lower (closer to zero).
value is actually available for curtailment.
Table 5: Cost of strategy (a) disconnection of generation and load -
4.4 Some results of the research study with limited (and unlimited) availability of Interruptible Load
The following tables report the results for a specific Limited corrective control
[Curtailed MW/winter]
case concerning a situation taken from the available
F CH A-SLO Balanced
historical data of winter 2000/2001. 1317 1118 2196 1229
The base case import of 6004 MW, presenting no Max curtailment for a single contingency [MW]
security violation, has been stressed up to 7000 MW. 1170 610 1074 845
The security analysis and investigation of possible Unlimited corrective control
control actions have been performed as outlined in [Curtailed MW/winter]
Section 4.2. Some results are presented and discussed. F CH A-SLO Balanced
1007 1079 2048 1011
Table 4 provides introductory information on the
Max curtailment for a single contingency [MW]
network situations obtained by forcing the import level
860 572 926 627
at 7000 MW. The four data columns refer to the
Table 6: Cost of strategy (c) Disconnection of load and Italian f/P Another element emerging from the tables is that load
block - with limited (and unlimited) availability of Interruptible Load curtailments in the “limited” cases are higher than in the
“unlimited” ones. This points out that more
Limited corrective control investigations on the optimal location of load to be
[Curtailed MW/winter]
curtailed may produce interesting results. Heuristic
F CH A-SLO Balanced
Not feasible 1635 Not feasible Not feasible approaches could also prove their validity.
Max curtailment for a single contingency [MW] Tables 7 and 8 report in detail the amount of load
--- 847 --- --- disconnected in the different areas. The last row of each
Unlimited corrective control table contains the sum of all areas’ curtailments for the
[Curtailed MW/winter] respective network situations, in order to aid the
F CH A-SLO Balanced understanding. Such figures are in fact the overall
1217 1591 5012 1542 values of Tables 5 and 6.
Max curtailment for a single contingency [MW]
990 809 2450 725
5. CONCLUSIONS

It can be noticed that strategy (a) is more efficient than The paper has examined the actual situation for what
strategy (c), as could already be argued by the concerns the use of Interruptible Loads as contributors
description of Section 4.3. In fact the former can be to system security. The different approaches used in the
chosen in a more selective way with respect to the international context provided by the liberalised market
overloaded lines, and the total import reduction is have been recalled.
larger. Therefore the amount of load curtailment needed The actual capability of Interruptible Loads under test in
to remove a violation is smaller than that required by the Italian system has been presented.
strategy (c). The preliminary results of a research study oriented to
analyze some different strategies for Interruptible Loads
Table 7: Distribution of load curtailment with respect to each area for with respect to TTC are finally reported.
strategy (a) with limited (and unlimited) load curtailment The present work developed within the aims of an
Limited corrective control industry-university research activity has pointed out that
[Curtailed MW/winter]
some benefits can be obtained by the use of Interruptible
Curtailment area F CH A-SLO Bal-
anced Loads. A preliminary analysis has shown that the
Area 1 111 83 0 111 amount of load to be disconnected for achieving a
Area 2 658 1011 642 685 significant increment in the TTC of a real system may
Area 3 289 24 1280 226 be somewhat burdensome. Lower increments should be
Area 4 259 0 274 207 feasible at reasonable levels of disconnection.
Σ 1317 1118 2196 1229 The implications in the mutual control among different
Unlimited corrective control
[Curtailed MW/winter]
TSOs can cause some difficulties in the implementation
Curtailment area F CH A-SLO Bal- of at least some of the strategies proposed. There is
anced anyway a significant international interest in the role of
Area 1 860 0 0 627 Interruptible Loads both for security applications and
Area 2 131 1055 115 158 economic reasons that deserve more research effort.
Area 3 16 24 1933 226
Area 4 0 0 0 0 6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Σ 1007 1079 2048 1011
This paper is a synthesis of part of the work developed within the
research activity “Ricerca di Sistema”, Italian Ministry DM
Table 8: Distribution of load curtailment with respect to each area for 17/04/2001.
strategy (c) with limited (and unlimited) load curtailment Dr. F. Casamatta has been with CESI during the present activity.
Limited corrective control
[Curtailed MW/winter]
7. REFERENCES
Curtailment area F CH A-SLO Bal-
anced
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