1. ACEBEDO v.
ARQUERO ● Recommendation of OCA:
Marriage | 11 March 2003 | J. Carpio- Morales
DOCTRINE:
Marriage is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by
law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties
FACTS:
● Edwin Acebedo filed a letter-complaint against Eddie Arquero, Process
Server of MTC Palawan for immorality. He alleged that his former wife,
Dedje Acebedo, a former stenographer, and Arquero were unlawfully and
scandalously cohabiting as husband and wife. As a result of such
relationship, a girl named Desiree was born.
- Attached in the complaint is the marriage contract of Edwin and
Dedje to prove that the existence of their lawful marriage
● Previously to the filing of letter-complaint, Edwin and Dedje executed a
“KASUNDUAN” consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek
any partner and to live with him or her
● In Desiree’s Baptismal Certificate, Arquero and Dedje were indicated as
parents
● Arguments of Arquerro:
a. He denied the allegation and claimed that it is just a mere
harassment and a product of hatred and extreme jealousy
b. He decided to have an illicit relationship with Dedje because of the
existence of KASUNDUAN, which allows Dedje to have a
relationship with another man other than her husband.
c. Claimed that Edwin is likewise cohabiting with another woman
● Recommendation of Executive Judge of RTC:
- That the case be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence
to show that Arquero is guilty of the charge
2. ESPINOSA et al., v. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMANA
MARRIAGE | OCT. 12, 2011 | CARPIO
DOCTRINE:
A notarized extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void.
FACTS:
● This is a disbarment case against Atty. Omaña filed by Rodolfo Espinosa
and Maximo Glindo.
● They alleged that Atty. Omaña violated her oath as a lawyer and committed
malpractice and gross misconduct for notarizing an extrajudicial dissolution
of conjugal partnership without judicial approval.
- Arquero shall be held guilty of immorality and that he be
suspended from office for a period of 1 year without pay.
- Being a court employee himself, Arquerro should have known that
the KASUNDUAN was void despite it having been notarized.
- The actions of Arquerro is contrary to the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees
● At the latter stage of the proceedings, Edwin became disinterested; so he
executed an Affidavit of Desistance to that effect.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the KASUNDUAN is a valid agreement that would allow a married
person to have illicit relationship with another [HELL NO!]
● AS A RULE: Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution, whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulations.
- It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
● IN THIS CASE: Being an employee of the judiciary, Arquerro
ought to have known that the KASUNDUAN had absolutely no
force and effect on the validity of the marriage between Edwin and
Dedje.
- Despite voluntarily executed by both parties, it cannot
give rise to a valid agreement because marriage cannot be
subject to any stipulation by any parties.
RULING: Arquerro is dismissed from his position as Court employee for his unlawful
behavior of having an affair with a married woman.
● Marantal (Wife of Esipinosa) and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of
the contract dissolving their marriage entitled “Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay” began to implement its terms and conditions.
o 1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming
mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin
ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong
gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10
taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si
Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo
Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na
si Elena;
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa
kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina,
habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari
ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;
 4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming
dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;
5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay
Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay
pupunan ng ina;
6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove,
mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay
Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;
7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa
mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at
hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.
BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong
ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
● Espinosa found out from Glindo (law graduate) that the contract is void
hence sought the advice of a lawyer to file the present case.
● The complaint was filed before IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Omaña
interposed the defense that her signature was forged and her part-time staff
notarized the document. IBP-CBD recommended to suspend her for 1 year
from the practice of law and 2 years as a notary public. This was affirmed by
IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
3. VDA. DE AVENIDO v. AVENIDO
Marriage | January 22, 2014 | J. Perez
DOCTRINE: Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage.
FACTS:
● Respondent Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina on the ground that she (Tecla) is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio.
o Tecla alleged that their marriage was solemnized in Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish priest of that town and evidenced by a
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Civil Registrar. However,
the records were destroyed.
● Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts were
unknown. Tecla later was informed that he was already living with another
woman. In 1957, Tecla also learned that he was married to Peregrina, which
marriage she claims is null and void for being bigamous
1. WON the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay is void? – YES
● The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. A lawyer cannot dissolve a marriage by a mere
notarization of the contract with terms and conditions such as both
spouses may separate and live as husband and wife with other people
while legally married, to renounce their marital rights and obligations,
authorizing remarriage and renouncing any action that they may have
against each other. In this case it was proven that Omaña herself
notarized the contract due to the inconsistencies of her testimony (1 st
part time staff notarized; 2nd her maid). Even it was true, Omaña is
negligent in doing her notarial duties. Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
RULING: SC adopted the decision of the IBP Board of Governors.
o She presented pieces of evidence consisting of testimonies to
substantiate the prior existing and valid marriage and documentary
evidence such as the certificate of marriage and birth of their 4
children.
● Peregrina averred that she is the legal surviving spouse and testified on their
marriage and how she took care of him.
● CA ruled in favor of Tecla and declared the validity of her marriage with
Eustaquio.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the court can validly rely on the “presumption of marriage” to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage - YES
● CA concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as H & W
and had 4 children. Since it was supported by documentary and
testimonial evidence, it created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
● Rationale of the presumption: The public is deeply interested in the
maintenance of marriage. Every intention of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony and in the absence of any counter-presumption,
they will be presumed in fact married. A man and a woman deporting
 themselves to be a H&W have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.
2. WON a Certificate of Marriage issued by the Church has probative value
to prove the existence of a valid marriage - YES
● In the case of Anonuevo, while a marriage certificate is considered
the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence. Marriage may be proven by other
relevant pieces of evidence.
4. REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS
Requisite of Marriage| October 16, 2013| Mendoz, J.
DOCTRINE: There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. As long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law,
it shall be declared valid.
FACTS:
● Fringer, American citizen and Albios were married before Judge Calo of
MTC Mandaluyong with a Certificate of Marriage as evidence
● Albios → RTC: declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer.
o Alleged that after marriage, they immediately separate and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had an
intention to enter a married state or comply with essential marital
obligation
o Marriage = made in jest = null and void ab initio
● When summons was served on Friger, he did not file his answer
● RTC RULING: Marriage void ab initio
o Reason: Parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it
▪ Parties married each other for convenience only for Albios
to acquire American citizenship
▪ Albios agreed to pay him 2K usd and after the ceremony
the parties went separate ways
▪ Fringer never contacted her nor processed her citizenship
and so Albios never paid him
● OSG → Appeal → CA
● CA RULING: Affirmed RTC
o Reason: Essential requisite of consent was lacking
▪ The parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest.
▪ Parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
RULING: The establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina (present in the marriage ceremony), Climaco and Tecla and the documentary evidence
of the birth of the 4 children as a result of their cohabitation.
▪ Purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios
to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of 2K usd
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent? --- No,
Respondent’s marriage is not void
● Art. 2 of the FC, for consent to be valid, it must be 1) freely given and 1)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer
○ A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
○ Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.
○ Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
○ heir understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism
● Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
✔ Real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent.
✔ Conscious and intelligent: they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.
✔ Consent was freely given → conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage.
✔ Clear intention → enter into marriage to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship.
✔ full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
● CA is wrong because a marriage in jest is complete absence of consent.
Contrary to this case where consent is present.
● See doctrine
RULING: Though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be
valid and subsisting.
Notes:
Albios has made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
5. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE
Requisites of Marriage | July 15, 2015 | C.J. Sereno
DOCTRINE:
In order for a marriage to be valid, a marriage license is essential. The only exception
to this is when the husband and wife had cohabited for at least 5 years without any
legal impediment to marry.
FACTS:
● Petitioner and Santos got married on July 1997, 4 months after the date they
were charged for bigamy.
● According to the prosecution, Santos had been married to Galang (private
complainant) since June 1974 and that Petitioner knew of such fact starting
when Galang met Petitioner as early as March 1997 and introduced herself
as Santos’ wife.
● As her defense, Petitioner argues that she could not be convicted of bigamy
since her marriage with Santos was void for lacking a marriage license.
● The RTC convicted her, finding her defense untenable considering that her
marriage certificate indicated that a marriage license is no longer necessary
as they (pet. and Santos) had been cohabiting for at least 5 years, as provided
by Art. 34 of the Family Code.
● The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON THE CONDITIONS FOR APPLYING EXCEPTION PROVIDED BY
ART 34 OF THE FAM CODE HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH - NO
● NO, the conditions have not been complied with. According to Art. 34,
No license is needed for a man and a woman who had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years without any legal impediment to
marry. It also requires that the parties must state the particular fact in an
affidavit under oath and that the solemnizing officer has ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and similarly indicate the same
in an affidavit under oath. In the present case, there is no question that
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
pet’s marriage with Santos lacked a marriage license, however their
marriage certificate indicated that such license is no longer necessary
since they had been cohabiting for at least 5 years.
● The Court, however, finds that after a review of the records, pet and
Santos failed to meet the conditions under Art. 34, particularly the
period of cohabiting for 5 years. Based on the testimonies adduced
during trial, Santos and pet first met sometime in 1993 but their
courtship only 6 months before their marriage in July 1997. During the
courtship stage, Santos would visit pet. in the house of her in-laws.
Clearly then, not only were they (Santos and pet) not living together as
husband and wife but also they had only known each other for only less
than 4 years hence Art. 34 does not apply. Therefore, the second
marriage is void.
2. WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF BIGAMY - YES
● Despite the finding that Petitioner’s marriage with Santos is void for
lack of marriage license, Petitioner is still liable for bigamy. It is
undisputed that one of the key elements for the prosecution of bigamy
is that the second marriage is valid however the same cannot be of help
to petitioner in this case.
● Clearly, petitioner and Santos misrepresented themselves as having
been cohabiting for at least 5 years before the solemnizing officer which
in turn allowed them to get married. This illegal act, according to the
SC, cannot be used by pet. to escape prosecution for bigamy. Indeed in
the case of Tenebro v. CA states: “the State's penal laws on bigamy
should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.”

6. RONULO v. PEOPLE
Requisites of Marriage| July 02, 2014 | Brion, J
DOCTRINE:
No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before
the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife
FACTS:
● Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating
priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage license.
● As a result, Joey, along with his parents, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church
and requested petitioner to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate
● Petitioner then conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the
bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of
their invited guests
● An information for violation of Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, was filed
against the petitioner for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
● Petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his
act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage
as contemplated by law
● Petitioner argues that the RPC vaguely defines what is an illegal marriage and
likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
7. BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN
Marriage/Requisites of Marriage | July 3, 2013 | Carpio
DOCTRINE: Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without
a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be
void from the beginning.”
RULING: For contracting a marriage with a man who is still married, petitioner is
guilty of bigamy
1. WON petitioner conducted an illegal marriage – YES
● The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony"
which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
● While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically
define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Arts. 3(3) and 6 of FC are clear on these matters. It
provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Art. 6 of the FC and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
● Under Art. 3(3) of the FC, one of the essential requisites of marriage
is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.
● Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony
despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of
marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of
these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
RULING: petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law
but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
FACTS:
● Benjamin was married to Azucena Allegre on September 10, 1973. In 1979,
Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin’s family.
● In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
 ● On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to
an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
● The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada.
● She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence.
● Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage.
● Trial Court ruled in favor Benjamin. Since there was no valid marriage
license recorded with the local civil registrar then the second marriage was
void and no bigamy was commited.
● CA Affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the second marriage was void ab initio- Yes
● First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of
their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin
and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
● It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office.
● Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
“shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
8. KHO v. REPUBLIC
Requisites of Marriage | June 1, 2016 | Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
FACTS:
● The present petition arose from the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage filed by petitioner w/ the RTC. Pertinent portion of the petition allege
as follows:
o On May 31, 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned the then clerk in the office
of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520
which made their marriage void ab initio.
2. WON Benjamin committed bigamy- NO
● For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.
● In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and
Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Benjamin and Sally is void ab initio and no bgamy was committed.
NOTE:
Related provisions
Other things the Court may have said
between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around
midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
o Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a
marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3 am of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza
which was just beside the church wherein the said couple was married.
o Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforesaid clerk of the
treasurer’s office was told to obtain the pertinent paper in the afternoon of
May 31 , 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up
to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1,
1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby
rendering the marriage null and void for want of an essential requisite.
● Among the pieces of the evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar which attested to the fact that the said
 has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent w/ respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
● RTC rendered its decision granting the petition.
● On appeal, , the CA held reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that since a
marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that
petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was
issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not
invalidate the parties’ marriage.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON there was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent – NO
● The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs
their union.
Petitioner and respondent’s marriage was celebrated without one of the formal
requisites of marriage which is a marriage license.
● Art. 53 of the Old Civil Code requires as one of the essential requisites of
marriage the presence of a marriage license. This requirement, however,
also admits of an exception – a marriage of exceptional character. (See
note).
● Petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
● Article 80(3) of the Old Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void.
● The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the
Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity
to contract marriage.
9. NIÑAL, et. al, v. BAYADOG
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
the exception on the marriage license requirement requires that the cohabitation be
like that of a husband and wife and for a period of 5 years which must be
continuous and exclusive.
FACTS:
● Pepito was married to Teodulfa on september 26, 1974. However on april 24,
1985, Pepito shot Teodulfa causing her death.
● Thereafter, 1 year and 9 months after Teodulfa’s death, Pepito and Norma
got married without a marriage license.
Presumed validity of marriage had been overcome by petitioner, thus, the burden of
proving validity thereof was shifted to respondent which he failed to do so.
● In Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. It was further held that
the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license
had been secured.
● In this case, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage
license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972.”
● Based on this Certification, coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no
valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
● Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple
defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not
affect the validity of the marriage.
RULING: As the marriage license, a formall requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage
of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
NOTE:
Marriages of exceptional character are covered by Arts. 72-79 of the Old Civil Code. These are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in
remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
in lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that
o
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
● On february 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
o Petitioners (children of Pepito and Teodulfa) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage claiming that it was void
for lack of a marriage license.
o Norma filed a MTD on the ground of no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment
of marriage under article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant? YES.
 ● The code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Only parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
2. WON the 2nd marriage is void? YES.
- the 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is
the Civil COde which was the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
- according to the article 53 of the CC - a valid marriage
license is a requisite for marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void
- However there are several instances recognized by the
CC wherein a marriage license may be dispensed with,
one of which is article 76 - a marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together for 5 years as husband
and wife exclusively before the marriage.
RULING: SInce the cohabitation between the 2 parties was less than 5 years and was not
exclusive as there was a legal impediment to marry - then the 5 year period required by law is
not complied with.
10. REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
Requisites of Marriage|March 28, 2008| Chico-Nazario, J.
DOCTRINE: The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had,
since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It
is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character.
FACTS:
● On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City
through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
● Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31,
1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then
on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan,
Laguna. (An admin case was also filed against Jose and Rufina as they
were employees of NSO)
- The court said that the 5 year period should be both exclusive -
meaning no 3rd party was invlolved AT ANY TIME within the 5
years and continuous - that it is unbroken.
- In this case the court said that the 5 year period was not complied
with because from the time the first marriage was dissolved, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Assuming that Pepito and hist 1st
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma
had started living with each other for 5 years, the fact remains
that their 5 years cohabitation was not the one contempalted by
law as it should be a perfect union valid in aw but rendered
imperfect only by the basence of a marriage contract.
● In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing
of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
● He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through
fraud.
● RTC Decision: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the testimonies
and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible and found
his claims belied by the fact that he listed Felisa in his SALN a year after the
date he said to have discovered the fraud and
 ● CA Ruling: Initially, it did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed an Mr. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the New Civil Code
were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that
the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained
that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false. The CA reversed itself.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the marriage between Felisa and Jose is void ab initio.
YES. It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that
"they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union,
they desire to marry each other.
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency
but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under
Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
SC: CA decision affirmed. The marriage declared void ab initio.
11. LLAVE v. REPUBLIC, et al.
Requisites of Marriage| March 30, 2011 | J. Del Castillo
DOCTRINE: Marriages contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage, is void
ab initio for being bigamous under Art 35 of the Family Code.
Under Sec 2(a) of AM No. 02-11-10-SC, only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. In case the ground is bigamy, the “injured spouse” who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
FACTS:
● 11 months before his death in 1993, Sen. Tamano married petitioner Llave
twice - once under Islamic laws and tradition and another under a civil
ceremony.
● In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as
“divorced.”
● Private respondents Zorayda and her son filed a complaint with the RTC for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous.
● They alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda’s marriage under civil
rites in 1958 remained subsisting when he married petitioner Llave.
● Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under PD 1083 or the
Muslim Code, the shari’a courts have jurisdiction.
● The motion was denied, which was upheld by the SC, reasoning that the
shari’a courts do not have original and exclusive jurisdiction and RTC, as a
court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction.
● In the main case, the RTC found that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
respondent Zorayda were never severed, declaring Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under
Art. 35 of the Family Code and Art. 83 of the Civil Code.
● The CA uphe the RTC Decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the marriage between petitioner Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void
for being bigamous.
● Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
● Estrellita cannot benefit from the divorce granted under PD 1083. It does not
provide for a situation were the partners married both in Civil and Muslim
rites.
● Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on Feb. 4, 1977, and this cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights
on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
● The Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the
time of the celebration of their marriage.
● In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage, which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by
the CA as void ab initio.
 2. WON the respondents have legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.
● Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation
does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
● Under Sec 2(a) of AM No. 02-11-10-SC, only an aggrieved or injured spouse
may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.
● The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
● Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare
the marriage void and thus, in such circumstances, the “injured spouse”
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
12. UY v. SPS. LACSAMANA
Requisites of Marriage | August 19, 2015 | Carpio J.
DOCTRINE:
While there is a presumption of marriage. It may be overcome by contradictory
evidence. Hence the burden is shifted to the party who alleges the existence of
marriage to prove it with competent and relevant evidence.
FACTS:
● The subject of litigation involves a parcel of land in Batangas.
● Petitioner filed a petition for the nullity of documents with damages against
respondents Rosca, his wife, and the spouses Uy.
● Petitioner alleges that he and his wife bought 2 parcels of land; the one
subject of litigation was from the Spouses Manuel in which the TCT was
named after Rosca and her husband Uy. On this parcel of land they built a
house.
● Uy alleges that his wife acted in bad faith when she executed a simulated
deed of sale of the land in favor of respondent Spouses Lacsamana and
prayed that the same be declared null and void with corresponding
damages.
● Respondent Rosca claims that she bought the land with her own money and
alleges that she was never married to Uy.
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse.
● As to the legal personality of the son, respondent Adib, while the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to AM No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
● Since AM No 02-11-10-SC does noy apply, Adib, as one of the children of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be
the real party in interest in the suit they filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
RULING: In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage, which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as
void ab initio.
● Meanwhile Petitioner filed a complaint before the Register of Deeds who
elevated the case to the Land Registration Commission because Uy’s
affidavit contained the information that the sale was made without his
marital consent. The LRC ruled in favor of Registration as the TCT was
named after Rosca and concluded that it was purchased through her own
paraphernal funds.
● Rosca testified that Uy and her cohabitated in Batangas before World War II
and sought to formalize their union which did not push through because of
the subsequent bombings. She then bought the lands and introduced
improvements with her own money and a loan from the Philippine Banking
Corporation. She corroborated this by showing her certificate of ownership
and the aforementioned TCT named: Rosca and her husband Uy claiming
that the phrase was merely a description of her status. She also alleged that
in 1973, Uy had an affair with another woman that sired children leading to
their physical separation.
● The RTC and CA found that no marriage subsists between Uy and Rosca.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON there was a valid marriage between Uy and Rosca to nullify the
deed of sale?
There was no valid marriage.
While there is a presumption of marriage - Semper praesumitur, pro matrimonio- this
presumption may be contradicted. Rosca’s testimony and evidence showed that
while she and Uy cohabitated, no marriage was ever consummated. Overcoming this
presumption, it is up to Uy to prove the marriage.
Marriage may be proven by competent and relevant evidence.
According to jurisprudence, marriage may be proven by the testimonies of the
contracting parties or the witnesses, and the testimony of the solemnizing officer.
However, the best evidence is the marriage license furnished by the solemnizing
officer to the contracting parties and the clerk of the Municipal Courts or the secretary
of the Municipality.
In the case at bar, Uy was not able to produce any marriage certificate, a marriage
license, the testimonies of the solemnizing officer or the municipal office where the
alleged marriage took place.
13. MORIGO v. PEOPLE
Requisites of Marriage | Feb. 6, 2004 |Quisumbing, J.
DOCTRINE:
A declaration of nullity of marriage retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
FACTS:
● Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years in
Bohol. They lost contact but reconnected and became sweethearts. They
were eventually married in Bohol.
● Lucia went back to work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Lucia filed with
the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted.
● October 4, 1992 - Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol.
● September 21, 1993 - Lucio filed a judicial complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.
● October 23, 1997 - RTC declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
● Lucio was charged with Bigamy.
● RTC: Lucio guilty - valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in Bigamy.
● CA: affirmed RTC - not valid defense and divorce decree obtained by Lucia
in Cada cannot be accorded validity in the Philippines given that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON all elements of a valid marriage are present and Lucio can be held
guilty of bigamy - NO
14. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA et al.
Requisites of Marriage| 23 July 2014 | J. Bersamin
DOCTRINE:
RULING: As Rosca was able to overcome the presumption of marriage and Uy was not able
to prove there was a marriage, the deed of sale is valid notwithstanding lack of Uy’s consent.
NOTE:
Uy died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his children.
Sps. Lacsamana sold the property in question during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by Buena.
● Elements of bigamy:
1. the offender has been legally married
2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case his/her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage
4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first
● RTC found that no actual marriage ceremony was performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
○ What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
● First element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. Legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia. There is no first marriage to speak of.
● Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
● Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
● The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
● The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
RULING: As the marriage between Lucio and Lucia was declared void ab initio because of
the absence of a marriage ceremony, there was no valid marriage at the time Lucio married
Maria Lumbago. Therefore, Lucio cannot be held guilty of bigamy.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even if either
or both spouses are residing abroad.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.
FACTS: - This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,
● Atty. Luna was first married to Eugenia, which begotten 7 children.
and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
● However, after almost 2 decades of marriage, they eventually agreed to live
between a man and a woman for the establishment of
apart from each other and agreed to separation of property. Such agreement
conjugal and family life.
was reduced into a written agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR
- It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT”
be grounded only upon death of either spouse, or upon
● In 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia
ground expressly provided by law.
in Dominican Republic.
● THUS: For as long as this public policy on marriage between
● On the same of issuance of divorce decree, Atty. Luna contracted a SECOND
Filipino exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between
MARRIAGE with Soledad. Thereafter, they returned to the Philippines and
them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
enforcement in this jurisdiction
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the divorce decree obtained abroad validly terminated Atty. Luna’s 2. WON Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad is valid.
first marriage with Eugenia. [NO]
NO. Their marriage was VOID for being bigamous
NO. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsited up to the time of
● AS A RULE: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
his death despite the existence of foreign divorce decree
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
● AS A RULE: Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
relating to the family rights and duties, or status, condition, and has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
legal capacity were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, rendered in the proper proceedings
although living abroad. ● IN THIS CASE: Since the Atty. Luna’s first marriage had not been
● IN THIS CASE: Since the first marriage between Atty. Luna and dissolved by the Divorce Decree obtained from Dominican
Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines, Republic, the second marriage contracted by him shall be VOID for
Philippine laws shall govern their relationship until the death of being bigamous.
Atty. Luna - Due to the nullity of the second marriage, the properties
- From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce the rules on co-ownership
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the ●
Philippines
RULING: Divorce Decree obtained abroad by a Filipino spouse cannot be recognized in the
- Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
Philippines.
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
The second marriage of Atty. Luna is void for being bigamous.
which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997.
15. REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III ● May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE| OCT. 5, 2005 | QUISUMBING the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. They
had 2 children- Kristoff Simbotriz and Lady Kimberly.
DOCTRINE: : The legislative intent of Art. 26 par. 2 likewise applies for Filipinos at
the time of their marriage and one spouse got naturalized and procured a valid ● In 1986 Lady Myros (wife) left for the US and got naturalized after.
foreign divorce decree capacitating the naturalized spouse to remarry. However, the
Filipino spouse must prove (1) naturalization; (2) foreign divorce decree; (3) foreign ● In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and
divorce law for him/her to have capacity to remarry and for Philippine courts to remarried to a certain Innocent Stanley.
judicially recognize the foreign divorce decree.
● Cipriano filed with RTC petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition. Granted.
FACTS:
 ● OSG sought reconsideration. Denied.
● OSG argues : (1) Art 26 par 2. Of FC is not applicable in this case because the
law applies only to a Filipino citizen and an alien; (2) proper remedy is
annulment or legal separation; (3) no law governs the situation in this case.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Art. 26 par. 2 applies to a valid marriage between Filipino citizens
and one spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him/her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise marry under Philippine law? -YES
● Art 26 Par. 2 Elements: (1) there’s a valid marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.
● The legislative intent of Art 26 par. 2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice.
16. CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS, et. al.,
Requisites of Marriage | August 11, 2010 | J. Brion
DOCTRINE: The alien spouse can claim no right under the 2nd paragraph of Art.
26 FC as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. Corpuz married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina in
Pasig City.
o Due to work, he left for Canada soon after the wedding. He came
back but he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man.
o He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was
granted.
● 2 years after the divorce, Corpuz wanted to marry another Filipina and thus
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry and registered the Canadian divorce
decree.
● However, Corpuz was informed that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still
subsists under Philippines law and the foreign divorce decree must first
be judicially recognized by a competent PH court.
o Thus, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
● The reckoning point in the application of Art 26 Par. 2 is their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the alien spouse to remarry.
● In this case, Cipriano’s wife was a naturalized US citizen while their
marriage is valid. Then she obtained a divorce decree and remarried. The
requisites of Art 26 par. 2 is complied with. However, SC held that Cipriano
must submit the divorce decree and naturalization of his wife because before
a foreign decree can be recognized by Phil. courts the party pleading it must
prove it as a fact and that it conforms with the foreign law allowing it.
Cipriano must also prove that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry. In this case Cipriano failed.
2. WON proper remedy is annulment or legal separation? NO
● Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case,
not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would
not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
RULING: SC granted Republic’s petition. RTC decision was set aside.
● RTC denied his petition concluding that Corpuz is not the proper party to
institute the action as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen
o It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Art.
26(2) FC which states that “where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the
capacity to remarry under the PH law”
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Art. 26(2) Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree - NO,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke Art. 26.
The PH does not recognize absolute divorce except Art. 26 (2) of the Family Code
which recognized the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his/her alien spouse. Its effect is to declare that the PH spouse is capcaitated to
contract another marriage if the court finds that the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry.
Its intent is to “avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.”

However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph to aliens does not necessarily strip
Corpuz of legal interest for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. Since he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen, he is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the
authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to the alien’s national law.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
17. FUJIKI v. MARINAY, et al.
Requisites of Marriage | June 26, 2013 | Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband
or the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
FACTS:
● Fujiki, Japanese, married Marinay in the Philippines.
● Japanese parents did not approve of their marriage so Fujiki cannot bring
Marinay to Japan and so they lost contact with each other.
● Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara.
● Without the first marriage dissolved, they married each other in the PH.
● Maekara was able to bring Marinay to Japan but she allegedly suffered
physical abuse and so she left Maekara and contacted Fujiki.
o They reconnected
● Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
● Fujiki → RTC PH → Petition filed: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)
o Japan FC be recognized
o Bigamous 2nd marriage be declared void ab initio
o RTC to direct Local Civil Registrar to annotate accordingly
● RTC RULING: Dismissed petition based on improper venue and lack of
personality
o In light of Sec. 2 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
▪ Only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
o Petition shall be filed in FC
● FUJIKI → MR:
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
RULING: Thus, Corpuz cannot claim the right under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code. It is
only the Filipino spouses its legislative intent is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.
o AM contemplated OCA for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage and so is not applicable in the case. Argued that the case
was a special proceeding to recognize foreign judgment.
●
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
○ No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country.
○ Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, the Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if
the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
○ While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
○ Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court
2. WON husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
○ Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
○ Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
 for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
○ There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it.
○ Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
18. MEDINA v. KOIKE, LCR OF QUEZON CITY & NSO
Requisites of Marriage | July 27, 2016 | J. Perlas-Bernabe
DOCTRINE:
When invoking a foreign divorce decree such must be proven as a fact according to
the Rules of Evidence. Both the validity of the foreign divorce decree accdg to the
national law of the foreigner and the applicable personal law of the foreigner that
obtained the decree must be proven.
FACTS:
● Petitioner, a Filipino married respondent Michiyuku, a Japanese national.
● They (both of them accdg to the case) later filed for and subsequently
obtained divorce in Japan, pursuant to Japan’s laws, as evidenced by a
Divorce Certificate, duly recorded in the Official Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike.
● Petitioner then sought for judicial recognition of the divorce decree before
the RTC.
● As her evidence, she presented the following:
o Several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/
Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City
and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
o A certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce
Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in
Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry
Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was
filed and recorded in the said Office.
o Photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding
English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"
● The RTC denied the petition stating that while petitioner may have proven
the divorce certificates as being public and official documents of Japan, she
19. REPUBLIC v. MANALO
Requisites of Marriage | April 24, 2018 | Peralta, J
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
RULING: Having a personal and material interest in the case, the prior spouse has
personality to maintain an action
NOTE:
Related provisions
Other things the Court may have said
failed to prove the national law of the respondent and the photocopies of
the civil code that she presented is insufficient to prove such.
● Petitioner filed the present petition for review on cert (45) questioning the
RTC ruling.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE
DECREE SHOULD BE GRANTED (CASE REMANDED TO CA FOR
DETERMINATION)
● According to jurisprudence (Corpuz v Sto Tomas; Garcia v. Recio), in a
petition for judicial recognition of a divorce decree, two things must be
proven as a fact: 1.) the foreign judgment, its authenticity and validity
according to the national law of the foreigner and 2.) The applicable
national law of the foreigner to show the effect of the judgement on
the alien him/herself. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgements hence, such must be proven as a fact accdg. to the
Rules of Evidence.
● Clearly then, the issue raised by petitioner (validity of foreign divorce
decree) requires an appreciation of the facts, which cannot be tried by
the SC since the present petition is under Rule 45 and the SC is not a
“trier of facts” hence the present case is REMANDED TO THE CA for
determination of the validity of the divorce decree between the
petitioner and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of
Japan on the matter.
RULING: Since the case involves the resolution of factual matters, the case is remanded to
the CA
DOCTRINE:
 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in
the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding.
FACTS:
● Respondent Manalo filed for petitioner for cancellation of marriage in San
Juan, by virtue of a judgment of divorce from Japan. The OSG questioned
the title of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
● Trial court denied the petition for lack of merit ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized base on Art. 15 of the
NCC, the PH law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the PH or in
another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages."
● The CA overturned the RTC’s decision which then held that Art. 26 of the
FC is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
● Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the legislative intent behind Article
26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
Jr. where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved
through a divorce filed abroad by the latter
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON respondent can file for divorce against foreign spouse – YES
● The Par 2 of Art. 26 confers jurisdiction on PH courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
20. JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the PH does not allow divorce.
● In Dacasin v. Dacasin, it was held that The argument that foreigners
in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that
an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected
his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino
spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction
● The purpose of Par. 2 of Art. 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where
it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
● The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where
the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
● Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
● Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties
to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.
● A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more
harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
RULING: Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving
the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former
husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Marriage/Requisites of Marriage | July 23, 2018 | Peralta
 legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of
DOCTRINE: The Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse
Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where
in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
● Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the
Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner
participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even
FACTS: if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still
● Stephen Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan. be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under
2 years later they obtained a divorce decree in Japan dissolving their Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
marriage. Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
● Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court
remarry under Philippine law.
(RTC). granted. CA also granted petition.
● However, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its 2. WON there was substantial compliance with submission of the
previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the authenticated copies of the Japanese law on Divorce- No
following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a)
there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino ● In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
● This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on
by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since persons and family relations are not among those matters that
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA function.
ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the 3. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause. GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016
● of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
ISSUE/S & RATIO: further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
1. WON the 2nd requisite is not present because the petitioner gave consent
to the divorce.- NO
● The Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted should not affect the application nor remove RULING: It does not matter if it is the filipino who initiated the divorce proceedings in
him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the another country as long as it was granted.
Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
● We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean
that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by
the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the