A SOURCE BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

[An Exhaustive and Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy]

By
Devendra Muni Shastri

Translated into English by

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, M.A., Ph.D.
Professor and Head of the Deptt. Of Jainology & Prakrits
University of Mysore

English Translation Edited by

Dr. T. S. Devodoss, M.A., B.L., Ph.D., D.P. & P.A.

Reader in Philosophy
The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan institute for Advance Study in Philosophy
University of Madras

Published by
SRI TARAK GURU JAIN GRANTHALAYA
SHASTRI CIRCLE
UDAIPUR (Raj.)

Foreword
Dr. G. R. Damodaran
Vice-Chancellor, University of Madras

Eng. Mss. & Proof Revision

Dr. Brij Mohan Jain

First Edition
Vir Nirvana Samvat 2509
Akshaya Tritiya, Vikram Samvat 2040
May 1983 A.D.
Printing & Designing Supervision
Srichand Surana ‘Saras’

Printed by
S. S. Agarwal, Dinesh Printers Agra

Price Rs. 80-00

NATURE OF DARSANA AND DARSANIKA LITERATURE........................................................................................16
DARSANA: A SYNOPTIC STUDY.........................................................................................................................................16
JAINA CANONICAL LITERATURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.........................................................................................................26
DISCUSSION OF PRAMEYA.............................................................................................................................................40
LOKAVADA (COSMOLOGY)...............................................................................................................................................40
JAINA METAPHYSICS.......................................................................................................................................................58
ATMAVADA: AN ANALYSIS (CONCEPT OF ATMAN)...............................................................................................................64
AJIVATATTVA: A STUDY (A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE)....................................................................101
PUDGALA (MATTER ): A STUDY......................................................................................................................................116
PRINCIPLE OF THE PUNYA (MERIT) AND PAPA (DEMERIT): A STUDY......................................................................................140
PRINCIPLE OF ASRAVA (INFLUX): A STUDY........................................................................................................................144
PRINCIPLES OF SAMVARA AND NIRJARA: A STUDY.............................................................................................................148
THE PRINCIPLES OF BANDHA AND MOKSA: A DISCUSSION...........................................................................................163
PRAMANAVADA................................................................................................................................................................177
SYADVADA: THE BASIS OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY..............................................................................................................177
SAPTABHANGI: A DISCUSSION................................................................................................................................191
NIKSEPAVADA: A STUDY.......................................................................................................................................212
NAYAVADA: A STUDY............................................................................................................................................218
JNANAVADA: A STUDY (THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE).........................................................................................241
PRAMANA: A STUDY...............................................................................................................................................270
KARMAVADA.....................................................................................................................................................................290
KARMAVADA: A SYNOPSIS.....................................................................................................................................290
JAINA DARSANA AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD............................................................................346
PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD: A STUDY..........................................................................................................................346
JAINA AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY...................................................................................................................................357
JAINA AND SANKHYA PHILOSOPHIES : A COMPARISON...........................................................................................................361
JAINA & VEDANTA PHILOSOPHIES....................................................................................................................................365
LEGACY OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY TO THE WORLD OF THOUGHT...............................................................................................369
APPENDICES.......................................................................................................................................................................373
REFERENCE BOOKS INDEX..............................................................................................................................................373
INDEX OF TECHNICAL TERMS..........................................................................................................................................379
JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE AND AUTHORS..............................................................................................................387
BENEDICTION-BLESSINGS

Human mind can be compared to a vast ocean. As the ocean never becomes
calm, so is the condition of human mind. In it the waves of inquisitiveness
always remain in existence. The different questionnaires regarding life and
universe, mundane soul and living and non-living substances, either the universe
is a chaos or a cosmos, how the activities of the world are going on, etc.,
perturbs human mind.

The Philosophy reconciles all the queries of human mind by logic, by intelligence
and with the medium of insight. The philosophy removes all such doubts of
human mind so the philosophy can be recognized as ‘Divine Eye’.

Philosophy is divided into numerous currents. But all those currents can be
classified into two distinctions, viz., (1) Materialism and (2) Spiritualism. Jain
philosophy is spiritualistic by its nature.

Jaina philosophy maintains its unique and magnificent position, not only among
Indian philosophies but also among the world philosophies.

The vast canvas of Jaina philosophy is woven by four elements, viz., (1) Non-
violence in conduct, (2) Many--sidedness in views, thinking and mind (3) stand
point-based speech, and (4) Non-possessiveness in social life. These are the four
strong pillars upon which the magnificent building is sanding of Jaina
metaphysics and philosophy. It is neither a fool’s paradise, nor irrelevant
imagination, but based on sound footings and solid ground of life and that is why
it gives due force to right conduct in the light of holy thinking.

I wished that at the auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana

Mahavira, two books should be prepared, one should be biography of Bhagavana
Mahavira and the other should be about his Philosophy and Metaphysics. I
desired that the style may be comparative but the language should be easy and
simple: so every man can be benefited and know ins and outs about Jainism by
this one and single volume.

I expressed the wish to my worthy disciple Devendra Muni. He prepared both

the precious volumes with full zeal, enthusiasm and hardship.

The present volume discusses the Jaina Philosophy. The typical and rough
subjects, like-theory of karman, theory of knowledge, intuition, many-sided
approach to the reality, noumenal and phenomenal points of view, conception of
soul, consciousness -unconsciousness, theory of valid knowledge, the objects of
knowledge, theory of auspicious and inauspicious activities, inflow and bondage,
checking the inflow and annihilation of karmas, state of liberation of soul have
been discussed with open-mindedness and giving the views of other
philosophies-Eastern and Western. So it became a complete book of philosophy.
Due to the rare qualities of this work, I liked it much and am sure that every and
any inquisitive, who wishes to know about Jaina Philosophy can quench his thirst
by this one single volume.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi has rendered English translation of the book with keen
interest and due labor. So he fulfilled a great gap in the field of philosophy. I am
hopeful that this English version will also be cordially welcomed.

It is my hearty desire that my favorite and worthy pupil Devendra Muni may
enrich the treasure of literature by deep creative intelligence and knowledge and
with his ever-flowing pen. He may create new milestones in the field of literature
and serve the Jainology and flag it. These are my heartiest blessings!

Adinath Jayanti -Upadhyaya Pushkar

Muni
April 5, 1983.
PUBLISHER’S NOTE

It would be apt to say that without understanding Jaina Philosophy, the study of
Indian philosophy and metaphysics would remain incomplete; not only this, but
the philosophic and metaphysical background of Indian thinking would remain
unclear and un-understood.

Not only among Indian philosophies, but among the philosophies of the world,
only the Jaina philosophy darefully advocates the limitless power and energy of
human soul and its independency; and bestows full responsibility upon the man
and man himself to attain the highest goal of his life-the infinite bliss, without the
help of any God or supreme being.

The non-violence (ahimsa) is the backbone of Jaina Philosophy. Non-violence is

the base of Jaina religion and philosophy. It is all and all of Jainism. Complete
thinking and conduct of Jainas are spread on the vast canvas of non-violence. So
the Jainas presented deep and vivid study of non-violence.

For this purpose, the exhaustive study of nonviolence, Jaina thinkers pierced
sufficiently deep into the material science like-Physics, Chemistry, and specially
Zoology, Botany and Biology. By the deep study of these sciences, the minutest
details, which were presented by the Jaina thinkers, proved true to such a high
degree, that even the greatest scientists of today are astonished. They highly
esteem those consequences, by saying that it is wonderful how such
consequences, by saying that it is wonderful how such consequences obtained
millenniums ago while there were no laboratories, etc.

These results proved very much beneficial to Jains. On the one side, they could
follow the path of non-violence, in their thought and behavior; and on the other
Jainism is standing upright in the modern science-effected world. While other
orthodox religions and isms are either in clash or they slink away and hesitate to
face the new researches of the modern science; the Jaina metaphysics,
philosophy and religion are proved true. The scientificality of Jainism is coming
into light as the scientific researches are enhancing. This is the open proof of
highest thinking of Jainas.

Though there are many books to get through the Jaina religion and philosophy.
An inquisitive can understood the subject with the help of those books, yet the
necessity of such a single volume, by which the authoritative knowledge can be
got, is keenly felt by the scholars and general inquisitives alike. The present
volume will fulfill the need. On the one hand, it will prove an authentic book
regarding Jaina Philosophy and on the other it will be a reference book of the
scholars.

This book came out from the pen of Sri Devendra Muniji Shastri. Munisri is a
great scholar of Jaina religion, philosophy and agama literature. He is a learned
man. Many ancient and modern languages like Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Gujarati,
Marathi, Hindi etc. are at hand to him. He has been devoting his precious time
since thirty years in the comparative study of the different currents of Indian
culture and literature, like-religions, philosophies, yoga etc. He had gone
through thousands of works of reputed authors-ancient and modern and himself
have written hundreds of books. Because of his extra-ordinary genius Munisri
now gained the fame as the ‘Wizard of comparative study’ of different
philosophies, religions and literature.

The present volume is the result of Munisri’s three years’ continuous study. In
this volume Munisri has impartially presented the exhaustive study of Jaina
Philosophy.

This volume (Hindi) was published at the auspicious occasion of 25th century of
Vir Nirvana. It got appraisal from every corner. Everyone liked it and gave warm
welcome.

The year 1977 proved lucky to Madras citizens. His Holiness, reverend
Gurudeva, Rajasthan Kesari, Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj stayed there
for four rainy months. At that time the intelligentsia, mainly the Gujarati
speaking inquisitives earnestly requested to the Maharaj Sahib, for the English
version of the book. Those people pleaded that the English version would be
more beneficial for the English speaking people and also those persons whose
mother tongue is not Hindi. Non-Hindi areas would also be able to know about
Jaina religion and philosophy.

The members of Gujarati Swetambara Sthanakvasi Jaina Association of Madras

were so enthusiastic to see the book in English that they became pre-publication
customers and gave financial co-operation in this way.

This enthusiasm instigated. Dr. Kalghatgi and he accepted happily the burden of
English translation. Dr. Kalghatgi is a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy and
specially Jainology. He has translated the book in English with full zeal and great
effort.

Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, The University of Madras took

great pains to edit the English translation. Honorable Dr. G. R. Damodaran, Vice
Chancellor, The University of Madras, has encouraged us by giving ‘Foreword’ to
the book.

Our affectionate companion and renowned literary man Sriyut Srichand Surana
‘Saras’ took the responsibility of printing of the book with due intimacy.

Dr. Brij Mohan Jain has very keenly and carefully carried out the tough work of
Mss. & revision exerting his full zeal.

We are grateful to all our aforesaid companions for the heartiest co-operation,
which they have rendered us.
We planned to give the book, three years before, in the hands of the readers; but
due to unavoidable circumstances-the difficulty of press, the printing of book
becomes undesirably late. Consequently, our inquisitive readers and financial
co-operators have to wait long. We apologize for the inconvenience. But lastly,
we have a satisfaction, that we could give this long awaited precious work in the
hands of our readers.

Secretary
Sri Tarak Guru Ganthalaya, Udaipur.
FOREWORD

The cultural heritage of India is pre-eminently represented by the Brahmanic and

Sramanic traditions. Jainism and Buddhism are the chief representatives of the
latter tradition. Lord Mahavir is the greatest exponent of Jaina thought.

Among the pathfinders to the Supreme Reality, Bhagavan Mahavira stands pre-
eminent. Vardhamana, universally known as Mahavira, the last of the twenty-
four Tirthankaras of the Jainas, represents the ancient Jaina tradition of India,
that of ahimsa, renunciation, sacrifice and asceticism. Though Mahavira’s
teachings are primarily followed by the Jainas, they are in fact applicable mutatis
mutandis to the followers of other religious faiths. In essence, Lord Mahavira is a
Jagadguru-a World Teacher whose teachings are meant for the entire mankind.
Far from being a recluse concerned only with an inner spiritual experience, Lord
Mahavira also associated himself closely in uplifting the social life of the people.
He was instrumental for codifying all unsystematic mass of belief into a set of
rigid rules of conduct for Munis, i.e., monks and shravakas i.e., householders.
The essence of Lord’s teaching is embodied in the three-fold code known as
ratna-traya. By following the three-fold path of Right Belief, Right Knowledge
and Right Conduct, as ordained by the Jains, the soul is released from the cycles
of birth and rebirth and attains the pure and blissful abode of the liberated souls.

Jainism is unique in the history of religious philosophy. Jainism, although usually

referred to as a religion, is basically a way of life. The Jains have always stood
for the dignity of man and equality of all, and have preached the elevated ideal
of ahimsa, which is considered central to the Jaina ethical, thought. As rightly
observed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, ‘The Jainas were first to make ahimsa, non-
violence, into a rule of life.

The present book is a classical work on Jaina Philosophy, rendered into English by
Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi from the original text-Jaina Darshana: Swaroop our Visleshana
written by the venerated monk Devendra Muni who belongs to the Svetambara
Sthanakvasi order. The author of the book is a renowned scholar and
outstanding exponent of Jaina Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni’s
scholarship is astounding and deeply penetrating as is evident in his numerous
writings and books written in Hindi, Gujarati and Rajasthani languages. As the
author of more than hundred books, Devendra Muni ranks among the world’s
greatest exponents of Jaina thought.

The present work shows great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine
he is expounding but also the realm of Indian thought. The book though
primarily concerned with Jaina Darshana, Logic and Metaphysics, allude in the
course of explaining its distinctive features to nearly all the other systems of
Indian Philosophy. The book contains frequent references to Contemporary
Western Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni’s exposition is throughout
admirable.
The book is divided into six parts dealing with discussions of Prameya, Pramana
and a synoptic study of Jaina Darshana. The Introductory chapter will serve as
an excellent aid to the study of the book.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and

Prakrits in the University of Mysore has done a great job by translating into
English, Devendra Muni’s classical book-Jaina Darshana: Swaroop aur Visleshana
written in Hindi, thereby drawing the attention of scholars over the globe to the
fascinating domain of Jaina thought.

It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here in this book by Dr. T.
S. Devodoss, Reader in Philosophy at University of Madras.

Devendra Muni’s admiration for Lord Mahavira and his teachings and for the
civilization which embodied it makes this not only a learned but also a
stimulating book. The world of scholars owes a debt of gratitude to Devendra
Muni’s monumental contribution to Jaina philosophical thought.

25 January, 1979
G. R. DAMODARAN
Vice-Chancellor
The University of Madras
PREFACE

Philosophy is the ‘Divine Eye' of man. What man cannot see by his physical
eyes, can see by the eye of philosophy? So, the philosophy is the vision of
insight. In other words, philosophy is the medium to get into the inner core of
reality.

The aim of philosophy is to discuss the nature of life and world. It also reconciles
the problems, like-what are living and non-living realities, the elements
constituting the world and how many are they, what are the effects of living and
non-living substances on the different activities of the universe.

As these and such other questions are eternal and had disturbed the human
brain since his invent, and the human mind remain always active to solve these
problems, so it would be apt to say that the current of philosophy is as old as
man itself or prehistoric.

When we come to historic period, we find that the systematic knowledge of

philosophy came into existence. The first such country is India and the second is
Greece. Indian philosophy and the Western effect all the eastern philosophies by
Greek philosophy.

All the Indian philosophies aim at the quest of soul and its nature. Indian
philosophers are found crazy to know the nature of soul and God, in detail. Such
tendency we do not find in Greek philosophies. Though they also have tried to
know about the soul but could not go to deep as Indian philosophers. Though
their style is charming, yet the outlook was mainly material. And because the
European and American, i.e., all the Western philosophers are influenced by
Greek philosophy so the western philosophy became material in outlook. But the
trend of Indian thinkers always remained towards the soul, so Indian philosophy
became spiritualistic by nature. Through Indian thinkers also discussed the
nature and material reality, but to the extent it was pertaining to soul. The
complete treatise of matter was to understand the nature of soul more clearly.
Being the main aim the quest of the soul Indian philosophers never neglected the
life and activities of the physical world. In true sense, Indian philosophers have
posited their faith in life and enhanced their continued steady footsteps toward
the attainment of ultimate truth.

Philosophy has logic and cogitation as its bases. It tries to understand the nature
of reality and ultimate reality by reason and then induces to believe the accuracy
and legitimacy of them. In this way, the faith and reason are in harmony in
Indian philosophy.

Western philosophy is based on freethinking. It is theoretical in nature and its

main characteristic is intelligence. It avoids authoritative valid knowledge.
The demarcation line between the Eastern and Western philosophy is the
conception of salvation. All the main currents of Indian thinking merge in the
ocean of salvation while western philosophy neglects this subject.

The various happenings and changes in nature leave man in astonishment. He

desires to search and know the causes of these happenings; and so is the aim of
western philosophy to investigate and understand the real nature of this visible
physical world. Hence it can be said that the western philosophy is the mental
exercise. It does not do much to remove the miseries of mankind. It suggests to
pathway to the ultimate good of man.

But according to Indian philosophers, misery is responsible for the origination of

philosophy and they posit its aim removal of misery. The prominency of Indian
philosophy resides in the fact that it is helpful to us to attain the highest goal,
i.e., salvation. The nature of elements is considered only due to the cause that
such knowledge helps to remove misery.

Indian philosophy is not only a method of thinking but also a method of life. It
has a specific viewpoint regarding the life and visible world. It is not only the
science of reasoning, but also an art of life. Indian philosophy does not satisfy
itself by the search and knowledge of Truth; but it induces everyone to lead
truthful life. Because of this, the philosophy and religion remained hand-in-hand
in India. There is neither variance separation between the two.

Philosophy thoroughly examines the reality and then accepts it by logic and
reasoning so that soul can get salvation; and the religion is the practical way to
obtain spiritual truth. Thus philosophy ascertains our highest goal and religion is
the way to attain it. Philosophy purifies the method of thinking while religion is
the purification of living-method. Philosophy demonstrates the fundamental
principles and religion brings them into action. It gives up the forbidable and
follows the beneficial. Hence philosophy and religion are complement to one-
another. In Indian philosophy conduct also found its valuable position along with
cogitation. Thinking and reasoning find its culmination in conduct-right conduct.

Jaina philosophy bears in itself some salient features, which place it at the
foremost position among the world philosophies. On the one hand, Jaina
philosophy dipped in the fathomless depth of ocean of spiritual science and
solved the unriddle problems of spiritualism by the medium of different view-
points and deep piercing reasoning; and on the other hand it demonstrates some
specially astonishing maxims and principles in the science of matter long before
modern scientific world. It has very minutely considered the conscious powers
and energies; and also a thorough analysis of the sciences, like-Zoology, Botany,
Biology etc. It gave the unique theory of many-sided approach to understand
from all directions the reality and the fundamental principles. Its style of truth-
demonstration by the theory of relativity (Syadvad) is a greatest acquisition.
The maxims ascertained by Jaina philosophy about ‘atom’, ‘sound’ fulcrum of
motion etc., are proved true by the modern science.
Really Jaina philosophy is unique and holds an out-toping place in the philosophic
sphere of the world. In present volume light have been thrown on the special
characteristics of this philosophy.

Vast literature has been published in Sanskrit, Prakrit and other languages
pertaining to Jainology. This literature is of both types-simple and complex. It is
a matter of happiness that the different branches of Jaina literature are being
published in National language-Hindi as well. Many important volumes also have
been published dealing with Jainology. The present volume is also an attempt in
the same direction. The vigilant readers would be the true judges of this work
and they will estimate that how much I am successful in this attempt. But I have
no hesitation to say that religion, philosophy, literature, culture, agam, purana
are my favorite subjects. While I wrote on these subjects, I get the indescribable
joy, therefore, I am confident that readers will also obtain the same joy at the
occasion of perusal of the book.

I got the commandment or reverend Gurudeva, an spiritual ascetic of highest

order, Rajasthan Kesari, Upadhyaya Pushkar Muniji Maharaja that at the great
auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, such
type of unique and original literature should be prepared which must be of ever-
lasting value and by the perusal of that literature the vigilant readers should get
instigation towards their spiritual upliftment beside increasing their knowledge.
According to the desire of reverend gurudeva, I determined to prepare two
books: one-comparative study of life of Bhagavana Mahavira. I devoted ten
precious years in the perusal of pertaining literature and consequently a volume
came into light entitled ‘Bhagavana Mahavira: Ek Anushilana’. In this voluminous
research work the critical study of the life history of Bhagavana Mahavira has
been described in the light of literature from the period of agamas i.e., 6th
century B. C. to modern times. The other volume is prepared pertaining to
philosophy. For this I studied more than hundred books and invested many
years. The book was published in 1975.

In the year 1975 we stayed for four rainy months in Poona (Maharashtra). At the
inauguration occasion of the book entitled ‘Jaina Darshana: Svaroopa aur
Visleshana’ (Hindi) the dignitaries, like-Dr. S. Barlingay (Head of the Deptt. of
Philosophy, University of Poona), Dr. Anand Prasad Dixit (Head of the Deptt. Of
Hindi), Dr. A. D. Batra etc., etc., were present and they appraised the book with
full zeal.

Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi (Head of the department of Philosophy and Jainology,

University of Mysore, Mysore) expressed his earnest feelings that this book
should be translated into English so that the readers and scholars of Eastern and
Western philosophies by English medium may also be benefited and English
speaking world would become aware of Jaina Philosophy. Dr. Kalghatgi
expressed his desire to translate the book in English to the renowned citizen of
Mysore Rikhaba Chand Ji Chhallani and Sri Chhallani informer me accordingly I
consented joyfully.
Dr. Kalghatgi is regarded as an authority in Jaina philosophy. He has good
command on English language. Many merit works came out of his pen. He had
fulfilled the job with due labor and vigilance. Dr. T. S. Devodoss (Professor,
Deptt. Of Philosophy, University of Madras) has edited the manuscript (English
translation) taking full pains. I am grateful to both the learned persons. Words
cannot express the pains they took.

Manuscript was given in the press for printing in 1978. It was estimated that two
to three months would be sufficient time for printing the whole book; but since
then a chain of difficulties enveloped the fate of book. Unavoidable and ultra
wire circumstances regarding the printing press continually hindered the
publication of the book, even to say that due to the negligence and hostility of
press management some pages of the manuscript were missed. A tedious
problem aroused to face.

Dr. Brij Mohan Jain (Agra) solved this problem. He also took the burden of
tedious work of proof-correction. Inspite of hilarious efforts of Dr. Kalghatgi and
Dr. Devodoss to give the manuscript quite correct, the description at some
places could not be clear, due to the ignorance and negligence of typist, as the
typist was unaware of philosophy and philosophic words and technical terms. So
mistakes have been created. This was a hard nut to crack. Dr. Brij Mohan Jain
also did this work with ability and to my satisfaction.

The cordial co-operation of Srichand Surana ‘Saras’ to get the book-printed eye
soothing and beautiful will also be remembered.

The tremendous efforts of Sri Surendrabhai President of Sthanakvasi Jaina

Gujarati Association, Madras, and Sri Balwantbhai, ease the path of publication of
this book, as due to their attempts some of the main members of the association
became the pre-publication customers of this volume and so created financial co-
operation. Renowned social worker C. L. Mehta, Indrachandji Mehta,
Madhukarbhai Mehta etc., also rendered valuable co-operation.

Whatever good is in this volume, it is due to the kind mercy of my Gurudeva

Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj, who is always like a lighthouse to me.
Words cannot express his mercy.

Respected mother Mahasati Prabhavatiji Maharaj is the greatest energy to me.

Alas! She has gone to the father’s abode on 27 January 1982. It would be a
matter of more joy if she could see this book printed by her own eyes; but
nothing can be done. Which cannot be cured must be endured. It is my solemn
wish that in the remembrance of Holy mother I might enrich the treasure of
literature.

It would not be proper at this occasion to forget my elder sister Mahasati

Pushpavatiji Maharaj; because she is a perennial source of instigation to me to
step forward in the field of knowledge.
The serviceful co-operation of my sramana companions-Ramesh Muni, Rajendra
Muni, Naresh Muni is of great importance in my writing work. It would be
negligence on my part, if I do not remember their polite behavior and co-
operation.

Lastly, I am grateful to all the writers, whose books are referred in preparing the
present volume.

Rishabh Janma Jayanti

5th April, 1983
Devendra Muni Shastri
Harakhachandra Kothari Bhavan
Two, Chopasni Road, Jodhpur.
Part 1

Nature of Darsana and Darsanika Literature

Darsana: A Synoptic Study

Darsana is an expression of man’s inherent capacity for intellectual

discrimination. The word darsana is derived from the root term Drs to see.
Drsyate anena iti darsanam signifies the meaning that it is perception.
Perception may be of different types like sense perception, logical inquiry or
insight of the nature of soul. However, darsana in its true sense would refer to
the intuitive experience aided by intellectual discrimination. Darsana would
mean the perception of Atman and not merely knowledge of the physical world.
It enables one to gain the inner meaning of life and the world. Darsana means
‘direct knowledge’, ‘intuitive experience’. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan holds the view
that “darsana is not an intuition, however much it may be allied to it. Perhaps
the word is advisedly used, to indicate a thought system acquired by intuitive
experience and sustained by logical argument." 1 The seer who has darsana
gains a wider perspective of the view of the life and the world than the scientist
and the poet. The scientist looks at reality from a particular aspect and from
analytical point of view, although he draws certain conclusions guided by flashes
of intuitive knowledge. The poet has, as his subject, infinite beauty of the whole
world in all its manifestations. But the seer, who is a philosopher, looks at life
and the world from the synoptic point of view. His outlook is much wider in its
scope and includes diverse points of view. He is not bound by the limitations of
particular aspects of the subject as the scientist is. He views life steadily and
sees it in all its comprehensiveness. As Plato observes, a philosopher
(Darsanika) is “the spectator of all time and existence”. Darsana is the whole-
view as revealed to the soul-sense. Man is a rational animal and rationality is the
chief differential, which distinguishes him from others. He thinks about the
nature of the different things of the world. Darsana originated from the moment
when man began to think and cogitate. The antiquity of darsana could be traced
to man himself. There have been divergent approaches to the understanding of
the origin of darsana, based on the prevailing circumstances. Some have laid
emphasis upon the intellectual exercise, while others have given primary
importance to the aspect of wisdom. Darsana stands for a philosophical
perspective, a Weltanschauung. It means the view of the world. There are some
thinkers who contend that darsana are the perception of the self. Thus, the
varied viewpoints may be traced to the circumstances, which prevailed during
particular periods of time.

ORIGIN OF DARSANA
Faith

Some thinkers say that the origin of darsana lies in intellectual inquiry. It is
believed that darsana begins from the exact moment, one asks the question:
‘Why'. Before the commencement of the age of darsana, there was the age of
faith (sraddha). Statements of an authority, like a prophet, were implicitly
accepted as true in nature. For instance, we find in recorded history, utterances
of great prophets like the Buddha and Mahavira and the statements of Manu
were accepted implicitly as ipso facto Truths. It may be noted in the context,
that faith marks the starting-point of one’s journey towards the ultimate goal. It
also indicates the first vision of truth. It is considered as a great moral virtue and
absolutely essential for a spiritual aspirant for his realization of the Supreme,
according to the Indian tradition. For instance, the Rgveda praises faith.1 The
Gita proclaims that only the faithful gains knowledge.2

Logic

This gave way to the place of reason. In the process of intellectual inquiry, man
began to get hold on the understanding of the phenomena of nature. The
cardinal dictum in this age was the question: “What is the nature of Reality". The
criterion of the origin of philosophy lies in the inquiry into the nature of reality.

Wonder

Some philosophers contend that philosophy had its origin in curiosity to

understand Nature’s phenomena, which was baffling to the finite mind. The
World of Nature thwarted the imaginations of the poet and the seer. The
sublimity of nature’s beauty, the grandeur and the fragrance of blooming
flowers, the fierce wind blowing, the sunshine, the rapturous senses of the
flowing of rivers and the roaring of seas, the dazzling-twinkling stars in the sky
amidst the encircling beauty of moon’s light-all the aspects of nature’s delight
were the subjects of philosophical inquiry into the nature of its origin and
creation. The Greek philosophers hold the view that the origin of philosophy lies
in ‘wonder’. To think and to wonder by looking at the vicissitudes of life is
philosophy.

Doubt

The origin of modern philosophy is to be traced to this early tendency of

doubting spirit and also to the questioning attitude. Francis Bacon, for instance,
began to doubt the teachings of the Church. He aimed at bringing about a
synthesis between science and philosophy on the basis of integration, and he
ended with founding philosophy on the solid foundation of intuitive experience.
It may be noted here that science gives up knowledge, but only philosophy alone
gives us wisdom. Science is analytical description while philosophy is synthetic
interpretation. “Men are not animals erect,” said Francis Bacon, “but immortal
gods". He contended that man must war only on the obstacles that nature offers
to the triumph of man.

Descartes too stressed the need of ‘methodic doubt’ as the cobweb-clearing

prerequisite of honest thought. He built his super-structure of mathematical
philosophy based on the notion of ‘doubt’. Immanuel Kant based his philosophy
on the critique of knowledge and gave a formalistic philosophy of the
‘Noumenon’. Similarly, the rationalistic pluralism was based on the methods
used by Descartes. Thus, we find that Western philosophers adopted the
method of ‘doubt’ in analyzing the verities of life. Indian philosophers have
based their development of philosophical thought on the aspect of the ‘innate
curiosity’ of man to comprehend the nature of Reality.

DARSANA AND PHILOSOPHY

Darsana and philosophy are often referred to as synonyms. However, there is a

primary distinction in the connotation of the terms. Darsana leads to the
knowledge of the self. The ultimate end of darsana is to know oneself. The
starting-point of Indian thought is its emphasis on man himself. If we take the
utterances of the important philosophers of each tradition into consideration,
‘Man know thyself’ may be said to be the chief advice of all the four traditions.
Socrates said it in so many words. The Upanisada did the same when they
exhorted man: atmanam viddhi (know thyself). Philosophy is the intellectual
pursuit of the understanding of the ultimate reality. It is, as a philosopher puts
it, an unusually rigorous effort to think consistently. It is an intellectual
gymnastic, a luxury of the mind. But darsana has a practical purpose-in one’s
efforts to free oneself from the bondage of worldly existence. It aims at seeking
solace in the eternal bliss free from the empirical adjuncts of this life. In this
sense, darsana expresses the lofty grandeur of intuition. Darsana, according to
the Indian tradition, has not remained restricted to the academic pursuits of
understanding the nature of the ultimate reality to be sought in philosophy. It
has transcended the narrow empirical barriers and seeks to realize the highest
truth. In the West, philosophy is considered merely as an academic pursuit of
knowledge for knowledge sake. In India, the seers have gained the vision of
reality. Hence, the term ‘darsana’ as applied to Indian thought becomes
significant.

DARSANA AND SCIENCE

In this scientific and materialistic age, we find that men are generally drawn
towards gaining materialistic pleasures in life and seem to neglect the spiritual
values of life. Perhaps the reason lies in this that men are caught in the web of
samsara and fail to realize the deeper significance of life beyond this mundane
world. Darsana enables one to seek Truth through meditation while science tries
to understand the mysteries of the world through experimental investigation.
Science is analytic, while philosophy and darsana are synthetic in approach. The
conclusions of science are only intellectual shorthands and are provisional.
Scientific hypothesis is liable to be rejected. In fact, science proceeds to develop
on the basis of the rejection of earlier hypothesis in favor of more acceptable
forms. The Newton’s law is no longer accepted today. Einstein’s Theory of
Relativity may also be overshadowed by a more cogent hypothesis at a later
date.

Darsana is centered round the understanding and realization of the self, while
the main task of science is to comprehend the mysteries of nature. Darsana
meditates on the Atman and Parmatman. Science analyses the intricacies of
nature and discovers the uniformities of the laws of nature. Darsana looks at the
universe as an integrated whole. Science attempts to comprehend the diverse
aspects of the universe. Science looks at reality piecemeal. Darsana gives
prominence to reason, meditation and intuition. On the contrary, science lays
emphasis on analytical experience, experimental observation and deductive
analysis. The conclusions of science are tentative in nature because they are
subject to further investigations. Darsana gives a synoptic picture of reality and,
therefore, it discloses the aspects of truth and not mere probabilities. Yet
modern thinkers in their enthusiasm for understanding the nature have given
exclusive importance to scientific investigations and analyses.

Darsana can be said to be the vision. It is the higher intuition by which

realization of the supreme reality becomes true. A scientist looks at reality
through the external eye, although he uses reason and intuition to understand
the nature of reality. A seer (Darsanika) transcends the ordinary perceptions of
the outer eye and sees the highest reality through the inner eye. Darsana really
enables one to understand the world and life in its entirety. As Matthew Arnold
said: “Darsana looks at life steadity and looks at it as a whole". Thus, we find,
Darsana embraces in its fold the manifold aspects of scientific knowledge and
investigations and philosophical pursuits as well. Bertrand Russell observes: “the
utility of science is twofold-one is that it understands everything that falls within
the field of its experimentation; the other is that whatever is understood should
be brought within the scope of rules." Russell’s analysis shows that science can
be understood from two angles--one are with reference to its methodology, and
the other with reference to the subject matter.

The methodological approaches of science and Darsana stand on different

footings. While science uses empirical tools of observation and experimentation,
darsana adopts of transcendental modes of meditation and vision.

Science studies the universe in its various aspects. It is therefore analytic. Each
science studies a particular aspect of life. For instance, Biology studies life,
Physics studies matter, while Psychology studies the mind. Each science has its
own limited field of experience as its subject matter. The physical sciences study
the physical matter and its modification. Biological Sciences like Psychology
study mind and its states. The fundamental approach of all these sciences is
empirical in nature. But darsana uses the synthetic method in which reason and
intuition are synthesized and harmonized, in order to present a comprehensive
picture of reality.

DARSANA AND RELIGION

We have earlier noted that Darsana is one of the most characteristic and
fundamental thoughts of Indian philosophy-the meditative and mystical attitude
of mind toward an idealistic conception of the universe. Manu, the famous Hindu
Lawgiver, gives a clear perception of the notion of darsana thus:

‘’He who is possessed of true insight (darsanasampanna is not bound by deeds,

But the man destitute of insight (darsanenavihina) is involved in the cycle of
existence.'' 1

F. H. BRADLEY observes “Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete

reality of goodness through every aspect of our being". Philosophers also
contend that religion is ‘natural’ because the ultimate realities must be a
‘natural’ part of the universe of which man becomes conscious. Religion enables
every man what he is, and helps him to say, ‘Here is reality’: As Stanley Cook
observes: “Religion primarily involves some immediate consciousness of
transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, vitally influencing life and
thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire
stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and
tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies,
philosophies, and scientific doctrines.”1

Against this background, let us now compare and contrast the roles of darsana
and religion in all spheres of human activity.

Darsana and religion are both essential for man to gain self-realization or God-
realization. Scholars in regard to their mutual relationships have stated
divergent views. There are some that hold the view that they are identical.
Some others say that they are entirely different, two poles set asunder.
Whatever may be the opposing viewpoints, we cannot deny the fact that both
are fundamentally essential for man to reach higher heights of spiritual progress.
Considered thus, they are supplementary to each other. Reason, as we know, is
the differential of man. It is the prerogative of man. When reason looks within
itself, when man introspects, darsana is born; but when reason projects into the
external world and translates thoughts into action, then religion arises. When
religion and darsana have in common is they are fundamental to the way of life
of an individual or of a society, and it is not surpassing that they should be
closely connected. It is generally said, “religion is morality tinged with emotion."
Indeed, it has often been held that morality is wholly dependent on religion, that
a man who has no religion cannot have any morality. Whatever may be the
theories of the origin of religion, religion is born when the Truth arrived at by
reason is translated into action in the form of moral codes. For instance, mere
knowledge that ‘it is good to tell the Truth’ is not sufficient unless it is translated
into action. Truth speaking would then have mere academic interest. Unless we
practice speaking Truth, it will not have any meaning. However, philosophers
like Socrates said, “Virtue is knowledge” and “to know virtue is to be virtuous."
According to Socrates, “Knowledge is not mere collection of informations nor
academic facts, it is realization. To know is to realize." In this sense again,
darsana and religion are two main aspects of the experience. Without religion,
darsana would be merely delusive. Darsana becomes divine when it is strongly
backed by religion. In other words, darsana and religion are tow inseparable
entities of life. Besides, they are complementary to each other. Religion without
darsana is blind and darsana without religion is heretic. Bereft of darsana that
gives the rational and intuitional basis for its belief and practice, religion would
degenerate into mere blind belief and become only a collection of superstitious
practices without any rational and intuitional basis. They early primitive forms of
religion are blind and have no rational or intuitional basis. On the other hand,
darsana without the favor of religion would be empty, as it would not flow with
emotion and noble sentiments. The two are necessary for the realization of the
divine nature of man. Human life would be meaningless and devoid of the divine
nature of man. Human life would be meaningless and devoid of the higher
values of life, without the harmonious blending of darsana and religion in man’s
life and activity. A synthesis of the two would bring about a harmonious
development in man’s personality and endow him with a balanced view of life.

DARSANA AND LIFE

It may be asked: What is the relation of darsana with life as such? The answer to
it is suggestive of the fact that man is given to thinking. Man continues to think
and thinks constantly. As Aristotle said, “Man is a rational animal." Rationality is
his chief characteristic. Reasoning is his prerogative and through it combined
with his intuitive power, man seeks to build a structure of philosophy and
darsana. Sankara sums up the unique nature of man thus: ‘’Karma-
jnanadhikarat.'' He is one who is capable of both knowledge and moral freedom.
When man ceases to think and to intuit, he falls down to the status of an animal.
In short, it is impossible for a human being to the status of an animal. In short, it
is impossible for a human being to live without darsana or faith. Man’s life is a
sage of constant and coherent thinking. First, the knowledge of the ‘self’ dawns
on him and then of the ‘other’ as related to him. The knowledge, in fact, the
realization of the relation of the self with the other, is necessary for the
realization of one’s highest goal of perfection. To meditate on the fundamental
facts and values of life, to put them to the test of reason and to act up to the
ideals and values of life, is the expression of the relation of darsana to life. Life
compels man to live in society. He is gregarious, selfish and yet a rational and
moral animal. Self-development is possible only through his active social
participation that implies the observance of ethical codes of life. Man’s true
destiny is not the conquest of his external nature but the conquest of his own
self because atmanigraha or the suppression of the lower self alone indicates the
greatness of the human spirit. Man is not a ‘lost’ creature. He is ever capable of
self-development. Self-development is possible only through gaining
philosophical truths. This is made possible only through darsana. Thus, we find
the inseparability of darsana to life.
DARSANA AND THE WORLD

Having analyzed the relation between darsana and life, let us now attempt to
understand the significance of the relation of darsana to the external world.
Knowledge of the relation between life and the external world would give us the
idea of the extent to which darsana values the relation and the extent to which
man understands his relation to the values of life as such.

The world is as much the subject matter of darsana as life is. It studies life and
the world alike. In the analysis of philosophical thought, there are two
fundamental streams-the idealistic and the structure. The realist affirms the
reality of the external world, independent of cognitive consciousness. The
idealist affirms the priority of cognitive consciousness and the reality of idea
independent of the external world. In other words, the realist posits the
existence and reality of the external object independent of our knowledge of it.
The idealist posits the reality of an idea because we know the external object
and we considered it to be real. The different trends of idealistic thought are-
Subjective Idealism, Objective Idealism and Absolute Idealism. Similarly, there
are different types of realism, such as Naive Realism and Critical Realism.
Materialism would claim its relation to realism. Some contend that realism leads
to philosophy of matter and idealism leads to the philosophy of spirit. In Indian
thought, Advaita of Sankara, Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu and Sunyavada of
Nagarjuna are forms of idealism. Advaita affirms the identity of Atman and
Brahman, and the external world as an appearance. Vasubandhu states that the
world and its modifications are the forms of vijnana and the real can be
described as the alayavijnana (storehouse of consciousness). Nagarjuna goes
further than the Vijnanavadins and Advaitvadins by affirming that everything
including the external world, the self and God is unreal. Even dharma and
buddhi are unreal. The real is the sunya. The philosophy of Nagarjuna is
intricate in nature and poses problems to understand it. It is difficult to
understand the philosophy of Nagarjuna. Some have interpreted the sunya in
the absolutist sense of the term. Some others have interpreted the sunya in the
nihilist sense as the ‘void’.

Like the idealist tendencies, we have the realist schools of thought expressed in
the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of thought. Sankhya thought may be
considered to be realistic in a sense, because it posits the reality of two
fundamental principles-Prakrti and Purusa. In these philosophies, the empirical
as well as the transcendental spiritual reality have been accepted. The Jaina
gives the anekanta point of view. It is realistic and empirical in approach to the
understanding of reality.

A study of Western philosophy shows that in the Fifth century B. C., Parmenides
affirmed that real is the Being and not becoming. Being is. In this sense,
knowledge and the known are identical. This is the beginning of idealist thought
in the West. Socrates was primary a moral philosopher. His main object was to
make man good. Plato emphasized the primacy of the spirit. But, he built a
structure of philosophy that may be more realistic than idealistic. Plato raised
the ideal of Socrates to the metaphysical level and placed them in the world of
ideas. Ideal are real, objective, eternal and perfect. They live in the world of
ideas. Aristotle was more earthly than Plato was. He affirmed that ‘Form’ and
‘Matter’ are the two ultimate principles and ultimate realities. Pure Form and
pure Matter do not exist in the world, but they are real. The world consists of
form and matter. In European philosophy, Descartes is considered to be the
father of modern philosophy. He started with the method of doubt and built a
philosophy on the solid foundations of mathematics. With him commenced the
Rationalist School of Thought in modern philosophy.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (DARSANA)

Western thinkers have alleged that Indian philosophy is pessimistic and because
of its emphasis on renunciation and self-denial, it has lost the status of an
academic pursuit and cannot be aptly called philosophy. The primary object of
philosophy in India is practical. It aims at freeing man from the bondage of this
world that is full of misery. In this, it may be argued that Indian thought is
pessimistic. But pessimism in Indian thought is only used as a means and never
as an end in itself. In this sense again, all philosophy is pessimistic. If we
consider the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, we can say that it is not
pessimistic at all, because the aim of Indian thought is to free one from the
misery of this life and to lead him to transcend the misery and to attain the
highest bliss. Misery is a fact of life. But the highest bliss is also the fact of
experience that can be attained by every one who transcends the misery of this
world. This can be achieved by jnana-marga (the path of knowledge), bhakti-
marga (the path of devotion), and Karma marga (the path of action). The Jainas
affirm that the way to self-realization is the synthesis of right intuition (samyag-
darsana), right knowledge (samyag-jnana) and right conduct (samyag-caritra).
In this sense, Indian thought is not pessimistic but on the contrary, highly
optimistic. It is melioristic.

Indian philosophers aimed at divination of man. Their main object was to

impress upon the people that enjoyment of the pleasures of life should not be
the primary end of life. They exhorted the people to give up indulgence on
worldly or sensual pleasure and adopt an attitude of renunciation. Whether it
was the Advaitavada of Shankaracharya, visistadvaita of Ramanujacarya,
Sunyavada of Nagarjuna, Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu or Ahimsa and
Anekantavada of Mahavira, all of them inspired the people of their age to give up
enjoyment of pleasures and to adopt the spirit of renunciation and penance. The
ultimate object of philosophy, as we have seen earlier, is the attainment of bliss.
Bliss is not to be confused with sense-pleasure, nor with happiness of this world.
It is pure bliss, which the soul in its pure state can enjoy without any obstruction
from the empirical adjuncts of this world because the enjoyment of bliss is the
pure state or characteristic of the soul. Pleasures of the world are fleeting and
ephemeral; they lead to misery. The ultimate state of bliss is the pure state that
the Indian philosophers stressed. Freedom from misery was considered by
some, like the Buddha, as the state of nirvana. Some others, like the Vedantins
and also the Jainas, gave a positive import to the state of perfection expressing
pure bliss. They called this moksa. Indian philosophers gave importance to the
path of self-denial and rejection of the pleasures of this world not out of the
sense of frustration but with the supreme object of the attainment of the highest
state of peace and bliss.

The outlook of the ancient Indian thought was, therefore, practical and
pragmatic. Its aim, as we have said earlier, is to lead men to the highest end of
perfection, not of the worldly existence but of the pure nature of the soul. The
Indian ‘Weltanschauung’ was, therefore, primarily spiritual and the translation of
the spiritual attitude to the worldly activity. Thus, the stress in Indian thought is
on ‘inwardness’ which has often been wrongly understood as an emphasis on
‘other worldliness’. But it is unjust to regard the Indian attitude towards this
world and its people as one of indifference or hatred. Some critics of Indian
thought believe that the Indian pursuit of spirituality is a selfish quest and that
the saint and the sage are concerned with their own salvation. “This criticism,”
observes Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, ‘’is the result of a gross misunderstanding of the
Indian ideal of spirituality... God realization or self-realization is a state of
perfection where there can be no room for even the least trace of selfishness.
For the man of wisdom there is not the distinction of ‘mine’ and ‘not-mine’. He
regards the whole world as his household.'' 1

Thus, in India, philosophy is to be lived and it is not merely an academic pursuit.

In the West, philosophy was primarily an academic pursuit to be studied in
classroom. Indian seers did not merely get to know the reality, but they
experienced the reality and they lived the spirit of reality. Siddhasena Divakara,
Dharmakirti, etc. did not toy with the idea of knowing the nature of Truth in the
academic sense, but the realization of the Truth permeated every fiber of their
being. Theirs was the realization of Truth. The Westerner remained in his ivory
tower without any conscious effort to translate the truth in everyday life. It
remained far from the madding crowd. But the supreme aim of Indian
philosophical tradition was the kindly light that led men from untruth to truth,
from darkness to light and from death to immortality.1 It has led us from
indulgence in worldly pleasures to renunciation of pleasures. It is not merely a
piece of antiquarian investigation that Indian thought deserves study. It is of
immense value to the student of philosophy and the study of Indian philosophy
alone can give a right perspective about the past of India. A study of Indian
philosophy will enable us to adopt a balanced view of life and healthy
perspective of the situations in life. It is the synthetic vision of India that has
made philosophy comprehend several sciences that have become differentiated
in modern time.2

Swami Vivekananda describes India as “the blessed punya-bhumi and as the

land from where came the founders of religions from the ancient times, deluging
the earth again and again with the pure and perennial waters of spiritual truth."
3
Spiritual life is the true genius of India. She has stood like a ‘Rock of Ages’,
and has survived the ravages of time because her civilization, which is inspired
by the spiritual insight of holy men, is marked by a certain moral integrity, a
fundamental loyalty, a fine balance of individual desires and social demands. It
is the emphasis on spiritual freedom as the summum bonum that makes the
message of Indian culture supremely significant to the modern man who is
afflicted with the malady of excessive outwardness.4 The men of God have felt
that the salvation of India did not lie in imitating the West but in holding fast to
Indian ideas and institutions and in purifying and elevating them. Their world-
view had an undeniable influence as a practical guide to life, individual and
collective national and transcendental.5 It should be noted that India did make
the first attempt to solve the most vital problem, the problem of harmony
between life and spirit, of which the vision came to her seers almost at the very
dawn of her spiritual history. Besides, the application of moral truths to the facts
of social life is the essence of Indian philosophical tradition.
Jaina Canonical Literature and Its Development

The Jaina philosophical literature is classified into five broad divisions, and it is
possible on the basis of this division to understand the nature of Jaina
philosophical literature from the time of Bhagavan Mahavira-the twenty-fourth
Tirthankara to the present day. The five divisions are as follows:

1. The Age of Agamas.

2. The Age of Anekanta view.
3. The Age of the establishment of Pramanasastra.
4. The Age of the Neo Nyaya.
5. The Modern Age of collection and editing.

THE AGE OF AGAMAS

The period of the Agamas may be considered to begin with the time of
parinirvana of tirthankara Mahavira (Vikrama-purva 470) and extended for
thousand years. The Ganadharas collated the teachings of Mahavira. Mahavira
gave the conceptual content of the Jain-sastras (in the artharupa) and the same
has been presented in the form of literature expressed in language by
Ganadharas. These works are called ‘Sutragama’. The Agama literature is,
therefore, of two forms: 1. Arthagama, and 2. Sutragama. The Agama literature
has been presented for the sake of the study by Acaryas, and therefore, it has
also been called, ‘Ganipitakas’. The collection of the teachings of Bhagavan
Mahavira has been made into 12 works and has been called Dvadasangi. They
are: (1) Acaranga, (2) Sutrakrtanga, (3) Sthananga, (4) Samavayanga, (5)
Bhagavati, (6) Jnatadharmakatha, (7) Upasakadasa, (8) Antakrtdasa, (9)
Anuttaraupapatikadasa, (10) Prasnavyakarana, (11) Vipaka, and (12) Drstivada.

From the point of view of structure, the Agama literature has been divided into
two types: (1) Anga-pravista and (2) Ananga-pravista. The collection and
systematic arrangements of the original teachings of Bhagavan Mahavira by the
Ganadharas are considered as Anga-pravista. The writings of the later elder
munis are called Ananga-pravista. The entire canonical literature, except the
twelve angas (Dvadasanga), has been called Ananga-pravista. It has also been
suggested that literature which comprised the dialogues between Tirthankara
Mahavira and his disciples concerning the fundamental questions relating to the
triple function of ‘generation of origination’, ‘destruction’ and ‘permanence’ of a
things is called ‘Anga-pravista’. It was on the basis of the teachings of Bhagavan
Mahavira that the elder munis wrote works explaining his teachings. These
works constitute ‘Ananga-pravista’ the former is the Anga literature and the
latter can be considered as sacred literature constituting the fringe of the Anga
literature.
The twelvefold Dvadasanga occupies the most prominent place in the Jain
canonical literature. Dvadasangi is valid by its own inherent nature. It is self-
valid. The validity of other canonical writings forming the Ananga-pravista is
determined to the extent to its consistency with the contents of the Dvadasanga.
Ananga-pravista is also valid because its statements are consistent with the
truths formulated in the Anga literature.

Ananga-pravista Agama literature can again be divided into two types: (a) the
writings of the Sthaviras (Elders) and (b) the writings which have come down
from the original teachings and from tradition. It is called ‘Niryudha’. Niryudha
Agamas are extracts from Dvadasangi or Purvas. They are classified as follows:

(1) Dasavaikalika (2) the Second Srutaskandha of Acaranga (3) Nisitha (4)
Vyavahara (5) Brhatkalpa, and (6) Dasasruta-skandha. Arya Sayyambhava
preached Dasavaikalika to his son Manaka.1 The other Agamas were taught by
Kevali Bhadrabahu. Syamarya was the author of Prajnapana. Anuyogadvara
was of Aryaraksita and Devavachak wrote Nandi.

From the point of view of language, the canonical literature can be classified into
two eras: the first era is from 400 B.C. to 100 A. D. The Agamas written during
this period have been written in Ardhamagadhi. The second era can be stated to
be from 100 A. D. to 500 A. D. and the writings in this period are in Jaina
Maharastri Prakrt.

In Sthananga and Nandisutra we get two types of division: 1. Anga-pravista and

2. Anga-bahya. We get similar distinctions in the Digambara literature also.
Agama literature has been described on the basis of the analogy of purusa, the
human personality having different organs. Agama literature has, therefore,
been referred to as ‘Agama purusa’. Anga-pravista literature was considered as
Anga-sthaniya and the twelve sutras were given the status of Upanga (Upanga-
sthaniya). As the human body has organs like, two legs, shoulders, neck and the
head, similarly the Agama purusa can be considered on that analogy as having
organs of this type. The twelve angas are considered to be the organs of the
Sruta-purusa and therefore they have been called ‘Angapravista’. The ears and
eyes etc. have been considered as upangas. Similarly, the twelve upangas are
mentioned as ‘Upangas’.

ANGA UPANGA
Acaranga Aupapatika
Sutrakrtanga Rajaprasniya
Sthananga Jivabhigama
Bhagavati Jambudvipaprajnapti
Jnatadharmakatha Suryaprajnapti
Upasakadasa Candraprajnapti
Antakrtdasa Kalpika
Anuttarapapatikadasa Kalpavatamsika
Prasnavyakarana Puspika
Vipaka Puspa-culika
Drstivada Vrsnidasa

Acarya Umasvati in his Tattvartha-bhasya.1 first used the term 'Upanga'

The term ‘Chedasutra’ was first used in the ‘Avasyakaniryukti2 and later in the
commentaries (Bhasyas). There are four Chedasutras: (I) Vyavahara, (ii)
Brhatkalpa, (iii) Nisitha and (iv) Dasasruta-skandha.

The use of the term ‘Mula’ is of very later date. Dasavaikalika and
Uttaradhyayana have been considered to be the ‘Mulasutras’. Nandi and
Anuyogadvara are the Culika-sutras.

In this way, the Angabahya-sruta literature has been classified in different ways
from time to time. An elaborate discussion on this question has been given in
the work entitled Sahitya aur Samskrti that may be referred to for a detailed
study.

Devardhigani Ksamasramana today has scribed the canonical literature

available. Agama literature was not in the written form before this time. In the
second century after the Parinirvana of Bhagavan Mahavira, a severe famine
struck forever twelve years. Soon after the famine, a Council was organized in
which the Agamas were for the first time recited. The second attempt at
crystallizing the Agamas was made during the period between Vira Nirvana
Samvat 827 to 840. Two recitations were held during this period one at Mathura
and the other at Vallabhi. The Council at Mathura was presided over by Arya
Skandila and the second Council at Vallabhi was presided over by Acarya
Nagarjuna. These recitations have been referred to as Mathuri and Vallabhi
recitations. But during all these three recitations the Agamas were not put in
writing. The work of writing the Agamas was not put in writing. The work of
writing the Agamas was done in Vallabhi after Vira Nirvana 980 under the
guidance of Devardhigani Ksamasramana. The period upto these were full of
obstacles due to effects of many severe famines. Much of the Sruta, which had
been handed down by oral tradition, was forgotten; but whatever was possible to
be revived by memory was recited and written down. The Agamas were
collected in fragments. Whatever was available, was systematically organized
and presented in the form of Agamic works.

The present form of Agamas is to be, therefore, traced to the work done by
Devardhigani. He collected the Anga and the Anga-bahya literature and edited
them. He is, therefore, considered as the editor of the Agama literature in the
present form.1

Philosophical Discussions in the Agamas

There is a good deal of philosophical discussion in the Agamas: (I) Sutrakrtanga.

(Ii) Prajnapana, (iii) Bhagavati, (iv) Nandi, (v) Sthananga, (vi) Samavayanga and
(vii) Anuyogadvara.
Sutrakrtanga refutes the prevailing philosophical schools of thought. In this
work, Naturalistic Monism (Bhutadvaitavada) has been refuted, and the doctrine
of separate and independent soul is established. The God and Soul Monism
(Brahmadvaitvada) is also refuted. In its place, the doctrine of the plurality of
souls is established. The doctrine of karma and its effects has been proved. The
theistic concept of God has been rejected. It is established that the world
(samsara) is beginningless (anadi) and endless (ananta). Several other theories
of philosophy prevailing at that time, like Akriyavada, Vinayavada, Ajnanavada
were refuted and the validity of Kriyavada (activism) were propounded.

In the Prajnapana we get a detailed discussion about the nature of the soul (Jiva)
from various points of view.

In the Rajaprasaniya, after an elaborate refutation of the atheistic thought, there

is an exposition of the Atman and the other world with copious illustrations and
expositions of different concepts.

In the Bhagavati we get a beautiful study of the topics like, Naya, Pramana,
Saptabhangi, and Anekantavada.

Nandisutra discusses the nature and types of knowledge.

In the Sthananga, there is discussion of the important topics like, Atman, Pudgala
(matter), Jnana and other topics. In the philosophical doctrines of Mahavira,
there are references to Nihnavavada, which refers to the single point of approach
or view of ekanta.

Samavayanga contains discussions on topics like, Jnana, Naya and Pramana etc.,
etc.

The Anuyogadvara has a discussion of the connotation of the term and incidental
references to Pramana and Naya and other principles.

In the commentaries (Tikas) of these Agamas we find vivid discussions on

philosophical topics.

Among the commentators the names of Sanghadasagani and Jinabhadragani are

frequently mentioned. They lived in the 7th century of vikrama era.
Jinabhadragani has written an important commentary called
Visesavasyakabhasya. Sanghadasagani’s Brhatkalpabhasya is a classical work,
which contains an exposition of the codes of conduct of Sramana from the
philosophical as well as argumentative points of view.

We cannot easily forget the name of Acarya Haribhadra, a renewed Sanskrit

commentator. He has written his commentary in Sanskrit on the basis of the
ancient curnis. In these commentaries he has made special use of philosophical
discussions. We find the same feature in Malayagiri’s commentary; philosophical
discourses have been employed in the work.

In the agama literature, prominence has been accorded to epistemological and

scientific discussions; however the philosophical aspects has not received much
attention as in religious literature other than the agamas. The primary reason
for this is that the agama literature is mainly meant for sadhakas (seekers of
truth). For the edification of the sadhakas, there are frequent repetitions at
many places. These agamic works make special mention of the injunctions
regarding the codes of conduct for the sadhakas. But in the later literature,
importance has been given to discussion of philosophical topics.

Tattvarthasutra is the most important work of Acarya Umasvati. It is a

comprehensive philosophical work, which discusses various subjects including
philosophy and science. Here, we find most enlightened discussions of subjects
like Philosophy, Ethics, Geography, Cosmology, Natural Philosophy and the
karma theory. Acarya Umasvati has also written a commentary (Bhasya) on his
Tattvarthasutra. In the 6th century A.D. Acarya Pujyapada has written a
commentary on Tattvarthasutra. It is called Sarvarthasiddhi. Akalanka and
Vidyanandi have also written commentaries on this work. Akalanka’s Rajavartika
and Vidyanandi’s Slokavarttika are important works. These Acaryas belonged to
the Digambara tradition. In these works, we get very thought provoking
discussions of the philosophical topics. In the Svetambara tradition, Acarya
Siddhasena and Haribhadra have also written commentaries on the
Tattvarthasutra. This was in the 8th or 9th century A.D. We find in these works
evidence of a distinct development of Jaina logic and philosophy. It would not be
an exaggeration to say that just as Dharmakirti’s commentary Pramanavarttika
on Dignaga’s Pramansamuccaya became the centre of the development of
Buddhist logic. So also the commentaries on Tattvarthasutra became the central
base for the development of Jaina logic. We get important commentaries on
Tattvarthasutra in the later period, as for instance, Malayagiri’s commentary in
the 12th century, A.D., Cirantanamuni’s in the 14th century A. D. and the
commentary of the great logician Yasovijayaji in the 18th century A.D. In
addition to these, there are several other writers of the Digambara tradition who
have written commentaries on Tattvarthasutra. We have commentaries of
Srutasagara and Vibudhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmideva and
Abhayanki. In the 20th century also we have several commentaries on the
Tattvarthasutra in Hindi and Gujarati languages.

The Tattvarthasutra nearly marks the end of agamayuga (age of agamas).

ANEKANTA YUGA-AGE OF ANEKANTA

In the Buddhist literature in India, the great scholar Nagarjuna, by his intellectual
discussions and writings, created a stir in the philosophical climate of his time
and he gave impetus to the development of philosophical thought. Nagarjuna’s
writings are to be found in all fields of Buddhist thought. But his special field was
logic and metaphysics. He has a new turn to the development of logic and
metaphysics. Prior to him, philosophy was primarily based on faith and its
elucidation. But with Nagarjuna we find a new turn to philosophical development
that gave emphasis on rational and critical studies. The Sunyavada of Nagarjuna
was the turning point for philosophy; and philosophy was brought to a systematic
level. This type of intellectual development was not merely restricted to the
development of Buddhist thought, but it influenced the development of other
systems of Indian philosophy. As a result of this, Jainism was also influenced to
some extent with the Nagarjuna’s philosophical wave. The great logicians
Acarya Siddhasena Divakara and Samantabhadra gave a systematic turn to the
development to Jaina Philosophy. This was during the 5th and 6th centuries A. D.
These Acaryas brought about a systematic development of the Anekantavada,
whose roots could be found in the teachings of Bhagavan Mahavira. On the basis
of this study, we can call this age as the age of the establishment of Anekanta
doctrine-Anekanta Sthapana Yuga. In this age, we find great scholars like Acarya
Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra, Mallavadi, Acarya Singhagani and Acarya
Patrakesari who built up Jaina philosophy on rational and logical foundations.
During this period of hectic intellectual activity, these Acaryas had triple duties
to perform - (1) They had to present Jaina thought in a systematic way on sound
logical basis; (2) To answer effectively the objections and difficulties raised by
the Buddhist scholars; (3) To present the Jaina thought effectively and vigorously
by answering the objections of the philosophers of the Vedic school of thought.
This period is regarded as the golden age (Svarnima Yuga) in the Jaina
philosophical literature.

In this age, Indian philosophical thought and three prominent theories which
were being frequently discussed. They are (I) Sunyavada of Nagarjuna, (ii)
Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu and (iii) Advaitavada of Vedanta. Jaina acaryas
thought that exposition of Anekantavada and Syadvada, in the face of the three
theories prevailing in Indian thought at that time, would give both validity and
strength to Jaina philosophy and that Jaina thought could be ably defended with
the help of Anekantavada and Syadvada. On this account, this age is considered
to be the Anekanta Sthapana Yuga or Anekantavadi Yuga.

PRAMANA SASTRA-VYAVASTHA YUGA

According to logic, knowledge of a thing could be established by means of valid

sources of knowledge. In Sanskrit literature the Pramanasastra became an
important subject. In this age Jaina acaryas turned their attention from
discussion of anekanta to the Pramanasastra. In Indian philosophy we find the
influence of rigorous logical discussions of Dignaga on the pramanasastra and
Nyayasastra. Dignaga provided inspiration to the development of Indian logic.
He was the interpreter of a very strong and systematic theory of logic and
pramanasastra. Dignaga was the father of the pramanasastra and Dharmakirti is
to be considered as the promoter of Indian logic. The intense and rapid
development of logical thought due to the inspiration of Dignaga had its
influence on the development of logic in other Darsanas also. In the Vedic
tradition, eminent logicians like Vyomasiva, Jayanta, Udyotakara and Kumarila
helped the development of logic in a systematic way. During this period (i.e., 8th
and 9th centuries A. D.) there were many Jaina acaryas who were great logicians.
Among them may be mentioned, the names of Haribhadra and Akalanka.
Haribhadra did not write any independent work on Pramanasastra. However his
works, Anekanta Jayapataka, Sastravartasamuccaya and Saddarsanasamuccaya
influenced the development of Jaina logic and metaphysics in his works
Pramanasangraha, Nyaya-viniscaya and Laghiyastraya. Vidyanandi wrote a
commentary entitled Astasahasri, on the work Astasati of Akalanka that was a
commentary on Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra. By this work Vidyanandi gave
a firm status to the Jaina pramanasastra. During this period Prabhacandra wrote
Prameyakamalamartanda and Nyaya-kumudacandra. These works give an
elaborate and critical discussion of the Jana pramanasastra. Vadidevasuri wrote
a commentary on his own work Pramanatattavanayaloka. This commentary is
called Syadvadaratnakara and it is really a crest jewel (Ratnakara) of Jaina logic.
It gives a comprehensive view of Jaina logic. Ratnaprabhasuri, disciple of
Vadidevasuri, has written Ratnakaravatarika and in this work he has given the
salient features of the problems discussed in Syadvadaratnakara. Acarya
Hemacandra has made a unique contribution by his book Pramanamimamsa.
Similarly, Mallisena’s Syadvadamanjari is a significant contribution to Jaina logic
of this age. All these acaryas have given an able and logical refutation of the
Dignaga’s position concerning Jaina logic. The special feature of the written of
this age is to be found in their two-fold object (I) refutation of the rival schools of
thought; and (ii) presentation of own school of thought in a systematic way. This
dual function of refutation and presentation (Khandana-mandana) of the logical
discussion is the most important contribution of this age of pramanasastra.

AGE OF THE NEO-NYAYA (NAVYA-NYAYA)

In the development of the Indian logic, the appearance of the book

Tattvacintamani gave a new turn to the development of logic that may be called
Neo-logic. The credit for this revolutionary change from logic to Neo-logic goes
to a brilliant writer of the 13th century, a Naiyayika, named Gangesa. In
Tattvacintamani, the author has used new terminology of logic and written in a
new style this work is the most prominent work in the Indian logic and meta
physics of this age. Tattvacintamani discusses the naiyaika theory of pramanas
mentioning four pramanas beginning with pratyaksa. The language and the
style used for discussing logical problems in this work by Gangesa are entirely
new. He has discussed the problems that are very terse and purely academic in
a language that attracts and appeals even to the common man. Many scholars
have written commentaries on Gangesa’s Tattvacintamani. Tattvacintamani
brought about a new turn in the development of Indian logic. The Buddhist
scholars were influenced by this new wave. The Jaina scholars also could not
escape from the powerful trend of this thought. The style of navya-nyaya made
a profound influence on the Jaina acaryas. The books on Jaina logic were,
however, being written in the earlier style and tradition up to the end of the 17th
century A. D. It was only in the beginning of the 18th century that Upadhyaya
Yasovijaya wrote his work on Nyaya in the navya-nyaya style. His work anekanta
vyavastha written in the Neo-nyaya style helped the re-establishment of the
Anekantavada. Similarly, Jainatarkabhasya and Jnanabindu were two important
contributions to the Jaina pramanasastra. Nayapradipa, Nayarahasya and
Nayopadista were important works on nayavada. A commentary on Nayopadesa
called Nayamrtatarangini is an important work. An explanatory work on
Astasahasri was also written. Similarly, a commentary on Sastravartasamuccaya
of Haribhadra was written. It is called Syadvadakapalata. Several other books
like Bhasarahasya, Vadarahasya helped the dual function of refuting the
naiyayika logic and presenting the Neo-logic of the Jainas. Apart from
Yasovijayaji, we find that Yasasvatasagara and Vimaladasa wrote works on logic
in the new style of navya-nyaya.

MODERN AGE-THE AGE OF ECLECTICISM

The trend of thought and writing, which Yasovijayaji started, continued to

influence for over a century. Some scholars did write commentaries and notes
on the classical texts on logic; but there was no substantial change in the trend
of thought. There was also no substantial contribution to the devilment of logic.
During the British period, however, a fundamental change took place in the
outlook in dealing with the problems of logic and philosophy. But the scientific
outlook and the empirical approach towards looking at the philosophical
problems became prominent. Very few works in Sanskrit and Prakrt were written
during this period. The study of western created a profound influence on looking
at the problems of Indian philosophy. The ancient Indian literature began to be
studied in a new perspective under the influence of western thought. Three
important characteristics of the change can be mentioned:-(1) Comparative
study of the Indian thought in the light of the western thought; (2) Collection of
and editing ancient classics in the new perspective; and (3) Critical notings on
the problems of ancient Indian thought. There was another trend that developed
during this period, and that was, to give copies references while editing the
works.

In the Jaina tradition of writing, the credit of giving new interpretation while
editing the ancient texts goes to Pandit Sukhalalji Sanghavi. In his edited works,
we find critical notes of these books, a new outlook and profound scholarship.
Two more great scholars Pandit Mahendrakumarji Jain and Pandit Dalsukha
Malvaniya continued the tradition of Sukhalalji Sanghavi. Professors A. N.
Upadhye, Chakravarti and Hiralal Jain have also contributed immensely to the
development of Jaina thought by editing many ancient texts with critical notes.

At present, many scholars have been writing research articles on the problems of
Jaina logic and philosophy. Everyday the work of editing the ancient tests and
writing critical papers is fast progressing and it would be difficult to give an
exhaustive assessment of the enormous work being turned out in the recent
past. Editing and interpretation are the special features of this age. In this way,
we can classify Jaina literature into five divisions, and it is clear that the Jaina
literature is most comprehensive in all its aspects-philosophical or otherwise.

Every age has something special to contribute to scholarship and literature. The
school that absorbs the contributions of the age enhances itself regularly and
without pause; but which does not absorb these contributions becomes static
and less prominent. The fundamental value of writing remains constant in all
ages. It is only looked from new angels of thought every time. The inner core is
the same, but the outer expressions may differ.1

JAINISM IN THE AGE OF AGAMAS

The question how the Jaina philosophy was presented in the Agamas cannot be
easily answered unless we develop a catholic outlook and a historical sense. As
the Upanisadic philosophy developed in greater breadth and depth and more so
through the Bhagavadgita, we can say that the development of Jaina philosophy
was from the Agamic age to the later stages of logical and critical development.
The Agamic thought became broader and richer in depth during the age of
Commentaries while the philosophic development became rich and varied at the
time of Tattvarthasutra. We have now to see what were the characteristics of
Jaina philosophy at the Agama stage of thought.

Philosophical problems of the Agamas can be studied under two heads:-(1)

Prameya or Jneya (object of knowledge), and (2) Pramana or Jnana (valid sources
of knowledge). The former is the ontological and the latter is epistemological in
nature. The Jaina Agama literature gives prominence to the discussion of the
following problems:

(I) Anekanta attitude, (ii) Saptabhangi, (iii) Naya, (iv) Niksepa, (v) Dravya, (vi)
Guna, (vii) Paryaya, (viii) Padartha, (ix) Ksetra, (x) Kala and Bhava, (xi) Niscaya
and Vyavahara, (xii) Nimitta and Upadana, (xiii) Niyati and Purusartha, (xiv)
Karma and its effects, (xv) Acara and Yoga and other subjects. The problems of
Jnana and Pramana were discussed with reference to the nature and various
forms of knowledge exhaustively. Similarly, in the Agama literature, we get a
discussion of the various forms of pramanas and their characteristics. Pramana
has been classified into pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect). Similarly, we
find that there is a discussion of other pramanas like anumana (inference),
upamana (comparison) and sabda pramana (testimony). In the early Agamas we
get the interpretation of the term naya as point of view (Adesa) and outlook or
attitude (drsti). Similarly, we find the distinction between dravyarthika
(substance point of view) and paryayarthika naya (point of view of
modifications). The word Pradesarthika naya has also been used for
Paryayarthika naya. Discussions from the complete (sakaladesa) and partial
(vikaladesa) points of view about the problems of pramana Saptabhangi
(sevenfold approach to the valid sources of knowledge) and naya saptabhangi
(sevenfold points of view) are to be found in the early Agamas. There are also
descriptions of the four types of niksepa. We find a beautiful description of the
doctrines of Syadvada and Anekantavada by the dream of a cuckoo. The eternal
and the non-eternal nature of Jiva (soul) have been discussed. The problems of
logic like, vitanda and jalpa found their way in the discussion in the Agama
literature. In this way, by the exhaustive discussion of epistemological and
ontological problems the nature and the problems of validity of pramana were
presented in the Agama literature in a lucid way. Besides, we get a critical study
of the nature of six substances (satdravya) and nine padarthas (categories). It is
clear from this that the Jaina philosophical practices was more developed and
nature than the philosophical thought of the Vedic seers.

THE PROBLEM OF PRAMEYA (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OR ONTOLOGY)

The terms prameya and jneya have been used as synonyms in sense in the
Darsana literature. That which is the object of knowledge is called prameya.
‘Samyagjnana’ (right knowledge) is knowledge and it has for its object the
highest reality. That which can be comprehended by knowledge is called jneya.
The object of knowledge (Jneya or prameya) whatever it may be, can be known
according to Jainism from different points of view. Jainism affirms that we have
to consider the nature of an object from the point of view of anekanta (many-
sided approach to understanding of a thing).

According to the Jaina history, Bhagavan Mahavira carried on the tradition of

Jaina thought from the earlier Tirthankaras without making any material
modifications. In epistemological subjects Bhagavan Mahavira taught the
distinction between five kinds of knowledge as was taught by the earlier
Tirthankaras. Similarly, the doctrines of four niksepas, seven tattvas, nine
padarthas, five astikayas, karma, Gunasthana, lesya and dhyana were taught by
Mahavira in the same way in which the previous Tirthankaras like Parsvanatha
and all the Tirthankaras have taught. He did not deviate from the earlier path in
these respects. But in the case of moral codes Bhagavan Mahavira did introduce
some modification in the tradition of Tirthankara Parsvanatha, that he preached
the vow of Brahmacarya separately to the four vows preached by Parsvanatha.
Though the vow of Brahmacarya, in the tradition of Bhagavan Parsvanatha, was
amalgamated in the fourth vow of Aparigraha. We get references about this in
the dialogue between Kesi, a follower of Parsvanatha, and Gautama, a disciple of
Mahavira.

During the Chadmastha stage and soon after the harassment given to him by
Sulapani, Bhagvan Mahavira had a dream in which he saw a male cuckoo with
variegated wings this dream was interpreted to mean that Bhagavan Mahavira
would preach the multivalued theory through the Dvadasanga. Later on his
disciples went about preaching the doctrines of Anekanta to the followers of
Buddha and Nyaya-Vaisesika. Mahavira preached the doctrine of anekanta and
he eschewed dogmatic approach to the problems under discussions. In the
Sutrakrtanga we get a reference to Bhagavan Mahavira being asked in what
terms the monks should talk to the people and to his telling them that they
should teach Vibhajjavada. The concept of Vibhajjavada could be better
understood, if we study the Jaina as well as the Buddhist literatures.

In the Majjhimanikaya we find a reference to Tathagata Buddha answering the

question of Subha-Manavaka thus: ‘Oh! Manavaka, I am vaibhajjavadi and not
ekamsavadi’. From this, it appears that the Buddha accepted the Jaina concept
of Anekantavada that may also be referred to as Vibhajjavada. In fact,
Vibhajjavada expresses the spirit of anekanta in the discussion of the problems
of things of the world. It would now be necessary to understand the implications
of the doctrine of Syadvada.

Syadvada is the logical expression of the anekanta spirit in propositional forms.

It expresses the possibility of predicating other aspects of the Truth. When one
aspect is predicated, a full and comprehensive picture of reality would not be
possible. And, therefore, the Syad is prefixed to all the seven predications.
Anekanta and Syadvada are the unique and significant contributions of Jainism to
the Indian logic.

We get descriptions of the concept of dravya (substance) in the Agama

literature. We often find three terms: dravya (substance), guna (quality) and
paryaya (modification) in these works. Dravya (substance) has qualities (gunas)
and the expression of quality is paryaya (modification). The three are inherent,
yet different. There is primarily a dichotomous division of dravya (substance)
into: Jiva (living) and ajiva (non-living) substance or the same can be classified as
conscious substance and unconscious substance. There is the six-fold
classification of dravya: (I) Jiva (living), (ii) Pudgala (matter, (iii) Dharma (fulcrum
of motion), (iv) Adharma (fulcrum of rest) (v) Akasa (space) and (vi) Kala (time).
Excepting Kala (time), the other five dravyas are multi-dimensional. Therefore,
they are called ‘astikaya’, a technical word used by the Jainas for describing the
substance with multi-dimensions. Kala (time) is uni-dimensional and, therefore,
it is not ‘astikaya’. Every substance (dravya) has infinite qualities and every
quality (guna) expresses itself in infinite modes.

We get the description of niksepa in Agama literature. There is detailed analysis

of the concept of niksepa in Anuyogadvara. It is not however the work of a
Ganadhara. We find a reference in the Sthanangasutra regarding this concept
(Sthananga 4: 299) and by the discussion of ‘Sarva’ in that work, it is clear that
Bhagavan Mahavira himself taught the doctrine of niksepa. This term niksepa
has been very often used but, if the exact connotation of the term is not
understood, there would be confusion of thought. Niksepa denotes the method
of explaining the exact meaning of a term. Bhagavan Mahavira said that a term
can be used in four contexts: (I) nama (its name), (ii) Sthapana (its context), (iii)
dravya (the object connoting the name) and (iv) bhava (its conceptual meaning).
This concept of niksepa signifying the methodology of use of the term has been
discussed in the earliest canonical literature as also in the modern works on
logic. In the literature other than the Agamic, there is a new approach to the
understanding of this doctrine from the point of view of Neo-logic. Yasovijayaji
has given all elaborate discussion of the problem of niksepa along with the other
problems of pramana and naya.

Agama literature gives an exhaustive study of the concepts of dravya, Ksetra,

Kala and bhava. They have been studied from the points of view of intrinsic four-
fold distinctions (svacatustaya) and the extrinsic fourfold distinctions
(paracatustaya). A thing in its inherent nature (svadravya), in its own place (sva-
Ksetra), in its own time (svakala) and in its own inherent connotation (svabhava)
can be said to have been considered in its fourfold aspects (svacatustaya). A
thing can also be considered from the extrinsic points of view that would be
described as from the points of view of para-dravya (extrinsic substance),
paraksetra (extrinsic place), parakala (extrinsic time) and parabhava (accidental
characteristics). We find that the same object can be looked at from different
points of view. Consequently, we get different presentations of the nature of the
same object. This is due to the differences arising out of the attitude of the
person that may consider as subjective, the ability of the person, sources of
knowledge of the object, the existing state of the object at a particular place and
time. According to the extent of the influences of these factors, the cognition of
the object differs. In fact, every moment there are fleeting changes in the
subjective and objective factors influencing and determining the nature of the
cognition of the object. It would be difficult to present exhaustively the entire
canvas of the various factors operating at the time of the cognition of an object.
That is the reason why we find enormous diversity in the presentation of the
view of different individuals and schools of thought. Keeping this point in view,
Bhagavan Mahavira presented the concept of niksepa and emphasized that it is
possible to view an object from different fourfold angels: dravya, ksetra, Kala and
bhava.

CONCEPT OF PRAMANA

There is abundant discussion about the nature of pramana and jnana as

epistemological problems. Pramana and jnana have been considered as the
sources of cognizing objects. In the Agama literature, we find that there is
greater emphasis on the discussion of the topic of jnana that on pramana. We
come to know from the Rajaprasniya that the discussion about five-fold division
of jnana (knowledge) was there to be found much earlier that of Mahavira’s time.
In the Agama literature we get discussion of the divisions and subdivisions of
knowledge. In the analysis of the doctrine of karma we find a critical study of the
distinctions in the Jnanavaraniya karma (karma which obscures knowledge).
Similarly, we also the distinctions of Jiva Marganas (distinctions in the varying
character of selves) in the Purva literature. Similarly, we have a separate part of
the Purva literature called Jnana-pravada, which gives an exhaustive discussion
about the nature, and the five-fold division of knowledge. It is clear from these
evidences that the five-fold division of knowledge with their nature and sub-
divisions was known to Jaina long before Vardhamana Mahavira, the last of the
Tirthankaras. On the basis of the study of Agama literature, we can say that
there were three basic divisions in the analysis of the nature of jnana
(knowledge)-(i) in the first division, knowledge has been divided into five types,
(ii) the second division makes a distinction in knowledge into (a) separate direct
(pratyaksa) and (b) indirect (paroksa). Mati and Sruta jnana are considered as
paroksa because the elf gets the knowledge indirectly through the sense organs.
The sense organs do not give us direct knowledge, as they are impediments to
the realization of cognition by the pure nature of self. Avadhi (clairvoyance),
Manahparyava (telepathy) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) are considered as
pratyaksa jnana, as the self gets direct knowledge. (Iii) In the third division, the
sense-knowledge is considered both as pratyaksa and paroksa.
Discussion of the nature and types of knowledge in the Agama literature has
been so important and extensive that references to the pramanasastra and
comparative study of the theory of knowledge in the light of the epistemological
problems in other systems of Indian philosophy have been neglected. Writers of
Agamas have made a distinction between the samyaktva (right or valid) and
mithyatva (wrong or invalid knowledge) on the lines of the distinction between
the pramana (valid knowledge) and apramana (invalid knowledge) in other
schools of Indian thought. The first three types of knowledge-mati (sense
knowledge) sruta (indirect and knowledge through other sources) and avadhi
(clairvoyant knowledge) have their valid and their invalid aspects (kumati,
kusruta and kuavadhi). But in the case of the next two types of knowledge,
manahparyaya (telepathic) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) there is no
possibility of invalid form of knowledge. In this way, in describing the various
types of knowledge, distinctions have been suggested without using the term
invalid knowledge (apramana).

There is not much discussion on the concept of pramana in the Agamas, as we

get abundant description of the nature and types of jnana (knowledge). The
Anuyogadvara and Nandisutra have used the term pramana in a wider sense and
have made distinction between (I) indriya pratyaksa (direct cognition through the
sense organs) and (ii) no-indriya-pratyaksa (direct cognition by other sources
than the sense organs). Indriya-pratyaksa has been distinguished into five types
based on the five sense organs. No -indriya-pratyaksa includes avadhi
(clairvoyance), manahparyaya (telepathy) and kevala (omniscience). In this
place the prefix ‘no’ denotes absence of ‘sense-organs.' The three types of
knowledge coming under the category of ‘no-indriya’ are cognitions without the
help of the sense organs as directly obtained by the self. Jaina theory makes
sense-knowledge as indirect (paroksa). But here is has been considered as
pratyaksa in order to correlate the discussion about this problem in the other
schools of Indian thought. Anumana (inference) has been distinguished into (I)
purvavat, (ii) sesavat and (iii) drstasadharmyavat, but the distinction of inference
as svartha (for one’s sake) and parartha) for the sake of others) has not been
mentioned. In the Agama and its commentaries we find description of anumana
(inference) and its divisions and sub-divisions. There is also a discussion of the
constituent proposition of inference as expressed in the form of syllogism.

CONCEPT OF NAYA

In the Agama literature we find that there is discussion about naya also which is
an aspect of pramana. We get a description of the general nature of naya in
Sthananga, Bhagavati and Anuyogadvara. The terms like drsti and adesa have
been used as synonyms of naya. The cognition of a particular aspect of an
object out of the varied aspects may be called naya. Many schools of thought
present their viewpoints from a specific point of view. They refuse the
viewpoints of others. This means of refutation of other points of view is likely to
lead to dogmatic and one-sided approach to the understanding of the nature of
reality. Bhagavan Mahavira said that such one-sided approach to problems is
ekanta (one-sided) and perverse. He presented a synoptic approach to the
understanding of the problem of reality and that is a many-sided view, anekanta.
It is nayavada. Nayavada has also been considered as a drstivada, adesavada
and apeksavada. The essence of these concepts is one and the same. We have
already discussed about the implications of the naya and its sub-divisions in the
last chapter, Naya is a specific point of view, it is a specific method of
approaching reality and it is the expression of anekanta view.

In the Agama Sahitya we get a description of the problems of logic according to

the contexts. Basic problems of logic and epistemology have been discussed in
the Agama literature.

POST-AGAMIC JAINISM

The Jaina philosophy that developed after the Agama literature and before the
systematic period may be called post-Agamic Jainism. This presents a
systematic development of the philosophical problems of Jainism including
epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. We get here the doctrine of Karma, the
ethics of Jainas, metaphysical problems, the concept of dravyas and the theory
of yoga systematically formulated and discussed. Enormous literature has been
written on these topics. Karma-doctrine has been discussed in a brilliant and
systematic way in Gommatasara-Karmakanda of Nemicandra and Karmagrantha
of Devendrasuri. A systematic study of ethical problems is to be found in
Mulacara, Bhagavati Aradhana, Anagara Dharmamrta, Dharmabindu, Prakarana,
Yogasastra, Ratnakaranda Sravakacara, Sravakacara of Vasunandi, and Sagara-
dharmmrta of Pandit Asadhara. The philosophical concepts of Jainism have been
ably and critically presented in Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati and the commentary
thereon, as also in Dravyasangraha of Nemicandra. Kundakundacarya has
presented philosophical problems in his famous works like Pravacanasara,
Samayasara, Niyamsara and Pancastikayasara. Yogavimsika, Yogasataka,
Yagadrstisamuccaya and Yogabindu Prakarana of Haribhadra are representative
works of this age. The Acaryas of this age concentrated on the study and
discussion of the conceptual aspects of Jainism.
Part 2

Discussion of Prameya

Lokavada (Cosmology)

We see the vast universe before us. Naturally some fundamental questions
regarding the orgin and the nature of the universe arise. We ask ourselves the
questions: When did the universe originate? Would there be the end of the
universe? What are its ultimate principles? Many similar questions may be
asked; and answers to these questions have varied according to the
philosophical predilections of different schools of thought. It would be necessary
to study these questions in the light of modern researches in philosophy and
science.

There were discussions on these questions during Mahavira’s period. Gautama,

the Buddha, considered these questions un-answerable, avyakrta)1 but Sramana
Bhagavan Mahavira has attempted to answer these questions satisfactorily.

Bhagavan Mahavira had a disciple called Arya Roha. He asked Mahavira,

“Bhagavan! Of the Loka and Aloka, is Aloka first and then came Loka?"
Mahavira said to Arya Roha thus: Loka beginningless (anadi) and endless
(ananta). Both of them are eternal (sasvata) and none of them is later or
earlier.2

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

We live in this world. The entire cosmos including our world is Loka. It is the
stellar universe. Beyond this, is the vast un-limited. This is Aloka. It is beyond
and infinite. Therefore, we have the Universe and the beyond, the limited and
unlimited, the Loka and Aloka. In the vast unlimited beyond, in the Aloka, the
fundamental substances like Dharma, Adharma, Kala, Pudgala and Jiva have no
relevance. They have their relevance and they exist in the Loka, the limited
universe. It is also said that the Loka is a cosmos which gives subsistence for the
five Astikayas (multi-dimensional substances).1 In the Uttaradhyayana, the Loka
is described as that which sustains jiva and ajiva.2

The distinction between Loka and Aloka, the limited and the unlimited is an
eternal distinction and it was not made at any particular time; because it is not
possible to divide the eternal and the non-eternal on some one principle.
Substances (saddravya) are also eternal. Space can be divided but the division
is only artificial and is meant for practical purposes. There is no fundamental
division in space. Time is the basis of change and this can be considered from
the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view,
time is the basis of the modifications of jiva and ajiva (living and the non-living
substances). Time is the fundamental principle that is present in Loka and Aloka.
From the phenomenal point of view, time is measured for practical purposes on
the basis of the revolutions of the sun and the moon, and this measurement has
relevance only to the human world. Jiva and Pudgala (living substance and
matter) are characterized by activity and have their madhyama-parinama
(phenomenal activity). The distinction between Loka and Aloka astikayas. They
divide the space into two parts-the limited and the limitless. The limited sustains
the universe; the limitless is the beyond. It is Aloka. In the limitless Alokakasa,
the principles of Dharma and Adharma (motion and rest) do not operate.
Therefore, jiva and pudgala are located in the limited universe (Lokakasa).

LOKA AND ALOKA (UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND)

The Universe (Loka) is bounded and limited, while Aloka, the limitless akasa, is
unbounded. It has no boundaries. Lokakasa (bounded space) has innumerable
pradesas (asankhyeya pradesa) while the boundless space has infinite pradesas.
The universe consists of 14 rajjus, but Aloka (limitless space) cannot be
measured at all. In the Bhagavati we get a dialogue between Bhagavan
Mahavira and Arya Skandaka. Bhagavan Mahavira said, “The universe is limited
with reference to the aspect of matter and also with reference to the measurable
space, because the universe occupies a limited portion of space. From the point
of view of time, Kala, the universe is endless and eternal because there is no
point of time in which the universe does not exist. From the point of view
essence (bhava) and modes (paryaya) the universe is endless, because the
modes of substance are endless.1

The great scientist Albert Einstein has given a picture of the four dimensional
reality of space and time which comes nearer to the Jaina description of space
and time. He says that the universe is limited while the limitless space is
unbounded. The universe is limited because matter and energy do not exist
beyond the universe. They have no relevance beyond the universe.

THE LOCATION OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND (LOKA AND ALOKA)

The universe is flat at the bottom (vistrta), narrow in the middle and globular on
the top like the form of musical instrument ‘mrdanga’. Of the three parts one is
curved, the second is straight and the third is placed on the top so as to give a
shape of a ‘mrdanga’. It is said to be of the shape of ‘trisarava samputa’. In
other words, the shape of the universe is well defined. It is difficult to give the
shape of the Aloka although it is sometimes suggested that it is globular in
shape. Aloka has no parts. It is one. Lokakasa has been divided into three parts
- (1) the Lower Universe (Adholoka), (2) the Middle Universe (madhyaloka) and
(3) the Upper Universe (Urdhvaloka).2 The universe in all the three parts
measures 14 rajjus in length i.e., from the lowest point of the uppermost point.
The upper universe measures little less than seven rajjus, the middle part of the
universe measures 1800 yojanas and the lower part of the universe measures a
little more than seven rajjus.

Akasa is one and indivisible. Still, we make a distinction between the Lokakasa
and Alokakasa on the basis of the operation of the cosmic principles of Dharma
and Adharma (motion and rest). On the basis of the operation of these
principles, a division is further made between the lower, middle and the upper
part of the universe.1 In some parts, the two principles are extended and in some
others their extension is limited. In the upper part of the universe the two
principles of motion and rest are extended and for this reason, the shape of the
upper part of the universe is of the shape of the musical instrument ‘mrdanga’.
The shape of the middle part of the universe is narrow. Its shape is like a curtain
without the borders. The lower part of the universe is again extended. Its shape
is like the bow attuned. The limitless space (alokakasa) has no substance
subsisting in it. Therefore, it has no form and it limitless. The thickness of the
limited universe is of seven rajjus.

The vastness of the universe is so great that it cannot be easily measured. In

order to explain the vastness of the universe, Bhagavan Mahavira made use of
an analogical parable. Suppose a god (Deva) is standing on the top of the mount
Meru, which is one lakh yojanas in height. Suppose again, that at the foot of the
Mount Meru six goddesses of directions (dik-kumurikas of East, West, North,
South, Up and Down directions) are standing facing the opposite direction of the
Mount. Granting that they throw balls of rice of oblation (balipinda). At this
point of time, the god starts running, and the catches hold of the balls of rice in
the mid air before they touch the ground. This is called fast running (Sighra-
gati). The analogy is extended in order to explain the extent of the vastness of
the Universe. Suppose again, at the same time a child is born in a merchant’s
house his span of life is one thousand years. He completes one thousand years
of his age. And after him, a son is born with one thousand years of age as his
span of life. In this way, the cycle continues for seven generations and memory
of their family and the status etc., are obliterated from the minds. Still the god
continues to run and he does not reach the end of the universe. It may be that
he has covered the major portion of the distance of the universe, still the
remaining part might measure ‘innumerable’ parts (asankhyeya bhaga).

Dr. Einstein says that the diameter of the universe can be measured as
consisting of one crore and eighty lakhs of light-years. The distance of light year
is measurable in terms of the movement of a light-ray in terms of time. A ray of
light of the sun travels at a speed of 1,86,000 miles per second.

URDHVALOKA (THE UPPER UNIVERSE)

That parts of the universe that is 900 yojanas above the world that we live in, is
called the upper universe (Urdhvaloka). The gods live in this part of the world. It
is therefore called ‘Brahmaloka’, ‘Devaloka’, ‘Yaksaloka’, and ‘Svargaloka’.1 The
uppermost part of this world is called ‘Sarvartha-siddhi’. Siddha-sila is situated
twelve yojanas above ‘Sarvartha-siddha’. It measures 45 lakh yojanas in length
and breadth. The circumference of ‘Siddhasila’ measures a little more than the
breadth by three times. In the centre it measures 8 yojanas.2 It gets narrowed
down from all the four sides. It appears like an open umbrella. It is white and
pure, like the conch, the pearl and, therefore it is called ‘Sita’. Another name for
it is ‘satpragbhara’. One yojana above this is end of the universe. In the
uppermost one-sixth portion of this one yojana space, the liberated souls reside.3
‘Lokanta’ has been called ‘Lokagra’ in the Uttaradhyayanasutra.4

The gods are not born of wombs. They are born in a special form and a divine
bed called upapat saiyya. They do not suffer premature death. They are
extremely brave. They could be classified into four categories on the basis of
their residence: (I) ‘Bhavanavasi’, (ii) ‘Vyantara’, (iii) ‘Jyotiska’ and (iv)
‘Vaimanika’. The svargas having the status of Indra etc., are considered to be
named as Kalpa and the gods taking birth there are referred to as ‘Kalpotpanna’.
Those who are above the Kalpa are called ‘Kalpatita’. In this part of the heaven
there are no distinctions between individual gods in status. They are all equal.
They are called ‘ahamindra’ as they have the same status as Indra. If gods have
to descend to the earth where human beings reside, it is only the gods born in
the Kalpa who can come down to the earth. The gods residing above the Kalpa
does not come to the earth. The ‘Bhavanavasi’ and the gods residing upto the
heaven Esana Kalpa’ experience erotic pleasures as human beings does. The
gods of the ‘Sanatkumara’ and ‘Mahendrakalpa’ enjoy sex-pleasures merely by
the touch of the bodies of the goddesses. The gods of the Brahma and Lantaka
Kalpa get sense-pleasures by the sight of the beautiful bodies of the goddesses.
The gods of ‘Mahasukra’ and ‘Sahasrarakalpa’ experience the erotic pleasures by
listening to the melodious music of the goddesses. And the gods residing in the
‘Anata’, ‘Pranata’, ‘Arana’ and ‘Acyuta Kalpa’ get sensual satisfaction by the
mere memory of their beloved goddesses. The other gods are free from sex-
impulses. Lokantika gods are also free from the bonds of sex-instinct.
Therefore, they are called ‘deva-rsi’ (the god-saints).

MADHYALOKA (THE MIDDLE UNIVERSE)

The Madhyaloka (the middle universe) measures 1800 yojanas. In the

Uttaradhyayana it is referred to as ‘Tiryak loka’.1 In this part of the universe,
there are innumerable islands and seas surrounding each other. In the vast
expanse of this part of the universe, it is only two and half islands (dvipa) where
there is habitation of human beings.2 It is called ‘samaya ksetra’.3 The structure
of each of these two and half islands is similar in form with only this difference
that each gets extended by double. There is the Mount ‘Manusottara’ in the
centre of the island called ‘Puskaradvipa’, is inhabited by human beings. There
are seven important divisions in the island called ‘Jambu-dvipa’ : (1) Bharata, (2)
Haimavata, (3) Hari, (4) Videha, (5) Ramyaka, (6) Hairanyavata and (7)
Airavata.4 Videha ksetra is further divided into two parts: (I) Devakuru and (ii)
Uttarakuru i.e., Purvavideha and Uttaravideha respectively. In the
Dhatakikhanda dvipa and in Puskarardhadvipa there are double than that of
Jambudvipa. All these islands have been divided into three parts on the basis of
the functional importance as: (I) Karmabhumi, (ii) Akarmabhumi, and (iii)
Antaradvipa.1

‘Karmabhumi’ is that part of the ‘Madhyaloka’ in which human beings are

engaged in activities like agriculture, commerce, art, architecture etc. In this
part, human beings are capable of earning the highest merit (Punya) and the
most intense demerit (papa). Bharata, Airavata and Mahavideha are
Karmabhumis. It has been suggested that there is one each of Bharata, Airavata
and Mahavideha and two each of the same in Jambudvipa and Dhatakikhanda
respectively. Similarly, in Puskarardha Dvipa, there are two Bharata, two
Airavata and two Mahavideha countries. In this way there are fifteen Karma-
bhumis in the two and a half dvipas (islands).2 All the continents that we have
today are covered by a small portion of the Bharataksetra in the Jambudvipa.
From this, we can just imagine the vastness of the Madhyaloka and specially the
three worlds of the universe.

That part of the universe in which there is no need to work for maintenance by
following any occupation like agriculture etc., is called ‘Akarmabhumi’. In this
part, the enjoyment of life is possible without any work. It is also called
'Bhogabhumi', as there is predominance of enjoyment only. There is constant
pleasure in that part as the gods enjoy lie without effort. There are six places of
Bhogabhumi, (places of enjoyment) in the Jambudvipa- (i) Haimavata, (ii) Hari,
(iii) Ramyaka, (iv) Hairanyavata, (v) Devakuru and (vi) Uttarakuru. In this way,
we find that there are double countries in Dhatakikhanda dvipa and Puskarardha
dvipa. There are twelve countries in each of the two dvipas i.e., in the
Dhatakikhanda dvipa and Puskarardhadvipa. So, in all, there are thirty
Akarmabhumis (lands of pleasure).

Apart from the Karma and Akarma bhumis, there are islands among the seas.
They are called ‘Antaradvipa. There are twenty-eight islands in the ‘Lavana
samudra’, the sea that encircles the Jambu-dvipa alround, and at the fringe of
the Himavana Mountain. The islands in the sea are spread over in seven
quadrangles (Catuska). They can be mentioned in the following order: - First
Quadrangle: Ekoruk, Abhasika, Langulika and Vaibhanika. Second: Hayakarna,
Gajakarna, Gokarna and Suskulikarna. Third: Adarsamukha, Mesamukha,
Hayamukha, and Gajamukha. Fourth: Asvamukha, Hastimukha, Simhamukha
and Vyaghramukha. Fifth: Asvakarna, Simhakarna, Gajakarna and
Karnapravarana. Sixth: Ulkamukha, Vidyunmukha, Jivhamukha and
Meghamukha. Seventh: Ghanadanta, Gudhadanta, Sresthadanta and
Suddhadanta.

In this way, there are twenty eight ‘Antaradvipas’ in relation to the ‘Sikhari’
mountains, and the total of fifty six ‘Antaradvipas’ (islands) can be mentioned.
These are considered to be the places of habitation of human beings. Thus we
find the Mid-universe (Madhyaloka) is vast and extensive. Still, compared with
the vastness and extensiveness of the Upper Universe, and of the lower, the
extension of the Mid-universe amounts to a negligible portion of the two, almost
amounting to zero.
ADHOLOKA (THE LOWER PART OF THE UNIVERSE)

The part of the universe that is below the mid-universe is called ‘Adho-Loka’ (the
lower Universe). There are seven worlds, on below the other. They are known
as seven ‘Narakas’ (hells). Mostly, the hell-beings reside in these worlds. The
measurements of these seven worlds are not uniform. The lower ones are more
extensive than the immediately preceding upper world in order of succession.
But they are not very close to each other. They are separated by the thick
coating of liquid, air, and space.1 Each world has below it the quantity of thick
liquid, dense air, thin air and space.2

The seven worlds of the nether region universe have been named as : 1.
Ratnaprabha, 2. Sarkaraprabha, 3. Balukaprabha, 4. Pankaprabha, 5.
Dhumaprabha, 6. Tamahprabha and 7. Mahatamahprabha. The suffix ‘prabhas’
to each of the name connotes the characteristic color of the place. Ratnaprabha
has three parts and the upper part has the color of ratna (diamond). It measures
16,000 yojanas. Just below, is the second part. It is covered by water, and it
measures 80,000 yojanas. Thus the total measurement of the extension of
Ratnaprabha comes to about 1,80,000 yojanas. From the second to the seventh
worlds in the nether universe, there are no parts as we get in the Ratnaprabha.
All the matter they have is of the same kind. The second nether world measures
1,32,000 yojanas. The third measures 1,28,000 yojanas. The fourth world
extends for 1,20,000 yojanas. The fifth world measures 1,18,000 yojanas. The
sixth and the seventh measures 1,16,000 and 1,08,000 yojanas respectively.
The thick layer of liquid below the seven nether worlds also varies in quantity
and measurements.1

The beings in hell reside in the different nether worlds just in the middle of each
part leaving one thousand yojanas on the upper and the lower parts. For
instance, in the Ratnaprabha measuring 1,80,000 yojanas in dimension, the
hellish beings reside in the central part leaving aside 1,000 yojanas on the upper
and 1,000 yojanas on the lower portions of the world. Similarly, in the other six
nether worlds there is habitation of the hellish beings in the central parts leaving
aside one thousand yojanas each on the upper and the lower parts of each world.

Beings living in these nether worlds are considered to be hellish beings (Naraki
Jiva). The lower we go in the stages of the nether worlds, we find beings
suffering and infected with ugliness, they are frightful in appearance and nature,
and they suffer from various disabilities in increasing degrees. In these places,
there are extremes of heat and cold. The residents of these hellish worlds suffer
untold misery, thought they seek to get some pleasure. Their lot is one of never-
ending misery. They see other with extreme anger and with bloodshot eyes.
They fight with each other like cats and dogs remembering their animosity in the
previously lives. They cut each other mercilessly with their weapons and even
with hands, feet and teeth. Their bodies become deformed and cut asunder into
pieces. But like mercury, the parts of the body join again and form a whole. The
hellish beings suffer indescribable pain when they are subjected to drink hot
boiling lead. The devilish gods make them embrace the red-hot iron-bars and
force them to climb the trees brimming with sharpest thorns. The devil-gods
torturing them are most cruel. They are found to be going upto the first three
nether world. They are technically named as Paramadharmika and are also
called as ‘asuras’ (demons). They are very cruel and they get sadistic pleasure
in torturing other inmates of hell. The hellish beings are constantly in the grip of
suffering and they have no possibility of escape till the expiry the course of their
allotted life in the nether world, as they have no possibility of premature death.1

There is the limitless space (Akasa) beyond the boundaries of the universe. The
expanse of this universe is so vast that it would not be possible to gauge even
the smallest portion of the extensive vastness of this universe by the modern
techniques of the modern science.2

LOKASTHITI (THE POSITION OF THE UNIVERSE)

Brhadaranyoka Upanisad has a dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Gargeyi

regarding the position the universe. Gargeyi wanted to know the fundamental
principle of the universe. She asked: What is the ultimate substance of the
universe?

Yajnavalkya: It comes from air.

Gargeyi: And where does the air come from?

Yajnavalkya: It is from space. And space is from Gandharvaloka; Gandharvaloka

from Adityaloka (the sun); Adityaloka from Candraloka (the moon); Candraloka
from Naksatraloka (the stars); Naksatraloka from devaloka (the heavens);
Devaloka from Indraloka (abode of Indra); Indraloka from Prajapatiloka (abode of
Prajapati) and Prajapatiloka from Brahmaloka.

Gargeyi: And where does the Brahma-loka come from?

Yajnavalkya: Gargi! Do not ask such question, otherwise your head will fall
down.3

In the Jaina philosophy, we do not reach such a situation where one reaches the
dead end of intellectual curiosity. Bhagavan Mahavira never flinched from
answering any question. He answered all questions and gave full intellectual
satisfaction to his disciples. In the Bhagavatisutra, Mahavira has explained the
problem of the nature and the ultimate substance of the universe.1

1. Air is in Akasa.
2. The sea has its basis in the air.
3. The earth is in the sea.
4. The moving and the non-moving beings are on the earth.
5. Ajiva is based on Jiva.
6. Jiva encrusted with Karman in dependent on Karman.
7. Ajiva is comprehended with the help of Jiva.
8. Jiva comprehends the nature of Karman and is covered by karmic particles.

The primary elements of the universe are earth, water, air and space. On the
basis of these elements, the constitution of the universe is found. The
fundamental substances of matter (ajiva) and life (Jiva) are inter-related and
inter-dependent on each other. Jiva is the support of ajiva, in a sense, and ajiva
is dependent on Jiva. Karman is the matrix of mundane souls (samsari jiva) and
jiva gets involved in the wheel of samsara due to the influx of Karman. Similarly,
body is the abode of the soul. The soul when bound by karmic matter gets
embodied and becomes involved in the wheel of life and death. Karman is
responsible for the embodiment of the soul and thereby all the physical activities
arise.

THE THEORY OF CREATION (SRSTIVADA)

Considered from the point of view of the end, we can say that the universe is
beginningless and endless from the point of view of substance; it has a beginning
and an end from the point of view of its modes (Paryaya). There are two
fundamental substances in the universe: the jiva (living substance) and ajiva
(non-living substance) this is the dichotomous division of the substances. Both
the substances are beginningless and eternal. There is no relation between
them as to the prior and posterior. From the point of view of modifications, the
universe is constantly changing. The changes are of two types: natural and
artificial. There are constant changes taking place in the substances by their
very nature. But the modification of a mundane being (samsari jiva) is due to
the encrustations of Karman to the soul; and this is not the natural condition of
the soul.

In the Vedic philosophy, there are two prominent views of thought: Advaitavada
(Non-dualism or Monism) and Dvaitavada (dualism).

Regarding the nature of the Universe, Advaita philosophy presents three views:
(I) Jadadvaitavada (Naturalistic Monism), (ii) Caitanyadvaitavada (Idealistic
Monism) and (iii) Jada-Caitanyadvaitavada (Naturalistic and Spiritualistic
Monism). The Jadadvaitavada (Naturalistic Monism) maintains that
consciousness is a product of matter. It is the by-product of the chemical
changes in the body of an individual. It is an epiphenomenon. The Carvaka-
Materialism and the Materialism of the modern science hold this view.

According to Caitanyadvaitavada, the Brahman is the ultimate reality and the

fundamental principle of the universe. The Brahman is transcendent of the three
worlds. In the Satapatha Brahmana, it has been said that the Brahman is beyond
the three worlds. He thought: ‘how can I express myself in the three worlds?'
Then he showed himself in the forms of nama and rupa (name and form).1

Jada-Caitanyadvaitavada maintains that the universe is a product of the

synthesis of spirit and matter (cetana and acetana). But, the Naturalistic Monists
(Jadadvaitavadin) and the Absolute Idealism (Caitanyadvaitavada) do not accept
the view presented by the Jada-caitanyavadin because the effect cannot proceed
from the cause which is dis-similar. The Naturalistic Monism maintains that the
mind arises out of matter, and the Ideal Monistic Idealism maintains that matter
is the expression of the spirit. Thus, the Monist does not accept the independent
reality of matter and spirit. The priority of cognitive consciousness is the
cardinal principle of the idealist and reality of the objective world independent of
consciousness is the assertion of the Realistic. Matter is primary for the
Materialist and spirit is primary for the Idealist.

But the Dualist (dvaitavadin) posits the reality of spirit and matter independent
of each other. One does not come from the other nor are they subordinate as
reality to each other. The universe is the effect of the union of matter and spirit.

The Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa systems of thought contend that God brings
together the atoms, and the universe is formed. The universe is the creation of
such combination of the atoms. This is the union of the spirit and the matter. As
the creation of the universe is based on the combination of atoms, the Nyaya-
Vaisesika theory is called Arambhavada.

Sankhya and Yoga philosophies give importance to the concept of Prakrti with
tree gunas. According to the Sankhya, the evolution of the universe begins when
Prakrit comes in contact with Purusa and there is disturbance in the balance of
the gunas in the Prakrti. Prakrti is unconscious, Purusa is conscious. Prakrti is
unconscious but active while Purusa is inactive. In the presence of the Purusa,
disturbance in the three gunas is created and the evolution starts. The need for
a Creator God is not felt for explaining the evolution of the universe. The
consequent modifications and effect exhibited in the universe are due to the
activities of the Prakrti. In the Yoga philosophy, the concept of God is brought,
although indirectly, for explaining the process of reality. Therefore, the Yoga
system is called theistic Sankhya he causal theory accepted by the Sankhya-
Yoga and the Vedantin is the identity theory of cause and effect. Effect is
potentially present in the cause and when the cause expresses itself in the
modifications, the effects show themselves. This causal theory of potentiality
and actuality, as Aristotle mentions, can be considered in two parts: (I)
Gunaparinamavada (expression of the modifications of the Brahman). And (ii)
Brahmaparinamavada (expression of the modifications of the Brahman).
Sankhya philosophy and Madhavacarya accepts the theory of
Gunaparinamavada while Visistadvaita of Ramanuja advocates the theory of
Brahmaparinamavada for explaining the evolution of the universe. They
maintain that Prakrti, Jiva and Isvara are the three principles that are real and
they are all the expressions of the Brahman. Brahman expresses itself in the
aspect of Prakrti and that results in the evolution of the universe.

Jainism and Buddhism do not accept the theory of creation. They believe in the
theory of modifications (parivartanavada).
The Buddhist theory of the world and its evolution depends on the doctrine of
pratityasamutpada. The Buddhists advocate the theory of aggregate and
continuity and not permanence. In Jaina philosophy, whatever modifications are
to be found in the universe, they are to be explained in terms of the combined
co-operation of the Jiva (living substance) and pudgala. These modifications can
be considered into two parts: (I) natural (svabhavika) and (ii) practical
(prayogika) or phenomenal. The natural modifications are very subtle. They are
not visible to the eyes. But the phenomenal changes are gross (sthula) and they
are visible to the eyes. The universe is, therefore, the result of the combined
operation of matter and spirit.

The Vedic seers were perplexed about the origin of the creation of the universe.
In the Nasadiya sukta of the Rgveda, the fundamental question of creation and
origin of Creation has been raised. A series of question have been asked. They
are: What is the first principle of the universe? Who can describe it? How did it
originate and what is the cause of varieties in the universe? Who can explain the
origin of this universe? What is the cause of the creation? Finally, who created
the Creation and who did not? One who knows this is beyond us, and it is
possible that he also does not know.1

The Jaina philosophy is clear about the problem of the universe and its reality.
Jainism maintains that matter does not arise from spirit nor does spirit arise from
matter. Both are beginningless and real.

BHEDABHEDAVADA (THE DOCTRINE OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE)

The problem of identity and difference in explaining the reality has given rise to
four schools of thought. One school of thought gives primary to difference
(bheda), and the second gives to non-difference or identity (abheda). The third
school of thought gives importance to both as of equal reality and the fourth
school maintains that there is the qualified distinction of bheda and abheda
(bhedavisista-abheda).

The school emphasizing difference (bhedavada) maintains that nothing is

permanent. Everything is changing. Difference is the only reality while oneness
or identity is an appearance. Where there is bheda (difference), there is reality.
Sautrantika and Vaibhasika schools of Buddhism advocate this theory.
Everything is momentary (ksanika). Every moment there is the origination and
destruction. Nothing is permanent. Where there is not permanence, there is no
non-difference. Jnana and Padartha both are momentary. What we call the
Atman is merely an aggregate of five skandhas (physical and mental states):
vijnana, vedana, samjna, samskara and rupa. These are the aggregate of the
skandhas and what we call the self.1 This theory is called sanghatavada (the
theory of aggregates). This is also the theory of anatmavada and it is also called
pudgalanairatmyavada. From the point of time, the theory of self and the world
does not express the reality of permanence but only of the stream or continuity
(santana) without anything permanent to continue. We find that all our empirical
thinking implies the process of thought leading to the theory of impermanence.
The identity and oneness are the expressions of the aggregate or collection, and
it is merely with reference to time and space. In fact, things and cognition are
different and there is only a stream or continuity of the things and conditions
which are discrete. Change is the fundamental principle of the universe and
permanence is only the appearance. The wheel of the chariot moves on one
point of axle and also stops with that point. Similarly, every jiva lives in moment
as a thought is fleeting, so also the jiva is temporary and fleeting.2

The Greek philosopher Heraclitus said that everything is changing and nothing is
permanent. Permanence is only appearance. We cannot step into the same
river-water twice. Every moment there is change, and change is the very
essence of thing. One moment, it is and the next moment, it is not. It does not,
however, mean that there is modification of a thing because modification
requires a substance to modify but there is no permanent substance. One who
trusts his reasons and not the essence knows that everything flies and nothing
is. Considered from the rational point of view we can say, impermanence is the
essence of reality.1 David Hume also maintained that permanence is an
appearance and change is reality.2 The illusion of permanence is due to the
senses but reason knows that nothing is permanent. Whenever I try to catch
‘myself’, I stumble upon this or that perception. I do not find myself as
permanent substance. Williams James propounded a theory of the stream of
consciousness. Every passing thought is itself a thinker.3 Bergson enunciated
the doctrine of Elan vital as the very essence of life and the universe. The Elan is
the very source of the world and everything is the manifestation of the Elan.4

The abhedavadin affirms that reality is one, and difference is an illusion. The
diversity and difference in life are due to our ignorance. The fundamental
principle of the universe is one. It is; and the diversifications of the One are only
an appearance. This viewpoint has been presented in the Upanisads and by the
thinkers of the Advaita Vedanta. The Absolutists, as they are called, post the
One as the ultimate reality because that is the consummation and the limit of the
gradual process of the synthetic approach. The one is the perfection and duality
is imperfection. This is the cardinal principle of the Advaita Vedanta.
Vijnanavada and Sunyavada have presented similar points of view.

In the Western thought, we get traces of the development of monistic philosophy

from the time of Greek thinkers like Permenides. Permenides said that reality is
and it does not become. That, which becomes, that which changes, is not real.
There must be something that changes. It is the eternal principle. It is the one
principal that remains the central point of the changes. It is the sat in the
language of Indian philosophy and change is the asat. He said, ‘Ex nihilo nikhil
fit.' From the sat, you cannot get another sat, because it is the reality. That
which becomes, must come out of that which it was not. If it were, it would not
become and there is no problem of diversification of being. Therefore, being is,
and all difference, multiplicity and change are mere illusion. As Permenides tried
to establish the theory of being, Heraclites attempted to advance the theory of
change on similar grounds. Jaina philosophers refuted the argument of those
who tried to establish the reality as a change and flux, and established the
theory of the reality of the identity and Difference.

The third view presents a theory of identity and difference. According to this
theory, identity or oneness is as real as difference and multiplicity. In the Nyaya-
Vaisesika theory, we find that there is equal emphasis on the universal and the
particular (samanya and visesa). The substance and its modifications are based
on the universality and the differentia of a thing. The universal and the
particular are both important, for instance, the concept of cow as a universal, is
as much derived from the generality of particulars, as particulars derive their
identity from the universality of the universal. Therefore, the universal and
particular are both independent and real. This is clear from the example
mentioned above regarding the relation of the particular cow to the universal
‘cow in general’. This view tries to reconcile the two theories that apparently
contradict each other and affirm the reality of the universal or the particular as
the case may be. The Syadvadamanjari mentions that the universal and the
particular are equally and complementary to each other and yet different from
each other.1

Next, we come to the theory of qualified monistic theory (visistadvaita). There

are two forms of this theory. One gives prominence to the unity for the oneness
making multiplicity only as an expression of the unity. Ramanuja presented a
Qualified Monism in which the one expresses itself into the many. The Brahman
and the world are real. The soul merges itself into the Brahman as the waters of
the river merge into the waters of the sea. The triple principle of cit, acit and
Isvara are real. The Reality is one and the self and the world are the expressions
of the reality. The world is considered to be the body of Isvara and Isvara is the
soul of the world. Isvara is, therefore, considered to be the one with the cit and
acit as its qualified expression. Cit and acit are derived from Isvara as they are
the body of Isvara.1 His philosophy has, therefore, been called Visistadvaita
(Qualified Monism). The primacy of unity is recognized and multiplicity is
explained as emanating from the unity.

The Jainas have made a specific and significant contribution to this problem of
the relation between the one and the many. According to the Jainas, the one and
the many are equally real and ontological realities. As the multiplicity and
difference are the facts of life, so is the unity. However, the two are not separate
and independent realities. One implies the other: One cannot be expressed
without the other. Where there is difference, there is identity, and where there is
identity there is difference. The very nature of generality and particularity
(samanya-visesa), identity and difference (bhedabheda) and permanence and
change (nityanityatva) characterize every object. Every object expresses the
generality of its class and particularity of the individual object. It would not be
proper to say that an object expresses the substantiality and the unity only,
because it also expresses the substantiality and the unity only, because it also
expresses as the inherent characteristic, the particularity and diversity as the
form of modification (paryaya). Similarly it would not be correct to consider the
unity and oneness an appearance and not real, because modifications are not
possible without a permanent object which changes. Similarly, the identity and
difference cannot be considered as independent entities because they do not
express themselves independently of each other, and there is no third substance
that unites them. Therefore, identity and difference should be considered as
complementary and as simpling each other, though both are real. A thing can be
described as similar, and dis-similar according to the point of view of and the
context. Identity and difference are both applicable to a thing. It is identical, as
well as, different from the different points of view. For instance, a thing is
identical when considered from the point of view of similarity and genus, while it
is different, looked at from the context of differentia and other species and
individuals belonging to other species. Therefore, to say that identity and unity
are real, and difference and change are unreal would be a logical and
metaphysical fallacy. Further, identity and differences cannot also be considered
as separate and independent realities. They imply each other. Therefore, it
would be apter to say the performance and change, identity and difference
characterize a thing. These are categories of judgment. It has, therefore, been
said that reality is similar in a particular context kathancit, is dis-similar from
another point of view, it is describable from a still different context and
indescribable from another point of view. It is real and also not real considered
from different contexts.1 A thing has all these characteristics inherent in it. A
thing is permanent and changing, general and particular, similar and different,
one and the many and eternal and non-eternal. Aristotle expressed a similar
view. A thing is characterized both by generality and particularity. It cannot be
comprehended without the categories of generality and particularity, and
nothing can exist without the category generality and particularity.2

Jaina thought has tried to comprehend the essence of a thing in its complex and
comprehensive form. This view is, in a way, the expression of the anekanta
point of view. It is possible to predicate contradictory attributes to a thing at the
same time on the basis of the point of view (nay) and the contextual reference
(niksepa). This is the approach of the Bhedabhedavada, (the theory of identity
and difference). The prediction of the attribute of identity and difference at the
same time does not nullify the comprehension of the nature of a thing, but it
gives a clearer and modifications are not different. It is the substance that
undergoes modifications. They imply each other.3

DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE)

Jainism has presented the six-fold substances. They are (1) Jiva (living substance
or soul), (2) Pudgala (non-living matter), (3) Dharma (principle responsible for
the motion in the world), (4) Adharma (principle of rest), (5) Akasa (space) and
(6) Kala (time). Excepting Kala (time), all other substances are called ‘astikayas’,
because they have multi-dimensional forms: while Kala is not considered as
‘astikaya’, as it has linear dimension only. Time moves in linear dimension. It
never looks back. Not can we measure time in the three dimensional categories.
Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are indivisible substances. They cannot be
divided into parts although Akasa and Kala in their empirical contexts are
practically measurable. But they are considered as ‘avayavi’ in the sense,
conceptually they have innumerable points comparable to atoms (paramanu).
The Pudgala (matter) alone is divisible. The ultimate indivisible point of Pudgala
is an atom (paramanu). It cannot be further divided. When atoms combine they
form an aggregate called ‘skandha’. The ‘skandha’ has as many special points
as it has atoms. The aggregate of two atoms would called ‘Dwi-anuka skandha’
(two-atomed molecule). The infinite points of space would characterize the
molecule (skandha) consisting of infinite atoms (anantanu). Division of the
molecule brings back the atoms to their original single atoms. Molecule is not
permanent. In this sense, the matter (Pudgala) is divisible. From the point of
view of number, jivas are infinite. Looked at from the angle of special positions,
we could say that Jiva is characterized as occupying innumerable pradesas
(points of space). Dharma, Adharma and Lokakasa (empirical space) have
innumerable pradesas. Dharma, Adharma, Lokakasa and Jiva occupy equal
pradesas (points of space). Kala (time) has no special point nor is it considered
at atomic substance. As it has not the multi-dimensional special characteristic, it
cannot to considered an astikaya. It is included in the category of substance
(dravya) because it functions as substance and change, in the empirical
existence that is always in time. Acaryas have made a distinction in time as: (a)
real time and (b) phenomenal time (Vyavahara Kala). Pancastikayasara
mentions that the constant change expresses the real time, while time measured
by astronomical phenomena would be considered as phenomenal time
(Vyavahara Kala). It can be considered from another point of view: a point of
time in the present is the real time and the time measuring the past and the
future points of time are the phenomenal time. A point of time that has passed
cannot come back, the point of time yet to come is not present at all. Therefore,
past and present do not exist; they are only empirical and conventional
measurements of time. The division of time into samaya, muhurta, day and
night etc., are only practical and conventional measurements of time. Similarly,
the conventional and practical distinction and division in Akasa is considered as
measurable space called ‘Dik’ (direction) and it is not an independent substance.

The present synthesizes the past and the future. The past and the future have
their importance on account of the present. Whenever we accept the existence
of a thing, we have to admit that it existed in the past and will continue to exist
in future. It is not possible to say that the object would exist in original state for
all time. It undergoes modifications; still modifications do not affect the real and
substantial nature of the object. In the Tattvarthasutra, dravya (substance) has
been defined as that which has undergone modifications, which undergoes and
which will continue to do so in future also.1 The real nature of the object remains
unchanged in and through all modifications. If it were not so, the substantial
nature of the object would not remain and the past and the future changes would
not have relation whatever. The object does express the identity in
modifications. The substance does imply the reality. Acarya Umasvati says that
dravya expresses the attributes of origination, permanence and destruction. He
also says that substance is that which has modifications.2 He has in this
connection, used the word paryaya (modification) in the place of utpada
(origination) and vyaya (destruction) and the dhrauvya in place of guna. Utpada
(origination) and vyaya (destruction) imply the concept of change. Every object
has two aspects: identity and difference, permanence and change. Similarly, it
exhibits the qualities of similarity and dis-similarity. The core is the permanent
nature of the object and that that changes and undergoes modification. We find
that the qualities are expressed in modifications. In the substantiality of the
object, there is permanence, and in modifications we get change. Permanence
and change, therefore, are equally real. The origination and destruction express
modifications of the substances, but the substance remains permanent, it is not
destroyed. For purposes of explaining this, Umasvati calls it ‘Tadbhavavyaya’.3
This is the characteristic of permanence. Acarya Kundakunda defines dravya
(substance) as that ‘It is itself’. Aparityakta has the characteristics of origin,
continuity and has qualities (utpada, dhrauvya and vyayayukta) and has
modifications (paryaya).1 In this, we get the real definition of dravya.
Pancastikayasara describes the realty in similar way.2 In this sense; the Jaina
thought does not consider reality from one point of view only (ekanta) eternal or
non-eternal. It is both eternal in one sense and non-eternal in another sense. It
is eternal from the point of view of its essential nature, but non-eternal from the
point of view of the modifications (paryayas). By presenting the nature of reality
either as eternal in the language of Nyaya-Vaisesika and Vedic thought or as flux
and non-eternal in the language of the Buddhist thought, we would not be giving
a comprehensive and synoptic view of reality. It would be one-sided view
(ekanta). Therefore, it is necessary to give a synoptic picture of the nature of
reality in the many-sided approach as the Jainas do. The Reality has to be
considered as both eternal and non-eternal; eternal from the point of view of
substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes. An object is, it gets
modifications and it is also destroyed. It does not lose its identity in the changes.
Change is not mere discrete flow of independent points. It is the thing that
changes. Change and permanence are, therefore, equally real. We experience a
thing as permanent only when there is substantiality in the changing modes.
This theory of the Jainas of identity and change has been compared to the
chemical change.

In 1739, Lawosier, an eminent scientist, propounded a theory of conservation of

matter. According to this theory, matter is constant. Its modifications are only
expressions. The modifications do not destroy matter nor do they add to the
quantity of matter. Just as the coal when burnt becomes ash, the matter is not
altogether destroyed. It is only converted into ash. Similarly, in the universe,
oxygen and carbon dioxide are being continuously combined and dis-integrated
without ever effecting quantity of the gas. Nothing new comes out; it is
transformation or the modification of matter. For instance, if we keep a metal
not unused for a long time, it gets rusted. But the rust is not a new substance. It
is only a chemical action on the matter due to its contact, and it forms as oxy-
hydrate. A Th qualitative aspect of matter gets transformed into its different
modifications due to certain physical and chemical actions. The mass of matter
remains constant and there is no change in the essential function the nature of
matte. Similarly, light-energy may be transformed into heat-energy. Magnetic
attraction will not anyway fundamentally alter the quantity of matter or energy.
They are only paryayas, modifications without affecting the quantum of matter.
The Jainas have affirmed the same point when they say that in the modifications
of dravya the quantum of dravya does not change. It expresses itself in different
forms. Dravya is eternal; modifications express change without affecting the
quantum of dravya. Therefore, dravya is constant in all its modifications.

The Sankhya philosophers have propounded a theory of permanence and change

(nityanityavada). Purusa is eternal. Prakrti is also eternal, but it expresses itself
in the form of its evolutes. The Nyaya-Vaisesika says that atoms and souls are
eternal and the objects of the world like a pot and pieces of cloth (Ghata-pata)
are non-eternal. The aggregates of the atoms are eternal. But unlike the Jainas,
they do not accept the eternity involved in the paryayas also. Patanjali, Kumarila
Bhatta, Parthasarathi and other do not accept the functional theory of eternity
parinaminityatvavada; but they accept the concept of the ultimate reality.1

DRAVYA AND PARYAYA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES)

The term Dravya has many meanings. In its substantial sense it is eternal
(Nitya). It is also used in the sense of a principle. Very often Dravya refers to
the universal and paryaya refers to its modes.

The concept of the universal has been considered by the Jainas in two respects:
First, the universal in the sense of referring to the jinas. For instance, jivas,
whether empirical individuals or the liberated souls, all are considered as Jivas.
Empirical individuals have their distinctions on the basis of various principles like
the place of residence, the number of sense organs; etc. liberated souls are the
siddhas. They are also jivas. This reference of the universal (samanya) to the
jivas is called tiryak samanya.

The second distinction in the meaning of the concept of the universal refers to
the verticular distinction of generality. This is called urdhvatasamanya. For
instance, an object may undergo modifications, all its modifications are its
particulars and the object in its generality is constant. It refers to the universal
referring to the substantiality urdhvatasamanya.2

A disciple once asked Bhagavan Mahavira: How many jiva paryayas

(modifications of jiva) are there? Mahavira said: There are endless forms of jiva
paryaya. ‘’How is it?’’ asked the disciple. Mahavira said: There are innumerable
denizens of hell. There are numberless Asurakumaras and Stanitakumaras.
There are innumerable earth-bodies and air-bodies (Prthvikaya and vayukaya).
There are numberless vegetable-bodies (vanaspatikaya). Similarly, there are
innumerable two-sense organisms and in this order there are innumerable men.
There are Vyantara beings. There are innumerable siddha jivas (liberated souls).
Therefore, the substance of jiva is infinite in its variety of modifications.1 In this
dialogue; we find the expression of a specific form of distinction based on certain
criteria. The modifications of the substances of jiva are to be found infinite forms
in this universe. Among the jivas are also included the perfected souls.
Therefore, this concept of generality or universality as applied to the jiva may be
considered as tiryaksamanya paryaya.
So far, we have considered the modifications of jiva at a particular point of view.
But there would be infinite varieties of modifications within a span of many
points of time. In this sense, a jiva has its infinite variations in point of time and
space considered from the point of view of its modifications. While thinking
about the various modes of a particular jiva we are looking at it from the point of
view urdhvatavisesa (verticular particularity). The description of the different
modifications of jiva has reference to generality in the sense that jivas assume
various forms. Similarly, denizens of hell can also be described in terms of the
various states of existence in hell that they undergo. This type of the infinite
variety of existence of the denizens of hell who are of the same nature has been
ably described in Prajnapana.

One resident of hell is similar in its substantiality with another resident. But
considered from the point of view of status, nature, place and time we can make
distinction between the different types of hellish beings. From the point of view
of the residence, color, smell, etc., for instance, there are innumerable variations
in the complexity of the hellish beings. The distinctions are numerous and
various. Therefore, as has been described in the Prajnapana, we can classify the
hellish beings into different varieties on the basis of the distinctions in their
capacity of understanding and possession of various forms of knowledge like,
matijnana, Shrutajnana and also on the basis of their color and smell, etc. in this
sense, we have numerous types of denizens of hell.2 Even considered from their
bodily forms, there are innumerable types of the beings. Some are tall, some
are very short, measurements beings judged from one ‘angula’ to five hundred
dhanusya. In between there are innumerable varieties. Similar distinctions
could be made on the basis of their span of life. Therefore, the jivas can be
considered from various points of view and can be classified on the basis of
different criteria. These distinctions are referred to as undhvatasamanyasrita
visesa (particularity from the cross-sectional point of view).

Bhagavati sutra and Prajnapana sutra have given details study of jiva from the
point of view of substance and also from the point of view of its modes. The
changes and modifications imply the distinction of time and the modes and
particularity imply the distinction in space. In this sense, words paryaya, visesa,
parinama, utpada and vyaya have similar meanings. In the analysis of dravya,
these words have been used in various contexts.

A question has been asked whether substance and mode are different or
identical.

The Agama literature has considered the modes as different from substance. It
has also been considered in some respects as identical. Bhagavati sutra points
out that modes are changing and not eternal and even after the destruction of
the mode, the substance remains. Otherwise, when modes are destroyed
substance also will be destroyed. It implies that substance is not to be
considered as a substance cannot be destroyed, but its variations and
modifications may change.
The disciples Bhagavan Parsvanatha had, presumably, some doubts about the
question whether the disciples of Mahavira understood the concepts of
samayika. Bhagavan Mahavira said: The soul is samayika, and samayika is the
essence of the soul. Here the soul is the substance and the universality and the
equality are its essential features. They are expressed in the form of modes. In
this sense, the modes are not different from the substance. The soul is identical
with its attributes of universality, equality and omniscience.

Bhagavati sutra1 and Sthananga2 have mentioned eight types of the jiva or
Atman: (1) dravyatma (soul as substance), (2) kasayatma (soul in the affective
state), (3) yogatma (the soul as active), (4) upayogatma (hermic energy of the
soul), (5) jnanatma (soul as knowledge), (6) darsanatma (intuitive experience of
the soul) (7) caritratma (soul as an ethical being) and (8) viryatma (the inherent
energy of the soul). These distinctions have been made from the points of view
of substance and modifications. The description of soul as a substance has been
made from the point of view of substance, and the remaining descriptions of the
seven states have been made from the point of view of modifications. The
substance (dravya) and modifications (paryaya) are both mutually
complementary to each other. One cannot exist without the other. Substance
without modifications and similarly modifications without substance, are not
possible. Where there is substance, there must be modes (paryayas).1
Jaina Metaphysics

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

The Indian philosophical literature has made an exhaustive study of the concepts
of Tattva (the first principle). Tattva comes from the word tat, and tat is Sanskrit
pronoun. By the suffix of the word tva it connotes the meaning of this (tasya
bhavah tattvam). Tattva, therefore, refers to the first principle. In philosophical
literature, there has been a very elaborate and deep study of the concept of the
tattva.

From the practical point of view, tattva refers to the existing status (vastavika
sthiti), the essence (saravastu) and the summary (saramsa) of a thing. In the
philosophical thought the common sense point of view of tattva is accepted but
transcended and given a richer content from the ultimate point of view. It
means the nature of the substance, pure principle or the ultimate principle.1 In
the Vedic literature; Brahman and Paramatma have been referred to as tattva.
In the Sankhya thought the first principle of the universe is described as tattva.

Different schools of philosophy have given the description of the tattva from
different points of view. But all of them emphasize that the tattva is very
important in life. The life and thought are intimately connected with each other,
and they cannot be separated. They also emphasize that without the first
principles or tattva, the life cannot be dynamic, it would be still. So to isolate the
contemplation of the first principles from the process of life could be to deny the
reality of the atman.

The entire Indian philosophy is based on the study of the first principles. The
orthodox systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the concept of ultimate
principles according to their philosophical predilections. The Carvaka philosophy
has also accepted the first principles. It says that earth (prthvi), water (jala), air,
(vayu) and fire (agni) are the four ultimate principles of the universe.1 Akasa is
not the ultimate principle because it cannot be apprehended by sense-
experience, but it can only be known through inference. Vaisesika experience,
but it can only be known through inference. Vaisesika philosophers first gave six
principles: (1) Dravya (substance), (2) Guna (quality), (3) Karma (activity), (4)
Samanya (generality), (5) Visesa (particularity) and (6) Samavaya (inherence).
Later, the principle of abhava (non-existence) was added. Thus, there are seven
fundamental principles of the universe. The Naiyayikas have given 16 principles
(padarthas) of the universe. They are: (1) pramana, (2) prameya, (3) samsaya,
(4) prayojana, (5) drstanta, (6) Siddhanta, (7) avayava, (8) tarka, (9) nirnaya,
(10) vada, (11) jalpa, (12) vitanda, (13) hetvabhava, (14) chala, (15) jati and (16)
nigrahasthana. They are primarily logical categories. Samkhya darsana has
enunciated 25 principles in the evolution of the universe. They are: prakrti,
mahat, ahamkara, panca jnanendriyas (5 sense organs), panca karmendriyas (5
motor organs), panca tanmatras (5 elements) and panca mahabhutas (5 basic
substances) and purusa, the self. Yoga philosophers have accepted the
Samkhya enunciation of the 25 principles. Purva Mimamsa has advocated that
the injunctions of the Vedas are primary and they are the first principles. The
Advaitavedanta is monistic philosophy and has postulated the first principle of
the universe Brahman-all else is its appearance. The Buddha has formulated the
4 noble truths: (1) duhkha (misery), (2) duhkhasamudaya (cause of misery), (3)
duhkhanirodha (cessation of misery), (4) duhkha-nirodha-marga (way to the
cessation of the misery). In Jaina thought the concept of tattva has been
considered from two aspects: (1) saddravya aspect (the six substances) and (2)
seven tattvas or nine padarthas. The terms Dravya, Tattva and Padartha are
sometime considered as equivalent.

TERMINOLOGY OF TATTVA

In Jaina metaphysics the terms sat, sattva, tattva, tattvartha, artha, padartha
and dravya have been used in various contexts as equivalent terms. However,
these terms have their variations of uses. Acarya Umasvati in his
Tattvarthasutra has used the word tattvartha, sat and dravya in a similar way, in
the context to reference to substance. These concepts have only linguistic
variations, but there is no difference between the uses of the words
conceptually. Acarya Nemicandra has mentioned a dichotomous division of the
tattva into jiva and ajiva (living and the non-living) as dravyas. The universe is
constituted of these two fundamental substances. The Buddhist philosophers
have propounded a theory of the impermanence of things. Everything is
transitory, everything is flux. Therefore, reality is only fleeting and transitory.
But Vedantins, on the other hand, have formulated a theory of the absolute as
the ultimate truth that is permanent and unchanging. The changing universe is
an appearance. In this way, the Buddhists and the Vedantins have approached
the theory of reality from their different points of view: one from the synthetic
point of view and the other from the momentary point of view. The Jainas say
that these two points of view are one-sided, partial and ekanta. To assert their
point of view is to commit the fallacy of exclusive affirmation (ekanta).
According to Jainism the reality is comprehensive and complex. Both the
synthetic and momentary points of view are partial approaches to the
understanding of the real. Both these approaches are partial truths. Because
permanence and change are both real and without permanence there is no
change. It is the permanent that changes. Therefore, the Jaina believes that
they are equally real. We cannot assert exclusive truth in any one of them.
Everything in the universe would be permanent if it is looked at from the point of
view of substance and it will be change and impermanent if it is looked at from
the point of view of modes. Let us consider, now, the Jaina analysis of the theory
of the reality.

THE NUMBER OF TATTVAS

The Jaina philosophers have answered the question regarding the number of the
tattvas in different ways in different contextual references. There are three
fundamental approaches to this problem. From the point of view of the cosmic
order, it can be said that the universe consists of two fundamental principles: jiva
(living substance) and ajiva (non-living substance). From ontological point of
view, with the element of the spiritual considerations, we can say that there are
7 tattvas: Jiva, Ajiva, Asrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara and Moksa. If we include
the ethical and religious overtones to these considerations, we have nine
principles, which includes the seven principles mentioned above and two more
are added i.e., Papa and Punya. In the philosophical literature there appears to
be a general agreement on the usage of the second tradition of the looking at
reality from metaphysical and spiritual points of view and they give seven
principles. In the Agama literature, the third tradition is used. The Bhagavati1,
Prajnapana2, Uttaradhyayanasutra3 have mentioned nine principles. The
Sthananga4 mentioned two-fold classification: Jiva and Ajiva. Acarya Nemicandra
has stated in the Dravyasangraha that there are two-fold distinctions in the
Tattvas: Jiva and Ajiva on the basis of the Agamas, mentioned above. Acarya
Umasvati has included, in the Tattvarthasutra, the principles of Punya (merit)
and Papa (demerit) in the principles of Asrava or Bandha and mentioned the
seven distinctions of the tattvas (principles).5 Acarya Malayagiri has followed the
enunciation the principles as given by Acarya Umasvati, in his commentary on
the Prajnapana.6

THE ORDER OF THE TATTVAS

A relevant question has been asked as to why the Jiva dravya has been given the
first place and other dravyas are mentioned later. The answer to that would be
that Jiva dravya is fundamental for the following reasons although other
principles are equally important.

The essence of Jiva is consciousness. As such, jiva knows, it experiences the

modes of Pudgala. It experiences the fruits of good and bad karmas. Each jiva is
aware of the tendency of experiencing the pleasure of the world and also it has a
craving for the realization of the self. The principle of ajiva is useful for the soul
to realize the highest end of Moksa. It is like the ladder with the help of which,
we can ascent to the other floor. It is like the boat by means of which we can
cross the ocean of life. Similarly, the external world (ajiva) is a canvas on which
the activities of the jiva are to be developed. In this sense, Ajiva is the next
category in importance of the seven tattvas. Similarly, jiva in contact with ajiva
will bring about the influx of karma (asrava) and bandha (the bondage). The
empirical individual (samsari jiva) experiences merit (punya) and papa (demerit)
due to the influx of karma (asrava) and bondage (bandha). Therefore, in some
Agamic books, punya and papa have been mentioned before the categories of
asrava and bandha; and in some books they have been included after the
categories of asrava and bandha. The separation of jiva and pudgala leads to
moksa. Samvara and Nirjara are the means for the attainment of moksa. When
the karmic particles are entirely removed from the jiva, moksa is possible. The
order of the principles in many works has been Samvara, nirjara, bandha and
moksa.

PRESENTATION AND ELABORATION

The Acaryas present the philosophical problems to the disciples keeping in view
the degree of their capability of understanding the intricacies of the problems. If
the disciple is sharp-witted, the presentation becomes brief and sometimes even
suggestive. Elaboration in simple language should be necessary to persons who
are rather slowwitted. If the seven-fold principles are crystallized in a brief
presentation, then the principles are to be expressed in the two-fold distinction
of jiva and ajiva, because these two principles incorporate the other five
principles in the form of expressions of the jiva and ajiva. The ways of the forms
of tattvas are different. Asrava, bandha, punya and papa are principles mainly
concerned with ethical and empirical considerations. They are called ‘samyogi’.
But samvara, nirjara and moksa do not have their eyes towards the worldly
attainments. One is based on the secular activity and the other turns towards
spiritual salvation. The latter is therefore called ‘viyogi’. Asrava is the influx of
karma into the soul. The soul gets karmic particles encrusted and it is vitiated by
the influx of karma. This causes the bondage (bandha). Where there is asrava,
there is bandha. The soul gets entangled in the wheel of life and death due to
the influx of the karmic particles and vitiating the psychic states of the soul,
through passions (kasayas). Auspicious bandha is punya and inauspicious
bondage is papa. In this way, the four principles of asrava, bandha, samvara and
nirjara are closely associated with the principles of jiva and ajiva. Samvara is to
prevent the influx of karma, and that is possible by stoppage of the inlet of
karma, just as we close the inlets of water in a tank for the sake of obstructing
the flow of water inside. The function of nirjara is to remove the karma, which is
there associated with the soul, just as we remove the accumulated water from
the tank for cleaning the tank. When all the karmas is removed, the soul
becomes pure and free from karmic tinge. It reaches the state of perfection.
The function of the three principles is to remove the karmic particles that are
foreign to the soul.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES (TATTVAS) FROM THE SPIRITUAL

POINT OF VIEW

The tattvas can be classified into three forms from the spiritual point of view of
the tattvas that will be known (jneya), those that should be discarded and those
that should be grasped and accepted. Jiva and ajiva are principles that need to
be understood in the proper way (samyagjnana). One who wants to realize
himself would have the right knowledge of the principles of jiva and ajiva;
otherwise, he would not be able to develop self-control. For the sake of
salvation, one should avoid bandha and samsara. Moksa is to be realized.
Samvara and nirjara are the means for the realization of moksa. Asrava, punya,
and papa will bring the bondage (bandha) and they have to be discarded. If the
merit (punya) is related to the good activity that leads to self-realization, it has
its functions for the path of realization. In the Chadmastha stage of Gunasthana
the self is associated with punya along with the realization of the triple jewels
(samyagdarsana, jnana and caritra). In the lower stages there are emotional
upsets. Those who are seeking to realize the self, but because they rely on the
noble words of the munis and arhantas (tirthankaras), would attain the states of
righteousness. In short, punya considered from a particular point of view
(ekanta drsti) may be worthy be being discarded, but from other points of view,
it has the characteristics of jneya, heya (to be discarded) and upadeya (to be
accepted). In the fourteenth gunasthana, which is the highest stage, punya has
also been discarded, because punya (merit) as well as papa (demerit) have no
relevance in that stage. From the 11th to 13th stages of gunasthanas, it is only
knowable (jneya) and in other gunasthanas, the seeker after truth has need of
the punya (merit) because with the help of the punya he will have treed his way
to self-realization. In this sense, jiva and ajiva are jneya (worthy to be known);
asrava (influx of karma), bandha (bondage) and papa (demerit) are to be
discarded and nirjara and moksa are worthy to be pursued. Punya can be
considered from various points of view. It is worthy of knowledge (jneya), it is
heya (to be discarded) from another view and punya needs to accepted in the
earlier stages of self-realization. It has all the three characteristics.

RUPI AND ARUPI (WITH FORM AND THE FORMLESS)

Jiva is formless. Moksa is also formless. There are 5 types of ajiva category:
Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, Kala and Pudgala. Dharma, adharma, akasa and Kala
are formless (arupi). Pudgala (matter) has form. The modes of pudgala can be
found in the forms of karma, asrava, bandha, punya and papa. Those that have
form are characterized by the qualities of varna (color), gandha (smell) rasa
(taste) and sparsa (touch). That which is characterized by the absence of these
qualities is formless.

JIVA AND AJIVA

The questions arise out of the nine principles, how many are jivas (living
substances) and how many are ajivas (non-living substances). This question has
been considered with reference to principle of samvara, nirjara and moksa.
These are expressions of function of jiva. So these are also called jivas. Asrava,
bandha, punya and papa are expressions of non-living substances. Hence, these
are also called ajivas. Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, Kala and Pudgala are non-living
substances.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WITH REFERENCE TO DRAVYA

Jainism makes a two-fold distinction in the study of tattvas as follows: (1) from
the point of view of the ontological categories and (2) from the point of view of
substances. We have already seen the classification of the substances from the
ontological point of view. From the point of view of substances (dravya), tattvas
have been classified into two: jiva and ajiva. On the one hand, there is the jiva
category and on the others the ajiva. Ajiva has been further classified into
different types as: (1) dharma (principle of motion), (2) Adharma (principles of
rest), (3) Akasa (space), (4) Kala (time) and (5) Pudgala (matter). Jiva, Pudgala,
Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are called Astikayas because they have three-
dimensional extensions. Astikaya connotes the characteristic of multi-
dimensional extension, but Kala (time) is not considered as astikaya, because it
is not multi-dimensional. It has only linear dimension.

DRAVYA AND BHAVA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES)

If we want to understand the nature of a thing, we have to consider the nature of

the object from the point of view of its substance and its characteristic. Dravya
refers to the original matter and bhava has reference to its modes. Dravya and
bhava can be considered from another point of view, i.e., dravya has reference
to the material aspect and bhava refers to the psychic state. The seven tattvas
can be analyzed from the point of view of substance and the modes.

The jiva as a substance is eternal, beginningless and endless. This is considered

from the point of view of substance. But from the point of view of psychic state,
jiva can be considered a substance expressing itself in various psychic ways like
desires and other mental activities. Similarly, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa are non-
living substances. The modifications are also non-living (ajiva) substances.
Punya can be considered from both dravya and bhava points of view and punya
affects the soul in its activity and the encrustations of karma. Similarly, papa
also has two aspects: the material aspect and the psychic's aspect. Jainism
considered the various principles from the two fundamental aspects, i.e., from
the point of view of material aspect and the psychic point of view. In this way,
we get the dravyasrava; and dravyasrava expresses itself in mithyatva
(perversity), avrata (violation of vows), pramada (negligence), kasaya (passions)
and yoga (activity). In the same way, we have bhavasrava with reference to the
same forms of expression like mithyatva, asrava etc. these are psychic states of
the self. Samvara can also be considered from the material and psychic points of
view. Samvara expresses itself in activities which are wholesome and which are
meant to arrest the influx of karma. These activities may be expressed in the
forms of practice of vratas, samiti and in three forms of gupti. By means of these
activities, the influx of karma can be arrested and the karmic particles are held in
abeyance. There is the psychic aspect of samvara that expresses itself in the
psychic states of the self, which are helpful for enabling us to stop the influx of
the karmas. Nirjara has two aspects: dravyanirjara that expresses itself in tapa
(austerities) and bhavanirjara that is the psychic foundation for the practice of
austerities. The bandha (bondage) has also been considered from two points of
view, i.e., dravyabandha that is the karmic bondage and bhavabandha which is
expressed in the psychic expressions like emotions etc. The highest state of
dravyamoksa is a state where all the karmas are removed and bhavamoksa is a
state of perfect and perfect peace of atman.
Atmavada: An Analysis (Concept of Atman)

VARIOUS THEORIES OF SOUL

Sutrakartanga discusses different theories of soul.1 Some philosophical theories

postulate the ultimate elements as the highest reality of the universe. The
earth, water, air, fire and space have been considered to be the ultimate
elements of the universe, and soul is a product of the combination of these
elements.2 In the Buddhist literature, we find references to these theories of the
soul and there is mention of a theory that the soul as a thing consisted of the
four elements excepting space.3 The Rigvedic seers speculated over the nature
of the soul and they were perplexed to discover the real and the ultimate nature
of the soul. They asked the question: ''who am I?'' ‘’I do not know.'' 4 In the
philosophic discussions about the nature of the soul, several views have been
presented which mention the nature of the soul in the materialistic and the
idealistic strain. Some have said that the soul is composition of matter, some
identify it with an aspect of prakrti, some make the soul the essence of life
(prana) and still others give an idealistic picture of the soul as a person (purusa).

THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL

Considered from the historical point of view, the materialistic view of reality is
very ancient. We find mention of this view as a polimic in the Upanisads, the
Buddhist and the Jaina literature. In the Svetambara Upanisad, the problem of
the ultimate source of the universe has been discussed, and mention has been
made the matter is the ultimate source of the universe.1 In the Brhadaranyoka
Upanisad, there is discussion about the ultimate source of the universe. It has
been suggested that matter is the ultimate source of the material things, and
consciousness in this universe. There is no consciousness in the dead body (na
pretyasamjna asti)2 Jayanta, the Naiyayika philosopher, has suggested that the
materialistic, theory is to be found in ancient Indian thought in the Carvaka
philosophy.3 In the Visesavasyakabhasya we get references to the materialistic
theory of the soul.4 Sutrakrtanga makes mention of the Carvaka theory of soul as
the combination of the five physical elements.5 In the Digghanikaya, there is a
discussion of the view of Ajitakesakambalin, who said that the soul is a product
of the combination of the four elements except space.6 It is clear from the
discussion of the materialistic theories, that they maintain the view of the soul as
a product of the combination of the basic elements and consciousness is also a
by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. This view is called
‘Lokayatamata’. This has been criticized by other systems of philosophy in India.

In the ancient philosophical literature, we also get references to the theory called
tajjivatacchariravada as we get the materialistic conception of the soul. In the
Upanishads, the theory has not been mentioned in this terminology, but in other
philosophical works like Sutrakrtanga,7 VIsesavasyakabhasya8 and
Majjhimanikaya9 we get references of this view.

Pandit Sukhalal Sanghvi etc., has suggested that ‘’Bhutacaitanyavada’’ and

‘tajjivatacchariravada’ are two different theories. If they were identical theories,
there would not have been separate mention and separate discussion, of this
theories.1 Tajjivatacchariravada maintains that body and soul are one.
Tathagata Buddha has mentioned this problem as one of the unanswerable
questions (avyakrta prasna). In the Sutrakrtanga, we get discussion about this
theory. ‘’The soul and the body are one and identical. If they are different, they
could have been shown as separate entities as we can show the sword from its
case, a nut from the bag and as we can get the butter from the curds, but we
cannot show the soul as different from the body,’’2

These two schools of thought can be found discussed in the ancient Indian
philosophical literature. It has been described that the fundamental substance of
the universe is constituted of the fundamental elements like the earth, water, air
and fire (prthvi, apah, teja and vayu).3 According to this thought, the
consciousness has been described as a product of the combination of the
elements.4 Just described. There is no other source except this. Just as we get
alcohol from the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers, so also we get
consciousness from the metabolic changes in the body. This type of materialistic
theory of reality could be found in the Carvaka philosophers in India and in the
Greek philosophers like Thales, Aneximander and Aneximanes. They were
monistic materialists. Democratus was a Pluralistic materialist. He propounded
the theory of atoms. Similarly, in the Tattvasangraha we get the mention of a
theory of Kambalasvatara that mentions that consciousness is only body
(kayadeva caitanyam). According to the Tattvasangraha tajjivataccharira is a
theory of Kambalasvatara. Digghanikaya mentions the name of
Ajitakesakambalin as propounder of this theory. It is possible that
Ajitakesakambalin and Kambalasvatara are the same persons.

In the Buddhistic literature there is a part in the Digghanikaya called payasisutta.

In the Jaina literature we have Rajaprasniyasutra. In both these works there is a
similar discussion about the questions of the king Payasi or Pradesi regarding the
nature of the soul. The king Payasi did not consider the body and the soul as
separate. In order to prove this theory he demonstrated that there is nothing
that remains after the destruction of the body after death. He carried some
observations in this respect and made some experiments. Perhaps, these were
the first primitive forms of experiments. He had asked some persons that they
should come and report as to where they were after death, but none came to
report to him. He looked a man in a box and sealed it in order to show that after
the death of the man, there would be nothing in the box except the body. He cut
asunder the limb of the body of the person in order to locate the soul but he
could not locate the soul. A youth, for instance, can discharge many arrows with
his strength, but a young child cannot do so. This is because the strength is in
the body, and if the body is destroyed the energy is also destroyed.
Raja Pradesi carried these investigations and was sure that the soul is nothing
but the product of the body. Apart from the body there would be no soul. His
father was also of the same view. This materialistic conception of the soul as
belonging to the organism was discussed in the Upanisads and in some cases it
has been supported for the sake of presenting theories to the people of different
abilities.1

In the Chandogya Upanisad, there is a story of Virocana and Indra going to

Prajapati for getting a clarification regarding the nature of the atman. Prajapati
asked them to look into the pond of water and he said ‘’you are that’’ i.e., the
body i.e., the atman. Virocana was satisfied with this view and he went on
preaching the materialistic conception of the soul as identical with the body.

ATMAN AS PRANA (PRANMAYA ATMA)

But Indra had its doubts. He could not let be convinced of the view that the soul
is the body. Then a different view possibly came to his mind that atman is prana
(the vital or life force). This view has held by many philosophers. They argued
that without many philosophers held this view. They argued that without this life
force, sense-experience would not be possible and sense organs would not
function. Take away the life force and the sense organs would be dead. The life
force has sometimes been associated with breath because after death, breath
would not function. Therefore, atman is the prana and all functions of the life are
possible because of atman.1 In the Chandogya Upanisad it has been said that
prana is life force in the universe.2 Brhadaranyoka Upanisad describe that prana
is the god of gods3 But Nagasena has refuted the theory of prana as the soul in
the Milindapantha.

The sense organs have an important function in the body. Some identity the
atman with the sense organs, but philosophers have criticized this theory of
identifying the atman with sense organs. In the Chandogya Upanisad also there
is a criticism of the theory as the story of Indra and Prajapati Continues.4 In the
Brhadaranyoka Upanisad, it has been said that at death, the sense-organs cease
to unction, but prana which is the source of the energy of the sense-organs is not
destroyed. Therefore, indriyas function because of the pranas and indriyas have
been described as pranas.5

In the Jaina literature, there is the mention of ten pranas (life forces), in which
the sense organs are also included.

Vacaspati, while discussing the vaikrtika bandha, as accepted by the Samkhya,

has suggested that there are views, which mentions that indriyas are the purusa.
These are the views that identify purusa with indriya. They are
Indriyatmavadina.6

In this way, there have been several views that may be considered as
materialistic in nature as they identify the atman either with the body or the
sense organs. This is one of the views, which is equally important in Indian
thought. The materialistic view of the atman as presented by the Carvaka has
been recognized as a separate darsana in the current of Indian philosophy.

ATMAN AS MIND (MANDANA ATMA)

It has been observed that the sense organs do not function in the absence of the
mind. The body may remain in a place resting for sometime, but the mind
moves about. Therefore, the mind is more important than the sense organs and
some have suggested the theory that mind is the atman. Pandit Dalsukha
Malavania says that there was first the view of atman as prana and later came
the theory of atman, as the mind.1 Mind is subtler than the sense organs and the
prana. The philosophers do not uniformly agree as to the nature of the mind.
Whether it is material or immaterial. Some have suggested that the mind is
immaterial, but the Naiyayikas2 and Vaisesikas3 have considered mind as atomic
in nature. It is different from the material substances like earth, water etc.
Samkhya darsana maintains that the mind evolved out of ahamkara before the
evolution of the pancabhutas and therefore the mind is subtler than the bhutas
(elements). Vaibhasika School of Buddhism maintains that mind is of the nature
of vijnana and it is an expression of vijnana.4

Nyaya philosophers have sometimes considered mind as atman5 because mind is

different from the body as we make a distinction between the body and soul.
Mind is all-pervasive. Mind comprehends all that the sense-organs grasp.
Therefore, mind is considered to be atman and it is not necessary to make a
distinction between the atman and mind.6

Taittiriya Upanisad also says that mind is the atman (anyoantaratma

manomayah).7

The Brhadaranyoka Upanisad discusses the nature of the mind from different
aspects. Mind is considered to be the highest truth (paramabrahma samrat).8
Chandogya Upanisad makes mind the Brahman.9 Tejobindu Upanisad describes
mind in various ways and gives supreme importance to mind. Mind is the whole
universe. Mind is the greatest enemy and due to mind we suffer untold misery.
Mind is Kala (time). Mind is samkalpa (will). Mind is jiva (soul). Mind is citta
(consciousness). Mind is ahamkara (individuality). Mind is antahkarana (inner
sense). Mind is prthvi (the earth). Mind is jala (water). Mind is agni (fire). Mind
is pavana (wind). Mind is akasa (space). Mind is sabda (sound). Mind is sparsa
(touch). Rupa (from), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and pancakosa (five sheaths)
arise out of mind. The states of waking (jagrti) dream (svapna) and sleep
(susupti) are all expressions of the function of the mind. Similarly, the deities of
direction (dikpala), vasu, rudra, aditya and others are all forms of mind.1 In this
way; mind is the very source of universe. It is the very essence of the universe.

PRAJNATMA-PRAJNANATMA-VIJNANATMA (ATMAN AS PRAJNA AND VIJNANA)

The philosopher transcending the speculations of atman as mind reaches a stage
when he finds atman as identical with prajna (psyche). This is the later stage of
development of the theory of atma, in the hierarchy of thought. The mind and
the sense organs cannot function in the absence of the psyche (prajna). Prajna
is much more important than the sense-organs and the mind.2 In the Taittiriya
Upanisad, prajna has been described as antaratma and vijnanatma as
manomaya.3 In the Aitareya Upanisad, prajna is considered as ultimate truth and
it is aspect of Brahman and mind is one of the aspect of the prajna.4 Prajna and
prajnana are considered as identical.5 The word vijnana is considered a mode of
prajna.6

Vijnana, Prajna and prajnana have the same meaning. In this sense atman is
described as vijnanatma, prajnatma and prajnanatma. We have already
discussed about the views, which have considered mind as material, and those
views which say that mind is immaterial. Transcending these views we come to
a realm of views where atman is considered as psyche and the higher aspect of
function of psyche. This is expressed in the self as a cogniser. Cognition by
mind is possible only if there is a cogniser and that is considered to be, according
to this theory, the prajna. Indriyas are to be the means of cognizing an object of
the prajana.1 We should bear in mind that in Kausitaki Upanisad, the sense-
organs and mind have been included in the psyche as the man in the sleeping or
in an unconscious state does not cognize anything even if the sense-organs are
there because the prajna does not function. Therefore, the functions of these
asceceries like the sense organs and the mind are dependent on the prajna or
the psyche. The man gets up from sleep and he get awake and begins to
recognize things. Similarly, if a man is reborn, his experience starts. In these
cases, the sense organs begin to operate and get experiences as fire is born
from the spark.2 Man begins to get knowledge. The sense organs, therefore, are
an aspect and function of the prajna.3 Without the association with prajna, sense
organs and the mind cannot function.4 Therefore, it is necessary to understand
that the psyche is distinct from the sense organs and mind. In the Katha
Upanisad,5 we have a description of the grades of reality, one higher than the
other does. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than mind (manas), mahat (the
great) is greatest than buddhi, avyakta prakrti (undifferentiated prakrti) is higher
than buddhi, avyakta prakrti (undifferentiated prakrti) is higher than mahat and
purusa is the highest of all, because according to Samkhya, the mere presence of
purusa is sufficient to create disturbance in the equilibrium of the three gunas in
the prakrti and then the evolution starts. From this, it is clear that the intellect
(Vijnana) is not the characteristic of the attribute of consciousness but it is the
attribute of prakrti. From this we can say that in the search for vijnanatma (i.e.
atman is identical with the jnana) we arrive at the truth that the atman is
consciousness (cetanamaya) the consummation of the hierarchy in experience
will be the bliss (ananda) which is the highest point of experience. It is very
often suggested that atman is ananda. It is anandamaya.

CIDATMA (ATMAN AS CIT)

The Indian philosophers have described the different levels of the self in its
experiences starting from annamaya to anandamaya. These may be considered
as the sheaths of atman. In all these discussions, the outer encrustations of the
atma have been described, but the real nature of the atman has not been
mentioned. The contemplations and the nature of these aspects of atman have
led the philosophers to the conclusion that these different sheaths of atman are
also to be considered as the stages or the states of the self; for instance
annamaya atma is the bodily self. It is the instrument of experience. It is like
the chariot. The charioteer who drives the chariot is that atman.1 Without the
atman; the bodily functions cannot exist. The body and the self are two different
principles. According to the Prasna Upanisad, the prana is an expression of the
atman. It arises out of the atman, as the shadow of the man is due to the man,
because he is a physical being, so also prana depends on the atman.2 Therefore,
atman and the prana have to be considered as two different entities although
prana is an expression of the atman.

Kenopanisad3 makes it clear that atman is distinct from the sense organs
(indriyas) and the mind (manas). In the absence of the atma they cannot
function. As the essence of vijnanatma (intellect) is to be found in the
anandatma (the bliss). The essence of anandatma (bliss) is in the antaratma,
and that is the Brahman. In this sense, the Brahman is the highest reality
distinct from the vijnana and ananda.4

Brahman and the atman are not different, they re identical.5 The names are only
different. The Brahman is sometimes described as the highest reality and the
Purusa, and it is the ultimate essence (Gidhatma) of all that is in the universe.6
The Katha Upanisad considers Buddhi-vijnana (intellect) as a product of prakrti
and therefore, jada (unconscious). It is possible that the seers of the Upanisads,
were not satisfied with this aspect of vijnana, unconscious principle as an aspect
or prakrti and proceeded further to find out the ultimate reality. They realized
that the highest reality is the Brahman and Brahman is pure conscious. It is
atman and the identity of the Brahman and atman is the consummation of the
monistic theory of thought.

We have also seen that vijnanatman is not self-luminating (svatahprakasita). It

is a product of prakrti, but it gets illumined in the presence of the purusa and
purusa is self-illumined.1 It cognizes even intellect also.2 The Brhadaranyoka
Upanisad, describes atman as the higher reality and says that atman is the
cogniser it is aparoksa i.e. it gets direct experience. It grasps the prana. It
experiences through the sense organs like the eyes and ears. It reflects with the
mind. It cognizes the knowledge.3 The self is the seer (drasta), the hearer, the
thinker and the knower.4 It is cinmatra (pure conscious). It is illuminating
(sarvaprakasarupa) and it is all-shining (jyotisvarupa).5

The first seekers after the knowledge of the atman were concerned with
understanding the nature of the atman is materialistic terms. Later the
meditation of the atman lead to the conception that the atman is the immaterial
and spiritual substance. The atman cannot be grasped by senses. It is possible
to know the atman, if we transcend sense-experience of intuition. Deep
contemplation on atman is necessary and that is why we find Naciketa went to
Yama and sought to know the nature of the self. Yama offered him the pleasures
of the world, but Naciketa was not tempted by the worldly pleasures because his
aim was to know the self.6 Maitreyi gave up all wealth that her husband offered
for the sake of knowledge of the self.1 Yajnavalkya said that all things of this
world, all the animals, all the wealth, the son, the wife and the husband are all
because of the atman. It is therefore, necessary to know the atman. We should
meditate on the atman.2

PRE-VEDIC TRADITION: SRAMANA CURRENT OF THOUGHT

In this way, the discussion about the nature of the atman has been copious and
all the theories regarding the nature of the atman have been discussed in the
Upanisads, However, before the composition of the Upanisads, there was, in
India the Sramana current of thought which was prevailing much before the
Aryans came to India. The Sramana current of thought was full developed and
had its own outlook. This was the pre-vedic and non-vedic current of the
thought. But we find that sufficient attention has not been given to the study of
the pre-vedic Sramana current of thought, although the prominent conceptions
of this current of thought like nirvana and karma and ascetic life have been
assimilated in the general stream of Indian thought.

JANMANTARAVADA (THEORY OF RE-BIRTH)

There are many schools of philosophy that advocated the reality of infinite
number of individual souls. Each of them presented its thought from a specific
point of view.

All our activities have their after-effects. These after-effects constitute the
karma. The karma has to be exhausted or experienced and there is no escape
from it. If it is not possible to exhaust the karma in order to be pure-self in this
life, we have to postulate the existence of life after death and series of life as a
consequence of the necessity of explaining the bondage and the destruction of
the continuing karma that affects the soul. This has given rise to the theory of
rebirth and of the other world. The question was very often asked: ‘What would
be the nature of the self after the destruction of the body and where would the
self go?' On this difficult problem there have been different theories of
philosophy explaining the needs for the postulate of rebirth and the nature of the
self in the cycle of birth and death.

NATURE OF SOUL ACCORDING TO JAINISM

Pandit Sukhalalji says that among those who believe that there are infinite
numbers of independent souls that are all pure and perfect in their original
nature the Jaina tradition is first and foremost. Jaina theory of soul is prominent
and it has a special contribution to make to the theories of souls propounded in
Indian thought. The reasons for this are twofold: (1) Jaina view is based on
rationalistic ground and is very much amenable to reason, and (2) The Jaina
theory of self has already established itself by the time of the 23rd Tirthankara
Parsvanatha in the 8th century B. C. The theory crystallized during that period has
largely remained the same in its core. But the Buddhist and Vedic theories were
of non-self and have undergone major changes in the centuries that went by.

According to Sramana tradition the nature of soul may be described as follows:

1. Jiva is beginningless and endless. It has no beginning or end. It is

indestructible. It is eternal. From the point of view of substance the nature of
jiva is pure and perfect and the same in all three phases of time-past, present
and future. Therefore, it is eternal (nitya). From the point of view of
modification jiva is anitya (temporary) because it undergoes various forms of
empirical modifications. Therefore jiva is eternal but jiva, as an empirical
individual is not eternal.

2. Regarding the description of the empirical self (the samsari jiva), we can say
though milk and water, sesamum and the oil, and flower and its fragrance are
related, as it seems the relation between the soul and body, but really the
position of the soul is like a bird in the cage, like the sword in the sheath and
like the sugar in a pitcher. The soul can become independent of the body.

3. One of the characteristics of jiva is contraction and expansion, which it

pervades the body that it occupies whether big or small. In the body of the
elephant, the soul pervades entire body of the elephant and if it is the body of
ant, it pervades the body of the entire ant. However, this characteristic of
pervasion in a body, big or small, does not affect the fundamental nature and
the number of pradesas of the soul.

4. A space is formless and as it can be comprehended by its space-giving

function, so also jiva is formless, yet we can comprehend the nature of the
soul by means of intellect (vijnana).

5. As time is beginningless and indestructible so is jiva that is beginningless and

indestructible.

6. As the earth is the very basis of all things, so is jiva that is the basis of
knowledge and experience.

7. As space is undiminishing and constant in all the three times, so is jiva which
is indestructible, endless and beyond measure.

8. As the gold can get the form of garland, head-dress (crown) earrings, ring,
etc., but still as the substance of the gold is the same so also the jiva is the
same although it wanders about in the wheel of samsara, in the four forms of
existence-the heavenly, the human, lower animal and the hellish stage.
9. As the sun spreads its rays and objects illumined and as the sun moves
elsewhere at night and the light is not seen so also the soul that exists with a
particular body experiences the life in this existence, and as it leaves this
body, and enter another, this experience is no more.

10. As the fragrance of saffron and the lotus flower can be experienced by
smell and not by sight so also jiva cannot be seen by the eyes yet we can
know the existence of the self through the attribute of knowledge.

11. The music of the instrument can be heard but cannot be seen. In the
same way, the jiva in its form cannot be seen. We can also understand the
nature of the jiva by means of its characteristics and effects.

12. The ghost and the devils can enter the bodies but they cannot be seen.
We can only infer the presence of these by the bodily activities. Similarly, we
can know that there is self by observing the psychophysical activities like
laughter, pleasure and pain and bodily activities like dances etc.

13. The food we take is transformed into seven basic elements through
chemical composition. Similarly, the particles of matter, which are fit to be
karmic particle, are transformed into karmic particles (karmavargana) which
obscure the free function of the soul.

14. Jiva is a source of different forms of energy like knowledge energy

(jnanasakti), the energy of the basic power (viryasakti) and will-power
(samkalpasakti)1

15. Jiva, through its activity in the empirical world, accumulates samskara
(mnemic traces) and through the samskara a suksmasarira (subtle body)
constituted of material particles. This is called paudgalikasarira. When the
soul gives up one body and enters another in the next life the suksmasarira
will be there with it, with the load of mnemic traces of the previous life.2

16. Jiva is formless, but by its accumulated karmas it has acquired a body and
through this body it also becomes with form.

17. All Jivas have the same qualities and capacity of development. Yet each
jiva develops in different ways owing to several factors like the purusartha
and other causes.

18. There is nowhere in the world, a place where subtle bodied and gross-
bodied souls are not present.

19. Just as the particles of gold are mixed up with the earth in the form of ore,
this mixed form of ore has been beginningless. It gets purified and pure gold
is extracted with the help of fire. So also the jiva gets purified and reaches
the state of perfection through samvara and tapasya etc.
20. Just as it is not possible to decide whether egg is prior or the hen, so also
it is not possible to determine the priority or otherwise of jiva and karma.
Both of them co-exist from beginningless time.

COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH THE SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW

We have so far discussed the characteristics of jiva from the point of view of
Jaina philosophy. We shall now consider the comparative picture of Jaina view
with the Sankhya-Yoga view.3

1. Jiva from the Jaina point of view is beginningless and endless and it is
characterized by consciousness (cetana rupa). Samkhya-Yoga also presents a
similar view.

2. According to Jainism, jiva pervades the body that it occupies. It had a

characteristic of expansion and contraction according to the size of the body.
Therefore, it expresses itself in modes. But according to the Samkhya-Yoga,
jiva is all pervading and in its characteristic of consciousness, there is no
possibility of parinamitva of expressing in the form of modes.

3. According to Jainism there are infinite number of souls and each occupies a
particular body. The Samkhya-Yoga tradition also accepts this view.2

4. The Jaina conception of the soul accepts the characteristics of activity and
enjoyment (kartrtva and bhoktrtva) as belonging to the soul. It also says that
the pure and the impure forms of attributes are possible due to activity, but
the Samkhya, Yoga tradition does not accept the inherent activity of the soul.
According to the Samkhya-Yoga, the purusa is passive, but it is conscious.
similarly, experiences and enjoyments and substantiality and attributes are
not acceptable to the Smkhya-Yoga.3

5. The Jainas have advocated a theory that jiva acquires in its empirical,
existence the mnemic traces (samskaras), which form the subtle body in
terms of material particles. This subtle body moves along with the jiva into
the next life. In the same way, in the Samkhya-Yoga tradition, purusa itself
has neither attachments nor the consequential attributes of cetana. It is pure,
unattached and it is not directly involved in the activity and the enjoyment.
For the sake of explaining the continuity in the future life, the Samkhya-Yoga
also posits a subtle body (Suksmasarira) which moves with the soul and which
has the characteristic of pervading the body and experiencing the fruits of the
karmas. This is pratipurusa in short, as the Jainas maintain the variety of
expression of cetana in the empirical form so also the Samkhya-Yoga accepts
the subtle modes embodied in the principle of buddhi or linga sarira which is a
produce of prakrti.4

6. The Jaina view of the soul is that the soul is formless. But it appears to have
form due to karmic encrustations and the subtle body. But the Samkhya-Yoga
 thinks that the soul is formless and the forms of the individual soul are due to
the subtle and the cross bodies which are products of prakrti. The illusion of a
form arises due to the fact that the impressions received through the sense
organs are reflected in the soul and the soul therefore reflects it back. Just as
space has no form, yet we, through our reflection, imagine the form of space.
Similarly, the soul expresses the reflection that give rise to forms.1

7. According to Jainism, the soul is the source of infinite energy, and the energy
of knowledge, of will and of power, but in the Samkhya-Yoga we find these
forces are attributed not to consciousness which is the essence of the soul,
but to the subtle body which is the form of buddhi and buddhi is the product
of prakrti.2

8. According to Jainism all the jivas have the same capacity and the same
energy, but personality distinctions are due to the differences in the
purusartha and other causes. In the Samkhya-Yoga also the difference in the
personality development are traced to the Suksma sarira, which is the form of
buddhi, and the buddhi is the product of prakrti. In it real nature each soul is
equal.

COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH NYAYA-VAISESIKA VIEW

The Jainas and the Samkhya-Yoga tradition have presented a theory of the soul
in which we find the nature of the soul as independent and consciousness.
Consciousness is the essence of the soul. Similarly Nyaya-Vaisesika theory has
given an independent view of the soul. Nyaya-Vaisesika, like the Samkhya-Yoga,
accept the reality of the soul and its independence from the body. Souls are
infinite in number and they are beginningless.3 They are eternal, they are
spiritual substances. However, Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accepts the Jaina
characteristic of the soul as pervading the body, but it maintains that soul is all-
pervasive like the views of the Samkhya.4 The Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accept
the characteristic of the expansion and contraction according to the needs of the
body that the soul possesses, but like the Samkhya-Yoga it says that from the
substance point of view, the soul is kutastha nitya.1 However, in some points
regarding the characteristic of the soul like the substance, attributes and
characteristics, the Nyaya-Yaisesika comes nearer to the Jaina view. The
Samkhya-Yoga says that soul is consciousness and has no attributes. But the
Nyaya-Vaisesika like the Jainas accepts the possibility in the empirical sense.
The soul is receptacle of many attributes and modes.2 In the Jaina point of view
the soul is considered to be a source of many powers but in the Nyaya-Vaisesika,
we do not find this view. However, the psychic states like knowledge, pleasure,
pain, will, desire, hatred, dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) are all
considered to be the attributes of the soul. These attributes are operative and
they exist as long as the body exists. They arise and they are destroyed.
However, these qualities are inherent in the psychic states of the jiva as
expressed in the jnana and darsana. According to the Jainas the prominent
theory is that in the state of perfection jiva is consciousness, and has the
characteristic of bliss (ananda) and power (virya) and knowledge (jnana), but in
the Nyaya-Vaisesika the consciousness is only an attribute of the soul and as
such in the highest state of perfection consciousness cannot exist with the soul.
It is analogues to unconscious states. Nor has the soul any other characteristic
in the perfect state.3 The fundamental reason is that the Nyaya-Vaisesika does
not accept consciousness as the essence of the soul. It is only a quality, but the
view of Jainas and of the Samkhya-Yoga maintains that consciousness is the
essence of the soul and according to them the soul is characterized by
consciousness. The soul is consciousness. But according to Nyaya-Vaisesika,
consciousness is the quality of the soul. Soul has consciousness; and hence in
the highest state of perfection, the soul is unconsciousness.

Nyaya-Vaisesika darsana has certain differences in the consideration about the

nature of consciousness with the Samkhya-Yoga, as there are some similarities
also. Samkhya maintains that self is consciousness, pure and simple, it is self-
illuminating. It is free from the modifications like the modes of consciousness,
which do not really affect the true nature of consciousness. The modes of
mental states are due to the reflection of the states in consciousness and in the
self. In the highest stage of perfection consciousness is free from the states like
knowledge and feeling etc., which are mere modes without affecting the
consciousness. Similarly, Nyaya-Vaisesika considers consciousness and modes
as qualities of the self and self as only a substratum of the qualities. In the
highest state, self is free from consciousness. Therefore, in the state of
liberation (Mukti), the self is free from any attributes or modes. The same
interpretation could be even in the case of Samkhya-Yoga, although the
Samkhya-Yoga believes that consciousness is the essence of the soul. In this
sense, the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of self in the state of liberation could be
considered free from any quality life space (akasa) with this difference that
akasa is formless but it belongs to the empirical world. While soul is amurta
(formless) but not belonging to the empirical existence (bhautika). There
appears to be no difference between the liberated soul and akasa, as there is
absence of any quality or mode of consciousness in both. However, akasa is a
substance (dravya) and mukta jiva (liberated soul) is endless (ananta). There is
only the denominational difference. There is no other difference between akasa
and jiva.

Nyaya-Vaisesika thought has similarities and differences with the Jaina and
Samkhya-Yoga systems of thought. The Jainas maintain that jiva has the
inherent characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktrtva) and activity (kartrtva).
According to the Jaina view, these characteristics are very much present even in
the liberated state. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accept the presence of the
characteristics of enjoyment (Bhoktrtva) and activity (Kartrtva) in the state of
liberation, although they do admit the presence of these characteristics in the
empirical state of the jiva. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the states of
consciousness like knowledge, will etc. take their origin and are destroyed when
in contact with the body (sarira) and the jiva expresses the characteristics of
enjoyment (bhoktrtva) and activity (kartrtva) only in relation to the body.1 In the
liberated state these characteristics are absent. In this respect, the Nyaya-
Vaisesika comes nearer to the Samkhya conception of self as consciousness.
According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, the characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktrtva) and
activity (kartrtva) of the soul are different in content. The jiva is eternal but is
characterized in its very nature by the attributes of enjoyment and activity. The
attributes of enjoyment and activity have association with the phenomena of
origin and destruction. The jiva expresses modes of knowledge (jnana) will
(iccha) and activity (prayatna), and with the presence of these modes the jiva is
considered as possessing the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. But in
the liberated state, there is the total absence of the modes of knowledge, will
and activity and, therefore, the jiva is not characterized by the characteristics of
enjoyment and activity. These are totally absent in the liberated state. In this
sense, the Nyaya-Vaisesika makes a distinction between the jiva as substance
and jiva in the empirical state as expressing the mental modes. From the point
of view of ultimate existence jiva is nitya (eternal) but from the empirical point of
view, jiva is active and is the enjoyer of the experiences. In this sense, they
differ from the Jaina conception of jiva as having the inherent characteristics of
enjoyment and activity. The fundamental principle involved would be the
consideration of the Nyaya-Vaisesika view that the substance is different from
the attributes. The Samkhya-Yoga darsana does not accept the presence of
attributes in the purusa. Purusa is consciousness, but consciousness is not a
quality of jiva as the Nyaya-Vaisesika considers it to be. Consciousness is the
essence of purusa and does possesses the attributes. However, in both the
systems of thought, the eternity of the soul is established from different
standpoints. The Samkhya-Yoga takes the stand that the soul is eternal because
it is pure consciousness and the mental states are only modes not connected as
essential characteristics of this soul. The Nyaya-Vaisesika considers the soul to
be eternal because it is the substance and in this eternal sense as the
substratum of qualities. Consciousness and its modes are only qualities of the
soul and hence different from the soul.

The auspicious and inauspicious effects of activity through samskara (the

mnemic mass) affect the Nyaya-Vaisesika, like the Jainas accept the view that
jiva. The Jainas maintain that the subtle body (the Suksma sarira) which is
empirical in existence absorbs the after-effects. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika
considers the manas as atomic in nature. The jiva being all-pervasive is not able
to grasp the knowledge. It is the mind, which is atomic in nature, functions as
the instrument of knowledge. The jiva has this atomic mind (parmanu manas)
when the jiva gives up one body and takes into another in the succeedining life,
takes the other body also. According to the Jinas, it is the Suksma sarira (the
subtle body) which goes with soul and enters into the body in the next life.

Samkhya-Yoga darsana postulates a Suksma-linga-sarira (subtle body) which is

the repository of the good and evil and their effects. It has the capacity of
pervading the body it occupies. It is this Suksma-linga-sarira which goes
alongwith the pure soul from one body into another in the next life.1 The Nyaya-
Vaisesika presents its theory of after-life (punarjanma) in terms of its conception
of the atomic vies mind (paramanu manas). The Jainas say that jiva moves into
the next life with the suksmasarira with its characteristics of enjoyment and
activity. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, as also Samkhya-Yoga, there is not
possibility of activity in the pure soul; these are accidental qualities and modes.
But in the Nyaya-Vaisesika, we find that there is the conception of the effect of
the good and evil on the rise and fall of the states of jiva. It does not accept the
Samkhya-Yoga conception of the impact of the good and evil on the Suksma-
linga sarira and is only, as the Samkhya-Yoga says that we attribute the direct
effect of these characteristics on soul.

THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF NATURE OF THE SOUL

In order to understand the views of the Buddha about the nature of soul, we
should analyse the Buddhist view of the concept of non-self in the historical
perspective.

Prior to the Buddha and during his time, there were two views regarding the
nature of the soul: (I) The Atman is eternal and is not affected by any modes of
time and empirical adjuncts; (ii) the second view was that the Atman although
permanent is affected by the empirical adjuncts. According to first view, the
Atman remains pure and perfect, unaffected by any psychophysical modes in
time-past, future and present. The second view, while accepting the Atman as
the eternal principle, does accept the possible influences on the nature of the
Atman by the empirical modes. Both these views have one common factor of
accepting the conception of Atman as the permanent substance. The Buddha
was against the view of the eternity of the Atman. What you call self is merely
an aggregate of physical and mental states. It is the sanghata (aggregate) of
the nama (mental) and the rupa (the physical states), samskara (mnemic mass),
samjna (cognition), vedana (affective states) and vijnana (physic energy). There
is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Every moment, there
is change. What I am this moment, next moment I am not. This kind of
description of the Buddha’s view of the soul was considered Anatmavada. It is
difficult to say whether he denied the existence of a permanent self as the
eternal or whether he refused to accept the empirical personality as a
permanent entity. There has been a controversy over this problem. However, it
is necessary to note that the basic attitude of the Buddha was ‘sarvam prahak’
everything is fleeting. The Buddha was considered as the ‘Nairatmyavadin’ one
who denied the existence of a permanent soul. The Buddha did not however
accept the materialistic conception of the soul, as constituted if the material
elements as presented by the ‘lokayata’ view. He followed the middle path
(madhyama marga). He accepted the concepts of rebirth, (punarjanma), karma,
purusartha (fundamental values) and moksa (liberation). In this sense, the
Buddha did recognize that the concepts of Atman, Jiva and consciousness
(cetana) have important place in the system of thought, that he preached.

However, it would be a truism to say the schools of philosophy like the Nyaya-
Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga and Jainism presented a definite viewpoint on the
concept of the Atman. But Buddhism did not give a definite view of the elf.
Careful study of the development of Buddhist thought shows that there were five
different streams of thought in the Buddhist view of the nature of soul-
1. Pudgala-nairatmyavada (materialistic conception of non-soul)
2. Pudgalastivada (the materialistic view of the soul)
3. Traikalika dharmavada (theory of elements) and Vartamanika dharmavada
(the theory of momentary elements).
4. Dharmanairataya-nihsvabhavata or Sunyavada (theory of Sunya).
5. Vijnaptimatratavada (theory of consciousness as soul.)1

All these theories have been fundamentally based on the important tenets that
the Buddha preached in his conceptions of the four Noble Truths and the eight-
fold path. They draw their inspiration from the Buddha’s primary concern for
freedom, misery and the spiritual values.

PUDGALA NAIRATMYAVADA

In the Tripitakas there is the mention of the clear view that atman is merely an
aggregate of the skandha of physical and mental states. The mental states are
constituted of vedana (feeling), samjna (cognition), samskara (mnemic mass)
and vijnana (the psychic energy). These undergo modifications and the chain of
modification is called sanghata. It is the flow of the modes of mental
phenomena. All these are called nama.2 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad3 mentions the
term namarupa and there, it is suggested that the very nature of the principle
expresses its nature and its modes. According to Buddha, however, there is no
basic principle like nama-rupa and rupa-nama are the expressions of physical
and psychic states. The Buddha says that there is a constant flow of the mental
states like the vedana, samjna, and vijnana. For this flow, there is neither the
beginning nor the end. This is based upon and centered round the conception of
the pudgala and therefore it is called nairatmyavada.

PUDGALASTIVADA

The Buddhist sangha was against the conception of the permanence of the soul
and the philosopher featured the argument for the conception of the
permanence of the soul, but after sometime those who believed in the
permanence of the soul coming from the Brahmanic tradition joined the Buddhist
sangha. They gave a new orientation to the Buddhist conception of
nairatmyavada in the light of their original predilections of the sasvata
atmavada. They based their conception on the materialistic theory of the self.
Kathavatthu and Tattvasangraha have mentioned this kind of a theory of the
permanence of the soul as a polemic against the Buddhist view of atmavada.1
These pudgalvadins maintain that the jiva is of a materiel nature. When they
were asked whether the jiva has form like the material objects they were not
able to accept this view. The Pudgalastivada entered the Buddhist sangha but as
it was not consistent with the main concept of the Buddhist view as expressed in
the atmavada, this theory lost its importance and remained only in name.
TRAIKALIKA DHARMAVADA & VARTMANIKA DHARMAVADA

The Pudgalaniratmyavadins had to perform a two-fold function: (1) It had to

defend itself against the atmavadins and to show that there is no permanent
self. (ii) Yet this theory had to accommodate the conception of the rebirth,
bandha (bondage) and moksa (liberation). This gave rise to the theory of
sarvastivada. According to this theory, the mental states designed as nama
were referred to as ‘citra’ and it expresses itself in vedana, samjna, and
samskara flux. These are included as dharma (elements). This theory had to
defend on the basic stand of ksanikavada. Accordingly, the sarvastivadins
presented the modes of ‘citta’ as flowing in three durations of time and
presented the traikalikata2 But there appeared to be inconsistency with the
original Buddhist conception of reality as impermanent and fleeting and is
consigned to present only (Vartamanika). By introducing the conception of
Vartamanika to the moments of the present. The efforts to reconcile these views
gave rise to the theory of sautrantikavada. The sautrantikavada accepted the
sarvastivada conception of ‘citta’ (mental) and caitasika (mental states). But
they made them referring to the present moments only (Vartamanika). In this
way, they tried to make the reality a flux, yet accepting the mental states of
sarvastikavadin as elements.

DHARMANAIRATMAYA-NIHSVABHAVATA OR SUNYAVADA

This was the age of vigorous philosophical discussions. Philosophical

disputations were very prominent in this age. Some philosophers propounded
the theory of being (sat); others refuted the arguments of this theory and
enunciated the theory of non-being (asat). Still others presented the theory of
the being and the non-being. In this way the permanent, the impermanent, the
one and the many and similar problems were discussed vigorously by the
philosophers in this age. Nagarjuna came to realize that the Buddha’s catuskoti
(four-fold predications) was not very useful for providing the philosophical basis
for nairatmyavada. Therefore, he presented a theory of Syadvada. The
interpretation of the ‘sunya’ has been various. Some have suggested that sunya
is the void. But some others have suggested that Nagarjuna could not have
considered the reality as the void because he was originally trained in the dvaitic
conception of reality, as he was brought up in the Upanisadic tradition.
Therefore, they say that Nagarjuna’s sunya is not the void, it is the ultimate
reality that is unspeakable and inexpressible. However, as Nagarjuna was
converted to Buddhism and as he became the vigorous exponent of the
nairatmyavada and the theory of reality as momentary, it cannot be said that
Nagarjuna presented the absolutist viewpoint. Nagarjuna’s Sunyavada did not in
anyway refute the rationalistic and a spiritualistic conception of reality and the
theory of evolution.

VIJNAPTIMATRATAVADA
After Sunyavada, comes Yogacara. According to the Yogacara School,
Sunyavada does not systematically consider any of the Buddhistic theory, but
the Buddha's conception of nama was primarily concerned with mental states. It
is centered round vijnana. Therefore, according to the Yogacara, reality is
mostly mental in nature. It is vijnana, and atman is the expression of vijnana,
although there is no permanent Atma. Vijnanavadins are generally considered to
be subjective idealists who give prominence to mental states and to the external
works. The mental states are real and external world is only an expression of
mental states. Vijnanavadins had to posit an objective conception of the
storehouse of consciousness. It is alayavijnana.

In this way, we find discussion of the conception of self from different stages and
gradually it has reached the idealistic position of the conception of the self as we
find in the vijnanavada. In this, the self is primarily mental and expressing
mental states. Eminent philosophers like Dharmakirti, Santaraksita and
Kamalasila tried to present this idealistic conception of the self in terms of
vijnana, yet not deviating from the original stand of Ksanikavada.1

In the Buddhist tradition, all the schools of thought have presented their own
views concerning the soul as cuttasantana (the stream of consciousness). The
vijnana-advaitvadins maintain that there is nothing except vijnana and the self is
considered as a stream of mental states and self that is real. The physical states
are subsumed under the general conception of vijnana.2

In the Buddhist philosophy there is no discussion about the specific relation of

citta vijnanasantati or Jiva. We cannot, therefore, say whether self have any
reference to the states of bodily existence, however in some of the works like
Visuddhimaggo 3 there are reference to the bodily states and it is possible that
the mental states like the pleasure and pain have relation to bodily states.

We have already said that in the Samkhya-Yoga, Jaina thought and others there
is a view that in the rebirth the Suksmasarira moves from one body to the other.
Similar description we find in the Digghanikaya about the gandharva. The
description goes that one who wants to go from one life to the other after death,
has to wait for seven days with gandharva. In the kathavatthu there is a
discussion about the inner life in relation to the conception of gandharva.
Similarly, in some other works and in the writings of Vasubandhu and other
Vaibhasikas there is mention of transmigration from one body to the other.1 It is
like the subtle body. In Theravadi Buddhaghosa there is no mention of the
subtle body (antarabhavasarira). He has given certain examples of the
movement of consciousness from one body to the other.2

UPANISADIC THOUGHT

In the Upanisadic tradition we do not get a uniformity of views regarding the

nature of the self. Sometimes even in one Upanisad, we find the mention of
different views, regarding the conception of the self. For this reason, those who
have speculated on the nature of the self have presented various views.
Badarayana wrote the Brahmasutra and in the Brahmasutra, we find the mention
of various views of the self as presented by the ancient seers. Brahmasutra
became a very important work like the Upanisads and several commentaries on
that were written. But unfortunately all the commentaries are not available
today. Samkracarya wrote a commentary on the Brahmasutra and presented
Mayavada (theory of Appearance). But those who did not accept Mayavada
wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra and presented their own
interpretations of the Brahmasutra refuting the Mayavada. Among them may be
mentioned the Acaryas like Bhaskara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka. These Acaryas
presented different views in their commentaries but the basic uniformity of and
said that jiva is real as the Brahman is real. Jiva is different from the body. It is
eternal and is imperishable. Samkracarya while presenting his mayavada based
his argument on the Upanisadic streams of thought as presented by these
writers into three states, as 1. Samkara’s Advaita. 2. Madhavacaryas Dvaita
and 3. The vedic interpretations of other Acaryas.3

Samkara said Brahman is real. It is the ultimate reality and all other things are
appearances. The differentiations of Jivas in the empirical existence are not real
but are only appearance caused due to avidya. Everything is Brahman, and jiva
and the distinctions between the jivas are not real distinctions. The Brahman
and the atman are identical; ‘Aham brahmasmi’.1 Madhvacarya’s conception of
reality was different from that of Sankaracarya. His was dualistic conception of
reality. Brahman is real, jiva is also real. Jiva is not merely an appearance.
Brahman and Atman are both equally real. There are innumerable jivas. There
are all-eternal.

Bhaskara and other Acaryas have maintained that jivas are real. They are the
consequential expressions of the Brahman. It may be said that they are
products of the Brahman. They are expressions of the Brahman; therefore, they
cannot become an appearance.

In the Mahabharata, there are three views of the conception of the jivas based
on the Samkhya philosophy: (1) There are of 24 principles (24 tattvavadi) (2)
those who maintain an independent eternal Purusa still belonging to the 24
principles theory, i.e. 25 tattvavadi, and (3) those who maintain that purusa is
different from Brahman and belonging to the ‘chavvisattavavada’ i.e. 26
Tattvavadi.

It appears that ancient philosophers discussed these three streams of thought

and the discussions were mainly based on the Upanisadic thought. In brief, the
philosophical discussions concerning the nature of the self based on the
Upanisadic tradition can be summarized into some forms of philosophy as (10
kevaladvaita (2) satyopadhiadvaita (3) visistadvaita (4) dvaitadvaita (5)
avibhagadvaita (6) suddhadvaita (7) Acintya bhedabheda and such other various
forms. In general, we have exponents of the Advaita and Dvaitavada including
Ramanuja’s Visistadvaita.
Samkara presented kevaladvaita. According to him, Brahman is the only reality.
All else is appearance. The world is an appearance. Brahman is the ultimate
reality and phenomenal world is only an appearance. According to him, the
empirical individual soil is not an independent reality. It is only the phenomenal
state of the atman. Atman and the Brahman are identical and the phenomenal
reality of the atman is due to avidya and abhasa. Samkara takes recourse to the
conceptions of maya, avidya and abhasa for explaining the phenomenal world.
He makes a distinction between the different levels of thought like the dream
state, the waking state, the dreamless sleep and the turiya. These views are
based on the Upanisadic concept.

Appaya Diksita has written a commentary called Siddhanta Lesa-Sangraha on

vedanta Siddhanta Suktimanjari. In this, he has given a commentary of the
various views regarding the relation of the Brahman and atman according to the
kevaladvaita (pure advaita) strain of thought. Some of the views may be
mentioned as follows:

PRATIBIMBAVADA

Swami Vidyaranya and the commentators have given explanations about the
relation between the Brahman the Brahman and the jiva according to their
standpoints. One of the prominent views is that the jiva is the reflection of the
Brahman (the image of the Brahman). This reflection is considered by some as
un-understandable (avidyagata), as the inner sense (antahkarana) by others and
as based upon ignorance (ajnanagata) by still others.1

AVACCHEDAVADA

Some commentators have used the term avaccheda in place of pratibimba and
they maintain that the Brahman is not reflected in the antahkarana (inner
sense), but jiva is an expression of the antahkarana.2

BRAHMA-JIVAVADA

According to this view, Jiva is neither the reflection of the Brahman nor its
'avaccheda', but the reality of the Jiva is due to avidya nor the Brahman is due to
vidya.3

In this way, there are important conceptions regarding the relation of the jiva to
the Brahman in the kevaladvaita as: (1) pratibimbavada (2) Avacchedavada and
(3) Brahmabhedavada.4

Regarding the number of jivas, there is no unanimity among the kevladvaitins.

According to some jiva is considered to be one and the body with the jiva is
living-body and others are non-living. Some others maintain that jiva is one, still
other bodies are equally living and still other thinkers say that there are many
jivas.1 These views have been briefly mentioned by Sadananda in the
Vedantasara and Madhusudana Sarasvati in the Siddhantabindu.

According to Bhaskara, Brahman due to infinite variety of energy expresses itself

in the form of jivas as also in the form of the world. Jiva is the effect of the
Brahman and as such it has functional truth. The Brahman is one, but its effects
are many. There is no inconsistency between the concepts of unity and
diversity. Just as the one ocean manifests itself into infinite number of waves, so
also one Brahman manifests himself into the infinite soul jivas. With removal of
ignorance one realizes that Brahman is one and the jivas which appear to be
atomic in nature are the same as Brahman.

Ramanuja has presented the Visistadvaita theory. He said that the Brahman is
real and the jivas are equally real. Jivas are like the world, which is the
manifested Brahman, are also manifested as the world and as the jivas. The
unmanifested psychic energy (citsakti) expresses itself in the form of manifested
jivas and the source is the unmanifested Brahman, which is Brahmanarayana.

Acarya Nimbarka said that the Brahman is one and undivided, simple and
perfect, yet the jivas are the effects of the Brahman. Nimbarka has presented
the theory of Bhedabheda (identity and difference). It is therefore called
Dvaitadvaita (the one and the dual). The one wind expresses itself in many
forms; similarly, the one Brahman manifests itself into many jivas. These jivas
are equally real.

Vijnanabhiksu says that purusa is independent and beginningless like prakriti but
not different from the Brahman, this view is called ‘’avibhagadvaita’’
(undifferentiated advaita).

Acarya Vallabha presents the pure Suddhadvaita. According to him, the world
and the jiva are the phenomenal effects of the Brahman. These effects are due
to lila (magic or play). And the Brahman is pure and simple. It is a reality.

Caitanya accepts the ‘’acintyabhedabheda’’. The Brahman manifests in different

jivas due to the inherent jiva sakti (the inherent energy of the soul). Jivas are
both identical to and also different from the Brahman. This relation is beyond
the speculation (acintaniya).

Philosophers from Bhaskara to Caitanya have considered jiva as atomic in

nature. When the jiva removes ignorance by means as jnana (knowledge) and
bhakti (devotion), then the jiva attains liberation. All these acaryas are believers
in the atomic nature of the soul (anujivavadi.) They maintain that rebirth is
possible by means of the subtle bodies (Suksmasarira).

Madhya is Vedantin, but he does not believe in the theory of non-dualism

(advaita) and non-difference (abheda). He maintains, on the authority of
Upanisadic tradition, that jiva is atomic in nature. There is infinite number of
jivas. They are eternal and real. They re not the effects of the Parabhraman, nor
are they part of Brahman. When the jiva removes the ignorance, it realizes the
authority (svamitva) of the Brahman or Vishnu.

The Saiva’s do not accept the authority of the Veda or the Vedanta. They accept
the pratyabhijna darsana. They base their arguments on the pratyabhijna.
According to them, parabhrahma is Siva. Nothing else is greater than Siva. The
parabhrahma or Siva is the highest reality and by his will, he creates infinite
number of jivas and the world. From the point of view tattva (principles) jiva and
Siva are not different.

According to the upanisads and Bhagavadgita, atman is different from the body1
different from the manas.2 It pervades entire universe.3 It is not the effect of
anything (avikarya)4 and it is indescribable in words5 The things (avikaryas) and
the description of the Brahman can only be in the negative as ‘neti-neti’.1 The
Brahman is neither gross nor atomic, neither small nor large, neither water nor
any liquid, neither shadow nor darkness, neither wind nor akasa, neither the
aggregate nor having qualities like taste, smell, neither eye nor speech nor mind.
It is neither light nor prana (life force). It is not mouth. It is neither in or out.2

SIZE OF THE SOUL (PARIMANA)

In the Upanisads we get different views regarding the size of the soul. It has
been said that the atman, which is manomaya, is within the heart and is of the
size of grain of rice.3

There is a view, which says that the size of atman is equal to the distance of the
top of thumb to the tip of fore-finger.4

The atman is considered to be pervading the body.5

There is another view which says that atman is all pervading.6

There is another view, which says that the atman as residing in the heart and
which is greater than the earth, than the space, than the world and in fact
greater than all the universe.7

According to the Jainas, the jiva is eternal and has no end. Every jiva pervades
infinite points of space. It has the capacity of pervasion. At the time of Kevali
samudghata the atman pervades the entire universe for the some time8 and at
the time of the death of mundane soul pervades partially9 and has infinite
pradesas.

The dharma, adharma, Lokakasa and jiva occupy equal number of space, points
but from the point of view of measurement they do not occupy the equal number
of space-points. Dharma, Adharma and Lokakasa are receptive and they do not
express any qualities of action and reaction and there is no effect of any type.
Samsari jivas receive pudgala; they show activity and their efforts are not
uniform. Due to the accrusion of material particles like the karmic particles, jivas
express expansion and contraction. Yet they are atomic in nature also and
except in the case of the state of kevalin samudghata, they do not become all
pervasive. Therefore, the jivas are called as of madhyama-parimana in the
sense they have intermediate size.

It should be noted that the attributes of expansion and contraction do not really
belong to the nature of the soul. The attributes are ascribed to the karmic
bodies. Due to the accretion of karmic particle jivas occupies a particular size of
the body. And the effects of this type of pervasion of the body in a particular
size are due to the karmic body. The largeness or smallness of the karmic body
is due to the four directions (gati). In the liberated state these characteristics
are absent.

The capacity of the jiva of pervading the entire body that it occupies is likened to
the capacity of the light of the lamp, which pervades the entire room big or
small. As the light of the lamp which pervades the entire room big or small. As
the light of the lamp illumines the room, which is big or small, so the jiva
pervades the entire body big or small. This pervasion is possible due to the
karmic body.

The jiva, which occupies the body of a small child, occupies the body of a youth,
and also the body of an old man. The soul, which pervades a huge body, can
also contain itself in smallest of the bodies, the body of an insect.

CHARACTERISTIC OF JIVA

From the noumenal point of view, jiva has the characteristic of cetana (the light
of consciousness). All jivas have this characteristic of cetana (the light of
consciousness), and it is the inherent characteristic of the jiva. But the
development of the jiva differs in each individual case according to its capacity
and on the basis of the intensity of the karmic encrustations. Similarly, the
development of jiva depends on the extent of knowledge based on the removal
of knowledge-obscuring karma. In describing the distinction between jiva and
ajiva it has been said that all the jivas, however in the lowest possible stage of
development, possess an infinite part of kevalajnana (omniscient knowledge).1 If
that part of omniscience is also covered by the karmic particles, it would become
ajiva, but such a contingency never arise.

From the phenomenal point of view, jiva has the characteristic of growth, of
intelligence and a state of existence like animal state etc. A machine can be
made to eat food but it cannot make use of the digested food for its own
development. There may be some machines, which are self-controlled; for
instance, a tarpedo has the capacity of moving on its own energy, but other
machines cannot produce these machines nor do they produce such machines.
They can be used. There is not a single machine, which is self-skilled and self-
producing. A railway train, for instance, can take tonnes of luggage and move,
but it cannot fly like a bird. A bird has psychic energy which train or the machine
does not possess. Therefore, the psychic energy is the criterion of distinguishing
a living soul from non-living object.

MUKTA AND SAMSARI JIVA

Jivas have been classified into two types as (1) mukta (liberated) and (2) samsari
(empirical jivas). Both the types of jivas are infinite in number. The samsari
jivas are to be classified into six types on the basis of the nature of the body they
possess, as (1) Prthvikaya (earth-bodied), (2) apkaya (water-bodied), (3)
Tejaskaya (fire-bodied) (4) vayukaya (air-bodied), (5) vanaspatikaya (vegetable
kingdom) and (6) trasakaya (beings can move).

Except the trasakaya jivas the other 5 types of jivas can be distinguished into (1)
gross (badara) and (2) subtle (suksma). The universe is filled with subtle jivas.
The gross-bodied beings cannot live without any support like the body and they
reside in some parts of the universe. The number of the living beings, which are
earth-bodied, has been described with an analogy. If the living beings, contained
in a lump of earth of the size of a fruit (avala), and if each living being were to
get the body of the size of the dove, then the population of all the living beings
in the lump will overflow the one lakh yojana of the jambudvipa.2

If the living beings contained in a drop of water were each to get a body of the
size of a grain of sesamum, then they will overflow the jambudvipa.1

The living beings contained in a spark (cingari) were each to get the body of the
size of a small egg of louse (likha) then the jambudvipa will be over-populated.2

The living beings contained in a fraction of air which moves a leaf of a margosa
tree were to get the body of a tiny grain of khasa-khasa then jambudvipa will be
over-populated.3

BODY AND SELF (SARIRA AND ATMAN)

The problem of the relation of the body and soul has been an important problem
in philosophy. Three theories explaining the relation between the two have been
presented:

1. Materialistic view, which may be described as 'Epiphenomenalism', used in

describing the relation between body and mind.
2. Parallelism, and
3. Interactionalism.

Epiphenomenalism tried to dispense with mind and soul as an independent

reality and make them a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body.
Consciousness (Cetana) is the product of the metabolic changes in the brain
cells. As the function of intestines is digestion, the function of the lungs is
breathing so is the function of cerebrum is consciousness. It is also considered
as function a by-product of the chemical changes in the cerebrum. There is
nothing like Atman or the consciousness as a separate reality.

The Atmavadins, i.e., those who advocate the reality of the Atman as different
from the body of the mind refute the arguments of the epiphenomenalists by
showing that the use of the term action (kriya) is ambiguous. It is one thing to
say that the action or function of the intestines is to digest food and the lungs to
breathe yet another ting to say that the function of the brain cells is to get
consciousness. The consciousness and the cerebrum belong to two different
realms, qualitatively different. When we think of consciousness, we do not
normally think of cerebrum, though we may associate the two. Different organs
of the body have by themselves no active or creative function. Intestines do not
digest the food, lungs do not breathe, but we digest and we breathe through the
intestines and lungs. Similarly, it is the self that thinks and that is conscious,
although the function may be operated through the cerebrum. Consciousness
cannot be produced out of the un-conscious energy; it is the self that gives
consciousness. Without the body has no life, it is a dead-matter. The bodily
organs by themselves do not function. Father Butler wrote "that the brain is
formed of the dead hydrogen atoms, oxygen atoms, nitrogen atoms and
phosphorous atoms. Imagine them separate and senseless. Observe them
running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This is purely a
mechanical process, which can be seen by the mind. But can you see or dream
or in any way imagine how out of that mechanical act and from these individually
dead atoms, sensation, thought and emotion are to arise? We cannot create
Homer out of the rattling of dice or 'differential calculus' out of the clash of
billiard ball...You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for
logical continuity between molecular process and the phenomena of
consciousness."

It would be futile to compare the functions of digestion and respiration with the
consciousness, because, the functions of digestion and respiration are
unconscious. It is indubitable fact that consciousness and psychic energy are an
independent force not produced out of the bodily functions. Those who consider
consciousness as the effect of the bodily functions have to face a different
question: 'Am I acting on my self-will or am I influenced by the bodily functions?'

Psychophysical parallelism is another theory, which has been propounded to

explain the relation between body and mind or in a sense the soul. Psychical and
physical forces run parallel to each other without ever affecting each other. A
physical state is correlated to a mental state, point by point, without affecting
the other. Parallel occurrence is the point common to both the states.

The third theory of the relation between the body and mind is the theory of
interactionism. According to this view, the bodily and the mental states affect
each other. There is interaction between each other. For instance, physical
ailments like the stomachache and other ailments do affect the mental states
like the cognitive ability the emotional upset and the conative urge. Ill health
does affect the mental energy adversely, while health will bring wholesome
effect on mental life. For instance, particular type of food and drink would bring
about mental states due to the toxic effects. Certain types of food can improve
memory capacity. Injury to a particular part of the brain-cells would impair the
power of memory. Similarly, if the certain parts of the brain-cells were adversely
affected, there would be impairment to the mental energy.

EFFECT OF THINKING ON THE MIND

Body and mind are intimately related to each other. They interact on each other.
Cognitive, affective, and conative activity does affect the bodily condition.
Vigorous process of thinking brings about bodily fatigue. Emotions do create
certain metabolic changes in the body like, secretion of glucose in the blood,
coagulation of the blood and other chemical effects. The bodily and mental
energy affect each other. The body and the mind are two qualitatively different
substances. Still they influence each other. How this interaction is possible has
been a difficult problem to solve.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ATMAN AND THE BODY

The Atman and the body are different substances. One is a spiritual substance,
while the body belongs to the material realm. Atman is the psychic energy
(Cetana), it is formless. Body is material, it is unconscious. It has form. Then
problem is how the two different principles interact on each other. Jainism tried
to solve this problem of interaction between two qualitatively different principles
by means of the concept of the gross (badara) and subtle (suksma) body (sarira).
Every soul in this samsara is encased in the gross and subtle bodies. At the time
of death, gross body is left here and the subtle body continues to be encrusted
with the soul. When the soul enters the next birth it carries the subtle body with
it. It enters another gross body with the subtle body. The subtle body is
constantly being formed, like, the snowball, which adds particles of snow on its
downward journey. The relation between the soul and the subtle body could be
considered to be beginningless. It is always with the soul as long as soul remains
in the samsara. In this sense, it is possible to say that the soul from the point of
view of phenomenal existence has a certain form. It is in its pure state formless.
And in this sense the samsari jiva takes the form of the gross body by means of
'suksma sarira'. In this way, the body and soul are intimately associated with
each other; and form and the formless can have associations with contradictions.
When the soul attains its purity, it would have no connection with the body,
which has form. The relation between the body which has form and the soul
which has no form is beginningless, but it has an end, as the soul, by its own
efforts can free itself from the association with the body.

SOUL AND MODERN SCIENCE

Some scientists do not distinguish between mind and soul. Mind is considered as
expression of the modes of the brain. Pavlov regarded the memory as merely
the expressions of the metabolic changes in the numerous cerebral cells. Even
Bergson, who established the reality of the self by rational arguments, did
consider the memory is due to the physiological changes in the cerebral cells. As
the photo-plate receives the negative of photograph, so also the cerebral cells do
receive and preserve the impressions of the past. This could be described as the
physical memory. The memory traces are revived due to appropriate
stimulations. Therefore, the mind is not something separate qualitatively from
the cerebrum. It is physical. Pavlov's theory has been described as muscle
twitch psychology. In this way, some scientists have tried to prove that there is
nothing, which is immaterial and spiritual. Everything can be explained,
including mind and thought, through the operation of the bodily processes.
However, mind is both material and immaterial, the physiological basis is
material and psychic functions are immaterial. Otherwise, we cannot explain the
higher values of life. It cannot be said that Shakespeare wrote the Hamlet by
more movements of the muscles and nerves, by hands and with the brain.

In the vrtti of the Sutrakrtanga, it has been described that the cognitive,
affective and conative mental functions like thinking, memory, emotions and will
are due to the function of the mind which is immaterial.1 The means of getting
the mental states is primarily physiological based on the function of the brain
cells. But the mental states are not physical. They are immaterial. Brain is
physiological and the brain cells are often called knowledge cells. (Jnana tantu).
It is true to say that body affects the mental states; but the mental states are not
the bodily states. Some modern scientists have emphasized this point of view of
the distinction of the mental and bodily states. It would not be possible to
explain the qualitative distinction of the mental state from the body by merely
asserting that the mental states are nothing but bodily. We find prominent
qualitative difference in the mental states and the bodily states. Yet in a sense,
we can say that they are also similar in some respects, because the mental
states are based on the physiological states in the brain.

It is clear from this discussion, that modern science is not clear about the nature
of mind and body, whether there are prominent distinctions between the two.
Even supposing that the cerebrum is the repository of the mental states,
cognition and memory, it does not disprove the possibility of the presence of
psyche (cetana) as the prime mover of the psychic states. Like the photo-plate,
the cerebrum revives the impressions, preserves them and facilitates their
revival on appropriate occasions. It is difficult to explain the 'why' of such
processes and how co-relation takes place. It is possible to explain the insoluble
problem by positing the presence of psyche (cetana) which is not physical in
nature, but which is inscrutably associated with the bodily functions.

The phenomenal progress of science in the modern age is possible only because
of the function of the psyche, which is different from the brain rather bodily,
although they are necessary as instrument or media.

Modern science says that there are 102 elements. They are material in nature
and have from. All the experiments in science so far carried are on the empirical
and the material aspects of things. The immaterial is beyond sense observation
and is not amenable to experimental investigation. In the mental states we find
characteristic which are not to be found in the physical states. Therefore, it can
be said that the mental and physical states are qualitatively different, although
they are not discreet as not to interact on each other.

Modern science has not been able to find a satisfactory solution to the problem
of relation of body and mind. Even if we consider that cerebrum is the seat of
memory and is an instrument for the revival of memory, it cannot be said that
psyche (cetana) is not there at all. Like the negative of the photo-plate, the
cerebral cells do function as repositories of past events in the form of memory.
But the cerebral part cannot function as a guarantee of the future events. The
problems regarding the 'how' and the 'why' of the cognitive function can only be
understood if we posit independent of the cerebrum. In the case of the
mechanical retention of the negative in the photo-plate there is neither variation
nor novelty. It is a necessary mechanical and routine process, which can be
explained by means of the rules of mechanical science. But in the case of
human mind, we find there is variation and unpresentability based upon the
relation of the past impression. There would be individual variation in the
expression of mental states and the revival of past impressions on the basis of
the retention of the past impressions. However, this can be explained only with
the help of the function of a psychic energy, which is distinct from the physical
function.

There has been rapid and phenomenal progress in the field of empirical sciences.
This has been possible due to the enormous amount of systematic thinking and
imagination, which are expressions of the psychic energy (cetana sakti). This
proves the presence of the independent psychic energy.

The Russian Scientist Pavlov carried extensive experiments concerning the study
of the physiological problems of conditioned reflexes. He carried experiments on
the dogs and the experiments are called 'the dog and the saliva experiments'. In
these experiments, he first rang the bell and then presented food to the animals.
After sometime he rang the bell but did not give food. He showed, by the
quantity of saliva collected after ringing the bell, that the animals were
conditioned by stimulus response to the bell and the food. There is not question
of any mental states like expecting food. It is merely a physiological response
without any element of independent psychic states.

However, it is also true that experiments shown that by operating on the animal
and removing particular parts of the brain certain mental functions became
inoperative. But the physic was not lost. The animal behaved mechanical ate
food and other physiological processes like blood circulation and the respiration
were also normal. These functions are not purely physiological. But they have
the psyche as a spring cord. Experience is a criterion of the psychic energy and
experience is neither to be identified with the physiological processes nor to be
associated with them, although physiological processes are the basis of psychic
activity. Even when certain physiological function do not operate, it cannot be
said that the person does not experience the pleasures or pains, although he is
not able to communicate his experiences to others. In the Agama literature it
has been mentioned that a jiva does experience various experiences pleasant or
unpleasant in the series of affix lies. One is blind, one is dumb, one is deaf and
similarly one may be suffering from incurable diseases. If such a being is
tortured by sharp instrument, he may not be able to communicate to others
because of his dumbness and blindness etc., but he does suffer immeasurable
feelings of pain. Sthavarakaya Jivas also experiences such feeling of
immeasurable pain, but having no sense organ to express, they cannot express
their misery.

ORIGINAL FORM OF CETANA

Regarding the nature of cetana the philosophers have expressed two different
views. According to one view, it is said that life cannot be produced from object.
Life force is equally real, independent and beginningless. Louis Pasture has
shown by experimental investigation that life is a force by itself.

Louis Pasture carried experiment in this connection. He took a bowl of glass, and
kept some inanimate objects in it. He saw to it that no animate object, not even
an egg is kept in the glass. Then he gradually removed the air inside the glass,
and made it into a vacuum. In this state no minute organism accumulated there
even after a very long time. But when same objects were kept in the open for
some days and it was found that some animate infinite small organisms were
deposited on the surface of the object. From this, it was clear that the
atmosphere contains infinite number of minute organisms fleeting in the air and
they are deposited on the objects.

According to another view, it is maintained that life can be generated from

inanimate objects. Some scientists like Freud, Russian lady scientist
Lapesinskeya and the atomic scientist like Deraldure and his assistant Stanley
Millar have suggested that life can be generated from the inanimate objects.

Marxist theory maintains that the psyche is the qualitative transformation of the
physical objects. As water heated to a particular degree becomes vapor and
cooled to the zero degree, it solidifies into ice, so is psyche produced from the
changes in the physical objects.

But the question is, at what stage the changes in the physical things does
consciousness arise? The cerebrum contains various forms of material particles
and the gases like oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and phosphorus. It is
possible to determine which of these gases or physical particles become the
origin of consciousness? Is it due to one of them separately, or due to the
combination of all of them or some of them? So far empirical sciences have not
been able to give any solution to the problem of the origin of psyche out of the
physical changes. Thy have not was able to determine the original nature of
cetana.
It has sometimes been suggested that the atman can be identified with the
sense organs and the brain. This view is not correct because even when the
sense organs cease to function due to some defect, memory traces of previous
experiences continue to be experienced without the functioning of the sense
organs. Similarly, it can be shown that atman cannot be identified with the
brain. When the same function of the cerebral cell cease to work, even then
memory may continue to be experienced. Therefore, it is not appropriate to
identify the cerebrum with the atman although it is the source of knowledge.
The sense organs and the brain are only the instruments for getting experiences.
As the sense organs are the instruments of receiving external stimulations, so is
the brain the instrument of retaining the sense-impressions. It has been pointed
out that if the brain cells are injured, memory may be impaired. Yet we can say
that in the mentally defective beings, consciousness does work, even though it
may not function normally. But all other physiological and mental functions in
some respects do work without impairing the normal physiological routine of the
mentally defective. From this, can be shown that the psychic energy is different
from the brain and its functionings, although brain cells are the repositories of
the psychic functions, Tandula Veyaliya gives a description of the physiological
functioning of the body. There are 160 'urdhyagamini' and 'rasavahini' veins in
the human body. They start from the navel and terminate in the head. The
sense organs function normally as long as these veins are working in perfect
harmony.1

Accordingly to Caraka, the cerebrum is the center of the sense-organs and the
vital life forces (prana).2 It is truism that if a particular chord in the brain is cut, a
particular psychic function is paralyzed, but this does not mean that the brain
cells are the psyche.

ATMAN AND INFINITE PRADESAS

We have already seen that atman has infinite number of pradesas. Finite
number of pradesas cannot from the jiva. From the point of view of biological
science, infinite number of cells form the individual life and the body
(psychophysical organism). Body is composed of infinite material particles, but
life is formed of the protoplasmic units. From the noumenal point of view, it is
said that the atman is a spiritual substance. It is simple and pure. It is eternal
and perfect. And the description of atman as constituting of infinite pradesas is
only to be looked at from the practical point of view. It is only an attempt, an
imperfect attempt to find out the measurement of the atman, if it is possible to
say so. A piece of cloth is woven with threads. Threads are the part of the cloth.
But threads by themselves do not constitute the cloth, although threads are
necessary for the cloth. Nor can we say that the aggregate of threads could be
called cloth. It is the pattern that is important. Similarly, the atman has infinite
number of pradesas. They constitute the pattern of the atman.

Consciousness is the characteristic of the atman. This characteristic of

consciousness is psychic energy and it is a differential of the atman. The non-
living substances do not possess this characteristic. Therefore, atman is
considered to be a pure substance, independent of other substances. The jiva
expresses the characteristics of sat (existence) and kriyakaritya (activity). Due
to its characteristic of sat it is a parartha (substance). Due to its characteristic of
activity the jiva expresses modifications. But, in all these modifications it retains
its essential nature and identity. The stream of consciousness is the attribute of
the atman, and the atman remains the same through the modifications
constituted of origin and decay.

THE VIEWS OF THE SCIENTISTS

Prof. Albert Einstein says, "I believe that intelligence is manifested throughout all
nature." 1 Sir A. S. Eddington said, "something unknown is doing, we do not
know what it is...I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as
derivative from consciousness...The old Atheism is gone. Religion belongs to the
realm of the spirit and mind, and cannot be shaken." 2 Herbert Spencer
maintains that the teachers and founders of the religion have all taught, and
many philosophers ancient and modern, Western and Eastern have perceived
that this unknown and unknowable is our very life.3 J. B. S. Haldane expresses his
view on the nature of the self as, "The truth is that, not matter, not forces, not
any physical thing, but mind and personality is the central fact of the universe."
4
Arthur H. Compton has written to say, "A conclusion, which suggests...the
possibility of consciousness after death.... the flame is distinct from the log of
wood which serves it temporarily as a fuel."

In the book entitled 'The Great Design' there is a description of the views of
many scientists regarding the nature of the self, and the design of the universe.
According to their views, the universe is not merely a mechanical and unthinking
process which rolls its way with inexorable necessity, but there is a design and a
plan. This postulates an intelligence, which works behind the process of the
universe and the designer, we may call this intelligence by any name we want.

Rene Descartes has said, by giving a very simple example, that 'I think, therefore
I am'. He based his arguments regarding the reality of the self on the
indubitable fact of the process of thinking and reasoning. He doubted everything
but he could not doubt the doubter. The doubter is a substance.

Spinoza said that substance his infinite number of attributes, and among them
consciousness and extension is prominent. Consciousness is a form of the
attribute of thought. That is the Self. Similarly, extension has its infinite modes;
they constitute the physical universe.

John Locke said that Self is the object of direct experience. "I think, I argue, I
experience pleasures and pains." The 'I' is the substance; it is the substratum of
experiences. Self is an object of knowledge.

George Berkley has shown that the universe is constituted of three principles: (1)
The self, (2) God (Ultimate self) and (3) The external world. The consciousness is
the essential characteristics of the soul. Without consciousness soul cannot
exist.

The philosophers that we have just mentioned, Descartes, Locke and Berkley
have shown that the reality of the self is self-evident. No proofs are necessary,
no arguments are necessary. But, David Hume denied the reality of the self and
said that it is only a fleeting collection of impressions. His view is nearer to the
Buddhist concept of atman as not a real substance but merely an aggregate of
physical and mental states.

The scientists right from the beginning have been discussing the problem of the
nature of the self but they have not come to any definite conclusion. The
problem of the Self has still remained a mystery.

THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATMAN

Attempts have been made to give positive proofs for the existence of the atman.
On the contrary, there have been attempts to argue against the existence of the
atman. But on the whole, it can be said that arguments against the existence of
the atman do not hold ground. Therefore, there is a possibility of maintaining
that the atman is real. It is an independent substance. It is a spiritual
substance. We cannot get the knowledge of the atman through the senses. We
cannot get the knowledge of the atman through the senses. Still, this would not
be a counter-argument against the existence of the atman. We see with out
eyes and we see objects, which are within the range of the sense organ of sight.
Similarly, there should also be a favorable circumstance of the presence of the
light. Therefore, its physical capacity and environmental factors limit the
function of sense organ. But the experience of sight will be possible if there is a
Self, which perceive.

Those who question and those who doubt the reality of the Self have no valid
arguments to give. The Self is expressed through the experiences of the senses.
The Self cannot directly be seen through the senses. It can be inferred through
its object. Therefore, the Self is different from the non-living object. We have
seen that those who argued that consciousness is the product of the
physiological and chemical changes in the brain cells, have not been able to
prove that the brain cells of the chemical effect is the soul. They have not been
able to show that the physiological processes produce mental states, although
some Naturalist Psychologist like Pavlov have tried to demonstrate that all
activities of an organism are physiological. It is of the nature of stimulus
response and conditioned reflex. Moreover, evolution of anything has to be from
within its nature. Nothing can evolve from something which is not of its nature.
Therefore, the development of life has to be from life only. It cannot be from
non-living to life. That would mean arising of something out a thing of a different
nature, as the Asatkaryavadin would assert. Therefore, it would be proper to
consider that the immaterial soul and the material body are qualitatively
different.
CLASSIFICATION OF JIVAS

Jivas have been classified into different types on the basis of the different
principles. The foremost classifications of jivas is (1) Mukta jivas (liberated souls)
and (2) Samsari jivas (soul involved in this world). This classification is based on
the principle of the attainment of perfection.

Of the Samsari jivas, there are different classifications again on the basis of
different principles. For instance, on the basis of the principle of the capacity of
movement jivas have been classified into: (I) Shtavara jivas (beings which cannot
move e.g., trees) (ii) Trasa jivas (beings which have the capacity of movement).1

Sthavara jivas are of three types: (1) Prthvi jivas (Earth-bodied) (2) Jala jivas
(Water-bodied) and (3) Vanaspati (Vegetable kingdom).2 Sometimes, the
Sthavara jivas have been classified into five different types: (I) Prthvikaya (earth-
bodied), (ii) jalakaya (water-bodied), (iii) Tejaskaya (fire-bodied), (iv) vayukaya
(air-bodied) and (v) vanaspatikaya (vegetable-kingdom). The jivas of the air and
fire-body have movement as their nature and they are called gati-trasa
(moving). They have been distinguished into: gross (badara) and subtle
(suksma). The subtle-bodied beings are pervading the entire universe, while the
gross-bodied beings live in specific places of the universe.3

Gross earth-bodied being are of two types: (1) mrdu (soft) and (2) kathina (hard).
The soft earth-bodied beings are again classified into seven types on the basis of
the color of their bodies: krsna (black), nila (blue), lohita (red), harita (yellow),
sukla (white) pandu (orange) and panakamrtika. This distinction may be
considered to be more scientific.4 Similar distinction has been made in the
Prajnapana.

The hard portion of the earth has been divided into Bhutalavinyasa (terrain) and
karambapalo. Those too have parts and have been further classified into 36
parts: -

1. Suddha-Prthvi (earth)
2. Sarkara (sand)
3. Baluka
4. Sila (granite, rocks)
5. Lavana (salt)
6. Usa (soft earth)
7. Ayasa (iron)
8. Tamra (copper)
9. Upala (some type of rock)
10. Trapu (zinc)
11. Sisaka (lead)
12. Rupya (silver)
13. Suvarna (gold)
14. Vajra (diamond)
15. Haritala (emerald)
16. Hinguluka
17. Manahsila
18. Sasyaka (a variety of emerald)
19. Anjana
20. Pravalaka1
21. Abhraka Baluka
22. Abhrapatala
23. Gomedaka
24. Rucaka
25. Anka
26. Sphatika
27. Markata
28. Bhujamocaka
29. Indranila
30. Chandana
31. Pulaka
32. Saugandhika
33. Chandraprabha
34. Vaidurya
35. Jalakanta
36. Suryakanta

According to the Brhadvrtti commentary on the Uttaradhyayanasutra Lohitaksa

and Masaragalla are species of Sphatika and Morakata respectively.2

The gross water-bodied beings (sthula jala) can be divided into 5 types, as: (1)
Suddha udaka (pure water), (2) Osa udaka (dew), (3) Haratanu (green bodied),
(4) Kohara (fog) and (5) Hima (ice).3

The gross vegetable kingdom is of two types, as: (1) pratyeka sariri (having
separate bodies) and (2) sadharana sariri (having one body). The being having
one jiva in one body is called pratyeka sariri, but, if one body contains
innumerable jivas (living cells) it is called sadharana sariri.

Pratyeka sariri being in the vegetable kingdom are of twelve types as:
1. Vrksa (tree)
2. Guccha
3. Gulma
4. Lata (creeper)
5. Valli (plant)
6. Trana (blade of grass)
7. Latavalaya (encircling creepers)
8. Parvaga
9. Kuhuna
10. Jalaja
11. Ausadhitrana (medicinal grass)
12. Haritakaya (green bodied plant)4
The beings of sadharana sarira have innumerable types like Kanda and mula
etc.1 So far we have considered the Sthavara jivas i.e., the living beings who
have not got the capacity of movement.

Now we consider the trasa jivas (living beings who can move about) i.e. self-
moving beings. The trasa jivas are of six types:
1. Agni (fire-bodied)
2. Vayu (air-bodied)
3. Dvindriya (two-sensed organisms)
4. Trindriya (three-sensed organisms)
5. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms)
6. Pancendriya (five-sensed organisms)2

The fire-bodied and the air-bodied beings do not possess self-willed movements.
Therefore, they are called gati trasa. They move about randomly. The other
jivas from two sense-organisms onwards have self-willed movements.

The fire-bodied and air-bodied animals are gross and subtle. The subtle-bodied
beings pervade the entire universe, while the gross-bodies beings have a
habitation in a particular place.3 The gross-bodied fire beings have various forms
like angara, murmura, suddha agni, archi, jwala, ulka, vidyut, etc.4

The gross air-bodied beings have the following types: -

(1)Utkalika, (2) Mandalika, (3) Ghanavata, (4) Gunjavata, (5) Suddhavata and (6)
Samvartakavata.5

Those beings who have the capacity of movement on their own account and
being aware of the movement and those who can more forward and backward,
expand and contract, create sound, express the feeling of fear and run about, all
these are trasa jivas.6

According to the terminology of the trasa jivas, we can classify trasa jivas on the
basis of the criterion of the number of sense organs they possess. There are four
types or trasa jivas:
1. Dvindriya (two-sensed organisms)
2. Trindriya (three-sensed organisms)
3. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms)
4. Pancendriya (five-sensed organisms).1

They are all gross-bodied and there are no distinctions of subtle-and gross-
bodied organisms in this case. Two-sensed, three-sensed, and four-sensed
organisms are sammurchanaja i.e., they did not take their birth in a womb. They
are self-born. The five-sensed organisms are of two types: (1) sammurchanaja
(self-born) (2) Garbhaja (born of womb).

From the point of view of the states of existence, the five sensed-organisms are
of four types: (1) Nairayika (hellish), (2) Tiryanca (lower animals), (3) Manusya
(human) and (4) Deva (heavenly beings). Among the five-sensed lower animals,
there are three types, namely, (1) jalacara (moving in water) (2) sthalacara
(moving on the earth) (3) Khecara (moving in the air).2

The jalacara animals are of various types. Prominent among them are: (1)
Matsya (fish), Kacchapa (tortoise), graha, magara (crocodile) and sumsumara
etc.3

The sthalacara animals are mainly of two types as: (1) catuspada (four footed)
(2) parisarpa (crawling).4

Catuspada animals are of four types as:

1. animals with one hoof-horses etc.
2. with two hoofs-oxen etc.
3. with round legs, like elephants.
4. With feet having claws and nails, like lions etc.5

Parisarpa animals are mainly of two types as:

1. Bhujaparisarpa (moving with shoulders)
2. Urahparisarpa (crawling with the stomach) reptiles, like snake etc.6

Khecara animals are of four types as:

1. Carmapaksi
2. Romapaksi
3. Samudgapaksi
4. Vitapaksi1

SAMSARI AND MUKTA JIVAS

According to Jainism, from the point of view of substance and energy all jivas are
equal. There is no distinction between a jiva and Isvara as a higher jiva. But
from the point of vie of modes, a distinction has been made among the jivas as
those who are liberated (siddha jivas) and those whoa are in samsara (samsari
jivas). They re considered to be the freed souls and those who in bondage in this
wheel of samsara. When the soul is freed from the karmic matter, is becomes
pure and is freed from the wheel of life and death. Uttaradhyayana and other
agama books give various synonymous words for mukti which have been used in
their books: moksa,2 nirvana,3 bahihvihara,4 siddhaloka,5 atmavasati,6
anuttaragati,7 pradhanagati,8 varagati,9 sugati,10 apunaravrtta,11 avyabadha12 and
lokottamottama13 etc. The state of the soul in mukti condition is characterized
by freedom from disease, without body, without experiences of misery, the
enjoyment of the perfect bliss and peace, perfect purity and perfect holiness,
without destruction and possessed of perfect knowledge and intuition. It is free
from rebirth and is in the highest state of perfection.1

The atman in the highest stage of perfection is the paramatman and there is
really speaking no distinction between the atman and the paramatman in the
highest stage. In the highest stage of perfection, each atman retains its
individuality, unlike the Vedantic conception of the identity or the merger of the
atman with the Bahaman. The jiva has perfect knowledge and intuition
(samyagjnana and darsana) and its inherent characteristics. When the karmic
particles are completely destroyed atman becomes free from all the modes of
the body like old age, disease and death and is free from the rebirth. It has no
empirical body attached to it. Therefore, it is considered to be ghanarupa.
Moksa is not to be mistaken as a negative state of void. It is positive state of
bliss. The size of the mukta jiva (freed soul) is of the dimension of the subtle
body that it have been, last life minus one third of its form.2 This is because,
during the sukladhyan state (deep peaceful meditation) vibrations of he suksma
sarira are reduced to this form. Therefore, one-third portion of the earlier
suksma sarira is eliminated.

A question arises, when the atman is free from the body either it should be
atomic in form or all pervasive. Similarly, how can be explain the reduction of
the suksma sarira to one-third sarira in the highest stage.

The answer that has been suggested is that the jiva has been shown to be
pervading the body that it occupies in a particular empirical life. The form of the
soul was neither atomic nor all pervasive. In the freed state the soul is without
body. Therefore, there is no question of pervading or expansion or contraction
of the soul. It has no form and whatever description is given about the nature of
the soul in the liberated state; it is only with reference to the space points and
not extensions. It is formless and therefore many siddhas can live together in
the same space.

The soul in its liberated state is freed from the bodily activities like birth and
death. It is in its own nature. It is saccidananda (perfect reality, perfect
consciousness and perfect bliss). Urdhvagati (tendency to go up) is the very
characteristic of the atman and when the karmic encrustations are removed, it
goes up freed from all karmas to the siddhasila. As long as the karma vitiated
the soul, it is held down in the wheel of life and when the karma is destroyed, the
ghanatva of the world i.e. the downward force of the world like the gravity does
not affect the soul. It is freed from all the karmas.

The freed soul is free from the body. The movement is the attribute of the body
and therefore, in the state of freedom, the soul has not movement at all. It has
no other types of vibrations. It is free from material ad bodily modes of
movement and variations.1 Therefore, the soul moves towards the upward path
to the siddhasila. The Bhagavati sutra mentions the four causes for such state of
Urdhvagati, as (1) prayoga, (2) asangata (3) bandhaviccheda, (4) tathavidha
svabhava.2 Due to the absence of the principle of motion (dharma) the soul does
not go to aloka. The freed soul enjoys perfect bliss of itself.

Next distinction of the jiva is the samsari jiva, i.e., the souls involved into the
wheel of samsara. The samsari jivas are being eternally moving from one state
to the other experiencing the karmic effects and in turn accruing more and more
karma. It is full of karma and therefore, it is embodied and not freed from bodily
modes. But the freed souls are free from karma. They are omniscient and
perfect. The liberated souls are not bound by any other state. They enjoy their
own state without being affected by any other external or internal forces. There
are no distinctions between the different individual souls in the free state
although they retain their individuality.

The liberated soul is completely free from the empirical adjuncts like the modes
of the body and the mind. Therefore, there are no repetitions, revivals or re-
occurrence of the physical and psychic states because the karma is removed and
the karma is the cause of all these modes.
Ajivatattva: A Study (A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE)

Jivatattva is opposite of ajivatattva.1 Cetena is the characteristic of jiva and it has

the attributes of upayoga i.e., jnana and darsana. The substance which is in a
body and which sees, knows and experiences pleasure and pain is called jiva.2
The body in which there is no cognizing substance experiencing pleasure and
pain is the ajiva (non-living substance.)3

Ajiva is of two kinds: (1) rupi ajiva (with form) and (2) arupi ajiva (formless).4
Pudgala has form. The other four substances (dravya) Dharma, Adharma, Akasa,
and Kala are arupi (formless).

In the agama literature the substances having form have been called "Murta"
while those substances which have no form are called "amurta".

DHARMASTIKAYA

Of the six dravyas, jiva and pudgala have the capacity of movement. They have
the capacity to move from one place to the other, but it does not mean that they
are constantly moving every instant. It only means that they have motion as a
capacity and possibility and are not absolutely stationary (sthitisila). The other
four dravyas are having no motion. In Jainism, jiva and pudgala have been
considered to be both gatisila (having movement) and sthitisila (being
stationary)- and for this kind of movement they have a medium of motion and
that is the principle of Dharma; and Adharma is the principle of rest. These two
are the functional principles.1

In the Jaina literature the words dharma and adharma have also been used in the
ethical sense as subha (auspicious) and asubha (inauspicious). In the use of
these words the Dharmadravya connoted assistance of movement, while
Adharmadravya has a connotation of stagnation. Other Darsanas in Indian
philosophy have not given thought to the conception of Dharma and Adharma in
the sense of connoting the principle of motion and principle of rest. In modern
science, Newton for the first time discovered the principle of motion. Albert
Einstein while advocating the principle of motion said that the universe is limited,
similarly the space beyond the universe (aloka) is also limited. The universe is
limited because the substance or energy is limited to the sphere of universe.
Beyond this universe, there is neither substance nor energy that is responsible
for the motion. What the scientists call Ether as the principle of motion, Jaina
literature gives it the name of Dharmadravya (principle of motion).2

Bhagavana Mahavira said that the Dharmadravya is one. It pervades the entire
universe. It is eternal. It has no color, smell, nor touch and taste. It is the
principle of motion by which matter moves. All the activities and movement of
the jiva in both physiological and psychological sense like physical movement
and mental states, are due to principle of motion. It has infinite number of
pradesas (space points). It does not move although it is the principle of motion.
It is indestructible. It is the principle by which the movement is possible
although it does not contribute directly either in the material substance or as the
energy that makes objects moves. It is formless and therefore it has neither the
attributes of the physical objects nor the attributes of mental states.
Dharmadravya is one and whole and does not appear as arts. It pervades the
entire universe and there is no place in the universe in which Dharmadravya is
absent.

Movement (gati) is the characteristic, which refers to the movement from one
place to the another, and Dharma assists movement. Just as the movement of
the fish is possible in water although the water does not or may not make it to
move. Similarly, the principle motion (Dharma) is the principal by which the
movement is possible. Without this principle, motion is not possible, just as the
fish cannot move outside the water. Likewise, the movement of pudgala
(matter) is possible due to Dharmadravya. To give an example of modern life,
we can say just as the movement of the train would be possible because of the
rails, similarly Dharmadravya assists movement. Similarly jiva and pudgala have
movement because of principle of motion (Dharmadravya).

Motion and rest are the two states, which are the characteristics of pudgala and
jiva (matter and soul). They do not have mere motion or mere rest, sometime
they move and sometime they rest. In this world there are four states of
movement and rest of a thing, as, (1) from rest to motion, (2) from motion to
rest, (3) always at rest and (4) always in motion. Therefore, the movement and
the rest are natural to the objects. And they have principles assisting them.
They are the principles of Dharma and Adharma.

It is necessary to postulate the Dharma and Adharma as principles of motion and

rest, because we cannot explain the movement and the state of rest in the
universe nor can we divide the cosmos into Loka and Aloka. We have already
said that Jiva and Ajiva have primarily the state of movement as a characteristic.
The immediate causes of movement and rest in Jiva and Pudgala are in the very
nature of these substances however the efficient causes are Dharma and
Adharma, which are remote, and are causes for the movement and rest of the
two.

The states of motion and rest are to be found in the universe and these two are
possible by the Dharma and Adharma dravyas which do not themselves possess,
motion or rest, but which assists the motion and rest.1 It is therefore possible to
understand, how important are the substances of Dharma and Adharma in this
universe. Acarya Malayagiri said that the order in the Loka and the Aloka
(universe and the beyond) is not possible without these substances.1

This world is a fact, because it is experienced through the senses. But the
beyond i.e., the Aloka is not subject to sense-experience. Therefore, the
existence and the non-existence of the aloka have been a problem. But when we
accept the existence of Loka, we have also to postulate the existence of the
beyond, because the limited does imply the unlimited. The logic of our
arguments would certainly show that if there is a beyond, there must be a
limited as if there is the limited, which implied the unlimited. These are relative
terms.2

The universe has all the six substances like the Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma and
Adharma and Akasa and Akasa and Kala. But where there is only Akasa, it is the
beyond; the unlimited and it is called Aloka. In the Aloka, jiva and ajiva cannot
exist because Dharma and Adharma are the criteria of the distinctions between
the two spheres of Loka and Aloka, where Dharma and Adharma operate that is
Loka, and where these principles are not operative it is Aloka.

Gautama Ganadhara asked Bhagavana Mahavira "What is the use of

Dharmastikaya for the jivas?"

Mahavira said: "O Gautama, if the principle of motion were not to operate, where
would be the motion? Who would come and who would go? How could the
waves of the sound travel? How could eye lids open? Who would talk and who
could move about? The whole world would have remained stationary.
Dharmastikaya is the means to all the moving things.3

Gautama asked, "Bhagavan! What is the use of the Adharmastikaya for the
Jivas?

Mahavira said, "O, Gautama, if the Adharmastikaya were not to operate as

principle of rest who stand and who would sit? Who would sleep? Who could
concentrate? Who could remain silent? Who can remain inactive? Who could
keep the eyelids steady? The world would have constant movement without
break. All that is steady and at rest is due to the principle of rest, i.e.,
Adharma".1

COMPARISON WITH EHTER

Many Indian and Western philosophers have recognized the reality if motion in
the universe, but they have not found it necessary to postulate a principle by
which the movement is possible. In the modern science Ether has been
suggested to be the medium of movement. It is analogous to the Jaina
conception of Dharma. The Ether is one of the outstanding discoveries of the
modern science. The eminent scientist Dr. A. S. Eddington writes, "This does not
mean that the Ether is abolished. We need an Ether...in the last century it was
widely believed that Ether was a thing of matter. It would be difficult to say
when this view died out. Now a days, it is agreed that Ether is not a kind of
matter, being, non-material-its properties are signaries (quite unique) characters
such as mass and rigidity which we meet within matter will naturally be absent in
Ether but the Ether will have new and definite characters of its own---non-
material ocean of Ether".2
Albert Einstein has propounded the Theory of Relativity and he has shown that
Ether is non-material, continuous, non-discrete and co-extensive with space.
While discussing the comparative study of the Dharmadravya with Ether, Prof. G.
R. Jain says "that it has been established that the Jain philosophers and modern
scientists agree regarding the principle of Ether and the Dharmadravya as
synonymous because both of them are non-material, non-discrete, continuous
whole and all-pervading like Akasa. They have no form, nor have they
movement although they are the medium of movement".

ADHARMASTIKAYA

As the Dharmadravya is necessary for movement in the world so is the

Adharmadravya necessary for explaining rest and a static state of the objects.
As in the absence of the Dharmastikaya we cannot explain the existence of
motion, so also we cannot explain the state of rest without Adharmastikaya. Like
the Dharma, Adharma also pervades the entire universe. It is whole, and non-
discrete. As the sesamum oil pervades he entire grain of sesamum, so also the
principle of Adharma pervades the entire Lokakasa (the universe). Just as the
shade of the tree provides coolness and possibility of rest for a traveler, similarly
the Adharmastikaya enables the jiva and pudgala substance to experience the
state of rest. The question, if the state of rest which is due to Adharmastikaya in
what way does it help? For this, we can say, if the state of rest were not
possible, then there would be continuous motion and there would not be any
possibility of steadiness...This stage of steadiness and static existence is possible
through Adharmastikaya.

It has again been asked that if Dharma as a principle of motion and Adharma as
the principle of rest, they are contrary, how can they co-exist? Both of them are
continuos, both of them re formless. They are ajiva and they are inferable.

For this, it can be said that their functions are different. One helps motion and
the other helps the static existence. Both these functions are different. They
cannot be attributed to the same principle.

The third question has been asked: Dharma and Adharma are formless. How can
they assist motion and rest? The answer is that the capacity to help not
necessarily remains in those substances, which have form, even the formless
substances have this capacity. Just as Akasa (space) is formless, but still it
accommodates infinite number of things so also Dharma and Adharma are
formless, they are the basic principles of motion and rest. Akasa has the
capacity of accommodating things, so also the Dharma and Adharma has the
capacity to help the motion and rest.

The next question is: if Dharma and Adharma are all pervading then they must
inter-penetrate each other. And there will be no distinction between them.

For this, it can be said that as substances they are all pervading but as to their
functions they are different. Each does its own functions although they do co-
exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and the light of each lamp
pervades the entire room. It does not mean that the function of one is not
distinct from the other and it is lost and ahs not existence. Similarly, Dharma
and Adharma are all pervading, yet their functions are different and there are no
contradictions in their functional distinctions.

Some thinkers have compared Adharma with the principle of gravitation and
field. But Dr. Mohanlal Mehta is of view that the Dharmastikaya is quite different
from the gravitational force and field and it is an independent principle.

Acarya Siddhasena Divakara does not find it necessary that Dharma and
Adharma be considered as independent substances (dravyas). He considers that
both of them are not substances but they are modes of substances.1

AKASASTIKAYA

That substance which accommodates Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Kala
is called Akasadravya.2 It is the basis of all dravyas and therefore it has a special
function.3

Gautama Ganadhara asked to Mahavira: Bhagavan! What is the use of

substance of Akasa for the Jiva and Ajivas?"

Bhagavana Mahavira said: O Gautama, if Akasa were not to be there, where

would the jivas be? Where would the Dharma and Adharma astikayas pervade?
Where would be the Kala extend? Where would the dance of Pudgala be
possible? The whole world would be without foundation?4

Akasa is not a solid thing, but it is empty space, which accommodates all things.
It is all pervading (sarva-vyapi), formless (amruta) and it has infinite points of
space (ananta pradesi). Akasa is divided into two parts: (1) Lokakasa (the
limited universe i.e. the world) and (2) Alokakasa (the limitless beyond).1 As a
lake gives space to the water, similarly Akasa is a resting-place for all the
dravyas. A question has been asked that if Akasa were to be one and
continuous, how could there be distinction between the Lokakasa and the
Alokakasa? How can Akasa be divided into these two? But the answer is, this
division is not on the basis of substance, it is with reference to the functions of
the Dharma and Adharma dravyas. Akasa is really one and continuous without
parts, but we make a distinction between Lokakasa and Alokakasa because we
have to explain the distinction with reference to the accommodation to the other
dravyas. That part of Akasa where substances like Jiva, Pudgala, Adharma,
Dharma and Kala exist, are called Lokakasa and the beyond is called Alokakasa.
Akasa is one and formless, there is no distinction in substance.

A question has been asked that it may be true that which accommodates things
is the Akasa. Lokakasa accommodates the substances. We may call it Akasa.
But the limitless and the beyond void. Still why is it called Akasa? The answer is
that the very nature of Akasa is to accommodate things and Lokakasa
accommodates dravyas, but in Alokakasa there is nothing. So, there is no
question of accommodating. In the Alokakasa there are no substances at all.
Substances are limited to the Loka, so Alokakasa does not accommodate but it
does not mean that it looses its function of accommodation. The fact is this that
due to the absence of Dharma and Adharma as the principles of motion and rest
in the Alokakasa, it is completely free from any other substance. Therefore it is
empty. It is the limitless. Therefore, it is called ananta (endless). It is the
limitless beyond. In modern philosophy Dharma, Adharma and Akasa have been
considered as the forces in Akasa.

A question is asked: How does Akasa accommodate a thing? That which has no
place prior it can be given a place or the thing which was no there could be kept
there?

The answer is, every object is in one place or the other. It moves from one place
to the other. As Akasa is beginningless, so are other substances.

A question is again asked: If all substances exist simultaneously and if Akasa

accommodates all substances on the basis of Dharma and Adharma, how can
these substances be considered as those, which get accommodation (adheya).

The answer is Akasa is more extensive than the other substances. It gives
accommodation to all substances and so it is called base (adhara) and as the
other substances take accommodation it is so they have been called adheya.
Just as the hands and the body can be related as the part and the whole or the
organs and the body. The entire canvas of the objects depends on each other.
According to Jainism, water is the support of the earth. Vayu is the support of
water, and Akasa is the support of Vayu. But Akasa has no support outside itself.
It is self-existent and it does not need the support of any other substance.

Lokakasa has infinite number of pradesas (space points), while Alokakasa has
limitless space. The whole Akasa is limitless and endless. It is limitless because,
infinite pradesas are taken out from the limitless Akasa, still infinite pradesas
remain. Therefore, from the point of view of extension, Akasa has been
considered to be of different as ananta (endless), paritananta (endless more) and
yuktananta (still more endless) and anantananta (endlessly endless).1 All these
are the forms of the endless.

According to the Buddhists, Vaisesika, Samkhya and Devantins, Akasa is the

substance. But we do not get an elaborate discussion of Akasa in these schools
of thought as we get in the Jaina philosophy. In the Buddhist philosophy, Akasa
is considered to have a characteristic of avaranabhava (absence of pervasion)
and it is considered to be simple element (asamskrta dharma).2 But in the Jaina
philosophy, Akasa is not considered in a negative connotation, in terms of
abhava (non-existence), and also it is not considered as asamskrta dharma
because it has the characteristic in it of the origin, permanence and destruction
(utpada, sthiti and vinasa).
Vaisesikas have made Akasa as independent substance and it has a
characteristic of producing sabda (sound). They have considered the directions
different from Akasa.1 That which has the attribute of sabda is Akasa, and that
which limits the external world by direction is called dik.2 Nyaya-karikavali makes
dik as that which has the attributes of the farness and nearness (duratva and
sampiya) and which makes distinction between the one place and the other. Dik
is one and nitya (eternal). By the phenomenal distinctions for practical purposes
it is called the east and west and other directions.3 In the Jaina philosophy dik is
not considered to be distinct from Akasa. Because in the variable measurable
distinctions of Akasa, we find the dik i.e., the direction. These are conventional
measures. Akasa is not one, which produces sound because sabda is produced
by matter, which has form, and Akasa is formless. It is not possible to say that
the formless Akasa produced substances with form. Similarly, we cannot say
that Akasa is a product of prakrti nor is it an appearance of Brahman4 because
Akasa is an independent substance.

According to Jainism, Akasa as a substance has infinite number of pradesas.

From the point of view of extension, it is endless and limitless extending from
Loka to Aloka. From the point of time, Akasa is beginningless and endless and
considered from the point of view of nature, Akasa is formless.

Dik (direction) is a form of empirical measurement of Akasa with reference to the

existence and location of the things. It is the measurable extent of Akasa, with
reference to different locations. From the slanting loka (tiryak loka), we have the
"disa and a anudisa".

Disa commences with two points of space of Akasa, and increasing itself by two-
two pradesas, it covers infinite number of pradesas. Anudisa is a part of Disa.
Urdhva disa (upward direction) and adhodisa (downward direction) begin with
four pradesas and in these, there are four pradesas till the end. There is no
increase in the pradesas.1

The East is a direction which a man, where he is, considers as the direction from
which sun rises. The direction in which the sun sets is for him the West. If a man
faces the East and expands his both the hands, the direction to the right hand is
south and the direction to the left is the North. These directions are conventional
measurements based on the sunrise and sun's movement. These are also called
tapadisas.2

In Acaranganiryukti we get another description of directions. It is for astrological

purpose. The East would be in front of astrologer (prajnapaka) the West behind
him, the North to his left hand and South to his right hand. This distinction is
called Prajnapaka Disa.3

We should remember that Disa (direction is not an independent substance. Disa

has been conventionally formed for the sake of measuring space and
determining directions. Akasa has infinite pradesas (points of space). Just as
every point in a piece of cloth is necessary for giving pattern, similarly all the
pradesas give a pattern for the empirical measurement to Akasa. Pradesa give a
pattern for the empirical measurement of Akasa. Pradesa can be considered to
be a point of space in which one parmanu exists. This is the primary limit of
measurement. When we measure and determine the directions like east and
West, they are only for practical purposes. They are not to be considered as
separate entities and we cannot consider the countries, the districts and the
other sub-divisions as independent space. It is all one, but it is measured for
practical purposes.4

In modern science Akasa (space) is not to be considered to possess the

characteristic of producing sound. Sound is experienced by the sense organs
which are material in nature. Therefore, material particles come into contact
with the other material particles and due to the resistance of the material
particles, sound is produced. The stimulation of the sound is received by the
sense organ-the ear. Due to this contact, the sound is experienced. We cannot
consider Akasa as the substance having the attribute of sound. Akasa is not a
product or a mode of a material substance, nor is it neither extensible nor
extendable due to the material substance. According to Samkhya, prakrti is the
primordial substance and Prthvi and Akasa are the products of the prakrti but it
is a question worth considering. The products of prakrti like prthvi, water and air
and agni etc. have form and how can the product of Akasa which is also a
product of prakrti cannot have form. The prakrti evolve into a variety of
complexes of modes to form the universe. The evolution of the prakrti is based
on the disturbance in the equilibrium of the three gunas-sattva, rajas and tamas.
But the evolutes of prakrti will have different qualitative distinctions as some
having form and some formless, if we accept Akasa as a product of prakrti.

It cannot be said that prakrti gives rise to Akasa and we cannot make Akasa, the
product of prakrti. Because Akasa is inactive, formless, endless, and all
pervasive. The products of a prakrti arise out of the disturbances in the three
gunas and due to the presence of the purusa. Purusa is inactive and pure
consciousness. Purusa is an independent reality and prakrti is to explain the
evolution of the entire universe including Akasa. This appears to be difficult to
understand.

Water, earth and other substances have Akasas the matrix. In the case of water,
the particles are little apart and they are bound to be in-between. Therefore,
Akasa accommodates all substances.

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF AKASA

The Buddhist philosophers have considered Akasa to be a simple element

(asamskrta dharma). They have described it as having the characteristic of
anavrtti (non-covering) and avaranabhava (non-pervasion).1 It does not pervade
anything nor is it covered by any object, those elements which have the
attributes of origin and destruction are called samskrta dharma (composite
elements). But the Sarvaksanikavadi Buddhists maintain that Akasa is a simple
substance and not composite. But it is free from the characteristic of origin and
destruction. Vaibhasikas describe the nature of Akasa as a non-pervasive
element, but have its own characteristic.2 But the question is, is it possible to
have an object with empirical characteristic and at the same time not produced?
It is possible that we cannot describe the products of Akasa in the language of
origin and destruction. However, Akasa is eternal and not produced unlike the
other our elements like prthvi, ap, teja, and vayu. So, abhidhammasangraha has
described Akasa in terms of paricheda (analysis), but Akasa cannot be purely
described in terms of paricheda, because it is one and continuous and also
because in empirical characteristic like origin and destruction are applicable to
composite objects (samskrta dharma).

WESTERN CONCEPTION OE SPACE (AKASA)

The western philosophers have given an elaborate discussion about the reality
and nature of space. There are different views. There is the rationalistic
approach presented by Descartes and Leibnitz and that is the idealistic view
presented by Plato, Aristotle and even upto Kant.

Descartes, Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space as a form of

experience. Kant said that space is a form of perception. While Plato, Aristotle
and others have said that space is an independent substance. The Jainas have
given an independent reality to Akasa and have considered it as an astikaya
because it has the dual characteristic of astitva (existence) and kayatva
(extension).

Regarding the nature of Akasa as sunya (empty) or otherwise, philosophers are

not agreed. The idealistic philosophers like Kant and others have considered the
empty space as possible. Descartes, Leibnitz and Plato and Aristotle have said
that empty space without the content of objects is not possible. The Jainas have
advocated the possibility of empty space in their concept of Alokakasa. But from
the phenomenal point of view, Akasa is always filled.

Regarding the nature of Akasa, there are different views. Kant and others, as we
mentioned earlier, believe that space is a form of perception. It is the matrix on
which perception is possible. All experience is possible because of the matrix
and space and time. However, Akasa is not an independent substance. It is an
intellectual construct. If it is considered to be an independent reality there would
be no distinction between Isvara and Akasa.1 Akasa is jynatasapeksa (a product
of intellect). It is a priori principle and it is cognitively priori, which is a postulate.

Observation: The idealist philosophers have considered space as only a product

of understanding and that has no independent reality. It is made to be based on
cognitive consciousness, it is not in-reality. Even the support of the things that is
attributed to Akasa is a product of intellect. However, the things of the world
require some support and without the concept of Akasa, we cannot construct the
order of the universe, yet it cannot be said to be a mere product of imagination.
Because the facts of the world contradict it.
The idealist contention that the all-pervasive nature of Akasa would lead to the
identity of the Isvara and Akasa is not also correct. Thirdly, Kant said that space
is a form of perception and it is intuitive perception. This view, appears to be
inadequate, because space is a fact of experience and the things of the world do
require a substance which give support to them.2 Euclidean Physiometry and the
later mathematical development have proved contrary to the Kantian conception
of space as a form of pereption.3 Jainas and Kant agree in one point. In that,
they accept the possibility of the empty space.

According to Plato and Aristotle, space is considered as a substance. Plato has

said that space is the blank principle. Aristotle would only accept the reality or
space in the presence of physical objects. Descartes says that space cannot be
considered as an attribute of the object.

Observations: If Akasa has a reality of its own, it must be different from the
physical objects, because physical objects are destructive while Akasa is endless.
To occupy certain space and so obstruct have certain space is the characteristics
of the physical objects, but to give space to these objects is a different thing.
Many objects can exist together and the same object may exist in different
objects as different times. This makes it clear that the object occupying the
space, and space accommodating the objects is different subjects. According to
Jainas, the substance of Akasa can accommodate many objects in one space.
Akasa is formless, but if it considered in relation to the objects occupying space,
it can be described as having form. However, Akasa cannot inherit the qualities
of the objects it accommodates.

Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space, a form of visible objects,
Einstein has considered space as a reality; infact it is space-time reality.

According to Gasendi, space is a reality independent of matter and the Self. This
view is nearer to the Jaina conception of giving independent reality to Akasa.
This has relevance to the scientific conception of space. Newton, like the Jainas,
have accepted the reality of space with objects i.e., filled-space as having form.

Space is considered to be without movement (agatisila), one and continuous. It

is like the void. However, there is a difference between Newtonian and the Jaina
conception of space. According to the Newtonian conception, space is indelibly
connoted with ether and matter. This is meant to explain the principle of motion.
But according to the Jainas the principles of motion and that of rest (Dharma-
Adharma dravyas) are independent substances and they are the basis of motion
and rest in the universe. These two principles and the Akasa are not inherent. In
this sense, ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of
Akasa. Bertrand Russell also comes to a similar view. He would like to
distinguish the filled space, and empty space on the basis of rigorous of logic?

KALA (TIME)
Jaina philosophers have presented two prominent views regarding the nature of
Kala (time). According to one view, Kala is considered to be the mode of
substances of Jiva and Ajiva. Kala is considered to be an independent tattva.

According to the other view, Kala is an independent substance, just like Jiva and
Ajiva. In the same sense Kala cannot become the expression of change in the
objects although it is the medium of change, and Kala is an independent
substance. It is a dravya although it is not an astikaya, because it is not multi-
dimensional but it is only uni-dimensional.

In the Svetambara Agama literature, there is the mention of both the views in
Bhagavati,1 Uttaradhyayana,2 Jivabhigama3 and Prajnapana.4 Later Acarya
Umasvati,5 Siddhasena Divakara,6 Jinabhadragani,7 Haribhadrasuri,8 Acarya
Hemacandra,9 Upadhyaya Yasovijaya,10 Vinayavijaya,11 Devacandra,12 and other
Svetambara acaryas have mentioned both the views. Digambara acaryas like
Kundakunda,13 Pujyapada,14 Bhattaraka Akalankadeva15 and Vidyanandasvami16
have mentioned that Kala is an independent substance.

According to the first view of Kala, the measurable distance like samaya,
muhurta, day and nights are the modes of Kala from the practical point of view.
The modes are special features of the substances jiva and ajiva. In the
constitution of the world, jiva and Ajiva are the constituent principles and both of
them are expressed in the form of modification. These modifications and their
clusters are considered as Kala. Kala by itself is not an independent substance.1

According to the second view, Kala is an independent substance. Just as Dharma

and Adharma as principles of motion and rest are independent substances Jiva
and Ajiva have their functions of movement and rest. But the movement and
rest are possible in the medium of the principle of movement i.e. Dharma and
the principle of rest. The two are independent substances. Similarly, time is a
substance and change is possible in time.2

However, the two views mentioned above are not contrary to each other, but
they are complement to each other. From noumenal point of view, Kala is abode
of the Jiva and the Ajiva and not an independent substance. But from
phenomenal point of view Kala is a substance. It is considered a substance
because of its functions. The functions of Kala can be mentioned as change,
effect, activity, the one and the other etc. For this reason, Kala is considered as
dravya. The changes in the various objects are possible in time. The
conventional measurements of time like samaya and avalika are not different
from jiva and ajiva. They are the modes of these substances.

From the noumenal point of view, Kala need not be considered as an

independent substance. By making Kala the mode of the substances of Jiva and
Ajiva, the phenomenal existence can be explained.3 But from practical point of
view, Kala has been considered as an independent substance just as Jiva-Ajiva
and their modes are considered.4
If we survey the Jaina literature regarding the constitution of the Loka i.e., the
universe, we find that there are two views mentioned. The first view maintains
that the universe is constituted of six substances (saddravyas)1 and the other
view advocates the constitution of the universe as made up of five principles,
pancastikaya.2 However, according to Dalsukhabhai Malavania, the view of six
dravyas mentioned in the Uttaradhyayana may be considered as an exception.3
In the Svetambara literature like Sthananga,4 Jivabhigama,5 Bhagavati,6 and
Pancastikaya,7 in Digambara literature, it i suggested that the universe is
constituted of 5 principles (pancastikaya).

Uttaradhyayana8 and Dharmasangrahani have described Kala as of the measure

of two and a half dvipa (islands). In face Kala has relevance in the world of men
and also in the astronomical and astrological calculations. The rotations and
evolutions of planets are possible in time. In this sense, Kala has relevance with
reference to human intellect.

In the Digambara literature Kala is not merely considered as an aspect of or an

expression of human intellect with reference to human activity, but it is also
pervading the entire universe.

It may be noted that although Kala is a substance, it is not a substance like the
other five substances having extensional dimensions. It is not a substance
having the characteristics of skandha (aggregate of atoms), but it is of the
nature of the anu. It has no magnitude; therefore it has no kayatva. It is not an
astikaya. It is non-dimensional. The time series are always in forward direction
(Urdhva pracaya). It is a linear series.1 The span of Kala is considered to be uni-
dimensional. Dharma and Adharma and the panca dravyas except Kala have
three-dimensional forms. In these, there are aggregates of many points that
Kala always moves in one direction, it is forward-looking. Every point of time is
discrete and at a particular moment of time the present alone exists and the
past has gone and the future has no come. Therefore, here is only one samaya
every time. Therefore, there is not possibility of aggregate of time (skandha).
As it is mono-dimensional, it cannot present a reverse direction i.e., tiryak
pracaya. Therefore Kala is not considered an astikaya.

FORMS OF TIME (KALA)

Sthananga2 mentions four types of Kala: 1. Pramana Kala (measurable time), 2.

Yathayunirvrttikala (life span time of a jiva) 3. Maranakala (moment of death)
and 4. Addhakala (time relative to the movement of sun and moon).

Conventional measurement of Kala is impossible and is possible through the

changes in the objects. The life and death are two relative spans of time. The
duration of life is considered as yathayunirvrtti Kala and the cessation of the
duration of life is death and is called the Maranakala.

The measurement of time based on the revolutions of the sun and the moon is
called the addhakala. It is a primary distinction of measurement of time. The
other distinctions are forms of this distinction. This is the phenomenal
measurement of time with a practical purpose of determining the span of time.
Therefore, this is restricted to the human world and it is meant to measure the
various distinctions of time for human activities. We have already said that the
real time i.e., niscaya kala, is the mode of jiva and ajiva. And it is all pervading
both in the Loka and Aloka. There are not divisions in real time. All the divisions
from samaya to pudgala-paravartana are made of the addhakala.1 The minutest
division of kala is samaya. It is indivisible. It can be described on the analogy of
a hole in the kamalapatra or hole in a piece of cloth.

If the 100 petals of lotus are kept one over another and if now is to pierce a
needle so as to penetrate all the petals, it may appear that all of them have been
penetrated simultaneously? But this does not happen. Every petal is pierced
successively within the minutest fraction of time and that samaya which takes to
pierce one petal is the unit.

As a strong man, you may tear a piece of cloth at once. It may appear that the
piercing was done simultaneously, but this was not so. Every thread is torn at
every fraction of time and that is the smallest unit of time.

In short, a piece of cloth is woven into large number of threads and each thread
is constituted as the infinite points of cotton. When the piece of cloth is torn
every point of cotton and every thread needs to be torned separately and each
requires an indivisible and minutest fraction of time and this is called samaya.

We may now mention the conventional measurements of time for the purpose of
human activities from samaya, the smallest unit to the largest unit of
anantakalacakra.

The indivisible minutest fraction of time -one samaya

Infinite number of samaya - one avalika
256 avalikas -one ksullaka bhava (the shortest life span)
2223 1229-3773 avalikas -one breath (inhaling and exhaling)
4446 2458-3773 avalikas -one prana
Sadhika 17 ksullaka bhava or-one breathe
7 pranas -one stoka
7 stoka -one lava
381/2 lava. -one ghati (24 minutes)
77 lavas -2 ghati or-65536 ksullaka bhava or - 16777216 avalika or -3773
prana or -one muhurta (48 minutes)
30 muhurta - one day and a night
15 days - one paksa (fortnight)
2 pakras - one masa (month)
2 masa - one rtu (season)
3 rtu - one ayana
2 ayana - one year
5 years - one yuga
70 crore-crores, 56 lakhs krore years - one purva
Innumerable years - one palyopama
10 Crore-crore palyopama - one sagara
20 Crore-crore sagara - one kalacakra
Anantakalacakra - one pudgala paravartana

THE NATURE OF KALA IN THE VEDIC TRADITION

The term Kala has been used at many places in the Vedas and Upanisads.1 But
we do not get a clear picture of the exact meaning of the Kala in all these
references.

Kanada in the Vaisesika darsana has presented four sutras for describing the
principle of Kala. He says that Kala is substance, it is eternal and it is the ground
of all activities.2 In the Nyaya philosophy Gautama has not given an independent
interpretation about the nature of Kala. Incidentally, he has described the nature
of Kala as the ground of all activities. Just as Vaisesikas have done, the Nyaya-
Vaisesikas has a similar view of Kala.

In the Purva-Mimamsa there is not much discussion about the nature of the Kala.
Jaimani has not given specific reference regarding the nature of the Kala.
However, the commentator like Parthasarathi and Pandit Ramakrisna,1 have
discussed this problem of time and have largely accepted the Vaisesika concept
of time, with certain modifications in that, Vaisesikas consider kala to be indirect
in cognition, while mimamsakas make direct cognition. In this sense, we can say
that Nyaya-Vaisesika and purva-mimamsa maintain the time as an independent
substance.

According to Samkhya, purusa and the prakrti are the two fundamental
principles. Akasa, disa (direction), mind etc. are nothing but the products of
prakrti.2 There is no independent substance like time, but it is only an expression
of prakrti. Prakrti is eternal, yet it has its changing aspects. The gross and
subtle matter is expressions of prakrti.

In the Yoga philosophy, Patanjali has not discussed prominently the nature of
time. But the commentator Vyasa, in his commentary, has made specific
mention of the time. He says that measurable units of time like muhurta,
prahara, day etc. are phenomenal measurements of time and for practical
purposes they are products of intellectual discrimination. We make distinctions
in the different spans of time on the basis of minutest units of a Ksana (moment).
Ksana is real but it is not the fundamental substance. It is the ground of change,
and the minutest unit on which change is measured is Ksana. He shows that
Ksana can be measured by the time-span taken by an atom to reverse form from
one point to the other. In the Yoga philosophy, also like the Samkhya, prakrti is
considered to be unconscious, but active. Activity is the inherent characteristic
of prakrti and therefore it does not need any other force to bring activity in
prakrti. But the ground of activity and not the cause of can be considered to be
the principle of time. It is only an efficient cause; it is to be understood as a
principle on account of which change can be measured. However, unlike
Vaisesikas, Samkhya and Yoga Darsanas, do not make Kala as an independent
substance.1

Vedanta darsana is also called Uttaramimamsa or aupanisadika darsana. The

propounder of this school of thought was Badarayana. Badarayana has not
discussed the nature of time but Sankaracarya has presented his theory of
absolutism. According to him, Brahman is the only reality. Atman is the
Brahman, all else is appearance. According to this theory, substances like akasa,
atoms, etc. are not independent reality. However, as we have seen earlier other
Vedantins like the Visistadvaitins, of Ramanuja school of thought and other forms
of Vedantins like Nimbarka, Madhva, Vallabha, etc. have given their
interpretation of the relation of the Brahman and the Atman although the
foundational principle of the Brahman as the sole reality continues to determine
their interpretations of the Brahman. They have not considered Kala as an
independent substance. All the Vedantins alongwith the Samkhya and the Yoga
are agreed that the Kala is a form of perception and is not an independent
substance. Thus we have two views regarding the substance Kala in the Jains
philosophy. Similarly in the Vedic tradition, we have also two views, the one
advocating the time as an independent substance and the other denying the
independent substantially to Kala (time).

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KALA (TIME)

The Buddhists consider time as a mental construct for the sake of the practical
purpose. Time is not an independent substance. It is an only experience. It is a
cognition.2 The past, the present, the future are all phenomenal distinctions of
time made for practical purposes and they are not real time.
Pudgala (Matter): A Study

WHAT IS MATTER

What the scientists call matter and what Nyaya-Vaisesika call the physical
universe (jada); the Jainas call it Pudgala. In the Buddhist philosophy, the word
pudgala has been used to connote alaya, vijnana, cetanasantani etc. In the Jaina
agamas, atman embodied and associated with mater is also sometimes called
with form. Of the six substances, five of them, except Kala, are called Astikaya,
because they have extension and astitva. Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, and Akasa do
not possess characteristics of integration (samyoga) and disintegration
(vibhaga). Its distinctions are donated by means of atoms. If we imagine the
extension, if possible of the four substances, we can find that Jiva, Dharma and
Adharma have innumerable parts, while Akasa is indivisible and endless, Pudgala
is not indivisible. The minutest part of Pudgala is paramanu i.e. atom, and the
biggest part of the Pudgala is the entire cosmos. Atom can be considered as
macro-cosm and cosmos can be looked at as macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as
mahaskandha2 and as pervading the entire universe. For this reason also,
Pudgala is considered to have the characteristics of integration and
disintegration (purana-galana).

TERMINOLOGY OF PUDGALA

The term Pudgala has two parts-pud and gala. Pud refers to completing or
joining; 'gala' refers to dropping or finishing. The substance which has the
characteristic of constantly integrating and disintegrating i.e., joining and
separating, forming and separating is called pudgala,1 Tattvartharajavartika2,
Tattvarthavrtti of Siddhasena,3 Dhavala4 and the Harivamsapurana5 have stated
that due to the characteristic of integration and disintegration, the substance
Pudgala is considered to be matter. Pudgala is that substance which can be
divided and also combined. Pudgala has the attributes such as sparsa (touch),
rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and varna (color).6

PUDGALA IS RUPI

In this sense, Pudgala is an object of sense-experience. As it has the attributes

of rasa, gandha, etc. it is called rupi or rupavan (having form). The objects with
form can be experienced and cognized through the sense organs. Objects
without form cannot be experienced through the sense organs. For instance,
substances like Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are formless and we
cannot get the experience of these through the sense organs.

A question arises; namely, that as the Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha
etc. can we say that these attributes are inherent attributes of the substance
Pudgala or are they products of experience and imposed by the mind on
substance?

The answer is, Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha, etc. The sense organs
do not impose these attributes on matter. Matter has the inherent
characteristics of these varna, rasa, etc. Without these attributes, matter has no
existence at all. It is true that experience of these qualities is due to the contact
of matter with the sense organs. But it does not mean that these attributes are
not in the matter. The relation is between the sense organs and varna-rasa is
not between the cause and effect, but between the knowledge and the object of
knowledge. Similarly, sense organs are not the products of varna and rasa. Both
of them have independent existence. They, however, interact on each other.

There is another question regarding the experience of illusions. If color and taste
are inherent attributes of substance, how is it that experiences of these
attributes with different individuals differ and how is it that there are illusions,
concerning the color, taste etc? How is it that there are differences in the
experience of taste and color according to the differences in individual
capacities, place and time etc.?

The answer is, it is true that these experiences of color, taste, etc., may be
different with different individuals and also in different circumstances. The
causes are twofold (1) internal and (2) external. The internal cause refers to the
differences in the sense organs, and the external causes are concerned with
external stimulations. Due to these two types of causes, we experience defenses
in the experience of rasa, gandha, etc. For instance, a person suffering from
jaundice sees everything yellow. A color-blind man will see everything grey.
Similarly, our experiences of the melody and the music depend upon our mental
get up. If we are in a bad mood, thee music drags on. Such differences of
experiences are also possible due to the differences in the intensity and the
extent of the stimulations that the sense organs receive from the external world.
For instance, bright light may give different stimulations and discordant music
may also give different stimulations for the harmonious music. Due to these
differences in the external stimulations, we experience objects differently. These
differences in experience are therefore due to the internal and external causes.
However, the attributes of rasa, gandha etc. are inherently present in the
substance. Without these attributes, substance cannot exist. Substance is the
substratum of the attributes and the attributes are equally real and independent.
The Jainas maintain the distinct relationship between the substance and the
attributes.

THE FOUR TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)

Matter (Pudgala) is a substance and it is of four divisions (bheda): 1. Aggregate

(skandha), (2) skandha desa (aggregate occupying space), (3) skandha pradesa
((aggregate occupying limited space), (4) paramanu (atoms).1
SKANDHA:

The unit of formed matter (Murta dravya) is skandha. It is the aggregate of

atoms, i.e. from two atoms to infinite number of atoms arise. In the skandha, we
find the integration and disintegration of paramanus. Similarly, the aggregates
also may join with atoms, and that would be one skandha. If two atoms
combine, the aggregate is called dvi-pradesi. And if the dvi-pradesi skandha is
divided. We get two atoms.

If three atoms are combined we get three-pradesi skandha. If they are

separated, we get either three paramanus or one paramanu and dvi-pradesi
skandha.

If four atoms are combined, it is called Catuhpradesi skandha. If they are

separated we get the following forms:
1. One atom and one three-atomed aggregate (three-pradesi skandha).
2. Two dvi-pradesi skandhas (aggregates of two atoms each).
3. Two atoms each separate and one dvi-pradesi skandha.
4. Four atoms separate each.

Sometimes, infinite number of atoms combine and they form the cosmos.

The aggregates of atoms are called skandha. Skandha formation is of three

types: (1) bhedapurvaka (having distinctions) (2) sanghata purvaka (collection),
(3) Bheda and sanghata purvaka (with distinctions and collection.) 2

The distinction is possible due to internal and eternal causes.3 The internal
causes for the distinction between the one skandha and the other do not depend
on any external factors. The causes are inherent in the skandhas themselves.
The external causes are due to some external factors, and these called skandhas
formed due to external causes.

Formation of unity of different elements is called sanghata. This is due to the

external causes or the internal causes. Two different atoms combine and they
form a sanghata. The aggregates formed due to the distinctions (bheda) and
sanghata (union) are called bheda-sanghata purvaka skandha. For instance, at a
particular moment one part of the skandha gets separated and at the same time
another skandha comes and joins it and forms a new skandha then this skandha
is called the skandha due to distinction and union.

In this way, the skandhas are formed in three different ways. The aggregate
may be formed only by bheda or only by sanghata or sometimes due to both the
processes.

In modern science, the concept of aggregate has been designated as molecule

and it is very much discussed in the physical sciences. It has been pointed out
that physical objects are formed due to the aggregates. These molecules have
tremendous velocity in various directions in the gases and in the aggregate
skandha. For instance, a piece of chalk is considered to be an aggregate of
atoms and molecules. If it is divided into two parts and further divided into two
parts and in this way if we divide the piece of atoms into infinite parts, the
nature of the chalk remains essentially as chalk. The minutest part of the chalk-
piece is also skandha. But as we go on dividing a piece of object, we may reach
a point where it cannot be further divided. That is the indivisible unit of the
object and that skandha and the modern concept of aggregate (molecule) have
some similarities although there are some differences. According to Jainism, one
unit or collection of units of atoms is called skandha: it may be a pot or a table or
a book. If the pot is broken into two pieces, then also there are two skandhas
and if it is broken into thousand pieces, there are thousand skandhas. Similarly,
if we grind the pot into powder, each particle of the powder is a skandha.
Modern science considers such a particle as one skandha also. It is a molecule.
But, if we go further, the indivisible part looses its characteristics of a pot and
may form as a part of something else. According to Jainism, however, the
minutest part of the pot is also a skandha. It does not change the characteristic
of a pot in the skandha, as long it does not reach the stage of an atom. The
minutest parts of an aggregate are aggregate.

SKANDHA-DESA:

Skandha (aggregate of atoms) may be considered as one unit. This unit can be
measured intellectually as one unit (through out our intellect) and is called
skandha-desa. If we imagine that this is a part of one pencil or a book it is
considered to be ekadesa skandha. It means that desa and skandha are not
separate. They are only discriminations made due to intellect. If they actually
are separated, then they become separate skandhas.

SKANDHA-PRADESA:

The inseparable unit of a skandha is called skandha-pradesa. It means the

paramanu having the capacity to combine may be considered as skandha-
pradesa. It is the indivisible part, most subtle and which cannot be further
divided.

PARAMANU:

The indivisible unit of a skandha is called paramanu. As long as it has the

tendency to combine, it is considered to be pradesa and if it becomes separate
and remains separate, it is called paramanu. The commentators on Jaina sastra
have explained the nature of paramanu in different ways. Paramanu pudgala1
(matter), is indivisible (avibhajya), is indestructible (acchedya), cannot be
pierced (abhedya), adahya (cannot be burnt), agrahya (cannot be grasped). We
cannot have divisions of paramanu by any means even with the sharpest of the
instruments. It can remain on the tip of a sharp sword and remain uncut. Fire
cannot burn it. The rains cannot make it wet. The great Ganges cannot wash it
away. The paramanu as the minutest particle has no parts, does not occupy
definite space and as neither beginning nor end.2 It is neither long nor short,
neither big nor small. It has one definite form. As it is subtle, it is itself the
middle, the beginning and the end. It occupies a point in space.1 That which has
the beginning, the end, and the middle in itself and is not possible to grasp it
through the sense-experience, has no parts and that minutest particle is
paramanu.2 In the Pancastikayasara,3 we get the description of some of the
characteristics of parmanu. Paramanu is that particle of mater, which has one
color (varna), one smell (gandha), one taste (rasa) and two sparsa. A paramanu
is the cause of producing the sound, but by itself it has not sound. It is different
from aggregate of paramanu. In the paramanu, the senses of color, smell, taste
and touch are present in specific degrees. But id does not have the sense of
space (ksetrendriya). The sabda or word is and expression of the aggregate
(skandha) in the form of sound. Paramanu is the cause of sabda, but it is not
possible to say that one atom is the object of the sense of sight, smell and other
indriyas. Yet these senses coming from the sense organs are the basic
characteristics of paramanu.

The distinction of pradesa and paramanu from skandha can be explained with
reference tot he non-differentiation (aprthakbhava) and differentiation
(prthakbhava).

THE FIRST DISCUSSION OF PARAMANU IN INDIA

In the Jain agama literature, is given an elaborate discussion about the nature of
paramanu. According to the Jaina philosophers, whatever differentiations and
non-differentiation, integration and disintegration in the things take place-all
these are possible due to the coming together and separation of jiva and
paramanu.

Some of the western philosophers are of the opinion that the atomic theory
mentioned in some school of Indian philosophy has been borrowed from the
ancient Greek thought. But this view does not appear to be satisfactory. There
is not evidence for this. In Greek philosophy Democrats was the founder of the
atomic theory, and he appears to have lived in the 5th century B.C. i.e. 460 to
371 B.C.1 The Greek theory of atomism has certain similarities with the Jain
theory of atomism. But there are certain fundamental differences between the
two. According to the Jainas, the nature of atom is unconscious. But Democrats
and Carvaka in Indian thought have mentioned that what we call atman or self is
only the subtlest form of atom.

Sivadatta Jnani that atomism has mentioned is the speciality of only the
Vaisesikas. The roots of atomic theory as propounded by Vaisesika system can
be traced to the Upanisads. Jainas and Ajivakas have given references tot he
atomic theory, but it was Kanada who gave a systematic explanation of the
doctrine of atomic theory.2 But considered from subjective point of view, it can
be said that Vaisesika atomic theory was not prior to the Jaina theory of atomism
and unlike the Jaina theory, Vaisesikas have given specific details about the
nature of the atomic theory. The term anu was used in the Upanisads. It reads
"Anoraniyan mahato mahiyan", but there is no mention of paramanu in the
Upanisads, nor is there any discussion about the paramanu theory.

Dr. Jacobi is of the opinion that the mention of the atomic theory in the
Upanishads and also in the philosophical literature of the Upanishads is very little
and therefore in the Vedantic literature, there is a refutation of the atomic theory
as supposed to have been mentioned in the Upanisads. In the Samkhya-
Yogadarsana, atomic theory has not been accepted. And Samkhya-Yogadarsana
claims to be as old as thee Vedas. But the atomic theory is an integral part of
the Vaisesikas, and the Nyaya philosophers have accepted Vaisesika theory of
atomism. These schools of philosophy, the Vedantic and the Nyaya-Vaisesikas
belong to the Vedic tradition. Jainas and Ajivakas are considered that Jaina
theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism has its theory of atomism on
the theory of matter.3

Modern philosophers have accepted the view that the atomic theory was first
presented in a systematic form by the Jainas.4

TWO FORMS OF PARAMANU

We have already seen that paramanu is indivisible, indestructible, and

inaccessible to senses and it cannot be burnt, not can it be divided into parts.
The description of these characteristics might trace some difficulty in the minds
of modern scientists, because modern science has shown that paramanu is not
indivisible, it can be split.

If it is to be said that paramanu is not indivisible, we cannot call it "Parama-anu".

Modern science has shown that what we call parmanu, can be split. We do not
deny this aspect of the nature of the paramanu as that which can be split. What
we need is the recognition of the view that the Paramanu is the ultimate
indivisible unit and it can be split. There it has been suggested that paramanu
has two forms: 1. Suksma paramanu (subtle), and Vyavahara paramanu
(paramanu from the practical sense).1

The description of the paramanu as indivisible, indestructible etc. refers to

suksma paramanu. Vyavaharika paramanu consists of aggregate of endless
suksma paramanus.2

Really speaking the aggregate of suksma paramanu is the nucleus of paramanu

9paramanupinda). This cannot be grasped from ordinary or normal sense, as it
is subtle. And it cannot be split by ordinary instrument or weapon. As it is
suksma in effect, it is considered to be paramanu from the practical point of
view. And what the science calls 'atom' is the Vyavaharika paramanu (paramanu
from the practical sense). Therefore, Jainas also consider that if it is to split, it is
practical paramanu.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUDGALA

Pudgala has four primary characteristics: (1) sparsa (touch), (2) rasa (taste), (3)
gandha (smell) and (4) varna (color). In every paramanu of the matter these
four characteristics are present. These characteristics express themselves to
twenty qualities. They are-
(1)Sparsa (touch)- (i) sita (cold), (ii) usna (hot), (iii) ruksa (rough), (iv) snigdha
(oily or viscous nature), (v) laghu (light), (vi) guru (heavy), (vii) mrdu (soft)
and (viii) kathora (hard).
(2)Rasa (taste) - (i) amla (acid), (ii) madhura (sweet), (iii) katu (sour), (iv) kasaya
(bitter), (v) tikta (astringent).
(3)Gandha (smell) - (i) Sugandha (fragrance), (ii) durgandha (foul smell).
(4)Varna (color) - (i) Krishna (black), (ii) nila (blue), (iii) rakta (red), (iv) pita
(yellow) and (v) sveta (white)

We find the Samsthana (formation), parimandala (globular), vrtta (circular),

tryamsa (triangular) caturamsa (square) and ayata (rectangular) in Pudgala. Still
these are not the real characteristics of the paramanu.1 These are the modes or
form of paramanu.

The twenty characteristics of Pudgala mentioned above, can be considered in

respect of its measurement and intensity into three distinctions, as (1) sankhyata
(measurable), (2) asankhyata (immeasurable) and (3) ananta (endless).2

From the point of view of substance, paramanu is partless and indivisible, but
from the point of view of modes, it is not so. Considered from the point of view
of modes, the four characteristics of varna, rasa, gandha and sparsa have their
infinite modifications.2 We have already seen that paramanu has the four
characteristics as mentioned with its sub-divisions like sita, usna and snigdha,
ruksa etc. Considered from the point of view of modes, we find a paramanu with
infinite modes can become a paramanu of one mode. And paramanu wit one
mode can express itself into many modes. And paramanu, according to the Jaina
theory one paramanu can transform itself from one attribute of varna to rasa
and to gandha to sparsa. The same is the case with the others.

The matter with one quality can remain in that stage approximately from one
samaya to a sankhyata kala (innumerable points of time).1 The same is the case
in the case of transformation of paramanus of two qualities to ananta qualities.
All the modifications in the paramanu on the basis of qualities are natural
expressions of the modifications.

THE FOUR TYPES OF PARAMANU

We have already seen that paramanu is indivisible and without parts. But it has
been suggested that other substances have their minutest parts, which are
intellectual constructs, and they are also called paramanus. In his sense, we can
say that there four types of paramanu as:
(1) Dravya paramanu (substance paramanu) -pudgala paramanu (material
paramanu).
(2) Ksetra paramanu (space paramanu) - akasa paramanu.
(3) Kala paramanu (time) (time) -samaya (definite span of time).
(4) Bhava paramanu - attribute.

Bhava paramanu is of four types as varna-guna, gandha-guna, rasa-guna,

sparsa-guna (color, smell, taste and touch).

There are 16 sub-divisions of these qualities like-

1. Krsna (black)
2. Nila (blue)
3. Rakta (red)
4. Pita (yellow)
5. Sveta (white)
6. Sugandha (fragrant)
7. Durgandha (foul smell)
8. Tikta (astringent)
9. Madhura (sweet)
10. Katuka (sour)
11. Kasaya (bitter)
12. Tiksna (sharp)
13. Usna (hot)
14. Sita (cold)
15. Ruksa (rough)
16. Snigdha (oily or viscous nature)

These sub-divisions are one-quality divisions (Ek-guna). In short we can say

according to the Jaina conception of paramanu the paramanu possess the four
qualities mentioned above.

PARAMANU INACCESSIBLE TO SENSES (ATINDRIYATA)

Paramanu is not accessible to sense experience through the sense organs, but it
is not formless. It has form. It is so subtle that even when it has form, it cannot
be grasped by the senses. It can only be seen through intuition or the higher
perception.

The omniscient souls (kevalajnana) can see the all substances, having form and
formless. In the Chadmastha stage of gunasthana where there is the
destruction-cum-subsidence of karma and which is partial, one can know the
paramanu and also may not know it. One who has clairvoyant knowledge
(avadhijnana) can see the objects with form upto a particular distance, can know
the paramanu but one who can see only through the sense-organs cannot see
the paramanu.1
FORMATION OF SKANDHA

Imagine for a moment that each paramanu is independent, isolated like a brick,
then the problem arises ho the combination of paramanus and their integration
bring the formation of mahakayaskandha, the cosmos. When we construct a
house, we keep the bricks one upon the other plastered with cement etc. But
the cosmos is formed by its own principle of necessities and not by any external
agency or intelligence. As the sky becomes laden with clouds and again
becomes clear so also the skandhas are formed and are separated by their own
nature. Still the problem remains-what is the object of such combination and
disintegration of skandhas and atoms?

The universe as we see is material in nature and is due to the integration of the
paramanus. Paramanus combine into skandha, and skandhas combine to form
the visible and gross objects. In Pudgala we find the inherent forces of
integration and disintegration.2 When paramanus integrate skandhas different
objects are formed. These forces of disintegration and integration are natural to
matter and these forces are also operative due to the jivas, as jivas are active. If
the Pudgala has not possessed the inherent attribute of integration, paramanus
would have remained isolated, and if the force of disintegration were not in
operation them the paramanus, would have been found in an unorganized
cluster. The cosmos would not be possible and there would be no use of the
paramanus and skandhas for the jivas.

According to the Jaina sciences, the formation of skandha has been explained in
the scientific way on the basis of the principle of chemical composition.

The formation of skandha can be explained in the following process:

1. The paramanus combine themselves into due to their characteristics of
viscosity. The separation of the atoms out of the skandhas is due to the
attribute of roughness.
2. The paramanus, which are alike having snigdha, come together and form into
skandha. (If the two paramanus have the viscosity to a degree less than two,
then the combination is not possible).
3. A paramanu which is viscous and the paramanu which is dried, if they come
together it is possible to form skandha. (In these cases the intensity of
dryness should be more than two degrees).
4. Viscous and the dry paramanus form skandha even when they belong to
different categories.

In all these, there is one point of exception i.e., that paramanus cannot form
skandha if the dryness and the viscosity are of one degree difference.

In other words,
(i) The parts, which have different characteristics (jaghanya guna), do not
form into a combination.
(ii) The Paramanus with identical attributes like either the viscous or dry
cannot form a combination.
(iii) The two coming together would form a combination.1

The Svetambaras and the Digambaras have expressed difference of opinion

regarding the formation or combination of skandhas. According to the
Svetambara tradition, if two paramanus with viscous nature having abominable
tradition, if two paramanus with viscous nature having abominable attributes
(jaghanya guna) comes together there would be no bandha (combination), but if
now paramanu consisting abominable attributes and the other of unabominable
attributes (ajaghanya guna) there would be a combination form; but the
Digambaras maintain even if one paramanu is of (jaghanya guna) there would be
no bandha. According to Svetambaras in the formation of parts and from one
part to the attributes of viscosity and the dryness vary in increasing degrees
from two, three, four, upto endless gunas, then also, the combination is possible;
but by the increase of one degree only bandha is not possible. But according to
the Digambara tradition by the increase of attributes of two degrees only the
combination would be possible. The parts having the degrees of intensity of
viscosity and dryness from one unit to the infinite units in ascending order the
combination would not be possible the Svetambara version says the two, three
or more qualities in the paramanus would lead to the process of combination and
this is possible if the qualities are of similar nature and not dissimilar; but the
Digambaras say, the formation of combinations would be possible in both the
cases where there are similar or dissimilar qualities. In short, the Digambara and
Svetambara version of the combinations would be as follows:

SVETAMBARA TRADITION
Sadrsa Visadrsa
(similar (dissimilar)
)
1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya No No
2. Jaghanya plus ekadhika (one addition) No Yes
3. Jaghanya plus dvyadhika (two addition) Yes Yes
4. Jaghanya plus triadhika Yes Yes
5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara No Yes
6. Jaghanyetara plus ekadhika No Yes
jaghanyetara
7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika Yes Yes
jaghanyetara
8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikadi Yes Yes
jaghanyetara

DIGAMBARA TRADITION
Sadrsa Visadrsa
(similar (dissimilar)
)
1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya No No
2. Jaghanya plus ekadhika No No
3. jaghanya plus dvyadhika No No
4. Jaghanya plus triadhika No No
5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara No No
6. Jaghanyetara plus ekadhika No No
jaghanyetara
7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika Yes Yes
jaghanyetara
8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikadi No No
jaghanyetara

After the combination of the atoms, which of the paramanus effect combination
with what type of paramanus, is a question that has been asked very often.
Similarly, another question has been asked very often, of the similar and the
dissimilar paramanus of similar qualities do not form combination? If the
paramanus are of dissimilar nature, they combine in the formation of the similar
paramanus collecting together or sometimes similar paramanus in two degrees
combine with similar paramanus of one degree. The combinations are formed
according to the substance and the place etc. The combinations are formed
according to the integration of paramanus. These types of combinations are
considered as madhyamabandha. The combinations of paramanus with higher
intensity and qualities absorb the combinations of the paramanus with lower
intensity and qualities.1 In the tradition, similar qualities do not come together
and the more intense qualities absorb the less intense qualities.2

DIVISIONS AND SUB-DIVISIONS OF PUDGALA

The two major distinctions of Pudgala can be stated to be anu (atom) and
skandha (aggregate). On the basis of this distinction, we can classify the matter
(pudgala) into 6 types.3
(1)Sthula-sthula (very gross)-It contains the gross objects like-earth, stones,
wood etc.
(2)Sthula (gross)-It has the following varieties, like-milk, curds, butter, water, oil
and other fluid material.
(3)Sthula-suksma (gross subtle)-It has the following forms, like light, electricity,
etc.
(4)Suksma-sthula-Wind, vapor etc., belongs to this category.
(5)Suksma-The objects belong to this category cannot be experienced by the
senses e.g., Manovargana (atoms of mental structure), etc. They are called
Acaksusa skandha.
(6)Suksma-suksma-The minutest paramanu is the subtlest form of atom.

That part of matters which is the aggregate of paramanus due to the

combinations and disintegration is unaccessible to sense experience. If the
aggregate of atoms becomes bigger and coarse (sthula) then the aggregate
becomes accessible to sense-experience. The combination and disintegration of
atoms is considered to be the coming-together of atoms and separation. The
degree of the combination so as to enable the aggregate to be coarser and
coarsest will make the aggregate accessible to sense-experience.

THREE TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)

Pudgala (matter) can be considered into three types on the basis of the
distinction on the types of combination of paramanus.1

1. Prayoga parinata-The collection of atoms processed by the jiva in the

formation of the body is called prayoga-parinata-sense organs, body blood,
flesh, etc.
2. Misra parinata-In this, the atoms are brought together by the jiva and they are
again discharged, e.g. nails which are cut, hair, cough and excretion etc.
3. Visrasa parinata-In this, we find aggregate of atoms without the help of the
jiva. The atoms come together by themselves, e.g., rainbow, clouds, etc.

ORIGINATION, CHANGE & PERMANENCE IN MATTER

Matter is both permanent and impermanent.2 From the point of view of

substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modifications, it i
impermanent. From the point of view of substance, a thing is permanent
because the atoms that form the aggregate are permanent, although the objects
that are formed due to the combination of atoms change their nature and
structure, and as such, from the point of view of modifications of the substance
due to the integration and is integration of atoms, it is impermanent. Due to the
combinations of atoms, the substance is not considered to be permanent, but
from the point of view of the original nature of atoms and from the points of view
of place and the time of the combination, it may be considered to be relatively
permanent.1

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MATTER

Matter may be considered to be of two forms on the basis of the manner of the
integration and disintegration of atoms. The two combinations are: (1) Badara
(gross), (2) Suksma (subtle). Infinite number of atoms combine together to form
objects. Sometimes the aggregates so formed are subtle and they are not
accessible to the sense organs. The subtle forms of aggregate of atoms have
fourfold attributes of touch, like- (1) sita, usna, snigdha and ruksa. If the atoms
are combined to form gross objects, the objects have four forms of touch, like-
guru-laghu, mrdu-kathina. If dry atoms are combined together, then the object
has the quality of laghu sparsa, but if the combination of snigdha paramanus
(viscous atoms) then the object gets the quality of guru sparsa. When molecules
are affected by quality of softness and viscosity they combine into producing the
quality of soft touch similarly, when heat and dryness are combined quality of
roughness is expressed. In short, when the transformation is from the subtle
qualities to the gross qualities then there would increase four types of touch.2
THE EXTENT OF MATTER

The molecules (skandha) and paramanu (atoms) are considered from the point of
view of flow, are beginningless and without any change. Considered from the
point of view of effects, it has a beginning and it is characterized by change.
Paramanus form themselves into skandhas and skandhas disintegrate into
paramanus.

The paramanus can remain in their original states for at-least a period of one
samaya or at the most upto asankhyata kala (innumerable points of time). In
the same way, if the molecule remains in its nature of molecule, it can do so at-
least for one samaya and at the most for innumerable kala.1 After this period,
transformation is inevitable.

From the point of view of ksetra (place), we can say the paramanu and skandha
can remain in a particular point or space for samaya or at the latest for
innumerable points of time (kala).

If a paramanu joins to form a molecule and again gets disintegrated to its

original nature of paramanu it might take one samaya or at the most asankhyata
kala.2

The molecule with two atoms or the molecule with three atoms can come back to
its original position paramanus and that would take one samaya at least or
ananta kala (endless time) at the most.3

If a paramanu or a molecule moves from one point of space (akasa pradesa) and
returns to that very point of space, it might take one samaya or at the most
ananta kala.4

A paramanu occupies one point of space, but a molecule may occupy one point
of space, two, innumerable or numberless points of space. It may also pervade
the entire lokakasa. We have already seen that the aggregate paramanus
pervading the entire universe is called acittamahaskandha. It is cosmos.

APRADESITVA (NON-SPACIAL POSITION) AND SAPRADESITVA (SPECIAL POSITION)

Paramanu considered from the point of view of substance and special position
can be considered as apradesi, as it does not occupy an extended point of space.
But from the point of view of temporal extension, it is considered to be apradesi,
because it is in one samaya, but if it is in more than one samaya, it is called
sapradesi, as it covers extended space. From the point of view of bhava,
(nature) a paramanu is apradesi (non-special), if it is one guna (quality) but if it is
characterized by many qualities it is sapradesi (special).
Considered from the point of view of substance, a molecule is sapradesi
(extensive in special extension). The number of paramanus it has determines
the molecule's extension.

From the point of ksetra (space), skandha (molecule) is sapradesi (extensive)

and also apradesi. A molecule which covers one point of space is apradesi, but if
covers more than one point of space, it becomes sapradesi.

From the point of view of bhava (nature), a molecule is characterized by one

quality it is apradesi. But if has more than one quality, it is sapradesi.1

MOTION OF MATTER

Paramanu is jada (unconscious) still it is characterized by motion. The motion of

the paramanu is sometimes due to some cause and sometime without any
cause. In fact, a paramanu is not always in motion. It is sometimes in motion
and sometimes not. In on samaya, it can travel from one point of space in the
universe to another point of space is the farthest point which is at a distance of
innumerable yojanas. The characteristic of motion is inherent in the atom,
although it may not always move. So, the principle of movement (Dharma) is
the principle due to which motion in paramanu is possible. But the principle of
Dharma is not the cause of the motion; it is only an efficient condition.2

A question arises, whether the motion in paramanu is due to itself of is caused by

jiva.

The answer is that paramanu does not move because of jiva, as paramanu is not
transformed or combined into molecules, due to jiva. It is material in nature.
And the cause is material only. Jiva has no power to move the paramanus.

Paramanu can be described as being vibratory (sakampa)1 and non-vibrate

(akampa). It is not unsteady, and not constantly vibrating.

A molecule with two atoms has both the characteristics, and expresses both the
characteristic like-vibration and non-vibration. It being composed of two atoms it
has special vibration and also absence of special vibration.

Molecules with three atoms express similar forms of vibration and non-vibration.
For instance, in the molecule one atom may vibrate and the other may not, the
two atoms may vibrate and the one may not, and two atoms may remain non-
vibratory while the one atom may not.

Molecules with four atoms may express all forms of permutations of vibration
and non-vibration. One special point may express vibration while others may
not. While the other points of space may express vibration and the one point
may not and so on.
Molecules of five atoms and molecules upto the infinite number of atoms have
similar characteristics of vibration and non-vibration.

LIMITS OF MOTION OF PARAMANU

The motion is paramanu has certain limits. The natural motion is always in
straight lines. If there are some cross-effects or other paramanus and material
particles, the motion gets curved. Jiva is not directly responsible for the motion
in a paramanu, as it is extremely subtle. But jiva can influence the motion of
molecules-big or small. As the maximum form of motion has been described, so
has the minimum form of motion has been described, can move from one point
of space of the point of space is of the same extension as of paramanu.

The motion in paramanu, as we have seen earlier, may be due to more inherent
causes or due to some other external factors present in matter. When the
motion in the paramanu starts, is difficult to say, but one thing is certain that
after infinite number of points of time, paramanu acts. Similarly, a paramanu
may stop movement within one samaya or at the most within infinite part of
avalika.1 And after the infinite number of points of avalika the paramanu will
definitely start motion.

The atoms are unobstructible (apratighati) and they can penetrate any object of
any type. For instance, atoms can penetrate a thick wall built of cast iron. Even
the mountain like Sumeru cannot obstruct the movement of paramanu.

Sometimes the movement of the paramanu may be arrested by the particles of

matter due to its contact with matter. But at that time paramanu also affects
the matter to which it has come in contact.2

THE SUBTLE NATURE OF PARAMANU

The special characteristics of paramanu are that it can occupy a point of space
and the same point of space can be occupied by another paramanu without any
resistance. Similarly, the subtle form of molecule consisting infinite paramanus
can occupy the same point without any resistance. This is the special
characteristic of paramanu. In this connection Acarya Pujyapada has pointed out
that there is not difficulty in atoms and molecules in occupying same point of
space without friction or resistance because they have no visible extension and
they are subtle in nature. For this reason, infinite number of atoms and
molecules can remain in one pradesa without any difficulty.3

For instance, a lamp lights a room to the fullest extent and this room can also
merge the light of many other lamps. Similarly, the light of the lamp illumines
the room fully; but if it is covered by a small pot, it restricts its illumination to the
pervasion of that very pot.4 It is clear from this, that the material aspect of the
atoms of matter have the characteristics of contraction and expansion. For this
reason and because of the power of contraction etc., a paramanu can remain
along with molecules in the same point of space.1

The subtle transformation is contraction of a paramanu and in this it is reduced

in its mass and effect.

THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF PARAMANU

If we study paramanu in a scientific way, we find that anu (atom) is of two parts.
The central part is a nucleus in which there are two functions-the protons and the
neutrons. The external part is the orbital shell. It contains electrons, which
move constantly with the velocity, which is unimaginable. The volume of a
nucleus is much smaller than that of an atom. If the orbital shell splits, then the
circumference of an atom becomes smaller. These split atoms are called
stripped-atoms. In the language of the astronomical science that some stars
have density which is two hundred times more than the densest object on our
earth. Eddington has said that if one ton (28 mounds) of nuclear mater is taken,
it can be contained in a basket or in our pocket. A star has been discovered
whose destiny is 620 tons (17360 mounds) for every cubic inch. This heave
weight of the stars is due to the stripped atoms and the atoms in these are
primarily nuclear and they have no orbital shells. The Jain theory of atoms
explains these phenomenon by means of the subtle process of movement in
atoms.2

Modern science has shown that atoms are very subtle in extension and the
subtlety can be explained that 50,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (50 sankhas) of
atoms weigh 2 tolas and occupy only one tenth crore of an inch space. In the
thickness of a cigarette-paper lakh of atoms may stay. A mole of dust in the air
contains more than 10,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (ten nila) paramanus.

The form of the atom orbits extension can also be measured if compared with
the magnified size of a small drop of blood coming out of the head, if we pull one
hair. The drop of blood may be magnified in size of the extent of 7 feet in
diameter. Even then the atoms inside it will have the diameter of 1/1000 of an
inch.3

THE SIZE AND FORM OF THE MATTER

The material atom is one, without parts, without middle and without space.

A molecule with two atoms is with parts, but without middle and it has special
extension.

A molecule with even number of atoms has characteristics like the molecules
with two atoms. And molecules with odd number of atoms express the
characteristics possessed by molecules with three atoms.
In the Bhagavati sutra we get description of the four forms of the existence of
atoms.1

(1)Dravya-sthanayu: It is the state when paramanu remains as paramanu and

skandhas as skandhas i.e. molecules as molecules.
(2)Ksetra-sthanayu: This is the akasa pradesa, in which paramanus and
skandhas exist.
(3)Avagahana-sthanayu: The specified form and size of paramanus and skandha.
The differences between ksetra and avagahana are that the first in pertaining
to space while the second to the pudgala (matter) itself.
(4)Bhava-sthanayu: In this form paramanus express the attributes of touch,
taste, smell and color, either in the form of paramanus or in the form of
skandha.

EIGHT COMBINATIONS (VARGANAS) OF PUDGALA

Paramanus have been classified into 8 forms of combinations on the basis of the
intensity and extension. They are called varganas.

(1)Audarika vargana: It is gross matter. This consists of the combination of

paramanus to form gross bodies for the jivas, vegetable, earth, water, fire and
air.
(2)Vaikriya vargana: In this, we get the aggregates of matter which have the
capacity of expressing the qualities, like-short and large, light and heavy,
visible and non-visible, etc.
(3)Aharaka vargana: This is the aggregate of matter formed by the paramanus
and molecules with a capacity of forming body by Yoga-sakti.
(4)Taijasa vargana: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the paramanus with
energy.
(5)Karmana vargana: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the minutest
particles of matter, which are responsible for the formation of karma, like-
Jnanavaraniya etc. This forms the subtle body.
(6)Svasocchvasa vargana: This is the aggregate of matter, which enables the
function of breathing.
(7)Vacana vargana: The collection of matter, which is responsible for speech.
(8)Mano-vargana: This is the collection of minutest particle which are very subtle
and which forms the mind for the sake of reflection and thinking.

Matter is of infinite variety. Among them, the eight varieties mentioned above
are prominent. These types of matter have graded existence forming from the
gross matter, which we get in earth, water, etc., to the subtlest form of matter in
mind. One form of matter can be transformed into another form of matter due
to the formation of molecules and the integration of paramanus in different
intensities.

According to the Jainas varganas of one type may also be transformed into
another.
The varganas like audarika, vaikriya, aharaka and taijasa have the qualities of
eight types of touch and they are of the form of gross molecules. They posses
the qualities-light or heavy, smooth and rough, etc. The varganas like karmana
varganas, bhasa and manovarganas have four types of qualities of touch. They
are subtle molecules and they have the qualities of cold and heat, viscous and
dry. Svasocchvasa vargana has four types of touch and also eight types of
touch.1

EIGHT DISTINCTIONS OF PUDGALA

The Jaina philosophers have studied the pudgala (matter) with its various
distinctions, the like of which we do not get in other systems of philosophy. In
modern science, we find recognition to large extent of the Jaina view of matter.
According to Jainism the function of pudgala is ten-fold. (1) Sabda (sound), (2)
bandha (combination), (3) sauksmya (subtlety), (4) sthaulya (grossness), (5)
samsthana (formation), (6) bheda (distinction), (7) tama (darkness), (8) chaya
(shade), (9) atapa (heat), (10) Udyota (cool-light).1

SABDA (SOUND)

Sabda (sound) is produced due to the friction of one molecule with the other.2
The sound is the object of sense hearing i.e., ears.

Vaisesikas do not consider sabda as a mode of matter. But they make it an

attribute of akasa. Sankhya-darsana considers the formation of sabda as the
sense cause of akasa. Jainas differ fundamentally from the sense cause of
akasa. Jainas differ fundamentally from the Vaisesikas and Sankhya
philosophers. They maintain that sabda (sound) is material in nature, because it
becomes an object of sense organ. Akasa is not material in nature. And it
cannot produce sound. Similarly, akasa is not produce of sound as the Samkhya
philosophers say. Because sabda (sound) is material in nature and hence sabda
(tanmatra) the subtle elements should also become material in nature. If
sabdatanmatra were to be material in nature its product akasa should also be
considered as material. But akasa is not material in nature. Therefore akasa is
not a product of sabdatanmatra.

Secondly, akasa is a substance, which is formless. It has no qualities like touch

etc. But sabda has form and it has qualities of touch etc. It can be grasped. The
substance, which is formless, must have qualities, which would also be formless.
And then it cannot be grasped by the sense organs, which have form. The
objects, which are formless, cannot be grasped by the sense organs, which have
form.

Thirdly, the friction of molecules produces sound and due to the friction there
would be echo and sound production. If sound were to be the qualities of akasa,
which is formless, such interruption of atoms and molecules would not be
possible.
Fourthly, sabda can be arrested and checked. If it were the quality of akasa how
could it be possible to check the sabda.

Fifthly, sabda has velocity (gatimanata), but akasa is without any motion and is
passive.

Sixthly, argument would be considered from scientific point of view, sabda

cannot traverse in space if there were no matter. If sabda were the quality of
akasa it would have penetrated into every point of akasa. Because quality
pervades the substance having that quality and there is not question whether
there is the need of the presence or not.1

Jaina agama literature has elaborately discussed the nature of sabda as material
in nature and also the characteristics of sabda in its various aspects, like-the
production (utpatti), velocity (stghragati), pervasion in the universe
(lokavyapitva), stationary nature (sthititva) and other forms.2 According to
Jambudvipaprajnapti the ringing of the bell (sughosa ghanta) in a particular
region will be echoed in a bell in a far of palace even though there is no medium
of transmission like the wires except the medium of air. This can explain the
function of a radio. The sabda pervade the entire universe in a fraction of
moment. This phenomenon was recognized and explained by Bhagavana
Mahavira 2,500 years ago.3

We have already seen that sound is produced due to contact, friction and inter-
action of the molecules formed by paramanus. Sabda is of two-type (1)
prayogika (practical, artificial) (2) vaisrasika (natural).

Prayogika-The production of the sound in this form is possible due to efforts and
these efforts are of two types-due to speech and due to efforts without speech.
(1) Bhasatmaka expresses some meaning. Therefore, it is called
arthapratipadaka vani. (2) Abhasatmaka does not convey any meaning.
Abhasatmaka sound is of four types- (i) tata, (ii) vitata, (iii) ghana, (iv) sausira.

The tata form of sound is produced by a musical instrument made of leather

(carma) like mrdanga, pataha etc. The vitata sound is produced by musical
instrument having streams, like-vina. The ghana type of sound is produced by
musical instruments like tala, bell etc. And sausira form of sound is produced by
musical instruments, which are to be blown through mouth, e.g., conch (sankha),
flute, etc.1

The vaisrasika sabda is all sounds produced without any effort on the part of an
individual, for instance, the thunder of the clouds is vaisrasika sound.

An individual grasps a sound and communities it through language. The moment

it is communicated through sound to other individuals, it passed on to other
individuals. The sound so produced spreads in the akasa and the waves of the
sound travel throughout space. If the intensity of the sound produced is low, the
sound travels like the waves of the water for quite sometime for several yojanas
and then the waves of the sound fade away. If the intensity of the sound
produced is high, the waves of the sound travel to farther distances even upto
the end of the world.

The sound that we hear spoken by a particular person is not the original word of
the person speaking. It is the sound waves that travel through akasa in the form
of sabda. The sound waves so produced spread in all the six directions-east,
west, north, south, up and down.

If the waves of the sound spread in even combination (samasreni) then we hear
the misra sabda (combined). It implies that we hear the sabdadravya that is
uttered by an individual and the sabdadravya i.e., contained the waves of the
sounds. But if the waves of the sound are received in odd combination (visreni)
we hear the sabda in the waves of the sound only.1

BANDHA (COMBINATION)

Bandha means tieing, joining and combination (samyojana). Two paramanus or

more than two paramanus can come together and become bound together.
Similarly, two or more molecules can also come together. In this way, the
combination or the aggregate can be of two or more paramanus or two or more
molecules. In samyoga (joining together), there is the combination without any
distance (antara rahita avasthana) but in bandha there is the identity or unison
of the aggregate.

Bandha is of two types- (1) vaisrasika (natural) and (2) prayogika (artificial).

Vaisrasika bandha is of two types- (a) sadi (with beginning) and (b) anadi
(without beginning). Dharma, Adharma and Akasa have bandha, which is
without beginning, but in the case of matter, the bandha has beginning. The
paramanus may join together in a group of two or more and form molecules.
These are formed at a particular time and they have a beginning. They may also
be disintegrated. The lightening, meteors, the flow of water, fire and rainbow,
etc. have a beginning. Therefore their formation is sadi.

Prayogika bandha is of two types- (a) ajivavisayaka i.e. connected with non-living
matter and (b) combination, which is connected with the living and the non-living
substance. (Jivajivavisayaka).

The bandha or union of paramanu in the case of wood and wax is of the
ajivavisayaka types. The jivajivavisayaka which is connected with the
combination of paramanus in association with jiva and ajiva may be referred to
those of karmic and quasi-karmic (no-karma). The bondage of the soul with 8
types of karmas is called karma-bandha. The association of the soul with the
bodily forms like audarika body etc. is called nokarma-bandha. That is, it is
associated with quasi-karmic material.1
SAUKSMYA (FINENESS)

Suksmata is related to fineness. It is of two types- (1) antya suksmata (the

ultimate fineness) and, (2) apeksika suksmata (relative fineness).2 The ultimate
fineness to be found in the paramanu. The relative fineness has a reference to
relative extension of the objects. One object is finer and smaller in size than
another object. For instance, the sizes of the fruits like the lemon and the
mangoes vary in form. One is smaller than the other is.

STHAULYA (GROSSNESS)

Sthulata refers to the largeness in size. It is of two forms: (1) antya sthulata,
which is all pervasive. It is mahaskandha. It is the cosmos. (2) Apeksika
sthulata is relative largeness of the size. It is concerned with determining the
size of the objects. One object would appear larger than the others, if we
compare the sizes of the objects,3 for instance as we have seen earlier the size of
a mango is larger than the size of betel nut.

SAMSTHANA (FORMATION)

Samsthana connotes form or structural design. Samsthana is of two types. The

first type of samsthana has been divided into two types as: (a) it is called ittham
samsthana which related to geometrical forms like triangle, rectangle, circle, etc.
(b) anittham samsthana refers to irregular forms.4 It has no specific form.
However it has various structural designs-regular or irregular and it has been
classified into different types, utkara, curna, khanda, curnika, pratara and
anucatana.

The second type of samsthana has reference to the different forms of the bodies,
which embody the jiva. It has also been classified into different types of: (1)
samacaturasra, nyagrodha, sadika, vamana, kubja and hundaka. For instance,
vamana refers to a dwarfish body and kubja refers to hunch-backed body.

BHEDA (DISTINCTION)

Bheda refers the disintegration of the molecules into different atoms or

separation of some atoms from a molecule.

TAMA (DARKNESS)

Tama is darkness. It is that which obstructs vision and which is opposite of light.1
The Indian philosophers like naiyayikas do not consider darkness (andhakara) as
a substance, referring to characteristics (bhavatmaka dravya), but these
philosophers give a negative interpretation of darkness implying absence of
light. But if light is a substance conception in nature (bhavatmaka in nature), it
is necessary to consider darkness also as a substance. Because light has form so
also the darkness has form.

Modern science does not give a negative interpretation of darkness. It is

considered to be a positive substance, because darkness is possible due to
infrared heat rays. These rays could be found in the eyes of some of the animals
like cats owls, etc. The negative of the photographic plates expresses similar
phenomenon. It shows that in addition to the visible light, we have invisible
light, which may be considered as darkness.2

CHAYA (SHADE)

That which covers the light is called chaya (shade).3 If light is obstructed by
opaque bodies we get shade. Shade may be considered as a form akin to
darkness. But it is not absence of light; it is to be considered as modification of
matter.

According to modern science, the visibility produced by the various combinations

of paramanus can also be considered in the light reflections and these reflections
are of two types: (1) vastavika (natural) and (2) avastavika (unnatural).
Similarly, chaya or shade has reflections in these two types. We find that due to
interference bands of the counting machine when worked, give dark band.
These are like the electronic effects. The dark band is not merely the absence of
light, but it is the electronic effect, in the form of a dark band.

The light can function through reflection (darpana) and the refraction. These two
functions can be natural and artificial. They also may be expressing different
types of reflections and images. Inverted images would help formation of the
correct images, if reflected upon.

ATAPA (HEAT)

Atapa is heat. It is the heat rays of light.1 By itself, it is cool but it its light is hot.

UDYOTA (COOL LIGHT)

Udyota refers to the rays of the light, which give a cooling effect. It also gets
cooled and its effect would be coolness. It is different from the heat of the fire.
The Jainas have considered the cooling and heating effect as the forms of light.
This is a scientific approach to the problem and it shows remarkable insight and
discriminating power into the phenomenon of light.

Scientific have considered light as the continuous process of movement. They

say that the cosmos contains the light rays, which are moving with a velocity,
which is un-imaginable. Earlier, it was considered that light has no mass, but
recent scientists have begun to realize that light has also mass (bhara).
Electoral magnetism and every minute the light travels from the sun with
unimaginable speed characterize it.

Heat is considered to be a quality of the matter. From the scientific point of

view, paramanus have distinctions like dhananu and rnanu and they are
constantly in motion, and inter-penetration. Then they express themselves in
the form of heat.

Ordinary, we find that electrical energy may be seen in two forms as ghana
vidyut (electricity produced from the friction of particles) and jala vidyut
(electricity produced from water particles). These two are the modes of matter.
Scientifically considered, ghana and usna are two forms of electrical energy. The
basis of ghana is protons and the source vidyutkanas is electron. When we find
the lightning and the thunder produced, we find that there is friction of the
proton and the electron particles and they produce electrical energy. This
energy is accompanied by the sound. This process of radiation is called radi0-
active process. In ancient Indian science, the paramanu were not considered to
be as capable of splitting. But modern science has shown that the ancient
conception is wrong. It has been shown that when atom is split, infinite energy
released. This is the principle for the manufacture of atom bomb.

We find that the principle of manufacturing the radio-transistors, telegraph is

based on the fundamental conception of the material nature of the sound.
Sound is a mode of matter. Just as the electrical energy transmits the sound-
waves to far distance, so also the light waves transmit images to far off
distances, so we find expressed in television.

In Jaina literature, it has been described that every moment the objects in the
universe are receiving reflections and spreading far and wide. These are caught
and crystallized in mirrors and water, and other forms of matter. Television is
based on this principle.

Modern science has discovered the function of the X-rays. They are very subtle
rays creating invisible effects. Therefore, we can say that the light as former
mode of matter is expressed in such phenomena like X-rays etc.1 Thus we find all
the sense-experience arising out of touch, smell, taste, etc., are nothing but
modes of matter.

FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA
The primary functions of jiva are six like ahara (food), sarira (body) indriya
(sense organs) Svasocchvasa (breathing), bhasa (speech) and manas (mind).
These express fundamental functions of the cetana in various forms; and these
are material in aspect.

Acarya Nemicandra has pointed out that matter is responsible for the production
of the body. Audarika sarira is due to audarika varganas (clusters of
paramanus). Vaikriya sarira is formed by vaikriya varganas. Similarly aharaka
sarira is formed by aharaka varganas. We can describe the Svasocchvasa
(breathing) based on aharaka varganas in the same way. Taijasa body is formed
due taijasa varganas. The same can be said about bhasa and manas, and they
are formed by the respective varganas (fine particles of matter).1

It is not necessary to give a detailed description about the ahara, indriya,

Svasocchvasa and bhasa. Jaina philosophers have made distinctions of sariras in
the audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa and karmana into five types. We can
experience the audarika sarira through the indriyas. The other forms of body
cannot be seen through the sense organs. They gradually become finer and
finer.2 Taijasa and karmana bodies do not interact with other bodies. They can
move in lokakasa according to their capacities. They do not suffer from any
external bonds. These two forms of bodies are associated with samsari jivas
from beginningless times. They are with every jiva. Every jiva can have at the
most four bodies at a time.3 But all the five bodies cannot co-exit because the
vaikriya and the aharaka functions do not simultaneously express themselves.
The vaikriya function is generally possible in the pramatta dasa (in the
uncontrolled state),4 but such is not the case of aharaka function. Formation of
aharaka body is possible in the pramatta dasa. But when the aharaka body is
formed during the pure state of mind, apramatta avasiha is inevitable.
Therefore, vaikriya and aharaka functions do not take place simultaneously.

The mental functions are not possible without the material basis. While we think,
thoughts emanate from the mind through the molecules of mano-varganas. The
thought forms get shape through mano-varganas and these flit across leaving
behind their traces in the form of thought-processes. These thought-processes
have their different types of durations. Some continue too remain in the mind,
some flash across the mind and some create impact in the mind as mental traces
through the mano-varganas. These mano-varganas, therefore, leave the
mnemic traces on the cerebral and have their effect on body.

In short, a samsari jiva is very closely associated with various forms as in the
form of gross bodies and the subtle body and in the mental functions. In this
sense, we can say the matter has a tremendous influence on the functions of the
jiva and the formation of the universe as such.
Principle of the Punya (Merit) and Papa (Demerit): a Study

PRINCIPLES OF PUNYA AND PAPA

Punya (merit) is auspicious karma-pudgalas and papa (demerit) is inauspicious

karma-pudgalas. Both are ajivatattva.

A question may arise that the auspicious and inauspicious karmas, which are
enumerated under principle of ajiva are the auspicious and inauspicious
tendencies of atman; and the tendencies of atman should be jiva, i.e., jiva-rupa,
they cannot be ajiva. Hwy merit and demerit are enumerated under ajivatattva?

The question is answered as-the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of

atman are mental, physical and vocal. These are enumerated under the influx
(asravatattva).1 Here the punya and papa, only means that the karma-pudgalas
which are attracted by the psychological, physiological and vocal tendencies of
atman and are connected with jiva; if they re auspicious, they are punya and if
inauspicious, they are papa. The auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of
atman are bhava-punya and bhava-pap. As the result of atmic tendencies, the
karma-pudgalas gets connected with the atman; they are called as dravya-punya
and dravya-papa. Hence the tendencies of atman are bhava-punya and bhava-
papa, while the dravya-punya and dravya-papa are pudgalas-ajivatattva.

As the atmic tendencies are of innumerable types so the cause of punya and
papa (merit and demerit) are also innumerable. Still due to behavioral point of
view, many causes are enumerated of these are described in agamas like
Sthananga etc.

TYPES OF PUNYA AND PAPA

Auspicious karma-pudgalas are called punya. It can be acquired by the

auspicious deeds, like-to have sympathy and kindness towards the poor and
distressed people and serve them, philanthropic deeds, to be glad to see good
charactered people etc.

Agamas have told that jiva can acquire punya by the nine deeds. These are-
(1)Anna punya-to gives food to the hungry ones keeping kindness and with faith
and devotion to saints.
(2)Pana punya-to give drinking water to thirsty people.
(3)Layana punya-Layana means shelter. Everybody should give shelter (i.e.,
place for living) to the needy persons.
(4)Sayana punya-Sayana means to give space for sleeping.
(5)Vastra punya-to give cloths to the needy persons.
(6)Mana punya-to thinks that everybody should be happy, none should be
sorrowful, etc.
(7)Vacana punya-It means to acquire punya by sympathetic and sweet words.
(8)Kaya punya-A man may acquire punya, if he serve others by his body. This
type of punya cans be acquired by physical auspicious activities.
(9)Namaskara Punya- This type of punya is acquired by vinaya. To bow to the
elders, virtuous and meritorious people are the cause of this type of punya.

In other words, it can be said that the punya can be acquired by giving food,
drinking water, medicine, etc., and to give place to rest to the needy persons, to
have good feelings to everyone, to speak sweet and advantageous words and to
do good deeds by body. To bow, keeping devotion and faith in heart towards the
deva, guru and dharma is also the cause of acquiring punya.

Acarya Umasvati tells, the auspicious mental, bodily and vocal activities are
punya.1 Auspicious and meritorious karma-pudgalas are called punya.2

Demeritorious karmas are papas.3 In other words, due to papa atman could not
do auspicious deeds.4

There many causes of papa, yet, briefly, eighteen causes are described in the
agamas. These are also called papa-sthana (the homes of papa). These are
enumerated as under: -
1. Himsa (violence)
2. Mrsa (to tell a lie)
3. Caurya (theft)
4. Abrahmacarya (non-celibacy)
5. Parigraha (covetousness)
6. Krodha (anger)
7. Mana (pride)
8. Maya (deceit)
9. Lobha (lust or greed)
10. Raga (attachment)
11. Dvesa (detachment)
12. Kalaha (to make dispute)
13. Abhyakhyana (to nickname anybody, to call bad names)
14. Paisunya (back-biting)
15. Para-ninda (to blame)
16. Rati-Arati (Rati means inclinations towards demerit and arati denotes
non-inclination towards auspicious deeds).
17. Maya Mrsavada (deceitful lie)
18. Mithyadarsana (delusion).

From the spiritual point of view, merit and demerits both are bondages. Indian
thinkers have widely discussed these merits and demerits. Mimansakas gave
two much force to acquire merits. They regarded punya (merit) as the aim of
life. But Jain philosophy, by the different points of view, regarded punya as heya
(abandonable), jneya (knowable) and upadeya (acceptable). By the noumenal
point of view, punya and papa-both are abandonable. Punya is charming while
papa reverse to it, i.e., uncharming. Punya is golden fetters while papa is an iron
fetter. Being sparkling and charming, the golden fetters are a bondage to
atman. It also bounds the atman, as that of iron-fetters. There is no difference,
if a sword is made of gold or iron. Both can be used equally to kill anybody. In
the modern language, punya can be termed as first class imprisonment, while
papa as rigorous imprisonment. But, for getting salvation, both are to be
discarded.

According to behavioral point, punya can be called better than papa can. Due to
papa, jiva has to bear the agonies of hell, and many kinds of miseries and pains,
disfame etc., in this world. While as the result of punya, jiva gets the joyful
heave-life and fame, pleasure etc., in this world. The punya is like a shadow of
tree. A traveler, after a long journey, under sharp sunlight, gets relief in the
shadow of a tree; so jiva, during the long-long rigorous journey of his mundane
life, gets rest and relief by the punya. Hence punya is regarded better and self-
soothing.

TWO KINDS OF PUNYA

Acaryas described two kinds of punya. These are-

(1)Punyanubandhi punya-This type of punya (merit) is virtuous both in operation
(udaya) and result (phala-bhoga). It also paves the way to salvation to jiva.
(2)Papanubandhi punya-This is a punya, which gives joy to jiva, during operation;
but leads it towards the wrong deeds. During this type of merit jiva earns
papas.

For example, a man gets all types of worldly luxuries by his previously acquired
meritorious deeds and in this life also he becomes virtuous, does philanthropic
deeds, he keenly absorbs himself in such activities which may lead to the
salvation, he acquires new punyas, while enjoying the consequences of
previously acquired punyas. It is called punyanubandhi punya.

On the other hand, a man gets all means of happiness in world; but he leads a
sinful life and earns new papas as the result of his bad activities. This kind of
punya is called papanubandhi punya; because it is a cause of new papas.

In the Jaina literature, punyanubandhi punya is described like a guide, who leads
atman to his ultimate goal, i.e., salvation.

Quite reverse to it, papanubandhi punya is like a robber, who robs everything
and makes man a beggar. So, this type of punya robs all the previously earned
punyas; and becomes a cause of downfall of jiva.

Hence the punyanubandhi punya is regarded acceptable (upadeya) and

papanubandhi as abandonable (heya).

TWO KINDS OF PAPA

Like punya, papa is also of two kinds. These are-
(1)Papanubandhi papa-Troublesome in present experience and also acquires
sinful karmas for future.
(2)Punyanubandhi papa-Troublesome in present experience but acquires
meritorious karmas for future.

The first kind of papa is troublesome both for present and future. Because, due
to this type of papa, jiva experiences agonies, pains, disfame etc., in this life and
also absorbs himself in sinful activities, so he acquires papa-karmas for future
also. For example, butcher, fishermen are the men of this type.

The second type of papa is troublesome; but it acquires merits (punyas) for
future. Because, due to this papa, though man experience miseries in present,
but he absorbs himself in auspicious activities, so he earns punyas for future.
Such persons are called as papanubandhi punya jivas.

Hence, the principle of papa and punya is described in the Jaina literature with
various points of view. By the noumenal point of view, being the filters for
atman, regarded abandonable and kept in one category. While by behavioral
point of view, papa is outrightly abandonable; but punya is acceptable upto some
extent. Because, on account of this, atman may progress and get the path of
salvation, which is the ultimate goal and real home of mundane soul.
Principle of Asrava (Influx): a Study

PRINCIPLE OF ASRAVA (INFLUX)

The asrava, in Jain agamas and philosophy is defined thus-the thoughts, words
and activities, by which the pudgalas of karma-varganas flow-in, to get
connected with atma-pradesas, is asrava. In other words, psychological, vocal
and physiological activities-vibrations (yoga) of atman, is asrava.1

Atman and pudgala, both are of opposite nature. The qualities of atman are-
knowledge, consciousness and bliss; while that of pudgala are-touch taste, smell,
and color i.e. rupi; it is also totally senseless, without consciousness and any kind
of feeling. Pudgala is rupi while atman is arupi.

Until and unless atman remains in his own self nature, karmas do not inflow; but
as soon as atman, doe to delusion, attracts towards other objects i.e., para-
bhava or vibhava, the pudgalas of karman-vargana which are called as karmas
flow-in. The way of flowing-in-of karmas is called asrava. Atman gets karmas
through asrava.

As in a pond water comes through a channel so the karmas come to the atman
through asrava. Hence, asrava or influx means the way of karmas to come to
atman.

FIVE TYPES OF ASRAVA

The causes of bondage are five, viz., mithyatva (wrong-belief), avirati

(vowlessness), pramada (negligence), kasaya (passion) and yoga
(psychophysical activities). The thoughts of atman by which karmas flow-in is
called bhavasrava, and flowing-in of karmic matter is dravyasrava. The
emergence of karma-paryaya in the matter and coming upto atman is
dravyasrava. Though wrong belief etc., five causes are called as thought-influx
(bhavasrava); but really at the first movement these are the efficient causes of
psycho-physical activities, which is the immediate cause of attracting the karmic
matter. So these 9wrong-belief etc.) are called thought-influx. The next
momentary thoughts are bondage. According to the varying intensity of
thought-influx, the karmic matter is attracted and attached with the soul.

The description of the five causes, i.e., wrong belief etc., is, briefly, as under-

WRONG BELIEF (MITHYATVA)

It means reverse or contrary belief; or lack of metaphysical knowledge. Due to

wrong belief, a person considers non-living as living matter and vice-versa, he
also cannot differentiate between dharma (path of salvation) and adharma
(cause of bondage). He remains in illusory state.

Wrong belief is of two types: (1) natural (naisargika or sahaja) and (2) grasped
(grhita). Due to both of these wrong beliefs, the truth-seeking tendency cannot
arise in the jiva. He exposes his belief in pseudo deities (ku-deva), pseudo-
religion (ku-dharma), and pseudo-saints (ku-guru) and public follies (loka-
mudhata).

Wrong belief is the root cause of the infinite samsara.

VOWLESSNESS (AVIRATI)

Vowlessness means lack of control over five senses and mind. In this state, jiva
does not renounce the sensual pleasures; even he has no wish to do so. He
wants to enjoy sensual pleasures and has no inclination towards renunciation.
Due to the intensive passions atman cannot accept the vows of a monk
(sramana-caritra) and not even householder's vows.

NEGLIGENCE (PRAMADA)

Negligence is the lack of enthusiasm towards the spiritual progress. It is of

fifteen kinds, viz.; (1-4) talks about food (bhojan-katha), women (stri-katha) and
state (desa-katha), (5-8) four passions-anger, pride, hypocrisy and greed (9-13)
five kinds of sensual enjoyments, (14) sleep (15) affection. Being indulged in
these fifteen kinds of worldly activities, the jiva forgets his own welfare and gives
no preference to salvation-path (moksa-marg). Consequently, jiva beings to
acquire papa-karmas. Whether he does or does not the sinful deeds, yet, on
account of negligence, papas are acquired.

This is why, Bhagavana Mahavira said to his first disciple Ganadhara Gautama-

"Gautama! Always be careful and do not negligent for a single moment".

PASSIONS (KASAYA)

Passions (kasaya) are the root cause of misery, pain and agony etc. to jiva.
These are the main causes of transmigration of the jiva.1

Really the velocity of passions is very great. These are passions, which moves
the jiva in the circle of life and death. As the passions extinguish, the circle of
life and death stops. The passions keep the tree of transmigration green.
Sayyambhava Suri said-'The uncontrolled passions keep the root of
transmigration fresh, due to them it can not dry'.2
Passions are spiritual defects. May these be manifest or not, yet they make
defective the inherent qualities of atman. On account of these, atman gets the
pains, miseries and agonies etc., upto long-long time and in this world. Acarya
Virasena in Dhavla, says that passions make the karma-field fertile.

Passions are four in number, viz., anger (krodha), pride (manu), deceitfulness
(maya) and greed (lobha). These are classified into two categories, i.e.,
attachment (raga) and aversion (dvesa). Anger and pride are dvesa, while
deceitfulness and greed are raga.

The four types of passions are fundamental passions. Besides these there are
nine types of passions more. These are called no-kasayas (quasi-passions).

Some acaryas have also classified four fundamental passions in many other
ways, in raga and dvesa.

These raga-dvesa (attachment and aversion) are the main asravas (influx).
Nyaya-sutra, Gita and Pali Tripitaka literature also ascertain the raga-dvesas the
root of demerit or sin.

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL VIBRATIONS (YOGA)

The vibrations caused in atma-pradesas, due to mental, vocal and bodily

movements, are called yoga. In Yogabhasya etc., yoga is described as the check
of mental activities; but Jaina philosophy differs at this point. In Jaina philosophy
yoga signifies the mental, vocal and physical activities. These activities make
the contact of karma-pudgalas with the atma-pradesas, so these activities are
called yoga and to check-up or control these yogas is termed as dhyana
(meditation).

Literally the word yoga means to add, to join, to contact. Jaina philosophy uses
this term in the meaning-to contact karma-pudgalas with atma-pradesas: while
yoga philosophy means to join atma with Paramatma.

Really, atman is an active substance. Due to mental, vocal, physical

movements, the vibrations in atma-pradesas are caused. This activity continues
upto 13th gunasthana (soul stage) i.e., Kevalin State. The complete check up of
yogas is possible only in 14th gunasthana. In this stage of soul the jiva becomes
quite pure. According to Jain philosophy, jiva can attain nirvana (salvation) only
after the destruction of karmic filth and yogic movements.

Yoga is influx (asrava). Auspicious mental, vocal and physical activities cause
auspicious influx (subha-asrava); while inauspicious activities become the cause
of inauspicious influx (asubha-asrava). Inauspicious influx is also called
meritorious (punya-asrava); while inauspicious influx denotes Demeritorious
(papasrava).
TWO-FOLD DISTINCTIONS OF INFLUX (ASRAVA)

Influx (asrava) is of two kinds- (1) Subtle influx (Iryapathic asrava) and (2)
Samparayika asrava ((activities backed by passions).

Considered by the point of view of bondage, Iryapathic asrava, is not the cause
of bandha. Due to this kind of influx karmic pudgalas flow in; but they does not
combine with atma-pradesas; because the cause of bondage are passions and in
this type of inflow, there is no existence of passions.

Samparayika asrava being backed by passions, is the cause of bondage. So, it is

abandonable, for getting salvation.

INFLUX (ASRAVA) IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE

The original Buddhist literature is written in Pali language and in Pali word
asrava' is transformed as asava. Discussing asava in Pali literature, it is said-
Avidya is the cause of accepting anything stable; while really it is unstable.
Asava is the cause of this avidya (delusion).

Asava is distinguished into four types:

(1)Kamasava-Desire to get sensual pleasures.
(2)Bhavasava-Desire of life, i.e., non-desire towards death. Due to this asava,
man wishes to live in the same body for a long time.
(3)Drsvasava-Opposite point of view that of Buddha philosophy.
(4)Avidyasava-To accept unstable things as stable etc.

Asrava is the general result of avidya; while sorrow, pain etc., are special
results.1

Professor Jacobi holds the view that "all the three words asrava, samvara and
nirjara are as old as Jainism itself. Bauddhas have borrowed the word asrava
from Jainas, which is the most important among all the three. The Bauddhas use
this word in the same meaning, as that of Jaina; but they make difference in
literal usage. The cause of this difference is-they does not accept karmas as real
entity and also does not accept atman; and the existence of asrava is only
possible in atman. This also proves that karmavada (theory of karmas) is the
original thing of Jainas and it is much more ancient than the beginning of
Buddhism".2
Principles of Samvara and Nirjara: A Study

PRINCIPLE OF SAMVARA

To check the influx (asrava) is samvara. It is the principle, opposite to influx

(asrava.) It checks the inflow of karmic matter. Asrava (influx) is like a channel
through which the karmic matter flow-in. By checking the same channel to stop
the inflow of karmic matter is samvara. The main function of samvara, is to
check the impure activities of atman, which are due to attachment and aversion
(raga-dvesa).

Samvara is the activity of checking inflow (asrava).1 On account of samvara new

karmas could not come and get contact with atma-pradesas.

There are two types or divisions and kinds of Samvara- (1) Dravya Samvara
(material check-up of influx) and (2) Bhava samvara (thought check-up influx).2

Dravyasamvara (material check-up of influx) means the check-up of receiving

the karma-pudgalas; while bhavasamvara (thought check-up of influx) includes
to give up the activities which are cause of increasing the circle of life and death,
and to indulge himself in his own spiritual suddhopayoga (natural conscious
attentiveness). So, samiti (vigilance), gupti (self-restraince) etc. are regarded as
bhava-samvara (thought check up of influx).

An example will be sufficient to clearly understand the subject.

Suppose, a man is throwing off water so that the pond may be empty. He is
working hard; but the water of pond is as much as before was. What is the
reason? The reason is that the water is regularly flowing in through the
channels. How the pond may be empty? He should first of all check-up the
channels so that water may not flow in. Then he should throw off the water. By
this process the pond will be empty.

So is the position of samvara.

Now let us express the above example.

The atman is a pond. The karma is like water, which is filled in. Asravas are the
channels though the medium, new karmas regularly coming, as water flows in
through channels. A devotee is throwing off karmas by meditation and
penances; but he does not check-up the channels through which newly bound
karmas are regularly flowing in. Imagine how could he accomplish his goal of
mukti or to be free from the ties of karmas?
Hence, samvara or to check-up the inflow of karmas is too much essential to get
salvation.

TYPES OF SAMVARA

Gupti (self-restraince), samiti (vigilance), uttama ksama (excellent forgiveness)

etc. ten sramana dharmas, anupreksa (reflection), parisaha-jaya (victory over
the hindrances during penances) and charitra (right conduct) are the ingredients
of samvara, according to Tattvarthasutra.1 By all these, the samvara becomes
complete. The same view is adopted in Navatattvaprakarana,1 with slight
difference in order. But the ingredients are the same as described by Umasvati
in his Tattvarthasutra.

Regarding the number of ingredients of samvara, there are many traditions.

But mainly there are five types of samvara2-

1. Samyaktva-to be free from wrong faith (mithyatva)
2. Vrata-To renounce all the eighteen kinds of sinful activities.
3. Apramada-to have a keen desire towards auspicious deeds or dharma.
4. Akasaya-subsidence (upasama) of anger, pride, greed, hypocrisy etc.
5. Ayoga-stopping all the mental, vocal and bodily activities.

Besides these, to give up all the sins, like-violence, falseness, stealing,

cohabitation of sexual desire, hallucination (murcha) of possessions; to control all
the five senses and to control the mental, vocal and physical activities are also
samvara. In this way, there are 20 types of Samvara.3

Sri Devendra Suri tells 57 types of Samvara, viz., 5 Samiti (vigilance), 3 gupti
(self-restraince), 10 sramana dharmas (excellent forgiveness etc.,) 12
Anupreksas (reflections), 22 parisaha-jaya (victory over the hindrances during
penances) and 5 caritra (right conduct)4

Swami Kartikeya in his Dvadasanupreksa5 tells only four kinds of samvara.

These are- (1) Samyaktva-samvara. (2) Virati samvara. It is of two kinds- (i)
partial or small vows (Desa-virati) and (ii) great vows or complete vows
(mahavrata). Partial vows are for householder and great vows for a monk. (3)
Kasaya samvara (passions), and (4) Yogabhava samvara, i.e., stopping the
activities of mind, body and speech.

Acarya Kundakunda in Samaysara1 tells four types of Samvara. (1) mithyatva

(wrong faith) (2) ajnana (nescience), (3) avirati (vowlessness) and (4) yoga
(activities of mind, speech and body)- these are asravas; and to stop all these is
samvara. Hence, samvara is also of four types.

As far as there is asrava, due to it, the atma-pradesas (the space-points of

atman) always remain vibrating. This vibration stops only when the inflow of
karmas checked up. So, it can be said that the restlessness of atma-pradesas is
asrava and the calmness is samvara. The restlessness of atma-pradesas, which
is due to asrava turns into calmness, as soon as the asrava or influx of karmas in
stopped. Due to asrava there is regular inflow of karma-pudgalas in atma-
pradesas and this inflow is stopped by samvara.2 Therefore it is definite that the
main cause of transmigration (samvara) are asrava (influx) and bandha
(bondage) while that of salvation are samvara (stopping of influx) and nirjara
(shedding or annihilation of karmas).3

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF SAMVARA

Tathagata Buddha also accepts samvara. In Anguttaranikaya, he tells that

asrava can be checked up by samvara. There the division of samvara is as
follows: -

(1)By senses (indriyas)-By the samvara (checking up) of senses, the type of
asrava, which is possible due to senses, extinguishes.
(2)By pratisevana- If a man does not eat food, drink water, wear clothes and take
medicine, etc., then his mind can not be happy to keep the mind happy, he
bounded with karmic ties. Therefore, to keep the mind happy, he should take
all these things. This checks up the inflow of karmas. But here he
(Tathagata) warns that if food is taken for tastefulness that it would be the
cause of asrava (inflow of karmas).
(3)By adhivasana (tolerance)- A man, who wants to tolerate the physical
hardship then he does not like bodily pleasures. For such a man, the
tolerance of bodily hardships is the cause of checking up the inflow of karmas
(asrava-nirodha)
(4)By parivarjana (forbearance)- Fierce animals, like-elephant, lion, tiger etc.,
and poisonous creatures, like-scorpion, snake etc., the places full of thorns the
meantype friends etc., -all these are painful to a man. Therefore, all of these
should be forbidden. By it, also, the asrava could be checked-up. Here, it can
be said that the Tathagata Buddha does not believe in Kayaklesa tapa
(mortification of the body). He wants that the devotees and monks should
forbid all the painful circumstances and should live in peaceful places, so that
the external causes of karmabandha (bondage of karmas) may not arise.
(5)By vinodana- A devotee and a monk and even a layman should not indulge in
the vain discussions, like--himsa-Vitarka (violent discussions), papa-vitarka
(discussions regarding sins), kama-vitarka (discussions regarding mean and
false desires, sensual pleasures etc.,); because all of these are bandhaka-
vitarkas (bounding discussions for atman). By forbidding these bandhaka-
vitarkas, this type of asrava can be checked up.
(6)By bhavana- (reflection)-Asrava is also possible due to inauspicious
reflections. If a man does not indulge himself in the auspicious reflections
then the reverse, i.e., inauspicious karmas may flow in. For stopping these
inauspicious karmas of asrava, a man should always keep auspicious thoughts
in his heart and head.1

Anguttaranikaya also asserts that the checking up of avidya (hallucination) is the

checking up of asrava.2
PRINCIPLE OF NIRJARA

Nirjara means the annihilation or shedding off the karmas. In the order of sapta
tattvas (seven essential elements), it comes after samvara. Samvara stops the
inflow of new karmas; while nirjara means the destruction of previous bound
karmas. As the water of a pond dries up by the sharp sunlight, air, etc., if the
inflow channels have been stopped. So the karmas, previously bound with the
atma-pradesas are annihilated gradually, if the inflow of new karmas have been
stopped by samvara. By this point of view nirjara means the partial separation
of karma-varganas from the atma-pradesas.1 According to Dvadasanupreksa,
nirjara means the separation of karma-varganas of aggregate of karmic matter
from atma-pradesas.2 Umasvati says in his Tattvarthabhasya, being ripen by
penances etc., the separation of karmas in called nirjara.3

Suppose, a man is washing his dirty coat with washing powder of soap; but the
dirt does not come out at the very moment. It comes out gradually as the soap
enters through the threads of the coat. As much as the soap enters through the
threads, the filth comes out. This can be an example of nirjara. The ascetic or
devotee as much indulges himself in penances; so much the karma-varganas
separate from tama-pradesas. Here we may take coat or cloth as atman, the
threads of which it is made as pradesas and filth as the karma-varganas or the
karmic matter. The ascetic has checked the inflow of new karmas by samvara
and began the penances; but the filth of previously accumulated karmic matter
takes time to separate. As much as the filth of karmas removed from atman, so
much the spirit or soul becomes pure. Complete exhaustion of karmas is the
pure state of soul and this is the salvation.

Nirjara is like the ladders for getting the pure state of soul. As a man reaches
the upper storey by step by step and every step should be firm and steady. So
to get salvation atman also has to march forward by steady steps.

Nirjara is of two kinds, viz., and (1) sakama nirjara and (ii) akama nirjara.

The shedding of karmas on account of vrata (vows) etc., is called sakama nirjara
and the annihilation of karmic matter, ripen itself is akama nirjara.1 In akama
nirjara, karmic matter separates itself after fruition and giving effects.

Vachaka Umasvati gives two types of nirjara, as (i) abuddhipurvaka (without the
use of intellect) and (2) kusalamula (with intellect). The karmic experience,
which the jiva gets unintellectually in the narak gatis etc., is called
abuddhipurvaka nirjara. The nirjara or shedding off karmas by penances, vows
etc. is kusalamula.2

Swami Kartikeya also describes two types of nirjara. He says that the fruition
power (the power by which the atman experiences the effects of the Karmans) of
knowledge obscuring Karmans etc., ((Jnanavaraniya karma etc.) eight Karmans is
called their intensity (anubhaga or rasa or vipaka.) After the operation (udaya)
of karmas and giving their fruits to atman the karma pudgalas are separated
from atma-pradesas. It is called nirjara (shedding off the karmas). It is of two
kinds- (1) swa-kala-prapta (at the completion of duration of time), and (2) tapah-
krta (by penances etc.).

The first type of nirjara or the exhaustion of previously accumulated karmas i.e.,
swa-kalaprapta nirjara is always in existence of all the jivas of four gatis. It is
regular, without any interruption. The second type nirjara, tapah-krta nirjara can
be done only the vowful (vratayukta) jivas, i.e., the jivas who have accepted the
vows.3

The Candraprbhacarita states-the exhaustion of karmas i.e., nirjara is of two

types, viz., (1) Kala-krta (by the completion of duration of time) and (2)
upakrama-krta. After experiencing the effects of karmas, the shedding off the
karma-pudgalas is kalaja nirjara (separation of karmas on the completion of the
duration of time). The upakrama-krta nirjara place by penances etc.1

The Tattvarthasara states-after the experience of effects, the annihilation of

karmas, is vipakaja nirjara, and toe experience the karmas, which are not in
operation, bringing in operation avalika (udayavalika) is avipakaja nirjara.2

Really, akama-nirjara is automatic. It needs no efforts on the part of atman. The

other names swakalaprapta, abuddhipurvaka, kala-krta, etc., also denotes the
same fact. All the thinkers have the same opinion about this type of nirjara; but
they differ regarding sakama-nirjara.

Some of the differences of great thinkers are given here.

Sakama-nirjara is possible only by those who have adopted vows (anuvratas and
mahavratas) and self-control (samyama) and the akama nirjara takes place with
all the rest samsari jivas-says Hemacandra Suri.3

In the opinion of Swami Kartikeya-akama nirjara is the regular formality of all the
mundane souls residing in four gatis and sakama nirjara is possible only by the
souls who have adopted vows.4

Generally prevailed phrase 'avipaka munindranam savipakakhilatmanam'

(avipaka nirjara is possible only by the Jaina monks, who have adopted
mahavratas and savipaka nirjara pertains to all the mundane souls) shows the
above-mentioned phantom.

A general view also prevails that only the souls having right faith (Samyag-drsti
jiva) can do sakama nirjara; while the souls deluded in wrong faith (mithyadrsti
jiva) can not do it.

Pandit Khubacandra Siddhantsastri gives his conviction in the following words-

yathakala nirjara (shedding off karma pudgalas after completing the duration
time) is the regular process, and it pertains to all the mundane souls; because all
the previously accumulated karma-pudgalas sheds off themselves after the
specified duration of time, giving their effects (good or bad) to the jiva. So this
type of nirjara should not be regarded as the element of nirjara; because it does
not help jiva to get salvation. The other type of nirjara, i.e., shedding off the
karmas by effort, is possible by penances, vows etc. Really, this must be called
as principle of nirjara; because it is the cause of salvation. Thus there is basic
difference in the cause and effect of both types of nirjara.1

Hence it may be concluded that the annihilation of karmas due to penances,

vows etc., is sakama nirjara.

The wet cloth dries up sooner, when we spread it under sharp sunlight; and if do
not do so, then it would take too much time to dry. The same position is with
nirjara.

When a person (devotee or ascetic) indulges himself wisely and with

discrimination in penances and vows, keeping only the aim of karma-nirjara is
the result of unwise and without owning mahavratas, penances etc., and the
shedding off the karmas on the completion of their specified period.

Undiscriminatory and without self-control (samyama) the penances etc., are

called unwise hardships (Balatapa). Though Balatapa is also a cause of karma-
nirjara and by it jiva can get worldly and sensesnal pleasures; but it cannot be
the cause of sell-purification.

The one and only goal of the devotee is to break all the ties of karmas, which are
accumulated in the atman from the time's beginningless (anadikala), and attain
salvation. So, it is suggested in Dasavaikalika-'a devotee should never practice
penance, meditation etc., to get worldly pleasures, like-fame, immense riches,
wealth, majesty, grander etc., during other life etc., but he should practice
penance etc., with the aim of nirjara.2

TYPES OF NIRJARA

The covering of karmas around atman is destructed by penances. So the

penances are also regarded as nirjara.1

The Sthanangasutra asserts as edge nijjara-one nirjara2 There we get only these
general wordings; but elsewhere twelve types of nirjara are described.

As the fire has no distinctions, while we consider its nature; but due to
instrumental causes (Nimitta karana), it has distinctions, like wood fire, stone-
fire, etc. So being nirjara as one, with the point of view of its nature; but due to
instrumental causes it is divided in twelve types.3

There are innumerable kinds of penances (tapa) like--kanaka-vali etc., so nirjara

may also be of innumerable types.4
Acarya Abhayadeva writes in his vrtti of Sthananga-'Considered from the point of
view of Karmans, nirjara is of eight types; because Karmans (knowledge
obscuring Karman etc.) are also of eight types. Being produce of twelve types of
penances, nirjara is also of twelve kinds. As nirjara is the result of many causes,
like-akama (without any desire) tolerating hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc., and the
vow of celibacy etc., it (nirjara) is also of many types.5

But mainly, there are twelve types of nirjara, on account of twelve types of
penances. All the thinkers are one-minded on this point. These twelve types of
nirjara or tapas (austerities) are as follows: -
1. Fasting (anasana)
2. Eating less than one's fill or hunger (unodari)
3. Taking a definite vow secretly to accept food from a householder only if
certain condition is fulfilled (bhiksacari).
4. Abstinence from one or more of the six objects of taste (rasa-parityaga).

These rasas or tastes are--1. Katu (sour), 2. Madhura (sweet), 3. Amla (acidic),
4. Tikta (bitter) 5. Kasaya (astringent) and 6. Lavana (saltish).
5. Mortification of the body or to tolerate the pains, griefs given by other beings
or aroused by previously accumulated demeritorious karmas (Kayaklesa).
6. To be static in self-nature (pratisamlinata).
7. Expiation (prayascitta).
8. Modesty (vinaya)
9. Servitude (vaiyyavrtya).
10. Self-study (swadhyaya).
11. Meditation (dhyana).
12. Giving up through non-attachment (vyutsarga).

Among these twelve tapas (penances), first six are external penances or
austerities (bahya tapas) and the last six are internal austerities (antaranga
tapas).

ANASANA (FASTING)

Fasting (anasana) is the first of the external austerities. It is much more difficult
to practice in comparison to other austerities. In this type of austerity a devotee
has to win victory on hunger, and it is well known to all that hunger is too difficult
to win, in other words, it an be said that hunger has got victory over every jiva of
the world. It is a hero, who can be termed as world-victorious. Every type of sin
is the consequence of hunger. But a devotee has to win this world-famous hero.

To win hunger and control the mind is anasana austerity. Only to remain hungry
cannot be regarded anasana austerity. Much man and animals, creatures' etc.,
have to remain hungry when they could not get food and drinking water. But
their being hungry cannot be regarded as austerity. It would be austerity when a
devotee can get food easily, but he willfully keeps fast and controls his mind and
indulges himself in auspicious and religious activities.
Considering from medicinal point of view, fasting is a cause of bodily-purification.
It is the maxim of vaidyaka sastra-to keep fast is the best medicine (Langhanam
paramausadham). The fast does not only purify the body but it also purifies the
mind even.

Gita says, by giving up to eat food the senses become pure and consequently
mind also becomes pure.1 That is why, a Vedic saint has said--'there is no
hardship greater than fast. But generally it is very difficult to practice, nay only
difficult but most difficult to the superlative degree.2

Really, to keep fast and observe anasana tapa is a fire-bath. One, who can
practice it, will be capable to burn all the filth of body and mind. He will shine
like a sparkling star.

Ganadhara Gautama once asked humbly to Bhagavana Mahavira--Venerable! By

keeping fast (anasana) jiva accomplishes what?

Venerable Bhagavana Mahavira replied thus--O Gautama! By practicing anasana

tapa, jiva is bereaved from the desire of living, alias his attachment towards the
body and vital forces (prana).3

Consequently the ascetic gets bereavement from the attachment towards his
vital forces and body.

One thinker warned the person, while keeping fast, not to do three deeds viz., (1)
anger (2) pride and (3) negligence (pramada). He as well suggested to do three
deeds viz., (1) to observe celibacy (2) study the Holy Scriptures and (3) self-
realization.

The word anasana means forbearance of food. It may be at least for one day
and at the most of six months and in special circumstances life-long.

There are two distinctions of anasana-- (1) Itwarika (for specified period) and (2)
Yavat-kathika--life long or upto death.1

During Itwarika tapa, there remains the limit of specified period and after this
period, the fast-keeper has the desire of getting food in his mind. So it is called
as the austerity with desire (savakanksa tapa); while during Yavat-kathika tapa,
there is no existence of desire regarding getting food. So it called as austerity
without desire (niravakanksa tapa).2

There are innumerable kinds of itwarika tapa, i.e., to keep fast like-Navakarasi
(for 48 minutes), porasi (for 3 hours), purvardha (for beginning half of the day,
i.e., for six hours from rising the sun) divasa-carima (for full day, it begins from
the sun-set of the previous day and completes in the morning of the day-after)
caturtha-bhakta (a full day-night fast), ratribhojanatyaga (not to eat and drink
any thing after sunset upto the sun-rise the next day, i.e., full night) chattha-
bhakta (two full day-night) etc., etc.3
Yavat-kathika anasana is of two types-- (1) padapopagamana and (2) bhakta-
pratyakhyana.4

During bhakta pratyakhyana, besides giving up the food, it is necessary for a

devotee to pass every moment in studying Holy Scriptures, meditation and self-
realization.

Padapopagamana is harder that bhakta-pratyakhyana. During this type of

anasana, the devotee becomes static like a stalk. He does not even change his
posture and remains in the same posture, in which he has accepted the vow of
anasana. For example, if he is standing then he will not sits, nor will lie or vice
versa. If his eyes were open, he will not shut them and vice versa.

For padapopagamana anasana and santhara, it is quite necessary that man must
have vajra-rsabha narach sanghanana1 of his body, otherwise it is impossible to
be static like a mountain. Therefore it is not possible for other or general men.
Agamas definitely asserts that with the dispersion (vicheda) of 14 purvas the
padapopagamana santhara also disjuncts.

UNODARI

The next type of nirjara is unodari (eating less than one's hunger). It is second
external austerity. It is also called avamaudarya. It can be said as to eat little
food or limited food. Like food, unodari also pertains to passions and
possessions as well.

There are two divisions of unodari-- (1) Dravya (regarding matter or external)
and (2) Bhava (thought or internal).

Dravya unodari is of many kinds.

Bhava unodari means to subside the passions, like--anger, pride, hypocrisy,

greed and to speak as little as possible, not to come into conflict with anybody,
etc.

Really speaking Dravya-unodari (external) makes the external life of an ascetic

light and easy; while internal (bhava) unodari paves the way for attaining mental
and internal happiness and the evolution of good qualities.

BHIKSACARI

In general sense bhiksacari is to get food from a householder, but for Jain monks
it is an external austerity, because he accepts food and drinking water only when
his secretly adopted vow and certain conditions are fulfilled. He is not a general
beggar who can accept and any kind of food. He accepts it according to his vows
and limitations.
Acarya Haribhadra Suri describes three kinds of bhiksa-- (1) Dina-vrtti, (2)
Paurusaghni, and (3) Sarvasampatkari.2

The poor, orphans, oppressed, downtrodden, grief-stricken, and deaf-dumb-blind-

maim etc., who takes food by begging is called beggary or Dina-vrtti bhiksa.

Strong, sturdy, healthy persons capable to earn their livelihood, when beg to get
food, it is called Paurusaghni bhiksa. This type of beggary depresses the
manhood and vigor of a person, so it is regarded the meanest type of beggary.

The non-violent and content saints take food according to their limitations from a
house-holder only for giving dose (diet) to the belly is called sarva-sampatkari
bhiksa. By it both the taker and giver gets auspicious gatis.

In the agamas, there is the description of many kinds of bhiksacari.1

Jaina monk accepts the alms only when it is completely faultless and without any
kind of shortcomings.2

RASA-PARITYAGA

Rasa literally means--enjoyment-increasing ingredients. The ingredient, which

inspires attachment towards any thing, like--food etc., is called rasa. There are
six kinds of rasas regarding food. These are-- (1) Katu (sour) (2) Madhura
(sweet) (3) Amla (acidic) (4) Tikta (bitter) (5) Kasaya (astringent) and (6) Lavana
(saltish).

By these rasas the food becomes tasty and delicious; and being so it is eaten
more than hunger. So the rasas are also called inspiring elements.3

Vigayas, like--Milk, curd, gee, etc., re also called rasas.

Why these milk etc., are called vigaya? Acarya Siddhasena answers this
question. He says--by eating or taking these the perversion (vikara) arouses in
the tendency of atman. So the person falls down the highest altar of Samyama
(self-control) and consequently he has to go to vigati or durgati (downward
conditions of mundane soul). Therefore, these things are the causes of sad
effects (vikrti) and bad or inauspicious gati (vigati). Hence, things are called
vigar.1

But it should be remembered that the healthy diet is not altogether denied to
monk. He can take vigaya, according to his needs, but he does not take it for the
sake of taste only. For taste-sake even to chew and suck the food is also
regarded as defect.2

Different types are described of rasas also.

KAYAKLESA

Kayaklesa literally means to give turmoil to the body. The turmoil or trouble are
of two types- (1) swa-krta (done by own-self) and (2) para-krta (done by others).
The ascetic keeps no inclination or attachment towards his body. He firmly
believes that atman and body both are quite separate from each other.

Acarya Bhadrabahu wrote in his Avasyaka-niryukti--'atman and body are quite

different'--by this type of pure intelligence, the ascetic renounces the attachment
towards his body, which is the cause of grief and ain.3

The thinking of spiritual thinker is thus--the pains, troubles and miseries are all to
the body, not to me (self). The pain may be to body through trouble and turmoil.
The body may be destroyed by the strokes of weapons. But atman can never be
destroyed, it can never be destructed (natthi jivassa nasu tti).4 He think that I,
i.e., my soul is full of conscience, cognition and bliss etc. No power of the world
is capable to destroy it. It can never be destructed. Fire cannot burn it and
water cannot drench it. It is pure and blissful and this is my own nature.

By the dint of this thinking and having deep faith to the core about atma-svarupa
(nature of self) the ascetic tolerates all the agonies peacefully.

Sthanangasutra describes the type of Kaya-klesa--Kayotsarga, meditation by

utkatuka posture, to accept pratima (a special type of vow); virasana, sitting in
palathi posture for the study of Holy Scriptures, stand erect (Dandayat) posture,
mediation and standing posture.1

Fourteen types of Kayaklesa are described in Uvavai sutra.2

This shows that Kayaklesa tapa is the mortification of body.

PATISAMLINATA

The process of bringing soul to its own nature, by taking off from external
thoughts is called Pratisamlinata. So samlinata is svalinata to (remain in own
nature). To restraint internally, the passions, senses and yogas, bringing back
from external tendencies, is samlinata.

Bhagavati sutra has given four distinctions of pratisamlinata. These are: (1)
indriya (sense) pratisamlinata, (2) kasaya (passions) pratisamlinata, (3) yoga
samlinata, and (4) vivikta saiyyasana (sitting and stopping in a lonely place).3

PRAYASCITTA

Prayascitta is the formation of two words--'prayah' and 'citta'. The word 'Prayah'
denotes sin and the word 'citta' denote visodhana (purification). So prayascitta
(expiation) is the process of purifying the sinful activities.4
According to Acarya Akalanka offence is 'prayah' and 'citta' means purification.
Hence prayascitta is the process by which crimes or offences are get purified.5

In the Prakrta language word 'prayascitta' is termed as payacchitta'. The

origination of word 'payacchitta' has been described thus--'paya' means papa
(sin or demerit) and 'cchitta' means destruction. In this way, the process which
destroys sin, is 'payacchitta (expiation).1

There is a vast difference between expiation and punishment.

Suppose, a man has done a wrong deed due to negligence. After it he repents
heartily for this wrong deed. He goes to his elders and clearly tells them all
about his wrong activity and prays them to give any kind of punishment for the
purification of that misdeed. He accepts the punishment told by the elders and
practices the hardships etc., then it is expiation.

Now we take punishment. The ruler gives punishment to a criminal. First of all,
he does not confess his guilt. He tells thousands of lies to escape himself from
punishment. The judge or ruler needs proofs and witnesses to ascribe crime. If
anyhow the crime is proved and he sentenced a legal punishment. Still there is
not repentance in his mind and heart. He accuses judge, advocates and
witnesses. So there is no change of reform of the criminal by punishment.

Another difference is that, when expiation is self-punishment; while punishment

is external. First is internal and second is external.

Ten types of prayascitta are described in Sthananga sutra.2

By prayascitta (expiation) the defects are removed and the heart becomes pure.
The simple hearted man can practice prayascitta (expiation).

VINAYA

Vinaya (modesty) is directly related to heart. It is a spiritual quality.

The word Vinaya (modesty) has been used in three different meanings, in the
Jaina literature. These are--
(1)Vinaya--discipline
(2)Vinaya--self-control, sila, good conduct.
(3)Vinaya--namrata (modesty) good behavior.

Acarya Abhayadeva wrote in Sthananga-vrtti--Vinaya removes all the eight type

of Karmans and by it soul gets salvation.1

In the vrtti of the Pravacanasaroddhara, it has been suggested that Vinaya refers
to the removal of the karmas which lead to afflictions and which are enemies of
the soul.
In the agama literature like the Bhagavati, distinctions have been made of the
Vinaya: (1) Darsana Vinaya (2) Jnana Vinaya (3) Caritra Vinaya (4) Mana Vinaya
(5) Vacana Vinaya (6) Kaya Vinaya and (7) Lokopacara Vinaya.2

Vinaya (modesty) and formal courtesy or flattery (capalusi) is diametrically

opposed to each other. In the vinaya there is sincerity and the openness of the
heart, but courtesy expresses only formality. It may not have sincerity. On the
contrary, it may have veiled hypocrisy.

VAIYYAVRTYA (SERVETUDE)

Vaiyyavrtya refers to protection and service of things and individuals leading to

the attainment of the righteousness. Through service, it is possible to be free
from the Nama and Gotra karma.3 Service to the deceased persons, the sadhus
and the acaryas leads us towards Nirjara. Real and devoted service leads us to
the freedom from the wheel of samsara.4

Sthananga mentions eight commandments and out of these two refer to the
service to humanity.5

In the Bhagavati sutra6 ten types of vaiyyavrtya has been suggested.

A poet has praised the qualities of the Vaiyyavrtya and says that the excellence
of service is so great that even the yogis cannot easily understand its
importance.

SVADHYAYA (SELF-STUDY)

Svadhyaya refers to self-study. It is a systematic study of the sastras.1

Svadhyaya also means introspection on the nature of self.2

The self-study increases the capacity of intellect. As food is necessary of the

body, self-study is absolutely necessary for the development of the mind. Self-
study and contemplation lead us towards creative thinking and towards the
development of the mental capacity.

Wrong types of physical exercises are harmful to the body. Unwholesome food is
injurious to the body. Similarly, study of literature like--sex literature, would be
very harmful to the purification and to the development of the mental states in
the proper direction. Mental activities become distorted and one loses the power
of discrimination. It would, therefore, be necessary that we always study
wholesome literature, although we may study less.

It is possible to be free from misery, through svadhyaya.3 The accumulated

karma coming from a chain of previous life can be annihilated by svadhyaya.4
Svadhyaya; itself is a form of important tapas. Acarya Sanghadasagani says,
that svadhyaya, is unique and the austerity of svadhyaya is unparallel because
such noble type of austerity has not been experienced in the past, nothing so
great in the present and nothing similar to it in future.5

The Vedic seers have also said that svadhyaya is a form of the tapas.6 we should
not be negligent of svadhyaya.7 Just as the wall becomes shining by constant
rubbing and polishing, it reflects the image of the persons standing in front of it,
so also svadhyaya if done carefully and seriously and without fault, becomes
transparent and it reflects the essence of all the satras. Patanjali has said that it
is possible to get the direct experience of the deities through svadhyaya.1

Svadhyaya can be distinguished into five types as (1) Vacana (reading), (2)
Pracchana (in arrogation), (3) Parivartana (rotating or repeating loudly), (4)
Anupreksa (psychic preparation through meditation) and (5) Dharmakatha
(listening to religious stories).2

DHYANA (MEDITATION)

Dhyana is concentration of mind. Acarya Hemacandra says that Dhyana is the

concentration of mind on a particular subject.3 Bhadrabahu also says, that
Dhyana refers to the concentration of the mind on a particular subject and fixing
the mind on that subject.4

Dhyana is of two types: (1) auspicious and (2) inauspicious. Inauspicious Dhyana
(aprasasta) is of two types: (i) Artadhyaya (concentration of mind on things of
the world) and (ii) Raudradhyana (revengeful concentration). Acarya Siddhasena
Divakara has said "Subhaika pratyayo dhyanam".5 It means auspicious dhyana is
concentration of mind on an auspicious object. It is suggested that the one who
aims at the highest from of self-concentration, which is, called samadhi must
avoid Arta and Raudradhyana and he must practice righteous concentration
(Dharmadhyana) and pure concentration (Sukladhyana)6

Dharmadhyana consists in the concentration of the mind on the auspicious and

righteous objects. It is also been described as self-concentration i.e.,
concentration on the self by the self.7 In this way, the atman withdraws itself
from the external objects and concentrates on its own nature. Through Dhyana,
karma is destroyed, just as in fire; pieces of wood are burnt away.

VYUTSARGA (GIVING UP THROUGH NON-ATTACHMENT)

Vyutsarga has two elements--'vi' which means specific and 'utsarga' which
means giving up, or renunciation. Vyutsarga, therefore, means giving up or
renunciation in a specific way.

Acarya Akalanka says that vyutsarga may be referred as renunciation, non-

attachment, fearlessness and giving up of hunger and thirst for things of the
world. For the sake of self-realization and for the sake of righteousness,
vyutsarga aims as self-denial and renunciation.1

Vyutsarga is of four types, like-- (1) Gana Vyutsarga (renunciation of group), (2)
Sarira Vyutsarga (mortification of the body), (3) Upadhi Vyutsarga (giving up of
the things connected with activities) and (4) Bhakta-Pana Vyutsarga (giving up of
food and drink)2

Sarira Vyutsarga is considered to be Kayotsarga. It refers to the affliction

through the body. The seeker after self-realization practices prayascitta for all
the ills that he has done. He gives up attachment for the body and resolves to
by free from all faults. With this firm resolution and with a repentant heart the
weight of the karma becomes lighter. The stream of auspicious concentration of
mind flows freely. It gives peace and tranquility. The atman enjoys the pure
bliss.

In the practice of Kayotsarga, it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and

obstructions from the gods, from men and from the lower animals too. But one
who is engaged in the practice of Dhyana accepts these troubles with equanimity
of mind and by this process the Kayotsarga gets purified.3

Kayotsarga is a routine procedure of everyday, and it is absolutely necessary for

everyone to practice. In this, every moment, the mental preparation for
Kayotsarga goes on. Bhagavana Mahavira says: "abhikkahanam
kaussaggakari"--the seeker practices Kayotsarga very often. Kayotsarga has
been distinguished into two types: (1) Dravya-Kayotsarga is concerned with the
bodily aspect of self-control and (2) Bhava-Kayotsarga is concerned with the
psychic accompaniments of vyutsarga.1 Dravya-Kayotsarga refers to the control
of the bodily states and Bhava Kayotsarga is involved in the Dharmadhyana and
Sukladhyana. Kayotsarga is one of the important forms of tapas and for this
reason we get in the agamic literature the description that Kayotsarga is infact a
full form of the vyutsarga. The seeker after self-realization will attain full
vyutsarga if he is successful in the practice of kayotsarga.3

There is a regular procedure and the graded process of the practice of tapas
from Anasana (fasting) to Vyutsarga (renunciation). There is a study flow of
austerities in these graded processes.

From the discussions above, we may conclude that the Jaina description of tapas
does not merely refer to the physical austerity, but it has also reference to
mental austerity, which consists of control and practice of mental states and
events, which lead to the purity of the mind and soul.
The Principles of BANDHA and MOKSA: A Discussion

THE PRINCIPLE OF BANDHA

The association of two things with each other is called Bandha. There are two
types of Bandha: (1) Dravyabandha (the association or contact of the material
things) and (2) Bhavabandha coming together or joining of the psychic states
and events). The Karmic particles coming in contact with the soul and creating
the veil of obscuration is called the Dravyabandha. The psychic states
accompanying the physical activity and also those psychic states which are the
causes of the physical activity and which come together and vitiate the Karmic
particles associated with a soul is Bhavabandha. In the Dravyabandha the
atman is connected with the karmic particles. In the Bhavabandha the psychic
states are associated with the soul leading to the karmic bondage. These two
are complementary to each other and the one is intimately connected with the
other. If the particles of the matter are brought together, there would be the
specific form of binding or association. It may create chemical action. For
instance, if the viscosity and dryness are combined in the particles of matter, a
new chemical action will be created and new properties are formed. The atoms
come together to form molecules and when they are combined in different
degrees, chemical reaction is possible. Similarly, if the karmic particles are
formed into the aggregates of karmic particles, those will have some effect and
association with the soul, although there is no chemical action in this activity.
This is because the jiva and the karmic particles are qualitatively different. The
manifestation of the jiva is to be found in the psychic and the conscious states
while the modes of matter are unconscious. The manifestation of jiva is through
the expression of Caitanya (consciousness) and its states, while modes of matter
are expressed in the qualities like taste, smell and touch etc.

THE TYPES OF BANDHA

The Bandha has been distinguished into four types such as: (1) Prakrtibandha,
sthitibandha, anubhagabandha and pradesabandha. Tattvarthasutra uses the
word anubhava in place of anubhaga.

Prakrti karma refers to the nature of karma, Sthiti-karma has reference to the
state and the limitation of the karmic particles with the soul. Anubhaga is the in
intensity of the experience of karma, while Pradesa karma has reference to
aggregates of karmic particles associated with the soul. Detailed discussion of
this problem can be found in the theory of Karma as presented by the Jain
philosophers.

Philosophical literature on the Karma theory of the Jainas gives the analogical
example of a pudding (modaka) with its medicinal properties. A pudding may be
used for the sake of gastric trouble; some other puddings may be used for curing
the diseases of phlegm and other types of intestinal disorders. Similarly, some
form of Karma is responsible for obscuring knowledge, some other forms of
Karma would obscure intuition, and still others would be responsible for limiting
the inherent energy of the soul etc. There are some forms of Karma, which
create the deluding effects on the soul. This, we can say refers to the Prakrti-
karma and Prakrtibandha.

Some puddings last for a day, while some others may last for a week and so on
and after which the efficacy of the pudding will be lost. Similarly, the karmic
particles affecting the soul have their duration of the effect in varied degrees.

As some puddings are sweet and some sour, similarly the experiencing effect of
the Karma will be different in intensity.

Just as a pudding may be half in size or full in size, similar description can be
given about the Karmic Pradesa.

Prakrti and Pradesabandha are caused by activity (Yoga). Sthiti and Rasa-
bandha are caused by Kasayas (passions). The intensity of passions depends on
the nature, and the potency of the karmic particles. This is called by the
expression of Sthitibandha and Anubhagabandha. These types of Bandha are
due to passions and emotional disturbances. In the case of those in whom the
passions are subdued, and in the case of those, the passions are destroyed and
similarly in the case of Kevalins, the kasayas (passions) have no effects. There is
no rise of kasayas in the Kvealin. Even if the karmic particles are encrued in the
soud of a Kevalin due to activity, they are immediately washed away in the next
moment because the soul has reached the state of purity. In these cases,
Sthitibandha and Anubhagabandha are not possible in these cases.

Bandha is of two types: (i) subha and (ii) asubha. Subhabandha (auspicious
bondage) brings in merit and asubha bandha (inauspicious bondage) brings in
demerit. As long as Karma does not fructify in the form of an effect, it remains
potential, and it is called the Satta State of Karma. The moment the Karma
fructifies Punya and Papa flow in. The potential form of Karma is Bandha and the
fructification of Karma refers to the acquisition of Punya and Papa.

MOSKA AND THE PATHWAY TO MOKSA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

There are three great philosophies of the world--Greek philosophy, Modern

Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. Aristotle, a great Greek philosopher
said that philosophy begins in wonder. Plato also held the same view. Modern
western philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Hegel hold a similar view
expressed. It is said that the philosophical speculations are rooted in curiosity1
and curiosity results in misery, birth, old age, disease and death have to be
overcome for the sake of self-realization. (This is possible through the arousal of
the metaphysical curiosity). Indian philosophy does not merely aim at the
achievement of the knowledge of the reality, but it has dual purposes of
knowledge and virtue. The main purpose of philosophy in India is to free oneself
from the misery of this life. In this sense, we can say that in the western thought
the aim is purely academic, while Indian philosophy is practical and it aims at
self-realization. It is not merely an academic pursuit of knowledge of reality, but
it has the highest aim of the realization of the truth in life.

Moksa is the highest ideal of Indian philosophy. Sri Aurobindo considers the
concept of Moksa to be the central point of Indian thought. This is the
distinguishing feature of Indian thought. In the description of the Purusartha.
Moksa is considered to be the supreme (Parama purusartha). Moksa is the
highest ideal to be achieved and dharma is the means of achieving this supreme
end.1

In Indian philosophy the concept of Moksa may be considered from four different
points of view; viz. Vedic, Jaina, Bauddha Ajivaka. Ajivaka has not remained as
important philosophy. It is, therefore, not necessary here to consider the
concept of Moksa from the point of view of Ajivakas. The Vedic tradition gives six
darsanas like Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa and Uttara-
Mimamsa, Purva Mimamsa was primarily considered to be Karma Mimamsa. It
was mainly concerned with the study of Moksa.2 But in the other five darsanas,
the concept of Moksa is important.

We should remember that as there are differences in the presentation of the

nature of self, so are there differences regarding their speculation on the nature
of Moksa. Sometimes the concepts of Moksa are not only different but also
contrary. Those systems of philosophy which have based their thought on the
Upanisads and Brahmasutra also differ regarding the nature of Moksa. Some
philosophies make a distinction between the Atman and Paramatman, some
others considered them to be identical and still other philosophies consider the
distinction and the identity to be equally real. Similarly, some philosophies have
considered the Atman to be all pervading,3 and some others make Atman to be
atomic.1 Some philosophic traditions have accepted the plurality of Atman while
others consider it to be one. However, all the philosophies above have accepted
to primacy of the concept of the Atman in one from or the other.

NYAYA-VAISESIKA

The Nyaya-Vaisesika darsanas have generally a common viewpoint of the nature

of Atman. They consider Atman to be the ultimate and eternal substance. The
Atman is not one. They believe in the plurality of the Atmans. There are as
souls as there are bodies. If the Atman were one, there would be no possibility
of diversity in life.

Nyaya-Vaisesika darsanas maintained that Atman has consciousness. But

consciousness is not the essence of the Atman; it is its attribute. The association
of body, sense organ and central function of mind gives rise to cognition. This
cognition is possible due to consciousness. But consciousness is not the essence
of the self. It is only a quality. Therefore, it can be said that the self as
consciousness and not that the self is consciousness. This view of the nature of
the self is different from the view of the nature of self-presented by the
philosophical systems like Sankhya-Yoga and Vedanta. These systems do not
accept the conception that consciousness is an attribute of the self. They
consider it to be the essence of the self.2 In the highest state of Moksa, according
to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, self does not have any experience or consciousness; it is
pure satta (reality). It does not experience pure consciousness or pure bliss,
because in the sate of Moksa, the accidental quality of consciousness of the soul
is absent. It is qualiityless, and therefore in a sense, we can say it is free from
consciousness and also because consciousness is an empirical adjunct of the
relational categories.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika says that the highest state of Moksa is absolute freedom
from misery1 and there is no possibility of the recurrence of misery in any from.

Vatsyayana2 the commentator on Nyayasutra says that when perversity of

knowledge is removed through philosophy, all imperfections are removed. When
imperfection is removed, then the tendency to perform karma also ceases. With
the cessation of the tendency to do karma, the cycle of birth and death also
stops.3 The commentators on the Nyayasutra have pointed out that in the state
of perfection there is absolute cessation of misery.4 In the state of Moksa the
nine attributes like intellect, happiness, misery, desire, hatred, will (samkalpa),
punya (merit) and papa (demerit) do not exist.5 In the final state of Moksa the
Nyaya-Vaisesika lays emphasis on the absolute cessation of misery and the
cause of misery.

Mallisena in the Syadvadamanjari says that considered from the point of view of
the Nyaya-Vaisesika the worldly experience would be superior to the state of
Moksa, because in the worldly experience, we sometimes get happiness, but in
the highest state of Moksa, there is absolute cessation of happiness also. There
is the absence of consciousness.6

A disciple of lord Krishna says that instead of the state of Moksa as described by
Nyaya-Vaisesika, the description of life in Brndavana is much better.7 Sri Harsa
says that the state of Moksa described by the Nyaya-Vaisesika presents a
bloodless category since consciousness and sang happiness.8 Nyaya-Vaisesika
have analyzed the concept of Moksa from the empirical point of view. According
to them, one who wants to realize the highest end must aim at the removal of
the misery and the unwholesome and unrighteous states of existence? There is
no evidence to show that in the highest state of Moksa, there is the presence of
either the consciousness of bliss. In the highest state of Moksa the self subsists
in itself without any attributes of knowledge (jnana), and bliss (ananda).

SANKHYA AND YOGA DARSANAS

Sankhya and Yoga darsanas are complementary to each other. The Sankhya
presents the metaphysical aspect of reality, while Yoga is practical, in the sense;
it presents the pathway to the realization of the highest end. The Sankhya gives
the metaphysical foundations to Yoga and Yoga presents the practical pathway
to the realization of the highest end of perfection (Kaivalya).

Sankhya presents the dualistic principles of Purusa (self) and Prakrti (matter).
Purusa and Prakrti are the ultimate realities. Prakrti is the primordial matter and
it is the expression of the equilibrated state of the gunas--sattva, rajas and
tamas. The presence of the purusa disturbs the equilibrium in the gunas and the
activity of the Prakrti. The activity of the Prakrti through the disturbance of the
guna due to the presence of the Purusa gives rise to the evolution of the
universe. The modes, both physical and mental in the world are the expression
of Prakrti. Prakrti evolves but it is not the product of any other higher principle.
The things of the world are the products of Prakrti. But Purusa does not produce
anything nor it is produced by anything else. Purusa is uncaused, eternal and is
a spiritual substance. Consciousness is the essence of Purusa. In this sense, we
can say Purusa is consciousness. The Bandha (bondage) and Moksa (the self-
realization) are due to the states of Prakrti. Purusa in its real nature is
unaffected by the evolutes of the Prakrti.1 But through nescience (avidya) Purusa
falsely identifies itself with the evolutes of Prakrti. Just as the image of a bird
flying in the air is reflected in the waters of the pond below, so also the states of
Bandha and Moksa are reflected in the Purusa.

Sankhya and Yoga philosophies have posited the plurality of self. This concept of
plurality is not qualitative, but numerical. The Sankhya-Yoga contends that if the
Purusa were one, then with the death of the Purusa all individual selves would
have cease to exist. Similarly, if one Purusa were to be in bondage or if a Purusa
were to be free from bondage and reach the Moksa State, the same conditions
would have been experienced by all the individual selves. Therefore, there are
many selves. The Sankhya-Yoga maintains that consciousness is the essence of
the self and not a quality of the self as the Naiyayikas contend. Purusa is a
subject and the cogniser. The Sankhya-Yoga concept of the nature of Purusa is
similar to the Vedantic conception of the Atman, the Jaina conception of jiva and
the monad of Leibnitz.

According to Sankhya, nescience (avidya) is the cause of bondage. The self does
not know its real nature. It forgets its real nature and identifies itself with the
Prakrti and its evolutes. This is due to avidya. But with the awakening of the
real knowledge ad discrimination, Purusa realizes that it is different from Prakrti.
Then ignorance is destroyed, and the elf becomes free from the bondage
(Bandha).

Kapila does not elaborately discuss about the nature of Moksa. Like the Buddha,
he also says that this world is full of misery and the main object is to be free
from misery. However, later Sankhya philosophers have given description of the
nature of Moksa.

The main cause of bondage is ignorance and the false identification of Purusa
with Prakrti and its evolutes. This is the bondage. The self, when it gets
enlightenment, realizes that it is free from Prakrti and this realization leads to
the freedom from the bondage. In the Sankhya darsana Moksa is also described
as Kaivalya.

The conception of Moksa of the Sankhya-Yoga is different from the conception

that the Nyaya-Vaisesika presents. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, although
the self is a spiritual substance, it is not consciousness. In the highest state of
Mugti there is no consciousness nor the mental states expressed in the self. In
the state of Mukti, the states like intellect, happiness and other mental sates are
no longed present and there is not scope for any activity of consciousness.
According to Sankhya-Yoga the self is free from any attributes (nirguna), self-
luminous and consciousness is the essence of the self. Unlike the Nyaya-
Vaisesika the Sankhya-Yoga contends that in the highest state of Mukti, there is
pure consciousness and bliss. This is the cardinal distinction between the two
different schools of philosophy. The Nyaya-Vaisesika considers that mental
states experiences are due to the contact of the body, mind and the states like
intellect, misery and happiness, desires and other forms of psychic states are
completely absent in the state of Mukti. But Sankhya-Yoga maintains that the
mental states and epxeriences are not due to the self, but due to the
antahkarana (the inner organs). These states arising due to the antahkarana are
reflected in self-the self falsely identifies it with varied mental states and
experiences. The self falsely believes that it is experiencing all the empirical
experiences. And that is samsara. In the highest state of Mukti, the self realizes
that it is not the agent of the experiences but these experiences are reflected in
it, and it is different from the Prakrti and its evolutes. In the highest state of
Mukti, the empirical experiences are absent, but pure consciousness is its real
essence.

The earlier Sankhya propounding twenty-four principles is different from the

Sankhya propounds twenty-five principles of evolution. According to this school,
the empirical experiences like happiness and misery and knowledge and
ignorance are primarily due to the Prakrti and its attributes. In the highest state
of Mukti, these empirical experiences are absent. But the Sankhya propounding
twenty-four principles does not say that the self, which is consciousness, is
completely different from the empirical consciousness due to the dance of
Prakrti. In this sense, we can say to some extent that the Sankhya with twenty-
four principles presents similar view with the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The former view
of the Sankhya points out that in the state of Moksa the activities of Prakrti are
differentiated from the pure nature of the self. While the later schools of thought
show that in the state of Moksa there is the complete absence of the states of
experience associated with the activity of Prakrti. The first view oriented
towards the karya prapanca (empirical activities) and the second emphasizes
guna prapanca (the attributes of Prakrti). The differences in the presentation of
the nature of the self in the two schools of thought are only due to terminological
differences and not due to real differences.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika says that the empirical experiences like happiness, misery
and desire are due to the states of consciousness, which is the attribute of the
self. Therefore, in the highest state there is absence of consciousness. The
thing appears to be somewhat ideational strange, although its presentation
depends in the ideational distinction between the self and consciousness.
Nyaya-Vaisesika distinguishes between substance and quality. The attributes
and the modes arising out of the attributes are not related to the substance,
which is the substratum of the attributes. The modifications and changes in the
states do not adversely affect the nature of the substance. These modifications
are related to the attributes only and not to the substance. In this sense, the
Nyaya-Vaisesika accepts the empirical states of the Atman as doer, the enjoyer
and that, which is in the state of bondage.

But the Sankhya-Yoga does not accept the distinction between the substance
and its attributes. The Sankhya-Yoga posits the self as nirguna but
consciousness as its essence.

The Vedantic philosophers like Sankara, Ramanuja and Vallabha maintain that in
the highest state of perfection there is the pure light of consciousness and bliss,
although there are variations in their the Brahman. In this sense, again, we can
say that the Upanisadic conception of Moksa is different from the Nyaya-
Vaisesika conception in some form. The Sankhya-Yoga conception of the nature
of the Moksa comes nearer to the Upanisadic view. The Upanisadic view of
Moksa presents the self as in the state of pure consciousness and bliss and of the
ultimate reality of the Brahman.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA (Nirvana)

The Buddhist refers to the conception of Moksa as nirvana. Nirvana is absolute

cessation from misery. There is nothing real. Everything is momentary. There
is not atman as the permanent principle and Nirvana is a state of freedom and
from misery, in fact freedom from everything. Nirvana is the most important
conception in the Buddhist philosophy, Prof. Murthy says that the history of
Buddhist philosophy is the history of the conception of Nirvana.1

In the Abhidhamma Mahavibhasa sastra the etymological meaning of Nirvana

has been discussed. Vana refers to rebirth and Nirvana is freedom from rebirth.
Vana also means bad smell and Nirvana would be freedom from bad smell of the
karma. In the third sense, vana refers to the jungle and Nirvana would be
escape from the thick jungle of Karma. In another sense, Nirvana would be
cutting of all the threads of empirical existence, which are formed due to karma.
The Pali Texts Society explains the meaning of the word Nirvana as extinction. It
is extinction of all empirical existence. Amarakosa also presents the same view.
Several philosophers like Rhys Davids, Thomas, Anandkumaraswamy, Dr.
Radhakrsnan and others maintain that the state of Nirvana does not represent
the denial of the self or personality. It has moral overtones. It is the highest
state of moral perfection and it is full of bliss. Dr. Radhakrsnan maintains that
the concept of Nirvana is negative in its content. It is nothingness. The Buddha
said that Nirvana is freedom from misery and it is different from the adjuncts of
empirical personality. The Buddha does not deny that highest state of perfection
expresses bliss. He was only silent about it. According to the Buddha, some
philosophers contend that Nirvana is the cessation of misery and the experience,
but it is not the destruction of the Atman. It is the destruction of the desire, the
passions and the craving for life due to ignorance.2 Maxmuller maintains that
there is no version in the Dhammapada, which gives the negative meaning of
Nirvana i.e., Nirvana is absolute cessation. Wherever there is reference to the
Nirvana as cessation or destruction, there is ambiguity in the interpretation.
Nagasena has given the interpretation of Nirvana positive in content during the
discussions with king Milinda.3 In this sense; the Buddhist conception of Nirvana
is different from the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of Moksa as a state in which
there is no consciousness.

The Tathagata Buddha said that Nirvana is 'avyakrta', indescribable in words and
inexpressible in thought. Nirvana cannot be described in words nor its nature
can be comprehended by thought. The nun Khema, while explaining the
concepts to Prasenajit, says that just as the sands on the banks of the Ganges
cannot be counted, just as the waters of the sea are immeasurable, so also the
Nirvana is incomprehensible. It is beyond comprehension in thought and
description in words.1

The disciples of the Buddha however, took two different paths. The Hinayana
and the Mahayana ways. They give different conceptions of the Nirvana. The
question arose about the nature of Nirvana whether it pertains to individual
existence or to the existence in general. Some say that Nirvana refers to the
individual freedom from misery, while some others have emphasized the
cessation of existence in general as Nirvana. The first is the individualistic and
the second is the universal content. The first is called the Hinayana conception
while the second refers to the Mahayana conception in its broad content.

The Buddha did not discuss the nature of Nirvana and other metaphysical
problems, because he was averse to metaphysical discussions. The
metaphysical questions like Nirvana are avyakrta, inaccessible for speculation.
The result was his disciples followed inaccessible for speculation. The result was
his disciples followed different paths of interpretation. Some adduced negative
interpretation of Nirvana as absolute cessation of existence, it is Sunyata. The
others gave a positive content to Nirvana as a state with the bliss as its
category.2

JAINA CONCEPTION OF MOKSA

There are varied interpretations regarding the nature of Moksa in the Buddhist
and Vedic traditions. But the Jaina conception of Moksa does not accept
differences of opinion. This is possible because the Vedic seers did not discuss
the nature of Moksa. The later philosophers of the Vedic tradition gave their own
interpretations of the nature of Moksa when the concepts were introduced in the
Vedic tradition. The Buddha never claimed to be and omniscient being. He did
not impose his views on his disciples. He said to his disciples that they should
accept whatever stands the test of reason and should not accept any view
because the Tathagata has said. This is one of the reasons why there developed
differences of opinion regarding the nature of Nirvana in the Buddhist
philosophy. Moreover, the Buddha was silent over the nature of metaphysical
problems like Nirvana and the self. But this is not so with the development of
Jaina thought. The Tirthankara Mahavira was an omniscient, a Kevalin. And the
words of the Kevalin had absolute authority. Therefore, there did not appear to
have differences regarding the metaphysical problems like the nature of the
Moksa.

The Jaina conception of the universal and the particular, the identity and
difference and the permanent substances and its changing modes as equally real
has influenced the Jaina conception of Moksa. The principle of permanence,
however, is not like the eternal principle of Purusa and Prakrti in the Sankhya
philosophy. The Jaina conception of the Atman is a synthesis of the principles of
permanence and modes. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is
permanent as a substance. From the phenomenal point of view, there are
modes. Considered from the point of view of modes, the self is changing.

The Jainas do not consider the Atman as all pervading like the Nyaya-Vaisesika or
atomic in nature like Ramanuja's standpoint. They say, that Atman is madhyama
parinami, pervading the body that it occupies. It has the characteristics of both
expansion and contraction in order to pervade the entire body, whether small or
big. This is the empirical description of the soul from the empirical point of view.
From the noumenal point of view the soul is eternal as a substance. It is non-
eternal from the point of view of modifications. The Jainas have accepted the
principle of the co-reality of substance and its modifications. For this reason, the
Jainas contend that at the time of attainment of Moksa the pervasion of the soul
becomes less by one-third of the body of the soul just previously occupied by it
at the time of Moksa.1

It should be remembered that though the quality of the contraction and the
expansion is inherent in the soul but it do the accumulations of particles of
karma form expression due to the karmic body. The liberated soul has no body
and therefore there is no question of contraction or expansion. The conception
of the ultimate size of the soul just at the time of Moksa is based on the
conception of the size of the soul just at the time of Moksa is based on the
conception of the size of the body that it last occupied. The soul has no form but
due to its extension in space, it is described as having form.

The Jaina conception of Moksa is different from other conception in Indian

thought. This theory is a special contribution of the Jainas. This is because; the
Jain conception implies the pervasive quality according to the body; while
according to some thinkers the soul is described as atomic in nature. This also
gives a clear picture of the nature of the soul in the state of Moksa.

According to the Jainas, the liberated soul has infinite knowledge and bliss
because of its inherent nature of consciousness and bliss. The eternity of the
soul is not the static eternity as in some systems of Indian philosophy, but it
expresses the inherent nature of infinite energy. This conception of the nature
of the soul in the Moksa is a special contribution of the Jainas. It agrees with the
Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of the eternity of the soul so far as it refers to the
soul as substance. In regard to the inherent characteristics of the soul as infinite
knowledge, bliss and infinite energy, it is nearer to the Sankhya conception of
the Purusa. The Buddhist schools of philosophy of Yogacara posit the conception
of Vijnana as a centre of self and in the state of Nirvana it is referred to the
'alaya vijnana' the storehouse of consciousness. In this sense of psychic energy
of the soul, Jainas have a common point, but the Jainas do not accept the
ksanikavada of the Buddhists.

THE STATE OF MUKTI (MUKTI-STHANA)

There is a fundamental question regarding the state of the soul at the time of
Moksa: What is the state of the soul when it is liberated from the body? There is
different interpretation on this question based on the different philosophical
predilections.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika and Sankhya-Yoga maintain that the soul is all pervading.
They also maintain that there are many souls. According to this interpretation,
the liberated souls do not possess; state of liberation the souls become free from
the gross bodies and also from the subtle bodies which is due to a gross body.
The Jivatman or a Purusa becomes different from the differentiated states and
becomes all pervading.

The Kevaladvaitin maintains that the atman i.e., the Brahman has vyapakatva,
but there is no plurality. According to this theory, in the liberated souls the soul
becomes free from the subtle bodies, which is antahkarana. As a consequence
of this, freedom from the subtle body, the soul is free from all empirical adjuncts.
It realizes the state of the Brahman. The difference between the souls that are
liberated and the souls that are in bondage is with reference to the freedom and
the presence of the suksma sarira and the empirical adjuncts. The absence of
the empirical adjuncts (Upadhi) in the liberated state does not mean that the
liberated soul is different from the empirical soul, it is the Brahmasvarupa in its
pure form.

The Madhva philosophy posits the souls as atomic in nature. They are different
from Parabrahman. According to this school of thought, the liberated soul lives
in the sannidhya of Vishnu.

Similarly, those who maintain the soul as atomic in nature like the Visistadvaitin
accept the plurality of souls. But in its real nature, the soul is not different from
the Parabrahman. When the soul is liberated it reaches the Brahmaloka and gets
merged in the Brahman.

According to Vallabhacarya, souls are atomic in nature, but at the same time
souls reach the state of Brahma in their state of merger with the Brahman.
Some souls get merged with the Brahma but some other souls, due to devotional
preponderance enter the samsara in the state of practical liberation for the sake
of expression of devotion.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF THE MUKTI-STHANA

The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent. Everything is transitory and

in flux. In the state of rebirth, there is no permanent self that emerges from the
earlier birth to the next birth. It is only the psychic continuity of vijnana that
projects itself into the next line. Just as a snow ball goes on accumulating,
particles of snow in its movement, but it is not one substance, so also the vijnana
the psychic energy, loaded with its samskara the anamic mass projects itself into
the next life i.e. rebirth. Therefore, there is not permanent self that is reborn.

The king Milinda asked to Nagasena: which of the states of life prior to Nirvana
are nearer to the state of Nirvana? Acarya said that there is no analogy to
explain the state of Nirvana. We cannot say that in the state of Nirvana, the soul
goes and settles in a sthana.

King Milinda asked: "just as there are pearls in the sea, fragrance in the flower
and the grains in the field, so also there must be a place for Nirvana which is
permanent". Nagasena replied: There is no state analogous to these which can
be called Nirvana, in which we can say the self goes to settle there. However,
the state of Nirvana is real. Nirvana is not something external. We have to
realize the state of Nirvana in the purity of mind. Just as through the friction of
two pieces of metal fire is created so also the Nirvana is a state of experience of
the purity of mind. We cannot say that there was first the fire or first the friction
and then the fire. Similarly, we cannot distinguish between the state of Nirvana
and the purity of experience.

The kind said: We may accept the view that there is not special state of Nirvana.
However, there must be some state from which a pudgala experiences the state
of Nirvana. The Acarya replied: Pudgala (the continuing self) is rooted in the Sila
(righteousness), and can experience the state of Nirvana from any point of
space. Therefore Nirvana is the realization from the purity of the mind.1

THE JAINA VIEW OF THE MOKSA-STHANA

The Jainas say that the Jiva has the characteristics of Urdhvagati (tendency to go
upwards).1 When the karmic particles are removed and when the soul is free
from karma, it moves upwards to the end of the Lokakasa and remains in its
pure form in the Siddhaloka, at the end of Lokakasa. It does not move further
because there is the absence the Dharmastikaya in Alokakasa. This state of
perfection at the end of the Lokakasa is called Siddhasila. The Jaina literature
presents the extension of Siddhasila and such a description of the extension of
the place where liberated souls reside is not stated in any other school of Indian
thought. According to the Jainas the world where the human beings inhabit, has
the extension of forty-five lakhs of yojanas and the extension of the Siddhaksetra
has also forty-five lakhs of yojanas. From the Karmabhumi of the human beings,
men can attain perfection through their self-efforts. In this sense, we can say,
that the state of moksa is the highest state of perfection to be attained. It is the
state of freedom from misery. It is a state of self-realization.

MOKSA MARGA (THE PATH-WAY TO MOKSA)

We may now consider the pathway to Moksa. Just as in the science of medicine,
four factors are important for consideration, like: the disease, cause of the
disease, the removal of the disease and means of the removal of the same; so
also in the understanding self0realization, and the spiritual with path for the
salvation, we should also consider the four important principles like samsara, the
cause of samsara, moksa and the pathway to moksa.2

The different schools of Vedic traditions have given their interpretations of the
pathway to Moksa. The Upanisads and Bhagavadgita are the foundational texts
for the Vedic tradition. On the basis of the thoughts expressed in the Upanisads
and the Bhagavadgita, Patanjali has given as elaborate discussions about Moksa
and pathway to Moksa. According to him the four cardinal principles are: (1)
heya1 (misery), (2) heyahetu2, (cause of misery), (3) hana3 (cessation of misery &
(4) hanopaya4 (the pathway to the cessation of the misery). Vatsyayana, the
noted commentator of Nyayasutra has elaborated the four principles of the
Moksa and pathway to Moksa.5

The Buddha enunciated, in his Sermon at Banares, the four noble truths
(Aryasatva): (1) dukkha (misery), (2) dukkhasamudya (cause of misery), (3)
dukkha-nirodha (cessation of misery) and dukkha-nirodha marga (the pathway to
the cessation of misery).6 In the Jaina darsana, the four fundamental truths have
been enunciated: (1) bandha (bondage), (2) asrava (cause of bondage), (3)
moksa (state of liberation) and (4) samvara (the way to the cessation to the
bondage).

The Bandha (bondage) is due to the passions arising out of ignorance. This
creates misery. Asrava is the influx of karma. It is the cause of misery. It is due
to the passions and the activity. Moksa is the complete freedom from karmic
matter. It is the state absolutely free from misery. Samvara is the way to the
cessation to the misery. This is possible if the influx of the karmic particles is
obstructed. The next stage would be the removal of the accumulated karma.
This is the nirjara. These two constitute the pathway to Moksa. In this sense, we
can say that the Jainas have propounded the four fundamental and noble truths
in the tradition of the Vedic and Upanisadic thought and similar to the Buddhist
tradition too.

Every school of Indian thought has emphasized the importance of the concept of
Moksa as the highest stage of self-realization. They have suggested that the
root-cause of samsara and the misery in this life is due to avidya (nescience).
Avidya gives rise to passions (ragadvesa), attachment and hardship (klesa).
Patanjali says avidya, asmita raga-dvesa and abhinivesa are the five obstacles or
hardships which cause misery and which bring obstructions to the path of
liberation. He has suggested that avidya is the root cause of all these things.1
Isvarkrisna 2 in the Samkhyakarika has elaborated the five obstacles in the way
to self-realization. Kanada has said avidya is the root cause, which gives rise to
all sorts of passions, and difficulties.3 Kathopanisad4 and the Bhagavadgita5 have
also emphasized that avidya is the primary cause of all passions and difficulties.
In the Buddhist literature, like the Majjhimanikaya it has been described that the
Buddha has said that avidya is the root cause of misery because it leads to
craving trsna and other blemishes.6

Jainism asserts that the root cause of samsara is darsanamoha & caritramoha.
Darsanamoha refers ignorance or perversity of attitude in the sense of avidya
used in other Indian thought. In the other systems of Indian philosophy, this has
been referred to the cause of all blemishes. Caritramoha is perversity in
conduct, which has been referred to by other systems of Indian philosophy as
asmita, raga, dvesa and trsna. In this sense, the Indian systems of philosophy,
including the Jainas, have given prominence to avidya (nescience) as the root
cause of misery.

Kanada says that avidya can be removed by Vidya (discriminative knowledge.)

Patanjali calls it vivekakhyati. Aksapada has used the term tattvajnana or
samyagjnana (right knowledge). The Buddhist have suggested that 'vipassana'
or prajna are analogous to vidya. The Jaina have used the word samyagjnana
(right knowledge). It causes the destruction of kasayas and other blemishes.

From the spiritual point of view, avidya is perversity of knowledge. It is the

absence of the right knowledge regarding the nature of the pure self. In the
Vedic tradition, the pathway to destruction of avidya and to the realization of the
Moksa has been suggested to be three-fold as (1) jnana (knowledge) (2) bhakti
(devotion) and (3) karma (action). The Buddha advocated the eight-fold path,
for the realization Nirvana: (1) samyagdrsti (right belief) (2) samyagsankalpa
(right resolve) (3) samyagvak (right speech) (4) samyagkarma (right action) (5)
samyag ajiva (right living) (6) samyag vyayama (right effort) (7) samyag smrti
(right thought) and (8) samyag samadhi (right self-concentration).1 Buddhaghosa
has enumerated three important ways, like sila, samadhi and prajna for the sake
of realization of Nirvana. Jainism has advocated the three-fold path for the
attainment of perfection: (1) samyagdarsana (right faith), (2) samyagjnana (right
knowledge) and (3) samyagcaritra (right conduct).2 In this way the Indian
philosophers, both of the Vedic and the non-Vedic traditions, have emphasized
the importance of the realization of Moksa or Nirvana, as the highest end of life.
This has exception only in the Carvaka School. The different schools of thought
have used their terminologies to describe the stages in the pathway to
perfection, and in explaining the concept of Moksa. The difference in
terminology is mainly verbal and it does not effect the basic unity in the
conception of state of perfection and pathway to the state of perfection. We find
that there is a fundamental similarity of approach and a unity of thought in the
description of the highest end of life, viz., self-realization (Moksa) and pathway to
the realization of this end.
Part 3

PRAMANAVADA

SYADVADA: the basis of Jaina Philosophy

WHAT IS SYADVADA?

Anekantavada is a special contribution of the Jainas to the philosophical world. It

is the unique contribution that the Jainas have made to the logic and
epistemology. It is the foundational principle for philosophical position of the
Jainas. Anekanta is the basic attitude of mind, which expresses the fundamental
principle that reality is complex, and it can be looked at from different points of
view. The points of view are the nayas and the naya is the psychological
expression of the basic principle of anekanta. Syadvada is the logical expression
of nayavada in predication from. It has the significance of expression and
communication in the logical and predicational pattern.

Syadvada is formed of the two words 'syat' and 'vada'. 'Syat' very often
supposed to suggest the meaning of 'doubt' or 'perhaps' but 'syat' does not
express doubt or uncertainty. It refers to a point of view or in a particular
context, or in a particular sense.1 'Vada' presents a theory of logic and
metaphysics. Syadvada means a theory of predication of the description of
reality from different points of view, in different contexts or from different
"Universes of discourse". Syadvada is the expression of the pictures of reality
obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical
predications.

The Jaina acaryas have made Syadvada, the foundation of Jaina philosophy.
Syadvada promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of
knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it presents a synoptic picture of
reality from different points of view. Syadvada expresses protest against one-
sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problem of Reality. It
affirms that there are different facets of Reality and they have to be understood
from various points of view by the predications of affirmation, negation and
indescribability. The thinker having one-sided view in his mind can see only one
facet of Reality, such thinker cannot realize reality in full.1 For this reason, Acarya
Samantabhadra says that the word syat is a symbol of truth.2 And therefore, the
Jaina Acaryas say that in some cases of predications, even if the term the syat is
not used, it is to be considered as implicit in the predication.3

Syadvada presents a comprehensive and a synoptic picture of reality, which

expresses presence and co-existence with particular points of view, of the
different characteristics like permanence and impermanence. Similarity and
difference, expressibility and inexpressibility, reality and appearance.4

Generally Syadvada is identified with Anekantavada, but considered from the

logical distinctions inherent in two theories, we can say that Anekanta is the
basic principle of the complexity of reality and the possibility of looking at reality
from different points of view. Syadvada is the expression of the Anekantavada in
logical and predicational form.5 In this sense, Anekantavada is the foundational
principle and syadvada is the logical expression of the foundational principle.

Acarya Samantabhadra says that Syadvada and kevalajnana (omniscient

knowledge) are the foundational facts of knowledge. The difference between the
two is that kevalajnana expresses the comprehensible knowledge of reality while
Syadvada expresses the predicational propositions of the experience of reality
presented in kevalajnana. The first, is a direct experience, Syadvada is the
indirect expression of the direct experience.1

SYADVADA: THE PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE

The different systems of philosophy have given different pictures of reality. As a

result, there is an ambiguity and metaphysical confusion, because the pictures of
reality presented by different schools of thought sometimes contradict with each
other, and we are at a loss to know which of reality should be accepted. This
creates intellectual chaos. For instance, even in the concept of the Atman, there
are different views expressed by different philosophies. Carvaka denies reality
of the Atman as a permanent substance. Even in those schools of thought where
there is agreement regarding the reality of the Atman. Sankhya philosophy
accepts the eternity and substantiality of the Atman. Consciousness is its
essence. According to Sankhya atman is passive without attributes.2 Nyaya-
Vaisesika posit the reality of the Atman and say that Atman is a substance, which
has qualities. Mimamsakas maintain that Atman is a substance and is eternal,
although it expresses modification in different forms of status. Buddha, refuses
to discuss the metaphysical problems like the Atman and Nirvana. He said that
Atman is a subject, which is "avyakrta" (indescribable)3 and became silent. In
this sense, different schools of thought have given different interpretations about
the nature of the Atman. Some say, it is all-pervading like space (Akasa), some
maintain that it is atomic in nature and some others say that Atman is of the size
of the thumb.

Regarding the nature of the Atman, some say that it is the product of the
elements. Some others maintain that consciousness is not the characteristic of
the Atman, but it is produced by the metabolic changes of the body. Still others
say that consciousness is not a quality of the soul, but is inherent in the soul. In
this way, there are basic differences between the different schools of philosophy
regarding the nature of the Atman.

The differences in the views regarding the nature of reality presented by

different schools of thought are based on their basic outlook of, and their
approach of looking at reality. Some take the synthetic point of view and
present the picture of reality in a synthetic sense. They seek unity in diversity,
and posit that the reality is one. It includes the consciousness and the
unconsciousness as aspects of reality. Some other schools of thought look at
reality from the empirical point of view. They seek to emphasize diversity as
presented in the universe. Reality, for them, is not one or a unity, but it is many
and diverse. Some other school of thought has said that reality is
incomprehensible (ajneya). In this way, there is intellectual chaos in the study of
the metaphysical problems.

Anekantavada seeks to find out a solution out of this intellectual chaos. It seeks
to find meaning in the diversity of opinions and tries to establish that these
diverse views are neither completely false not completely true. They present
partial truths from different points of view. The Anekanta seeks to determine the
extent of reality present different schools of thought and gives a synoptic picture
of reality. The eminent Acaryas, like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka and
Haribhadra have presented the subtle logical distinctions and the metaphysical
thought involving unity and diversity, the oneness and duality and other forms of
philosophy on the basis of Anekanta. A comprehensive picture of reality is
sought to be presented by the theory of Anekanta.

And for this reason, the theory of Anekanta has become foundational for Jaina
thought. In fact, the Anekanta outlook is the basis for other schools of Indian
thought. The Jaina Acaryas have presented a synoptic outlook in understanding
the problems of philosophy on the basis of Anekanta. They say that Ekanta or
dogmatism or one-sided approach to the problems of reality is not inherent in
reality (vastugatadharma), but it is due to the working of the intellect. It is the
product of intellectual discrimination. If the intellect is pure in its essence then
Ekanta will disappear. The pure exercise of intellect will give rise to a synoptic
view-point expressed in the Anekanta and the different partial view-points get
merged in the Anekanta, just as the different rivers get merged in the sea.

Upadhyaya Yasovijaya says that one who has developed the Anekanta outlook
does not dislike other viewpoints. He looks at other viewpoints with
understanding and sympathy, just as a father looks at the activities of his son.
One who believes in the Anekanta outlook looks at the conflicting and diverse
theories of realities with equal respect. He does not look at the diverse theories
of realities as one superior to the other. He has the spirit of equanimity in
approaching for the understanding of the problems of other theories. In the
absence of the spirit of equanimity, all knowledge would be fruitless, and any
amount of reading the sacred texts would not lead to any fruitful results.1

Haribhadra Suri says that one who develops the ekanta attitude and insists on
his point of view is one-sided in his approach and would like to lead others also
to his points of view. But the one who develops the synoptic outlook based on
the anekanta attitude is always guided by objective and rational considerations
in evaluating the theories of reality.
Anekanta states that the nature of reality should be considered and studied
purely from the rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The ekanta
attitude is compelling and it drives us to accept its point of view and discourages
us to accept the others' point of view.

A milkmaid churns the buttermilk, and while churning the buttermilk, she pulls
the string on the side and loosens the string on the other. The consequence is
butter is extracted from the buttermilk. Similarly, if we look at the different
points of view of knowing reality in their proper perspective, considering the
primary points of view as important and the secondary points of view with their
due consideration, truth can be understood in the true perspective and in a
comprehensive way. The intellectual confusion is created by ekanta while
Anekanta clears the welter of confusion; the synoptic outlook of Syadvada gives
a comprehensive and true picture of reality.

THE IMPACT OF ANEKANTA ON OTHER DARSANAS

The Anekanta attitude gives a comprehensive and synoptic view of life. Some of
the systems of Indian thought have expressed their opposition to the Anekanta
theory. Yet we can observe the impact of Anekanta on their theories also. It is
not possible to disregard the Anekanta theory, as it is rational and objective in its
outlook.

In the Isavasya Upanisada Atman has been described as a substance which

moves and does not move, which is near and far, which is inside and outside.
This is the expression1 of the Syadvada point of view.

Sankaracarya and Ramanujacarya have argued against the validity of Syadvada

on the ground that contradictory attributes cannot co-exist at the same time.
But in trying to refute the validity of Syadvada they seem to have adopted the
Syadvada outlook only. The description of the Brahman as 'para and apara' and
the analysis of the degrees of reality as expressed in the paramarthika,
Vyavaharika and pratibhasika satya, does expressed in the paramarthika,
Vyavaharika and pratibhasika satya, does express the spirit of Anekanta and
Syadvada. Sankara mentions that there is nothing in the world which is purely
without faults and without attributes--Istam kimapi lokeasmin na nirdosam na
nirgunam".

This would mean that everything has its good qualities and also its faults.
Nothing is purely perfect and purely attributes. This is the expression of the
Anekanta.

Swami Dayanand Sarasvati was once asked whether he was a wise man or not.
He said that in the field of darsana he is wise, but with reference to the practical
world, he is not wise. This is an expression of Anekanta.

The Buddhist conception of the Vibhajjavada and Madhyama Marga express the
Anekanta spirit. The Sankhya conception of prakrti as having the three
attributes of sattva, rajas and tamas in the state of equilibrium in the original
state of prakrti and as expressed in varied degrees in the process of evolution
expressed the spirit of Anekanta.

Among the Greek philosophers, Plato has presented the theory of the degrees of
reality. The world of ideas is real and the physical world is real to the extent of
the participation of the ideas in the physical objects. This is also the expression
of the Anekanta.

Einstein's theory of relativity expresses the spirit of Syadvada.

From this, it is clear that Anekanta expresses the synoptic point of view and
gives a comprehensive picture of reality in which partial pictures from different
points of view are synthesized and harmonized. This spirit of Anekanta cannot
be ignored by any school of thought because of its intrinsic value.

Having considered the impact of Anekanta on the different schools of thought, it

would now be necessary to understand the extent of the expression of the
Anekanta in the different problems of philosophy like the problem of permanence
and change, of the identity of self and the body etc.

PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANANCE (CHANGE)

The Anekanta view presents a theory that every object is a synthesis of the
attributes of permanence and change. From the point of view of substance, it is
permanent and from the point of view of modes, it is changing. Substance and
modes are inseparable and complementary. Without the one, the other does not
exist. Without substance (dravya), modes (paryaya) are not possible and
without modes substance cannot be understood. It is the thing that changes.
Changes do not exist without a thing. A thing changes in its attribute. For
instance, jiva is a substance and its various states are its modes. Jiva is
necessary for the expression of the various states like man, a substance and the
expression of the various states like man, lower animal and bird. These are the
modes of the jiva. Jiva as a substance and the states of jiva in the empirical
sense, are both necessary and complementary to each other. Substance is
permanent, but modes are changing. Jiva is permanent and is indestructible.
But the modes as expressed in the states of jiva are not permanent. In this
sense, Syadvada expresses the synthesis of the theories of permanence and of
change. Every substance is permanent but its modes are changing and in a flux.
But it should be remembered that substance and its modes are not two different
entities. There is not difference in essence, but the difference can be seen in
expression. According to the Anekanta view, every object has the triple
attributes of Origination, Destruction and Permanence. The modes originate and
are destroyed but the substance remain permanent.1 This is true of every object
and there are not exceptions to this.

When we meet a person whom we have already met, we recognize him and say
he is the same man that we met. Rain brings greenery on the land. We have
camphor on the palm and anon it evaporates, and then we say it is not there. All
these states express modifications of the substance but these different states
taken independently for consideration express the theories of permanence,
change and destruction.

There are different theories of causation regarding the origination of the

substance and objects. Some of the theories may be mentioned as
Parinamavada, Arambhavada, Rupantaravada and Vichedavada. Samkhya
philosophers have presented Parinamavada. According to them, cause and
effect are not different events. Effect is in the cause. Cause has the potentiality
of the effect is the actualization of he cause. This is called Satkaryavada.
According toe Satkarmavada, that which is not cannot originate and that, which
is, cannot be destroyed. It is only a transformation. It is the actualization of the
potential. Nyaya Vaisesika darsanas present the Arambhavada theory. It is also
called Asatkaryavada. According to this theory, cause and effects are different
events. When the effect appears, cause disappears.

According to the Naiyayikas Isvara is eternal (non-changing reality) while the

flames of a lamp are non-eternal. The Buddhists maintain that there is nothing
permanent and what we call a thing appearing to be permanent is an aggregate
of states, which are fleeting. A philosophical system, which maintains that
reality, is the permanent and the eternal cannot easily dispense with the facts of
life, which present the changing modes. Similarly, a philosophy, which gives
exclusive importance to the flux, cannot a thing that changes. In this sense, the
Naiyayikas considered the perceptible objects as impermanent and the Buddhists
considered everything as fleeting, as a vast continuum.

The modern scientific view of reality accepts the fact of transformation. It has
been suggested that nothing is destroyed, it is only that an object gets
transformed. For instance, a candle burns, but in its process or burning the
substance of the candle is not destroyed. It is transformed into some other
element.

Similarly, we find transformation of water into a different form like ice and water,
the gases like hydrogen and oxygen. As we are aware, water is formed through
the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in a definite proportion of 2:1. By the
process of disintegration, the hydrogen and the oxygen can be separated of the
water and water expresses itself in the form of gases, of hydrogen and oxygen.
This view is supported by actual scientific experiments.

Modern science has shown that matter and energy are mutually convertible.1 The
accepted principle of conservation of matter and energy has been a primary
principle in the science of Physics and Chemistry. Therefore, matter and energy
are convertible and conservable.

From the standpoint of Syadvada Jainas affirm that a thing is never destroyed.
That which is not, never comes into being.2 There is nothing which is free from
the modes of coming into being and destruction. Substance has the modes of
origination and destruction. Therefore, every substance has its modes. A
substance without modes cannot exist, and modes must have a substance for its
substratum. Therefore, the Jainas maintain that substance and modes are both
real. In this world, there is nothing, which is purely permanent without modes,
and there is no change, which has not got a thing as a substratum of change.
For instance, the jiva is a substance, but it expressed itself the empirical world in
its various modifications and states in different forms of life like men and lower
animals. Just as a candle, which is a substance, changes in accordance with its
flames, which are susceptible to change. In this sense, the jiva and the chandler
have both the characteristics of permanence and change. They are permanent
in the form of substance, but changing in the form of modes.1

If a thing were to be purely permanent, it would have may remain in one static
form only and there would not have been any states or changes. If there were
only change and flux without any substance that changes, there would not have
been any substratum and a support and any form. According to the Syadvada
theory, permanence and change are equally real. It is thing that changes and
has its modes. A thing as a substance is permanent, while the changing modes
are not permanent. In this sense, a substance (dravya) has been considered a
synthesis of permanence and modifications. Substance is a substratum of
change and changes take place in a substance. Modern science analyses an
atom into its three constituent's (1) neutron which is its central and focal point,
(2) electron which is moving with a velocity and (3) proton which is non-moving.

THE IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ATMAN AND THE BODY

The Atman and the body are both identical and different. Different philosophical
systems have given varied explanations about the relation between the Atman
and the body. They consider consciousness to be a product of the metabolic
changes of the body. With the destruction of the body, consciousness is also
destroyed.2 Sutrakrtanga has mentioned a similar theory of tatjiva tatsariravada.
It is slightly different from the Carvaka philosophy, yet basically it does emphasis
the identity of the jiva and the body.3

Some other darsanas have considered that Atman is different entirely from the
body. While explaining this problem of relation of the body and the soul,
Mahavira said to his main disciple Gautama that Atman is different from the body
is one sense; it is identical with the body in a different sense. It Atman and body
were considered to be identical, then the Atman will be destroyed with the
destruction of the body. In this state, there is no possibility of the conceptions of
the moksa and rebirth (punarjanma). But rational considerations and testimony
of the Sastras to admit the possibility of mukti and rebirth. Therefore, it is
necessary to accept the theory that the Atman and the body are different. At
the same time, it is also necessary to postulate the relation between the Atman
and the body as closely associated with each other from beginningless time. We
experience pain if the body is hurt, but if the body of Devadatta is hurt, Jinadatta
does not experience the pain, because the Atman of Jinadatta is not associated
with the body of Devadatta.
It is clear from this, that the Atman of Devadatta is not associated with body of
Jinadatta, yet the Atman of Devadatta is associated with his own body. In this
sense, they are very closely associated and in the empirical sense they may be
considered to be identical. But in the real sense of jiva as a spiritual substance,
the association of the jiva to a particular body is only external and temporary.

SATTA AND ASATTA (The Real and The Unreal)

Reality of a thing and the reality of its modes can be considered from the point of
view of Syadvada. In this sense, a comprehensive seven-fold predication of
Syadvada presents the manifold aspects of reality in its affirmative and negative
forms of predications. The affirmation and negation have to be predicated with
reference to the identical nature of the four-fold aspects of consideration called
'svacatustaya' and with reference tot he four-fold aspects of other nature of a
thing 'para-catustaya'. For instance, the four-fold aspects of understanding the
nature of the objects will be (1) Dravya (substance) (2) Ksetra (place) (3) Kala
(time) and (4) Bhava (its nature). Every thing can be considered from the point
of view of its own substance, place, time and it gives affirmations. It may also be
considered from the four-fold aspects of the otherness of a thing in respect of
substance, place, time and nature. This brings the negative predications.

We may take the example of a pot made up of gold. Its substance is gold.
Therefore, from the point of view of substance, it is gold. Affirmative
predications may also be made in respect of the place in which it is, the time at
which it is and the real nature of the pot. For instance, its yellow color and other
modes are of its nature. But the same pot considered from the point of view of
other material like the clay out of which the pots are made, may give a negative
predication. Similarly, with reference to another place, another time and another
nature, we may give negative predications. In this sense, the golden pot is a
golden pot and it is not a pot made of clay. It is in a particular place and it is a
golden pot with reference to its nature and characteristics like the yellowness of
color etc., and not an earthen pot with reference to the nature of the substance
of clay. In this sense again, we may predicate affirmative predications with
reference to its own four-fold aspects and negative predications make with
reference to other four-fold aspects not belonging to it (paracatustaya).

Some scholars consider that affirmation and negation at the same time
contradict each other. But it has been recognized that affirmation and negation
may be predicated of a thing from specific points of view is specific situations.
There should be no contradiction between affirmation and negation as
predicated from different point of view of the same thing. For example, we may
affirm that a particular person is a man; and deny that he belongs to any other
species than that of man. We may say that a particular person is an Indian and
that he is not a Westerner; he is at present living, but he is not eternal; he is wise
and is not unwise. These statements do not contradict each other and these
statements are not only logically compatible, but are also compatible in fact.
Such varied statements from different points of view are necessary to present a
coherent and comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing with its many
facets.

These examples do emphasis the fact that it is possible to present a

comprehensive picture of reality by predicating different aspects of reality in
their negative and affirmative states. For this, the Jainas have formulated a
methodological scheme presenting seven-fold predications. That is called
Saptabhangi.

SAPTABHANGI

Everything is complex in its nature and it expresses many facets of its

characteristics. To give a comprehensive picture of a thing in all its varied
aspects the Jainas have formulated seven-fold predications incorporating
affirmation, negation and inexpressibility with their possible permutations.1 We
shall discuss about this in the later chapter.

It is necessary to note that Syadvada presents the predicational form of

expressing the nature of reality indifferent aspects. The seven-fold predications
re not fragment of imagination, but they are only expressions of the many facets
of reality for the sake of comprehension. Herman Jacobi says that Syadvada
opens the floodgates of the comprehension of the nature of a thing in its
different aspects.

An American philosopher Prof. Archie J. Bahm has stated that Syadvada is the
expression of non-violence in the intellectual form. This doctrine would be more
effective to establish world-peace, if popularized. It is the foundational
intellectual attitude of the Jainas. Mahatma Gandhi gave importance to non-
violence and he emphasized the primacy of Syadvada as the intellectual basis of
the ethical doctrine of non-violence. Acarya Vinoba Bhave has emphasized the
need of understanding Syadvada for the sake of world peace.

CLARIFICATION OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT SYADVADA

It would not be out of place to mention some misconceptions regarding the

validity of the theory of Saptabhangi. In the earlier portion of the Agamas, roots
of Saptabhangi have been mentioned briefly.2 Acarya Kundakunda ahs
mentioned some predications of the Saptabhangi as affirmation, negation and
affirmation-negation.3

Later philosophers like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka, Vidyanandi,

Hemacandra, Vadideva etc., have developed the Saptabhangi doctrine in its
fuller and detailed aspects of predications. Some scholars have taken this as
gradual development of the doctrine of Saptabhangi. According to them
originally, the theory of Syadvada was formulated not in its full form and it was
later developed in its seven-fold predications. But we should recognize that
Tirthankaras first presented the Jaina darsana. The Ganadharas formulated and
taught the same to their disciples. Later it was expressed in the form of written
documents. This gradual presentation of the doctrine in an elaborate form from
the Tirthankara to the Ganadharas and their disciples does not mean that the
doctrine was not fully formulated at the time of the Tirthankaras. Tirthankara is
an all-knowing Sarvadarsi. It is not possible to say that he did not know the
Syadvada doctrine in all its aspects. It would be apt to say that the Ganadharas
only elucidated the doctrine of Saptabhangi and the later philosophers and not
that they developed the theory in an elaborate form.

The first Tirthankara of this era is Rsabhadeva. The twenty-three other

Tirthankaras presented his teachings to people from time to time. These
teachings were elaborated and crystallized in book forms by the disciples and
philosophers of the later times. In the act of elaboration and presentation,
certain factors like the capability of the Acaryas who had elaborated and
intellectual climate of the time when it was presented in a fuller and detailed
form have to be considered. It is possible that the personal factors and the
intellectual achievements of the later philosophers have influenced he
presentation of the doctrines. Therefore, we find that in the later presentations
in the book-form the scholars have used the two-fold objects of first presenting
the other systems of philosophy as a polemic for refutation and later presented
their own doctrine in a positive and constructive form. This type of presentation
has developed in dialectical forms too.

But scholars like Archie J. Bahm have ignored these factors and they have
misunderstood the elaborate presentation of the doctrines as the later
developments. Scholars like him have suggested, that the Saptabhangi doctrine
is the development from the Buddhist conception of Catuskoti nisedha. This is
far from the truth. If we look at this problem from the historical perspective we
can very well say that Saptabhangi could not have arisen and developed out of
the Buddhist theory of Catuskoti, because Jainism prevailed much earlier to time
of the Buddha.1 There were twenty three Tirthankaras before the Buddha.
Tirthankara Parsvanatha lived two hundred and fifty years before the Buddha.
He has presented the doctrine of Syadvada. Sanjaya Velatthiputta lived much
earlier to the Buddha. He had criticized the Syadvada as a from of samsayavada
(the theory of doubt). From this, it is clear that Syadvada was formulated before
the time of the Buddha. The theory of Catuskoti was formulated much later than
the Buddha.

We may also point out that there are fundamental differences between the
Catuskoti and Syadvada. The conceptual form of Catuskoti is formulated as
follows:
1. It is not that a thing is;
2. It is not that a thing is not;
3. It is not that a thing is and is not;
4. It is not that a thing neither is nor is not.

But Saptabhangi incorporates the predications of affirmation negation, and

inexpressibility in their possible permutations. It is not merely an expression of
negation of a thing; it predicates the nature of a thing in its different aspects, in
the form of affirmation and negation. The affirmation and negation are to be
predicated with reference to the four-fold aspects of the elf nature of the objects
(sva-catustaya) and the four-fold aspects of the other-nature of the objects (para
catustaya). According to Saptabhangi, the predications of the nature of man
would be that he is a man and he is not a non-man like other animals. Btu
Catuskoti would express negative aspect of predications, as it is not that a man
is a man, it is not that a man is other than the man. It is not that a man is and is
not other than the man; and it is not that the man neither is nor is not other than
the man. In this way, Catuskoti is neither the expression of the affirmation nor is
it the presentation of the different aspects of the nature of a thing.

Saptabhangi does not deny the possibility of the affirmative predications about
the existence of a thing. It points that a thing is and has affirmative predications
about its nature from its self-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects and it
denies the absence of the other-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects. As
we have seen earlier the Buddhist doctrine of catuskoti is fundamentally
negative in its predications.

SYADVADA IS NOT A THEORY OF DOUBT

According to Jainism, the nature of a thing is complex. It has infinite number of

characteristics.1 In describing the characteristics; one has to look at it from
different points of view. Therefore, the comprehensive description of the varied
nature of the objects is possible by different predications involving affirmation,
negation and inexpressibility. The word "Syat" in the Syadvada has created a
good deal of controversy. The word has been very much misunderstood. It is
very often suggested that 'syad' means 'perhaps' or 'may be'. This would lead to
doubt and more probability. It would lead to skepticism. But the word 'syat' has
to be taken in a proper perspective. It does not mean perhaps and it does not
express any from of doubt in the seven-fold predications. 'Syat' means "in a
particular context" or from one point-of-view. It refers to a particular 'universe of
discourse' In this sense; 'Syat' does not lead to any element of doubt. Syadvada
would not present a theory of doubt. Prof. Baldeva Upadhyaya has also stated
that Syadvada is not a theory of doubt. It is not skepticism.

Sankaracarya in his Sankarabhasya has stated that Syadvada has the element of
doubt and it gives an indefinite knowledge. The illusioned conception began
from Sankaracarya is still prevailing to somewhat extent. But as we have
already said, the confusion that arises due to the word 'syat' is not to be taken as
the final say regarding the value of Syadvada. But, it may be pointed that the
conditions of doubt are not present in the predication of Syadvada. In the case
of a man who is in doubt regarding his perception whether the object that he
sees is the man or a tree, there is the elements of doubt and lack of
determination. But in the case of seven-fold predication, the affirmation of
existence and the predication of negation are well-defined and certain from
specific points-of-view. The condition of these determinations makes doubt
impossible. Prof. Phanibhusana Adhikari has stated that there is not theory,
which has been as such misunderstood s, the Jaina theory of Syadvada. It is
possible that Sankaracarya did not go through the texts of the Jainas in their
original form.

It is evident that Syadvada is not the theory of doubt. All philosophies accept
and utilize it in one way or other; but they hesitate to accept in by name.

The western thinker, Thomas says that Syadvada theory has great depth and
needs a keen intellect to understand. It gives a comprehensive picture of the
varied aspects of reality. Syadvada presents a picture of reality in its many-
colored aspects. The Jaina theory of Syadvada is free from obscurations and
inaccuracies of presentations. In philosophical world Syadvada is like an
emperor.

Once Bhagavana Mahavira was asked what form of language the sadhu should
use. Mahavira replied that the sadhu (ascetic) should use the language of
Vibhajyavada. Vibhajyavada is interpreted as syadvada.

REFUTATION OF CONTRADICTIONS

Sankaracarya has criticized the saptabhangi on the grounds of the impossibility

of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. For instance, a thing
cannot have the attributes of coldness and hotness at the same time. But to one
whom has understood the theory of Syadvada in its proper perspective of
dialectical predication the change of contradiction does not stand. If
Sankaracarya were asked who he was, he would have replied that he was a
sannyasi. If he were have said that he was not. Therefore, there would be no
contradiction if it were to be predicated that as a sannyasi Sankaracarya gives
the characteristics of a grhastha of his nature. These two opposite predications
are consistent in their contexts and from their points-of-view. Thus we find
syadvada presents the many-folded predication from the different points of view
in different contexts. It does not present two contradictory predications from the
same point-of-view. For instance, if from the same point-of-view, were to say
that he is a sannyasi and that he is not a sannyasi, there would be contradiction,
but there is no such uni-contextual predications in the Syadvada. Therefore,
Syadvada presents dialectical predications from different points-of-view.

NAYAVADA

Nayavada is the basis of Syadvada. It is the psychological aspect of anekanta.

Nayavada presents the theory of different points-of-view.

These points of view have to be expressed in predicational form for the sake of
communication. Syadvada does that. Syadvada is the logical expression of
Nayavada. Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Nayavada is
analytical in character and Syadvada is synthetic.
Pramana expresses the different characteristics of an object. But naya presents
the specific characteristics of an object. While presenting the characteristic of an
object nay does not deny the possibility of other characteristics present in an
object. If it were to deny the possibility of other characteristics, the denial would
be dogmatic. That is 'durnaya'1 Predications have a reference to pramana. Naya
is different form and is an aspect of the pramana in a particular sense. Just as a
part of the sea2 is not the sea, nor is it non-sea. It is the part of the sea. The
naya comprehends the aspect and the characteristics of an object. The different
systems of philosophy project a particular point of view, a particular naya but
their presentation is always one-sided. They cannot have a full and
comprehensive picture of reality in all its aspects. But Nayavada demands us to
look at reality from different points-of-view. That gives a fuller picture of reality.

The Buddhist approach of looking at reality was from the point of view of
momentariness. Therefore, they emphasize that there is nothing permanent in
the world. Everything is in a flux. The Buddhist approach to the problems of
reality, according to the Jainas is from the point of view of Rjusutranaya. This
partial approach of looking at reality does not give a correct picture of the real.
Similarly, the Advantin looks at reality from the synthetic point of view
Sangrahanaya. The other points-of-view presents only an appearance. But the
Nayavada does not discard any point-of-view. Nayavada, therefore, gives a
synoptic picture of different doctrines, like--Dvaita and Advaita Niscaya
(noumenal) and Vyavahara, yadrccha-purusarthavada etc.

Nayavada is against dogmatism, which gives exclusive importance to a particular

point-of-view. Nayavada presents the catholic approach to the problems of
reality. Acarya Samantabhadra had made obeisance to Jinendra (Tirthankara)
for presenting a synoptic approach to the understanding of reality in the
Syadvada. It has been said that a thing has three characteristics origination
(utpada), destruction (vyaya) substantiality (dhrauvya). For instance, a
goldsmith presents a crown after breaking up the pot made of gold. In this case,
the first state of pot is destroyed and a new form of crown is made. But the
substance out of which it is made and the material gold, is the same in both.
Therefore a thing is permanent as a substance. But its modes change. Again, if
a person only takes milk and refuses to take curds, he takes the substance, but
he is not prepared to take its modification. Similarly, if a person takes curds, but
does not take milk, he accepts the modifications and does not accept the
substance out of which it is made. But one, who does not accept the milk and its
modes, has to give up milk and the curds also. The formation of curds involves
the destruction of the state of milk and the production of the state of curds. But
in both these, the substance of milk is constant.
Therefore, a thing has its substantiality and modifications. One who looks at the
objects from the substance point-of-view as a synthetic approach (dravyarthika
naya) and one who looks at the objects from the point of view of its modes has
paryayarthika naya. But the real nature of the object is complex. It has
substance and its modes, both real. The substance point-of-view gives exclusive
importance to the substance (dravya). This is called dravyarthika naya, and the
point of view, which looks at reality from the side of its modifications, is the
paryayarthika naya. There is enormous literature on this problem of nayavada in
the Jaina philosophy. I do not propose to elaborate on this point for the fear of
being lost in the woods.
SAPTABHANGI: A Discussion

Anekanta is the foundational principle of Jainism. It is the very essence of

Jainism and it pervades the thought and philosophy of the Jainas. It would not be
an exaggeration to say that a thorough understanding of Anekanta would give
the key to the understanding Sanmati Prakarana, has stated that Anekanta is the
very first and foundational principle which teaches us the first and the last
lessons of the Jaina darsana. In everyday life, we find the spirit of Anekanta
pervading the thought and life of the people. Therefore, he salutes the theory of
anekanta.1

The Sankhya theory of evolution is expressed in the evolution of Prakrti in the

presence of the Purusa. The Prakrti and the Purusa are the primary principles.
The development of the Vedanta has culminated in the principle of Advaita. The
development of Buddhism can be seen in the theory of Vijnanavada i.e. (theory
of consciousness). In this sense, Anekantavada and Syadvada are to be all and
the end all in Jaina philosophy. The concepts of pramana and naya can be
properly understood if we know the essence of saptabhangi. Pramana and naya
present the background of understanding of Anekanta and Anekanta is
expressed in the form of Saptabhangi.

SAPTABHANGI

Question has been very often asked regarding the nature and the function of
saptabhangi. The Jaina Acaryas have discussed these problems elaborately. The
nature of a thing is complex having many characteristics and the nature of any
one of characteristic can be described in seven types of words. This can be
called as in seven different ways. Therefore, this is called seven-fold predication
of saptabhangi.1

For understanding the nature of a thing, it is necessary to know the thing in the
light of naya (point-of-view) and pramana (valid source of knowledge). Naya and
Pramana do give a valid and comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the
thing. The reasoning is of two types--svartha (for one's own sake) and parartha
(for the sake of communicating to others).2 Svarthadhigama aims at presenting
the knowledge to oneself. While pararthadhigama is concerned with presenting
the knowledge to others in the form of communication in language. This gives
the predicational form of expressions. In the pararthadhigama we have 2 forms
of expressions: (1) pramana vakya which is concerned with the predication of the
validity of the knowledge and its source and (2) naya vakya which is concerned
with predicating the nature of a thing from a particular of point-of-view (naya).
On this basis, a distinction has been made in the saptabhangi as pramana
saptabhangi and naya saptabhangi.3 Pramana vakya is comprehensive
(sakaladesi) because it is more concerned with presenting the nature of the
object as a whole in its various aspects through the valid source of knowledge.
Naya vakya is considered to be vikaladesi (partial presentation) because it
presents one aspect of the nature of reality from a particular point of view,
although reality is complex and has infinite aspects.4

Mallisena in his Syadvadamanjari while describing the nature of an object has

stated that an object is constituted of the attributes and its modifications.
Tattva, Padartha and Dravya are synonymous to a thing or reality.5

Acarya Akalanka has stated that in the presentation of the nature of the object in
its infinite aspects we have to adopt predicational form in the seven-fold
predication which may include the positive and negative predications also
without contradicting each other.1 The nature of the object can be considered
from seven points of view and their predications would be seven-fold. Similarly,
it has been said that curiosity (jinasa) may be analyzed into seven forms; as a
consequence there are seven-fold predications. Everything can be presented in
seven-fold predications. These predications have been worked out on the basis
of permutations of the fundamental three-fold predications of affirmation,
negation and inexpressibility. Bhanga refers to the partial presentation (vikalpa)
or a particular form of expression.

SAPTABHANGI AND ANEKANTA

Anekanta is the basic attitude of the Jainas. It is the foundational principle. It

expresses itself in the theory of naya (points of view) and the points of view are
primarily epistemological and psychological. Predications from these points of
view give us the dialectical form of propositional expressions. Saptabhangi is
primarily logical. It is the logical expression of the psychological basis in
Nayavada. Anekantavada is the foundational attitude. Anekanta emphasizes, as
we have said earlier, that reality is complex and it has infinite aspects to be
known and understood. These can be presented from different points of view. A
particular point of view gives one aspect of reality and these various aspects
have been classified into seven fundamental forms on the basis affirmation,
negation and inexpressibility. These predications are not absolute. They are
related to each other. And all of them put together would give as a
contradiction, if affirmational and negating propositions are presented. Again,
we can say that Anekanta attitude gives a fuller picture absorbing all aspects of
reality, Syadvada is the dialectical presentation of the Anekanta attitude. The
first is the expression and the second is the basis.

SYADVADA IN THE AGAMAS

If we study the theory of Syadvada from the historical point of view tracing its
presentation in the Agamas, it is clear that Syadvada and its predicational forms
are not later developments. We can find the presentations in the Agamas
enunciated from the philosophical points of view.
Gautama Ganadhara asked Bhagavana Mahavira whether the earth called
Ratnaprabha is soul or not?

Bhagavana Mahavira replied, (1) "from one point of view, Ratnaprabha is atma,
(2) from another point of view it is no soul; (3) from still another point of view its
nature is inexpressible".

Having heard these predications, Gautama asked again--Lord! How your are
describing the same earth in such different ways?

Bhagavana Mahavira said (1) it is a soul from the point of view of the self-nature
of the soul. (2) it is no soul from the point of view of other aspect than the soul
and (3) from the point of both the aspects its nature is indescribable.1

Then Gautama asked for clarifications on the same lines, regarding the nature of
other earth, planets, the habitation of the gods (devaloka) and siddhasila (the
place of the liberated souls). He received similar presentations from Mahavira.
Then he asked about the nature of the Paramanu (atom) and he got similar
precepts. He then asked about the description of the nature of molecules with
two pradesas (having two space units) & he got the following answer.

(1)Molecule with two space units (dvipradesika) is atman from one point of view.
(2)Molecule with two space units is not atman from another point of view.
(3)Molecule with two space units is indescribable (avaktavya) from still other
point of view.
(4)Molecule with two space points is atman and is not atman from different
points of view.
(5)Molecule with two space points is atman and is indescribable.
(6)A molecule with two space points is not atman and is indescribable.

Bhagavana Mahavira explained to Gautama Ganadhara when he was asked

certain clarifications thus:

(1)A molecule with two space points is atman from the point of view of its self-
nature of atman.
(2)From the point of view of its nature other than the atman (para-adesa) it is
not atman.
(3)From the point of view of both the self-nature (sva-adesa) and the other
nature (para-adesa), it is indescribable.
(4)From the point of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place
unit (ege desi) and of the mode of non-existence of the same a molecule of
two space points has the predications of affirmations and negation.
(5)From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and non-
existence of the other place unit, molecule of two space has the predications
of affirmations and inexpressibility.
(6)A molecule of one place unit having the modes of non-existence and the other
place unit the modes of existence and non-existence a molecule of two space
points has the predication of negation and inexpressibility.
Then, Gautama asked clarifications about the predications regarding molecules
of three space points. Mahavira replied thus:

(1)A molecule of three space points is atman from one point of view.
(2)A molecule with three space points is not atman from a different point of view.
(3)A molecule with three space points is indescribable in nature from still another
point of view.
(4)A molecule with three space points is and is not atman from a different point
of view.
(5)A molecule with three space points is atman, but is not (two) atmans.
(6)A molecule with three space points from another point of view is (two) atman
and is not atman.
(7)A molecule with three space points is atman and is indescribable.
(8)A molecule with three space points is atman and (two) indescribable.
(9)A molecule with three space points from one point of view (two) atman and is
indescribable.
(10) A molecule with three space points is atman and is indescribable.
(11) A molecule with three space points is atman and (two) indescribable.
(12) The molecule with three space points is not (two) atman and is
indescribable.
(13) A molecule with three space points is and is not atman and is
indescribable.

Gautama Ganadhara asked clarifications regarding the function of these different

predications. Mahavira said thus:

(1)A molecule with three space points is atman from the points of view of the
self-nature of the atman.
(2)A molecule with three space points is not atman from the other nature.
(3)A molecule with three space points is indescribable from the points of view of
both the natures.
(4)A molecule with one space point can be considered from the points of view of
the mode of existence and also of non-existence. From these points of view,
a molecule with three place units (tripradesis) is atman and is not atman.
(5)From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and also of
the mode of non-existence of two place units and a molecule with three space
points is atman and is not (two) atman.
(6)From the point of view of the mode of existence of two place units the mode
of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is (two
atman) and is not an atman.
(7)From the points of the mode of existence of one place unit and of both
existence and non-existence of the second place unit a molecule with three
space points is atman and is indescribable.
(8)From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of
existence and non-existence of the two place units, a molecule with three
space points is the atman and (two) indescribable.
(9)From the points of view of mode of existence of two place units and of
existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of three space
points is (two atmans) and is indescribable.
(10) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place
unit and of both existence and non-existence from other place units, a
molecule of three space points is not atman and is indescribable.
(11) From the points of view the mode of non-existence of one place unit
and of mode of both existence and non-existence of tow place units a
molecule of three space points is not atman and is (two) indescribable.
(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of two place
units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one space point a
molecule of three space points is not (two atman) and is indescribable.
(13) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit
and of non-existence of one place unit, and also the modes of existence and
non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is atman, is
not atman and is indescribable.

After this, Gautama asked explanation about the predication of the molecules of
four space points. Bhagavana Mahavira enunciated nineteen predications--

(1)A molecule with four space points is not atman from the self-nature of the
atman.
(2)A molecule with four space points is not atman from the nature other than the
atman.
(3)A molecule with four space points is indescribable from both the points of
view.
(4)From the viewpoint of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-
existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman and is
not atman.
(5)From the viewpoints of the modes of existence of one place unit and non-
existence of numerous place units, a molecule of four space points is atman
and is not (numerous) atmans.
(6)From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and of
non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous)
atmans and is not atman.
(7)From the points of the view of modes of existence of two place units and of
non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two)
atmans and is not (two) atman.
(8)From the points of view of mode of existence of one space point and the
mode of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four
space points is atman and is indescribable.
(9)From the point of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and the
modes of existence and non-existence of numerous place units and molecules
of four space points it is atman and is indescribable.
(10) From the points of view of the mode of existence of numerous place
units and the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a
molecule of four space points is (numerous) atmans and is indescribable.
(11) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units
and the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule
of four space points is (two) atman and is (two) indescribable.
(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place
unit and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a
molecule of four space points is not atman and is indescribable.
(13) From the points of view of mode of non-existence of one place units
and of existence and non-existence of numerous (place units) a molecule of
four space points is not atman and (numerous) is indescribable.
(14) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of numerous
place unit, a molecule of four space points is not (numerous) atmans and is
indescribable.
(15) From the points of view the modes of non-existence of two place
units and of existence and non-existence of two lace units, a molecule of four
space points is not (two) atmans and is (two) indescribable.
(16) From the points of view of mode of existence of one place unit and of
non-existence of one space point and of the modes of existence and non-
existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman, is not
atman and is indescribable.
(17) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit
and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is not
atman and is (two) indescribable.
(18) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit, of
non-existence of two place unit and of both existence and non-existence of
one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman and (two) not atman
and is inexpressible.
(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units,
of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of
one place unit a molecule of four space points is (two) atmans, is not atman
and is inexpressible.

After this, the question was asked regarding molecule of five space points, and
Bhagavana replied by enunciating twenty-two predicational propositions from
different points of view. They are:

(1)A molecule of five space-points is atman from the point of view of the self-
nature of the atman.
(2)A molecule of five space points is not atman from the point of view of other
nature (paratva).
(3)A molecule of five space points is indescribable from both the self and other
nature.

(4, 5, and 6) These are similar to the predicational propositions of the molecule
of four space points.
(7)From the points of view of the modes of existence of two or three place units
and of non-existence of two or three place units & of non-existence of (two or
three place units) a molecule of five space points is (two or three) atmans.
(When we take the mode of existence of two place units, then we should take
 the mode of non-existence of three place units. When we take the mode of
existence of three place units we should also take the mode of non-existence
of two-place unit.)
(8), (9) and (10) These are similar to the predicational forms similar to the
molecule of four space points.
(11) From the point of view of mode of existence of two or three place
units and of existence and non-existence of two or three place units a
molecule of five space points is (two or three) atmans and is (two or three)
inexpressible.
12, 13 and 14 predicational forms are similar to the predicational forms of a
molecule of four space points.
(14) From the points of view of the modes of existence and non-existence
of two or three place units, and of non-existence of two or three place units, a
molecule of five space points is not (two or three) atmans and is (two or
three) indescribable.
(15) This propositional form is similar to the propositional form of the
molecule of four space points.
(16) From the point of view of existence of one place unit, non-existence
of the one place unit of the modes of existence and non-existence of one of
numerous place units, a molecule of space of five points is atman and is
indescribable.
(17) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit
of non-existence of numerous place units and of existence and non-existence
of one place units a molecule of five space points is atman, is not (numerous)
atmans and is indescribable.
(18) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit,
of non-existence of two place units of existence and non-existence of two
place units a molecule of five space points is atman, is not (two) atman and is
(two) inexpressible.
(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of numerous place
units, of non-existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence
of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is atman is not (two) atman
and is (two) inexpressible.
(20) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units
of non-existence of one place unit and from the point of view of the modes of
existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of five space
points is not (two) atmans, is not atman aid is (two) inexpressible.
(21) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units
and of non-existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and
non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is two
atmans, is not (two) atmans and is avaktavya (inexpressible).

In this way, various combinations and permutations of the propositional forms

regarding the molecule of six space points have been presented. There are
twenty-three propositional forms. Twenty-two predicational forms are the same
as described above and twenty-third is as follows:
From the points of view of modes of existence of two place points of existence of
two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place
units, a molecule of six space points is (two) atmans, is not (two) atmans and is
(two) inexpressible.1

From the discussions given above, it is clear that the seven-fold predicational
school called saptabhangi, is not a later development presented by the acaryas.
Dalsukha Malavania1 says that--

(1)The syadvada doctrine is based on the predication of affirmation and

negation.
(2)From the combinations and permutations of the two propositional forms, we
get other predications.
(3)The primary predications of affirmation and negation give rise to the possible
logical combinations for the sake of presenting other forms of predications.
Each predicational form must have its own viewpoint. Each predicational form
is accepted and is proved. It is valid from a particular point of view in a
particular universe of discourse.
(4)The word "syat" has been prefixed to every predicational form for the sake of
expressing the implication of the point of view.

Therefore, this theory is called 'Syadvada'.

On the basis of these considerations it is clear that the syat is used for connoting
a point of view or a specific situation. When this point of view is clear, the word
'syat' has been used. Therefore, the word 'syat' has a preference to the point of
view or the context in a particular situation in the background of the other
situations as rational presentation.

(5)The third predicational form is "avaktavya" inexpressibility. Some Jaina

philosophers have made is the fourth predication. But in the Agama
literature, this predication has not got the fourth place. It is worth
considering, how and when the predication of "avaktavya" was given the
fourth place; and who gave it.
(6)In the seven-fold predicational forms, there must be seven predications
including the affirmation and negation, neither more nor less. Therefore, the
doctrine of seven-fold predications has its roots in the Agamas. In the case of
the predications regarding the nature of the molecules with three place units
and in the case of more place units the predicational forms are many. But
these predicational forms are only permutations of the seven-fold predications
based on the number of space only. It would be a fallacy to say that the
saptabhangi doctrine is not restricted to seven-fold predications alone.
(7)The conception of the partial place unit structure (vikaladesa) and complete
place unit structure (sakaladesa) is also to be found in the Agama literature,
for analyzing the doctrine of saptabhangi. In the agamas, we find that the
first three predications are 'sakaladesi' and the remaining predications are
'vikaladesi'.
THE METHODOLOGY OF SEVEN-FOLD PREDICATIONS

From the point of view of grammatical presentation of the propositions, there are
two forms of predication (i) of affirmation and (ii) negation. These predications
are complementary, because affirmation implies the negation of its opposite and
negation implies affirmation of its contrary. From the absolute point of view
there is relation between the affirmation and negation, but considered from
relational point of view, the two forms of proposition of affirmation and negation
are complementary to each other. These two propositional forms combine to
give rise to seven-fold predications. The seven-fold predications are:

(1)Syad-asti--From a particular point of view 'it is'.

(2)Syad-nasti--From a different point of view 'it is not'.
(3)Syad-asti-nasti--From a still different approach to problem 'it is and is not'.
(4)Syad avaktavyam--From another point of view, 'it is inexpressible'.
(5)Syad astiavaktavyam--From a point of view, 'it is and is inexpressible'.
(6)Syad nasti-avaktavyam--From another point of view 'it is not and is
inexpressible'.
(7)Syad-asti-nasti avaktavyam--From a different point of view 'it is, it is not and
is inexpressible'.

In the seven-fold predications affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility are

primary forms of predications. With the combinations of these three
predications, we get the remaining four: asti-nasti (affirmation and negation),
asti-avaktavyam (affirmation and inexpressibility), nasti-avaktavyam (negation
and inexpressibility) and asti-nasti-avaktavyam (affirmation, negation and
inexpressibility).

These seven-fold predications have been mentioned in the Agama literature. In

the Bhagavati sutra, seven-fold predications are mentioned.1 Kundakundacarya,
in the Pancastikayasara2 has mentioned the seven-fold predications. The
predications of avaktavya (inexpressibility) has been made the third predication
in the Bhagavati sutra and in the Visesavasyakabhasya.3 In the
Pancastikayasara, Kundakundacarya has made it the fourth predication,4 but in
the Pravacanasara, he has placed it as the third predication.5 Later philosophers
have used both the methods of predications according to their convenience.

SYAD-ASTI (FIRST PREDICATION)

The first predication is syad-asti. It implies that from a particular point of view of
nature, a pot exists as a pot--syad asti ghatah.

The question of the relative approach to the problems from a particular point of
view has been given in this predication. For example, we affirm the existence of
the pot, as pot, in the context of its in which it is, the time of its existence and its
nature as the pot. These refer to the self-nature of the pot. The affirmation as a
predicate does imply the affirmation with reference to its self-nature which is
expressed in the four-fold scheme of expression of dravya (matter) out of which
it is made, the place of its existence, kala the time of its existence, and the
nature of the function of the pot. The predication of affirmation also implies the
predication of negation of its opposite. For instance, the pot is made up of clay
or some metal like brass. It cannot be made out of sand. Similarly, the
characteristic and function of the cloth would be a cover. If the pot were not able
to perform its function of holding water, then it would no longer be called a pot.
Similarly, if a piece of cloth does not possess the qualities of covering or the
function that the cloth has to perform, it would be no longer be called a piece of
cloth. These are the inherent characteristics. If these distinctions in the
functions of different objects were not to be recognized, then there would be no
difference between a quantity of manure and a similar quantity of jaggery. In
this sense, the function of the predication of affirmation has its importance in
presenting the self-identity of the objects.

SECOND PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI)

The second predication is the predication of negation. It is Syad-nasti. It

expresses that in a particular context with reference of the other nature of the
objects (para catustaya); there is the predication of negation. This predication
has reference to the four-fold expression of the other forms and nature of the
objects like the material out of which it is made, the place, the time and its
nature. From the points of view of its nature, other than its own and its
expression of other forms like place, time and the material out of which it is
made, the pot is not a pot. For instance, the pot would be a pot and would
function as a pot only, if it had its own characteristics. With reference to the
other characteristics like its creation out of different materials like sand and its
other place and time; it would not be pot, because it may not function as an
object holding water. This predication of negation from the other point of view is
also important and the predicational forms would not be complete without the
predication of negation. Vidyanandi says that the predication of negation has a
reference to the other nature and the presence of opposite characteristics. If the
negation were to be applied to the object with reference to its own nature, then
the real nature of the pot would not be understood, and, infact, the nature of the
pot as pot would no longer be existent.1 Similarly, if the negation were to be
predicated absolutely without reference to the other nature of the objects then it
would lead to nihilism. It is, therefore, necessary to have second predication of
negation.

THIRD PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-NASTI)

The third predication is the composite predication of affirmation and negation.

For instance, the pot is and is not. These predications are to be considered as
presented successively from different points of view and not simultaneously.
Otherwise, there would be contradiction. From the point of view of the four-fold
scheme of expression of self-nature (svacatustaya), the pot exists as pot. And
from the point of view of the expression of other nature (papa catustaya) the pot
does not exist as pot. In the first two predications, separate and independent
expression of affirmation and negation has been made. But in the third
predication the affirmation and negation are predicated of a thing successively
for the sake of presenting the positive and the negative aspects of the thing.

FOURTH PREDICATION (SYAD AVAKTAVYAM)

The fourth predication presents the concept of inexpressibility. For instance,

from a particular point of view and in a contextual situation the nature of the pot
is inexpressible. The real nature of the pot is its pure form may not be
expressible in terms of words, because a thing is complex and has infinite
characteristics. All of them cannot be presented in words. This refers to the
impossibility of simultaneous affirmations and negations of the characteristics of
the pot. This predication shows that we may understand the nature of the object
in its various aspects, but it is difficult to predicate these characteristics in the
form of language. But it should be realized that the predication of
inexpressibility is not final. It has always reference to a particular point of view
and the situation. Similarly, it is based on the acceptance of contradiction of the
predication of affirmation and negation simultaneously. Otherwise, it would lead
to agnosticism.

FIFTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-AVAKTAVYAM)

This is the composite predication of affirmation and inexpressibility. For

instance, it affirms the existence of the pot as a pot, but express the inability to
express the full nature of the pot. These two predications are also to be
considered as presented from two points of view in a situation. To make this as
an absolute predication would lead to dogmatism and ultimately to agnosticism.

SIXTH PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI-AVAKTAVYAM)

The sixth predication is a composite predication of negation and inexpressibility.

In the first instance, from a particular point of view it is not a pot and in the
second instance, from the point of view of simultaneous affirmation and
negation, it is inexpressible.

SEVENTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-NASTI-AVAKTAYAM)

The seventh predication is a composite predication of affirmation, negation and

inexpressibility. These predications are considered as successive and not
simultaneous, although in the case of the predication of inexpressibility it refers
to the impossibility of affirmation and negation, simultaneously and
consequently inexpressibility of its nature. Therefore, there should be no
contradiction or ambiguity in the presentation of the composite predication of
affirmation, negation and inexpressibility.
The predications of the saptabhangi are dialectical presentations of the
predications, which are possible to express in their various forms of affirmation,
negation and in expressibility. The dialectics of logic has been an important
contribution in the field of logic and metaphysics. Recent researches have
shown that saptabhangi doctrine is very useful in understanding the dialectic of
the theories of probabilities and quantum physics. Eminent scientists like J.B.S.
Haldane and Mahalnobis have recognized the importance of the doctrine of
syadvada for the dialectic of probability and for discoveries of biological
sciences.1

"CATUSTAYA" (EXPRESSION OF FOUR-FOLD ASPECTS)

A thing is complex in its nature with infinite number of attributes. Understanding

a thing requires the insight of analyzing its various aspects, positive and
negative. From the positive aspect of self-nature, we can predicate the
existence of a thing affirmatively. From the point of view of the four-fold
expression of the aspects other than its own, we can predicate the negation of
the existence of the object.1 The four-fold aspects are: (1) the matter out of
which a thing is made (dravya), (2) place of existence (ksetra) (3) time of its
existence (kala) and (4) its nature (bhava). From the point of view of the nature
of matter out of which a thing is made, we may predicate its existence if it is
consistent with its nature. We may predicate its existence if it is constant with
its nature. If we have to refer to its place, time and its function, and if they are
consistent with its nature, then we can predicate its existence. For instance, the
pot is a pot, if it is made out of clay, if it is in a particular determined place, at a
particular time and in its own nature. But if the object is referred to the four-fold
expressions of its aspects other than its real nature, then we predicate the
negation.

Syadvadamanjari present the four-fold expression of the aspects of a thing from

the phenomenal or the practical point of view (vyavaharanaya). For instance,
from the point of view of the substance out of which it is made, we can affirm the
existence of the pot in Patliputra at a particular time, say winter and from the
point of view of its nature as black.2

Every thing in the universe is complex in its nature with its infinite
characteristics. Considered from points of view of its self-nature, in the four-fold
expression of its aspects as mentioned above, we can predicate the affirmation
of its existence as the object is considered from the point of view of the contrary
nature with the objects with reference to the four-fold expression of its otherness
of the aspects, we can predicate the negation of the object. In these
predications there should be no contradiction at all, because as we have pointed
earlier, a thing is not merely made up of positive qualities, it has also the
negative qualities. Therefore, the Jaina conception of the seven-fold predication
with reference to the four-fold expressions of the self-nature and the other
nature is a coherent presentation of he analysis of the nature of the object.
There is no inconsistency either logical or metaphysical in the seven-fold
predications.

Again, there is not doubt or uncertainty in the seven-fold predications. We have

seen that the word 'syat' is not an expression of uncertainty of mere probability.
It is the expression of a particular context of a point of view. From a particular
point of view the predication is always certain and never in doubt. Therefore, we
find that the word 'eva' is suffixed to the predicate. For example, 'syat ghata
asti eva'. It means that from a particular point of view of its self-nature the pot
exists as a pot, and there is not doubt about it.

THE USE OF THE WORD SYAT

Every predication of the seven-fold predications is characterized by the primacy

of the self-nature of predication svadharma. The other nature of the predication
(anyadharma) is secondary. The word 'syat' is used for the sake of giving
emphasis on the distinction of the primary and secondary emphases of the self-
nature and the other nature of the predications. The word 'syat' is primarily
concerned with emphasizing the specific nature of the objects from a particular
point of view. It aims at distinguishing between the primary emphasis of the
specific nature and the secondary emphasis of the other nature of the objects.
In this, the function of denial is not contradictory, but is relational. The word
'syat', therefore, does give importance to the analysis of the objects in the form
of language will possibly be different, because words cannot express the full
nature of the object of experience, but it becomes necessary to predicate the
different aspects of nature from different points of view. If the words had the
capacity of a full expression of the entire nature of the objects, then 'syat' would
not be necessary.1 The expression of anekanta would be also possible without
the use of the word 'syat'. For instance, in the proposition "aham asmi" (I exist),
there are two terms: the subject and the predicate. These are the two terms,
which are consistent and are related intrinsically to each other. The proposition
gives definite meaning of the existence of myself. In this proposition the use of
one of the words would be sufficient to give full meaning of the proposition, but
for the sake of clarity and emphasis, the two words are used. Similarly, in the
proposition--"partho dhanurdharah", gives a clear meaning of the nature and the
state of Arjuna. It is not necessary to use the word 'eva' because the two words
are self-explanatory. Therefore, the word 'eva' is not used.1 The proposition "asti
ghatah" (the pot exists) gives a full and determinate meaning about the
existence of the pot. But for the sake of clarification and emphasis the word
'syat' is also used, as it clears doubts and discrepancies. Acarya Hemacandra
says that the use of the word 'syat' implies the expression of anekanta attitude.2
Akalankadeva says that the function of the 'syat' is two-fold, in giving emphasis
on the validity of anekanta (samyakanekanta) & the validity & rightness of
expression of one point of view (samyak ekanta). So he wished to use the word
syat in naya and pramana both types of saptabhangi.3
SAPTABHANGI IN OTHER DARSANAS

We have seen that the primary predications of saptabhangi are three-fold--

affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. We find similar expressions in other
schools of Indian philosophy like the Vedanta, Buddhism and Vaisesika.

According to the Advaitavedanta, the reality is one. It is Brahman. It is

inexpressible, still it is. Therefore, Brahman is real, but it is inexpressible
(avaktavya). In the Buddhist philosophy, there is nothing permanent or real.
Every thing is fleeting, and is inexpressible in words. Language is an inadequate
instrument for expression of the complex nature of the objects and depth of the
experience. Therefore, the Buddhist expression of the negation of a permanent
reality still leaves the possibility of the real as being inexpressible. Vaisesika
School posits the seven-fold category and samanya (generality) and visesa
(particularity), as the two are independent categories, which are equally real.
Generality and particularity are independent categories though related to each
other and though expressing the affirmation and negation as predications.
However, the real nature of the categories cannot be expressed in language. It
is 'avaktavya'. In this way, the fundamental predications of the Jaina theory of
Saptabhangi have been implied in the systems of philosophy like the
Advaitavedanta, the Buddhists and the Vaisesika.

PRAMANA SAPTABHANGI

Pramana saptabhangi can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold

predications with reference to the valid source of knowledge. It is
comprehensive and all covering, and it is called 'sakaladesa'. While a predication
from a particular naya (point of view) is the predication from a particular point,
because it does not give a comprehensive presentation of reality from all
aspects. Therefore, it is called 'vikaladesa' (partial presentation). The seven-fold
predications from the saptabhangi are comprehensive if they are exhaustive &
cover the different points of view. If the partial presentation is there, it is called
'nayavakya'. The comprehensive presentation is called pramanavakya.

Every thing is complex in its nature and is characterized by infinite attributes. To

give a comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing in all its aspects, it would
require presenting the predications in an infinite number of ways. But such
infinite number of predications is neither possible nor practicable. It would
require infinite time but life is short and it does not permit us in the short span of
time to present the entire nature of an object. Therefore, it is necessary to use
significant words pregnant with comprehensive meaning. This is possible by the
comprehensive presentation of the nature of the object in a language, which
uses the valid sources of knowledge. The synthetic view of presentation (abheda
upacara) is necessary for the comprehensive predication of reality. The
synthetic and non-synthetic and non-dual presentation implies the diversity of
expression also in giving the diverse nature of the object. This is 'pramana
saptabhangi'.
A question arises--what is the nature of 'abheda vrtti' (the approach of unity) &
non-duality? What do we mean by the presentation, especially when there is
abundant diversity in the things of the world? We can ask what is the basis of
the oneness the comprehensiveness and oneness (aheda?). the answer to this
would be, that the real nature of the object does not express unity alone of
diversity alone, it is complex and the predications have also to be complex. The
predication of the unity does imply the expression of diversity though secondary
& sometimes is mentioned as inexpressible. The unitary & synthetic approach to
the understanding of the nature of a thing is expressed in the different
predications as presenting the following aspects of the infinite nature of the
object: (1) Kala (time) (2) atmarupa (self-nature) (3) artha (meaning) (4)
sambandhah (relation) (5) upakara (function) (6) gunidesa (existence in a place)
(7) samsarga (association) and (8) sabda (expression in words). In this way, by
presenting the synthetic and the synoptic picture of the objects in its various
aspects like its nature, its substance, relation, causality etc., we get a
comprehensive nature of the objects. This is 'sakaladesa', because it
comprehends to the various attributes of the object in a synoptic way.

In predicating the nature of the objects like jiva, we lay emphasis on the
predication of existence (astitva) & this predication implies the predications of
the other aspects of the objects like its nature, its relation, its function, the time
and the place in which it is to be found. We analyse this with the reference to
the eight aspects:

(1)Kala: When we predicate the existence of a thing like a pot, we also predicate
the existence of the other attributes like its color, its size, its quality of
hardness, etc. For this reason, with reference to the aspect of time the other
attributes alongwith the existence are non-different and can be
comprehensively apprehended.
(2)Atma-rupa: It refers to the real nature of the objects. In predicating the real
nature of the object, as for instance of a pot (ghata), we have also to
predicate the other attributes like it's black color, its hardness etc., by
implication. These attributes are inherent in the very nature of the objects.
Therefore, the description of the objects implies the description of the
inherent qualities.
(3)Artha: Existence is an attribute of the pot. Similarly, the attributes of
blackness and hardness are related to the objects. All these attributes exist in
the same place and therefore there is no difference between existence and
other attributes with the view of (artha) meaning.
(4)Sambandha: Just as the relation of the attributes of existence with the
subject is that of inherence, so also the relation of the other attributes with
the objects is that of inherence. There is no difference in their relation.
(5)Upakara: Just as the attribute of existence implies the use and the function
of the object like the pot, so also the other attributes imply the characteristics
of that pot. In this sense, there is the relation of non-difference (abheda).
(6)Gunidesa: The relation between the object and its attributes is intimate and
inherent in a specific place and situation. So is the relation of the object with
 other inherent characteristics. This type of relation is the product of
intellectual discrimination.
(7)Samsarga: Just as the attributes of existence with the object is intimately
connected, so also the other attributes which are inherent. The distinction
between the other attributes is not known through the senses. Therefore, the
association of the objects with the inherent qualities can be considered to be
one of non-difference.
(8)Sabda: The existence is predicated by the word 'is'. Similarly, the other
inherent attributes of the objects are predicated by the word 'is'. The objects
like the pot exists, is black, is hard etc. In these prepositions, the verb 'is' is
the copula which connects the object with the attributes. If this connecting
link were not to be there, then the attributes would be associated
affirmatively with the objects. The association of the object with its attributes
is through the verb 'Is'. Thus it expresses the relation of non-difference.

In this sense, the relation of non-difference of the object with its essential
attributes has to be considered in aspects of kala, desa etc. This is the
characteristic of the pramana svarupa & pramana saptabhangi. The relation of
the object with its qualities with reference to the modes is not to be considered
as primary in this connection.

NAYA SAPTABHANGI

Naya is a point of view that one takes in looking at an object. It presents a

partial picture of the object, without denying the predication of other aspects of
the same object. Naya can be considered from two points as 'Sunaya' (valid
point of view) and 'Durnaya' (invalid point of view). Sunaya aims at presenting
the picture of the object from a particular point of view, but it does not claim to
say that it is the only and exclusive point of view. Naya saptabhangi (the seven-
fold predications from the point of view of naya) is a valid presentation of the
predications of the naya and hence it is 'Sunaya'. Another consideration
regarding the analysis of the naya would be that the predications of the naya
imply the differentiations of predications and not the non-difference of
presenting the attributes. It is essentially 'bhedadrsti' to see the differentiated
qualities of the thing, from a particular point of view.

From the Point of View of Kala

Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The presentation

of the inherent characteristics of the substance in a synthetic way is secondary
of the Naya saptabhangi. In the pramana-saptabhangi, we find the effort at
finding out the synthetic presentation in the diversified predications. But in the
naya saptabhangi, we give prominence to the diversifications and to the analysis
of the attributes from different points of view. This analysis may be considered
from eight aspects like kala (time), atmarupa (self-nature), artha (object) etc as
in the description in the Pramana saptabhangi. It is as follows: --
(1)Kala (time): The attributes of the objects undergo constant modifications
every moment. The emphasis on modifications as different points of time is
the primary consideration in the nayasaptabhangi. In this sense, from the
point of view of time, there is differentiation in the expression of modes and
not the non-difference as in the case of pramana saptabhangi.
(2)Atmarupa (self-nature): The attributes of an object express themselves in
different modes. The different modes cannot be considered as identical and
the distinction between attributes of an object cannot be eliminated. If there
are differences in the attributes and modes, then there would be do
distinction between an object and another object and in the same object in
different times. Therefore from the point of view of the aspect of atmarupa
also there is the expression of difference and non-difference.
(3)Artha: From different points of view, the substratum of the attributes will
have to be considered different, because if they were to be considered as one,
then, there would be no distinction between objects, and the substratum will
become one. The difference in the artha is an important characteristic of the
naya-saptabhangi with reference to the artha of the substratum.
(4)Sambandha: With reference to the relation of the objects and the attributes
of the objects, we find that the characteristics of differentiation are primary.
For instance, the relation of Gurudatta with his son will be different from that
of his relation with his wife or his brother.
(5)Upakara: Upakara refers to function or utility. This also implies
differentiation in the context of the seven-fold predications of the naya. The
functions of the different objects are different.
(6)Gunidesa: The objects with different characteristics express differentiations
in different situations and places. Otherwise, if they were to be considered as
identical, then no distinction would be possible as for instance, in that case,
the experiences of pleasure and pain of one man would not have been
different from the experiences of another man. This is the essential
characteristic of difference in the objects having different attributes and
modes.
(7)Samsarga: The relation between the different objects and their modes
expresses the essential characteristics of differentiations and diversities. For
instance, while eating the different condiments, the ultimate experience of
these will be a synthetic presentation of all the tastes together, as in the case
of eating the beatle leaf, the beatle nut and cardamom.
(8)Sabda: The predications of the nature of different objects will have to use
different words. One word cannot express the differentiated functions of the
different objects. If it were not so, then all experiences and the
characteristics of objects would have been explained by one word only.

Thus we find that Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the differentiation of

predicational aspect, while Pramana saptabhangi gives emphasis on the non-
difference (abheda) of the predicational form, as it is synthetic in nature.

Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between
attributes and modes is one of the combinations of non-difference and
difference. When we study the object with reference to the different aspects of
pramana, we look at the object in a comprehensive way, and the predications of
pramana give the picture of the object in a synoptic way by emphasizing the
different aspects as a coherent whole. The differentiation is secondary. But in
the seven-fold predications of naya, the emphasis is on presenting one aspect of
an object from a particular point of view and the predications analyse the
different aspects of an object. It does not give a synthetic picture. It is
concerned with the analytic function of the predicational forms regarding the
nature of object. In Naya saptabhangi, the nature of the object is analyzed from
different points of view with reference to its modes in different aspects of time,
dravya etc. Therefore, the function of differentiation 1 (Bhedopacara pramana) is
sakaladesa (comprehensive) and coherent, while Naya is vikaladesa (partial) and
analytic.

VYAPYA AND VYAPAKA BHAVA (PERVADED AND PERVADING CHARACTERISTICS)

The relation between the Syadvada and saptabhangi is of the relation of

pervasive and pervading characteristics. Syadvada is pervasive while
saptabhangi is pervading. Syadvada, when expressed in definite predicational
forms, becomes Saptabhangi. But Saptabhangi may be considered to be a form
of Syadvada or it may not be. Naya is not to be identified with Syadvada, but it
has the characteristics of expressing itself in the forms of Saptabhangi. This is to
be found as a characteristic in the Naya and the Syadvada doctrines.

NO INFINITE PREDICATIONS (ANANTABANGI)

We have seen that the nature of a thing is complex and it has infinite attributes.
Therefore, a question has been asked that if the attributes of a thing are infinite
why should there not be infinite predications? The answer to this is that it is true
that there are infinite attributes of a thing, but each attribute can be expressed
in the seven-fold predications, and hence there would be infinite number of
seven-fold predications. If each attribute were to express one predication only,
then there would have been infinite predications for infinite attributes, but that is
not so. Each attribute or characteristic has its seven-fold predications and its
nature can be expressed in the seven-fold predications. Thus there would be
infinite or seven-fold predications.1

Acarya Siddhasena and Abhayadevasuri maintain that the primary predications

of the seven-fold predications would be affirmation, negation and
inexpressibility. The other four predications are permutations of the same. They
are "vikaladesi" (partial expressions).2 Similarly, Acarya Santisuri in his
Nyayavatara-sutravartika3 has also suggested that the primary predications of
asti, nasti and avaktavya are 'sakaladesi' and the remaining four predications
are vikaladesi. But Upadhyaya Yasovijaya in his Jaintarkabhasa says that all the
seven predications of the Saptabhangi are sakaladesi as well as vikaladesi.
Akalanka and Vidyananda have said that the seven-fold predications are all
'sakaladesi and vikaladesi'.4
Those Acaryas who have considered the primary predications of sat, asat and
avaktavya as 'sakaladesi' and the remaining 'vikaladesi' are of the opinion that
the first predication is of identity or non-difference from the substantial point of
view and we get a full knowledge of the nature of the substance. The second
predications refer to the paryayas, and from the point of view of non-difference
in the case of the predication of negation, we may get the comprehensive picture
of the object. The third predication of inexpressibility expresses the concept of
difference (bheda) in an implicit way (avivaksita). In this way, the knowledge of
the full nature of the object is possible without much difficulty. From the point of
view of the concept of non-difference (abhedarupa) the three predications
comprehend the nature of the object in a fuller way (sakaladesi), while the other
four predications comprehend the nature of the objects in partial aspects.
Therefore they are vikaladesi.

Some other philosophers do not give prominence to this way of thinking

regarding the comprehensive or the partial understanding of the nature of an
object. Understanding of the nature of an object can be covered from the
affirmative side by emphasizing the positive aspects of the object; we can very
well get a fuller comprehension. Therefore, all the seven predications of the
saptabhangi can be considered as presenting fuller comprehension (sakaladesi)
or partial comprehension (vikaladesi) according to the nature and the emphasis
of the predications.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SAPTABHANGI

The Indian Philosophers in the past have presented four-fold aspects of the
predications for comprehending an object. The four-fold predications are (1) sat
(affirmation), (2) asat (negation) and (3) ubhaya (affirmation and negation), (4)
anubhaya (neither affirmation nor negation). In the 'Nasadiya sukta' of the
Rgveda, two contradictory hypotheses of expression as affirmation and negation
have been presented1 It seems that before the seer of this sukta, there were two
opinions regarding the creation of the universe. Some suggested that the
primary cause of the universe is being, while others said it is non-being. The
seers then presented the third view i.e.--it is neither being nor non-being, but it is
both neither being nor non-being (anubhaya). In this way, the three forms of
expression of being, non-being and neither being nor non-being were expressed
in the Rgveda.2 Similar view is also to be found in the Upanisads, and there is the
possibility of the presentation of both the points of view.1 In this tradition three-
fold forms of expression of being, non-being and being non-being (ubhaya) are
also found. In the view, where there is negation of both sat and asat, we find the
fourth predication of neither being nor non-being (anubhaya).

In the Upanisads we get the four forms as expression as sat (being),2 asat (non-
being),3 sadasat (being and non-being) and neither both (anubhaya). Anubhaya
may also be said to be avaktavya (inexpressible.) 4 The predication of avaktavya
has three meanings as (1) it is a negation of being and non-being (2) it is a
negation of being, non-being and both (sadasat) and (3) sat and asat are to be
considered as predicated simultaneously. The predication of avaktavya is very
important in the Upanisadas.5 Avaktavya has been given the third place of
predication, the first being sat and the second asat. In some places, the
predications have been given the fourth place and in that case it expresses that
the negation of the three predications of sat, asat and sadasat. The predication
of avaktavya can be considered as of two forms, as sapeksa (relative) and
nirapeksa (absolute). Sapeksa avaktavyata expresses the concept of
inexpressibility of the sat, asat and of both. Nagarjuna, the Buddhist
philosopher, has presented the concept of inexpressibility of all the four
predications of sat, asat, ubhaya, and anubhaya. This is the expression of
catuskoti. In this way the sapeksa (inexpressibility) predication is based on the
negation of the first, second and third or all the four aspects. It expresses, the
negation of being, non-being, being and non-being and, neither being and non-
being. These predications may be simultaneous or successive. This presents
inexpressibility as a category. The concept of inexpressibility with reference to
the predications is considered to be sapeksa avaktavyata (relative
inexpressibility). Nirapeksa avaktavyata (non-relative inexpressibility) is that
which presents the concept of inexpressibility regarding the description of the
nature of the object, as the nature of the object is incomprehensible.

The four-fold expressions mentioned above are to be found in the Buddha's

concept of Vibhajyavada, or avyakrtavada. The Buddha described the problems
regarding reality as presenting an end (or santata) or as endless. Similarly,
reality as eternal or non-eternal is questions, which are indescribable (avyakrta).
The problem regarding the continuation or not of Tathagata after nirvana is a
problem which is inexpressible and indescribable.

When the Buddha was asked-- (1) does the Tathagata exists after nirvana? The
Buddha was silent. (2) does he not exist after nirvana? He was silent. (3) does
he exist and not exist after death? --the Buddha was again silent, the final
question was (4) does he neither exist nor non-exist?1 He did not reply.

For the Buddha, these problems were avyakrta. They were indescribable in
words. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. Similarly, the
problems regarding the fact of misery (dukkha) can be analyzed in terms of
catuskoti. The questions regarding the man, who suffers, whether he suffers due
to himself, due to others, due to both or due to neither, are all avyakrta
problems.

At the time of Mahavira, we find a similar four-fold approach to the problems in

the Ajnanavada (theory of nescience) of Sanjaya Velatthiputta. Sanjaya
Velatthiputta gave answers to such problems neither in the affirmation nor in the
negation and not in both. He was advocating the theory of doubt and
uncertainty. For him, such problems were neither vyakrta nor avyakrta. It is
difficult to predicate anything about them. In this sense, we can say that his
theory was primarily a theory of uncertainty and doubt. It is skepticism. In
modern western philosophy, we find Hume's position similar to that of Sanjaya
Velatthiputta.
The theory of uncertainty was expressed by Sanjaya regarding some
metaphysical problems like-- (1) the existence of the other world, (2) the fruit of
good or bad action and (3) the concept of immortality. According to him, it is
difficult to say whether the world exists, whether it does not exist, whether it
does not does not exist and whether it neither exists nor does not exist.

Sanjaya's theory of doubt is quite different from the Syadvada of the Jainas. The
theory of doubt presents uncertainty in any predication, while Syadvada stands
from the foundation of certainty of expression of different points of view. There
is no doubt in the predicational form regarding the nature of the object
predicated from different points of view. From a particular point of view, the
predication is certain and not in doubt. Similarly, Syadvada does not advocate,
as the Buddhists do, the theory of inexpressibility as a final form of expression.
The implication of the catuskoti of the Buddhists is that the nature of the
problem is inexpressible in its fundamental aspect, but in the Jaina concept of
inexpressibility (avaktavya) there is not uncertainty; it only says that the words
cannot express the nature of the object in its different aspects. It is possible to
predicate existence & non-existence simultaneously from a particular asceticism,
nor nihilism, nor the theory of ignorance. It is the theory of certainty of
expression with certain knowledge from a particular point of view.

Bhagavana Mahavira presented the synoptic approach to the understanding of

the problems in his Anekanta and Syadvada theories. Nature of a thing need not
be analyzed from the four aspects only as in the case of the predications in
catuskoti. But the nature of a thing is complex, it has infinite aspects and each
aspect can be predicated in infinite ways. Therefore, every aspect can be
presented in the seven-fold predications, and there is infinite number of
predications.

In the Upanisadic period, the problem regarding the aspects of existence and
non-existence (sat and asat) of the objects and their nature were discussed, but
the discussion was not exhaustive. Sanjaya tried to explain away the problems
by referring to the Vibhajyavada and said that certain problems, which are
metaphysical, are inexpressible (avyakrta) but Mahavira was not satisfied with
such partial solutions of the problems. He gave dialectic of the predications by
the help of rigorous logical exercise and presented Syadvada and
Saptabhangivada.
NIKSEPAVADA: A Study

TERMINOLOGY OF NIKSEPA

Man uses language for expressing his ideas. Without the use of language, he
cannot express his thoughts. Man is different from animals in this that he has
the power of expressing in a language, while animals cannot make use of the
language for expressing their experiences. Without the use of language it is
difficult to carry on the activities in this world. Language is the medium of
communication. There are numerous languages and millions of words in these
languages. Each language uses different words for explaining things. It is,
therefore, necessary to have knowledge of the words that we use. Language
would be useful and it will serve its function properly if its words are replace with
exact meaning.

The function of Niksepavada is to understand the exact content of the words in

terms of meaning and its usage. This is the theory of niksepa. The essence of
the Niksepavada is to study the implications of the meanings in the words and in
their definiteness and to try to find out the implications of the words in the
meanings. In fact, the function of niksepa is to define words with reference of
their content or the meaning and the usage.1

The other sense in which niksepa is used to "nyasa" it is implication and

clarification. In the Tattvarthasutra, the word 'nyasa' has been used.2

In the Tattvartharajavartika, it is described as nyaso niksepa, meaning the

clarification and definitising of words.

UTILITY OF NIKSEPA

In the Anuyogadvara it is stated that the main function of niksepa is to clear the
meaning of the word and to find a definite meaning of the words. This is its use.1
Laghiyastraya describes the function of niksepa as to remove the inadequate
meaning of a word and to present the exact meaning.2 Upadhyaya Yasovijaya
says that the function of niksepa is to present the correct meaning of the word
by removing ambiguity and indeterminateness.3

The function of niksepa is to remove ignorance, doubt or perversity of meaning

of a word. The primary function is to determine the exact meaning of the word
used.

A question has been raised regarding the necessity of niksepa in the logical
analysis of the meaning of term, specially when pramana and naya give us the
knowledge of the nature of object.
The answer is that, pramana and naya are concerned with presenting the
knowledge of the object fully or partially. But niksepa is more concerned with
linguistic use of the words and their meanings. The utterance of a word
expresses the meaning that is intended by the person using it in addition to the
meaning that accuses to the word. The unintended meanings of the words are
likely to create confusion and ambiguity in the use of words. For the purpose of
understanding the nature of a thing, we have to depend upon the language that
we use. Sometimes language presents difficulties in understanding the
connotation of a word, because the real meaning and the intended meaning may
differ. Therefore, we have to consider two types of meanings of the word: (1)
primary meaning and (2) the secondary. The make a distinction between the
primary and secondary meaning, it is important to analyze the linguistic function
of niksepa. The distinction between the primary and the secondary meanings is
possible to be possible to be understood through the different varieties of
niksepa like nama niksepa. So one cannot have the knowledge of object
(tattvartha) without the help of niksepa.1

Bhattakalanka in his Siddhiviniscaya2 has described the function of niksepa as

the act of knowing and determining the meaning of the word used for
understanding the nature of the things through naya. There are numerous forms
of niksepa, but four of them are prominent. The object of these different forms
of niksepa is primarily to dispel errors and misunderstanding about the meaning
of the words used for explaining the nature of a thing. Through dravyarthika
(from the point of view of substance) and paryayarthika (from the point of view
of modes) naya, we can understand the exact nature of the categories of jiva
and ajiva etc. niksepa does not only give us the knowledge of the category, but
is removes doubts and indiscrepancies in the meaning. The primary importance
of niksepa is to emphasize that we must use appropriate words mentioning the
connotation of a term for explaining the nature of the objects.

THE BASIS OF NIKSEPA

The basis of niksepa can be analyzed into four aspects as (1) primary
(pradhana), (2) secondary (apradhana), (3) imagined (kalpita) and (4) un-
imagined (akalpita). Bhava is unimagined drsti. It is therefore primary. The
other three niksepas are more concerned with the mental constructions.
Therefore, they are not primary.

Nama niksepa enables us to recognize an object. Sthapana niksepa does not

give us the qualities, but it gives us the idea of form. Dravya niksepa enables us
to know the meaning of the word with reference to its functions and also with
reference to its prior and posterior characteristics. In this sense, the nama,
Sthapana and the dravya niksepas are expressions, which are primarily
concerned with grammatical and linguistic analysis of the statements and not so
much with the expositions of the nature of the object. Therefore, they are not
primary.
THE NIKSEPA METHODOLOGY

Niksepa presents a harmonious blending of the word and its expression. It would
be difficult to understand the significance of the meaning of the terms used
without niksepa. The special characteristic of niksepa is that it gives clarity of
expression and thought in analyzing the meaning of the word as it is expressed
by the word. The words signify the meanings and meaningful words are the
primary consideration of the use of language. Words and their expressions
convey the characteristics that the objects have. Sometimes, although the
words do not convey the presence of attributes of an object, the implication of
the presence of attributes is to be found in the use of the words. In this sense,
the intention of the speaker is also important, otherwise the language will lead
us astray and serious fallacies will arise. For example, a person who was a judge
some time in the past cannot be always considered to be a judge even at the
present moment. It may be a false statement. This kind of a distinction in the
use of the words and the significance of the meanings of the words in different
situations is an important function of niksepa.

Nama niksepa refers to the name, more specially the proper name, arbitrarily
given to an object without considering the presence or the qualities suggested by
the name. For example, the name of a very poor man may be Laxminarayana.
A proper name has no connotation.

Sthapana niksepa, the denotation of a thing and the connotation is implied and
projected in the object, although it does not by itself have that connotation. For
instance, a stone image is referred to as God.

Dravya niksepa refers to the substance with its qualities implied in the word. For
example, a pot, which used to contain ghee in the past, is even now called ghee-
pot. Similarly, a pot purchased for keeping ghee, but which does not at present
contain ghee, is also called a ghee-pot. A person who was an eminent lawyer
gives up his practice as a lawyer and starts a business. Still he is called a lawyer.
A person of wealth in this world is called Indra and a person who possesses
spiritual wealth of self-knowledge is called Indra in the spiritual sphere.

In this sense, the practical way of expressing the nature of things through words
in order to present adequate meanings is called niksepa methodology.

NAYA AND NIKSEPA

The relation between naya and niksepa is that of the relation between the object
and expression of its qualities. Naya is jnanatmaka (concerning knowledge). It is
epistemological, while niksepa is concerned with the expression of the contents
of knowledge through language. In is logical and linguistic. Nama and Sthapana
and dravya niksepa are all concerned with the substance and its attributes, while
bhava niksepa has reference to its modes.1
NAMA NIKSEPA

Nama niksepa refers to a proper name. It has no connotation. It is a name given

to an object arbitrarily for the sake of recognizing it for practical purposes. The
proper name may have connotation when it gets an acquired connotation or it
may be a meaningless name. For instance, in some cases we give a name to an
object or an animal without consideration regarding its nature or qualities. An
unlettered man may be called Vidyasagara. A poor man is named as Laxmipati.
These names given to the two individuals are purely arbitrary and have no
connotation. But if the names given to the individuals do acquire the
connotations suggested by the name, it would be bhave niksepa. When one who
is called Vidyasagara becomes a learned man, then it would not be merely a
meaningless name. It would acquire a connotation. The names like Vidyasagara
and Laxmipati do suggest the connotation of learning and possession of wealth;
but a proper name need not imply these characteristics, as they are given
arbitrarily to an individual. The expression of the content of the meaning is not
important in the Nama niksepa, although the intention of the parents in giving
these names to their children may be noble and filled with maudlin sentiments.
But the function of the Nama niksepa is only to present a name without the
content of the meaning.

The Nama niksepa refers to proper names, but some proper names have their
various modes of expressions suggesting different meanings. For instance, Indra
is also called Devendra, Surendra, Purandara and Sakra etc. But a proper name
given to an individual cannot be exchanged to anyone of these modes. Indra is
always called Indra. He cannot be called as Surendra, Sakra, etc.

With reference to time, Nama niksepa has two aspects: one is permanent and
the other is temporary. The names, which are permanent for things, which are
eternal, refer to 'sasvata-nama-niksepa'. The names like Surya, Candra, Mount
Meru, Siddhasila, Loka, Aloka etc. refer to sasvata (permanent) namaniksepa. In
the cases, where there are modifications and developments, the name may not
remain appropriate for the object after sometime. This would be asasvata
(temporary) namaniksepa. For example, a girl may be called Kamala in her
parents' house and she may be called Vimala in her husband's house. This is a
proper name without connotation and it is not a permanent name given to an
individual.

STHAPANA NIKSEPA

Sthapana niksepa refers to the identification of the meaning of the word,

although a meaning may not be identical. In this, we take a word and identify
the meaning of the word with one object. Sthapana niksepa is of two types: (1)
Tadakara (of the same form) and (2) Atadakara (of different form). In these
sadbhava sthapana and asadbhava sthapana may also be distinguished. If the
meaning of an object is fixed on the object of the same form, it is called tadakara
sthapana. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is
called tadakara sthapana. But the signets of chess are also called as elephant or
horse etc., but they are not identical with the shape of horses, elephant's etc.
Such identification of signets as elephants and horses is called atadakara
sthapana. Nama and sthapana niksepa are not very much significant with
reference to the meaning of the objects in the practical life.

DRAVYA NIKSEPA

Dravya niksepa does not refer to the mental, the physical element, like the
intention as to the nature of the object; and its state in the past, present and the
future does not depend on our intention and idea. Therefore it is called dravya
niksepa, because it expresses the state of the object in one of the transferable
forms, like, past as used in the present etc. For example, sometimes we use the
description in the present context of the state although it may refer to the past
state. Similarly, of the future state, we may refer in the present state. A pot,
which contained ghee in the past, may still be called the ghee-pot. Similarly, if a
pot is purchased for keeping ghee in future, the pot may still be called the ghee-
pot. A person who was a judge in the past, but has since retired, may still be
called a judge; or a person who is to be a king in future may be addressed as a
king.

The scope of dravya niksepa is very wide. It may cover the expressions relating
to the past or the future as projected into the present tense. The future king is
also called king. And when the king is dead, his body is also referred to the king.

Dravya niksepa is of two types: (1) 'Agama dravya niksepa' and (2) 'no-agama
dravya niksepa'. No-agama dravya niksepa is of three types: (1) jna-sarira, (2)
bhavya sarira and (3) tad-vyatirikta. The Atman knows through a body and this
is called jna-sarira or jnayaka sarira. Similarly, we see the dead body of a
learned man, and then we say that he was a learned man. This is jna-sarira, no-
agama dravya niksepa.

In the first two types of niksepa, the emphasis is on the body, which is only the
medium. In the third, the emphasis is not so much on the body, but it is on the
bodily activities, like--movement of the hands etc. For example, when an ascetic
is preaching, he may make gestures with the hands. These gestures are tad-
vyatirikta no-agama dravya niksepa.

Agama dravya niksepa refers to the implication of the meanings and the
cognition content of the meaning, rather than the exact expressed form of the
knowledge. In the no-agama dravya niksepa there is the absence of both types
of knowledge, expressed or implied. It only refers to the medium of knowledge
i.e. the body. No-agama tadvyatirikta dravya niksepa does not possess any
content of knowledge. Therefore, it is called dravya niksepa. This is of three
types: (1) Laukika, for instance, according to the common parlance of language
"Sriphala" is auspicious. (2) Kupravacanika, for example, according to this
"Vinayaka" (god Ganesa) is called auspicious. (3) Lokottara: From the ultimate
point of view, religion with jnana (knowledge), darsana (faith) and earitra
(conduct) is auspicious.

In this way, bereft of the content of the meaning, and also bereft of the present
state of the object, we recognize the other states as the present and we impose
the present state and consider to be always there. This is dravya niksepa.

BHAVA NIKSEPA

Bhava niksepa refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object
through the word.

The learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be said to
be a teacher. This is Agama bhava niksepa. In this sense, he is a real teacher. A
teacher who is engaged in the activities of teaching may be considered to be a
teacher in activity from the point of view of "No-agama bhava niksepa".

In these cases, the word has no reference to the aspect or the function in partial
form. It has three forms: (1) Laukika, (2) Kupravacanika and (3) Lokottara.

We have seen that there are similar distinctions in the no-agama tadvyatirikta
dravya niksepa, but there is a primary difference in the emphasis of the two
forms of niksepa. The word 'no' in the dravya niksepa implies the absence of the
cognitive functions (agama). But in the bhava niksepa there is a partial absence
of cognitive functions.1 The scope of dravya tadvyatirikta is primarily activity and
not cognitive function. While the scope of bhave tadvyatirikta is two-fold: i.e.,
the expression of activity and also the cognition implied in the activity. For
example, a teacher makes some gestures by the hand and turns over the pages.
These activities do not refer to the cognition. In this sense, the word 'no' in the
bhava niksepa refers to the partial negation. The function of the bhava niksepa
is primarily concerned with the expression of the present state and the mode of
the object. In this expression of niksepa, there is the absence of the distinction
of activity of the body as a medium of cognition. This is the difference between
the two types of niksepa.

Every thing is expressed through niksepa. It is the linguistic expression; there is

infinite number of expressions. But every thing has to be expressed in the form
of four expressions of niksepa. Only one niksepa will not give a full picture of the
state of the object. Every object has its name. It is Nama niksepa. It has its
state. It is sthapana niksepa. It is referred to with reference to its material, it is
dravya niksepa and there is the expression of the nature and its attributes. It is
bhava niksepa.

We give below the classification of niksepa as discussed in the earlier pages.

NIKSEPA
(1)Nama (2) Sthapana (3) Dravya (4) Bhava
- Sthapana: (A) Tadakara (B) Atadakara
- Dravya: (A) Agama (B) Noagama
- Bhava: (A) Agama (B) Noagama

Dravya: (B) Noagama: (a) Jna-Sarira (b) Bhavya-sarira (c) Tadvyatirikta

Dravya: (B) Noagama: (c) Tadvyatirikta: (1) Laukika (2) Kupravacanika (3)
Lokottara
Bhava: (B) Noagama: (a) Laukika (b) Kupravacanika (c) Lokottara

The concept of Niksepa is primarily linguistic in nature. It is aimed at giving the

exact meaning of a term.

NAYAVADA: A Study

THOUGHT AND ITS BASIS

Nayavada is a significant contribution of the Jaina logic and epistemology. If

helps to understand the nature of an object in a comprehensive way. It is the
basis of the principal Anekanta.

It would be necessary to understand the foundational processes of thought for

the sake of our knowledge of the Nayavada. The empirical activities are of three
types:
1. Concerned with knowledge and its effects.
2. Concerned with the objects and its modifications.
3. Concerned with the language and the use of the word.

The process of thought, in which there is the predominance of the purpose or a

will, it is jnanasrayi, based on the knowledge. Naigamanaya is of this type. That
which is based upon the object arthasrayi. Sangraha, Vyavahara and rjusutra
nayas are arthasrayis as they primarily refer to the objects and there
modifications. In these nayas, there is the analysis of the varied aspects and
distinctions of objects. The Sangrahanaya is primarily concerned wit finding out
the unity in the diversity of the modes of the objects. Nyaya and Vaisesika
system of philosophy are based upon vyavahara naya. Ksanikavada of the
Buddhists is an expression of rjusutranaya. The nayas, which are concerned with
the analysis of words and the linguistic study, are called sabdasrayi. Sabda,
Samabhirudha and Evambhuta nayas are pertaining to the words. These nayas
are primarily concerned with the linguistic study and the persons who study
these give importance to the science of language.

On the basis of the considerations mentioned above we may analyse the

characteristics of the nayas as:
1. Naigamanaya refers to the purpose or the object in view that is in the mind of
the person who is responding.
2. Sangrahanaya refers to the tendency to find unity among diversity.
3. Vyavaharanaya is very much concerned with particularity and the study of
diversity.
4. Rjusutranaya aims at presenting the aspect of reality from the point of view of
the momentary present.
5. Sabdanaya analyses the function of the word and its meaning.
6. Samabhirudhanaya refers to the etymological meaning of the word.
7. Evambhutanaya analyses the specific situations and the contexts in which a
particular meaning is referred to the word.

THE BASIS OF DISTINCTIONS OF NAYA

The primary consideration of sangrahanaya is the emphasis on unity, while that

of vyavaharanaya is on diversity. Sangrahanaya does not accept diversity as the
basis and vyavahara ignores unity in its search for diversity. But the basis of
naigamanaya is the synthesis of the diversity and unity. It asserts that unity and
diversity are equally present in an object, but the emphasis may be on one or
the other according to the purpose of the analysis. In some cases, the unity
becomes primary and the diversity is secondary, while in some others diversity
becomes primary and the unity is secondary. The varied emphasis on unity and
diversity is primarily mental and is based upon the purpose and the predilection
of the individual.1 sometimes, an object, which has the diverse modifications,
becomes important but sometimes the modifications, which are diverse, are
prominent.

Rjusutranaya is based on the principle of diversity only. It is concerned with the

analysis of the nature of the object from the point of view momentary present. It
does not find any relevance for the past or the future modifications. Sabdanaya
studies the meaning and function of the word. Its primary emphasis is on getting
the exact meaning of the word. Samabhirudhanaya has reference to
etymological meaning of the word. Evambhutanaya is more specific and it aims
at finding out the exact meaning of the word in a particular situation and in a
particular context with reference to the present. These nayas are based upon
the concepts of unity and diversity. The principles of unity and diversity are
operative in these nayas in different forms as shown below:
1. Naigamanaya emphasizes that the unity and diversity both are important.
2. Sangrahanaya gives prominence to unity and in that (a) parasangraha
emphasis absolute unity while (b) apara-sangraha gives prominence to
relative unity or oneness.
3. Vyavaharanaya is concerned primarily with the diversity and difference of
both absolute and relative types.
4. Rijusutranaya gives importance to diversity and difference.
5. Sabdanaya similarly gives importance to difference.
6. Samabhirudha and Evambhuta are also concerned with difference.

In these nayas, sangrahanaya emphasis non-difference or unity. Those, which

give emphasis on difference or diversity, are five in number and naigamanaya
gives importance to both difference and unity. The Jainas have said that unity
and diversity, oneness and manyness, and substantiality and modifications are
equally important and real. There cannot be any diversity without unity and
there cannot be any unity without diversity. Both are real, both are
complementary. One without the other is not possible.

THE TWO TRADITIONS

We have seen that the nayas can be classified into two types as (a)
dravyarthika--those concerned with the understanding of substance and (b)
paryayarthika--those concerned with the understanding of the modes. There are
two traditions in understanding these nayas. One is the metaphysical tradition
and the other is the logical tradition. Jinabhadragani Ksamasramana outlined the
metaphysical tradition. According to him, naigama, sangraha, vyavahara and
rjusutranaya are dravyarthika nayas. While sabda, samabhiruddha and
evambhuta nayas refer tot he paryayas, therefore, they are paryayarthika nayas.
Siddhasena Divakara has given the logical tradition. According to him, the first
three nayas are dravyarthika nayas and the remaining are paryayarthika nayas.1

The metaphysical tradition considers rjusutranaya as dravyarthika as it refers to

the substance. This view is based on the 14th sutra of the Anuyogadvara.2
According to this view, in this with reference to this naya an individual without
the upayoga (harmonic energy) is to be considered as from the point of view of
substance as an individual. From the metaphysical point of view, if rjusutranaya
is not taken with reference to substance, it will contradict the statement in the
Anuyogadvara. But the logical tradition maintains that the statement in the
Anuyogadvara has reference to the modifications of an object at a particular
point of time and reference to substance or object (dravya) is only formal.3
Therefore, there should be no contradiction in reading the statement of the
Anuyogadvara with reference to the analysis of the modes of a thing. The
metaphysical tradition has given importance to the substance (dravya) which is
secondary. Therefore, they considered it as dravyarthikanaya. But really
speaking, according to the logical tradition, reference to the substance (dravya)
is only secondary, while the modes are primary. Therefore, rjusutranaya is
primarily paryayarthika. The metaphysical tradition gives importance to dravya
as primary, while the logical tradition looks at it from the point of view of
paryaya. These two are only distinctions in the approaches to the problems, but
there is fundamental difference in their analysis. One presents the object from
the point of view of substance and the other presents the object from the point
of view of view of modes.

NAIGAMANAYA

Naigamanaya is the point of view by which the generality and particularity of the
object is synthesized. It gives importance to the aspect of generality and
particularity of an object and takes a synoptic view of the relative importance of
generality and particularity.1 Nyaya-Vaisesika2 darsanas maintain that generality
and particularity are independent categories, but the Jainas do not accept this
view, for the particular and general are inter-dependent. One cannot exist
without the other. There is not particular without reference to the general and
there is nothing general without reference to the particular. A thing can be
looked at from the points of view of generality or of the speciality of an object.
When we want to distinguish one object from another, the emphasis is on
particularity or differentia, although it has general nature in relation to other
similar objects. We give secondary importance to general characteristics or the
universality. For instance, when we distinguish one man from the other, we
consider them in particular, but the general nature of man as such remains
secondary. Similarly, when we look at objects from the point of view of
generality as belonging to a class, its special characteristics or differentia remain
secondary, although they are there in the objects. When we consider two
different men as man, we make the distinguishing feature of the two men, as
secondary.

Naigamanaya is concerned with the synthetic approach to the problem of

understanding the nature of the object and its qualities, the relational activity
and the agent of the activity. The two aspects like the substance and activity,
the relation and the objects of relation and activity and the objects of activity
have both the aspects of identity and difference. From a particular point of view,
they can be considered as identical, because there is not absolute difference
between the substance and its qualities etc. But from another point of view, i.e.,
from the point of view of looking at objects on the basis of distinctions and
particularity, the differences are emphasized. In these cases, when the identity
is emphasized differences are looked as secondary and while the differences are
emphasized, identity is considered as secondary. This is the cardinal aspect of
Naigamanaya. Akalanka says that when one considers identity (abheda) as
primary, difference (bheda) is considered to be secondary. Similarly, while
emphasizing difference, identity is considered to be secondary. This is the main
presumption of Naigamanaya.1 For instance, the object and its qualities are
intimately related to each other. They cannot be considered as apart. Jiva has
its attributes and happiness is one of its attributes. When we say jiva is happy,
sometimes there is the primacy of the identity of jiva and happiness. The
difference between the jiva and happiness is also emphasized, but happiness
here becomes secondary. To comprehend both the aspects in their primary and
secondary. To comprehend both the aspects in their primary and secondary
forms is the function of Naigamanaya. It may also be noted that if the emphasis
is given on oneness, then the diversity or manyness is secondary in its
importance. Sometimes, identity gains primary importance and sometimes
difference is emphasized upon.

There is a distinction between Naigamanaya and the synthetic comprehensive

approach of looking a thing, which may be, called sakaladesa. In the sakaladesa,
all the attributes are considered equally important and it gives a synthetic
approach. But in Naigamanaya, prominence is given to substance sometimes,
and at other times its attributes gain secondary importance. Particularity is
looked at from the relative point of view and the distinctions and entity are
emphasized with the relative prominence.
In the phenomenal approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing,
naigamanaya gives importance to a relative appreciation of generality and
particularity. The generality is a unifying characteristic while particularity
presents the differentia. For instance, if a hundred wristwatches were
considered to be wristwatches, in this the generality is primary. But if individuals
recognizing it as his here take each wristwatch own, particularity or its differentia
or the special characteristics of the object as an individual object is emphasized.
Thus both the aspects are present. The emphasis is mental and it depends upon
the point of view that we take at a particular time. When we again take up two
individual men as distinct with their personality, we emphasize the particularity
and the difference although the generality is secondary. But if we consider the
two individual men as men essentially, we give importance to the generality
particularity.

If one is asked where he stays, he might reply that he stays in the world. If he is
further asked to specify, he might go on particularizing by starting that he stays
in Jambudvipa, in Bharatavarsa, in Rajasthan, in a particular lane in Udaipur and
or in a particular room in a house in a lane in the Udaipur city. If he is still asked
to further specify the particular location, he would say, "I live in my body". In
this way, with reference to the habitation or residence, naigamanaya presents
the specific characteristic in light of generality. Progressively, he goes on
particularizing the place of residence. The previous statements are more general
than the succeeding statements.1

Some philosophers have referred the function of naigamanaya to the purpose or

the end which an action or an object implies.2 It has reference to the purpose of
action. A man who is going to a forest with an axe to cut the wood is asked what
he is doing and he would reply he is cooking. This statement has a reference to
the object or the purpose for which an action is being done.3 This is the point of
the naigama.

Naigamanaya is expressed in three forms: (1) Bhuta Naigama (2) Bhavisya

Naigama (3) Vartamana Naigama. To impose the characteristic of the present
tense to the past incident or a thing is called bhuta naigama. On the Dewali
festival day, we say, to day Bhagavana Mahavira attained salvation. Though
2500 years ago. Bhavisya naigama imposes the present tense to a future
incident. If a person is to attain kevalajnana, we say that he attains nirvana after
a specific period. The Vartamana Naigama refers to the imposition of the
present tense to an activity which has been started, but which has yet to be
completed. For instance, if one starts preparing bread and if he was asked: what
have you prepared? She would say, 'I have prepared bread', although the bread
is yet to be prepared and it is in the process of being prepared. Here we are
imposing present perfect tense on the action that is yet to be completed.

Naigamanaya is of three types.1 (1) Dravya Naigama, (2) Paryaya Naigama and
(3) Dravya-Paryaya Naigama. The function of these three is (1) to apprehend
two objects (2) to apprehend two conditions and (3) to apprehend one thing and
one condition respectively.

Naigamanaya expresses the Anekanta point of view. According to the Jainas, the
one and the many are equally real. Without the one, many cannot exist, and the
many have reference to the one. The concept of cow (cowness) is the one
referring to the many individual cows. Similarly, the concept of the animal is
common to the cows and other animals. From the point of view of the concept of
the substance, all animals and inanimate objects have reference to that one
concept. Similarly, existence is the one concept, which refers to all that exists.
The emphasis on the one or the many is a matter, which has relation to the
concept or is the intellectual construction. The unity and diversity are facts of
life. The universe exists with its rich diversity. The diversity as considered from
the point of multiplicity is a fact of life, which may express contrary qualities.
The universe is constituted of the living and the non-living. From the point of
view of looking at the universe as cetana the universe may be considered as one,
although there are many forms of consciousness.

From the point of view of consciousness and the unconsciousness there would be
distinctions, but considered from the points of view of substantiality and inter
activity, the diversity has one common element. Similarly, considered from
different points of view, the one and the many are relational terms. Each refers
to the other. Therefore, the Jainas said, the one and many are equally real.

NAIGAMABHASA (FALLACY OF NAIGAMANAYA)

Naigamabhasa is a fallacy, which arises out of the mis-interpretation of

Naigamanaya. Naigamabhasa consists in giving primary emphasis on the
distinctions between the substance and its qualities, activities and the object of
activities as absolute distinctions. But the object and its qualities and the action
and the agent of activities cannot be distinguished in the absolute sense. If they
were absolutely different then the relation of inference between the object and
its qualities cannot be real. Therefore, the relation between the object and its
qualities have to be considered a relational and equally real. The Nyaya-
Vaisesika considers the object and its attribute as denoting essentially
difference. That would be naigamabhasa.

The Sankhya philosophers have considered knowledge and happiness, which are
qualities of the self as different from the self. According to the Sankhya
philosophers, knowledge (jnana) and happiness (sukha) are inherently related to
the tri-attributal (tri-gunatmaka prakrti). They come out of Prakrti and also
submerge in it. The self (purusa) due to contact with the prakrti believes that he
experiences knowledge and happiness. But these experiences belong to the
buddhi (intellect) which reflects the states due to its contact with prakrti and its
attributes. Intellect is also not the inherent essence of the self. In this way, the
Sankhya philosophers consider knowledge, happiness and the self as distinct.
This is Naigamabhasa, because really there is no difference between the self and
the knowledge. Wherever there is self, there is knowledge.1
SANGRAHANAYA (SYNTHETIC POINT OF VIEW)

Sangrahanaya is the synthetic point of view, which seeks to find unity in

diversity.2 It aims at finding out the common element in many objects. Every
object is the synthesis of many qualities--generality and the particularity. It is
the synthesis of the unity and the diversity. And to find out the unity in the
diversity is the function of Sangrahanaya. Sangrahanaya seeks to establish the
common point between objects and bring them together as belonging to one
category, although they have many differences excepting the one characteristic
of existence. To seek the general among the particulars is the object of
sangrahanaya.1

Vedanta and the Sankhya darsanas look at reality from the synthetic point of
view (sangrahanaya). Sangrahanaya seeks to find reality as one without
distinction.2

Sangrahanaya finds unity and oneness in numerous modes of an object.

Similarly, it finds the one common point in the many objects due to the
similarities.3 According to the sangrahanaya the one is real, the substance is real
and the modes cannot exist without the substance.4

The sangrahanaya is of two types: (1) 'parasangraha' and (2) 'aparasangraha.5

Parasangraha aims at finding out the oneness of the reality from its diversity in
the world. And aparasangraha seeks to find the unity and the oneness in an
object from its numerous modes. From the point of view of attributes it seeks to
find out the common element among the many attributes. It finds out the
'cowness' from the all the cows. Similarly, amidst the many individual men, the
concept of the man in general is presented.6

The limit of the aparasangrahanaya is up to the attainment of the unity in this

world amidst diversity. This common point between the six dravyas has a
reference to the aparasangrahanaya and the common point is referred to as
apara-samanya. "It is the phenomenal generality".7 This leads to the conception
of substance (dravya). It expresses the common characteristics of dravyatva in
the six substances.

SANGRAHABHASA (FALLACY OF SANGRAHANAYA)

Parasangrahanaya refers to the concept of the oneness as the ultimate reality

and parasangrahanayabhasa also refers the ultimate oneness of the reality. But
the difference between the two is parasangrahanaya does not deny the diversity
and distinction in the phenomenal objects. But parasangrahanayabhasa denies
the reality of the diversity of the phenomenal object. Hence it is called the
nayabhasa. It emphasizes the reality of the absolute, which is one and the
multiplicity as an appearance.
Vedanta darsana is the example of parasangrahanayabhasa because it posits the
reality of the absolute Brahman and considers the phenomenal world of diversity
as an appearance. Aparasangrahanaya accepts the reality of the general
concepts like substance etc. And it does not deny the distinctions between the
substances like dharmadravya etc. But aparasangrahanayabhasa denies the
reality of the distinctions between the substances.

VYAVAHARANAYA (PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW)

Vyavaharanaya is the practical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It

can be considered to be an empirical approach to the problems of grasping the
object from thee synthetic point.1 Vyavaharanaya analyses the different aspects
of the objects in a scientific way and it helps in understanding the phenomenal
world. The sangrahanaya grasps the generality, the rjusutranaya looks at the
moments and not to the continuum while the vyavaharanaya attempts to
understand the coherent relation between the substance and its attributes,
general and the particular and also to the empirical significance of understanding
the object. The general is comprehended through its specific nature. Therefore,
this is called the practical point of view or the empirical point of view.

In other words vyavaharanaya comprehends reality from the practical and the
commonsense point of view.1 A thing can be understood in respect of its
substance and its modifications. With reference to the substance, it has its forms
like the matter (pudgala), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of
rest), akasa (space) and kala (time). With reference to the modifications as
substance, we find various classifications of the jiva substances, like the siddha
jivas and the samsari jivas. These classifications may be based on difference
principles like the presence of the attributes in different degrees at a particular
time or the evolutionary process wherein the attributes are presented in a
chronological order. This naya aims at analyzing the nature of the object for
practical purpose.2 When we know an object like a pot (ghata), we are more
concerned with understanding the nature of the object in its modifications and
attributes rather than in its generality i.e., potness or the pot in general
(ghatatva). Similarly, if a patient is to be given medicine, we do not merely say
that the medicine should be given, but we specify a particular medicine.

Vyavaharanaya is practical in outlook. Without its pragmatic nature for the

empirical world vyavaharanaya has no value. Vyavaharanaya is of two types: (1)
samanya bhedaka wherein we are concerned with presenting the general nature
of the object. For example, in describing the dravya we try to present the
distinction between the jiva dravya and ajiva dravya (2) visesa bhedaka; gives
the analysis of the specific nature of a thing and makes distinctions in the
various types of the thing on the basis of differentia. For example, samsari jivas
are classified into naraki (living in hell), tiryak (lower animals), manusya (human
beings) and deva (heavenly beings). This kind of distinction on the basis of
specific nature of the object continues to be made till we reach the minimal point
of where we get the individual only and not a type of species. Below this point,
there would be no distinction possible. The main use of this naya is to
understand the phenomenal world in its details.3 It is consistent with the practical
outlook of life.

Vyavahara drsti (practical point of view) does not merely grasp the substance,
but it also presents the particular distinctions of the object for the sake of
understanding the nature of the object. In this sense, we can say although its
function is analytic, it is not restricted to the analysis of modes only. It is more
concerned with the presentation of a thing with its specific attributes and modes.
Therefore, it is referred to as dravyarthika naya (concerning dravya). Naigama,
sangraha and vyavahara nayas are forms of dravyarthika nayas.1

VYAVAHARANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF VYAVAHARANAYA)

The point of view which is not consistent with the practical point of view and
which presents a picture contrary the existing nature of the object is called
vyavaharanayabhasa. It is a fallacy concerning vyavaharanaya.2 Vyavaharanaya
makes a distinction between substance (dravya) and its modifications
(paryayas). But this distinction is not absolute. If the distinction were to be
considered as absolute and not relative then it becomes inconsistent with the
presentation of the object as it is. And that is vyavaharanayabhasa. Carvaka
darsana does not make a distinction between substance and its modifications. It
posits reality as consisting of the modes of the four elements--earth, water, fire
and air and nothing else. Consciousness also is a product of the modes of these
elements i.e., due to the metabolic changes of the body. This is
vyavaharanayabhasa.3

RJUSUTRANAYA

Rjusutranaya is restricted to the understanding of the modes and the states of

the momentary present, and not as a continuum. It looks at the object, as a
modification of the momentary present.4 The past modifications are destroyed,
the future modifications is yet to come; the two cannot be comprehended. What
we can get to know is the momentary present and the states and events in the
present moment. Attempt to know the past modes or the future ones would be
futile like seeing the sky-flower. It is not an object, it is only the state of the
object in a particular moment.1 The object is merely an aggregate of the states in
the present moment. According to the rjusutranaya, the object is from the real
point of view not an object at all. It is only a state. When I say--I am happy, it
only expresses the present state of my being Rjusutranaya gives importance to
such modifications of the present moment, and considers that what is real is to
be found in the present. For instance, the pleasure of the present moment and
the possession of the wealth of the present moment are important and not their
past and the future states. This does not mean that rjusutranaya gives absolute
emphasis on the present moment only. It only gives primary importance
although the past and the future states are considered as secondary. It only
says that they have no practical value. According to the rjusutranaya every
state of an object is different. The first and second states and others are
distinguishable. The state of an object at a particular moment lasts only for that
moment. Next moment, it is different. In analyzing the statement "the crow is
black" rjusutranaya states that the crow is a crow and blackness is blackness.
They are two cuckoo and other black animals would be crow. The blackness of
the crow does not exhaust the states of the crow, because it has other states
present at the moment, like--its possession of blood, flesh, bone etc., which are
of different colors, then how can we say that the crow is of black color only.

According to this naya a potter (kumbhakara) would not be considered as a

potter as long as he is engaged in preparing some other articles like the umbrella
or a palanquin, but the moment he is engaged in preparing the pot, he may be
called the potter.

We cannot say that the wood is burning, because the act of burning requires a
series of numerous moments. Innumerable moments are necessary in the
process of burning. The moment the wood burns, it is no longer wood, it would
have been destroyed as the wood and turned into coal. Again all wood is not
burning; some of it is still unburnt. One can easily see that in the process of
burning some portion of firewood is burnt, some is burning and still some of it is
not burning. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the wood is burning. The wood
can be described as burning and as not burning, as burning it is not wood and as
wood it is not burning.

The rjusutranaya in its subtle form would also maintain that in the act of eating,
we are not eating at all. Because the act of eating involves the series of
moment, and each moment presents a particular action. When we take food in
the hand in a particular moment, it is not eating. Next moment we keep it in the
mouth, it is also an act in a particular moment and when we gulp the food it is
not eating at all. The rjusutranaya does not accept the continuum of the actions
in different moments. It looks at the object at a particular moment. It is not very
much relevant for understanding the nature of the object from the practical
point. The comprehension of the nature of objects from the practical point is
possible from naigama and vyavahara nayas. In the rjusutra naya primary
emphasis is given on modifications and that too of the moments, although there
is the implicit acceptance off the substance which has modifications. But this is
secondary.

Rjusutranaya two forms (1) Suksma rjusutranaya and (2) sthula rjusutranaya.
The suksma rjusutranaya comprehends the state of the object at a particular
moment only, but the sthula rjusutranaya looks at the state of the object as it is
presented in the series of moments constituting the present.1 Akalanka has given
copious examples of rjusutranaya.2

RJUSUTRANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF RJUSUTRANAYA)

Rjusutranaya gives primary importance tot he modifications (paryaya)

considering the substance (dravya) secondary, but the rjusutranayabhasa
(fallacy of rjusutranaya) totally neglects the substance and considers the
modifications the only redity.3

The Buddhistic ksanikavada is a clear example of the fallacy of rjusutranaya.1

because according to Buddhists, there is no existence of substance, only the
modifications remain. Even in the state of salvation the continuance of
consciousness extinguishes like a lamp. Thus it totally exhausts. And according
to their view the substance of consciousness finally comes to an end.

SABDANAYA

Sabdanaya has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the
meaning of the word in the context of time, gender, number, case and prefixes
that are attached to the word. According to various contexts of time, gender,
number, etc., the meaning of the word changes. The aim of this naya is to
determine the exact meaning of the word.2 This naya is primarily concerned with
the linguistic part of the expression of thought. According to this naya, the
meaning of the word is determined by its function, the use in the various
contexts with reference to the number, gender and the prefixes etc. When we
say the mountain Meru was, is and will remain, it has a reference to the time
element in the expression of the word. But the difference in each expression
emphasizes the difference in the contexts of time, the past, the present and
future and accordingly in the object as well. It recognizes the difference in the
state of mountain Meru, of present, past and future time.3 We may determine the
meaning of the word with reference to the modifications of the word. When we
say that he prepares the pot and the pot a contains water; in these statements
the meanings emphasize different contexts with reference to the agent i.e.,
potter, and the function of the pot. Three genders of the word give different
meanings. A word used in a masculine gender will have a different meaning
from the same word used in feminine gender. The word tatah, tati and tatam
have different meanings.

With reference to the prefixes the words will have different meanings also.
Prefixes 'a', 'vi', 'pra' and 'sam' for the word hara will give different meanings.
Ahara means food, vihara is walking about, prahara is striking and samhara is
destruction. Due to the different prefixes, words will have different meanings.
Science of language presents innumerable details regarding the meaning and
function of the word. The linguistics is a developing science and the Sabdanaya
is the root cause of this development. It incorporates all the traditions, which are
responsible for the development of linguistic science.

SABDANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF SABDANAYA)

Sabdanayabhasa is a fallacy, which consists in maintaining that the meaning of

the word is not affected by the contextual situations and the different prefixes.
Reference to different points of time may bring different modifications and these
modifications have to be recognized as facts. But the Sabdanayabhasa does not
recognize this important fact that there is the possibility of changes in the
meaning due to contextual changes. To emphasizes and retain the same
meaning even if the contextual emphasis and references are changed is called
sabdanayabhasa.1

SAMABHIRUDHANAYA

Samabhirudhanaya refers to the meaning of the word, within the contexts of its
etymological analysis. It goes to understand the meaning of the word with
reference to its origin. The evolution of the word may lead to various changes in
the meaning. However, the origin of the word needs to be considered for
understanding the exact meaning of the word. In the varied modifications of the
word it would be necessary to understand the stages of the modifications, and
the modifications will show different meanings. To show this, is the function of
samabhirudhanaya. Samabhirudhanaya accepts this difference among the
synonyms of the same word.2 In the sabdnaya we try to understand the meaning
of the word with reference to its function in context of the number, the gender
and the prefix, etc. But samabhirudhanaya is concerned with analyzing the
etymology of the word and on the basis of this analysis it distinguishes the
meanings of the same word due to its varied modifications in different contexts,
may there be no difference of number, gender etc.1 Words like Indra, Sakra, and
Purandara are referred to the same person Indra. But they have different
meanings.2 Words like Raja and Nrpa may apply to the same man, but they have
different meanings with reference to the etymology of the words. Raja is one
who shines and Nrpa is one who rules. Samabhirudhanaya has given importance
to the etymological sense of the word. On the basis of the roots of the word, its
meaning differs. The words Indra and Sakra, although applicable to the same
person, do not signify the same meaning.

In the sabdanaya we do not make a distinction in the meaning of the word in the
same gender, but samabhirudhanaya finds differences in the meaning of the
same word with reference to its roots and its variations in modifications. The
dictionary gives different meanings of the same word, but really speaking the
same meanings of the different equivalents of the word about an object do not
mean the same thing. They have different shades of meanings due to the
contexts of the origin of the word. For example, the word cow (go) has eleven of
different meanings, but these different meanings are only expressions of
different senses due to the different contexts of the origin. In this sense the
word has the force of meaning with reference to the agent as the meaning can
be considered as potency of the word. In this way, samabhirudhanaya refers to
the distinctions in the meaning of the word with reference to its varied
modifications.3

In the Jaina literature we talk of the universal spheres which have their galaxies.
But in the scientific language we say that the universe consists of numerous
stellar systems. Samabhirudhanaya gives definite meaning of the term with
reference to its roots although the different, words are applicable to the same
object. It is necessary to have a scientific study of the etymological function of
the word. So this naya is very much useful in the scientific analysis of any
object. In a general sense the words like ghata, kuta or kumbha refer to the
same object i.e. the pot. But each word has different meanings, with reference
to its roots, ghata refers to that which contains, kuta refers to that which has
uneven form. Both the words are etymologically different.1 With a view to
avoiding confusion in the words it would be necessary to study the etymological
sense of the words and to emphasize upon the definiteness and its truthfulness
for fixing up the meaning. Otherwise, ambiguity in the meaning will create
confusion. Avoiding the confusion and specifying accuracy is the speciality of
this naya.2

Samabhirudhanayabhasa

Samabhirudhanayabhasa is a fallacy is a fallacy which arises in ignoring the

distinctions arising due to functional sense and giving exclusive emphasis on the
etymological distinction of the word.3

EVAMBHUTANAYA

Evambhutanaya is more specific and its meaning is narrowed down to the

present context. The meaning of a word, in the case, is determined by its
relevance to the present context.4 The functional meaning of the word based on
its etymological content may be operative or may not be operative, but in the
case of evambhutanaya the emphasis is given on the present use and the
content of the meaning operative at the time of expressing the word. The
etymological sense is secondary although it may have remote relevance.5
Indicating the present meaning of the word when the word is actually expressed
is the significant factor in evambhutanaya.1 We call Indra as Indra only when he
is sitting on the throne. When he is not sitting on the throne he need not be
called Indra. The name Purandara would be meaningful when Indra is in the act
of destroying the town. We can call him sakra when he exhibits his powers. The
meaning of the evambhutanaya has reference not so much to the individual as a
name, but the name is applicable and is relevant in the present context of its
function of meaning. A pujari (priest) would be called a priest and the name of
the priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity.
This naya relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity. This
naya visualizes the expression of powers and qualities at the present moment.

Evambhutanayabhasa: (fallacy of evambhutanaya)

Evambhutanayabhasa is a fallacy, which consists in negating the relevance of

the present function and its etymological meaning of a word. If a word were to
be used in its etymological sense only sometimes the meaning may be relevant
and sometimes the meaning may not be relevant, because its present function of
the word may not connote the etymological sense. But to negate the present
function only and tract it to the etymological sense and to apply to the individual
is the fallacy called Evambhutanayabhasa.2 Evambhutanaya has reference to the
meaning traceable to the etymological sense, but applicable to the present
function. In this sense, to connote the general meaning fallacy of
evambhutanaya.3 To call a broken pot a pot, would lead to this fallacy, because
the etymological sense of the pot (ghata) would be that which holds or which
contains, but the broken pot, as it is broken, cannot contain or hold anything.
Therefore, in the present context, it should not be called ghata. Otherwise,
similar meaning will have to be applied to the objects which have ceased to
function, as in the case of the cloth that is destroyed. If the word has its
meaning without reference to its function then any name would be appropriate
to any object with any function. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict the
meaning of the word to its function in the present context. Otherwise it loses its
potency.

THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF NAYAS

We have considered the nayas in their different aspects from the Naigamanaya
to Evambhutanaya. As we proceed from Naigamanaya to Evambhutanaya the
scope of the meaning becomes restricted and narrower at every stage.1
Naigamanaya is wider in its content because it embraces the generality and
particularity and unity and diversity. In this naya sometimes generality is given
primary importance and particularity becomes secondary. Sometimes
particularity is comprehended with greater emphasis and generality becomes
less important. Sangrahanaya is less comprehensive than naigamanaya because
it grasps only the general, the unity and not the diversity. The vyavaharanaya is
less extensive and narrower than sangrahanaya, because it refers to the
particularity and it is analytic only. Rjusutranaya is restricted to a still narrower
field, because it limits its understanding to the momentary present. It is more
concerned with the modifications and not with the substance which has
modifications. Sabdanaya is still narrower than rjusutranaya in the sense that it
is concerned with the understanding of the meaning of the word of the moment.
Samabhirudhanaya narrows down its scope still further, because it refers to the
root of the word and presents the etymological sense. Then we come to the
limited field of application of the point of view in the evambhutanaya. It refers to
meaning of the word in the present context and does not look before and after.
There is a gradual narrowing down of the scope and the content of the naya from
the naigama to the evambhuta. Because of this, the nayas in their various
aspects have reference to each other and are related to each other in presenting
the varied picture of the object in its content and meaning.

METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF NAYA

So far, we have studied the logical and epistemological interpretations or the

concept of naya. Now, we may now try to understand the metaphysical
implications and content of the concept or naya. From the metaphysical point of
view, naya can be distinguished into two types: (1) Niscayanaya (the ultimate
point of view) and (2) vyavaharanaya (the phenomenal point of view).
Niscayanaya presents the picture of the object and its meaning from the ultimate
point of view. We may call it the noumenal point of view, because reality can be
looked at from the phenomenal and noumenal point of view. The noumenal
point of view goes to the source of the reality and finds out the ultimate meaning
of reality. Vyavaharanaya is the phenomenal point of view, it is analytical in
nature and it presents the picture of the object in its relation to other objects. It
is relational in its aspect. Vyavaharanaya is sometimes considered to be
secondary to the niscayanaya is "abhutartha" (the relational thought) and
niscayanaya refers to the bhutartha in the sense it is ultimate and pure
(suddha).1

Niscayanaya, being suddhanaya, grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while

vyavaharanaya is practical in its approach, and tries to understand the
phenomenal nature of reality.

In the Jaina Agamic literature, there is distinction of the niscaya and

vyavaharanaya whose functions are to look at reality from who points of view,
i.e., from the ultimate and the practical points of view, just as in the advaita
philosophy, we have the ultimate and the practical points of view which are
referred to as "Paramarthika and Vyavaharika drsti". The Buddhist mentions the
paramartha and samvrtta points of view. The Upanisads mention the sthula and
the suksmadrsti. But there is difference between the Jaina approach to the
problems and the approaches of the other absolutistic philosophies. Jainas look
at reality from the niscayanaya in order to find out the real nature of the object,
with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to the
distinctions and paryayas. But they do not deny reality of the distinctions and
the paryayas, as do the Vedantins in considering the external world as an
appearance.

In the Buddhistic literature, a distinction has been made between paramartha

satya (ultimate truth) and lokasamvrtti satya (the practical truth).1 What the
Buddhistic in the Vijnanavada and the Sunyavada call the parmartha satya and
the Vedantins call the paramarthika drsti, the Jainas call it the bhutarthanaya or
the niscayanaya.

Vyavaharanaya has been distinguished into two types: (1) sadbhuta

vyavaharanaya and (2) asadbhutavyavaharanaya. Sadbhutavyavaharanaya
refers to the analysis of substance and its qualities while describing a thing. This
naya has two forms: (a) upacarita sadbhuta and (b) anupacarita sadbhuta. That
vyavahara naya which grasps the nature of the objects with reference to its
substance and its attributes in the relational and conditional form is called
upacarita sadbhutavyavahara naya. And the naya or a point of view, which tries
to understand the relation between substance and its attributes without their
being essentially related, is called Anupcarita sadbhuta vyavaharanaya.
Matijnana and srutajnana are attributes of jiva from the practical point of view.
In the case of matijnana conditioned by empirical adjuncts due to the
encrustations of karma is the jiva. It is considered to be a phenomenal approach
to the understanding of the jnana, because it is not pure and free jnana. It is
called upacarita. In the case of anupacarita sadbhuta vyavaharanaya there is
the awareness of the distinction between the object and attributes. The soul and
its attribute of jnana are considered to be distinct and without any conditioning
due to freedom from karma. Kevalajnana is the pure jnana of the soul and it is
unconditioned. Kevalajnana is free from impurities and passions. In this, we are
aware of the distinction between the substance and its attributes.

Asabhutavyavaharanaya can also be distinguished into two forms as (1)

upacarita and (2) anupacarita. Anupacarita asadhuta vyavaharanaya tries to
understand the relation between the substance and its attributes as in the case
of the body and the jiva. The relation is not inherent in the jiva, but it is
accidental due to conjunction. But this conjunction is inseparable as long as the
empirical life lasts. Therefore it is anupacarita.

But upacarita asadbhuta vyavaharanaya understands the distinction between

the substance and its attributes in the relation of accidents, which are primarily
separable as, in the case of Devadatta and his wealth. Relation between the
Devadatta and his wealth is only accidental and also separable. This type of
comprehending the relation is upacarita asadbhuta vyavaharanaya.

Niscaya naya is the pure point of view. It is the ultimate point of view. It is the
noumenal point of view. In this, there is the fuller understanding of the
distinction between the substance and its attributes. The self is known in its
pure form and its qualities are considered to be distinct, though accidentally
related. They are not the essence of the soul. For example, the effective and
connotive states are the modifications, which arise out of knowledge, feeling and
connotation. These are not inherently related to the soul, although
consciousness is the essence of the soul. This type of an attitude gives a clear
and a synoptic view of the relation of the soul and its attributes. And there is a
clear awareness that the self is not these attributes. From the noumenal point of
view, self is seen not these and it is also apprehended that the bondage of the
self is not eternal. The self is seen as pure and perfect without the impurities of
the karmic particles. The mind, body and the sense organs are considered as
separate although they are related to the embodied soul. But this relation is not
eternal.

From the practical point of view the self appears to be bound and as having a
shape. But from the niscaya point of view the self is pure and perfect and is
uncontaminated, with the karmic matter. The vyavaharanaya is analytical and
tries to find out the distinctions, pure nature, and the fundamental aspect of the
object. Niscayanaya comprehends the pure nature of the self as distinguished
from its attributes and modifications, which are mainly looked at from the
practical point of view. Vyavaharanaya is the point of distinction, while
niscayanaya aims at getting the pure point of view of non-distinctions.

When we say that knowledge is the essence of the Atman, we are saying this
from the noumenal point of view. But when we say that knowledge is the quality
of the soul, we are using the practical point of view. In these expressions, the
Atman is considered to be the substance having attributes and knowledge is the
attribute possessed by the Atman. This relation of the Atman and knowledge as
substance and attributes is to be considered not as a relation of dependence, but
as of inherence. When we consider the relation of the ghee that is in the pot and
the pot, the relation is of conjunction because the two objects are separable. But
when we consider the relation of jnana (knowledge) and the self there is the
relation of inherence. According to Jainas, the relation between the substance
and quality is neither that of exclusive difference nor of exclusive identity. It is
the relation comprising of difference and identity. The attribute of knowledge
cannot exist without the Atman. This understanding is due to
sadbhutavyavaharanaya.

In order to understand the distinction between niscaya and the vyavaharanaya,

it i necessary to analyse the spatial concept of relation as in the case of jiva and
the karmic particles. The jiva and the karmic particles are to be found in space.
Both of them are to be found in the same space. This is the practical point of
view. From the noumenal point of view each object lives in its spatial position
and not in the spatial position of others. The Atman is in itself. Karma has its
own spatial position. But from the practical point of view, we say that the bound
soul is to be fund in conjunction with the karmic particles in the same spatial
position, just as from the practical point of view we say, when we mix water and
milk, that it is milk. We do not make a distinction between water and milk from
the point of view of spatial position. But from the real point of view, water is
water and milk is milk. They are distinct. Similarly, the Atman and the karmic
particles are considered to be together from the practical point of view. But in
reality, they are distinct, as also their nature is distinct.

It should be noted that the distinction made between the naigama and the other
nayas and vyavahara and niscayanaya has been made with the purpose of
emphasizing the practical and the spiritual point of view. Naigama and other
nayas are meant to analyse the nature of the object and to understand their
implications in the empirical world. But the purpose of distinction between
vyavahara and niscaya is to lead one to the spiritual world in understanding the
real nature of the self. It aims at leading us from the facts to reality, from the
world to the realization of moksa.

PRAMANA AND NAYA

It was considered in the previous stages that naya is the point of view that a
person takes in knowing the objects.1 It apprehends one specific feature of the
object, but pramana has no such distinction of partial understanding of the
objects in relation to its other aspects. It comprehends the object in its fullness.
Pramana comprehends the nature of the pot (ghata) in its fullness. Pramana
comprehends the nature of the pot (ghata) in all its aspects. But naya grasps its
nature in one of its aspects. In this sense, it is partial comprehension. Pramana
does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but its grasps
the object in its entirety. But Naya looks at the object from a particular point of
view and gives emphasis on a particular aspect of the object. But both naya and
pramana are forms of knowledge. We can say that pramana is sakaladesa
(comprehensive and full), but naya is vikaladesa (partial). The comprehensive
understanding of the object gives a synthetic picture of the object in all its
aspects of substance in relation of its attributes. It is a comprehensive
knowledge. Naya being vikaladesa need not however be considered as purely
practical and incomplete knowledge, because it looks at the object from a
particular point of view and presents the picture of the object in some aspects,
although the awareness of other aspects is in the background and is not ignored.
Both the sakaladesa and the vikaladesa approaches to the understanding of
nature of the object are equally important and complementary to each other.
Both of them are concerned with grasping the nature of the object in relation to
its attributes. Sakaladesa grasps the objects with all its attributes while in
vikaladesa it is restricted to the apprehension of one particular quality.
Sakaladesa may be considered to be the expression of the Syadvada, while
vikaladesa expresses naya.1

DRAVYARTHIKA AND PARYAYARTHIKA POINTS OF VIEW

Dravyarthika and paryayarthika drsti refers to the point of view of substance and
that of modes. Dravyarthika drsti is comprehensive point of view. It grasps the
generality without ignoring the particularity of the modes. Paryayarthika drsti is
analytic and is mainly concerned with the distinctions of the modes of an object.
Acarya Siddhasena says that in the teachings of Mahavira we find a synthesis of
dravyarthika and paryayarthika points of view. All other points of view are forms
of these two points of view.2 When eternal, he said from the dravyarthika point of
view jiva is eternal, but from the point of view of its modes existing in this world
(paryayarthika or vyucchitti naya) the jiva is non-eternal.3 Dravyarthika drsti is
also called avyucchitti naya. From the point of view of substance (dravyarthika)
every substance is permanent with its modes. From the point of view of the
modes the object is impermanent, because here we look at the object from the
points of view of changing modes. The dravyarthikanaya presents an outlook of
comprehension and non-difference, while paryayarthika naya emphasizes and
non-difference, while paryayarthika naya emphasizes distinction and difference.
In the Bhagavati sutra the word bhavarthika has been used in place of
paryayarthika.4

DRAVYARTHIKA AND PRADESARTHIKA DRSTI

Dravyarthika drsti refers to the point of view of substance, while pradesarthika

drsti looks at the objects in its different modes and its analysis in its spatial
distinctions. The distinction between paryaya and pradesa can be considered in
respect the modes and the spatial points. Paryaya refers to the different modes
of an object, while pradesa refers to the different arts of an object occupying the
different spatial positions. A pradesa is the point of space occupied by the
smallest point of pudgala (matter). According to Jainas, matter occupies
different points of space and there is not definiteness about this. But the other
substance like, dharma, adharma, lokakasa and jiva occupy determined space
points. But in the case of matter there are variations according to the nature of
the aggregates of the atoms coming together. Mahavira gave the analysis of
substance from the point of view of spatial positions also. He said from the point
of vie of substance, modes, pradesa and from the points of view of qualities, and
bringing all these points of view in a synthetic sense "I am one". But from the
point of view of paryaya, I am 'jnana and darsana as two modes. From the point
of view of pradesa, I am permanent and is indestructible. From the point of
upayoga I am changing (asthira) because I express myself into different mental
states. Similarly, I express modes in the past and the present.1 In this he has
used the pradesa drsti for expressing the permanence and indestructibility of the
Atman. From the point of view of pudgala pradesa the self is not changeable and
is eternal. This is no variation in the Atma pradesa (the spatial point of Atman).

Pradesarthika drsti is useful in another way. From the point of view of

substance, the object is one, but from the point of view of pradesarthika the
object maybe looked as many, because it occupies many space points. In the
Prajnapana, dharmastikaya is considered to be understood from the dravyadrsti
as one, while from the pradesarthika drsti it is many because of these
numberless space points. The object which is comparable to other objects from
the point of view of substance is not comparable from the point of
pradesarthikadrsti, just as the dharma, adharma, and akasa astikayas are
considered to be comparable (tulya) from the point of view of pradesarthika as
they occupy numberless pradesas. But akasa being anantapradesi, it is
incomparable. In this way, the objects may be considered from the points of
view of dravya and pradesa. They may also be considered as comparable and
incomparable with reference to the point of space occupied by the objects. This
gives a comprehensive picture of the objects.1

VYAVAHARIKA AND NAISCAYIKA DRSTI

Philosophers have discussed about the problem of the reality of the objects.
They have faced the question regarding the reality and have asked whether the
sense-object is real or that which is beyond the sense experience and which can
be gasped only by the intuition (Prajna) is real. The Cchandogya Upanishad
presents the view that knowledge, which is through intuition, is real and that
which we get through sense experience is only an appearance.2 The ultimate
reality is one and non-dual. The diversity that we find in the phenomenal world,
which is known through sense experience, is an appearance. But many
philosophers held different views.

The Carvaka holds that whether is known to the sense experience is real and all
the rest is unreal. The materialists maintain that matter alone is real. Different
philosophers have emphasized the effusive reality of either things known to
sense experience or reality apprehended through reason or intuition. Bu the
Jaina does not find any contradiction in the assertions made by these
philosophers. The Jainas take the stand on the basis of the nayas and on the
methodology of syadvada. Reality is complex and it can be looked at from
different points of view. The noumenal point of view gives us the ultimate thing
of the world. The real is known through intuition and reason. But from the
practical point of view of the phenomenal point of view, the things of the world
are as much real as the ultimate things known through intuition. There is no
contradiction in maintaining realities of both spheres from the different points of
view. The practical point of view gives us the picture of reality, which is sensible,
and could be grasped. The ultimate point of view (niscaya naya) leads us to the
comprehension of reality, which is the subtle essence of the phenomenal world.
Both of them are equally real.

In the Bhagavati there is a dialogue between Bhagavana Mahavira and Gautama

Ganadhara regarding the different aspects of reality. Gautama asked Mahavira,
there are how may colors, smell, taste and touch in treacle. Mahavira said, from
the practical point of view it is sweet. But from the real or ultimate point of view
it has five colors, two types of small, five types of tastes and eight types of
touch. Similarly, Gautama asked the question regarding the qualities of a black-
bee. Mahavira said that from the practical point of view the bee is black. But
from the real point of view (niscayanaya), it has five colors, two types of smell,
five types of tastes and eight types of touch. In this way, Mahavira gave answers
to many questions from the practical and the real points of view.1 It is clear from
this, that Mahavira understood that both the practical and the real points of view
present the picture of reality which are equally real and valid. They do not
contradict each other nor is one less real than the other.

ARTHANAYA AND SABDANAYA

Anuyogadvara,2 Sthananga3 and Prajnapana4 mention seven nayas. Among these

seven nayas, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhutanayas belong to the category
of sabdanayas.5 Naigama, sangraha, vyavahara and rjusutra nayas have
reference to the objects. Therefore, they are called dravyarthikanaya.

TYPES OF NAYAS

Acarya Siddhasena maintains that there are as many nayas as there are
statements. And there are as many views and theories as there are statements.6
In this sense there are numerous nayas and they been variously described.
However, the Jainas have attempted the primary ways of the describing thing
and main points of view, which are the bases of their description. The
dravyanaya and paryayanaya include numerous forms of expressing the nature
of a thing and the numerous points of view, although in theory there would be
infinite ways of expression. In the agama literature, as well as according to the
Digambara tradition,1 seven prominent nayas have been mentioned. Naigama,
sangraha, vyavahara, rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta are the
seven primary nayas. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara does not consider
naigamanaya as an independent naya and he mentioned six nayas. Umasvati
has in the earlier part mentioned five nayas: naigama, sangraha, vyavahara
rjusutra and sabda are the five primary nayas.2 Naigama naya has been
distinguished into two forms: despariksepi and sarvapariksepi. Sabdanaya has
three forms: samprata, samabhirudha and evambhuta.3
NAYA AS PRAMANA OR APARAMANA

Nayavada is a comprehensive and a special from of thought in the Jaina logic.

Every object is looked from the points of view, which are nayas. Jinabhadra
Ksamasramana says that the naya theory pervades the entire Jaina philosophy
and thought.4

Jaina logicians were faced with a question regarding the validity of the nayavada.
Is the naya a pramana or not was the primary question. If it were a pramana
why are they differently mentioned? And if it were not a pramana then it would
be false knowledge and there is no scope of false knowledge in the philosophical
world.

The Jaina logicians say that naya is neither pramana nor apramana (not
pramana). It is part of the pramana. A drop of water of the ocean can not be
considered to be the ocean and also not the non-ocean, but a part of the ocean.5
Similarly, a soldier is neither an army, nor a non-army; but the part of army. The
same argument is true in the case of describing the nayas.

Pramana comprehends the nature of the objects in the different aspects, while
naya looks at it from a particular point of view. It grasps one aspect of the
object. In this sense, naya is the partial presentation of the nature of the object,
while pramana is comprehensive in its presentation. But naya does not give
false knowledge nor does it deny that the other aspects of knowledge of the
nature of the object are true. In this sense it is outlook and it is not invalid.

SUNYA AND DURNAYA: RIGHT NAYA AND WRONG NAYA

We have seen that pramana comprehends objects in its various aspects and it is
exhaustive in its presentation. But naya looks at the object from a particular
point of view. However naya does not deny the possibility of looking at the
object from other points of view and it accepts that the nature of the object is
complex and the presentation from other points of view may also be valid. This
is presentation is only valid and all other presentations from different nayas, are
invalid, this is durnaya. We may also say that pramana comprehends the tat,
(that) and the atat, while naya grasps only the tat.1 Naya is concerned with the
presentation of 'tat' only. Durnaya has a negative function also. In aims at
negating and denying the other aspects of presentation.

Umasvati says that Durnaya is one-sided in its approach because it emphasizes

that the point of view taken by the naya is the only correct point of view and the
other points of view are wrong. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara has also stated that
Durnaya is a mithya drsti (perversity of attitude) because it is dogmatic in
outlook. It asserts the truth of its point of view and rejects the other points of
view.2 But in order to understand the nature of the object in all its aspects; it is
necessary to accept the presentation of the object in different points of view
also. Otherwise, the picture would be one-sided, just as a garland of diamond
can be called a garland only when the different individual diamonds are arranged
and attached in a systematic way.1 Just as the garland of diamonds depends on
its cohesion on the thread that weaves out the diamonds, so also nayavada
weaves out the right attitude and right knowledge (samyagdrsti) and
samyagjnana.

Acarya Kundakunda says that the one who takes the stand of looking at the
things from two different nayas understands the truth of the presentation of the
two nayas. He does not reject the other point of view, because he known that
the other point of view has also its value.2

Everything is complex in its nature, presenting the many facets of its qualities.
We cannot describe the entire nature of the objects from one point of view; that
would give a partial and inadequate picture of the object. To understand the
object in its various facts from different points of view, does not mean that we
are presenting different vies about the reality. There is no difference of opinion
in presenting the different aspects of the objects from different points of view.
Such a presentation would give a comprehensive picture of reality and not one-
sided picture of reality.3

Everything can be looked at from the point of view of the knowledge about it,
expression in words and the nature of the object itself. From the point of view of
knowledge, we get different facets of understanding. From the point of view of
the objects of knowledge, we can present different variations of the view. For
instance, as the universe it is one. On the basis of the distinction of substances,
there are six substances. Looked at from the point of view of astikaya, there are
five astikayas. But these distinctions do not present different views, they only
present different facets and variations of looking at the reality.1

UNFORMITY AND CONTINUITY IN THE JAINA DARSANA

The study of different systems of Indian philosophy makes it clear that the Vedic
tradition and the Buddhist philosophy present varied, and sometimes conflicting
metaphysical theories among themselves. The Vedic tradition gives the
monistic, the dualistic and also the pluralistic theories of reality. Similarly, the
Buddhist philosophy has been presented in various theories often conflicting with
each other in their ultimate metaphysical standpoints. For instance, in the
Buddhist philosophical systems there are divergent theories of realities like
realism, subjective idealism, idealism and even nihilism. The Hinayana schools
of thought like Vaibhasika and Sautantrika presents the realistic approach to the
understanding of the universe by positing the dharmas (elements). Mahayana
schools of philosophy like vijnana vada (Yogacara) and Madhyamika present the
idealistic stand. The Madhyamika School is said to be nihilistic because
according to this school everything is unreal; there is nothing real. The real is
the sunya (void), although sunya has been interpreted by some as the absolute,
which is inexpressible. However, the Buddhistic philosophy have a common
current of thought expressed in the prthakada (doctrine of momentariness) and
madhyamavada (the doctrine of middle path). Thus we find that the Vedic
tradition and the Buddhist thought present a variety of philosophical school, very
often diverting from each other, even to the point of being conflicting in the case
of the realist and idealist schools of Hinayana and Mahayana sects. Similarly the
Vedic tradition also presents the realistic thought in the Nyaya Vaisesika and the
idealistic stream in the vedanta.

Seeing the vast differences in the various sects of vedic and Buddhistic
traditions, it is hard to believe that these are the off-shots of one current.

But if we survey the development of the Jaina thought, we find there is

uniformity and continuity in the Jaina tradition. There is consistency in their
approach to philosophical problem. Jainism realistic in its approach ad empiricist
in its methodology. The distinction between the svetambara and digambara
tradition have shown certain differences which are only superficial pertaining
primarily to religious practices. The fundamentals of Jaina philosophy have been
accepted by both traditions. For instance, there is unanimity of thought in their
acceptance of the doctrines like six substances (saddravya), nine categories
(nava padartha) and seven tattvas (principles) and pancastikaya (five
dimensional substances).

This unanimity and consistency in the Jaina tradition has been possible due to
the fundamental outlook of the Jainas expressed in the nayavada and syadvada.
The nayavada gives scope for catholicity of outlook. It asserts that others may
also be right and the rightness of each point of view is partial and it adds to the
comprehensive picture of reality. In this sense, the Jainas have been tolerant in
accepting the various points of view in order to present a coherent picture of
reality. The nayavada and syadvada express the spirit of tolerance. They
symbolic intellectual non-violence.
JNANAVADA: A Study (THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE)

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SELF AND THE KNOWLEDGE

The self and the knowledge are related to each other, not in any external way,
but the relation is inherent. It is samavayi (inherent relation) and not
conjunction, (samyoga) as external elements. Jnana is not external to self; it is
the essential characteristic of the self. Self has Jnana and self cannot exist
without Jnana, but this relation need not be construed as a relation of a thing and
its quality in the senses that the Nyaya-Vaisesika maintain. Therefore,
knowledge is inherently related to the self. From the practical point of view we
may distinguish knowledge and self. But from the pure and noumenal point of
view, there is no distinction between knowledge and self.1 Although jnana is the
essential characteristic of the self, it cannot be considered to be externally
related. Knowledge and self are very intimately connected as even to say that
they are identical.

Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (sva-

para-prakasaka). Cognition illumines the object it cognizes and also it illumines
itself, cognizes itself and this fact of self-cognition can be understood by an
analogy. Just as the lamp illumines the object around it and it illumines itself,
similarly the self has cognition the object of cognition. It is, therefore, necessary
to understand the nature of knowledge.

In the Agama literature, the characteristics of knowledge have been presented

from the points of view of identity and of difference. From the point of view of
identity (abheda), it has been said that self and knowledge are one and there are
no differences. From the point of view of difference, knowledge is the quality of
the soul. From the point of view of identity and difference (bhedabheda), self
can be said to be neither completely different from knowledge, nor completely
identical with knowledge.1 Knowledge is identical with the self. Therefore, it is
not different. Knowledge is the quality of the atman. Therefore, it is different
also.

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge and the object of knowledge are independent of each other.

Knowledge is the quality of the self. Substance, quality and the modes are the
objects of knowledge. Knowledge and its object do not produce each other. The
object of knowledge may give us knowledge but it is not inherent with the act of
cognition. It is related to the object when it is produced from the object, then it
has the characteristics of the object. In that case, the identity of knowledge with
the self would be remote. When we cognize and object the process of cognition
involves the activity of the self. However, cognition depends on the object of
cognition. The media through which we have to cognize an object are the body,
sense organs and the mind. But they are not conscious. When the senses come
in contact with the object through the stimulations, then the process of
knowledge starts. The act of cognition is not some new creation. It is the
process of the activity of the self to the media of the sense organs and the mind
in contact with the object. The process of cognition and the extent of knowledge
depend upon the capacity of the knower.

We have seen that knowledge is possible by the self through the sense organs
and the mind, but the function is limited. The mind also has a limited capacity.
The mind comes in contact with a particular sense organ at a time. Therefore,
we can cognize an object through the operation of the sense organs and through
their limitation. But we also get knowledge without the media of the sense
organs. This knowledge need not be limited. Because the limitations of the
sense organs are not operative in the complete or uneneveloped knowledge.
Through the complete knowledge all the objects can be cognized at a time
moment.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

The relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge is like the
object and its quality. The subject of knowledge is characterized by the
possession of cognition. The object has a characteristic as the object of
knowledge. Both these are independent. But both are intimately related in the
sense that the object enters into relation with the cognition as the object of
cognition and cognition has the relation of knowing the object. In this sense, we
may say that there is no difference between the object and cognition.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION

The psychic energy that the soul possesses is expressed in cognition, perception,
and experience. The eyes perceive. The other experiences are possible through
the other sense organs including the manas. According to the agamas the
experience through the eyes as well the experience through the other organs
may be considered as darsana. Avadhi (clairvoyance) and kevala (omniscience)
may also be considered as darsana. In this analysis darsana does not mean only
perception. But it means the experience of the universe and the non-difference.
Knowledge (jnana) is analytic and it presents the varied characteristics of the
object. Jnana is of five types, while darsana is of four types. Manahparyaya
jnana (telepathy) is not considered as darsana, because it cognizes difference
only.

The universe has diversity when considered with reference to attributes, modes,
but considered from the point of substance, it is one and undifferentiated.
Therefore, we cannot say that the universe is one only or diverse only. The
capacity of empirical knowledge is limited. Therefore, we first know the
generality of the substance and then we cognize the diversity to be founded in
the attributes and modes.
The kevalajnana (omniscience) is not limited. Its capacity is infinite. It cognizes
everything including the substance and its modes. The omniscient knows
everything in the moment of its experience, in the aspect of its universality.
Then he cognizes the diversity. This is the procedure of kevalajnana and
kevaladarsana.

The Chadmastha who has reached the tenth gunasthana does not grasp
everything in one moment of experience. He cognizes the subtle nature of the
cognition and after numerous moments he grasps the universality that is in the
substance. The universality and the diversity of the object are progressively
experienced. Jnana cognizes particularities and is analytic, while darsana
experience the universality diversity would involve the process of darsana and
jnana.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE AFFECTIVE STATES (VEDANA)

Of the five sense organs, the sense organs of touch, taste and smell are sensory.
They cognize the objects and experience the senses of touch, taste and smell,
but the sense-organs of sight and hearing are instruments of cognition only,
because they cognize the objects, but do not experience the objects as there is
no direct contact with them.

We experience the external objects through the sense organs, but the process of
experience is not the same in all the sense organs. The sense organ of sight has
a greater capacity of cognity of cognition. But it cognizes the object without
touching it. The sense organ of hearing is less in its capacity to experience,
because it can cognize the sounds which touch it, or come in contact. The sense
organs of touch, taste and sound are less in their capacity of experience as
compared with the other two. Because they can experience the object when
they come in direct contact with the object and therefore they can cognize the
objects and experience the experiences. But in the case of the eyes and the ears
there is no direct contact with the objects of experience. Therefore, they can
only get knowledge, but they do not directly get the experience. In the case of
the mind it can have both knowledge and experience, although it does not come
in direct contact with the object. This is because the mind transforms itself into
the self of the object to be cognized. The mind can also have the higher type of
experiences in the manahparyayajnana (telepathic knowledge). The cognition
that we get without the contact with the object through the sense organs is not
sense-cognition, but it is extra-sensory experience. It is neither completely free
from the sense organs and the mind nor is dependent on them. It is the state,
which happens between these two.1

AFFECTIVE STATES--PLEASURE AND PAIN

We experience the external world through the sense organs and mind
exaggerates it. The qualities of touch, taste, smell and forms are original
characteristics of an object and the sound is the modification of the object. The
sense organs receive the stimulations and the mind organizes and interprets the
sense stimulation. The feelings of pleasure and pain are due to the conjunction
and separation of the external objects in relation to the sense organs. These
affective states are not pure cognition. Its experiences cannot be had through
the unconscious sense organs. Nor can these feelings be considered to be
ignorance or ajnana. The feelings of pleasure and pain are created due to the
conjunction of cognition and the external objects.

The pleasure and pain are experienced through the sense organs and mind. The
animals without the possession of mind experience organic sensation and not
feelings, while animals that have minds experience sensations as well as
feelings. Pleasure and pain cannot be experienced simultaneously. The self-
experiencing these feelings is not in its pure state and the experience of pure
bliss is not to be considered as the experience of feeling. Bliss is the pure state
of experience; the soul gets in its pure form. The self-experience cannot be
named as self-feeling; it is called as self-realization.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGAMAS

The theory of knowledge in the agamas is very ancient. In the

Rajaprasniyasutra, Kesikumara sramana explains to Raja Pradesi the theory of
knowledge as presented in the agamas. The agama classify knowledge into five
types:
1. Abhinibodhika jnana (sense experience)
2. Srutajnana (indirect knowledge)
3. Avadhijnana (clairvoyance)
4. Manahparyayajnana (telepathy)
5. Kevalajnana (omniscience)1

Kesikumara Sramana belonged to the Parsvanatha tradition. The five types of

knowledge mentioned in the Parsvanatha tradition have also been presented by
Mahavira.2

In the Uttaradhyayana sutra there is a dialogue between Kesi and Gautama.3

From this, it is clear that there was no difference of opinion between them
regarding the theory of knowledge and metaphysics although there were sight
differences regarding the practice. If there were difference regarding
metaphysics these would have been mentioned in this discourse. The
Digambara and Svetambara traditions have the same theory of five types of
knowledge, although there is some differences regarding the nature of
kevalajnana and kevaladarsana.

From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on
the basis of the agamic theory of knowledge we get three stages.4 The first stage
describes the five types of knowledge. It also mentions the distinctions in the
abhinibodhika jnana (sense-experience) into four stages like avagraha, iha,
avaya and dharana. The first stage gives the following classification of
knowledge.

JNANA5
abhinibodhika (2) sruta (3) avadhi (4) manahparyaya (5) kevala

abhinibodhika (1) avagraha (b) iha (c) avaya) (d) dharana

The second stage makes a distinction in the knowledge as pratyaksa (direct and
paroksa (indirect) with its sub-divisions. There is no place in this for sense-
experience as direct knowledge because according to this view direct knowledge
is that which is obtained by the soul without the help of sense organs. The sense
organs are obstructive to the acquisition of knowledge by the soul directly. The
knowledge obtained through sense organs and by other means like reason is
considered to be indirect knowledge. The other systems of philosophy
considered sense-experience as direct knowledge, but Sthananga has made a
clear distinction between the direct knowledge, but Sthananga has made a clear
distinction between the direct knowledge obtained by the soul without the
medium of the sense-organs and indirect knowledge which is through the sense-
organs and other indirect knowledge which is through the sense-organs and
other means.1 Bhagavati sutra presents the classification of knowledge which is
slightly different from the two traditions that we discussed. In this jnana has
been distinguished into two types and not the five types. And these two types
are pratyaksa and paroksa. It evidently shows that it is the first stage of the
theory of knowledge. Bhagavati sutra gives the classification of knowledge as
shown in the table--

JNANA

Pratyaksa (2) Paroksa

Pratyaksa: (A) Kevala (B) No-Kevala

Paroksa: (A) Abhinibodhika (B) Srutjnana

Pratyaksa: (B) No-Kevala: (1) Avadhi (2) Manahparyaya

Pratyaksa: (B) No-kevala: (1) Avadhi: (a) Bhavapratyayika (b) Ksayopasamika
Pratyaksa: (B) No-Kevala: (2) Manahparyaya (a) Rjumati (b) Vipulmati

Paroksa: (A) Abhinibodhika: (1) Srutanihsrta (2) Asrutanishrta

Paroksa: (B) Srutjnana: (1) Angapravista (2) Angabahya
Paroksa: (B) Srutjnana: (2) Angabahya (a) Avasyaka (b) Avasyakavyatirikta
Paroksa: (B) Srutjnana: (2) Angabahya (b) Avasyakavyatirikta (-) Kalika (-)
Utkalika
Paroksa: (A) Abhinibodhika: (1) Srutanihsrta (a) Arthavagraha (b)
Vyanjanavagraha
Paroksa: (A) Abhinibodhika: (2) Asrutanishrta (a) Arthavagraha (b)
Vyanjanavagraha
In the third stage there is a slight modifications in the classification of the types
of knowledge. This classification distinguishes the matijnana (sense-experience)
into two types as pratyaksa and paroksa. This is considered to be (a) due to
sense organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs (no-indriya). We give below the
classifications of (a) the sense organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs as
discussed. According to Nandi sutra,1 the gist of third stage of knowledge is as
following:

JNANA

Abinibodhika (2) Sruta (3) Avadhi (4) Manahparyaya (5) Kevala

Abinibodhika: (A) Pratyaksa (B) Paroksa

Abhinibodhika: (A) Pratyaksa: (a) Indriya Pratyaksa (b) No-indriya pratyaksa
Abhinibodhika: (A) Pratyaksa: (a) Indriya Pratyaksa (1) Srotrendriya pratyaksa (2)
Caksurindriya pratyaksa (3) Gharanendriya pratyaksa (4) Rasanendriya
pratyaksa (5) Sparsendriya pratyaksa
Abinibodhika: (A) Pratyaksa: (b) No-indriya pratyaksa (1) Avadhi (2)
Manahparyaya (3) Kevala

Abhinibodhika (B) Paroksa: (a) Abhinibodhika (b) Sruta

Abhinibodhika: (B) Paroksa: (a) Abhinibodhika: (1) Srutnihstra (2) Asrutanishrta
Abhinibodhika: (B) Paroksa: (a) Abhinibodhika: (1) Srutnihstra: (-) Avagraha (-)
Iha (-) Avaya (-) Dharana
Abhinibodhika: (B) Paroksa: (a) Abhinibodhika: (2) Asrutanishrta (-) Autpatiki (-)
Vainayiki (-) Karmaja (-) Parinamiki Buddhi

Abhinibodhika: (B) Paroksa: (a) Abhinibodhika: (1) Srutnihstra: (-) Avagraha (*)
Arthavagraha (*) Vyanjanavagraha

The analysis of the theory of knowledge as presented in the three stages gives a
picture of knowledge as developed from first to the third stage and graduality
imply metaphysical consideration. The first stage has no metaphysical basis.
This is the earliest presentation of the theory of knowledge. It has five divisions
of knowledge and matijnana has been distinguished into four different states as
avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana. The Bhagavati sutra carries the tradition of
this stage. The second stage introduced metaphysical consideration with
reference to the nature of the self. It distinguishes the knowledge into two types
as pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect). The later philosophers have
followed this distinction. The basis for the distinction between direct and indirect
knowledge is to be found in the clarity and certainty on the side and
indefiniteness and relative knowledge on the other side. Pratyaksa is the
knowledge that the soul gets directly. Paroksa is the knowledge, which is
acquired through the sense organs and other indirect media. Pratyaksa jnana
has been distinguished into three types as 1. Avadhi (clairvoyance) 2.
Manahparyaya (telepathic cognition) and 3. Kevalajnana (omniscience). From
the point of view of the certainty and purity of knowledge there is the graduated
excellence in the three types of knowledge. Kevalajnana is a pure and project
knowledge par excellence. Abhinibodhika jnana and Sruta jnana are paroksa
(indirect) knowledge. Abhinibodhika is also called matijnana. Matijnana is
knowledge acquired through the contact of the sense0organs and the mind by
the soul. Srutajnana is arrived at through the functions of the mind. Mati, sruta,
avadhi and manahparyaya have distinctions regarding the nature and the
degree of certainty.

The third stage takes into consideration the viewpoints of other systems of
Indian philosophy and attempts to correlate the Jaina standpoint with that of the
other. The other systems of Indian philosophy consider sense experience as
pratyaksa but the Jainas considered it as paroksa. With a view to avoiding
ambiguity in the use of the terms the Jainas also adopted the term pratyaksa for
sense-experience. But they called it samvyavaharika pratyaksa (direct
knowledge from the practical point of view). Nija-pratyaksa or paramarthika
pratyaksa is the knowledge which is arrived at not through the sense organs, but
which the self gets directly. Avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala would be
nijapratyaksa according to the Jainas. Jinabhadragani Ksamasramana has
elaborated this point in the Visesavasyakabhasya. From this standpoint the
schematisism of the classification of the knowledge would be as follows:
1. Avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala is paramarthika pratyaksa.
2. Srutajnana is paroksa.
3. Indriya-pratyaksa (sense-experience) is paroksa from the paramarthika point
of view and pratyaksa from the practical point of view.
4. Knowledge arrived at by the mind only is paroksa.

Acarya Akalanka and some other acaryas have distinguished pratyaksa into
paramarthika and samvyavaharika. The distinction has its basis in the
Nandisutra and Visesavasyakabhasya.1

The Abhinibodhika, jnana has been distinguished into the four different stages
like avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana.

These stages have been scientifically analyzed and discussed by the Jaina
acaryas. The mental states like memory (smarana) and recognition
(pratyabhijna) have been defined with reference to their metaphysical
implication by the later acaryas. But there is not many bases for definition of the
concepts like smarana and pratyabhijna in the agamic literature. The main
cause of this is that there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation
at the time of agamic literature. But later logicians have to complete with the
scholars of other darsanas in interpreting their logical and psychological
concepts. We may now consider the nature of five types of knowledge and also
of memory (smarana), pratyabhijna (recognition) and anumana (inference) etc.,
from the point of view of pramana and also from the metaphysical implication.

MATIJNANA
Matijnana is sense-experience. It is arrived at with the help of the sense-organs
and the manas (mind).2 In the agamic literature matijnana has also been called
abhinibodhika jnana.1 Tattvartha sutra2 mentioned equivalent names like mati,
smrti, samjna, cinta and abhinibhodha. These words are used synonymously. In
the avasyakabhasya the following terms are mentioned as equivalents-Iha,
apoha, vimarsa, margana, gavesana, smrti, mati, and prajna etc.3

Nandisutra also uses the same words.4 In the Tattvartha sutra svopajnabhasya, a
distinction has been made in the samvyavaharikamatijnana, into two types, as
(1) indriyajanya (sense contact experience) and anindriyajanya or manojanya
(i.e. knowledge born of the contact with the mind alone).5 Siddhasenagani
mentions three forms of samvyavaharika pratyaksa as indriyajanya,
anindriyajanya (manojanya) and indriyanindriyajanya (born of the contact of the
sense-organs and the manas both). That knowledge which arises out of the
contact with the mind alone is anindriyajanya, while in the case of
indriyanindriyajanya the mind and the sense organs function jointly.6

INDRIYA (SENSE-ORGANS)

The sense organ is the distinguishing mark between the living organism and the
non-living objects. Some acaryas like Pujyapada has used the terminology and
aliases the meaning of the word Indriya. The etymological meaning of the word
would be one who has power and wealth--indratiti indrah. But here the word
Indra refers to the atman. Knowledge is possible through the means of indriya.
According to this the meaning would be knowledge of the essence of the atman
through the medium of the Indriya. Similarly, the word Indra has a reference to
activity.1 It means that the atman has the natural characteristic of activity, but
due to the accretion of karma the self cannot get direct knowledge. Therefore, it
requires a medium and that medium is the sense organ. Therefore, that through
the medium or which the self gets the knowledge is called indriya. There are five
sense organs, the sense organ of touch (sparsa), the sense organ of taste, the
sense organ of smell, the sense organs of sight, the sense organ of hearing. The
five sense organs have the five senses: Senses of touch, taste, smell, form and
hearing. Therefore, these sense organs have been considered as receptive of
the stimulation. They are the means through which experiences are the
possible.
1. The sense organ receiving the stimulation of touch-the sense of touch.
2. The sense organ of taste has sense of taste.
3. The sense organ of smell has the sense of smell.
4. The sense-organ of form has (rupa) the sense of sight (eyes).
5. The sense organ of receiving sound has the sense of hearing.2

Every sense organ has two forms (1) physical sense-organ (dravyendriya) and
(2) psychic sense organs (bhavendriya).3 The dravyendriya is expressed in the
form of a sense-organ with its basic materiel form like the retina in the eyes or
the ear for hearing.
The physical part of the sense organs, therefore, is called Dravyendriya and the
psychic part of the sense is bhavendriya. The physical part of the sense organs
is created by the rise of the corresponding namakarma; the destruction and
subsidence of knowledge obscuring karma (Jnanavaraniya karma) cause the
psychical part of the sense organ. Dravyendriya is again sub-divided into (1)
nirvrtti, (2) upakarana.1 Nirvrtti is the organ itself, and upakarana is the
protective physical cover like the eyelid in the case of the eye. Each of these two
is again sub-divided into antaranga and bahiranga. Bhavendriya is a psychic
part of the organ; it is also divided into two parts labdhi and upayoga.2 Labdhi is
the manifestation of the specific sense-experience due to the destruction and
subsidence of the specific sense-experience due to the destruction and
subsidence of the knowledge obscuring karma. It may be referred to as the
removal of psychic impediment, which have to be eliminated if sense-experience
is to be made possible. Upayoga is the psychic force determining the specific
sense-experience coming out of the contact of the specific sense organs with the
object of stimulation. Thus the Jainas make a distinction between the physical
structure and the psychical element involved in the sense organs. Jainas have
given a detailed analysis of the structure of the sense organ.

PROCESS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE

The development of the sense organs is not uniform in all the animals. There are
gradations in the animals according to the number of sense organs possessed by
them. We have one-sensed organism two-sensed organisms, three-sensed, four-
sensed, and five-sensed organisms according to the number of sense organ they
possess. Similarly, the size of the sense organs and its capacity to experience
may also vary with different animals. The capacity of sense-experience
determines the different gradations of animals. Therefore, it can be said that
labdhi (the capacity) is the basic factors for the distinction between different
sense organs and their function. Without labdhi, nirvrtti, upakarana and
upayoga cannot exist.

Next to Labdhi comes nirvrtti as an important factor in the function of the sense
organs. Thus, we find that it is possible to have upakarana in the absence of
upayoga, nirvrtti in the absence of upakarana and labdhi in the absence of
nirvrtti. But it is not possible to have the functions, as it is not possible to have
nirvrtti without labdhi and upakarana without nirvrtti and upayoga without
upakana. We give below the table of the functions of the sense organs:

INDRIYA
Paudgalika (dravyendriya) (2) Atmika (bhavendriya)

Paudgalika (A) nirvrtti (B) upakarana

Atmika (A) Labdhi (B) upayoga
MIND (MANAS)

Each organ is different. One sense organ can not receive the stimulation
connected with other sense organs. It requires a subtle sense organ which is
called, mind. Mind grasps the sense stimulation of all the sense organs.
Therefore, it is called sarvarthagrahi.1 It is a quasi-sense-organ because, it is very
subtle. It is sometimes called anindriya because of its subtlety and not because
the absence of the sense organ. The function of mind, which is inner-organ is
knowing and thinking. The Jaina theory of mind, as developed by the Jaina
acaryas, is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind
and as sharply separated and opposed. The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind
shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and psychological
approaches to the problems. It is predominantly a realistic approach. The mind
and its state are analyzed at empirical level.2 The mind recollects the past
impressions, grasps the present simulations and imagines the future. Therefore,
it is also referred to apprehending impressions of the long periods (dirghakalika
samjna). Jaina agamic literature mentions the word samjna with reference tot he
mans and the animals, which possess mind, have been called samjni. The
functions of the mind can be analyzed as (1) analysis of the meaning of the
impression--iha, (2) Apohadetermination, (3) margana-analysis and
discrimination, (4) gavesana--discrimination and distinctions, (5) cinta--
obstructions and thinking about the how and the why, (6) Vimarsa--analysis and
appreciation. These constitute the characteristics of samjna and the organism,
which possesses the characteristics, is called Samjni, i.e., having mind.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIND

That through which we think, is mind. We may distinguish two types of

substances in this world-- (1) Substances having form and (2) Substances without
form. The sense organs are substances with form and they grasp the present
stimulations only. Mind is a substance without form, and it grasps the present
impressions, recollects the past impressions and imagines of the future ideas.
Therefore, it has a reference to the past, present and the future.1 The mind also,
like the indriyas has a reference to the material aspect in connection with the
psychic force. Therefore, mind is distinguished into two phases-- (1) the physical
mind and the (2) psychic mind (dravya manas and bhava manas). In the
Visesavasyaka bhasya, we get a description of the two phases of the mind. The
material mind may be called the mental structure. It is composed of infinite, fine
and coherent particles of the mind meant for the function of the mind. It is
further described as a collection of fine particles, which are meant for exciting
thought-processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact with the jiva with
the body.2 In the Gommatasara Jivakanda there is a description of the material
mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a
full blown lotus with eight petals.3 The material composition of the mind consists
of the subtle particles of matter which are called manovarganas. Therefore, it is
different from the atman and the ajiva (non-living substance).4
The bhava manas are the psychic function of the mind. It is the result of the
activities of the dravya manas. It is expressed in mental processes like thinking.
In this sense, bhavamanas is sometimes identified with self, because it is a
thinking self. Therefore, the self is both manas and not-manas, in the sense it is
a thinking self and the psychic function is a quality of the self. The bhavamanas
is not therefore entirely distinct from the activity of the self, it is referred to as
belonging to the activity of the self.1 as we said earlier, bhavamanas has two
functions--labdhi and upayoga. First is the mental set and the second is the
activity of the mind.

Dhavala refers to the mind quasi-active (nokarma). The dravya manas are the
result of the operation of certain forms of namakarma, while bhavamanas is due
to the destruction and subsidence of the antarayakarma and the no-indriya-
karma. The mind in its undeveloped form (aparyapta) consists of the material
particles, which are yet to cohere. Therefore, in this state the developed psychic
functions are absent.2

FUNCTIONS OF MIND

The function of mind, which is the inner organ, is knowing and thinking.
Sthananga describes it a samkalpa vyaparavati. It is also referred to as
cittamanovijnana. Visesavasyakabhasya defines mans in terms of mental
processes.3 The mind grasps the sense-impressions received through the sense-
organs.4 The mind gets knowledge for us through the sense organs. But in all
forms of knowledge, it is not necessary to have the instrument of sense organs.
The sense-knowledge is through the sense organs and it is limited to the
stimulations coming through the objects in this empirical world. But mind can
also have its own function without the stimulation received through the sense
organs. They are knowledge through the mind only. It is manojanya. Such
psychic functions of the mind can be mentioned as iha (integration), avaya
(association), dharana (retention), smrti (memory), pratyabhijna (recognition),
tarka (implication), anumana (inference) and agama (knowledge from
testimony).

PLACE OF MIND

The Vaisesikas,1 Naiyyayikas2 and Mimamsakas3 have considered mind as atomic

in nature. Therefore, mind is not considered to be eternal, in its causes.
Samkhya, Yoga and Vedanta darsana consider mind to be produce of prakrti and
ahamkara and is atomic in nature.4 It is due to avidya. According to the Jainas
and the Buddhists the mind is neither pervasive nor atomic in nature, it is
madhyama parimana. It is finite in its extension. Nyaya, Vaisesika and the
Buddhist philosophers consider mind as emanating from the heart.

Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist systems consider that the mana is in the
heart. According to the Samkhya-Yoga and Vedanta the place of the heart is all
pervasive in the body because it is in the suksma sarira (gross).5 According to
Jainism, bhavamanas is in the atman, but regarding the place of the
dravyamanas, there is no agreement. The Digambara tradition maintains that
the place of the dravya manas is in the heart, while svetambara tradition does
not give any specific inclination about this. Pandit Sukhalal says that the
svetambara traditions maintains that the dravya manas is all-pervasive in the
body.6 Although it is difficult to determine the exact location of the manas in the
body, at-least there must be some centers of mind through which the mental
function takes place. It may be located partly in the brain and functioning
through the sense organs.

The sense organs are functioning in one direction only, because these are
receptive and they are functioning in particular part of the body. But from the
point of view of psychic energy the sense organs function in the pervasive way.
The function of the sense organs depends on the subsidence and destruction of
the karmic matter, which gives rise to the removal of the obstructions connected
with the point of sense-experience. This is all pervasive in the body.1 From the
point of view of grasping and understanding the subject, manas can be
considered pervasive of the body.

EXISTENCE OF THE MANAS

Different philosophers have given arguments for the existence of the manas.
The Nyayasutra says that we can infer the existence of the manas because
without manas, knowledge is not possible.2 Vatsyayana says that the manas can
be proved because certain mental functions like memory and cognition are not
possible to be obtained through the sense-organs only.3 Annambhatta says that
mental states like pleasure are possible through the medium of manas.4 Jainas5
maintain that mental states like doubt, dream-cognition, pleasure and pain and
connotive activity are not possible without the medium of manas.

We may now analyse the different stages of avagraha, iha, dharana, and avaya
as states of sense perception.

AVAGRAHA

Avagraha is a sensational stage where there is an awareness of the object

without cognizing the specific nature of the object.6 It only presents the general
characteristic of the object in cognition. We cannot, in this, know the specific
details about the nature of the object. This is the stage, which may be
considered to be the stage of sensation following the stage of darsana in the
sense of the threshold of consciousness. In the avagraha we do not really get
the general characteristics of the object, but only the awareness of the object
that we get.1 In this sense, it would be different to make avagraha as
determinate cognition coming after darsana. In that case darsana will become
mere species of the jnana and it would be reduced to mere sensation. The
higher forms of darsana like the kevaladarsana would be meaningless.
Avagraha is therefore the stage of sensation. It is the first stage of experience.
It is the given, it does not involve the stage of darsana which is qualitatively
different from jnana. Avagraha is a species of jnana. It is immediate experience.

STAGES IN THE AVAGRAHA

Avagraha has been considered to be the stage of consideration. This has been
further distinguished into two stages: (1) vyanjana avagraha and (2) artha
vagraha.2 Vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage. In the Visesavasyakabhasya, we
get the description of the vyanjanavagraha. It is a physiological stimulus
condition of the sensation. It is only the relation of the sense organs and the
object in the form of sense stimulations.3 In the Nandisutra; we get the example
of the earthen pot and the drops of water. It gives a description of the stage of
vyanjanavagraha. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when
water is poured, a portion of the water is absorbed by the pot. And there is not
sign of the existence of the water. If we go on pouring the water again, at a
certain stage the water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate.
The stage when the water begins to be visible in the threshold of saturation. The
drops of water below the threshold get absorbed in the pot. Similarly, a person
who is asleep receives the sound stimulation continuously for sometime. The
soud atoms reach the ear. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ear
becomes conscious of the sound. So far we has not aware of the sound although
the auditory stimulations were pouring in. We may call this, the sate of first
awareness, "the threshold of awareness". The sound sensation begins to be
experienced the moment the threshold is crossed. That stage is arthavagraha.
Arthavagraha is the experience of sensation, while vyanjanavagraha is the
earlier stage of physiological stimulus condition. The Nandisutra has beautifully
explained this point in the example given above. The illustration is called
mallaka drstanta.1 Vyanjanavagraha is a condition of arthavagraha, which is the
stage of sensation.2 The presence of vyanjanavagraha may be admitted as a
condition of arthavagraha although it is explicit not because of its undeveloped
existence.3

Avagraha has also been distinguished from the logical point of view as
vyavaharika avagraha and naisargika avagraha. Naisargika avagraha grasps as
the generality without distinction. But vyavaharika avagraha experiences the
generality with the distinctions implicit. Avagraha has been described with some
equivalent expressing its modes like avagrahanata, upadharanata, sravanata,
avalambanata and medha.4 Tattvarthabhasya mentions the following
synonymous terms like avagraha, graha, grahana, alocana and
avdharana.5Satkhandagana mentions the following as the equivalents, avagraha,
avadhana, sana, avalambana and medha.6

Avagraha is the sensational stage and that does not give the knowledge of the
nature of the object. It only gives awareness of that and does not explain the
'what'. The complete psychosis of perceptual cognition would be possible when
we experience the other three stages of perceptual process than iha, avaya and
dharana. In this sense, our empirical experience will not complete with
avagraha. Avagraha is not self-sufficient. Arthavagraha is mere sensation,
which lasts only for only one instance. It immediately transforms itself into more
specific cognition, i.e., and iha.

IHA

Iha is the second stage of Matijnana. In it one cognizes the nature of the
sensation like the sound. Nandisutra gives synonyms of iha: abhoganata,
marganata, gavesanata, cinta and vimarsa.1 Umasvati gives the synonyms as
iha, tarka, vicarana and jinasa.2

Vyanjanavagraha is the potential condition of awareness. Arthavagraha is the

dawning of the awareness. Iha is the tendency towards cognizing the specific
features of the object. Iha has been very often translated as speculation. But is
would be more appropriate to use the word associative integration.

The Jainas thought that, as Iha is striving for determinate and specific cognition,
it is possible to confuse it with doubt (samsaya). But iha should not be confused
with doubt (samsaya) although it does involve a striving towards the
determinate knowledge. In the case of doubt, the alternatives are equally
pressing and they are not certain, which is to be accented. But in iha there is a
tendency to determinate cognition. Iha is the mental state in which there is
striving for the ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and
the avoidance of the untrue.3 Siddhasena Divakara also draws the same line of
distinction between iha and samsaya. For instance, on receiving a sense
impression of sound, there arises a doubt, whether the sound comes from the
conch or horn. The mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement
and difference. The sound is perceived as a sweet and an agreeable. This
quality is attributed to the sound of the conch and not at the horn. In the
Pramanamimamsa it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between
sensation (avagraha) and associative integration (iha), even when the object is
the matter of habitual perception but the existence of the state of doubt is not
easily detected owing to the rapidity of succession of mental event.5

AVAYA

The third factor in matijnana is avaya. From the stage of associated integration
(iha) we come to the stage of interpretation. The sensations of interpreted and
the meaning is assigned to the organization of sensation. Iha is integration of
the sensations; avaya interprets and determines the meaning of the sensation.1
In avaya there is a definite determination about the meaning of the perception.
In this we come to the judgement about the nature of the object. This is
therefore called perceptual judgement, still it is non-verbal. Avasyakaniryukti
defines avaya as determinate cognition.2 In the Sarvarthasiddhi, we get the
description of avaya as cognition of the true notion of the object through
cognition of particular characteristics.3 Umasvati says that upagma upanoda,
apavyadha, apeta, apaviddha, apanuta and apagata are synonyms of avaya.
They mean the determinate cognition.4 Nandisutra gives avartanata,
pratyavartanata, buddhi, vijnana as synonyms.5 Tattvartha bhasya describes
avaya as the stage of ascertainment of right and exclusion of wrong.6 For
example, on hearing sound, a person determines that the sound must be of a
conch and not of a horn, because it is sweet and not hard. This type of
ascertainment of the existing specific features of the object is called avaya and it
involves perceptual judgement.

Some Jaina logicians say that avaya has only a negative function. In this stage of
experience there is only the exclusion of non-existing qualities. They ascribe the
cognition of the existing quality to a later stage of experience called dharana.
But Jinabhadra says that the view is not correct. Because avaya does not merely
perform the negative function of excluding non-existing qualities. But it also
determines the existing characteristics. Umasvati agrees with this view.
Pujyapada says those avaya cognizes specific features of the object cognized in
the stage of iha, in the final determination of the objects. Avaya can be used to
be perceptual judgement and it can be compared to the apperception involved in
the perceptual experience. But avaya need not be the final determination of the
specific feature of the objects as it is the perceptual judgement. Therefore, in
this characteristic of the describing the avaya the two traditions concerning the
negative or the positive function of avaya are in agreement.1

DHARANA

Dharana is retention. It is essential of the perceptual experience. Nandisutra

defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for the number
of instances or innumerable instances. It gives sthapana and pratistha as
synonyms of dharana.2 Umasvati defines dharana as the final determination of
the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object
on future occasions. According to Umasvati retention develops through three
stages: (1) nature of the object is finally cognized, (2) the cognition so formed is
retained, and (3) the object is recognized on future occasions. Avasyakaniryukti
defined dharana as retention. Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of
the lapse of perceptual cognition. Pujyapada Devanandi defines dharana as
condition of the absence of forgetting the what has been cognized by perceptual
judgement, by avaya.3 Akalanka says that it is the absence of forgetting what
has been cognized by perceptual judgement.4 Some logicians like Vadideva do
not accept dharana as a condition of recall on a future occasion. Thus we find
that some logicians make dharana merely retention of perceptual experience,
while some others make it also the condition of recall, of that experience on a
future occasion. Hemacandra reconciles his views of retention and the condition
of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in
Visesavasyakabhasya. He says that retention is the absence of the lapse of
perception, but it is included in the perceptual judgement.

The analysis of the perceptual experience shows that it involves the four stages
of the development of the perceptual experience. The concrete psychosis does
involve all these four stages of perceptual experience.
Dharana has been distinguished into three types: (1) avichuti in which there is
the retention for a long time and it is not washed away. (2) Vasana--It is the
psychic condition of dharana after it ceases to function as dharana. This may be
compared to the disposition that modern psychology uses. Dispositions are
responsible for giving recollection. (3) Anusmarana is a mental condition which
arises out of dharana and which retains the effects of dharana. It will facilitate
recollection. This may be compared to the engram complexes described in
modern psychology. Nandisutra gives the following synonyms of dharana--
dharana, dharana, sthapana, pratistha and kostha. Umasvati mentions
pratipatti, avadharana, avasthana, niscaya, avagama and avabodha as
synonyms.2

We have so far seen that matijnana is experienced through the stages of four
factors like avagraha, iha, avaya, and dharana. Avagraha has been
distinguished into two types: vyanjanavagraha and arthavagraha.
Vyanjanavagraha is of four types, the sense of touch, taste, smell and hearing.
Vyanjana has three different meaning (1) sabda etc. pudgala dravya. (2)
upakarana indriya (accessory material) and (3) visaya and upakarana
conjunction i.e., the contact between the object and sense organs.
Vyanjanavagraha is implicit awareness or apter to say that it is the threshold of
awareness. The sense organ of sights (the eyes) and the quasi-sense organ of
mind is aprapyakari as there is no contact with the object and these sense
organs. And therefore, vyanjanavagraha is not possible in these cases to
experiences.

The Buddhist considers the sense organ of hearing also as aprapyakari. The
Nyaya-Vaisesika does not consider the eyes and the manas as aprapyakari.

From the scientific point of view the eyes and manas do not come into contact by
physical contact with the object of stimulation. The eye is considered to be a
sensitive lense, which receives stimulations sent by the objects, through the rays
of light. The image of the object is formed on the retina and the mind
consolidates it by interpreting the stimulations so received. Therefore, that the
Jaina views that the mind and the sense organs of eye are aprapyakari is
consistent with the modern scientific analysis, of the visual perception.

The four distinctions in matijnana as mentioned above are avagraha (with its
division vyanjanavagraha and arthavagraha) iha, avaya and dharana. They have
been further divided into different types: five sense organs plus the manas.
These six have the four stages of matijnana, i.e. they are 24. The sense organs
except the eyes and manas have vyanjanavagraha. Therefore, they are 4 so the
total would be 24+4= 28. According to the Svetambara tradition, each type of
cognitive experience is further sub-divided into 12 types like (1) bahu (many) (2)
bahubidha (different types) (3) alpa (less) (4) alpavidha (lesintense) (5) ksipra
(quick) (6) aksipra (slow) (7) aniscita (interminate) (8) niscita (determinate) (9)
asandigdha (definite) (10) sandigdha (indefinite) (11) dhruva (certain) (12)
adhruva (uncertain). The bahu means many and alpa means one. The cognition
of many objects is bahugrahi and the cognition of one object is alpagrahi. The
cognition of many types of object is bahuvidhagrahi. The cognition of one type
of object is alpavidhagrahi. The relation between bahu and alpa has a reference
to the number and the reference between the bahuvidha and alpavidha has
reference to the types. Sighra (quick cognition) is called ksipra and that
knowledge, which is not quick, is considered to be aksipra. The cognition, which
has been obtained without any motive, is called aniscita. And that cognition
which has been obtained due to certain motives and based on the previous
cognition is called niscita. Niscita (definite) cognition is certain (asandigdha) and
the indefinite knowledge is sandigdha. Avagraha and iha can also be
distinguished on the basis of the criterian of indefiniteness. In these cognitions,
there is the awareness of the object. But the specific nature is not determined.
The cognition, which arises out of the definite stimulations (avasyambhavi), is
certain (dhruva). But that cognition which arises casually undefined stimulations
is uncertain (adhruva).1 Out of the 12 types of cognition that we have seen, the 4
have reference to the object and the remaining have a reference to the subject
cognizing the aspect.

The Digambara tradition gives the classification of the matijnana with slight
variation. According to the Digambara tradition niscita and aniscita cognition
have been considered and named anihsrta and nihsrta. Anihsrta cognition
apprehends the stimulations partly and in the nihsrta cognition, we have the
apprehension of the stimulations truly. In this sense the Digambara tradition
also used the forms anukta (unexpressed) and ukta (expressed) in place of
asandigdha and sandigdha. The anukta implies cognition through opinion and
ukta implies cognition through the words.2

These are 336 kinds of matijnana. These are obtained by multiplying 28 (as
previously described) kinds with these 12 types, i.e., 28 x 12 = 336. There is
light difference regarding the names of these in Svetambara tradition also.

SRUTAJNANA

Srutajnana is knowledge obtained through discursive reasoning subsequent to

matijnana. It is necessary to have use of language for the srutajnana. In the
case of mati the hearing of words is implicit, but when the words are uttered the
meaning of the two words are remembered. Matijnana in this sense expresses
the potentiality of the meaning as implied in the stimulations of the word. But in
the case of srutajnana acknowledge arises due to the explicit expression of the
meaning signified by the word. In this sense srutajnana would not be possible
without matijnana. The srutajnana would be possible when the karmic matter
obscuring the srutajnana is removed. This is the internal cause of the
srutajnana. The external condition of srutajnana is matijnana. This is because
even if we have sense knowledge it may be not possible to have knowledge
through discursive reasoning as in the case of srutajnana, because the karmic
encrustations obscuring the srutajnana are still operative. This may be
interpreted as that unless the mental set is formed and psychic impediments are
removed srutajnana is not possible.
In the early agamic literature srutajnana has been considered to be knowledge
through the scriptures. It is knowledge obtained through the scriptures given by
the authorities (Aptapurusa) and also the knowledge obtained through the words
of omniscient. There are two types of srutajnana--angapravista and angabahya.
Angapravista is of 12 types and angabahya has many types.

Angapravista srutajnana may be referred to as knowledge obtained through the

scriptures given to us in a codified form by the ganadharas of tirthankara.
Tirthankaras have taught the doctrines. This is arthasruta. While the
garnadharas have codified and presented in the form of sastras. This is
arthasruti. Due to the deduction in age and the ability to grasp, the acaryas in a
later stage wrote books explaining the knowledge contained in the agamas on
various subjects. This is angabahyasruta. In this, the Tirthankaras gave original
meaning. This is angapravista. Later the meanings are elaborated by the elder
acaryas it is called Angabhaya. The angabahya literature has various divisions
like kalika and utkalika etc. The detailed description about this have been given
in our work entitled Jaina Sahitya aur Samskrti. The srutajnana is primarily
concerned with knowledge and the literature is called sruta because it gives
knowledge.

Acarya Bhadrabahu has stated that there are various distinctions in the
srutajnana based on the words and their permutations. It is not possible to give
the elaborate description of the permutations of the words. However, we can
mention 14 types of srutajnana; (1) aksara, (2) anaksara, (3) samjni, (4) asamjni,
(5) samyak, (6) mithya, (7) sadika, (8) anadika, (9) saparyavasita, (10)
aparyavasita, (11) gamika, (12) agamika, (13) angapravista and (14) angabahya.

The fourteen types of srutajnana can be classified into different parts on the
basis of the nature of the srutajnana (i) aksara sruta--it has three sub-divisions--
(i) samjnaksara referring to the form of the letter (word) (ii) vyanjanaksara--
sound of the letter, it is pertaining to phoneticism (iii) labdhyaksara--referring to
the psychological maturation or the mental set of expressing the word.
Samjnaksara and vyanjanaksara are considered to be dravya sutra, because they
are concerned with the expression of the sruta, while labdhyaksara is considered
to be bhavasruta, because it is psychological is nature.

Coughing, respiration and sneezing are anaksara sruta because they do not
involve the expression of any letter.

Samjna is of three types; therefore those possessing samja are also classified
into three types. It is called samjni sruta and is of three types: (1) dirghakalika-it
covers the past, present and the future ideal. (2) hetupadesiki--in this we are
primarily concerned with the thinking about the present circumstances with its
consequences. (3) drstivadopadesiki-in this there is a right understanding and
also the comprehension of the various aspects of the being. Those who have
these samjnas are called samjni and those who do not possess these samjnas
are called asamjnis.
Asamjnis are of three types: (1) those who cannot think of the future and cannot
have the perspective regarding the long duration of time are the first type of
asamjni. (2) those who possess slight mental activity, although they are having
mind are called amanaskasamjni and they are of the second type. (3) those who
are possessed of perversity of attitude are the third types of asamjni.

The srutajnana, which comprises of the knowledge of the twelve angas as

presented by the Tirthankara and is called samyaksruta. And that knowledge
which is contrary and which does not contain the knowledge presented by the
Tirthankaras is called mithyasruta.

That knowledge which has the beginning and which starts at a particular time
are called sadika sruta. And that knowledge which has no beginning and which
are eternal truths is called anadika sruta. The srutajnana may be considered to
be anadika from the point of view of substance of knowledge and sadika from
the point of view of its modes.

That knowledge which comes to an end is called saparyavasita. And that which
cannot be destroyed and which is eternal is called aparyavasita srutajnana. In
this distinction also the criteria of points of view of substance and modes is
operative.

That srutajnana which is comprised of the similarity of teaching is called

gamikasruta, that in which there is not harmony, and similarity is called agamika
sruta. We have already explained the distinction between the angapravista and
the angabahya sruta.

MATIJNANA AND SRUTAJNANA

It is necessary to understand the relation between matijnana and srutajnana in

certain respects. Every empirical individual (samsari jivas) has mati and
srutajnanas. But the question is regarding the upper limit of the possession of
these two forms of knowledge in an individual. A question has been raised
whether on the attainment of the kevalajnana, there still remains matijnana and
does srutajnana operative. On this question, there is a controversy. Some Jaina
scholars say that on the attainment of the kevalajnana (omniscience), there is no
place for mati and srutajnana, because (1) mati and srutajnana are obtained due
to partial destruction and subsidence of the jnanavaraniyakarma, and (2) in the
case of the kevalajnana all the four karmas have been destroyed. But some
other scholars maintain that on the attainment of the kevalajnana the matijnana
and srutajnana are not obliterated. They are still present and operative although
the effect is negligible and unascertainable. Just as in the bright sunshine, the
light of the stars and the planet is not clearly visible and is dim because it is
merged in the light of the sun. So also, the effect of the matijnana and the
srutajnana are not discernible in the light of the kevalajnana. The second view
appears to be consistent with Jaina stand point.1
Srutajnana is described as the knowledge accompanied by the expression in
words and significant with meaning. Matijnana is knowledge with generally
precedes srutajnana and is not accompanied by srutajnana. Matijnana is of two
types: sabhilapa and anabhilapa. But srutajnana is only of sabhilapa type.1
Arthavagraha is not sabhilapa while all other forms of matijnana are sabhilapa.
Srutajnana is sabhilapa but it should be noted that only sabhilapa jnana is not
srutajnana. Because, knowledge, which used words, cannot be considered as
srutajnana.2 The knowledge which used words is meant for others (parartha) and
it is meant to communicate the knowledge to the other individuals. It is used for
explaining to others by means of language. Matijnana can also be saksara as it
used certain expressions, but it is not meant for the sake of others and it does
not serve the purpose of communicating to others. Srutajnana on the contrary is
saksara and also it is primarily concerned with use of language for expressing
the thoughts and experiences.3

The function of matijnana is to experience the sensory experiences like touch,

taste, smell, form and sound and also to give meaning to these experiences. The
function of srutajnana is to comprehend the meaning of these experiences to the
use of words and sentences and to communicate to others. Therefore, mati is
considered as arthajnana and sruta as sabdarthajnana.

The relation of mati and sruta is that of the cause and the effect. Matijnana is
the cause and srutajnana is the effect. Srutajnana is that knowledge which gives
meaning through the use of the language and based on the memory. Srutajnana
gives the possibility of acquiring meaning to the word and that meaning is
retained after the knowledge is obtained. First, there is matijnana through the
stages of avagraha, etc. and then we get Srutajnana.

Dravyasruta becomes the effect of the matijnana (pertaining to the hearing

sense organ) but bhava sruta cannot be the effect of matijnana and therefore
according to this viewpoint srutajnana is considered the effect of matijnana.
From another point of view dravya sruta is not the consequence of the sense of
hearing but it becomes the subject. This is because, knowledge is obtained
through language; but language itself is not the essence of knowledge.
Language is the medium through which knowledge is presented. Knowledge
obtained through previous knowledge or convention in tradition can be
considered as srutanihsrita matijnana, for instance, the knowledge that we get
about the word 'cow' or the knowledge to the understanding of the nature of the
cow on the perception of the animal is srutanihsrita matijnana, because it based
on the previous information and the samskaras that we have already obtained.1

Matijnana is primarily concerned with the cognition of the object in the present
while srutajnana comprehends the objects with reference to the present, past
and the future. Therefore, with reference to the presentation, srutajnana is
considered to be different from matijnana. In that case the srutajnana is
primarily based on the use of language.
The knowledge, which is expressed through the language for the sake of
understanding and also for communication is, called srutajnana. In the case of
matijnana, expression in the from the language is not primary.2

AVADHIJNANA

Avadhijnana is a from of extra-sensory perception. It is pratyaksa or direct

perception. In this, we apprehend objects, which are beyond the reach of the
sense organs and the mind. However avadhi has limits, it can apprehend only
such things which have form and shape.3 It cannot apprehend the things which
have no shape and form. Of the six dravyas, pudgala becomes the object of
avadhijnana, because the other dravyas do not have form. Similarly, there are
limitations in the avadhijnana with reference to the substance (dravya), place
(ksetra), time (kala) and nature (bhava) of the objects. Avadhi is that kind of
extra-sensory perception which grasps the objects with reference to its
substance, place, time and nature and beyond the capacity of the normal sense-
organs.1

OBJECT OF AVADHIJNANA

The avadhijnana has limitations with reference to its objects in the light of the
substance, place, time and nature.
1. With reference to the substance it can apprehend the minutest particle and
also it can extend its knowledge to the cosmos.
2. With reference to space one can get avadhijnana from the smallest part of the
finger to the knowledge of the entire cosmos. It is possible to get avadhijnana
on the basis of the knowledge of the cosmos and imagine similar stellar
universes.
3. With reference to time avadhijnana can cognize to the minutest part of the
period called avalika. And for the duration of the entire innumerable
avasarpini and utsarpini periods.
4. With reference to the nature of the object known through avadhijnana, we can
say that one can have clairvoyance cognition with reference to the mildest
psychic mode to the entire cluster of modes.

ELIGIBLE BEING FOR AVADHIJNANA

The living beings in the four states of existence are eligible for getting
avadhijnana. Gods (residents in heaven) and hellish beings get avadhijnana by
birth. Therefore it is bhavapratyaya.2 Men and the animals get avadhijnana due
to efforts, it is gunapratyaya. In the case of the beings in heaven and hell
avadhijnana is to be found in them by birth. They need not do any mental and
moral practice for obtaining it. But this is not the case with human beings and
the animals. In the case of human beings avadhijnana is possible through
mental and moral discipline. Men have to practice vratas, and they get
avadhijnana through the acquisition of merit. The avadhi of the human beings
as well as the five-sensed animals is due to the destruction and subsidence of
the relevant karmic veil. Therefore, it is called gunapratyaya avadhijnana.

A question arises regarding the destruction and subsidence of the relevant

karmas in the case of the birth of the heavenly and the hellish beings.
Sometimes a question is asked that if these beings possess avadhi as
bhavapratyaya, then is it not necessary that there should be destruction and
subsidence of the relevant karmas in the case of these beings. The answer to
this is that in the case of heavenly and the hellish beings the destruction and
subsidence of the relevant karmas would have taken place at the time of their
birth, otherwise the possession would not be possible. Therefore, those beings in
whom destruction and the subsidence takes place at the time of birth, the will
have avadhi and so it would be bhavapratyaya. But in the case of those who
have to acquire merit for the sake of obtaining avadhijnana it would be
gunapratyaya.

Gunapratyaya avadhijnana has been classified into six types--

1. Anugami--It is that type of avadhi, which continues to be present with the
individual wherever he goes.
2. Ananugami--In this case the avadhi ceases to function, if the individual goes
to another place, from the place where avadhi was acquired.
3. Vardhamana--In this avadhi increases in intensity as it goes on developing.
4. Hiyamana--In this the avadhi goes on decreasing in intensity as the time
passes.
5. Apratipati--This avadhi lasts up to the life or until one attains kevalajnana.
6. Pratipati--This avadhi does not last long. It vanishes after sometimes.

With reference to the spatial extension of the object cognized in avadhi

Tattvartharajavartika distinguishes three types (1) desavadhi, (2) paramavadhi
(3) sarvavadhi.

Desavadhi has been distinguished further into three types (a) jaghanya
desavadhi in which one can know only the smallest part of the finger. (b) utkrsta
desavadhi the scope of the knowledge of the avadhi in this is the entire universe
and (c) ajaghanya utkrsta desavadhi intuites the objects of the medium size
neither of the highest nor of the minutest part.

Similarly, paramavadhi also can be distinguished into three different types.1 But
sarvavadhi is of one type. The uppermost limit of the intuition in this is the
innumerable place-points beyond the scope of paramavadhi. The scope of this is
the entire universe. And it cannot intuite anything outside the universe, as there
is nothing outside the universe. Desavadhi is possible to be obtained by the
beings in the four states of existence, but paramavadhi and sarvavadhi are
possible only for the munis.2

Jinabhadragani ksamasramana says that it is possible to study avadhijnana with

reference tot he seven niksepas--dravya, ksetra, kala, bhava, bhava, sthapana
and nama.3
MANAHPARYAYA JNANA

Manahparyaya jnana is possible for human beings only; and only the human
beings who are self-controlled and who acquire merits get the
manahparyayajnana. In other words, only Sramanas can acquire manahparyaya
jnana. The human beings that are without self-control cannot possess
manahparyayajnana. Manahparyaya is telepathic expression. In this one
experiences and cognizes the mental states of others. This view of
manahparyaya based on the Jaina conception of the nature of the mind as
material in content consisting minute and fine particles of matter called
manovarganas. Due to the infinite modes of the formation of the mind one
understands the mental states operating in the minds of others.4

Manahparyaya experience is not inferential knowledge, it is direct experience.

This is not through the instrument of mind, but the soul gets it directly and mind
and the mental states are the objects of knowledge of manahparyaya.

THE TWO TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT

There are two traditions for explaining the nature of manahparyayajnana. The
first tradition is mentioned by acarya Pujyapada1 and Akalanka.2 According to this
tradition, manahparyaya cognition reveals the meaning of thoughts expressed in
others minds. There is no distinction between the thought and the content of
thought. It is the material objects and the state of thought by the mind of others
that are intuited in the manahparyaya. The mind undergoes the process of
change while thinking and the objects content of this process are intuited in
manahparyaya.

The second tradition is given by acarya Jinabhadragani. According to Jinabhadra,

one possessed of manahparyayajnana intuites the states of the mind-substance
directly, but knows the external objects of thought by the mind only by
inference.3 Therefore, we can say according to Jinabhadra that one possessed of
manahparyaya knowledge, object thought of by others only by way of inference.
Manahparyaya implies that we know the modes of the mental states and not the
objects that are thought of by these mental states. The objects are known by
inference.

It seems that the second tradition propounded by Jinabhadragani is more

consistent, because in manahparyaya it is not easy to get the intuition of the
object thought of by the mind. The objects of thought are secondary and are not
the main content of the thought.4 If manahparyayajnana were to intuite the
mental states and objects, then this kind of intuition would have grasped the
formed and the formless object, but this does not happen. In this case of the
avadhijnana, we can intuite objects having forms, but in the case of
manahparyaya, we intuite the mental states. The objects of the mental states
are known through inference and then because of this, the objects which have
form and also formless can be known through manahparyaya by means of
inference.1

TWO TYPES OF MANAHPARYAYA

Manahparyayajnana has been distinguished into two types: (1) rjumati and (2)
vipulamati. Vipulamati intuites subtle forms of mental states, while rjumati is not
able to grasp the subtle forms.2 Rjumati is temporary and it may last for
sometime and vanish but vipulamati once obtained will continue at least till the
attainment of kevalanjana.3

THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OF MANAHPARYAYA

Manahparyayajnana intuites different aspects of the knowledge from the points

of view. I.e. dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. (1) From the point of view of
substance (dravya) manahparyaya intuites mental stage and events, through the
manovarganas (fine particles of atoms constituting mind). (2) From the point of
view of place (ksetra) the scope of the manahparyaya jnana is restricted to the
region, where the human beings live. (3) From the point of view of time (kala) it
intuites mental states for innumerable moments of time and it can extend upto
past and future. (4) From the point of view of nature 9bhava), it can intuite the
infinite states of manovarganas.

AVADHI AND MANAHPARYAYA

Avadhi and manahparyayajnana are both extra-sensory perceptions, which the

self can get directly without the help of the sense organs and the mind. But both
these forms of intuition are restricted to the cognition of objects having form.
Therefore, they are incomplete and not perfect forms of cognition. They are
vikala pratyaksa. But kevala jnana is the complete and perfect. Therefore, it is
sakalapratyaksa. Avadhi and manahparyaya can be distinguished from each
other on the basis of the clarity (visuddhi). The criterian of clarity (visuddha) is,
here, not concerned with any inadequacy. But it has reference to the intensity of
experience, and the subtlety of cognitive forms. Manahparyaya intuites the
mental states and events of other individuals. The distinction between the two
forms of direct cognition can be presented in the form of an analogy. A
physician knows and treats the patient in general. He is the doctor, which cures
the diseases of whole body. But there are doctors who are specialists as of eye,
ear, heart etc., the different parts of the whole body. In both types of the
physicians there is a difference of generality & speciality. Similarly, avadhi and
manahparyaya have the distinction of subtlety, and un-subtlety of perception.
Manahparyaya intuites the objects in its subtlety. While avadhijnana gets a less
subtle cognition of the objects. With reference to the ksetra, avadhijnana can
intuite the objects from the minutest part of the finger in the entire cosmos.
While manahparyaya is restricted to the human abode only. Avadhijnana is
possible for obtaining in all the four states of existence. But manahparyaya is
restricted to the human being of self-controlled character. The scope of
Avadhijnana is to intuite the objects having form and not all of its modes. But
the manahparyaya jnana intuites mental states, which are based on the finest
particles of matter, constituting mind.

KEVALAJNANA (OMNISCIENCE)

Kevalajnana is direct cognition of everything in the universe. It has a reference

to the knowledge which cognizes without the help of sense organs and the mind.
The self-intuites everything without the help of the sense organs and the mind.1
With the destruction of the Jnanavaraniya karma (knowledge obscuring karma)
all distinctions disappear. And it is not necessary to have mind and sensory-
organs as instruments for gaining the knowledge.

According to the Jainas the soul in its pure form is pure consciousness and
knowledge. It is omniscience. It is obscured by the karmas and the veil of karma
is removed as omniscience dawns.

In the Vyakhyaprajnapti Ganadhara Gautama asked Bhagavana Mahavira, "does

the kevali (omniscient) knows through the indriyas or the manas?" Mahavira
replied, "he does not know the objects through the indriyas and mind". Then
Gautama asked, how does he know? Mahavira replied, 'the omniscient knows
the limited and the limitless. These cannot become objects of sense organs'.1

Kevala also means pure.2 When the jnanavaraniya is removed, all impurities are
removed and therefore it is called kevala (pure knowledge). Kevala also means
full or complete. When the jnanavaraniya karma is removed one gets full or
complete knowledge. Therefore, it is kevala.

The other meaning of the word kevala is extraordinary or superior.3 When the
jnanavaraniya karma is removed, the knowledge that we get is superior and
nothing is comparable to the knowledge. Again kevala would also mean ananta
(endless).4 When the jnanavaraniya karma is removed; knowledge that we get
has no end, because the entire veils that cover the knowledge have been
removed.

Kevala would mean omniscience (sarvajnata), although sarvajnana has to be

taken in the right sense. When the impurities and obscurations of knowledge are
removed, we get pure, super, normal and perfect knowledge. Therefore, there
would be no deficiency or defect in that knowledge. Therefore, in this sense
kevalajnana may be called perfect and pure knowledge and omniscience.

The Jainas are agreed on the nature of the omniscience. Omniscience intuites all
substances with all their modes of the world and the beyond5. All substances
and modes are intuited by kevalajnana6. There is nothing to be known and
nothing unknown. It is the knowledge of all substances and modes of the past,
present and future, all in one. The fullest realization of the capacity of the self
when all the impediments are removed is to be found in the kevalajnana. When
the kevalajnana is attained, all imperfect knowledge is washed away.

THREE VIEWS ABOUT DARSANA AND JNANA

The Jainas make a distinction between anakara and sakara upayoga. They say
that anakara upayoga is indeterminate cognition, it is darsana. It is intuitive in
nature. While sakara upayoga is determinate cognition, it is jnana in nature.
Sakara upayoga is specific cognition and cognizes the specific qualities of the
objects.1 Sakara & anakara are the distinctions made on the basis of determinate
and indeterminate cognition.2

The distinction between jnana and darsana in the Jaina epistemology has been
very ancient. The karmic matter, which obscures knowledge, is jnanavaraniya
karma & that karmic matter, which obscures darsana, is called darsanavaraniya
karma. When the relevant karma is removed, we get jnana or darsana according
to the intuition, where jnanavaraniya karma or darsanavaraniya karma has been
removed. In the agama literature jnana has been referred as janai and darsana
has been referred to as pasall". Digambara acaryas contend that the function of
jnana is external and is meant to grasp the external objects. It is extroverted
(bahirmukha). The function of darsana is introverted and is mainly concerned
with intuiting and gasping through intuition. It is antarmukha, introverted.
Acarya Virasena, in his commentary called Dhavala on Satkhandagama of
Puspadanta says "what comprehends an external object of the nature of the
universal-cum-particular is jnana and comprehension of the self of the same
nature is darsana. Virasena says that the only difference between them is that
jnana knows the external reality while the darsana intuites the internal self.3

The distinction between darsana and jnana has been made on the basis of the
nature of cognition, whether the cognition is general or particular. According to
this view darsana intuite the general features of an object without analyzing the
particulars. While jnana gives the cognition based on the analysis of the specific
features. According to the Jainas the universal and the particular are equally
important and both of them are the essential characteristics of the object.
Without the one, the other cannot exit. Therefore, that cognition which grasps
only the universal without understanding the specific features would not be a
valid cognition. Similarly, the cognition which analyses the specific features of
an object without grasping the universal aspect would also be not a true
cognition.1 Presenting this view point Brahmadeva, in his commentary on
Dravyasangraha has suggested that the distinction between darsana and jnana
also be studied from the points of view of naya, especially from the logical and
metaphysical point of view. From the logical point of view, it should be better to
say tat darsana grasps the universal features of the object. But from the
metaphysical point of view the self is to comprehend the general and the specific
features of the object or the inner or the outer aspects.2 From the practical point
of view darsana and jnana3 can be distinguished but from the noumenal point of
view, there is no distinction between darsana and jnana. The distinction
between darsana and jnana made on the basis of the principles of generality ad
particularity has been refuted by the Jainas from another point of view. It is said
that this distinction has been made with a view to adopting the phraseology and
falling in line of the other systems for the sake of logical distinctions. But one
who has understood the Jaina philosophy properly has grasped the agamic view
of darsana and jnana. The agamic point of view emphasizes that the atman is
distinct from the other objects, but darsana and jnana are aspects of the same
upayoga of the soul.4

A few philosophers have however held this type of the view of the non-distinction
between darsana & jnana. Many Jaina philosophers do accept the distinction
between the sakara and anakara upayoga. Their contention is that darsana is an
expression of anakara upayoga which grasps the general features of the object.
While jnana is an expression of the sakara upayoga which analyses the specific
features because it is the expression of upayoga in its anakara form. Upayoga
has these two-form sakara and anakara. But here there is no distinction of
generality and particularity in the object.

We may now consider the relation of darsana and jnana from the point of view of
kala (time). Jaina philosophers are agreed that in the case of Chadmastha (one
who has reached upto the 10th gunasthana), he experiences darsana and jnana
successively. But in the case of the kevalin regarding the experience of darsana
and jnana there are different views. Three views have been mentioned. The
first view says that the kevalin experiences darsana and jnana successively. The
second view gives importance to the simultaneous cognition of darsana and
jnana. According to the third view there is not difference between darsana and
jnana. They are identical. In the Prajnapana, there is a dialogue between
Bhagavana Mahavira & Ganadhara Gautama. Gautama asked Bhagavana: Can
we say that a kevalin who grasps the nature of the Ratnaprabha prthvi through
forms, example, its color and area etc., at the same time he intuites the object.
Mahavira said, this interpretation is not correct.

Gautama asked, does the kevalin not simultaneously grasp the general nature of
the prthvi & understand the nature through various categories of cognition.
What is the reason for this?

Mahavira said, that the cognition of the kevalin is sakara and his intuition is
nirakara. Therefore, when we intuites (darsana), he does not cognize. But when
he gets cognition, he does not intuite. They are successively possible. In this
way up to the adhahsaptamiprthvi, from Saudharmakalpa to Isatpagbhara prthvi,
from the paramanu (atom) to the innumerable pradesa skandhas, you should
understand this order of cognition and intuition.1

The Avasyakaniryukti1 and VIsesavasyakaniryukti2 maintain that in the case of

the kevalin the darsana & jnana upayoga cannot be present simultaneously. The
Svetambara agamic tradition supports this view and maintains that jnana and
darsana upayoga cannot be had simultaneously even in the case of the kevalin.3
The Digambara tradition however contends that in the case of the kevalin it is
possible to have kevaladarsana and kevalajnana simultaneously. All the
Digambara acaryas are agreed on this point.4 Acarya Umasvati also says in the
case of mati and srutajnana etc., there is the successive presentation of jnana
and darsana, wile in the case of the kevalin the intuition and cognition are
simultaneous.5

Acarya Kundakunda, in the Niyamsara says just as the light and heat of the sun
are simultaneously experienced, so also the kevalin experiences darsana and
jnana simultaneously.6

The third tradition is presented by acarya Siddhasena Divakara, in the fourth

century A. D. In his Sanmatitarka Prakarana, he has stated that distinction
between jnana and darsana could be made upto manahparyaya, but in the case
of the kevaladarsana and kevalajnana it is difficult to distinguish between the
two.7 Jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya karmas are destroyed simultaneously.
Therefore, expressions upayoga as a result of the simultaneous destruction of
jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya karmas, cannot be distinguished between
jnana and darsana as successively experienced.8 In the case of the kevalin when
he attains kaivalya, mohaniya karma is first destroyed and then the
jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya and antaraya karmas are destroyed
simultaneously. When there is no succession of time in the destruction of
jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya karmas there is not possibility of the
successive presentation of the kevalajnana and kevaladarsana. They have to be
presented simultaneously. And also because there is no distinction in the
upayoga, although upayoga expresses itself in the anakara and sakara forms. In
the case of the kevalin state there is not distinction between darsana and jnana
and to consider darsana and jnana as distinct would raise some other difficulties.
If the kevalin is to know everything at one moment of experience, then for all
times he will know everything. In that case, his knowledge would not be perfect
because he would go on knowing and experiencing. In that case, how can it be
omniscient.1 But in the case of omniscience, knowledge and experience are
perfect and one. And there would we no distinction between jnana and darsana.
Jnana is determinate (savikalpa) and darsana is indeterminate (nirvikalpa). This
kind of distinction between the determinate and indeterminate cognition is not
be found when the karmic matter obscuring knowledge and intuition are
destroyed.2 As long as there is perfect, not but imperfect expression of upayoga
there would be distinction between determinate and indeterminate cognition.
But when upayoga is perfectly and fully expressed, there would be no distinction
of this type. One more difficulty would be that darsana (intuition) would be
without the element of jnana. But in the case of jnana, the element of darsana is
involved.3 In the case of the kevalin when he gets omniscient knowledge, then
darsana again would not be possible because darsana is not involved with jnana
although jnana involves darsana. Therefore, the successive cognition of darsana
and jnana in the case of the perfect knowledge would not be possible. The
digambara tradition accepts the simultaneous cognition of darsana and jnana.
But in the Svetambara tradition there are three streams of thought: (a)
successive cognition of the two, (b) simultaneous cognition and (c) non-
difference of darsana and jnana in the case of the kevalin. These three streams
of thought have been coordinated from the point of view of (naya) by the famous
logician Yasovijaya in the vikrama 17th century.1 From the point of view
rjusutranaya, successive presentation of darsana and jnana in the case of kevalin
is acceptable, because the view-point is to look at the particular moment the
present. Jnana and darsana in these moments can be considered as the cause
and the effect. However, the relation of the cause and effect would be the
viewpoint presented by rjusutranaya. From the point of view of vyavahara naya,
the distinction between jnana and darsana is accepted so the simultaneous
cognition of both would be the acceptable view. From the point of view of
sangrahanaya the emphasis is on non-difference between jnana and darsana. It
appears to be from the point of view of rational consideration that the non-
difference point of view is more adequate.

There is the agamic point of view, which is based on the natural process of
cognition and intuition. It is natural that in the first moment we experience the
particulars as distinct and then we cognize the general among the particulars.
The characteristic of cognition (jnana) is of this type. It is a synthesis of bheda
(difference) and abheda (non-distinct) and bhedabheda. However, knowledge
with its emphasis on distinction and darsana with its emphasis on non-distinction
cannot occur simultaneously.

Thus we have studied the problems of knowledge and intuition from the agama
yuga to the darsanikayuga. Detailed discussion on these problems would be
beyond the scope of this small book.
PRAMANA: A Study

PRAMANA IN THE AGAMIC LITERATURE

In the agamic literature, we get elaborate discussion of pramana (valid source of

knowledge). A good deal of discussion has been carried out on regarding the
nature and types of pramana.

In the Bhagavati sutra1 there is a dialogue between Gautama Ganadhara and

Bhagavana Mahavira. Gautama asked Mahavira, 'Bhagavan! In the case of the
kevalin who is to relinquish the body for the last time, his cognition and intuition
are perfect. Similarly, can we say how a Chadmastha, gets knowledge?
Mahavira said, in the case of the Chadmastha, knowledge is not spontaneously, it
is through the valid sources of knowledge like sravana (hearing) and other
pramanas. On this, Gautama asked a question on the basis of hearing?
Mahavira replied, from the point of view of kevalin....

Gautama again asked by what pramana does the Chadmastha get knowledge?
Mahavira replied, knowledge is possible through four pramanas: pratyaksa,
anumana, upamana and agama. The description of the four pramanas has been
given in the Anuyogadvara.

In the Sthananga, the term pramana, and hetu has been used. From the point of
view of niksepa pramana has been distinguished into: dravya pramana, ksetra
pramana, kala pramana and bhava pramana.2

In the Sthananga where the word hetu is used the four-fold distinction of
pramana as pratyaksa (direct), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison) and
agama (testimony) has been presented.1

In some place three-fold distinction of pramanas has been mentioned. In that

case the word vyavasaya is used, meaning determined cognition. Vyavasaya is
of three types, pratyaksa, pratyayika and anugamika.2

There are different traditions regarding the distinctions in the types of pramana,
some have mentioned three pramanas and some other four pramanas. Samkhya
philosophy mentions three pramanas and Nyaya mentions four pramanas. Both
these traditions are mentioned in Sthananga. In the Anuyogadvara there is an
elaborate discussion of the pramana, which is mentioned below.

PRATYAKSA (DIRECT)

Pratyaksa has been distinguished into two types as (1) indriya pratyaksa (sense-
pratyaksa) and (2) no-indriya pratyaksa (knowledge without the help of the
sense organs). Indriya pratyaksa is of five types, as (1) auditory perception
(Srotrendriya pratyaksa) (2) visual perception (caksurindriya pratyaksa) (3)
alfactory experience (ghranendriya pratyaksa) (4) experience of taste
(jivhendriya pratyaksa) and touch experience (sparsanenendriya pratyaksa).

No-indriya pratyaksa is of three types: (1) avadhi pratyaksa (clairvoyance) (2)

manahparyaya pratyaksa (telepathy) and (3) kevala pratyaksa (omniscience).
The cognition through mind (manasa pratyaksa) has been included in the sense-
experience (indriya pratyaksa). Therefore, there is not separate mention of
manasa pratyaksa. The later philosophers have given a separate status for the
cognition through mind.

ANUMANA (INFERENCE)

Anumana (inference) has been distinguished into three types as (1) purvavat
(from cause to effect) (2) sesavat (from effect to cause) and (3)
drstasadharmyavat (from universal to particular). Nyaya3 Bauddha1 and
Sankhya2 darsana have accepted these three forms of inference.

Purvavat--Purvavat proceeds from the cause of the effect, from the antecedent
event to the consequent. For instance, when there are clouds, we say it will rain.
Similarly, a mother seeing her son after several years, when he returns from
abroad. In the first few moments she could not recognize, but she see a sign on
his body and instantly she recognizes him as her son. This is purvavat
anumana.3

Sesavat--Sesavat anumana is from effect to the cause from cause to effect, from
quality to the substance, which is the substratum of quality from constituent
forms to the agent of constituent forms and the source of dependence to the
dependent. These are the five types of sesavat anumanas.

From effect to the cause, we move from knowing the effect & we infer the cause.
For example, from the sound of particular thing, we say it is a sound of particular
instruments. We also proceed from cause to effect as in the case of; we infer the
quality of a pot from the clay.

We infer the nature of the substance having qualities on the basis of the
qualities, as for example we infer the standard of gold by rubbing it; from the
smell, we infer the nature of the type of the flower, from the taste, we infer the
salt of any other object.

In the case of inference from the constituents to its objects, we infer, for
example, from the horns the type of buffalo, from the ivory the elephant, from
the hood we infer the existence a horse and from mane we infer the existence of
lion.

When we infer the dependence of an object, from the object of dependence, we

infer the presence of fire from the smoke; from the presence of a collection of
swans, we infer the existence of water and from the good nature of a man we
infer his family background.

We infer from the cause to the effect in two types. But in the case of avayava
and avayavi etc., there is no such distinction.

Drstasadharmyavat--In this, the inference is from the general to the particular,

on the basis of common points and similarity. For instance, on the perception of
particular object with its quality, we infer the nature of similar objects. In this,
from the particular object we go to the species and gunas. For example, when
we see a person we infer the existence of similar persons in that land.

There is a form of inference called visesa drasta anumana. In this, we distinguish

one object from a large collection of objects and we infer the specific nature of
that object. For instance, when we distinguish one man and recognize him from
among the large crowd, we use this inference. Samanya drsta inference is like
upamana (comparison) while visesa drsta upamana is analogue to pratyabhijna
(recognition).

Anuyogadvara has made a distinction in anumana as of three types on the basis

of the consideration of time: (1) atita kala grahana--When we see the greenery
all-round and the overflowing ponds, we infer that there has been good rain in
that part. (2) pratyutpanna kala grahana--In this also, we infer the causes from
the effect, although the causes may be remote causes. For instance, if an
ascetic who goes for begging food, if he gets sufficient food, then he infers that
there is plenty in this part. (3) anagata kala grahana--It is from antecedent even
to the consequent event. For instance, when we see thunder and lightning and
when the sky is full of dark clouds, we infer that it would rain heavily.

Apart from these three types of anumana based on the criterian of time we may
infer wherein contrary situations might give negative inference. For instance, if
we see the land very dry, we infer that there has been famine. When the ascetic
odes not get sufficient food during his begging round, he infers that there has
been famine in that area.

THE CONSTITUENT PROPOSITIONS OF INFERENCE (Syllogism)

Syllogism refers to the constituent propositions, which are called avayavas.

There is not much discussion about this problem in the original agamas. The
syllogism is meant for the communication of one's thoughts to others. It
presents the methodology and the procedure of expressing one's thoughts to
others so as to it effective and valid. Dasavaikalikaniryukti has a distinction
about this problem and it mentions various forms of syllogism from the syllogism
with two propositions to the syllogism with ten propositions.1 The syllogism with
two propositions has been mentioned with two specific functions. In the case of
syllogism with only two propositions, hetu is not mentioned only udaharana is
mentioned along with pratijna. We give below a schemata of the number of
propositions involved in the various types of syllogisms based on the number of
propositions: (1) a syllogism with three propositions mentions pratijna and
udaharana (2) a syllogism with three constituent propositions mentions pratijna,
hetu, udaharana, (3) a syllogism with five propositions mentions pratijna, hetu,
drstanta, upasamhara and nigamana.

A syllogism with ten propositions has been elaborated as follows pratijna,

pratijnavisuddhi, hetu, hetuvisuddhi, drstanta, drstantavisuddhi upasamhara,
upasamharavisuddhi and nigamana, nigamanavisuddhi.

The ten membered syllogisms have also been mentioned in the following way:
pratijna, pratijnavibhakti, hetu, hetuvibhakti, vipaksa, pratisedha, drstanta,
asanka, tatpratisedha and nigamana.2

It may be noted that there are sufficient discussions about the two membered,
three-membered and five-membered syllogism in the other darsanas.3 But
Bhadrabahu alone has given an analysis of the ten-membered syllogism.4

UPAMANA

Upamana is comparison. It is nearer to analogy in the western logic. It is based

on the points of similarity (sadharmya) and points of difference (vaidharmya).
Accordingly, upamana is distinguished into two types: sadharmya upamana and
vaidharmya upamana. Sadharmya upamana is further distinguished into three
types: --(a) Kincit sadharmyopanita. It consists of the similarity in terminology
like aditya and khadyota, candra and kumuda. The terms apply to the similar
objects on the basis of similarity of functions denoted by the similar objects on
the basis of similarity of functions denoted by the words. (b) Prayah
sadharmyopanita--This is based on the points of similarity perceived in two
objects. For instance, when we see an animal in the forest, which resembles the
cow, we say that this animal is like the cow. Because there is sufficient similarity
between the two. (c) Sarvasadhrmyopanita--In this there is complete similarity
so as to deny the same quality to the other individuals and other objects. For
instance, the object or the individual is unique because the qualities that one
possesses cannot be applied to others. For example, Indra is Indra only;
Tirthankara is tirthankara only and Chakravartin as chakravartin only.

Vaidharmyopanita upamana is based on the points of difference. It is also of

three types: (a) Kincit vaidharmyopanita--In it we express the distinction
between the cow and the horse (b) Prayovaidharmyopanita--In this, there is
emphasis on the distinctions on the contrary qualities. For instance, the black is
not white. (c) Sarvavaidharmyopanita--In this, the specific and peculiar qualities
have been specifically distinguished. For example, a good man did actions,
which are good only, and bad man very often does action consistence with his
character.

Dr. Mohanlal Mehta says these examples are not adequate to explain this type of
analogy. We may give examples of good and the bad, the servant and the
master etc.1
AGAMA

Agama is testimony. It is the acceptance of an authority. It is of two-type (1)

Laukika agama and (2) Lokottara agama. Laukika agama refers to the
expression regarding the empirical events and Lokottara agama refers to the
philosophical and spiritual discussions as given in the sastras. For instance, we
can mention Mahabharata and Ramayana as laukika agamas while the angas like
Acaranga, Sutrakrtanga, Samavayanga, Bhagavati, etc., coming from the
omniscient tirthankara are lokottara agama.1 Lokottaragama has been
distinguished into three types as suttagama, atthagama and tadubhayagama.2
Agamas have also been distinguished into three types from another point of
view: atmagama, anantaragama and paramparagama.3 Agamas have also been
distinguished into two forms as artharupa and sutrarupa. The tirthankara
preaches the doctrines to his disciples, i.e., artharupa agama. It is atmagama for
tirthankara because it comes from the omniscient only and not received from
any other person. Ganadharas receive the teaching of the tirthankara directly.
There is not third person in between them. Therefore this arthagama received
by the ganadharas is anantaragama for themselves. But on the basis of this
ganadharas is anantaragama for themselves. But on the basis of this
arthagama, ganadharas for themselves. But on the basis of this arthagama,
ganadharas present it to the others in the forms of sutra (aphorisms),4 therefore
this sutragama for the ganadharas is atmagama. The disciples of the Ganadhara
receive the teaching directly and there is no third person involved. Therefore,
agama teaching received by the disciples from the Ganadharas directly is called
anataragama for the disciples. But from the point of view of the content of the
teaching it is paramparagama, because it comes from the master tot he teacher
in succession. In this sense, the teachings received by the ganadharas cannot
also be considered as atmagama because it was received from the tirthankara.
For the disciples of the ganadharas and their disciples in succession sutragama
and arthagama are to be considered as paramparagama only.5

So far, we have discussed the nature of pramanas. The validity of the pramanas
have been discussed in the agamas and on the basis of that discussion, the later
acaryas have developed a system of logic presented in the methodology of the
polemic (purva paksa) and the construction of the theory of logic on the basis of
the polemic. In this, the later acaryas have made a significant contribution to
the development of Indian logic.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAMANA

Pramana is characterized by valid knowledge. The relation between jnana and

pramana is one of pervaded and the pervasion. Jnana is pervasion (vyapaka)
and pramana is vyapya, Jnana is of two types: Yatharatha (valid) and ayathartha
(invalid). Valid knowledge is that which is consistent with the previous
knowledge and is definite and certain. That knowledge which is expressed by
doubt (samsaya) and perversity (viparyaya) is invalid knowledge. The
knowledge, which is valid, is free from doubt, is certain, and well defined.

CAUSATION OF PRAMANA

The general characteristic of pramana is--"pramayah karanam pramanam" It is

the instrument of the prama. "Tadbhavati tatprakaranubhavah prama" that
object, which is known as it is, called prama. It is the object of valid cognition.
For the cognition of an object several factors contribute, but all of them cannot
be called karana (instrument of knowledge). Karana is that which is the
instrument of knowledge and by which knowledge is cognized. The conditions
for using an axe would be the hand and the blade. The hand would be a
condition no doubt; it is the less essential condition than the blade.

The philosophers are agreed on the general nature of pramana, but there are
differences of opinion regarding the sources of the instruments (karana) of valid
cognition. In the Buddhist literature consistency and adequacy (yogyata) are the
criteria or karana.1 In the case of the Naiyayayikas sannikarsa (contact) & jnana
(cognition) are the criteria or karana of pramana. But in the Jaina darsana jnana
is considered to be karana.2 Although Sannikarsa and adequacy etc., are useful
for grasping the meaning of the cognition, but jnana is much more important for
understanding the meaning. Jnana established the intimate contact between
itself and the object.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PRAMANA

The acaryas have used different terminology for explaining pramana. According
to the Jainas the essence of pramana is well-defined knowledge (nirnayaka
jnana). Acarya Vidyananda in his Tattvarthaslokavartika (1, 10, 77) says that
pramana is that which establishes the correct and well-defined knowledge. This
is the characteristic of knowledge.

Pramana determines the exact meaning of a thing. This is the characteristic of

pramana. The other characteristics mentioned about pramana are only
variations of the descriptions of the determinateness of the meaning of the
thing. The use of other characteristics mentions are due to three reasons: (1) to
differentiate between the description given by the others, (2) to refute the
description of other characteristics of pramana mentioned by other schools of
thought and (3) to refute the discrepancies and errors in the description of
nature of pramana.

Acarya Siddhasena in his Nyayavatara says that the function of pramana is to

illumine the self and also the object. Therefore, it is self and the other
illumination. According to them pramana is to cognize the object in a definite
way. We cognize the object and therefore, we are the subject of cognition and
cognition is the knowledge. This is the 'paroksa jnanavada'.1
Nyaya-Vaisesika considers cognition and the object of cognition as distinct.
According to them, all knowledge except the divine knowledge is cognized by the
other cognition. Sankhya philosophers consider cognition as a product of prakrti
and therefore, acetana (unconscious). According to them, cognition is the mode
of prakrti; it is sometimes a perverse expression of the mode of prakrti.
Therefore it is unconscious. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this argument and
has used the word sva-abhasi.1 According to Jainism, he says jnana is sva-abhasi.
Its characteristic is cognition. The cognition is not the object of cognition for is it
the pramana, as in the case of the cognition of Isvara. Cognition is not
unconscious and not the mode of prakrti. Knowledge is the characteristic of the
soul.2

The Buddhists3 consider cognition as real and the world of physical object as an
appearance. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this stand by using the word "para
abhasi". He has shown that the objects have an independent existence and
reality, independent of the cognition of the object.

The Jainas maintain that knowledge and the object of knowledge both are real.4
Viparyaya (fallacious knowledge) is not a pramana. Therefore, the term
"badhavivarjita" has been used. In characteristics of pramana as described by
the Jainas from jnana given by other schools of thought.

Akalanka has used the term "anadhigatarthaka" and "avisamvadi" for explaining
the characteristic of pramana.5 And he has justified the use of the word "sva-
paravabhasaka" as the characteristic of pramana.6 Acarya Manikyanandi has
followed the footsteps of Akalanka. He has suggested tat pramana determine
the exact nature and the real nature of the object. In this, he has followed the
tradition established by acarya Samantabhadra and Siddhasena and developed
by Akalanka.7

Vadidevasuri says that pramana is sva-para-vyavasayi jnana (cognition of the

self-natured cognition and of the object.) 1 In this, he has not given important to
the word apurva used by Manikyanandi.

During this time, two schools of thought were developed. Digambara acarya did
not accept the knowledge which is received by stimulations and which is
continuous (dharavahi) as pramana, while Svetambara acaryas has considered
the cognition also as pramana. Vidyanandi has made it clear that the cognition
that determines the self-natured cognition and of the nature of the object as
pramana, whether it is received and comprehended or not comprehended.2

The Digambara and the Svetambara tradition have used the different
terminologies, but really there is not much of difference in the content of the
meaning of the interpretations given by the two traditions. The development of
the controversy regarding the nature of the pramana reflects the prevailing
logical tendency and disputation of the time.
KNOWLEDGE AND PRAMANA

The analysis of the nature of pramana shows that there is no difference between
the knowledge and pramana. Jnana means samyagjnana (right knowledge).
Knowledge reveals itself and cognizes the object. The Jainas hold the nature of
cognition as sva-par-prakasaka. Just as a lamp reveals the objects and also
reveals itself, similarly knowledge reveals itself and cognizes the other objects.
The Jainas have said that pramana is knowledge which is fruitful, determinate
and certain. In the Nyayabindu nirvikalpakajnana (indeterminate knowledge)
has been considered to be a pramana4 But the Jaina logicians refute this view
and they say that nirvikalpa cognition cannot be a pramana nor even as
apramana because if there is nothing determinate we cannot say whether it is
pramana or not. Nirvikalpa can be attributed to darsana. Pramana cannot be
valid cognition if it is not determined and determinate.

THE CRITERION OF THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMANA)

Pramana is truth. There is no doubt about, it, although different words have
been used for describing the word pramana. Several words have been used to
describe the nature of pramana: yathartha, abadhitattva, arthakhyapana,
apurva, arthaprapana etc. These words have been accepted by some schools
and rejected by others. Acarya Vidyanandi explains the characteristics of
abadhitattva as that wherein we find the absence of the badhita (discrepancies).
The criterion of abadhitattva is its being incoherent and consistent.1 Acarya
Abhayadeva has refuted this stand in the Sanmati tika.2 Acarya Akalanka, the
Buddhists and the Mimamsakas maintain that the function of pramana is to make
explicit the meaning of the word and to make the knowledge from the known to
unknown.3 Vadideva Suri and Hemacandra have refuted this stand.4

In this way, there has been a long controversy on the nature and function of
pramana and the relation of pramana and jnana. It may be noted that the
pramana has to point has to point to the pragmatic test. Unless the valid
cognition leads to the successful knowledge, the cognition cannot be considered
to be valid. At the same time it should be noted that cognition and truth must be
consistent and mutually related.

THE VALIDITY OF COGNITION

We have seen that pramana refers to samyagjnana (correct knowledge). But it is

necessary to distinguish between the correct knowledge samyagjnana and
mithyajnana. The Jaina logicians have given the criterion of validity of
knowledge on the basis of the two-fold function (i) the self-cognition of the
cognition and the cognition of the object. Sometime cognition becomes valid by
itself and sometime it has to be verified by means of some other cognition.

Therefore, the words svatah and paratah are used. If cognition is self-valid, it is
true to itself and it is a pramana. But in some cases, cognition has to be verified
through some other means. The Naiyayikas do not accept the validity of
knowledge. According to them the validity or other wise of cognition has to be
determined by some other criteria outside cognition. Therefore, it is praratah
pramanya.

The Mimamsakas maintain the view of the self-validity of knowledge. The invalid
knowledge is due to external circumstances and differences. It is not necessary
to have any external criteria for determining the validity of knowledge. This is
the svatah pramanyavada. The Naiyayikas do not accept the svatah
pramanyavada (self-validity of knowledge). According to them validity of
knowledge can be determined by circumstances, which are eternal to knowledge.
That knowledge is valid which corresponds to the facts or the external objects.
That which is contrary to the fact is invalid knowledge. This is the criterion of
correspondence to determining the truth or the falsity of knowledge. Sankha
darsana is of the opinion that the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both
determined by self. There is no necessity of an external condition to determine
the validity or otherwise of knowledge. The Jainas are against the three vies
mentioned above. According to the Jainas, the validity of knowledge can be
determined by the self or by the external circumstances according to the
situation. They accept both the theories of svatah pramanya and paratah
pramanya of the validity of cognition.1 But they say the validity or otherwise of
cognition are determined by the situation, for instance, a man is thirsty, he
drinks water and he knows that the water has quenched his thirst. In this
cognition, it is not necessary to have external circumstances for determining the
validity of knowledge. Again, if we see light coming out from a closed room, and
if we do not know from what source the light comes, whether it is from candle or
an electric light, we have to open the door and see. In this case, the validity is
determined by external circumstance. Therefore, in this situation it is paratah.1

RESULT OF PRAMANA

Now the question has been asked: what is the result of the effect of pramana. In
the Pramanamimamsa (1, 1, 34) it has been suggested that the aim of pramana
is to make the object clear. It is to illumine the object. Pramana enables to
comprehend the two objects of the nature of the object. We cannot get a correct
nature of the object unless we have the knowledge of the distinction between
pramana and apramana. The direct result of pramana is to remove ignorance.
This is the effect of all forms of pramanas. If we consider the effect of pramana
in various degrees, we find that in the case of kevalajnana it leads to happiness
and bliss. With this knowledge, one gets full comprehension, just as the rays of
the sun's light make everything clear. The omniscient person wards away
ignorance and enjoys eternal bliss. He develops and attitude of non-detachment
for the things of the world. For those who have other forms knowledge except
the kevalajnana they develop the capacity of comprehension and discrimination.
Similarly, they develop tendency towards good action and disgust towards
evilactions.2
THE NUMBER OF PRAMANAS

In Indian philosophy, there is no agreement between the different schools of

Indian thought on the question of the number of pramanas. The Carvaka School
maintains that sense perception is the only valid source of knowledge (pramana).
Vaisesikas recognize pratyaksa and anumana as pramana. Sankhya darsana
mentions three pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana and sabda. Nyaya darsana
accepts four pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and sabda. Prabhakara
school of Mimamsa has given five pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana, upamana,
sabda and arthapatti (implication). The Bhatta School of Mimamsa gives six
pramanas by adding abhava or anupalabdhi (cognition of absence). Buddhists
have mentioned only two pramanas: pratyaksa and anumana.

In the Jaina epistemology, there are three different views regarding the number
of pramanas. In the Anuyogadvara sutra four pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana,
upamana and agama have been mentioned. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara
mentions three pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana & agama. Umasvati in his
Tattvarthasutra, Vadidevasuri in mimamsa have recognized two pramanas:
pratyaksa and paroksa.1

The Buddhists have recognized pratyaksa and anumana.2 The Jainas have
mentioned that anumana is a form of paroksa pramana and there are agama
etc., many forms of paroksa pramana. The Jainas maintain that the Buddhist
classification of pramana is not exhaustive, because it does not mention agama
etc. as a pramana. The contention of he Carvaka school that indriya pratyaksa is
the only pramana is not correct because it ignores other forms of pratyaksa,
which we can get without the help of the sense organs directly by the soul. Our
knowledge of the mental states of others on the basis of the observation of
external behaviors cannot be considered to be pratyaksajnana. It implies
anumana. Similarly, without anumana it is difficult to get the knowledge of the
relation of the cause and effect. We may state that without anumana it is
difficult to establish one's own position on the basis of the refutation of the
opposite position and also to establish the truth for otherwise of the existence of
the other world.3

The criterion of the validity of knowledge is that cognition should be valid and it
must correspond to the facts. For all the forms of pramana, this is the primary
criterion. The pramanas can be classified into pratyaksa and paroksa. The
anumana, upamana and agama are considered to be paroksajnana. Arthapatti is
the form of anumana; abhava or anupalabdhi is a form of pratyaksa. The object
has its nature of existence or non-existence. We can apprehend the existence
and non-existence and both these states are directly apprehended. Therefore, it
is not necessary to enumerate abhava or anupalabdhi as a separate pramana.
For example, we perceive the absence of the book on the table, in this, we
perceive the table and in perceiving the table on the table, in this, we perceive
the table and in perceiving the table without the book which was there in the
past, we perceive the absence of the book. This is a form of perception.
Therefore abhava cannot be different from pratyaksa.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRATYAKSA

The Jainas contend that clearness and distinctness (vaisadya) as the

characteristic of Pratyaksa.1 Siddhasena Divakara maintains that pratyaksa
apprehends the meaning of the nature of the object directly without the medium
of any other form of source of knowledge.2 This criterion can be understood when
we know the distinction between pratyaksa and paroksa. Akalanka in the
Nyayaviniscaya states that clearness and distinctness (spastajnana) is a criterion
of pratyaksa.3 He has used the terms "sakara" and anjasa to explain the criteria
of clearness and distinctness for pratyaksa. Jaina darsana does not accept
sannikarsa as a criterion as having been used in the Vaisesikas and not do the
Jainas accept "kalpanapodhattva" as the criterion of pratyaksa. Vaisadya would
mean that type of cognition, which does not require any other form of cognition
to make the meaning clear. In the case of anumana and other forms of paroksa
jnana there are intermediary cognition and media like lingajnana (the knowledge
of the middle term), vyapti (universal concomitance of the middle major term)
and smarana (memory etc). This is the differentiating term and the
characteristics of pratyaksa. Pratyaksa, therefore, cognizes the object directly
and fully without any other media. But while in the case of anumana, we
proceed from previous knowledge to some other knowledge based on the
previous knowledge. That knowledge, which is based on the previous
knowledge, is paroksa jnana, it is not direct.

TWO TYPES OF PRATYAKSA

The Jainas have classified pratyaksa into (1) atmapratyaksa and (2)
indriyanindriya pratyaksa. Atmapratyaksa is the knowledge that the soul gets
directly without the help of sense organs. The indriyanindriya pratyaksa is
empirical knowledge, which is obtained through the sense organs through the
mind, or knowledge obtained through other sources like reason and testimony.

Atmapratyaksa has been classified into two types: 1. Sakala pratyaksa which is
kevalajnana, 2. Vikalapratyaksa which is no kevalajnana it is partial knowledge
short of omniscience. Nokevala jnana is of two types: (1) avadhijnana and (2)
manahparyaya jnana.

Indriya-anindriya pratyaksa has four stages (1) avagraha (2) iha, (3) avaya and
(4) dharana. Atmapratyaksa is the direct knowledge that the soul gets without
the help of indriyas, the manas, and other pramanas. This is paramarthika
pratyaksa or no-indriyapratyaksa. In the indriya pratyaksa one gets direct
cognition through the medium of sense organs and the manas, without the help
of the middle term or the process of reasoning.

Siddhasena Divakara1 says that direct knowledge is that knowledge which is

obtained through the sense organs without the medium of reasoning procedure
& and the analysis of the meaning. In this analysis, he used the word aparoksa
and that is a significant word. Because Naiyayayikas consider pratyaksa jnana to
be the knowledge which i obtained through the contact of sense organs and the
object. They do not use the word aparoksa because it would convey negative
meaning for them. But the knowledge obtained through the contact of the sense
organs and the object is not knowledge that the soul or the cogniser gets
directly, it is, therefore, not pratyaksa. This contention of Siddhasena Divakara
has the support in the Bhagavati1 & Sthananga2 on the analysis of pramana.

Acarya Hemacandra, Akalanka and Manikyanandi have elaborated the nature of

pratyaksa. They have used the word "visada" as a characteristic of knowledge,
in the place of "aparoksa". From the practical point of view the use of this
terminology has been mentioned and has the support of Nandisutra.3 According
to them pratyaksa has been distinguished into two types as mukhya and
samvyavahara. The mukhya pratyaksa is the knowledge that the soul gets
directly without the help of the sense organs. The samvyavahara pratyaksa is
that knowledge which one gets through the sense organs and the manas. In this
analysis of the samvyavahara pratyaksa the words "aparoksataya" and
"arthagrahana" do not figure in as the criteria of pratyaksa. Therefore, the word
visada has been used.

The word visada is meant to clear the meaning of the cognition with reference to
clarity and perceptual judgement. The meaning of the samvyavahara pratyaksa
and anumana would be clear with the use of visada. However, the word
aparoksa is nearer to the concept of the Vedantic analysis of pratyaksa, and the
word visada has similarity with the description of the nature of pratyaksa, as
given by the Buddhists. But considering the content of the meaning in the two
verses there are some fundamental distinctions. The Vedantins maintain that
pratyaksa jnana is possible through the medium of antahkarana (inner sense
organs). The antahkarana takes the modification of the object i.e., seen & is
reflected through the intellect to the soul and that is a pratyaksa jnana. But
according to the Jainas, there is no other medium between the object and the
cognition to the Jainas; there is no other medium between the object and the
cognition in the case of the pratyaksa jnana. To consider that antahkarana is
illumined by the suddhacaitanya (pure consciousness) and also to maintain that
antahkarana gets modified to the size of the object is not very adequate
explanation. It is, therefore, more appropriate to maintain that suddhacaitanya
directly cognizes the object without the help of any modifications or reflections.

According to the Buddhists pratyaksa is nirvikalpa jnana. It is indeterminate

cognition. But Jainas maintain that nirvikalpaka bodha cognition (darsana) is not
determinate cognition. Therefore, it is neither pratyaksa nor even pramana.1

We have already seen that pratyaksa according to the Jainas have been
distinguished from two points of views: (1) paramarthika (the ultimate point of
view) and vyavaharika (phenomenal point of view).2 In the paramarthika
pratyaksa we have mentioned two types: Sakala and vikala. And vyavaharika
pratyaksa has been distinguished into four stages: avagraha, iha, avaya and
dharana.
PAROKSA

That knowledge which is yathartha (adequate) and yet which has the
characteristic of being unclear and distinct is called paroksa pramana.3 Paroksa is
opposite of pratyaksa. In this, there is absence of clearness and distinctness
(vaisadya and spastata). Paroksa is of five types (1) smarana-smrti (memory),
(2) pratyabhijna (recognition) (3) tarka (logical discussion), (4) anumana
(inference) and (5) agama (testimony).4

Most of the Jaina logicians have made these five distinctions in the paroksa
pramana. But Vadiraja in his commentary on Nyayaviniscaya called Pramana
nirnaya,5 that paroksa can be classified into two types: (1) anumana and (ii)
agama. Anumana is of two types: (1) primary (mukhya) and (2) secondary
(gauna). Gauna anumana is of three types (1) smarana (2) pratyabhijna and
tarka. Smarana is the cause of pratyabhijna and pratyabhijna is the cause of
tarka. Hence these three are the instruments in the formation of anumana.
Therefore he has considered these as gauna. There is another reason mentioned
in the Nyayaviniscaya, in that work pratyaksa, anumana and agama have been
mentioned as pramanas, and other pramanas have been included as form of
anumana.

REFUTATION OF CARVAKA VIEW

The Carvaka maintains that sense perception is the only valid source of
knowledge, there is not other pramana. The criterion for determining the
pramana suggested by Carvaka is avisamvada (non-contradiction with fact). And
the other pramanas except the indriya pratyaksa are based or do not possess
these characteristics. Anumana and other pramanas are based on probability.
And there would be distinctions and differentiations in the strength of probability
on the basis of the time element and the element of form. In these cases, it
would be difficult to find the characteristic of avinabhava and avyabhicara
(unerring). For example, a sour and bitter fruit may be transformed into a sweet
fruit through the passage of time and in a different place due to some material
transformations also. Therefore, the inference regarding the fruit as bitter would
not be adequate. Similarly, the case is with smarana and other pramanas.

But this contention of the Carvaka is not satisfactory, because even to affirm the
sweetness or otherwise of the fruit in the first instant would involve the process
of inference and other forms of pramanas. Similarly, to make a distinction
between pratyaksa pramana and other forms of pramanas as invalid source of
knowledge on the basis of the criterion of avisamvada (non-contradiction) would
involve the process of inference. Similarly, it is not possible to know the mind of
the others without the help of the inference. Because through the indriyas we
cannot know the mind of others.
We can know the mental states of others by inference on the basis of the
behavior and their speech.1 The inference is based on the universal relation
between the middle term and major term and the application of that universal
relation to specific instance. If this application is inconsistent and incoherent,
valid inference would not be possible. The Carvaka maintains that the other
world is unreal. This conclusion of Carvaka is also based on inference. If we do
not make use of the inference for getting knowledge, life would be difficult and
knowledge impossible. It would be necessary to correlate the cause-effect
relation for the sake of becoming valid conclusions in inference. Similarly, in
practical life we have to depend on the testimony of others for the sake of
knowledge. Otherwise the knowledge and the life would not be possible on surer
foundation. Human knowledge has not limits. Therefore, knowledge obtained
through other means than the direct cognition through sense organs, like
inference and testimony would not become inconsistent and invalid.1

MEMORY (SMRTI)

The revival of the mental traces due to retention could be memory.2 Memory
depends on recollection of the mental states retained in the mind of past
experience. The recollection of the impressions received in the past is due to
various causes, physical and the mental. The mental states of interest would be
an important condition of memory. Jainas consider memory as a form of prajna.

Other darsanas in Indian philosophy do not give the status of pramana to

memory. According to them memory cannot become a pramana because it has
reference to the past events and the past events were perceived in the past and
are not longer present the mind. At most this is a form of revival of perceptual
experience. But Jainas maintain that the correct knowledge of object with
reference to the past, present or the future may be considered to be a pramana.
Memory presents the valid cognition of the past event through recollection.
Therefore, it is pramana. Knowledge received through memory is consistent and
has a reference to the past event. Because the criterion of pramana would be
correctness (yatharthata) and correspondence to the fact of life.

The other Darsanas maintain that the past experience is no longer present and
therefore how can it generate a valid cognition. The Jainas content that the
object is not the cause of cognition and cognition is possible through its own
conditions of cognition. Cognition has its own capacity of expressing itself and
revealing the object. Similarly, the thing can become the object of cognition.
The relation between the cognition and the object is not to be considered as a
relation between the effect and cause. The relation between the object and the
cognition of the object can be expressed as the relation between the illumination
and the illuminator. Therefore, the Jainas have rightly contended smrti
(memory) as a pramana. If we do not accept smrti as a pramana, then anumana
cannot be considered as a pramana. Because anumana depends on the linga
(middle term) which is not based on pratyaksa? Similarly, the cognition of the
major term is not possible without the memory of the universal relation of the
major term and the middle term. Memory therefore is an essential condition of
inference.

PRATYABHIJNA (RECOGNITION)

Pratyabhijnana is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of

pratyaksa and smarana (memory).1 In this, we say this is Devadatta. We
recognize that the cow at the cow at home is the animal that we see. We also
say that the buffalo is different from the cow. These statements are expressions
of recognition. The process of cognition in this would be, we see Devadatta, we
recollect that we have seen him in the past and we recognize that Devadatta
that we see, is the same Devadatta that we have seen earlier. We see an animal
in the forest called gavaya. We remember the cow at home, which is similar to
this animal, and we say we recognize that this animal is like the cow at home.
This is called sadrsa pratyabhijnana as it is based on similarity. But we can
recognize the distinction between the buffalo and the cow. It would be
recognition based on the point of dissimilarity. Therefore, it is "vaisadrsa
pratyabhijnana". Pratyabhijnana is recognition arrived at through the process of
perceptional memory. Similarly, all relation cognition like the statements: this is
near, this is far, he is taller and the elderer etc., are all forms of recognition.

The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent in the world. Everything is

fleeting. Therefore, nothing continues to remain from the past. Pratyabhijnana
cannot be considered as a pramana. Because, it is said to be cognition which
proceeds from the past to the present. But as a thing is not possible and there is
no continuity of thing, there cannot be cognition of the past in the present. The
past cognition has been destroyed. The present cognition has no reference to
the past. Therefore, recognition cannot present the past cognition into the
present. Pratyabhijnana would include two cognitions. One refers to "that which
was experienced in the past", & the other cognition refers "this which is actually
experienced now". These two cannot become one cognition. Therefore, the
Buddhists do not consider recognition as a pramana. The other systems of
Indian philosophy like Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsakas, say that
pratyabhijnana is a valid cognition, but it is a form of perception and it can be
included in the pratyaksa. But the Jainas contend that the Buddhist view of
pratyabhijnana as two separate cognitions, therefore not a pramana, and the
view of other systems of philosophy making pratyabhijnana as a form of
perception are both inadequate. Pratyaksa has a reference to cognition of the
present. Memory refers to the cognition of the past event, but pratyabhijnana
gives a synthesis of the cognition of the present with the recollection of the past
incident. Therefore, it is a pramana and is a valid source of knowledge. It is a
paroksa pramana.

TARKA (HYPOTHETICAL REASONING)

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is conditioned reasoning.1 It is also called uha.

It has also been referred to as cinta in the Jaina sastras. It is inference based on
the previous condition. It has two constituent conditional propositions as the
major premise. It can be stated as "if 'a' is 'b' then 'c' is 'd', and because 'a' is 'b'
therefore 'c' is 'd'." For instance, if there is fire, there is smoke and if there is no
fire there is no smoke.

Vyapti is the universal relation between the middle term and the major term.
Tarka is inference based on the positive and negative conditions of the
universality of relation between the middle term and the major term.

Generally all schools of Indian philosophy have accepted tarka as a pramana.

The Naiyayikas maintain that tarka is a from of inference and not an independent
pramana. It is an auxiliary pramana and is based on conditioned relation
between the antecedent and the pramana. The knowledge that we get through
tarka strengthens the validity of knowledge. Pramana is valid cognition and
tarka strengthens and supports this cognition by hypothetical reasoning.
Therefore, the Naiyayikas has considered tarka as secondary pramana.
Logicians like Udayana and Vardhamana have considered that tarka have
function of supporting the valid conclusion by presenting the universality of
condition. Knowledge of vyapti is strengthened by tarka. But the Nyaya does
not accept tarka as an independent pramana. The Buddhists have accepted that
tarka is useful in the establishment or vyapti, but still they do not give the tarka
the status of a pramana. But Jainas have recognized it as a paroksa pramana.
According to the Jainas the knowledge of vyapti in its positive and negative
aspect is possible through tarka.

Anumana (inference) cannot take the place of tarka, because it is based on

tarka. The knowledge of vyapti is possible through tarka and inference is based
on knowledge of vyapti. Therefore, anumana is possible because of tarka. And
anumana cannot take place of the tarka. The two are different pramanas.

ANUMANA (INFERENCE)

Anumana is knowledge which is arrived at through the means of other

knowledge.1 It is possible through the middle term and therefore it is said that
anumana is possible through linga.2 Linga is the middle term which connects the
major and minor terms. Just as we can infer the existence of fire through the
perception of smoke. Smoke is the linga. It is the means through which
inference is possible. Fire is the major term about which we infer. It is called
Sadhya or lingi. Dhuma (smoke) is the attribute to fire. Without fire the
existence of smoke is not possible. Therefore, the relation between fire and
smile is of avinabhavi (universal positive relation). The absence of fire will also
be the absence of smoke; the relation is also universal considered form the
negative sense. But the converse is not true. By the absence of smoke we
cannot infer the absence of fire, because there may be fire without smoke, but
there cannot be smoke without fire.

The relation between the major term and the middle term will have to be
universal, both positively and negatively. In the sense that the presence of the
middle term will bring the presence of the major term. And the absence of the
middle term will bring the absence of the major term. This type of relation is the
basis of valid inference. Akalanka terms this relation as
"sadhyavinabhavabhinibodhaikalaksana". This type of relation is also called
anyathanupapatti, as it presents the universality of relation of the negative
sense. Sadhana or linga is called hetu.

All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Carvaka, accept anumana as a
pramana. Carvaka darsana does not give anumana the status of pramana,
because it is based on vyapti. And vyapti cannot be grasped by direct
perception through perception. The Carvaka does not accept the phenomenon
and extra-sense organs, but through other means. The other systems of
philosophy have distinguished it into two types: (1) Svarthanumana (inference
for oneself) and (2) Pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others).

SVARTHANUMANA (INFERENCE FOR ONESELF)

Svarthanumana is inference for oneself in which we get valid inference on the

basis of the vyapti. But this is not expressed in the verbal proposition. It is
meant for oneself and the moment it is expressed in the form of proposition it
becomes pararthanumana. The universal relation may refer to co-existence of
succession. For instance, in the case of the invariable concomitance of morality,
and man, there is the universality of co-existence. But in the case of the
presence of clouds and the consequent rain there would be succession.

SADHANA

In the Pramanamimamsa, acarya Hemacandra mentions five forms of sadhana:

(1) Svabhava, (2) karana, (3) karya, (4) ekarthasamavayi and (5) virodhi.1
Svabhava sadhana is the essential characteristics of the object. As for instance,
heat is the characteristic of the fire. Sabda (sound) is non-eternal because it is
not the cause (karana); it is the effect (karya). When we see the collection of
dark clouds in the sky, we infer the possibility of rain and in this, the relation is
between cause and effect (karana-karya). In the inference between cause and
effect there must be necessary relation between cause and effect and not the
contingent relation. Moreover, the absence of that cause should bring the
absence of the effect. The inference from effect and not the contingent relation.
Moreover, the absence of that cause should bring the absence of the effect. The
inference from effect to the cause of that event. For instance, we see the open
space outside wet, when we get up early in the morning, then we infer that it
must have rained. In this, we proceed from effect to the cause.

In some cases it is possible to have a conjunction of effect as in the case of juice

of many fruits. To infer the nature of the juice from the fruit is the inference
from cause to effect. But to infer from the juice, the nature of the fruit would be
from effect to cause. This type of inference is called ekarthasamavayi inference,
because there is the co-existence of the cause and the effect or the attribute and
the object.

Inference from the negative relation of universality would be virodhi sadhana.

For instance, fire and cold are contrary to each other. If one exists, the other
cannot exist. In the presence of the fire, there would be no cold. But a small
portion of fire cannot remove cold, therefore, the relation between the cause and
the effect or the attribute and the object of attribute ahs to be adequate
(samyak).

PARARTHANUMANA (INFERENCE FOR OTHERS)

Pararthanumana is inference meant for others. It is communicated for the sake

of others.1 Svarthanumana is meant for self-expression. In the case of
pararthanumana, a person communicates his reasoning or the methods of
reasoning for the sake of coming to the conclusion to other person who does not
know. It is communicated through the propositional form (avayava). This
knowledge and inference is not meant for one who already knows and has the
knowledge of the methodology or reasoning.

In pararthanumana knowledge is obtained by the self (svayamjnanatmaka), and

while it is communicated to others through the medium of communication in
propositional forms.2

The conceptional content of pararthanumana has to be communicated in the

propositional form for the sake of giving knowledge to others. This type of
communication in pararthanumana may be considered in two forms: (1)
affirmative and (2) negative. Both of them are based on the universal relation
between the sadhya and sadhana. In the affirmative form of communication the
universal relation of the presence of the effect or the thing having attribute. For
instance, the presence of smoke on the hill entails the inference of the presence
of fire. The negative form of communication of universality of relation gives the
relation between the cause and the effect and the thing and its attributes in a
negative way. The absence of the cause will entail the absence of the effect;
similarly, the absence of the essential attribute will entail the absence of the
thing. The absence of fire on the hill will entail the inference of the absence of
smoke.

AVAYAVA (CONSTITUENT PROPOSITION OF INFERENCE)

Pararthanumana has to be communicated in propositional forms for the sake of

giving knowledge to others. The question arises regarding the number of
constituent propositions forming pararthanumana. Logicians are not agreed on
this point. Sankhya philosophers say that there are three constituent
propositions (avayava): (1) paksa, (2) hetu and (3) udaharana. Mimamsakas
mention four constituent propositions; (1) paksa, (2) hetu, (3) udaharana and (4)
upanaya. The Nyaya mentions five constituent propositions like: (1) paksa, (2)
hetu (3) udaharana (4) upanaya and (5) nigamana.

We have already discussed about the number of constituent propositions that

the Jainas present. Generally for an intelligent man, two propositions mentioning
the major term and middle term in one proposition and the second, the minor
premise are sufficient for inferring the conclusion. But to men of dull intellect,
ten propositions would be required for explaining the process of inference.
Generally five constituent propositions are accepted.

PRATIJNA

Pratijna is the first proposition. It expresses the statement regarding the major
term. It is the statement of what is to be proved.1 For instance, we state there is
fire on the hill.

HETU

Hetu is the statement of reason, which mentions the presence of the middle
term.2 It, states--because there is smoke, the presence of the smoke is a
symptom for the presence of the fire, although we can say the presence of the
smoke does not entail the presence of fire.

UDAHARANA

Udaharana is the statement of the major premise containing the universal

relation between the major and middle term, and also the examples. In the
Aristotelian tense it is a major premise, which examples the universal proposition
and in which there is the universal relation between the major and the middle
term. But in the udaharana, there is also the example. For instance, the
statement would be "where there is smoke there is fire as for example in the
kitchen". Udaharana is, therefore, a combination of the deductive and inductive
process. While Aristotelian major premise impurely deductive and formal.1

UPANAYA

Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular situation.

It expresses the middle and minor term and says that this particular situation
falls under the category of the major premise.2 For example, there is smoke in
this hill, and this is the application of a particular situation to the general
proposition.

NIGAMANA
Nigamana refers to the conclusion, which we arrive at finally on the basis of the
combination of minor and major premises. It is the result of the application of
the vyapti and paksa dharmata. It is the restatement in a final form what was
intended to be proved in the pratijna.3 For example, we say therefore; there is
fire on the hill. The inference based on five constituent propositions may be
summarized as follows:
(1)Pratijna--there is fire on the hill.
(2)Hetu--because there is smoke.
(3)Udaharana--where there is smoke there is fire, for example in the kitchen.
(4)Upanaya--this hill has smoke.
(5)Nigamana--therefore this hill has fire.

This form of inference is based on the universality or relation between the middle
term and the major term in the positive sense of the existence of the relation.
Therefore, it is called sadharana drstanta, which shows the universal relation in
the absence as in the case of the absence of fire in the water.

AGAMA

Agama is testimony. It is the acceptance of the truthful statements of worthy

man.1 It is the aptavacana. Aptapurusa is the man of authority. He is the expert
in the subject and he knows how to present his knowledge in a subject in a
proper form. He is free from hatred and attachment. He is objective in his
approach and has no prejudices or bias. He is not afflicted by mithyatva. From
the practical point of view statement of such an aptapurusa is important. In the
pararthanumana aptatva is not necessary while in the agama it would be
necessary. The statements of an aptapurusa (the authority) are valid for all the
time--past, present and the future. Tirthankaras are considered to be the
aptapurusa par-excellence. We have already discussed about the agama as a
pramana in the earlier chapter.
Part 4

KARMAVADA

KARMAVADA: A Synopsis

THE IMPORTANCE OF KARMA THEORY

The doctrine of karma is the most important doctrine in Indian thought. All the
systems of Indian philosophy, except the Carvaka accept the doctrine of karma.
Karma is the basic pre-supposition of Indian thought. In this world, there is
evident inequality in the status and the experiences of individual men. Some are
happy while others are miserable. Very often the virtuous lead miserable life.
Bad men are happy. Several attempts have been made in the different
philosophies of the world to find out an adequate solution to the problems of
inequality in life. The Indian philosophers presented the theory of karma as a
possible solution to the inequality in life. The Jainas have given a systematic
study of karma theory based on rational considerations. They have infact built a
science of karma theory. In the literature dealing with the theory of karma, we
find that Jainas have made substantial contributions to the literature of the
karma theory. They are called as karma sastras or karma granthas. In addition
to the specific writings on karma theory, we find abundant material scattered in
various philosophical literatures both agamic and non-agamic on the doctrine of
karma.

LITERATURE ON KARMA THEORY

Jaina Literature on karma theory is very vast & thought provoking. If we study
the Jaina literature on this subject, we can make three divisions of the karma
literature: (1) purvatmaka karma sastras, origination from the sources of the
purvas. (2) Purvoddhrta karma sastra which is based on the purvas and
elaborated on the basis of the doctrines given in the purvas. (3) Prakaranika
karma sutra, it is an elaborate discussion about the development of the theory of
karma as discussed in karma literature.

It we study the Jaina canonical literature, we find that 8th purva out of the 14
purvas relate to the discussion about the theory of karma and it is called Karma
Pravada. Similarly, a part of the second purva is also called Karma Prabhrta. A
part of the fifth purva is called Kasaya Prabhrta. There is a discussion on the
karma theory in these works. The karma theory is elaborated in the purvoddhrta
literature coming after the purvas and based upon original discussion in the
purvas. The nature of the development cannot be easily explained, as much of
the purva literature is lost, according to both the traditions of the Jainas. Though
some purvoddhrta karma sastras are available to us but there are slight
variations in the presentation of the theory of karma in the two traditions.
Digambara tradition gives importance to Satkhandagama and Kasayaprabhrta as
the two important works dealing with karma theory. In the Svetambara tradition
we have Karma Praktri, Karma Sataka, Panca sangraha and Saptatika. These are
the purvoddhrta granthas.

In the Prakaranika karma sastras, we have numerous works and they are based
on the purvoddhrta karma literature.

This form of literature was given during the periods from Vikrama 8th century to
the 16th and 17th century. Later literature of the karma literature is the
elaboration of the karma theory.

From the point of language in which the karma theory has been presented we
find there is abundant literature in prakrt samskrt and regional languages.
Purvatmaka and purvoddhrta literature is to be mainly found in Prakrt language.
The Prakaranika karma literature is also to be found in Prakrt literature along
with its commentaries. Later writings on karma theories are generally in
Samskrt. There is a good deal of literature on the karma theory in the regional
languages like--Kannada, Hindi and Gujarati. Works in Kannada and Hindi mainly
belong to the Digambara tradition and works in Gujarati refer to Svetambara
tradition. On the whole, the literature on karma theory is very vast and we may
estimate that the Digambara writing constitute about 5 lakhs of slokas and
Svetambara literature comes to about two lakhs of slokas.

In the Svetambara tradition, the earliest independent work on the karma theory
is the Karma Prakrti of Sivasarma Suri. It has 475 gathas. Acarya ahs discussed
in his work the eight processes of the karmic mechanism like bandhanakarana,
sankramanakarana, udvartanakarana, apavartanakarana, udiranakarana,
upasamnakarana, nidhattikarana and nikacanakarana.

There is also a description of the concepts of udaya and satta of karmic matter.
There is a commentary (Curni) on this book. There are other commentaries
(tika) written on this work acaryas like Malayagiri and Yasovijaya. They are in
samskrt. Acarya Sivasarma has also written a sataka on karma theory and
Malayagiri as written a commentary on this. Candrarsi Mahattara, a disciple of
Parsvarsi has written pancasangraha and svopajnavrtti on the karma theory.
There is also a Digambara work called Prakrt Pancasangraha, which is earlier
than this work. It appears that the Digambara work was not found to be
consistent with the agamic version. Therefore, Candrarsi Mahattara wrote this
(new) Pancasangraha. Acarya Malayagiri has written a samskrt commentary on
this. There are other works like Karmavipaka, Karma-stava, Bandha-svamitva,
Saptatika and Sataka. There are svopajnabhasya also on these works.
Devendrasuri has written five works on karma theory based on the early works
on this subject. In this way, we find there is abundant literature in the Jaina
sastras on the theories of karma.
KARMA THEORY AND THE OTHER DOCTRINES

Before we study the nature of the theory of karma, it would be necessary to

examine the other theories, which attempt to explain the inevitable equality
among man. Several theories have been presented. We mention a few of them
like Kalavada, Svabhavavada, Niyativada, Yadrchchavada, Bhutavada,
Purusavada, Daivavada & Purusarthavada.1 There is a brief discussion about
these theories in the works mentioned below.1

KALAVADA (THEORY OF TIME)

According to the theory of Kalavada the various states of existence and

happiness and misery of individual beings are determined by kala. Kala is the
determining principle, which creates and destroys. It determines the good and
bad of actions. In the Atharvaveda,2 there is an independent sukta for describing
the importance of kala (time). Kala has created the earth (prthvi), it is the basis
of the sun and the heat of the sun. All the beings of the world depend on kala.
The eyes perceive things due to kala. Kala is the Isvara. It is the lord of
Prajapati. Kala is the first of the gods. There is nothing more powerful than kala.
In this sukta, kala has been described as the first cause of the universe.

In the Mahabharata, there is the description of the importance of the kala as a

first cause of the universe and is the basis of life and death and happiness and
misery of all beings, let alone the human beings.3

In the Sastravarta--samuccaya, it has been stated that time determines

everything, living being entering into the womb of the mother, the childhood and
all other incidents connected with life and experience, are determined by time.
Kala is the destroyer of everyone. Kala is awake when everyone is asleep. It is
not possible to transgress the limits of kala and it is not possible to have any
events or experiences in the absence of kala.4 The concept of 'Time' is so
important in philosophy that the Naiyayikas gave time very important status
equal to the creation of the universe.5

SVABHAVAVADA (THEORY OF NATURE)

According to this theory, everything takes place according to its nature. Nothing
happens contrary to its nature. Svetasvatara Upanisad mentions svabhavada.1
The Bhagavadgita2 and Mahabharata have given a description of svabhavavada.3
In the Buddhacarita, we get the description of Svabhavavada and it has been
stated that according to this theory, the pointedness of the thorns and the
variety in the birds and animals is due to the very nature of these things.
Svabhavavada does not recognize the will or efforts of the individual.4 Acarya
Haribhadra in his Sastravartasamuccaya, says that according to svabhavavada
the events and experiences are determined by the very nature of the objects.
For example, the various stages of life like the childhood and old age are
determined by the nature of the individual. There is not external force.
Svabhava plays an important part in the lie incident and experiences of
individual beings. In fact, even pulses and rice can be cooked due to their very
nature.5 For every action, the nature of the event or the object is the determining
factor. This theory of svabhavavada does not recognize the creator or the
controller of the universe except the very nature of the objects and events.

Niyati-vada (Theory of necessity-Necessarianism)

According to this theory, everything happens out of necessity. What is to happen

must happen, there is not change in that. Everything is determined and there is
nothing left to chance. Freedom of will has no place in the niyativada. The
western philosopher Spinoza says that it is due to ignorance that we say that we
are free and that freedom of the will is an important factor. Whatever happens,
must happen. We cannot change the past because the past has already gone.
We do not know the future and it is not desirable to swing from hopes and fears.
Yesterday is dean and tomorrow is unborn. Everything is determined. It is
therefore not proper to blame anyone neither for the failure nor to offer praises
for the success.

The first mention of the niyativada is to be found in the Svetasvatara Upanisad.

But the Buddhist tripitakas and the Jaina agamas have given exhaustive
discussion about this theory of niyativada. In the Digghanikaya samannaphala
sutta, there is a description of niyativada as given by Mankhali Gosalaka.
According to Mankhali Gosalaka the evil that living beings do, has no other
reason except its very necessity. Similarly, the good is necessary and has no
other external reason. We cannot say that we change our destiny and that by
our efforts we can build up our personality. The beings in this world experience
the pain and sufferings through six types of resistance. Having gone through the
84 lakhs of mahakalpa and wheel of life, the wise and ignorant are like to
become free from misery.1

In the Jaina agamic literature also, we get beautiful description of niyativada and
akriyavada. Sutrakrtanga,2 Vyakhyaprajnapati3 and Upasakadasanga4 have
given adequate description of niyativada. In the Buddhist literature, it has been
suggested that Pakudha Katyayana, and Purana Kasyapa advocated niyativada.5
There is not much of a difference between niyativada and akriyavada. They
agree in their fundamental principles. But later the disciples Purana Kasyapa
joined the fold of the disciples of ajivikas.6

Acarya Haribhadra while describing the nature of the niyativada states that
everything is determined by the origination of a thing in a particular way, the
states of a thing and its destruction are all determined. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to refute its theory because refutation would be a
form of niyati according to them. Necessity devours everything.1

YADRCHHAVADA (ACCIDENTALISM)
According to Yadrchhavada, whatever happens, happens accidentally without
any reason. There is neither the cause nor reason for happening of the event.
Therefore, it is not necessary to explain the causal relation between the different
things. Yadrchha means accident and without any reason.2 According to the
Naiyayikas, Yadrchhavada refers to animittavada and according to this theory,
no explanation can be given for any phenomenon.3

We can find the mention of yadrchhavada in the Svetasvatara upanisad,4

Santiparva of Mahabharata5 and Nyayasutra6 We can, therefore, say that the
yadrchhavada is a very ancient theory. It has been referred to by various names
like akasmatvada, animittavada, akaranavada, ahetuvada and yadrchhavada. In
this theory, there is no relation between the cause and the effect, the reasons
and ground of the reasons.

Some philosophers identify svabhavavada with yadrchhavada but it would be apt

to say that there are some differences in the sense that svabhavavada makes
svabhava (nature), the cause of the event. But yadrchhavada altogether denies
the causal relation.7

BHUTAVADA (THEORY OF ELEMENTS)

The Bhutavada maintains that everything in the universe is due to primary

elements like earth, water, fire and air. Material and mental phenomena are due
to these four elements. There is nothing outside these elements. Those
philosophers who advocate the theory of atman are doing nothing, but
expressing the materialistic approach of the atman in the sense that the atman
is the product of the elements. There is no atman that is different from this
element. There is nothing like a spiritual substance, the body is found due to the
combination of the elements and when the body is destroyed the elements are
separated and there is no trace of the atman at all.

Just as the assembly of small parts of a machine, make a machine running in

order. So also the organism disintegrates if the limbs are destroyed. Similarly,
by mixing beatle nut, beatle leaves and lime we get red color. So also the
combination of different forms of the four elements gives rise to consciousness.1
Consciousness is a by-product of the metabolic changes in the organism, if the
body is destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. In the Sutrakrtanga, there is
the mention of tatjiva-tatsariravada and pancabhutavada. It has been suggested
that body and mind are not separated. This theory is also called anatmavada or
nastikavada, because it denies the consciousness of mind or God. The theory of
pancabhutavada says that jiva is the product of the combination of the five
bhutas (elements), prthvi (earth), jala (water), agni (fire), vayu (air) and akasa
(space). There is a difference between tatjiva and tatsariravada and
pancabhutavada in that the former maintains that the soul and body are
identical while the later maintains that soul and consciousness are products of
the combination of the five bhutas. When the body is destroyed, the soul is also
destroyed.
According to the theory of elements, whatever is amenable to sense is alone
real. Whatever is not verifiable to sense-experience, is not real. In this sense,
the other world, heaven and hell, the soul and god are unreal. Pratyaksa is the
only pramana. The function utility is the only criterion or activity of reality. It is
in this sense materialistic and pragmatic in its approach. The Darwinian theory
of evolution is an expression of this Bhautikavada. It advocates the possibility of
the development of the mind through the evolution from matter. In this sense,
consciousness is a form of matter and evolute of matter.

PURUSAVADA (THE THEORY OF CREATOR)

According to this theory, Isvara is the creator, sustainer and the destroyer of the
universe. Isvara is the person who is responsible for the origination, protection
and the destruction of the universe. The intelligence and the power of Isvara
remain intact even at the time or pralaya (dissolution) of the universe.
Purusavada is, therefore, theistic in approach.1

Purusavada can be distinguished into two forms, as brahmavada and Isvaravada,

which is theistic.

Brahmavada maintains that just as the spider is the efficient cause of the web,
and the Banyan tree is the cause of the numerous roots branching downwards,
so also purusabrahma is the efficient cause of the entire universe, in its creation,
maintenance and destruction. Brahman is, therefore, the basic principle of the
universe. It is the upadana karana, in a sense, the primary or the material
cause.

Isvaravadins maintain that matter and spirit are primordial and original
substances. The interaction between matter and space and their association is
due to Isvara. In this sense, Isvara is the efficient cause, of the creation,
sustenance and the destruction of the universe. Without Isvara, nothing is
possible and nothing moves. He is the controller of the universe and he
determines the nature of things and the movement of things.

DAIVAVADA (THEORY OF FATE)

Daivavada emphasizes the predominance of fate, which is the determining factor

in the activity of man. Fate or destiny predetermines everything. The moving
finger writes and has written moves on; not a word can be changed of it. We are
children of fate. Man is a slave of fate. We have to suffer the onslaughts of
destiny and experience the fruits of karma. Destiny shapes our end and we have
to experience the karma determined by fate.2 There is a distinction between
daivavada and niyativada although they appear to be identical. Daivavada
accepts the authority of karma as a determining factor in the prevalent
inequality of status. But in the niyativada, fatalism and determinism are
absolute, unexplainable, and inexplicable.
PURUSARTHAVADA (THEORY OF SELF EFFORT)

According to the theory of self-effort, individual jiva is responsible for shaping its
destiny. There is nothing as fate or destiny which i supreme. Men are masters
of their own destinies. Self-effort is the main cause of the success of our work or
the failure, as it may be. The principle of freedom of the will is the basis of this
theory.

THE JAINA VIEW

The Jaina view of karma presents a synthesis of determinism and free will, of
kala, niyati, purusarthavada etc. The Jainas maintain that the thing of this world
and the activities are complex and as they are complex and we cannot explain
the causes of the things and activities with reference to one or the other cause
like: kala, niyati, svabhava and purusartha. We have to find out the causes and
the predominance of one or the other in the complexity of things, it is necessary
to introspect and find out the causes and the predominance of one or the other
in the complexity of things, it is necessary to introspect and find out the causes
of happiness and misery within oneself. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara says that it
is not proper to give importance to one of the other. A phenomenon or an event
is complex and all the cause may operate in various degree.1 Acarya Haribhadra
also has supported this view.2 We have to take a synoptic view of things and look
at these problems from the point of view of anekanta (many sided approach).
Acarya Samantabhadra says that we have to seek the causes for the effect born
without any individual efforts in fate or destiny. But self-effort and conscious
effort make towards attaining goal makes us give importance to purusa for
understanding the result in activities. In some cases daiva (destiny) plays an
important part and in some other way purusartha also play an equally important
role.1 We have to consider the purusartha and daiva as playing their dual roles in
the explanation of things. The Jainas do not accept the predominance of Isvara
for explaining the living and the non-living substances of the universe. It would
be fruit-less to believe that Isvara or Brahman is the primary cause of the
origination, maintenance and destruction of the universe. Karma is an important
factor, which cannot be ignored in explaining the inequality of the beings of the
universe. Similarly, it would not be an adequate explanation to maintain the
cause of the phenomena of the universe and also the states of the jivas, is to be
found in some material source like the elements or the matter. It is necessary to
posit a non-material substance like the pure consciousness for explaining the
activities of the living beings. It is not possible to accept that a material
substance becomes a cause of the immaterial or the mental. If that were to be
soul, the very causal principle will have to be given out. Therefore, it is
necessary to postulate the reality of the material and the immaterial principle
like matter and spirit for explaining the phenomena of the universe and giving an
adequate explanation of the fruits of the karma.

KARMAVADA (A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

The study of karmavada in the historical perspective would require us to look at
the theory and its development from the Vedic times & onwards. The Vedas are
the earliest records of the world. The question arises: Whether the Vedic seers
were aware of the karma theory or not? This has raised a controversy. There
are two views on this subject.

The first view maintains that the Vedic seers were not aware of the karma
theory. According to this view, there is no mention of the karma theory, in the
Vedic literature, Vedic philosophers explained the variety and the unique value is
the state of individual being with reference to external reality. Some said that
the elements are the root causes of the diversity in the world. Some others
maintain that Prajapati Brahman is the ultimate source of this variety in this
world. In this way, the cause has been referred as some divine destiny and we
find the development of the thought in the Rgveda has been from polytheism,
monotheism and monism. But all of them looked outward to seek the causes of
the complexity in the universe. Many gods like Mitra, Varuna were worshiped
and involved giving them happiness in this world. Yajna were performed and
oblations like material objects and the living animals were offered in the yajnas.
This stream of thought could be traced in the age of the samhita and the
Brahmanas.1

But in the age of Aranyakas and Upanisads there is a shift in the emphasis in the
philosophical speculation. The invocation to gods and the performance in the
yajna become secondary. It is true that there is less discussion of karmavada in
the Vedic literature before upanisads. But it is also true that the upanisads were
not agreeing regarding the diversity in the world. Some accepted kala and other
prarabaha, and some others mentioned the view of svabhava and niyativada.
The emphasis on karma causally gains ground.

The second view emphasized that although there is no specific and detailed
discussion about the karma theory in the Vedic samhitas, there are mentions of
the karma theory in the Vedas. In the Rgveda we get the following mantras:
Subhaspatih (the protector of the subha karmas), Dhiyaspatih (the protector of
good karmas), vicarsanih and visvacarsanih (the seer of the good and bad
karmas) and visvasya karmano dharta (the basis of all karmas). These mantras
show that there is mention of the karmic theory although in a brief way. The
karma theory in its real form can be traced to Rgveda, although the development
of the theory is to be fund later. In the Rgveda it has also been suggested that
one who does auspicious karma attain immortality (amaratva). Jiva continually
takes birth and it dies in this world. Vamadeva has given a description of many
of his previous births. Men worship gods and pray to them for the sake of
getting themselves away from the evil effects of karma and rebirth. In the Vedic
samhitas, there is a description of sancita and prarabdha karma. There is also
the description that those who have sadharana karma go to candraloka through
pitryana. It has also been described that the jiva due to its karma takes different
forms in the following mantras "ma vo bhujemanya jatameno", ma vo eno
anyakrtam bhujema" etc. it has also been suggested that one can reep the fruits
of karma gained by others through their activities. Therefore, these mantras
have been recited. Primarily, a jiva experiences the fruits of karma due to the
activities performed by oneself, but sometimes through a peculiar influence of a
peculiar power, one jiva can experience the fruits of the karma of the other jiva.1

From the discussion of the two views regarding the development of the karma
theory in the Vedic literature, it may be noted that there has not been a full
fledged discussion of the developed theory of karma in the Vedic literature,
although there is mention of the concept of karma. But the concepts like theory
of Fate and yajna have gained prominence and karma theory becomes
secondary. We do not get adequate discussion about the nature of karma and
the mechanism of the working of the karma. In the Vedic literature, there is
emphasis on yajna karma and gradually gods have been involved for the sake of
equitable distribution of karma. Attempts have also been made to integrate
karma theory with the theory of yajna. This we find in the Purvamimamsa. We
also find that the development of the yajna theory has also led to the
development of the devavada (theory of deities). In the Brahmana we find a
gradual substitution of Prajapati in the place of many gods and there is
suggestion that the dispensation of karma is done through Prajapati. Prajapati
dispenses fruits according to different karmas acquired by individual beings, just
like a judge dispenses judgement. This current of thought is also to be found in
the philosophical systems like Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sesvara Sankhya and Vedanta.

The performance of yajna has also been referred to as karma. It is non-

permanent and it exhausts itself the moment the fruits of yajna are dispensed
with. But this dispensation needed an agency. Mimamsa darsana introduced the
concept of apurva for the purpose of distribution of fruits of karmas with the help
of which the gods dispense karma. In Vaisesika thought adrsta has been
mentioned as an attribute and it has two forms of dharma and adharma. The
Nyaya School considers dharma and adharma as samskaras. The soul is affected
by samskara through the effect of good and bad karmas, under the guidance of
adrsta. Adrsta is the attribute of soul and it remains with the soul as long as the
effect of the karma is not dispensed.1

If Isvara were not be dispense the fruits of karma to the jiva the fruits of karma
would be meaningless. The Sankhya considers karma as a product of prakrti.2
The good and evil tendencies are influenced by samskara. Samskara is a
disposition to the karmic effect. The Vedic tradition gives importance to the
karma and its effects on the individual soul.

BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KARMA

The Buddhist and Jaina philosophies belong to the sramana current of thought
which give emphasis on karma. The Buddhists have given elaborate discussion
on the invisible effects of karma. The Buddhistic say that the variety and
inequality among living beings is due to karma.3 Due to the infatuation and the
effect of emotion, the jiva acts through the body, speech and mind, and
produces like attachment and hatred. In this way, wheel of samsara moves on
eternal.1 It is beginningless and endless.2 It goes moving upto infinite times.
Once, king Milinda asked Nagasena: What is the effect of karma according to the
activity of the jiva? Acarya said, it cannot be shown, where the karma resides.3

In the Visuddhimaggo, karma is described as formless (arupi).4 Abhidharmakosa

describes karma as avijnapti (inexpressible).5 This type of description can be
considered sapratigha and not apratigha.6 The sautrantikas have considered
karma as arupa (having no form). And they do not accept the avijnapta nature
of karma.7 The Buddhists have considered karma as (subtle) suksma. Bodily,
mental and speech activities are described with reference to karma and they are
considered to be vijnapta and pratyaksa. In the Buddhist terminology, it is
described as vasana and avijnapti. They considered mental samskaras as
vasana and bodily and speech samskaras as avijnapti.8

The vijnanavadins have described karma as vasana. Prajnakara says that all
activities whether it is of prakrti (pradhana), karma and of Isvara is due to
vasana. Even if we consider Isvara to be the judge dispensing karma, therefore,
it is needed for postulating vasana for explaining variety in the universe. We
can, therefore, says in other words, that the karma, activity that is primarily of
Isvara also or of pradhana-all these are the streams of vasana, which merge into
the ocean of vasana only. According to the Sunyavadins, the neissance (avidya)
which is beginningless is to be considered as vasana.

The Jainas have made a special contribution to the study of karma theory. The
Jaina analysis of karma is scientific and they have developed the science of
karma. There is enormous literature in the study of Jaina theory of karma.
Etymologically, considered, karma means activity, it refers to any activity in this
life. The grammarian Panini has defined karma as that which is palatable to the
doer is karma.1 To the Mimamsakas, karma is considered to be the performance
of the yajna. It is kriyakanda. According to the Vaisesikas, karma or activity is
an inherent category of the substance. It is that which is not a quality nor
conjunction or disjunction of objects.2 The Sankhya school described karma as
the expression of disposition (samskara)3 The Bhagavadgita mentions karma as
"karmasilata", i.e. engrossment in action.4 The Nyayasastra refers to the
activities like expansion and contraction, movement in general, movement
upwards and movement downwards as forms of karma. In the smarta tradition,
the due it's of the four stages of life (asrama) and the four Varnas are referred to
as karma. The Buddhists have traced the variety and the inequalities of the jivas
to the karma. The Jainas have mentioned two forms of karma (bhava karma and
dravya karma). Bhavakarma is psychic in nature, it refers to the psychic states
responsible for the activities and dravya karma refers to the material particle
karma accruing to the soul and vitiating the pure nature of the soul. Acarya
Amrtcandra says that the influx of karma is due to the activities (yoga) that the
soul has in contact with the pudgala.5 Karma is material in nature according to
the Jainas and it obscures the pure nature of the soul.

KAMRA IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS

The Jainas have given the specific content for the conception of karma. The
other systems of Indian philosophy have used different concepts like maya,
avidya, prakrti, apurva, vasana, asaya, dharmadharma, adrsta, samskara, daiva,
bhagya etc., for explaining the phenomenal reality in the world and the
consequent inequality in the world. In the Vedanta darsana, we find the use of
the concepts like maya, avidya, and prakrti. The Mimamsa uses the term
apurva. The Buddhists have used the word vasana and avijnapti for explaining
the varieties in the universe. Sankhya used the word asaya in a specific sense
and we find the use of the words adrsta samskara and dharmadharma in the
Nyaya Vaisesika.

In many of the schools of Indian philosophy the term daiva, bhagya, punya and
papa have been freely used. In Indian thought it is only the Carvaka darsana,
which does not believe in the theory of karma and does not accept soul as a
substance? Carvaka does not also believe in the concepts like the past life, the
other world and the other transcendental concepts.1

According to the Nyaya2 school of thought, the three-fold activity of the jiva
(body, mental and speech) are affected by the passions and the emotional
upsets like attachment and hatred etc., and it consequently gives rise to dharma
and adharma. Dharma and adharma can be considered to be samskara,
Vaisesikas have given, 24 gunas and adrsta is one of the gunas. It is different
from dharma-dharma and samskara.3 Dharma and adharma have been included
in samskara. But it the Vaisesika darsana, they have been included in adrsta.
Raga and dvesa (attachment and hatred) give rise to samskara; samskara give
rise to birth and janma is again responsible for raga and dvesa. In the way, the
root-cause of samskara is beginningless.

According to Sankhya Yoga darsana, the variety, complexity, and also resulting
in inequality are due to the five klesas: like avidya, raga, dvesa and abhinivesa.
These complexities create samskara. Samskara has also been referred to as
asaya, vasana, karma and apurva. In this form of description, klesa and
samskara are the root causes of the wheel of life and they are beginningless.1

The Mimamsakas say that the various activities of men like the performance of
yajna gives rise to apurva and apurva gives rise and gives the fruits of all the
activities like the performance of yajna. Apurva is the potency born of the
performance of duties mentioned in the injunction of the Vedas. The other forms
of activities are not considered to be apurva.2

The Vedantins have used the concept of avidya and maya for explaining the
variety in the universe. Isvara is mayajanya (the product of maya). He
dispenses the fruits of karma. In this sense, the experience of the fruits of karma
is due to the agency of Iswara.3

The Buddhists maintain that the dispositions born out of mental crisis are vasana
and the dispositions arising out of the speech and bodily activities are avijnapti.
The lobha (greed) dvesa (hatred) and moha (infatuation) produce karma. Jiva
gets engaged in activities in bodily, mental and speech due to these emotional
disturbances, so also these disturbances and activities produce the lobha, dvesa
and moha in turn. This is the wheel of life, which is beginningless.4

THE NATURE OF KARMA ACCORDING TO JAINISM

The Jainas have considered karma as material in nature. The karmic particles
envelop the soul but do not destroy the real nature of the soul. They have an
obscuring function. Therefore, they affect the different paryayas of the soul.
Man is in bondage due to handcuffs, he gets intoxicated by liquor and becomes
unconscious by chloroform. These are material objects. Similarly, the soul gets
obscured and its pure nature is obscured and not destroyed due to the influx of
karma.

Karma is material in nature. The bondage by chain is material. It is of lesser

strain that the bondage of jiva by karma. The karmic bondage is subtle, yet
material in nature. The karmic particles enter the soul and vitiate its purity. The
effect is very subtle and strong. The karmic particles affecting the soul are
called karma-varganas. The particles of matter, which are responsible for
constituting the body, are called 'Nokarma-varganas'. The two are the finest
particles of matter and we can say that the atoms constituting karma are the
material objects. The body is also material. The relation between the two is
samavayi (inherent). The earth particles are physical in nature, so also objects
formed out of earth particles.

Palatable food brings the experience of pleasure. While injury by sastra

(weapons) brings dukkha. These two are Paudgalika (physical) and so are the
experiences of karmas Paudgalika.

From the point of view of bondage (bandha), jiva and injury by sastra (weapons)
brings dukkha. These two are correlative. From the point of view of their nature
they are different. Jiva is immaterial and formless and is characterized by
cetana. While pudgala is material and is unconsciousness (acetana).

The objects of sense organs are the experiences of touch, taste, smell, form and
sound. They are murta (having form). So are the indriyas (sense organs) which
are the medium of experiences and expressions. Similarly, the experience of
pleasure and pain are murta and so are karmic particles, which are the causes of
this experiences.1

The murta experiences murta only, murta binds the murta. Jiva is amurta but it
gives occasions for the bondage of karma. Therefore, jiva becomes occasion
(avakasarupa) of the bondage of karma.

In the Upanisads & the Bhagavadgita, the auspicious and inauspicious activities
have been referred to as karma. But the Jainas use the word karma in the sense
of the after-effect of activities.2
Jiva attracts the karma-varganas by the activity, which is threefold i.e., bodily,
speech and mind. The karmic encrustations with the jiva are due to these
activities and the activities are in turn specificated by the karmic encrustations.
In this way, the karmic particles of encrustations and the yoga of the jiva are
mutually interactive. Karma and the tendency to activity are intimately related
with each other with the mutually casual relation.1

In this way, karma is of two forms: (i) Dravyakarma and (ii) Bhavakarma.
Dravyakarma affects the Bhavakarma and Bhavakarma affects the
Dravyakarma. They are mutually interactive. Just as the seed becomes the tree
and the tree gives the seeds. This has been the process for beginningless time.
Similarly, interaction of Dravyakarma and Bhavakarma has been from
beginningless time.2

While discussing the karma theory, we should note that the impact of karma on
the soul, which is immaterial, has been studied in this perspective. Dravyakarma
or the Bhavakarma are both to be considered in material nature. And also has
the characteristic of consciousness as synthesis. Dravya and bhava karma have
the elements of the material nature and the element of consciousness is an
aspect of soul are prominent, but the question of the presence or the absence of
material or immaterial nature is not very important. The interaction of the
material and the immaterial and the process of interaction have to be
considered. In the Bhavakarma there is the atmic aspect which is predominant,
it is primarily psychological; while in the Dravyakarma the aspect of the material
particles is prominent. The question has been asked that if karma were
considered to be material particles, what would be the distinction between the
pudgala and karma. Similarly, if Bhavakarma ahs the atmic aspect as
predominant what is the difference between the soul and Bhavakarma?

The answers to these questions can be found in the analysis of the nature of the
soul as the doer (karta) and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (bhokta).
Moreover, it is necessary to understand the distinction between the samsari jiva
(mundane souls) and the mukta jivas. The mundane souls are in bondage of the
karma. There is the mixture of the Caitanya (consciousness) and the jadatva
(material in nature). The mukta jiva is free from this bondage. It is pure
consciousness. It has no element of jadatva. The soul that it is bondage in this
wheel of transmigration attracts the particles through the activities of speech,
body and mind and the 'fusion' of the karmic particles with the soul takes place
just as water mixes with milk. In this way, there is the synthesis of the
consciousness elements and the materiality of the body.

A further question rises regarding such synthesis of the material and the
consciousness elements in the empirical jiva and also in the karma. If both have
the same forms of combination, what is the difference in between the karma &
jiva? The empirical jiva with reference to karma as jadatva, but same jiva with
reference to the conscious aspects is consciousness. There is not possibility of
pointing out the extent to which the jivatva and the karmatva could be
distinguished in measurable distinctions. It is not possible to say that the jivatva
and the jadatva are to be distinguished separately in the empirical existence.
The distinction is not primary. But the fusion as apparent. The empirical soul is
always engaged in activity and when it is free from empirical activity, it sheds off
the karmic particles accruing to it. In such cases, the absolute distinction
between karmic matter and the pure soul and consciousness, we can point out
that there is absolute distinction. In the mundane soul and in the phenomenal
existence these absolute distinctions are not amenable to empirical
investigations. But in the highest stage of perfection. There is this distinction,
between the pure jiva and pure karma as matter. Therefore, we can mention the
three stages of the soul and pudgala karma: one. Suddha pudgala (pure karmic
matter), two. Suddha atman (pure soul) in the state of perfection and 3. The
commingling of the karmic matter and the atomic element in the samsari jiva.
The empirical nature of the individual soul has been referred to as having the
characterization of kartrtva and bhoktrtva.

RELATION BETWEEN ATMAN AND THE KARMAN

Atman or soul is immaterial while karma is material in nature. How can there be
relation between them? This is a natural question that has been asked. The
answer to this question lies in the phenomenal nature of the jiva in the samsara.
The empirical soul is involved in the wheel of transmigration from the
beginningless time. It is bound by the karma from the beginningless time and
has been affected thereby. The jiva that has been in bondage due to karma is
considered to be having form. In this sense, the amurta jiva being involved in
the wheel of life due to karma is murta and therefore the jiva has both the
affects the rupi and the arupi aspects. The liberated jiva is arupi, i.e., having no
form, while empirical soul has form.

The souls, which are free from the karmic matter, are not in bondage. The souls
that are bound by the karma get themselves further bound by the karma. The
relation between the karma and the jiva has neither beginning and is neither
prior nor the posterior. Just as the material objects like the jaggery and the
flowers when mixed and collected give rise to the intoxicating quality, so also,
the material aspects of karma is encrusted with the immaterial self.

WHO BINDS THE KARMA?

The karmic bondage is possible only to those who are in bondage. Jivas who are
in bondage get the encrustation of karma more and more.1 Due to the rise of
mohaniya karma; passions like ragadvesa (attachment and hatred) are
produced. They give to the influx of asubha karma (inauspicious karma).2 The
jivas which are free from attachment (moha) are called vitaragi and in their
activity there is subhakarma.3 The new bondage of the soul by the karma is not
dependent of the earlier bondage. And the souls, which are free from bondage,
have no karmic bond. We can say that the soul that is bound gets itself involved
in bondage. But the soul that is free has no bondage.
Gautama asked Mahavira: Bhagavan! Is the jiva that is in misery, affected by
misery? Or the jiva that is not in misery affected by misery?

Mahavira said, "O Gautama! the jiva that suffers misery is involved to suffer
more misery, but the jiva that is free from attachment and misery does not
experience misery. The sorrows afflict those jivas, which suffer from sorrow,
through passion and the increase of misery. The souls that are free from misery
do not attract sorrow.1

Gautama asked Mahavira, Bhagavan! Who binds the karma samyata (self-
controlled), asamyata (non-self-controlled) samyata-samyata (partially self-
controlled)?

Bhagavana replied, "Gautama! The self-controlled, the not self-controlled and

the partial self-controlled, all of them attract the karmic particles. The empirical
jiva, which is active, gets itself bound by the karma, and it is affected by karma.

CAUSE OF KARMIC BONDAGE

The bondage of the soul with the karma is from the beginningless time, but the
question arises what are the causes of this bondage and Gautama asked
Mahavira, to explain the cause of the bondage. Mahavira replied, "Gautama!
the rise of the jnanavaraniya karma brings the intensity of the darsanavaraniya
karma. From the darsanavaraniya karma comes the darsanamoha karma. Due
to darsanamoha karma arises mithyatva--perversity of attitude and from the
mithyatva karmic influx arises.2

The Sthananga3, Samavayanga 5th Samavaya and Umasvati have pointed out the
five types of karmic bondage: 1. Mithyatva (perversity) 2. Avirati (lack of self-
control), 3. Pramada (negligence), 4. Kasaya (passion) and 5. Yoga (activity).4

In short, the karmic bondage is possible due to two prominent causes: (1) Kasaya
(passions) and (2) Yoga (activity).5

The karmic bondage is of four parts depending on the processes of the karmic
influx. They are prakrti--the nature of karma, sthiti--the relation or duration,
anubhaga (the intensity of the experience of karma), pradesa (the extension of
karmic particles).1

The bondage based on prakrti and pradesa is possible due to yoga, while the
sthiti and anubhaga are due to passions.2 Passions are a primary force for the
bondage of karma. In the development of the stages of self-realization, the two
causes of passion and yoga work upto the 10th gunasthana and the bondage due
to these two causes is considered to Samparayika bandha i.e., the bondage
having the force of passions.3 In the case of the souls that are free from passions,
still the karmic flow may take place, but it is only due to the activity (yoga). It is
temporary and it is called, iryapathika bandha (bondage without passions)4 and
have been described to be of two samayas in the Uttaradhyayana sutra (29, 71)
and Prajnapana (23, 13, 37). Pandit Sukhalalji says that according to Digambara
tradition the duration of the bondage of the iryapathika karma is one samaya.5
There is yoga (activity) in this stage, but there is the absence of passions.
Therefore, the karmic bondage due to passion would not be possible. Passions
bring the intensity and duration of karma.

Kasaya is of four types: Krodha (anger), mana (egoity) maya (deceitfulness) and
lobha (greed).6 Sthananga and Prajnapana have mentioned four causes of karmic
bondage. In brief, passions can be considered of two types, (1) raga and (2)
dvesa. Raga and dvesa include all the four forms of passions.1 In raga
(attachment) deceitfulness, and greed and in dvesa, we find the anger and
egoity included.2 Raga and dvesa bring about the bondage of the eightfold of
karma.3 Raga-dvesa are considered to be bhavakarma.4 The root-cause of raga-
dvesa is moha (infatuation). Acarya Haribhadra says that just as if a man
anoints oil on his body and the anointed body attracts the particles of dust
deposited on the anointed body. So also the karmic particles get glued to the
soul due to raga-dvesa.5 We should remember, that the perversity which is the
cause of the bondage of karma is developed by attachment and hatred. The
intensity of attachment and hatred crowds the understanding and brings the
perversity of outlook. It clouds the capacity of discrimination.

The Buddhists also, like the Jainas consider mithyajnana (perverse knowledge),
moha (delusion factor) as causes of the karmic bondage.6 The Naiyayikas say
that mithyajnana is a cause of moha. Moha is not only responsible for deluding
knowledge, but for creating a false identification of the self with the external
object and with body, sense-organs, manas, feelings, etc. The atman deludes
itself to be all these. This is the cause of the karmic bondage.7 Vaisesikas
support this view.8 According to the Sankhya philosophers perversity of outlook is
the mithyajnana 1 and it is the cause of bondage.2 The Yoga darsana mentions
that klesa (mental disturbances) are the causes of the karmic bondage and klesa
is caused by avidya.3 Upanisads,4 Bhagavadgita 5 and Brahmasutra have traced
avidya to be the primary cause of bondage.

In this way, the other Indian systems of thought are in broad agreement with the
conceptual content of the Jaina theory of bondage although there is wide
variation in the use of terminology.

NISCAYA AND VYAVAHARA NAYA

The Jainas have studied the karma theory from both niscaya naya and the
vyavahara naya. Niscaya naya is the noumenal point of view in which we look at
the ultimate nature of the objects in its inherent quality. Vyavaharanaya is the
practical point of view which looks at the objects in relation to other objects.6 The
question arises, whether karma can be described in terms of kartrtva (activity)
and bhoktrtva (enjoyment) from the points of view of niscaya and vyavahara
nayas. Niscaya naya presents the real nature of the objects in its intrinsic value
without reference to any other object. In this sense, we can distinguish between
the pure self (suddha atman) and the pure matter (suddha pudgala) and we
cannot analyse the nature of the jiva which is embodied and which is mixed with
the karmic particles. Therefore, vyavahara naya can present a description of the
nature of the empirical individual ego in relation to the karmic encrustation.
From the noumenal point of view, the self is described in its pure state and
karma in its pure state. Therefore, there is contradiction to say that the two
descriptions vary without conflict. The subject matter of both are different.
Their jurisdiction is limited and distinct. Niscaya naya presents the pure nature
of the self and the karma so it cannot describe the kartrtva and bhoktrtva of
karma by the soul.

KARTRTVA (ACTIVITY) AND BHOKTRITVA OF THE KARMAN

Some philosophers have ignored this distinction and have analyzed the nature of
the karma with reference to kartrtva and bhoktrtva from the noumenal point of
view. This has created several problems, because in this, there is confusion in
the nature and the function of the suddha jiva and samsari jiva (empirical
individual). Similarly, this view has also ignored the karma and the pure matter.
According to this view, jiva is not the doer of the karma and the enjoyer of the
fruits of karma, because karma is essentially material in nature and is not very
much concerned with the immaterial jiva. They ask a question regarding the
relation between the immaterial jiva and the material karma. How can the
immaterial jiva be related to the material karma? Therefore, they say the
relation is farfetched, the karmic particles are due to the matter as origination
from matter, and the soul cannot act upon it.1

In this analysis, the jiva is not considered to be related with the material karma
with reference and enjoyment, because the conscious jiva cannot be related to
the un-conscious karma. Jiva (spiritual substance) cannot be intimately
connected with karma, which is unconscious and material. But we should realize
that empirical soul is associated with the material karma and the material karma
is the modification of the pure pudgala. This association of the jiva with the
karmic particles is due to its activity (yoga) in body, mind and speech. If the self
and the matter were to be in their pure state only, there would not be a question
of the inter-mingling of the jiva and the karmic particles. The karmic particles
get associated with and they enter into the self who is the empirical individual
and not the pure self. In this sense, we can say that the karma is associated with
the empirical jiva from the phenomenal point of view and not from the noumenal
point of view. This inter-mingling of the karma with the soul is very often
compared with the mixing of water and milk. Again matter, which is pure, does
not transform itself into karmic particles on its own but this transformation is
possible due to the soul's activity.

Again we have to determine the relation between the dravyakarma and

bhavakarma. The relation between the two is considered to be mutual.
Dravyakarma generated bhavakarma. The perfect souls, like the siddhas, are
free from the dravyakarma and therefore the bhavakarma does not affect them.
When the jiva attains the siddha-hood it is free from the certain material karma.
In this sense, we can say that jiva which is empirical, i.e., the individual jiva in
this world is the karta of the karmic particles and the bhokta of the fruits of
karma.

Those who do not accept the kartrtva and bhoktrtva of the jiva give the analogy
of handsome boy who attracts a beautiful girl. The girl gets attracted to the boy
and runs after him. In this case, the girl is active and the boy is merely an
occasion (Nimitta) for her activity.1 In this way, the pudgala gets attracted to the
jiva and gets transformed into karmic particles. In this, the jiva is not responsible
for the activity and the jiva is the only occasion (Nimitta). Activity is attributed to
the pudgala. But this relation of the bhoktrtva and kartrtva can also be
attributed to karma. If atman were neither the doer, nor the enjoyer of the fruits
of karma, then he would neither be in bondage nor would be released from the
bondage of karma. These terms of bondage and release are not relevant. It is
only from the phenomenal point of view, we can speak of the bondage and
release of the soul from the shackles of karma and the karma description with
reference to the kartrtva and bhoktrtva are not possible.

But the analogy of the boy and the girl with reference to the karma and soul is
not adequate. The facts are different. The pudgala that is matter becomes
active then the pudgala at once get attracted towards the soul and they are
transformed into karmic particles. The karmic particles and the self get mixed
up and on proper occasions the karmic particles produce their effects and get
separated again. This is due to the activity of the jiva. In this sense, this type of
activity is not possible for the jiva alone without the association of pudgala in the
form of karmic particles and similarly, pudgala in its isolated state cannot get
attracted to the soul. The co-mingling of the jiva and pudgala is responsible for
the association of jiva reference karmic particles. Therefore, we cannot make a
statement from the absolute point of view that jiva is pure cetana and karma is
pure jada (unconscious). Jiva also has been intimately associated with the
karmic particles can be considered as jada and karma because of its association
with the jiva can be described as having consciousness. When the jiva and
karma becomes separated completely in the highest state of perfection, then we
can say that jiva is pure consciousness and pudgala is pure matter and
unconsciousness.

The samsari jiva (empirical individual) get associated with the karmic particles
and due to the association, the bhavakarma in the form of raga-dvesa
(attachment and hatred) are born. A question arises that if jiva in its pure form
and pudgala in its pure form are active in their own pure nature, then how can
the bhavakarma be born and who would be responsible for these? The
bhavakarma are neither purely due to the self nor due to the pure pudgala.
Therefore, what is the cause of the bhavakarma?

The answer is, the individual ego is neither the pure atman, nor the pure
pudgala. It is a mixture of the atman with the karmic particles, which are
modifications or expressions in the empirical sense of the karmic particles. We
can say that it is an organism and not a pure soul. The passions like raga-dvesa
are produced due to the association of the karmic particles with the conscious
jiva through the activity of the jiva in the form of bodily, mental and speech. All
this is due to the diversity and variety of the encrustations of the karmic particles
in the soul.

Those, who consider the relation of karma with the soul from the noumenal point
of view, say that atman has its essential nature in jnana, darsana and caritra and
the expressions of the essential nature are due to be found in the emotional set
up like raga-dvesa. And due to this, the karmic particles pollute the soul. And
therefore, the soul is not the karta of the karmic encrustations nor the bhokta.
For instance, the potter is not the cause of the pot although he prepares the pot.
In common sense of language, the potter is considered to be efficient cause of
the pot. But in the real sense of the relation, the potter is only an occasion but
the clay is the material cause of the pot.1

But this analogical example is not adequate because the relation between the
pot and the potter is neither inherent relation nor very intimate relation. But the
relation between the self and karman is intimate like the mixing of the milk and
the water. Therefore, the association of the karman with the self cannot be
compared with the causal relation of the potter and the pot. The intimate
combination of the karmic particles with the soul has an effect of synthesis and
one necessarily affects the other. This does not happen in the case of the
relation between the potter and the pot. The atman is not only an occasion or
the efficient cause of the karmic particles enters the soul, but also it is the karta
in the sense, due to its activity, in body, speech and mind karmic particles enter
the soul. Similarly, atman is the bhokta, the enjoyer of the fruits of the karma.
Due to the various activities of the atman in its empirical form, the karmic
particles have attracted and they become intimately associated with the soul.
Therefore, atman is considered to be the karta. And because the atman in its
empirical sense has the experience of the fruits of the karma, it is also bhokta.

LIMITS OF KARMA

According to the Jaina theory of the karma, karma is intimately associated with
the body, mind and the atman (psychy), of the individual. These have their
defined limitations and they function within these limitations. Similarly, the
karma that is intimately associated with the individual self has to operate within
these limitations. If we do not accept the limitations of the karma, then the
karma would be all-pervasive like the akasa. We may also say that the self has
the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies and this is due to
karma. Due to karma, the atman gets involved and associated with the body
that it occupies in its full pervasion. When the soul gets freed from the body it
also gets freed from the karmas. But the samsari atman is somehow associated
with one or the other body and, therefore, associated with the karmic particles
within that limitation.

Another question arises and has been asked: The karma associated with the
body working in the limitation of the body--can it transcend the limitation and
bear its fruits? Is it responsible for the various types of the effects of karma
expressed in the possessions like wealth and other external objects that a man
gets which are not intimately associated with the body? For such things also, is
the karma responsible? It is also possible that the self may not be directly or
these objects have their impact of the experiences of the jiva. In such cases can
we say that the karman is responsible for such type of association in bondage.

The answer is, the Jaina theory of karma mentions eight types of karmas, which
are intimately connected in some form or the other with the jiva. Jnanavarana,
Darsanavarana, Mohaniya and Antaraya karmas are considered as ghatikarma
because they effect the essential characteristics of the soul like jnana, darsana,
happiness and virya (energy). Vedaniya, Ayu, Nama and Gotra karmas are
intimately associated with jiva and the body and not directly associated with
other external objects. From the point of view of the usage of the term
(parampara) of the word, it can be said that karma can be somehow connected
to the other object external to the body and the self, if such a connection is
proved.

If the karmic particles are intimately associated with the body and the self, then
the question arises how can we explain the possession of wealth and richness,
which give happiness due to merit (punyajanya)?

The answer is, the possession of wealth and having relations who give happiness
and other pleasant experience are due to the rise of karma, it is possible to say
in such cases, that these are the upa-punya, i.e. karma brings punya and punya
gives rise to experience of pleasure and bliss. In fact, the function of punya is to
give the experience to pleasure and punya is possible through subha karma. It is
also true that the external objects and creations are the cause of experiences of
pleasure. The experience of pleasure and pain and all bodily, mental and atmic
experiences are due to the internal causes. The association of karma is seen
with the internal causes and not with the external objects. The external objects
have nothing to do with karma. Karma is associated with the embodied
individual soul and the jiva attracts the karmic particles in varying degrees
according to its activities. The external objects are only occasions by which the
self gets experiences of pleasure and pain and therefore, on common parlance, it
is said that the external objects are the results of punya and papa.

The various physical and mental states of an individual are due to karma. The
body, sense organs, the functions of mind and body are all due to karma. But
the possession of external objects like wife or the husband or the relation or the
loss of these, famine or bumper crops, various natural calamities like the earth-
quake etc. or the anger of the king--all these are not the effect of the karma.
These are only the occasions, the experiences, that man gets because these are
primarily mental states. It is true that some of them do affect the mental states.
The possession of wealth and other relatives may become occasions for creating
pleasure in our mind. The loss of wealth may bring pain, but these external
things are not themselves due to karma. For instance, the birth of a son is not
due to the punya of the father, nor the death of a relative is due to the punya of
the father, nor the death of a relative is due to the papa of the individual soul.
These are due to the karmas of these individuals affected and karma in their
cases also is occasion by the external objects. It may be true that we get
pleasure by the birth of a son. This experience of pleasure is due to the
Mohaniya Karma, but the birth of a son is not due to Mohaniya Karma. The
experiences of pleasure and pain on the occasion of birth of son or loss are due
to the punya or papa of the father occasioned by the birth or the death of the
son. In this sense, the son is not born due to the punya of the father, nor is loss
of the son is due to the papa of the father. In this way, the relation of the
individual self with other objects can be explained on the basis of personal
experiences, which do the events and individuals in the environment due to
punya or papa occasion? The operation of the karma, the rise, the suppression
(upasama) and destruction of the karma (karma-kasaya) are all determined by
the limits of the individual self or the body due to the activity of the organism
through body, mind and speech. The rise of the karma is not possible beyond
this. The crux of the problem is that external object and events are due to their
own causes and not due to the rise of the karma to the individual soul.

RISE OF KARMA (UDAYA)

Udaya refers to the rise of the karma. It refers to the span of time of the
operation of karma.1 The karmic particles bound to the soul get matured enough
to express themselves (niseka)--and then they express themselves, i.e., the
udaya of the karma. The rise of the karma is possible from two ways: 1. When
the karma gets matured and fit to express itself it becomes praptakala udaya.2 2.
If it expresses itself prematurely, it is called apraptakala udaya. When the karma
gets bound to the soul, it does not get the potency of getting expressed
immediately, it requires a definite time to nature itself and till that time, it is in
the potential stage. This is called abadhakala. During this period, the karma, in
its potential form, not yet expressed. Abadha means the period of potency.

The period of potentiality of karma (abadhakala) can be divided into two forms of
durations (sthiti): (1) Avasthanakala and (2) anubhava or niseka kala. In the
abadhakala, the karmic effect is not yet expressed. It is in the potential form. It
is in the avasthana kala. But when the abadhakala is mature enough to express
itself, we get the experiences of karma. The abadhakala and the anubhava kala
have their own specific duration. If we exclude from consideration the concept of
the abadhakala we can say that niseka and anubhava are of equal duration. The
longer duration of the karma can be due to the intensity of the experience of
karma. This can be reduced in the duration and intensity of experience through
the tapas. The soul can become free from the karma in a shorter time.

The rise of the karma is possible after the completion of the duration of the time
of potentiality and when the problem of actualization comes. In the normal
course when the time of karma arises, and is affected extraneous forces like
ascetic practices, tapas and other sadhanas would not be possible. But due to
apavartana the karmic variation through udirana would be possible. But if the
karma-rise were yet to take place, then tapas and sadhanas would be useful for
the premature realization of the karmic effect.
The rise and fruition of karma may be sahetuka (by means of willed effort) or
nirhetuka (without willed effort). The rise and the fruition may take place
naturally without any external pressure or due to some pressures like internal or
the external pressure. For example, without any external cause one may get
angry and Vedaniya karmic particles may effect the soul. This is nirhetuka
udaya.1 In the same way; experiences of laughter,2 fear and other forms of
emotional upset may give rise to karmic particles to flow in.3

THE KARMA THAT ENTERS WITHOUT EFFORT (Svatah udaya hetu)

The karmic particles that develop the soul may be due to some natural causes
without any effort (conscious or unconscious). It is of different types:

1. Gatihetuka udaya--It refers to the karmic matter due to the state of the self
(gati) at the particular time. For instance, in the state in the hell (naraka gati)
there is the rise of asatavedaniya karma (pain producing karma).
2. Sthitihetuka--This refers to the state of an individual at a particular time. For
example, at the time of the rise of the mohaniya-karma in its intense form, it
is possible to have perversity of outlook (mithyatva moha) and attachment.
3. Bhavahetuaka udaya--This refers to the rise of different types of karma in a
particular life span. Though all the samsari jivas have rise of Darsanavaraniya
karma and this karma is the cause of sleep but manusya and lower animals
are affected by sleep, while heavenly beings and the hellish beings do not get
sleep. This is bhavahetuka udaya.

These three types of karmic influx and bondage are due to svatah vipaka udaya
(rising out of their own internal causes).

THE RISE OF THE KARMA DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES

The karmic rise may be due to external causes also. These may be considered
as due to two causes as: (1) pudgala hetuka udaya. This is due to the karmic
particles rising out of some material causes. For example, if a stone is thrown or
if some one hits us, we get pain. This is to asatavedaniya karma, arising out of
material causes. Similarly, experience of pain is possible due to some form of
unpleasant exchange of words, which give rise to anger. These are sahetuka
vipaka udaya. (2) In the sense, that the karmic bondage arises due to some
particular causes the bondage of the karmic particles due to the consequence of
the material cause (pudgala parinama). For example, taking heavy meals or due
to some diseases organic disturbances take place. This is also (hetuka udaya)
rising out of the consequences of the material causes, giving rise to the bondage
of karmic particles of the soul. Again, for example, intoxicating liquor affects the
clarity of mental states. This is also pudgala parinamana hetuka.

In this way, the rise and fruition of the karmic particles into the soul is due to
various causes.1 If these causes are not operative the fruition of the karma is not
possible. It is called pradesodaya vipaka. In this, the experience of karmic effect
is not very clear. It is indistinct. However, the karmic bondage has to be
experienced and exhausted.

Gautama asked Mahavira: 'Bhagavan! Can we say that one cannot be free from
the experiences of the karma, which are inauspicious'.

Mahavira said; 'Yes, it is true that we have to experience the papa karma'.

Gautama asked Mahavira to explain the process. Mahavira said, 'O Gautama! I
have described two types of karma: 1. Pradesa karma (extension of the karmic
particles) and 2. Anubhaga karma (experience of the karmic effect). Pradesa
karma has to be exhausted; some may be exhausted through the experiences of
the intensity and some without experience in the intensity of the karmic
particles.1

PURUSARTHA (SELF EFFORT) AS DETERMINING FACTOR

What we call purusartha (self-effort of an individual jiva) does play an important

part in the intensity and experience of the karmic bondage. From the point of
view of the past karmic bondage, we can say that it is both important and not an
important factor in shaping the experiences of karma. If the efforts, made in the
present time, are less than the efforts made in the past, then the present efforts
will have less impact on the manner of experience of karma. If the present
impact is greater, it is possible that it may modify the intensity and experience of
the past bondage of the karma.

Karma need not be considered only in two parts as bandha (bondage) and udaya
rise of karma. There are other states of impact of karma. The karmic particles
and the karmic experiences can be attributed and modified to particular
processes like apavartana, advartana, etc. These processes of the rise,
experience and the exhaustion of karma may be mentioned as follows:

1. Apavartana--In this, the karmic intensity may be decreased in experience, it is

rasaghata or mandikarana.
2. Udvartana--The intensity of the karmic experience may be increased. This is
udvartana, or it is also called tivrikarana.
3. Udirana--In this the karmic states which is to fructified at a later date more
intensely can be made to fructified and experienced in a less intense way.
4. Sankramana--It is the transformation of karma in its different intensities of
experiences. For instance, some part of karma is auspicious karma (subha
karma) and its fruition (vipaka) is also auspicious. Some part of karma is
auspicious, but fruition is inauspicious (asubha). Some forms of karma is
inauspicious, but its fruition is auspicious. In some cases both the rise of the
karma and its fruition are inauspicious. That type of karma which it binds
inauspicious way and rises auspiciously it is called asubha-subha vipaka. But
the karma which is in the form of auspicious bondage, but arises in an
inauspicious way, it is subha-asubha vipaka. That karma whose arise in
 inauspicious, but fruition is auspicious is called asubha-subha vipaka. And
that karma whose rise and fruition is both auspicious has been referred to
subha-subhavipaka.

The difference in duration between the karmic bondage and its rise is called
sankramana. Sankramana is the transformation of the karma-prakrti. In this,
the transformation takes place between the substance of the same karma. For
instance, in the darsanavaraniya-karma transformation between the caksu and
acaksu darsanavaraniya is possible.

Sankramana is of four types: 1. Prakrti sankramana 2. Sthiti sankramana, 3.

Anubhava sankramana and 4. Pradesasankramana. Prakrti sankramana is a
transformation of the karmic bondage already collected into the karmic
experiences are at present being received. Similarly, sthiti (duration) and
anubhaga (intensity of experience) also get transformed.

Apavartana, udvartana, udirana and sankramana refer to the rise (udaya) of the
karmic matter. In this rise and at the time of rising, there is no transformation.
But the karmic matter that is yet to rise can be transformed by the individual
efforts like sadhana. In this sense, we can say that the individual jiva is
responsible for its own karma and for the exhaustion of the karma. If this
freedom of the will in the process of the transformation of karma were not to be
accepted, then we land ourselves in niyativada (the theory of necessity).

IS THE ATMAN FREE, OR IS IT BOUND BY KARMA?

We have seen that the individual states and its position are determined by the
bondage of karma that the individual has acquired. Auspicious karma brings
auspicious results and inauspicious karma gives inauspicious results.1

The karmic process has primarily two forms: bondage and the other rise and
fruition. The individual jiva is free in the sense that it can do the karma and
bondage that he gets is due to his own activity. In this sense, he is free because
he acts and gets the bondage. But the karmic bondage that he has already
acquired due to his own activity has to be experienced and exhausted by him. In
this sense, in the case of rise and fruition of karma that has already Ben bound
to him, he has no choice, he has to experience the effects of the karma that he
has accumulated. And therefore in the fruition of karma and experiences, he is
not free.2 For instance, one is free to take opium, but once he takes the opium he
cannot escape the effects of opium. Whether he wills it or not, the opium
produces its effects on his organism. He has no choice in it. This does not mean
that he completely dislaids of the fruition of the karma that he has already
acquired. He can transform the karmic effect in its intensity of experience by
reducing the intensity or increasing the intensity. For example, after having
taken the opium he may try to reduce the effect of the same by taking the
counter affecting medicine. By this, he can reduce the intensity of the opium.
Similarly, he can reduce the intensity, as we have seen, of the experience of the
karmic effect by means of certain processes and practices. In other words, the
question of the dependence of the jiva and karma is difficult to be determined,
because if the soul gets sufficient strength due to the maturity of its activity and
duration of karma, the activity of soul becomes predominant, and the karma is
subordinated. But if the karma becomes stronger the soul's activity becomes
subjected to karmic particles. Therefore, in some cases soul predominates and
in some others, karma predominates.

The mechanism of the operation of the karma may be considered as two types:
1. Nikacita, in which the maturation of the karmic process will take its
determined course.
2. Anikacita, in which the maturation of the karmic process may take different
terms and may fructify in different ways. The same can be put in the different
forms-- (a) Nirupakrama where the process of the operation of karma takes its
determined course and there would be no resistance from the individual
moral activities. (b) Sopakrama, in which the individual effort may deviate
the karmic process.

The jiva is subject to the karmic activity in the process of nikacita process of the
rise of the karma. As long as the jiva does not make effort to thwart or to
deviate the fruition of the karmic activity, jiva will be in the hands of karma. But
if the karmic process has to be channelized either in the direction of suppression
or the destruction of the karmic process the jiva has to make consistent moral
effort and observe tapasya (ascetic practice).

In the Patanjala Yogabhasya, it has been suggested that the vedaniya karma
born out of adrsta have three different forms of expression. One of them is that
some karmas can be exhausted without fruition by the moral practices like
prayascitta (confession).1 In the Jaina terminology it is called pradesodaya.

UDIRANA

Gautama asked Mahavira: 'Bhagavan! Does the jiva increase the intensity of
karma when it has risen or does the jiva increase the intensity of karma when it
has not risen? Does the karma increase the intensity when the karma has risen
and expressed itself in the form of karmic particles?

Mahavira replied. 1. The intensity of karma is not increased when the karma has
not already risen or expressed itself. It does not increase the intensity when it
has not risen. Only when the rise of the karma is possible because of the
capacity of the rise of the karma although at the moment it is not expressed
itself, in such cases the jiva assists the increase in the intensity of the karmic
experience. Similarly, after the rise of the karma, it is not possible to increase
the intensity of experience.1 The increase in the intensity of karma would not be
possible if it is already increased, because if the increase of intensity is further
increased, there would be no increase of intensity of karmic experience and
there would be no end to the process of increase. 2. The increase in the
intensity of karmic experience would not be possible in the cases where the
increase in the intensity will take palace in future date. 3. The rise of the karmic
particles will not give occasions to intensities, if the karmic particles are weak
after its rise. 4. The rise and the intensity of karmic particles will be possible
only in such cases where there is not yet the rise and increase of the intensity of
karma, but where there is potentiality and capacity for the increase of the karmic
intensity.

THE CAUSATION OF UDIRANA

Sometimes, the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself and in such cases
there is no need to do self-effort. When the duration of karmic bondage is over,
the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself. It is ripe for the rise and
therefore no special efforts on the part of the jiva are necessary for effecting the
rise.

Gautama asked Mahavira, 'Bhagavan! When the karmic process is about to rise,
but which has not yet risen and which is capable of rising (udirana yogya) and
increase, in such cases when the increase in the intensity of karmic process
takes place and we say that individual effort, the strength of the individual jiva in
these efforts and the capacity (bala) and the near energy (virya) are necessary
to operate or are not necessary.

Mahavira said, that jiva helps the process of rise and increase of the karmic
process which are not yet risen cannot be made to rise and increase in intensity.2

In this process, the one's destiny and the efforts of the individual jiva are both
necessary. Due to the individual efforts the jiva effects certain processes in the
karmic particles. This is possible to the yoga (activity) of the jiva, which is of
three types: body, speech and mental. If the activity is auspicious, that is
subhayoga, if the activity is inauspicious which lead towards the obstruction of
the self-realization, it is inauspicious.

Mithyatva (perversity), avrata (lack of self-control), pramada (negligence) are all-

instrumental to yoga. But the activity without the kasayas is subha while the
activity that is accompanied or motivated by kasaya is asubha. Subhayoga
brings auspicious tendency and asubhayoga brings inauspicious tendency. The
two tendencies sat and asat bring about the process the udirana.1

VEDANA

Gautama said to Mahavira: "Bhagavan! Some say that the jiva experiences
vedana according to the type of bondage that it takes place. Would it be correct
to say that?"

Mahavira said: "Gautama! The explanation given by these persons is one-sided

and is not the whole truth. Some jivas experience the vedana (emotional states)
according to their deserts earned through the type of karma acquired. But some
other jivas experiences different vedanas also.
Gautama said: 'how is it?'

Mahavira replied: 'that jiva which experiences the vedana or affective states
according to the type and intensity of karma can be said to experience
evambhuta vedana and those jivas which experience different emotional
experience from the desserts are said to experience unevambhuta vedana.

Mahavira replied to another question stating that vedana (feeling) rises out of
the karmic particles accrued in the past. The karmic particles flowing in into the
soul at the present moment do not produce vedana.

NIRJARA

Atman and the atomic particles of matter are distinct and as long as they are
distinct, both of them are pure. But when there is contact between the atman
and the particles of matter, atman is considered to be rupi (having form) and
atomic particles are converted into karma-varganas. When sense karmic
particles get glued to the soul, then they are considered to be the karma, which
have the capacity of producing effect. When the karmic effect gets exhausted
the particles of karma are separated, and they become mere pudgala or matter.
They become akarma and are separated from soul. This process of extraction of
the karmic particles from the soul is called nirjara.

In the common parlance it is said that nirjara is a process where the karma is
separated from the soul, by the exhaustion of the effect of karma.

The fruits on the tree become ripe in two ways. The fruits may become ripe on
the tree only, after the period of maturity is over or they may be made ripe by
plucking them from the tree and using artificial methods. In the later case, it
may take lesser time for the fruits to be ripened. In the same way, karma
becomes mature for expression of its effects either in its natural process or it
may made to fructify prematurely by certain moral and spiritual process. If the
fructification of karma takes its natural process, this is called karma paripaka.
But if the karma is made to fructify prematurely by means of certain moral and
spiritual practices, then we call it karma nirjara. Karma-paripaka is neither
dharma nor adharma. Nirjara is a process of fructification of karmic effect much
earlier than it would have been possible for the karma to fructify in normal
course. The fructification of karma is very auspicious also. Therefore, nirjara
would be avipaki nirjara. It is also considered as sahetuka nirjara. And this is
dharma. Subha nirjara is dharma.

PRIORITY OF THE ATMAN OR THE KARMA

A question has been asked regarding the priority of the karma or the atman,
which is earlier? The answer is, both the karman and atman are anadi
(beginningless) and the relation between them is also beginningless. However,
there is the karma flow into the soul and new karma enters into the soul every
moment. There is not a single moment in an empirical jiva when the karma does
not enter in. In this specific sense, we can say that the influx of the karma has a
beginning and in the general sense of the relation of the karma to the soul.1

A question has been pertinently asked regarding the adequacy of explanation of

the usual statement that the karmic influx is anadi (beginningless), but it has an
end. How can that which is beginningless can have an end?

The answer is in general sense that which has no beginning has no end,
specifically with reference to the generic relation. But with reference to
particulars this fact of relation need not be true. For instance, the relation
between the gold and ore of the gold, between milk and ghee is anadi because
gold is in the ore and ghee is in the milk. But they can be separated, in this
sense; the relation has an end.

But from the point of view of the relation of the specific karma to the soul, we
can say that the association of karma with the jiva has a particular point of time
and therefore, it had a beginning. Similarly, the karma that has accumulated in
the soul can also be washed away at a particular time, and the new karma
enters. And there is new bondage. But the flow of karma as such into the soul in
its generic aspect is beginningless.2 Although from the point of view of specific
karma, it has beginning and also an end. The self-control, tapas and other moral
and spiritual activities can exhaust the karma that is flowing into the soul from
the beginningless time. The accumulated karma gets destroyed and the atman
becomes free from the karmic encrustation.3

THE SUPREMACY OF THE KARMA OR OF THE ATMAN

A question has been asked regarding the supremacy of the atman or of the
karma, which is supreme, which is more powerful?

The answer is that both are supreme and both are powerful. Both have infinite
energy. Sometimes jiva gets opportunate moments for the fruition of karma and
by its activity in the righteous direction. It drives out the karmic bondage. But
sometimes karma becomes predominant, and jiva has to suffer the effects of the
karma and be under its control.1 From the point of view of looking at objects as
an external reality, the karma appears to be more prominent. But if we
introspect on ourselves we find the atman is equally important and powerful.
Just as a spider weaves its web and gets into it, so also the jiva acquires karma
and gets involved in the karmic bondage. If the jiva will, the karmic bondage can
be cut off. Therefore, it can be said that however, powerful the karma is, the jiva
is more powerful than the karma. From the commonsense point of view, we find
an experience that the stone, which is hard, is very often cut by the liquid water
that flows over it. The flowing waters of the river cut through the hard and solid
rocks. Similarly, the atman is more powerful than karma if it wills. As long as
Hanumana did not know his real strength, he suffered indignities from Ravana
and from the Nagupasa. But once he realized his real strength, no body could
control him. In the same way, the atman has infinite strength and energy and
we do not know it. As long as we do not know it, we suffer the bondage of the
karma. But the moment, we realize the inner strength of the atman, the
shackles of the karma fall down one by one.

THE FRUITS OF KARMA

The empirical jiva experiences the fruits of karma. From the point of view of
enjoyment of fruits of karma, the fruition has been distinguished into two types:
(1) Subha karma, auspicious fruits of karma, which may also be considered as
punya (merit) or kusala (auspicious and good); and (2) asubha karma, the fruits
are inauspicious, it may be referred papa, which is also akusala (inauspicious and
evil). This distinction has been mentioned in various schools of Indian philosophy
like Jaina1, Bauddha2, Sankhya3, Yoga4, Nyaya-Vaisesika5 and Upanisads.6 The
fruits of the karma which are conducive to the spiritual realization give rise to
punya and those which are not conducive to self-realization are inauspicious and
they give rise to papa. All desire punya and do not want papa. However, one
cannot escape the effects of punya and papa.

The karmic bondage that the jiva has already acquired has to be experienced
and exhausted in this life or in the succeeding life.7 There is no escape for the
atman from experiencing the fruits of the karma good or bad arising out of the
karmic bondage.8

The Buddha said to his disciples that one cannot escape the fruits of the karma
at any cost, whether you want to avoid it by various means, you may fly in the
skies, you may enter the sea, or fall in the valley, wherever you go karma cannot
be escaped and the effects of papa have to be experienced.9

Similar views has been expressed by the great poet Sihalana Misra belonging to
the Vedic tradition.10

According to acarya Amitagati, we experience the fruits of good and bad karmas
that we have acquired. If we have to experience the fruits of karma from other
sources, the karma that we have acquired would be meaningless.11

Acarya Kundakunda says that jiva and the karmic particles are mixed together
and at appropriate occasions they get separated. But as long as they are mixed
together, the karma continues to give its effects either auspicious or inauspicious
way. We get pleasure or pain accordingly.1

The Buddha had his foot pricked by a thorn once. He said to his disciples that "in
my ninety one previous life, a man was murdered by my sharp weapon
therefore, the thorn has pricked me".2

Similarly, Bhagavana Mahavira had to suffer great physical and mental tortures
during his period of sadhana. All this must have been due to the effect of karma
that he had acquired in the previous lives.3
ISVARA AND KARMAVADA

The Jainas maintain that every individual jiva experiences the fruits of karma
according to his deserts.4 He does not accept Nyaya5 conception of Isvara as the
dispenser of karma. Because Isvara has no place in the system of karma. Karma
is associated with jiva. It envelops the jiva and produces the effect.6 The karmic
effect is determined by the karmic matter,7 the extensity of karma, the time, the
bhavakarma and other factors like the birth, the sthiti, (duration)8 etc. All these
determine the total karmic dispensations and shape the personality of the
individual. The food that we take may be sweet or bitter, palatable or not, the
food itself has not these characteristics, but these experiences come because of
its association with the cogniser and the psychic effects and the individual
consciousness. The individual self experiences these different types of food
according to the variation in physical and psychic condition.

The sramana Kalodayi asked Bhagavana Mahavira, "Bhagavan! Can we say that
jiva experiences the bitter fruits of papa karma as bitter?" 1

Bhagavana Mahavira said, "Yes". Then Mahavira was asked to explain the
process of experience the fruits of inauspicious karma.

Mahavira said, 'just as if one were to eat the food well and cleanly prepared, yet
mixed with poison, he may experience the taste of the food as good and tasteful,
but the effect of the food, as it contains poison will be gradually harmful to the
body. Similarly, the karmic effect due to the activities actuated by various
kasayas and the eighteen types of inauspicious deeds from violence upto
mithyadarsana may be pleasant in the beginning, but they do show inauspicious
effect.2

Kalodayi asked further question, "Bhagavan! if the jivas perform good karmas,
will the fruits of those karma be good?"

Mahavira said 'Yes'. Then Kalodayi asked him the process of the fruition of
auspicious karma into merit.

Mahavira said" 'just as actions performed due to auspicious merit, one who does
not injure any living being and is free from all the 18 sinful acts from violence
upto the Mithyadarsana (perversity of attitude) will earn punya (auspicious fruits
of karma). The auspicious work brings auspicious fruits of karma.3

Just as a machine like the electronic calculator having no intelligence, still makes
complicated calculations, which in the case of a human being would require good
deal of intelligence, so also karma, though material in nature consisting of
karmic particles, works out the schemata of the effects of karma. It is not
necessary to postulate the presence of Isvara for the dispensing of karma. He is
not free from distribute karma as he wants. One man's karma cannot be
transformed to another. If this were possible, then freedom of the will have no
meaning and the Isvara would have been powerful and karma would be some
commodity to be distributed at his will. But we find that karma works his own
way. There is a regulated mathematical and determined effect of karma, which
works their own course. In this sense, Isvara has no place in the karma theory.

TRANSFERENCE OF KARMA

According to the Vedic tradition, the individual atman is at the mercy of the all-
powerful Isvara. Without the grace of Isvara the atman cannot do anything.
Isvara is the one who dispenses karma to different individuals, who sends one to
the hell or heaven.1

The Jaina theory of karma does not accept this view. There is no possibility of
dispensation of karma by any external agency like Isvara. Karma cannot be
distributed like pieces of money. One man's karma cannot be transformed into
other. The individual soul is free. It is by its own activity that it earns the karmic
bondage in this empirical world. Each individual soul is responsible for its rise or
fall. The atman, which gets involved in the wheel, is like the river vetarani or the
tree kutasalmali. The soul expresses its two nature, gets the fruits of
perception.2 The individual soul is the doer of its own karma and the enjoyer of
the fruits of karma. The soul that follows the righteous path is its own friend,
while the soul that goes astray and follows un-righteous path is its own friend,
while the soul that goes astray and follows un-righteous path is its own enemy.3

The Jaina theory of karma maintains that the fruits of karma expressing in
happiness and misery are the results of the activity of the soul. The soul gets
the fruits according to its desert.4 The Vedic tradition and the Buddhist view are
refuted by the Jainas, regarding the distribution and the transform of karma.5

One man's karma cannot be transformed to another. If that were so, the efforts
of the jiva would be futile because the jiva would not know that its good actions
would give him good results. It would then the possible in such cases that one
does actions and someone else would enjoy the fruits of that karma. This would
not be an adequate explanation for the distribution of karma.1

THE FUNCTION OF KARMA

The function of karma is to get the soul involved in this wheel of life and death.
As long as the flow of karmic bondage continues, the soul gets involved in this
wheel and is not free. This is the general function of karmic action. In the
specific sense different types of karma have their different functions, in creating
the bondage, to the individual soul.

TYPES OF KARMA
Jaina karma theory has distinguished karma into eight types; 1. Jnanavaraniya
karma, 2. Darsanavarana, 3. Vedaniya, 4. Mohaniya, 5. Nama, 6. Ayu, 7. Gotra
and 8. Antaraya.2

Out of these eight karmas--jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya, mohaniya and

antaraya are ghati karmas, because they obscure the inherent nature and
capacity of the soul, like jnana and darsana.3 Vedaniya, ayu, nama and gotra
karmas are aghati karmas because they do not affect the original capacity of the
soul nor do they obscure the capacity. Therefore, they are called aghati
karmas.4

The consciousness is the characterization of the soul. The soul has infinite
energy. Similarly, infinite knowledge (anantajnana), infinite intuition (ananta
darsana), infinite bliss (ananta sukha) and infinite energy (ananta virya)
characterize it. Jnanavaraniya karma obscures the intellectual knowledge of the
soul. Darsanavarana karma covers the darsana, mohaniya karma obscures the
right attitude and faith and right conduct also. Therefore the atman will be
bereft of the ananta sukha. Antaraya karma obscures the infinite energy of the
soul, by which the soul will be temporarily incapacitated for expressing the
energy which is inherent in the soul. In this way, he ghati karmas or obscuring
karmas are basically responsible for the different states of the karma.

Those types of karana which do not affect the original nature of the jiva but
which affect the fruits and the determining effect of the original nature of the
jivas are called aghati karmas. Aghati karmas are directly connected with the
karmic particles of matter and not directly with the jiva. The rise of the aghati
karmas mixes the soul mixed with the paudgalika dravya (material particles of
karma).

Because of this, the jiva, which is amurta, will be considered as murta. The jiva
is bound with the sarira (body), and the inherent characteristics of jiva like
infinite jnana, infinite sukha, amurtakatva (formlessness) and agurulaghutva
(neither small nor big) do not get occasions to get express themselves.
Vedaniya karma obscures the infinite happiness or bliss of the soul. Ayu karma
obscures and obstructs the eternity of the soul. By nama karma, the jiva is
limited in its expression of the status. And the gotra karma thwarts the
expression of agurulaghutva. When the ghati karmas are removed, the atman
attains omniscient knowledge (kevalajnana) and omniscient intuition (kevala
darsana) and becomes Arihanta.1 But when the aghati karmas are also removed,
the body is case away, and the atman is freed from the material existence, and
becomes siddha, Buddha and mukta.

Jnanavarana karma

Jiva is characterized by pure consciousness. Upayoga is the essential

characteristic of the jiva.2 Upayoga has been variously interpreted, sometimes as
an expression of jnana and darsana and sometimes as the resultant of
consciousness.3 Sakara upayoga expresses jnana and nirakara upayoga
expresses darsana.1 Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi in his book, "Some Problems in Jaina
Psychology" has interpreted upayoga in psychological term stating that upayoga
may be referred to as the karmic energy which is primarily responsible for
expression of jnana and darsana. He has used the world upayoga on the pattern
of the Macdugallian sense with certain modifications.2 Jnanopayoga is the
expression of conscious energy which is associated with discriminative
knowledge by which the self distinguishing between species, the attribute, action
and other forms of distinguishing of the empirical jiva. Darsanopayoga
apprehends the generality of the object in a concrete psychosis.3 Jnanavarana
obscures such discriminative knowledge. Just as a piece of cloth tied round the
eyes so as to obstruct the perception will obscure the sense perception through
the eyes.4 The consequential expression of Jnanavarana karma will be to obscure
knowledge of the five types: 1. Matijnana (sense perception) 2. Sruta jnana
(inferential knowledge) 3. Avadhijnana (clairvoyance perception) 4.
Manahparyayajnana (telepathic cognition) and 5. Kevalajnana (omniscient
cognition).5

Matijnanavarana karma obscures sense experience, obtained through the

contact of sense organs and the manas. The srutajnanavarana karma obscures
knowledge obtained through inference and discriminative knowledge which is
defective. Avadhijnanavarana karma obscures knowledge which may be
considered as clairvoyance knowledge and which is mainly concerned with the
perception of objects having form. Manahparyaya Jnanavarana karma obscures
the telepathic cognition. Kevalajnanavarana karma covers the omniscient
knowledge, which includes the simultaneity of knowledge--the substance and
modes.

The consequential expression of the jnanavarana karma may be either

sarvaghati (complete) or desaghati which is partial.1 Sarvaghati jnanavaraniya
karma obscures the knowledge which is complete and which arises from the
obscuration of knowledge, while desaghati jnanavarana karma obscures partial
knowledge obtained through the matijnana and other forms of jnanavarana.
Mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya jnanavarana are desaghati, while
Kevalajnanavarana is sarvaghati, because the sarvaghati jnanavarana karma is
concerned with the total obscuration of knowledge. However although
sarvaghati Kevalajnanavarana karma obscures omniscience but the jnana of the
atman is not wiped out of the essential. When the dark clouds cover the sky, the
light of the sun percolates through the clouds and enables us to distinguish
between the night and the day.2 Again, just as the light of the sun piercing
through thick dark clouds obscuring the vision of the sun illumines different parts
in the surroundings and the buildings according to the natures and the type of
construction and color pattern. So also the jnanavaraniya karma obscuring
matijnana illumines various things with different intensities. There is no
complete destruction of matijnana. If that were to take place, jiva would be
considered to be ajiva.

The maximum duration of this karma is 30-kotakoti sagaropama and minimum

"antarmuhurta" (less than 48 minutes).3
Darsanavarana karma:

Darsanavarana karma obscures the intuitive experience. It obscures and inhibits

he possibility of the cognition in which we apprehend the generality of an object
without the discriminative knowledge of the particulars. Due to the obscuration
of the darsanavarana the avenues for knowledge are generally closed.
Analogical example in this connection may be mentioned in that the
darsanavarana may be compared to the watchman (dvarapala) at the door of a
king. Without whose permission we cannot see the king himself. Similarly, if the
darsanavarana karma obscures intuitive experience, we cannot get easily the
jnana (discriminative knowledge).1

Darsanavarana karma is of nine varieties: 1. Caksu darsanavarana 2. Acaksu

darsanavarana 3. Avadhi darsanavarana and 4. Kevala darsanavarana 5. Nidra
(sleep) 6. Nidra-nidra (deep sleep) 7. Pracala 8. Pracalapracala and 9.
Styanardhi.2

Caksu darsanavaraniya obscures the visual experience. Acaksu darsanavaraniya

obscures the forms of experience obtained through the sense organs other than
the eyes, and the mind. Avadhi darsanavaraniya obscures the clairvoyance
intuition and kevala darsanavaraniya veils the omniscience experience. Nidra is
a form of activity, which is responsible for the obscuration of darsanavaraniya
karma. It is sleep, which is considered light sleep. Nidra-nidra is heavy sleep.
Pracala is a form of stupor, by which one gets sleep even sitting or standing.
Pudgala-Pracala is a heavy sleep, which one gets while walking. We may
consider this as somnambulistic. Styanardhi is a very deep sleep where even
activity is possible during sleep. It may be referred to hypnotic form of sleep.

Darsanavarana karma may be partially affecting (desaghati) or totally affecting

(sarvaghati). Caksu, acaksu, avadhi darsanavaraniya are desaghati while the
remaining are sarvaghati.3 Kevaladarsanavaraniya karma, like
kevalajnanavaraniya karma is sarvaghati.

When darsanavaraniya karma is completely removed the jiva experience infinite

intuition. If the darsanavaraniya karma undergoes suppression and destruction,
partial (ksayopasama), then caksu darsana and acaksu darsana and avadhi
darsana experience would be possible. The minimum duration of darsanavarana
karma is one 'antarmuhurta' while the maximum duration will be 30 crores of
crores sagaropama.1

Vedaniya karma

Vedaniya karma causes experience of the pleasure and pain. It is of the two
forms (i) satavedaniya which is responsible for the experiences of pleasure
concerning senses and the mind; while (ii) asatavedaniya brings about painful
experiences.2 These two experiences are concerned with the body and the mind.3
Vedaniya karma can be compared to a drawn out sword besmeared with honey.
Satavedaniya is like the honey on the sword, while asatavedaniya is like cutting
one's tongue while licking.4

Satavedaniya karma is of eight types like: manojna sabda (pleasant words),

manojna rupa (pleasant form), manojna gandha (pleasant smell), manojna rasa
(pleasant taste), manojna sparsa (pleasant touch), sukhita mana (mind which is
pleased), sukhita vani (pleasing speech) and sukhita kaya (pleasing body).5

Asatavedaniya is similarly of eight types associated with unpleasant experiences

of sabda, rupa, gandha, rasa, sparsa, mana, vani and unpleasant body (dukhita
kaya).6

Asatavedaniya karma causes painful feelings through the senses and the mind,
thereby bringing misery to the being.7

The shortest duration of the vedaniya karma has been mentioned as

antarmuhurta in Uttaradhyayana sutra1 and Prajnapana.2 Bhagavati mentions
two samayas as the minimum duration.3 There is no contradiction between these
different statements, because muhurta includes antarmuhurta, which can be
described as having the duration of the samayas. But Tattvarthasutra and
Karmagrantha have mentioned twelve muhurtas4 as the minimum duration of
this karma. This discrepancy may be explained with reference to the
Samparayika asrava and iryapathika asrava. The maximum duration would be
30 crores of crores sagara.

Mohaniya karma

Mohaniya karma is deluding karma. It causes emotional disturbances and leads

one astray, making him believe that this world is very much real and one clings
strongly to the experiences of this world. In this sense, we may say it causes
"delusions". This is the most powerful of the eight karmas. Mohaniya karma is
the primary form of karma which is responsible for the wheel of samsara.5 In this
sense the real nature of the atman, which is pure and non-attached, free from
the passions, is very much affected by the perversions of the emotional
disturbances. By this karma, one ordinarily loses the power of discrimination.
The effects of this karma can be compared to the effects of alcoholic drinks in
which one loses the power of thought and discrimination and the sense of
discrimination good from bad.6

Mohaniya karma is of two types: (1) Darsanamohaniya which affects the intuitive
experience and (2) Caritramohaniya; it affects good conduct.1 Darsana in this
sense refers to the state of intuition of right tattvas and the real nature of the
atman.2 Just as the consuming of liquor stupefies, so also mohaniya karma
causes stupefaction of the mind by which he looses the power of discrimination
between right and wrong. In this, one identifies himself with all that is external
to him.3 And without discriminating the righteous from the unrighteousness; one
identifies himself with the unrighteous activity.
Darsana mohaniya karma is of three4 types: 1. Samyaktva mohaniya, in this, the
expression of samyaktva, if it is to come, cannot be obstructed, but it is slowed
down and vitiated with numerous faults. 2. Mithyatva mohaniya, in this the faith
in the righteous item is lost. 3. Misra mohaniya, in this one develops the mixed
attitude in which righteous is also present along with wrong attitude. It is also
called samyakmithyatva mohaniya.5 Mithyatva mohaniya is sarvaghati, while
samyaktva mohaniya is desaghati as it partially affects discrimination.6 But misra
mohaniya is sarvaghati with reference to the relation of relative emphasis of the
mithyatva and samyaktva.

Second distinction in the mohaniya karma is the caritra mohaniya karma. It

affects the right conduct of the soul. It thwarts activity leading to right conduct.7

Caritra mohaniya is of two types: 1. Kasaya mohaniya and 2. Nokasaya

mohaniya.1 Kasaya refers to the passions and emotional upset. Kasaya
mohaniya is of 16 types while nokasaya, which refers to the quasi-passions or
quasi-emotional upsets, has seven or nine types.2

Kasaya mohaniya has reference to the emotional upsets. It etymologically

comes from kasa and aya meaning attachment or attraction towards samsara,
which is kasa. These emotional upsets lead us to the attachment to the worldly
things and empirical experiences and the consequent involvement in the wheel
of life.3 Krodha (anger), mana (egoity), maya (deceitfulness) and lobha (greed)--
these are four types of passions. Each of them has four different levels of
intensity: 1. Anantanubandhi, 2. Apratyakhyanavarana, 3. Pratyakhyanavarana
and 4. Samjvalana. In this way, there are sixteen variations of expression of
emotional excitement. The rise of these mohaniya karmas, i.e. kasayas or
emotional upsets like anger, disturbs the individual's mental activity.

Anantanubandhi is of longer duration and because of this, the soul wanders into
worldly life for endless time (anantakala). This is responsible for the destruction
of samyaktva.4

Apratyakhyanavaraniya has the effect of partial destruction and due to this

atman cannot accept the sravaka vratas or anuvratas and follow the righteous
path.5

Pratyakhyanavarana obstructs the atman to become a monk or sramana.6

Due to the Samjvalana kasaya it is difficult to get the opportunities for practicing
right conduct for a sramana.7

Gommatasara also mentions these points.1

Anantanubandhi kasaya operates for the whole of life. Apratyakhyana has its
effects for one year. Pratyakhyana kasaya produces its effects and continues its
operation for four months. While Samjvalana has its effects for 15 days.2
In the Gommatasara karmakanda there is a description of the duration of the
effects of kasayas with reference to the emotional experiences.3

No-kasaya Mohaniya--We now describe the intensity and duration of nokasaya

mohaniya karma. Nokasaya refers to quasi-passions which arise due to the
operation of kasayas.4 They are also called as akasayas.5 Nokasaya does not
mean absence of kasaya, but it is a quasi-passion in which there is the intensity
of passion without the qualitative differences.6 There are nine types of nokasaya:
1. Laughter (hasya), 2. Rati (liking towards the other living or non-living things or
dislike towards the samyama), 3. Arati (disliking towards the worldly affairs and
interest towards self-control samyama) 4. Bhaya (fear), 5. Soka (grief) 6. Jugupsa
(disgust)7 7. Striveda (sensual desire with a man) 8. Purusaveda (desire of
intercourse with a woman), 9. Napumsakaveda (desire of sexual intercourse both
with the man and woman). In the Uttaradhyayana seven distinctions have been
mentioned. There are three types of vedas have been considered as one. In
other words, by the single word veda all the three vedas have been denoted.

It would be worthwhile considering on the basis of psychological analysis, to be

associated with somehow with instincts or the better word propensities in the
sense that McDonnell has used. This needs further psychological study. In this
way, Caritramohaniya karma has twenty-five varieties and among them four
Samjvalana kasaya and nine-nokasaya i.e., thirteen varieties are the
disturbances, which affect partially. Therefore, they are called desaghati, while
the others (i.e. remaining twelve varieties have their effects totally.) Therefore,
they are called sarvaghati.1 The duration of the mohaniya karma is for one
antarmuhurta at the minimum and for 70 crores of crores sagara at the
maximum.2

Ayuskarma (Age Determining Karma)

Karma that determines the age of an individual jiva is called ayuskarma. When
the age determined by the karma is over the individual jiva embraces death.3

This karma has been compared to the prison house. The udge sentences a
prisoner to undergo punishment for a specific period and as soon as that period
is over, he is released from the prison. Similarly, the individual jiva gets
embodied in a particular body in a particular life for a specified period of time.
For the determined period of time, the soul cannot be free from the bodily
existence in that particular body.4 The ayuskarma is not concerned with giving
pleasure or pain, but its function is to determine the age limit of a specific
individual jiva.5

The consequential distinctions of ayuskarma is of 4 types: 1. One that

determines like the lie span in the hell (naraka ayu), 2. The one determines the
life span in the lower animals (tiryanca ayu) 3. The life spans determining karma
in the case of human being (manusya ayu) and 4. That which determines the age
of the residents of heaven (devayu).1
The age determination may be considered in two ways: 1. Apavartaniya and 2.
Anapavartaniya. Apavartaniya refers the decrease in the age due to external
condition. Anapavartaniya refers to the non-decrease under any circumstance of
the duration of the ayu.2

Apavartaniya ayu does not however mean that it is possible to terminate the life
of an individual jiva without exhausting the duration of the age as determined by
the age determining karma. In only means that one can hasten the experience
of the ayu karma which would have taken a longer time. This experience of
karma can be reduced in antarmuhurta. In the common sense parlance, it is
called premature death. But we should remember that in the case of the human
being and the lower animals residing in Karmabhumi it is possible to have such
reduction in the experiences of the exhaustion of karma bringing about
premature death. But there cannot be such reduction of age in the hellish
beings, gods, tirthankaras and even human beings and lower animals of
Bhogabhumi i.e., the land of enjoyment.

Ayukarma extends in its duration to one antarmuhurta at the lowest and 33

crores of sagaropama at the highest.3 Bhagavati mentions the highest duration
as a third part of the purvakoti and 33 sagaropana.4 This includes the period of
time required for formation of the new life after the karmabandha in the previous
life is out off, to the time when the germination of the new life starts. In other
words this includes also the period of potentiality (abadhakala) of ayuskarma.

Nama karma

Nama karma is that type of karma, which determines the status, and other
conditions of the individual jiva.1 According to this theory, Nama karma
determines the different formulations of the bodily forms of the different
individual status and the determining experiences.2

The Nama karma has been very often compared to a painter who paints various
pictures of men and animals. A good painter presents varieties of forms of
animals and birds. Similarly, namakarma presents the determined the life of
individual soul in different stages like narak, manava (human) or heavenly
status. This karma determines the bodily form, the different limbs of the body,
sense organs and the general stature of the individual body.3

Nama karma primarily is of two types: (1) Subhanama karma that gives
auspicious presentations and (2) asubhanama karma, which gives inauspicious
presentation. The first is the consequence of punya (merit) and the second is
determined by demerit (papa).4 Nama karma expresses itself into forty-two types
of consequential forms.5 They are:
1. Gati nama--It determines the status of the individual soul in (a) hell, (b) lower
animal states, (c) in the human states and (d) in the stage for the heavenly
brings.
2. Jati nama--The nama karma that determines the form of the individual with
reference to sense organs and the species of the animals is called the jati
 nama. It has five forms: 1. One-sensed organism, 2. Two-sensed organism, 3.
Three-sensed, 4. Four-sensed and 5. Five-sensed organisms. These are
determined by the nama karma.
3. Sarira namakarma--It determines the type and the form of the sarira that the
jiva gets as the fruits of its karma. It has five forms: (a) audarika sarira (b)
vaikriyaka, (c) aharaka (d) taijasa and (e) karmana sarira (karmic body).
4. Sarira angopanga nama--It determines the different parts of the bodies and
also the limbs of the bodies. It is of three forms: (1) audarika sarira
angopanga (2) vaikriyaka sarira angopanga and (3) aharaka sarira
angopanga. Taijasa and karmana sariras (bodies) have no limbs.
5. Sarira bandhana nama karma is that body of the karmic particles, which
associates the karmic particles, which were accrued previously and are being
accrued in present. It has five forms: 1. Audarika sarira bandhana nama, 2.
Vaikriya sarira bandhana nama, 3. Aharaka sarira bandhana nama, 4. Taijasa
sarira bandhana nama, and 5. Karmana sarira bandhana namo.

In the Karmagrantha, fifteen distinctions have been made regarding the sarira
bandhana nama karma. We give below the same distinctions in their original
form:
1. Audarika-audarika bandhananama
2. Audarika-taijasa bandhananama
3. Audarika-karmana bandhananama
4. Vaikriya-vaikriya bandhananama
5. Vaikriya-taijasa bandhananama
6. Vaikriya-karmana bandhananama
7. Aharaka-aharaka bandhananama
8. Aharaka-taijasa bandhananama
9. Aharaka-karmana bandhananama
10. Audarika-taijasa-karmana bandhananama
11. Vaikriya-taijasa-karmana bandhananama
12. Aharaka-taijasa-karmana bandhananama
13. Taijasa-taijasa bandhananama
14. Taijasa-karmana bandhananama
15. Karmana-karmana bandhananama

The audarika, vaikriya and aharaka karma particles are not directly connected
with each other. Therefore, their interconnected bondage has not been
mentioned here.

6. Sarira sanghata namakarma is concerned with the association and

arrangement of the different karmas, which have been accumulated due to
various factors and the karmic particles, which are accruing due to the influx
of karmas. It has five forms: (a) audarika sarira sanghata nama karma, where
the karmic particles of similar nature accrued and accruing are arranged in a
proper way, so as to determines the form of the body, etc. Similarly, the
functions of other four allied karmas can be mentioned, like (b) taijasa sarira
and (c) karmana sarira sanghata namakarma.
7. Samhanana nama karma is concerned with the formation and structure of the
bone in the body. There are six forms in this: (a) vajra vrsabha naraca
samhanana nama-karma (formation of hard and strong bones), (b) vrsabha
naraka samhanana nama karma (c) naraca samhanana nama karma (flexible
and not brittle bones). (d) ardha naraca samhanana nama karma (e) kilika
samhanana namakarma (joint bones), (f) sevarta samhanana nama karma
(auxiliary bones).
8. Samsthana nama karma is concerned with the determination of the size of the
different parts of the body. It has also six forms like: (a) samacaturasra (even
form), (b) nyagrodha parimandala samsthana (globular and round forms), and
(c) sadi samsthana (formation of the ends of the body, (d) vamana samsthana
(formation of short bodies, (e) kubja samsthana (formation of dwarfish bodies
and (f) hunda samsthana (unequal bodies)
9. Varna namakarma is that type of namakarma, which is responsible for
determining the color of the individual organism. It is of five types: (1)
krsnavarnanama (black), (2) nilavarnanama (indigo), (3) lohitavarnanama
(grey), (4) haridravarnanama (yellow) and (5) svetavarnanama (white)
determining karma.
10. Gandha namakarma: This nama karma determines the smell of the
individual organism. It is of two types: 1. surabhigandhanama (pleasant
smell) and 2. durabhigandhanama (unpleasant smell).
11. Rasa namakarma is connected with determination of the taste of the
individual experiencing it. It is of five types: 1. tiktarasa nama (pungent) 2.
katurasanama (bitter) 3. kasayarasanama (astringent) 4. amlarasa nama
(acidic) and 5. madhura rasa nama (sweet).
12. Sparsanama karma determines the nature of the touch of the individual
organism. These are of eight types: 1. karkasa sparsa (hard) 2. mrdu sparsa
(soft) 3. guru sparsa (weighty) 4. laghu sparsa (unextended and light) 5.
snigdha (greasy and smooth) 6. ruksa sparsa (hard and dry) 7. sita sparsa
(cool touch) and 8. usna sparsa (warm). The sparsa nama karma determines
them.
13. Agurulaghu nama: This karma determines the extent of the intensity
neither too little nor too much in its intensity and duration.
14. Upaghata nama: With the rise of this karma the individual jiva suffers
hardships and physical tortures due to physical deformation like pratijivha
(defects in tongue or defects in teeth, etc.)
15. Paraghata nama: By the rise of this karma one can influence others even
through his talk or appearance. It is also possible that due to this karma, the
individual jiva would be able to harm other jivas.
16. Anupurvi nama: This type of karma enables an individual jiva to traverse a
particular distance after it leaves its first body at the time of death and before
it enters the other state of existence. It enables to cover some space so as to
reach the next stage of existence. It has four types: 1. naraka anupurvi nama
(leading towards hell) 2. tiryak anupurvinama (it has the capacity of leading
the soul to a point which to enter the lower stage of animals) 3. manusya
anupurvi nama (leading to the human existence) 4. devanupurvi nama (leads
to the next type of heavenly being).
17. Ucchvasa nama: By this karma, one can breath properly.
18. Atapa nama: By this karma, an individual organism can get warm for the
sake of life.1 Or, an organism, being himself cool, can expedite warm-light,
e.g., the light of gross ankaratna fixed below the sun.
19. Udyotanama karma: By this karma the organism becomes cool and gets
sufficient energy and light1 or, expedites cool light.
20. Vihayogati Nama: By this karma the individual jiva gets either the good or
the bad gati (walk). It has two types: prasasta (auspicious gati) and aprasasta
(uncomfortable or inauspicious gati).
21. Trasanama karma: It enables an individual organism to get the capacity of
motion.
22. Sthavara nama karma: By this karma individual jiva cannot move at his
will.
23. Suksma nama: This karma determines the subtle body of the individual
jiva.
24. Badara nama karma determines the individual to have a sthula sarira
(gross body).
25. Paryapta nama: By this, the individual soul gets appropriate functions
(paryaptis) suitable for its status.
26. Aparyaptanama: In this the individual soul may not get all the necessary
and fitting functions of the organism.
27. Sadharana sariranama: By this karma the infinite jivas get a common and
normal body.
28. Pratyekasarira nama: It determines the specific body of the jiva.
29. Sthiranama karma: It determines the type of the bones, the teeth and flesh
that a body gets in the proper form and proper place.
30. Asthira nama is responsible for the disharmony and discordant
arrangement of the bones, the flesh etc.
31. Subhanama: By this karma one acquires a beautiful body and limbs.
32. Asubha nama karma is responsible for the acquisition of ugly body and
limbs.
33. Subhaga nama karma: By this karma one becomes popular and the
impression on the others would be pleasant, even if he does nothing for the
good of others, he becomes saubhagyasali i.e. he acquires good things of life.
34. Durbhaga nama karma is responsible for the unpleasant experiences of life
and he becomes unpopular.
35. Susvara nama karma: This type of karma is responsible for the melodious
voice one get.
36. Duhsvara nama karma: By this one gets an unpleasant voice.
37. Adeya nama karma makes an individual jiva respected by this words.
38. Anadeya nama karma: this does not respect even the rule words of the
individual jiva.
39. Yasah nama karma: This brings fame to the individual soul.
40. Ayasahkirti nama karma: By this karma one is unlucky and does not get
success. He gets disfame.
41. Nirmana Nama karma: this properly arranges the limbs of the body.
42. Tirthankara nama karma: By this karma one gets the opportunity and the
capacity of establishing right path (dharma tirtha).
prajnapana1 and Gommatasara,2 have given 93 types of nama karma, and
Karmavipaka mentions fifteen types of bandhananama and 103 types of
namakarma distinctions.3 The distinctions in the namakarma on the basis of 67
prakrti are to be considered from the point of view of distinctions of auspicious
and inauspicious karma. And also from the point of view of four-fold distinctions
of varna. Elsewhere also, 71 distinctions have been made in the consequential
effects (prakrti) in the same nama karma, by which Subhanama karma has been
distinguished, into thirty seven1; and thirty-four types2 of asubhanama karma.
This is a brief analysis of the different types of namakarma. This analysis has no
ideological difference. The duration of the namakarma is 8 muhurta in its lowest
and 30 crores of crores sagaropama in the highest3.

Gotrakarma

That type of karma, which determines the status of the individual in the family
and the society, is called gotra karma. This has reference to the higher status or
the lower status of the family in society.4 Acarya Umasvati has given a
description of the concept of gotra in terms of the higher and the lower status
with reference to the desa (country), jati (community), kula (sub-section of the
community), sthana (status), mana (respect in society), satkara (the type of
honor in society) aisvarya (the extent of prosperity of otherwise). In the case of
the individual in the lower state of society, Umasvati mentions some sections.5

Gotrakarma is primarily of two types: 1. Uccagotra karma which determines the

higher status and the place of the individual in the family and in society. 2.
Nicagotra karma which determines the lower status of individual in the family
and the society.6

Uccagotra karma is of eight types:

1. Jati uccagotra associated with the high status of the family with reference to
the mother side.
2. Kula uccagotra, high status of the family from the paternal side.
3. Bala uccagotra, it concerns the power and strength of the individual with
reference to his family also.
4. Rupa uccagotra concerning the form of his body with reference to the
heredity of the family.
5. Tapa uccagotra, the quality of virtues etc., with reference to the family.
6. Sruta uccagotra with reference to the knowledge and learning for the family
and the individual.
7. Labha uccagotra refers to the gains of the individual with reference to his
family.
8. Aisvarya uccagotra is concerned with the prosperity of the individual and the
family.1

Nicagotra karma is also of eight types2:

1. Jati nicagotra associated with the maternal side.
2. Kula nicagotra the lower state of the family from the paternal side.
3. Bala nicagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family with reference to the
strength and power.
4. Rupa nicagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family and individual with
reference to the form, beauty etc.
5. Tapa nicagotra, refers to the lack of self-control and higher virtues in the
individual and with reference to the family.
6. Sruta nicagotra, it refers to the lack of learning and intelligence.
7. Labha nicagotra, it refers to the loss of gains and profits for an individual with
reference tot he family.
8. Aisvarya nicagotra, it is absence of prosperity of the individual and family.

This karma has been compared to a potter (kumbhakara). The potter makes a
variety of pots out of the same clay. But some are used for the sake of making
kumbha or kalasa for the worship of gods. They are aquatinted with fragrant
ointment like candana etc. But some others are used for keeping wines and
alcoholic drinks. In the same way, individual jivas according to the type of karma
get various types of existences with reference to their karmic deserts. Some are
poor; some are rich, some are virtuous and some re vicious. Some are born in
rich families and some in poor families.1

Gotrakarma is of 8 muhurta in the minimum and 20 crores of crores sagaropama

as the maximum.

In general, nama and gotra karmas are related to each other in the sense they
are associated with the forms and the state of the body and the mental states.
The various forms and mental states are due to these karma. Namakarma
determines the possession of subha and asubha sarira (body). And gotrakarma
is considered for determining the status of the individual organism with
reference to the high or low status. The subha (auspicious) sarira brings
pleasure and asubha sarira (inauspicious body) brings pain. Similarly, the high
or the lower status of the individual is determined by the gotrakarma.

A question arises whether it would be necessary to distinguish between the

nama and gotra karma as separate, as they are closely associated with the same
functioning regarding the form and the status and body and the mind.

For answer to this, we will have to refer to the distinction connected with the
association of the nama karma of the individual body while gotra karma with
reference to the status of the individuals and their family status.

A second question arises of the form and the status of the individual bodies and
the family status, where to be determined by the heredity and the heritage of
the parent status, why should it be necessary to have two types of karma as
nama karma and gotra karma. Moreover, if the form and the status of the
individual in the family are to be determined by heredity family circumstances,
individual karma will have very little place.
But in may please be noted that the determination of the individual status in the
family and society is not only determined by the parents or the family, but this is
possible with the karma that individual has earned in this respect. The individual
is himself responsible for these; and he has earned it. The family and the society
are only occasion and the environmental factors which enable the individual to
be placed in good or bad comfort, in different status in society and family by his
own karma.

Namakarma determines the individual concerning his birth as man or gods in the
heaven or in the animal kingdom. It is also connected in the formation of the
types of sense organs that he possesses and the types of bodies that he inherits
like audarika, vaikriya etc. Gotra karma is also concerned with the status of the
individual. Therefore, again a question is asked whether gotrakarma has
anything to do with the determination of the types of sarira etc.

But gotrakarma is not directly connected in the formation of the individual bodies
and the sense-organs etc. Because the higher or the lower gotra of an individual
is not relevant for the possession of a particular body, short or tall, particular
colors-black or brown, particular types of sense organs like healthy sense organs
or deformities. For instance, a man born in the higher family may have
deformities in the body, may be of dark color and may be also ugly. On the
other hand, a man who is born in a lower family may be handsome and healthy.
Therefore, gotra karma has nothing to do with the determination of the bodily
forms in their various aspects. It is concerned with the status of the individuals
with reference to his family and mental make up. However, namakarma and
gotra karma are closely associated with each other regarding the formation of
the individual personalities.

Another question has been raised regarding the criteria of determining the lower
and the higher status of an individual in the family and in society due to the
operation of the gotrakarma. The answer to this will have to refer to the
biological and social heredity. We find that physical and mental poise of an
individual as determined in society in a dignified way is largely due to the family
upbringing. Just as a beautiful body is due to the biological heredity, similarly
the status of the individual and upright behavior and his character and
personality re to a great extent influenced by the biological heredity and family
up-bringing.

Antaraya karma

Antaraya karma obscures and also obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. By
the rise of this karma, constructions would be created for the enjoyment of the
normal pleasures of life and the experience of an individual.1 This karma has
been compared to the finance minister of the king. The king orders to give
money to a person but the finance minister very often withholds and delays the
disbursement, of what is given. He creates difficulty in the implementation of
the king's order. So, also is the function of antaraya karma. It obstructs the
energy of atman regarding the act of giving dana (donation) and other forms of
generous act.2

Antaraya karma is of five types: 1. Dana antaraya karma--It creates obstructions

in the giving of gifts and charity. 2. Labhantaraya karma--Due to the rise of this
karma, one is prevented from enjoying the fruits of his labors. He does not get
the profits that he earns. 3. Bhogantaraya karma--It prevents the enjoyment of
normal pleasures of life although the pleasures are at hand. For instance, one
cannot eat delicious food kept on the table for dinner due to ill health. 4.
Upabhogantaraya karma--This prevents the enjoyment of pleasures frequently
available as for instance, one is prevented from getting good house, wearing
good clothes and ornaments. 5. Viryantaraya karma--It prevents an individual
from performing actions and duties which require strength and drive.

Antaraya akarma can also be considered of two types: 1. Pratyutpanna vinasa

antaraya karma--By the rise of this karma the objects, which are acquired, are
either lost or destroyed. 2. Pihita agamipatha antaraya karma--This refers to the
obstructions created in the enjoyment of the forthcoming experiences and
objects.1

Antaraya karma is of one antarmuhurta duration in the least and at the

maximum it is of thirty crores of crores sagaropama.

The soul has the inherent characteristics of moving upward (Urdhvagati), just as
a gourd (tumba) has the capacity of floating on the surface of water. But if the
gourd is smeared with clay it becomes heavy and it does not flow.2 Similarly, due
to the encrustations of karmic particles the soul is prevented from going upwards
and from purification; so it gets involved in the wheel of empirical existence, it
goes doen.3

Antaraya karma is concerned with the obstructions of the possibility of getting

enjoyment of the possession and the fruits of activity.

The question arises whether antaraya karma is directly related to the external
objects and the possession of enjoyment of external objects? For instance, in the
possibility of giving charity etc. if there are obstructions these obstructions are
due to antaraya karma.

The possibilities of knowledge and other experiences and possessions depend

upon the neutrality and appropriateness of occasion, which has reached the
stage of maturity of experience. We may call this labdhi. Labdhi is the
appropriateness of fructification. For instance, even when there is a donor to
give charity and also when there is the preparedness of accepting charity, by an
individual or an institution, it may not be possible that the act of charity may
materialize due to some other external forces. But when all the forces are
favorable for actualization then charity is given. This is the labdhi with reference
to time and other circumstances. Labdhi, therefore, may be referred to the
capacity, the potency and the fructification of realization. Just as jnanavaraniya
karma obscured valid knowledge so also other forms of karma prevents the
relevant experience. Antaraya karma refers to the inherent energy of the soul
for knowledge experienced and action. Antaraya karma obstructs the energy to
operate in the direction of getting experiences are external, for example the act
of charity, the gains, the enjoyment of the objects and the objects connected
with the inherent energy of the soul are external, but the acts connected with
charity and experiences of their individual in experiencing the fruits of karma are
internal in the sense that they are directly connected with the expression of soul
energy.

There may be external objects ready to be given as charity, the conditions for
giving charity may also be favorable, but if there is no internal urge on the part
of one who gives charity is not yet aroused, the act of charity would not be
possible. Due to the rise of danantaraya karma, the person who wants to give
dana is not mentally ready. This is asadbhava. When he is willing to it becomes
sadbhava. But sometimes we find occasions when even in the absence of the
desire to give charity is given, while even with the best of intentions the desired
charity; we may not give it. In these circumstances danantaraya karma operates
in different ways. But the external circumstances are not directly related to
danantaraya karma. It has a reference to the internal urge, the psychic factor
that is responsible for the act of giving charity. The external circumstances are
only occasions, which are indirectly responsible for the rise, suppression and
destruction (ksayopasamana) of the antarayakarma. The real cause is
psychological. It is the inner urge, which is the expression of anantavirya (the
infinite and inherent energy of the soul).

We also find that sometimes the circumstances are favorable, the objects are
there, still we do not get the objects. This is due to the opposition of
labhantaraya karma, which does not permit the rise of the desire of for getting
the objects. Sometimes, we may have a desire to have the object, but
circumstances may not be favorable. Similarly, in some situations all the three
factors, the desire to give, the desire to take and the object that is desired are all
present, but still we do not get the object due to some unfavorable and
accidental circumstances. In this sense, we find that the operation of the
antaraya karma is directly connected with the internal factors of the individual
and not with the objects which are external. The circumstances play an
important part in the determination of the act of possession of an important part
in the determination of the act of possession of the objects. Sometimes, the
labhantaraya karma may not have origin to express itself; even then it is
possible that we may not get the objects. In some situations even with the
operation with the rise of the labhantaraya karma, we may get the objects. The
bhogantaraya and upbhogantarya karmas are also directly related to the
inherent energy of atman and not with external things. The same position in
true about Viryantaraya.

Therefore what is primarily important is that the antaraya karma obstructs the
infinite energy of atman (ananta virya) and is not directly related to get or not
get the external things.
THE INTENSITY OF KARMIC EXPERIENCE

The intensity of the experiences of karmic fruition is primarily dependent upon

the emotional set and the operation of kasayas. If the kasayas (emotional set) is
intense, the karmic experiences will also be intense, it would give rise to papa
karma and if the kasayas are not intense the karmic experience would not be
intense, it would give rise to punya karma.

KARMA-PRADESA

An empirical individual (jiva) is constantly engaged in activity through body,

mind and speech. Due to these activities karmic particles flow into the soul and
envelop the soul. The extent of the enveloping of obscuration of the karmic
particles into the soul is referred to as karma-pradesa. The influx of the karmic
particle into the soul is distributed into eight types of karmic particles and they
envelop the soul in their own way. There is bondage. The ayu karma receives
the least of the amount of the karmic particles among those, which are glued to
the soul. Nama karma and gotra karma has a little more shares than that of ayu
karma, but equal share of the karmic flow. Jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya and
antaraya have a little more quantity of karmic particles that flow in; but they
have equal share. Mohaniya karma gets more quantity and the vedaniya karma
has still more, in other words vedaniya karma gets the greatest share. These
pradesas are again distinguished on the basis of consequential effects
(uttaraprakrti) and these varying degrees of pradesakarma depend on the
corresponding varying degrees of the influx of karmic particles of their nature.

KARMA-BANDHA

We have already seen that the karmic particles (karma varganas) pervade every
point in the universe. Individual soul is constantly in activity through the mind,
speech and body. Due to these activities motivated and accompanied by
kasayas attract infinite number of particles of karma varganas into the soul. In
the case of the ekendriyas (one-sensed organisms) influx of six directions. Bu if
there are obstructions it would have influxes from three, four or five directions.
But in the case of all other jivas the influx of karma is from all directions.1 With
reference to the ksetra (space), the jiva can attract the karmic particles from the
area where it exists itself but the karmic particles outside this sphere of
extension would not be attracted.2 We should realize that the variation in the
quantity of the influx of karma depends on the variations in the types of activity.
If the activity is slow, the influx of karmic particles also would be slow. This is
called in the agamic language, pradesabandha. In other words, the atman has
numberless pradesas (space points). On each pradesa, there would be glued
infinite number of karmic particles and pradesa, there would be glued infinite
number of karmic particles and this karma pradesa in the space point of a soul is
called pradesa bandha. The bondage and the association of karmic particles to
the soul pradesas is called pradesa bandha.1

Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! Can we say that jiva and pudgala are
intimately associated with each other in the form of bondage, close knit
association as if they are one like the water and milk?"

Bhagavana replied, Yes they are very closely bound together, and he explained
the process of pradesa bandha. "O Gautama", he said, "just as a lake is full of
water overflowing with the waves dashing against the banks and suppose a boat
with innumerable holes at the bottom and the sides is left in the water, the water
perforates into the boat and is full of water, the boat sinks, so also the soul is
bound with karmic particles and becomes one with each other.2

The karmic encrustations of the soul due to the activities of the soul creates
avarana (veil) and it obscures the knowledge, intuition, experiences of pleasure
and pain and other types of experiences on the basis of the different capacities
and original nature of the karmic particles. When the karmic particles which are
material in nature get bound to the soul, they form themselves into different
types. This is called prakrtibandha.

Prakrtibandha and pradesabandha are due to yoga and the different forms of
activity.3 The bondage of the karmic particles to the soul arising out of the yoga
only and its forms of activity can be compared to the depositing of dust particles
on a wall which is dry. They do not affect the wall and they can be blown away.
Such types of karmic bondage take place in the 11th and 12th and 13th stages of
gunasthanas. Because the normal human activity is in existence, but there is
the total absence of the passions and emotional upsets (kasaya). By this, there
is no bondage worth the name, which leads to the furtherance of samsara.

Yoga and kasaya operating together would create bondage which is more
endurable and whose effects have to experience before their freedom. This type
of bondage arising out of the yoga and passions (kasayas) is called sthitibandha.
In other words, the karmic bondage that the soul gets through jnanavarana etc.
and the duration the karmic bondage in the atma pradesa is called sthitibandha.1

The soul is by its activity and kasayas attracts karmic particles both of auspicious
and inauspicious nature. If karmic particles give rise to auspicious results it is
called auspicious karma (subhakarma); and the karmic particles giving rise to
inauspicious results is called asubhakarma. After the rise of the karma, they
experience the fruition of the karmic bondage may be in various intensities and
duration according to the nature of the karmic particles. This type of variations
is determined at the time of karmic bondage. This is called anubhagabandha.2

The karmic bondage expresses itself on appropriate occasions and at that time
there is the udaya or the rise of the karmic experiences with various intensities.
If the occasion is not appropriate the karmic particles may rise, but without
giving any fruition may disintegrate themselves as material particles. As long as
the appropriate occasions for fruition does not arise, the experience would not be
possible. The rise of the karmic particles for fruition gives rise to the experiences
of karma and the exhaustion of karma. The experiences of karma depend on the
nature of the karmic particles. For instance, jnanavaraniya karma obscures the
knowledge and darsanavaraniya karma obscures intuition and faith according to
their nature of the karmic particles and the strength. Similarly, the other types
of karmic particles create obscuration like the mohaniya and vedaniya and
caritra karma according to the strength of the karmic particles and their original
nature. There can be no alterations in the original nature of the karmic particles.

But in the case of the consequential effects of the experiences of the one karma
may be changed to the experiences and the consequential effects of the same
original karma. In other words, the karmic consequential effects (uttaraprakrti)
may be transferred and transformed. For instance, matijnanavaraniya karma
may express itself in the obscuration of srutajnana. But this type of
consequential transformation is possible in the case of similar types of karmic
particles (sajatiya), and not of dissimilar types of karmic particles. As for
instance, darsana mohaniya cannot be transformed into caritramohaniya and
vice-versa. Similarly, samyaktva vedaniya (right form of feeling karma) and
mithyatva vedaniya, consequential effects cannot be transformed. And also the
consequential effect of (uttaraprakrti) of ayukarma cannot also be transformed,
as for instance, the ayukarma of a lower animal cannot be transformed into the
ayukarma of the human being. The same is the case with other forms of
ayukarma.1

Just as there is transformation of the karmic effect on the basis of the nature of
the karmic particles, so also there is possibility of transformation of the various
karmic bondage. The karma, which has lower intensity, may be transformed into
the karma, which is of higher intensity and vice-versa.

Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! it is said by some that all the jivas
experience the karmas according to the karmic bondage that has been earned
by them. Is it true?"

Mahavira said, "O Gautama! this is not completely true, because all the jivas do
not experience the karmic experiences exactly the same way according to the
nature of the intensity of their karmic bondage. Some jivas do experience the
karmic experiences exactly according to the nature and the intensity of the
bondage. This I say, evambhutavedana. But in some cases there are
possibilities of variation of experiences due to the activity of the jiva and due to
the transformation of the bondage intensities. This is called "unevambhuta
vedana.1

Sthananga mentions four types of consequential effects of karma with reference

to its karmic particles (Karmavipaka): (1) the karmic particles may be of subha
karma (auspicious) and the consequential effects may also be subha
(auspicious), (2) the karma may be subha but its consequential effects (vipaka)
may be asubha, (3) karma may be asubha while the consequential effects may
be subha and (4) karma may be asubha and the consequential effects also may
be asubha.2

Naturally a curiosity arises as to the causes of such consequential effects--why is

it that the original karmic particles may be auspicious while the consequential
effects may be different? Jainas have attempted to give a solution to this
problem by the processes of transformation, fruition, suppression and
destruction of karmic particles. These have been called avastha (position) and
there are eleven avastha, of the relation between the nature of the karma and
the nature of the fruition of karma in varied forms.3 These states are: 1. bandha
(bondage) 2. satta (potential states) 3. udvartana (increase in the intensity) 4.
apavartana (decrease in the intensity of fruition) 5. sankramana (transformation)
6. udaya (rise) 7. udirana (premature actualization) 8. upasamana (suppression)
9. nidhatti (in which there is possibility of increasing and decreasing the intensity
of the fruition of karma but cannot be transformation and premature realization
of karmas) 10. nikacita (absence of increase or decrease or transformation or
premature realization) 11. abadhakala, the period of potentiality before
actualization.

1. Bandha--Bandha is bondage in which the karmic particles envelopes the soul

and become almost one with the soul just as the mixture of water and milk is
indistinguishable. We have already seen the four types of bandha.1
2. Satta--Satta is a state of the nature of the karmic particles attached to the
soul and they are in the state of potentiality not yet expressed. It is a state of
the soul with reference to the karma after the bondage and before the
realization of the Karman.
3. Udvartana--It refers to the increase in the intensity of the experience in the
fruits of karma this variation and increase in the intensity of the fruits of
karma depends upon the variation in the intensity of the emotional states.
4. Apavartana--This refers to the process of decreased realization and decrease
in the intensity experienced with reference to the transformation of sthiti
(duration) and anubhaga (intensity of fruition) of karma. Jainas have worked
out a complicated scheme of transformation of sthiti and anubhaga of karma.
The increased realization of ayukarma is however not possible with all the
beings, with celestial and infernal beings and the human beings in their last
existence, Chakravarti and tirthankaras.1 The increase and the decrease in the
realization of the karma is based on the nature of suppression or the
expression of karma. For instance, sometimes asubhakarma may be
accompanied by actions which are subha or subhakarma may be followed by
the actions which are inauspicious and the consequential effects of these
karmic processes are therefore, affected by the nature of the karma and the
later actions bring in different types of karma.
5. Sankramana--Sankramana is transformation of one type of karma into
another in respect of (1) its nature (2) duration (3) intensity and (4) the
strength of karmic matter. For example, asatavedaniya karma can be
transformed into satavedaniyakarma. Similarly, a person having right faith
(samyagdrsti) transforms the mithyatva karma into samyak-mithyatva karma
and samyaktva. But any karma cannot be transformed into any other karma.
 Mutual transformation is not possible in the case of darsana mohaniya and
caritramohaniya karma, nor between any two of the four sub-types of the
particular type of karma except in the cases mentioned above. A person
having wrong belief (mithyatva) cannot easily transform the mithyatva into
the mixed or samyaktva as it requires greater energy. Similarly, a person of
right belief is pure and it is not easy for him to fall back into the karmic state
of wrong belief.2 The four types of sankramana mentioned above are: (1)
prakrti sankramana, (2) sthiti sankramana, (3) anubhaga sankramana and (4)
pradesa sankramana.3
6. Udaya--It is the rise of the karma in the process of fruition. When the karma
rises and after giving its fruits become transformed into mere particles of
matter. It is phalodaya. But sometimes without giving fruits, the karma gets
disintegrated into particles of matter, and it is destroyed. It is called
pradesodaya.
7. Udirana--It is a premature realization of the karma. Karma does not
immediately bear fruit as soon as it is bound. It arises after the period of
potentiality or the period of non-production, which is called abadhakala. And
it continues to operate till it fructifies fully. But it is not possible to make a
defined predicational rule about udirana. However, in the normal course of
thing udirana is possible in the case of the same type of karma, which is in
operation.
8. Upasamana--This is the process of the suppression of karma, before it bears
effect. Upasamana is possible where there is possibility of udvartana and
apavartana and transformation (sankramana). Upasamana is only
suppression and not destruction of the karma in producing its effects, just as
the burning embers of fire produced by coal are covered by ashes and they
are prevented from giving their full effects of the fire. But as soon as the
ashes covering the embers of fire are removed the effect of fire is felt in its
intensity, so also the suppressed karma has to get itself exhausted and
produce its effects in varying degrees after the process of suppression no
longer operates.
9. Nidhatti--It is the process by which karma is made incapable of all processes
except udvartana and apavartana--increased and decreased realization.
Under certain conditions the karmic particles are so intensely glued that it
becomes impossible to affect them in any way except by increase or
decreased realisation.1
10. In the Nikacita even these processes are impossible. In this case the
duration, intensity and strength of the karma are determined by the very time
of the bondage of karma. Jiva is bound to suffer the fruition of this type of
karma.
11. Abadhakala--Abadhakala is the duration of the karmic state form the time
of its bondage to the time of fruition. The extent of the abadhakala has been
measured with reference to the extent of the duration of the type of karma.
Generally, the ratio is one hundred years to one sagaropama period of time of
its fruition as the original karma. For example, maximum duration of the
jnanavaraniya karma is thirty crores of crores sagaropama. And the
abadhakala will be measured as three thousand years. In the Bhagavati, we
get the calculations about the periods of abadhakala of the 8 types of karma.1
 In the Prajnapana also there is the calculation about the extent of the
abadhakala with reference to the consequential effects of the original karma.2

The Jainas have made a systematic study of the theory of karma. The Jaina
contribution to the theory of karma is unique. In the Yogasutra of Patanjali,
there is the mention of the consequential effects of the fruition of the different
karma. Yoga darsana mentions three such types, as: (1) niyatavipaki, in this the
karma gets expression at a determined time, gives fruit and exhausts. (2)
aniyatavipaki, this refers to the process of the transformation of one type of
karma with the similar type of karma or the sub-type of karma. These three
concepts of Yogadarsana may be compared to the Jaina concept nikacita,
pradesodaya and sankramana.

KARMA AND REBIRTH

The subject of rebirth is very closely associated with the doctrine of karma. The
two are basal pre-supposition of Indian thought. They are postulates of Indian
thoughts. Rebirth is a corollary of the principle of karma. If karma is fully
exhausted, the series of births will come to an end; but it is not possible to
exhaust all the karma that has been accumulated in one single life. The karma
that we have accumulated in the past gives rise to various births. It is a cycle of
existence and rebirth.3 Rebirth is very closely associated with the karma and jiva.
The karma of the past life is responsible for the present life.1 Karma of the
present life will be responsible for the future life. The accretion of karma, as
karmic particles of ayu karma enter the soul which is responsible in various ways
for determining the states of existence in the succeeding life, the length of life
and the status of the individual in all its different lives.2 Bhagavana Mahavira said
that passion like krodha (anger), mana (egoity), maya (deceit) and lobha (greed)
are the root cause of the cycle of births.3 In the Bhagavadgita we get an
analogical description about rebirth and the chain of birth. As a man takes out
the old clothes and wears the new one, similarly the soul casts away the worn
out body and takes on a new body, after death.4 This is possible through the
process of "avartana" (transference).5 The Tathagata Buddha once explained
that the pricks of the thorn that he suffered were due to the violence and injuries
caused to a human being in his ninety-one previous life.6

The newborn infant expresses various emotions like joy, fear and sorrow. These
are primarily due to its memories in the past life.7 The new infants, the moment
it is born, starts sucking the milk from the mother's breast. This is due to its
learning and habits that it had acquired in the past life.8 As the young boy grows
into a youth similarly the jiva enters a new life and the body, and grows, into full
stature.9 The new born in fact experiences pleasure and pain and expresses
various emotions. All these can be traced to the disposition (samskaras)
acquired by the infant from its previous lie due to the heritage of its karmas may
call it collective unconscious, the racial-unconscious as Jung has said as
equivalent to karma. These are due to the samskaras dragged on from previous
life. In this way, the Indian philosophers have adduced arguments and have
tried to show that the rebirth is a fact of life. The soul gets involved in the wheel
of life, (samsara) and is born and reborn in different existences.

As we said earlier, the karma and rebirth are basal pre-suppositions. If we do not
accept the theory of karma, rebirth cannot be explained and rebirth can be
explained only on the basis of the principle of karma. If rebirth were not to be
accepted as a fact principle of life, it would be difficult to explain the prevalent
inequality in this world and the experiences of various types of existences in this
life and in this world without reference to karma.

The western philosophers also were not unaware of doctrine of rebirth although
this doctrine was largely ignored in the western thought. Pythogoras was aware
of the principle of the rebirth. Plato said that the soul always weaves new
garment. The soul has a natural strength, which will hold out and is born many
times. Schopenhaur explicitly mentions the doctrine of rebirth and said that the
doctrine has relevance for explaining the concept of distribution. He said that it
is at once obvious to everyone who hears of the rebirth for the first time.

The Jainas have given an elaborate study of the doctrine of rebirth as based on
the karma theory. There re four states of existence: the human, the lower
animal, the heavenly being, and the infernal world. The soul moves one to the
other according to its desserts. The karma that it has accumulated determines
its existence and status in the next life. The time gap between the death in a
particular life and rebirth in the next life is called antarakala. This duration of
time varies from one, to three or four samayas. In the antarakala the gross
physical body has already been left, jiva is without the gross physical body and is
seeking to get into the new body. This process of movement from the old body
to the new body is called "antarala gati". This may be "rju" (short and direct)
and vakra (curved and indirect). The direction of the movement depends upon
its previous performance. If the direction is straight and direct it is rjugati. If the
direction of the movement is uneven and indirect, it is called vakragati. The
direct movement (rjugati) requires one samaya and the least effort on the part of
the jiva to enter from the previous to the next life. When the soul departs from
the previous body it acquires the speed of that body and it darts of to its next
destination like an arrow. In the case of the curved direction it has to make
certain efforts. When the soul reaches the point of curve the previous body is to
some extent arrested, then the jiva has to depend on the energy of the suksma
(subtle) karmic body. The time required for traversing the distance from one
birth to another birth in the next body depends on the number of curves in the
direction of the next body. If there is only one curve it will require two samayas.
If there are two curves it requires three samayas and if there are three curves, it
requires four samayas. Generally, the universe is extended in three directions
like: upward, downward and crosswise in the case of tiryak gati (lower animals).

The soul requires two samayas in its movement generally from the direction of
the upper world to the lower world. In the upper world (Urdhvaloka), it takes the
direction of the eastern side and the lower world it turns to the direction of the
western world. In the case of the duration of the three samayas for the
movement there are two turns. One is northeastern direction and the other
southwest direction. In the first samaya it moves in the direction of the lower
world, in the second samaya it takes a turn towards the western and in the third
samaya there is turn to the north-western side.

In the case of the duration of the time in the movement upto four samaya there
would be three turns. First, it moves towards the lower world, then turns
towards the southwestern side, then towards the western side and lastly
northwestern side. This movement in different directions is called "tri-vakra
catuh samayiki".

In all these cases the movement of the jiva is with the help of the suksmasarira
(subtle body), as the gross body is no longer. But the gross body will be created
in the next life with samskara and with the help of the subtle body and the
energy available. According to the karma there when the jiva casts off one body
and moves towards the direction of assuming the next body it is guided and
directed by anupurvinama karma. This type of karma is like the row that
controls the movement of the bullock. However, in the case of the movement
from the earlier to the next body in the straight direction (rjugati), there is no
need for any guiding anupurvinamakarma. During the movement only the
taijasa (electria) and karmana (karmic) body accompany. Audarika and vaikriya
bodies are created freshly for the new life on the basis of its samskaras.

A pertinent question has been raised regarding the absence of the sense organs
during the movement of the jiva from the previous body towards the formation
of the new life. The question is asked, if the gross body is not there, there would
be no sense organs and if the sense organs are not there, there would be no
cognition or sensing of the direction. In that case how can the jiva proceed its
journey in proper way?

The answer to this question has been given from the point of view of anekanta.
Bhagavana Mahavira says it is true that there are no physical sense organs
(dravyendriya). But the functions of the sense organs are not altogether lost.
They are expressed through taijasa and karmana sarira, just as the modern
machines like the aeroplane are controlled by electric motivations through the
computers. We can, therefore, say during the movement of the jiva from one
body to the other, there may not be the physical sense organs, but there is the
presence of the psychic sense organs.

THE PATH TOWARDS MOKSA

The Indian philosophers, except the Carvaka, accept the moksa as the highest
ideal and they have shown the way to moksa. The path to moksa given by
different Indian philosophers may give different emphasis on one or the other
aspect of the cognitive, the affective and he creative functions. For instance,
Sankhya darsana and the Advaita Vedanta give emphasis on jnana marga, while
Ramanuja and others emphasize the bhakti-marga. Caritra is also given
importance, in the way to attain to moksa. However, all are agreed that the
karma has to be removed and the soul to be purified in order to attain moksa.
The soul can be purified by penance and meditation etc., as the ore of the gold
has to be purified through various processes, like--heating etc. But the Jainas
have not given only exclusive importance to the jnana-marga as is done in the
case of Sankhya, Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism, nor it does emphasize
exclusively the kriyakanda, the pathway through activity and ritualism, as is
emphasized by the Purvamimamsa. But the Jainas say that jnana and kriya
(caritra) are both necessary for the moksamarga. There should be a synthesis of
both these.1 Jnana with caritra would be necessary. Even if the Jnana were less,
but caritra were to be emphasized, then it would be a way to moksa. But
knowledge without caritra, however great it may be, will not lead to the highest
end of perfection.2 Acarya Bhadrabahu says that knowledge without good
conduct may be compared to a donkey carrying sandal wood.3

The Jainas contend that the pathway to perfection lies in the synthesis and the
harmony of the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct.4
In the agamas, we find that the pathway to perfection is through samyagjnana,
samyagdarsana, samyagcaritra and tapas.5 There are only terminological
differences in the expression regarding the pathway to perfection. The
perfection and the general contention is that right knowledge, right intuition and
right conduct would be necessary as moksamarga.

Gautama, the Buddha, gave importance to the stoppage of karmic bondage

(samvara) as the first step to Nirvana. Jainas also give importance to samvara.6
Acarya Hemacandra says that just as a house with many windows and doors kept
open attracts dust from all the directions, so also activities of the jiva bring about
karmic particles. The first step therefore is to close these doors and windows so
that the fresh karmic particles do not enter the jiva. This is, as we have already
seen, the process of samvara. We have also seen that the process of samvara
can be compared to the stoppage of the inflow of water into the tank through the
different inlets. For the sake of cleaning the tank we have first to stop the water,
so that the fresh inflow of water is not possible. Samvara is such a process of
the stoppage of the influx of karma through varied channels.1 Once the influx of
karma is stopped through the stoppage of the influx i.e., through samvara, next
step would be to remove the karma that is already collected into the soul and
that is process of nirjara. This process may be compared to the cleaning of the
accumulated water in a tank. One who seeks to attain moksa had also to clean
the accumulated karma,2 and the removal of karma from the jiva pradesa is
called Nirjara.3

When all the karmas are removed the atman reaches perfection4 and the
liberated. Once the karmas are removed and the atman reaches perfection,
fresh karma would not enter into the soul, just as the fried seeds do not sprout.5

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION

The Jaina contribution of the theory of karma is significant. It has developed a

scientific theory of karma with its emphasis on the atomic nature of karma as
karmavargana and with its elaborate scientific description of the processes of
karma. Maxmuller says that karma theory has influenced mankind to a great
extent. When we know that our present actions are due to the effects performed
in the past and that our present actions will be responsible for the future life, we
become more conscious of the distinctions between the virtue and vice and we
face the difficulties of life with equanimity of mind. We strive to become good.1

Karma is infact a striking answer to the 'fathomless injustice to the nature of

things, and it appeals to the overpowering strength of the necessity of justice.
The conception of an all controlling law of natural distribution which links
together successive earth lives of each individual soul both satisfied by sense of
justice and through light on the problem of seemingly unmerited suffering.2

Having discussed the arguments and counter-arguments of the logical

justification of the doctrine of karma, we may say that from the real point of view
(niscaya naya) logical justification of the doctrine of karma is neither possible nor
necessary. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the
seers.3
PART 5

Jaina Darsana and the Philosophies of the World

Philosophies of the World: A Study

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the two traditions, i.e., the Vedic and the
Sramana traditions. The Vedic tradition advocates the authority of the Vedas. It
is traditionalistic and rationalistic and approaches. The Sramana tradition does
not accept the authority of the Vedas. It is empiricist in outlook and analytic in
its methodology. It is based upon the experiences of the seers for its
fundamental truths and the empirical experiences for the understanding of the
phenomenal world.

The Jaina tradition advocates authority of the teachings of the Tirthankaras as

presented through the agamas not because it is the final word of the Tirthankara
but because of their omniscient experiences which have been transmitted to the
disciples and which has been codified through the sutragama. The Veda-darsana
and the teachings of the Upanisads belong to the Vedic tradition. Later systems
of philosophy like the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga; Purvamimamsa and
Vedanta belong to the Vedic tradition. The philosophy of the Vedic tradition is
also considered to be orthodox systems of philosophy and are called "astika
darsana", primarily because they accept the authority of the Vedas and also
because they believe in the creator God, and therefore atheistic. Buddhism,
Jainism and Carvaka darsanas belong to the sramanic tradition or avedic
tradition (non-vedic).

VEDIC THOUGHT

The earliest presentation of Indian thought can be traced to the Vedas. The
Rgveda is the earliest document, which is supposed to be philosophical in
content. The main problems of Vedic aryans were concerned with the worldly
problems. Their outlook was to live a happy life in this world. The Vedas contain
hymns addressed to the gods for getting the benefits of the world. Occasionally,
the Vedic seers have expressed flashes of philosophical insights.

The main problem connected with philosophical study in the Vedic speculation
was cosmic. A pertinent question was asked: 'What is the source of this
Universe?' This was presented with reference to the many Gods who were
personalized forces of nature. In these discussions, we may however trace the
philosophical development in the Rgveda in the direction of thought from 1.
naturalistic polytheism to 2. monotheism in which the conception of henotheism
as suggested by Maxmuller may also be included, and 3. monism. Naturalistic
polytheism was the first current of philosophical thought. The phenomena of
nature were symbolized as Gods and they were worshipped. For instance,
Varuna was the sky God. Mitra his companion. Surya is the sun God. Savitra is
the solar God and there were a host of many other Gods-about three hundred
and thirty three was worshipped.

There was the idea of Rta. It was the conception of the order in the universe. It
is a cosmic principle. Varuna is considered to be the custodian of this principal
and it has been suggested that the doctrine of karma developed from the
principle of Rta. From the naturalistic polytheism, evolved the monotheistic
tendency. As we have seen earlier, Maxmuller mentions little intermediate stage
of henotheistic tendency, by which one God became prominent for sometime.
The highest position was granted to Visvakarman in the Rgveda at a later stage.
Similarly, Prajapati attained the highest rank.

Monotheism developed out of the tendency of the philosophic mood of the Vedic
seers. In the contemplative mood, the seers asked some pertinent questions:
'What is the source of this universe? and who has been the first born?'. These
questions lead to the philosophic development of monotheism. The philosophers
and the Rgveda presented the monistic thought in their one famous statement:
The ultimate reality is one and the wise calls it by many names.1

The Upanisads developed contemplative philosophy, presented rich, and varied

philosophic theories. There are 108 Upanisads. Of them, eleven are important
on which Sri Sankaracarya has written commentaries. The Upanisads state the
divine and mystic contemplation about the ultimate principle of life. The idea of
one God, a supreme and the principle of Rta were helpful in the development of
philosophic thought in the monistic and absolutist direction. The fundamental
philosophical concept of the Upanisads is the identity with the atman and the
Brahman; all else is the appearance. This is the cardinal principle of the
Upanisads. The idea of self has been discussed in different Upanisads in
different aspects. In the dialogues between Yajnavalkya and Janaka and
between Prajapati and Indra, we find the progressive development of the
definition of the self. Similarly, in the Katha Upanisad we find the description of
the self as the charioteer and the body as the chariot. Similar idea is to be found
in Plato's conception of the soul.

In the Bhagavadgita, we get a beautiful synthesis of the triple path of knowledge

(jnana), performance of duty (karma marga) and devotion (bhakti-marga) for the
attainment of the highest and self-realization. The Bhagavadgita also gives the
encyclopedic information about the duty and responsibilities of the secular life.
It is, therefore, a compendium of the harmony of the secular and the spiritual.

CARVAKA DARSANA
Carvaka darsana is non-Vedic in its tradition. It is materialistic in approach. It
refutes the arguments for the existence of God and of the authority of the Vedas.
Its fundamental approach is secular, as this is worldly. It is difficult to give a list
of authentic documents of the Carvaka darsana, as the description of this school
of thought is mainly found in other schools of Indian philosophy. The
fundamental epistemological stand of the Carvaka is: Pratyaksa is the only
pramana. Sense experience is the only source of knowledge. All other sources
of knowledge are not valid. Therefore, what is available through the sense
organs and what can be verified through the sense experience is alone real. All
else is illusion. Therefore, the cardinal injunction of the Carvaka is "to seek
pleasure, for tomorrow we die". "There is neither a permanent soul nor heaven
nor hell; why fret about them, if today be sweet".

"When the body is destroyed nothing remains. Therefore, we should seek

pleasure as long as we live".1

JAINA DARSANA

The Jaina philosophy is realistic and pluralistic. It is empiricist in its

methodology. Jaina presents the seven categories, which may be considered
metaphysic-spiritual category. The jiva and ajiva constitute the universe. Jiva is
active and due to the activity of the jiva, the karmic particles enter into the soul
and obscure right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct. This obscuration
and association of karma with the jiva is beginningless, but it has an end. When
the jiva gets free from karmic matter, it gains its purity and perfection, which is
its real nature. That stage is the stage of perfection, the moksa stage. This
stage can be attained by triple path, as samyagdarsana, jnana and caritra. The
doctrine of anekanta and ahimsa are the fundamental principles of metaphysics
and ethics. The principle of atman, karmavada, nayavada, niksepavada,
pramanyavada, saptabhangi and anekanta are the foundation pillars of Jaina
philosophy.

BAUDDHA DARSANA

Buddhism also belongs to the sramana current of thought. Buddhism is a

religion preached by the Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama. In his first sermon at
Varanasi, the Buddha presented his philosophy to his five disciples. That is
called dharmacakra paravartana. He said that we should follow the madhyama
marga (the middle path). The fundamental philosophy of the Buddha can be
presented in two principles: the four noble truths and the eight-fold path. Dukha
is the first noble truth; dukha samudayah is the second noble truth. It is the
cause of suffering and explains this with reference to the theory of causation of
pratityasamutpada. Dukhanirodha is the nirvana and this is the third noble
truth. Dukhanirodha marga is the fourth noble truth; it gives a transcendental
self. The self, what we call the atman is not real and what we call the atman is
only a collection or an aggregate of five states; physical and mental. It is the
skandha of these states: 1. vijnana, 2. vedana, 3. samjna 4. samskara and 5.
rupa. There is nothing more than this. This he calls the namarupa.1

Thus we find the foundational principle of Buddhism is dukha, and the ultimate
aim is dukha nirodha or nirvana.

It is difficult to say what he meant by nirvana, although it has very often been
interpreted as a state of nothingness. The origin of suffering arises out of our
attachment to the various things of life, craving for the things of life.2 Every thing
is in a flux and nothing is permanent. It is all a temporary and in a flux. The
highest end is the attainment of the state of nirvana, which is freedom from the
state of misery.3

SANKHYA & YOGA DARSANA

Sankhya and Yoga philosophy are complementary to each other. Sankhya

presents the metaphysical side while the Yoga according to Patanjali is the
methodical effort to attain perfection, through the control of different elements
of human nature, physical and psychical. Cittavrttinirodha is the cardinal
principle of Yoga. The Sankhya metaphysics is accepted by Yoga and Sankhya
philosophers largely accept the Yoga methodology. The Sankhya is dualistic. It
posits the two ultimate principles: 1. purusa and 2. prakrti. Purusa is passive, it is
pure consciousness. Prakrti is active, but unconscious. Prakrti is the primordial
matter and purusa is the self. Sankhya postulates the plurality of self. The
Sankhya theory of the evolution of the universe is presented in the light of the
association of prakrti with purusa. When the prakrti is in the proximity or in
contact with purusa, activity starts. Then there are disturbances in the
equilibrium of the three gunas--sattva and rajas and tamas. These disturbances
give rise to the various principles of the universe like mahat, ahamkara, manas,
the five-sense-organs and five motor-organs; the five elements (panca
tanmatras). Thus evolution consists of the twenty-five principles including the
purusa. The ultimate ideal for the purusa is to realize. The Yoga presents the
practical path for this realization of purusa to attain its own pure nature. The
Yoga gives eight-fold practical path in which 1. yama and 2. niyama are the
ethical background and 3. asana 4. pranayama and 5. pratyahara are the
physicopsycholoical preparation, 6. dhyana and 7. dharana are psychic
exercises, 8. Samadhi is the culmination and the psychic process of the highest
realization. This is the astanga marga.

NYAYA-VAISESIKA DARSANA

The Nyaya and Vaisesika darsanas are also complementary to each other. The
Nyaya gives logic and epistemology; while Vaisesika presents metaphysics. The
Nyaya is also called pramanasastra, because it presents the theory of pramanas.
According to Gautama, there are four pramanas: 1. pratyaksa, 2. anumana, 3.
upamana and 4. sabda pramana. Nyaya is theistic in its approach. It accepts the
creator God. The Vaisesika gives the theory of atomism and the fundamental
self-category like 1. dravya (substance). 2. guna (attribute), 3. karma (activity) 4.
samanya (generality) 5. visesa (particularity 6. samavaya (inherence) and 7.
abhava (non-existence). The Nyaya-Vaisesika ideal is also to attain moksa,
which is called apavarga. This is possible by the highest knowledge of the
padarthas and by removing ignorance.

MIMAMSA & VEDANTA DARSANA

Mimamsa and Vedanta darsanas are also related to each other very closely.
Mimamsa is considered to be karmakanda, while Vedanto is concerned with the
knowledge of the Brahman. The object of the Purvamimamsa is to help and
support the situations for the attainment of salvation in two ways: 1. by giving
methodology of interpretation with the help of which complicated Vedic
injunctions regarding the rituals may be understood and 2. by giving
philosophical justifications of the beliefs on which ritualism depend.
Radhakrishnan says that the aim of the Purvamimamsa is to examine the nature
of dharma. It is practical in the sense. It prepares the ground for the
performance of the Vedic injunction. This is based on the Purvamimamsa
epistemology wherein six pramana have been mentioned: the four as given by
the Nyaya-Vaisesika and other are arthapatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi.

The Vedanta darsana emphasizes the identity of the Brahman and the self. The
cardinal principle of Advaita Vedanta of Sankara is the identity of the Brahman
and atman and the ultimate ideal is the merger of the Brahman and atman.
Ramanuja emphasizes the merger of the atman with the Brahman and not the
identity. The dualistic Vedanta (dvaita) advocates the reality of the atman and
Brahman even in the highest stage of moksa.

Thus, we find the cardinal and the foundational principle of all Indian thoughts is
1.the fact of misery and 2.the ideal of attainment of the state of freedom from
misery and attainment of perfection. The Carvaka system alone is
phenomenalistic in its approach, and does not accept the trans-empirical reality.

The concept of atman is one of the cardinal principles of all Indian thought,
except the Carvaka and in a sense of the nihilistic aspect of Buddhism. Thus we
find that there is much common ground between the various systems of Indian
philosophy. We should also realize that the ancient Indian thought was catholic
in outlook. This can be very clearly evidenced by the fact that Carvaka was the
status of a darsana.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Early Greek philosophy is also sufficiently ancient. We may consider the

development of Greek philosophy from the seventh century B.C. to the 4th
century B.C. The early beginning of Greek philosophers were still groping to find
out the ultimate source of the universe in some physical phenomenon. When
Mahavira and the Buddha were preaching in India, Greek philosophy was in its
infancy. The early Greek philosophers were primarily concerned with the inquiry
regarding the ultimate source of the universe. They sought to find out in some
ultimate substance of this universe.

The earliest philosophers Thales said that water is the source of the universe.
Aleximander traced it to the unlimited and Aleximander said that air is the
source of the universe.

There were two currents of thought, which developed after the Ionic
philosophers. They are the Electicus and the later philosophers who preached
the doctrine of flux like Heraclitus. Promenades said that reality "is". It is being
and changes is the appearance while Heraclitus advocated that change alone is
real, and the being or permanence is unreal. He said we couldn't step into the
same water again. Heraclitus was called "Heraclitus the dark", because his
sayings were obscure. Then came the philosophers like Democrats to preach the
doctrine of elements and also the atomists. Pythogoras was a mystic. The
Indian mystics perhaps influenced him. He talked of the rebirth and the
influences of our action on the future life.

This was a stage of naturalist philosophy. But intellectualists at that time were
aware to seek the ultimate reality in some phenomenal source. Various theories,
sometimes conflicting, created confusion in the minds of the thinkers. There was
intellectual chaos. This was reflected in the philosophy of the sophists, who
made knowledge relative and subjective. Protogroras said "Homo mensura"-
"man is the measure of all thins". We cannot get objective criteria of reality.
The sophists brought philosophy to the brink of extinction when they said that
nothing can be known and anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.

This was the stage of intellectual chaos when Socrates came on the screen.
From the period of Socrates onwards the search for the ultimate reality was
inwards. Socrates was convinced that philosophy consists not in the knowledge
of the external world, but in the knowledge of the self. "Know thyself" was the
cardinal principle of the Socratic teaching. Socrates said knowledge is virtue and
virtues are knowledge. Knowledge and virtue are convertible terms. Socrates
was a simple man. He did not write any book but he discussed philosophy with
the intellectual of his time sitting in the market of the Athens. He had many
great disciples and one of them was Plato.

Plato was an aristocrat. He hated democracy. The ideal state is the "Republic' in
which the philosophers should be the king. The philosopher-king should have
very simple and virtuous life and guide the destinies of the nation entirely for the
good of the people. He made a distinction between the different classes on the
basis of the function, like-the guardian class, the soldier class and that function
was to obey i.e., the workers class.

Plato's political and social philosophy was based on metaphysical structure of the
decrease of reality. The idea is real. It is perfect, it is eternal and it is simple.
The things of the world are the imitations of the objects in the physical world.
Ideas participate in the physical object and to the extent, to which ideas
participate, they are real.

Aristotle was Plato's disciple. It can be said that Aristotle gave the first lessons of
rationalistic philosophy, which synthesize the idealism and rationalism to some
extent. Aristotle said that there are two fundamental principles of the universe:
1. Form and 2. Matter. Both of them are abstract principles. The phenomenal
world is the expression of form and matter. Form is potentiality and matter is
actuality.

Aristotle was a genius and he wrote books on many subjects like Philosophy,
Mathematics, Astronomy, etc. It is said all the later philosophies are nothing but
footnotes to the philosophy of Aristotle.

After Aristotle, philosophy in the west declined. The authority of Aristotle was so
great that he was referred to as the only greatest authority and no development
in philosophy took place till the end of the middle age. The Middle Ages were the
dark ages.

Revival of philosophical speculation was to be found in the rationalist and

empiricist schools in modern philosophy beginning with Descartes as a great
rationalist and Locke as great empiricist. In Kant, we get a synthesis again. Kant
is considered to have brought a Copernican revolution in philosophy and later
philosophers like Bradley built a structure of the idealistic philosophy. Recent
philosophy has gone off the tangent with logical positives and the analytical
schools.

ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY

Arabic philosophy can be considered to have started with prophet Mohamed.

Before the birth of Hazarat Mohamed, there were three different deities: 1. Lat 2.
Lajja and 3. Manat. There are three religious currents as that time. The Jews
were the followers of Moses. The Christians were the followers of Jesus. These
two religious were infact outside religions influencing the Arabic world. These
religions were not indigenous to the Arabic world. The Arabs had their own
religious practices. They worshipped different deities in Makka. In this way, the
Arabic world was full of many religious currents and men were practicing various
faiths. The Arabs were neither united for affluent at that time. Jewish people
were known for their trade and the use of horses and camels and Arabia was
famous for dates. There was trade with other countries, which was carried
through the seas from their ports. Hazarat Mohamed gave the Holy Kuran. It is
simple but very significant. Even an uneducated man can understand and
practice righteousness, following its teachings.

When the people of Arabia came in contact with other countries because of their
trade, there was the interaction of philosophical and religious thoughts. Because
of that, different traditions developed like: 1. "Motajala tradition". 2. Karami
tradition and 3. Asari tradition. All the Arabic current of thought former of
Motajala tradition was based on faith and does not permit differences of opinion
and philosophic speculation. So this may be considered to be a religious
tradition. But later the devotees of Motajala tradition introduced philosophical
discussion and so Motajala tradition in Islam is the first philosophic tradition built
on the basis of this new light.

The cardinal principles of the Islamic philosophy can be mentioned in five

principles:
1. The self (jiva) is free to do activity (karma). It need not be considered to be a
slave of any other higher beings. To believe that the activities of living beings
are determined by other higher being and to punish them would be injustice.
2. God is omnipotent and great and the world has good and evil alike. God is
the symbol of the good and not of the evil. Therefore, God does not elevate
his creatures to heaven or punish them to hell.
3. Like other Muslims the Motajala tradition considers this world as a creation of
God. The creation is out of nothing (abhava). In this connection, it is against
the Aristotelian conception of creation.
4. The Motajala tradition considers Kuran as the sacred book written as a
particular time. In this sense, it has a beginning. Unlike the orthodox
Muslims, it does not accept the beginningless nature of the Kuran.
5. The Motajala tradition brought about a synthesis between the orthodoxy as
presented in the authority of the sacred texts and the function of reason. It
also did not accept certain orthodox beliefs.

THE SUFI TRADITION

The term 'Sufi' comes from the Greek word "Sophi". It means 'Wisdom'. In the
8th century A.D., the works in Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic and
the Sufi tradition developed in the Arabia on the basis of the Greek philosophy
concerning mysticism. For the first time, the Suri epithet was given to Abu
Hasim who died in 770 A.D. At the time of Paigambar and other philosophers
who were preaching at that time were considered to be as phiasts (sahava or
companion) and even after Paigambar these were remembered by this name.

The Muslim philosophers have used the term Sufi in different senses. It has been
said that the Sufi philosophers were those who renounced everything for the
sake of realizing the God. It has also been said that life and death are all
dependent on God. The Sufi philosophers were same and they spend their life
for the practice of the self-realization. According to the Sufi philosophy, man is a
part of God or an aspect of God. The highest realization consists in the merger
of the self with God. It comes nearer to the vedantic conception, especially of
Ramanuja, where he advocates the merger of the self in the Brahman in the
highest state of self-realization. The Sufi philosophers presented the practical
path of self-realization, which contains elements of Patanjala Yoga. They say,
that the realization is possible through the practice of dhyana (contemplation)
and absorption in the God. It is analogous to the stages in dhyana, dharana and
samadhi of the Patanjala Yoga. Sufism is more a philosophy than a religion.
Mansur is supposed to the founder and propagator of Sufism. He is to pronounce
and repeat the prayer "Anal-huq" meaning; 'I am the God'. This concept is
analogous to the Advaitic concept of the identity of the atman and the Brahman
(aham brahmasmi). As we have seen earlier, the word Sufi has its Greek origin
and it also meals "wool", and "standing in line". The ancient mystics practiced
the ascetic practices using wool directly touching the body. Since they were
using suff (wool) they were known as Sufis. The other meaning which is popular
is "standing in line". The Sufi mystics practiced asceticism by standing and
concentrating with other practices like pranayama.

The Sufi mystic, Malik Mohammed Jayasi has given his famous discourse on the
aspect of love in his Padmavata which is described as divine and is primarily
spiritual.

MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

We have seen that after Aristotle, philosophy was stagnant for sometime. The
Middle Ages were dark ages and whatever philosophy developed was merely
theological. Subsequently, philosophical inquiry started with the scientific spirit
became prominent. In the Middle Ages, philosophy was sustaining itself under
the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. But in modern
western philosophy, we find the revival of the spirit of inquiry. This spirit
expressed itself in two directions: 1. deductive rationalistic inquiry based on
deductive and mathematical methods, and 2. empiricist inquiry which is founded
on experience and analysis of common sense.

In the modern age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From
the Cozito, ergo, sum he went on toe heaven and looked at the physical world
with compliments, which is indeed, away from that of the common sense.
Descartes split the world into two substances and postulated a God separate
from each of them. He arrived at the conception of the self on the basis of his
method of "doubt". He doubted everything but he could not doubt himself.
However, his skepticism was only a means to an end and not an end in itself.
Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between the God and the world on
the basis of mathematical deduction. The result was Spinoza's substances
became a lion's dens to which all the tracks lead and from which none returned.
Leibnitz continued the rationalistic tradition and arrived at metaphysical fantasy,
in presenting his theory of monds. God was for him, the monadus-monadum.
The empiricist philosopher used a posteriori and inductive methods. In the
Theavatatus, Socrates explains the protogoran doctrine that knowledge is
through sense-experience. English empiricism repeats the logical movement,
but does not save itself from its own conclusion of skepticism. We can see the
empiricist's method steadily marching from Locke, Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley
denied matter and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid,
summing up the English Empiricist movement, states that ideas first introduced
for explaining the operation of the human understanding, under mind,
everything by themselves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag
to cover them".1 Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go no
further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, claimed to have brought

Copernican revolution in philosophy. Empiricism faced the blind wall of
skepticism and phenomenalism wile rationalistic philosophy built up a
philosophical fantasy in the theory of spiritual monds. Kant's was a critical
philosophy. He wanted to examine the instrument of understanding. And he
came to the conclusion that categories of understanding can at best explain the
phenomenal world. The noumenal can be understood by practical reason. His
critique of Pure Reason led to his critique of practical reason and judgement.
Hegel gave dialectic of reason and for him the real was the rational. Later
philosophers like Bradley and Bosanquet built a structure of philosophy, which
can be called the absolutist philosophy. They rested in the absolute.

But the Cambridge philosophers, to the brink of extinction have recently revised
the Human tendency. Wittgenstein's Tractatus discusses the problem of
meaning, the nature of logic, facts and proposition and the task of philosophy.
He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies and logical proofs are only
mechanical devises for recognizing the categories. Mathematics consists of
equation and the proposition of Mathematics is without sense. The
metaphysician talks non-sense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not
understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like a
composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his
attitude towards the aim of philosophy.1 Bertrand Russell writes that the
influence the Tractatus made on him "was not wholly good", and the philosophy
of the "philosophical investigations" remains to him completely unintelligible.2
Logical positivism is the philosophical movement emanating from the "Vieana
Circle". Logical positivists explain that they have completely overthrown
speculative philosophy.3 Philosophy to them is only logical analysis; not a theory,
but an activity. Its function is analysis, logical classification of concepts,
proposition and theories proper to empirical science. Thus philosophy was
identified with the logical syntax; the higher level discussion of language and it is
important non-sense. Philosophy classes are converted into super-grammar
classes.

Thus a survey of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy faced continually
in past of the conflict between the consequences of the priori methods and
empiricists faverish denial of metaphysics. To save philosophy from this impose
we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problem of philosophy. We should
realize that reality is complex and life is a many-colored door. Idealism was
unable to see the trees in the wood while realism could not see the wood in the
tree.1 These two ways of approaching the problems were exclusive and absolute
ways and to realize this point that both these ways are partially view of the
synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and to see the
solution of the problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of the doctrine.2
The Jaina view of anekanta steers clear of the conflicting existence of extremes
of empiricism, which resulted in the metaphysical impossibility and of
rationalism, which resulted in the philosophical fantasies of absolutism. The
Jaina view asserts that the truth is many-sided and it can be looked at different
angles. The Whitehead's fundamental attitude of philosophy is essentially the
same as the Jaina anekanta view when he presented the theory of coherence.

THE NEW AGE IN THE INDIAN THOUGHT

The culmination of the vedantic philosophy is to be found in the age of Madhva.

Later philosophy emphasizes not so much the karma-marga, nor the jnana-
marga, but the bhakti-marga. The influence of the Muslim conquest of India
brought a cultural impact on the philosophical traditions in India. The idol
worship was gradually replaced by contemplation and devotional song. In the
15th century A.D., Kabirdas was against the idol worship. The influence of this
tendency could be traced in the Jaina tradition also in the thought and practices
of the Sthanakvasi tradition. In Saurastra, Dayanand Sarasvati was against the
worship of idol and it developed into Arya Samaj. In Bengal, witnessed a
renaissance in the Brahmasamaj and Prarthanasamaj. Swami Vivekananda gave
a new interpretation to the absolute idealism of Vedanta, with reference to the
social and political problems. Dr. Radhakrishnan adopts a synoptic interpretation
of the universal application of the vedantic conception to the problems of
philosophy. Bala Gangadhara Tilak presented the karmayoga in his
interpretation of the Bhagavadgita, in the Gitarahasya. Sri Aurobindo built a
super structure of mystic philosophy presenting the concept of superannuated
consciousness and the evolution of the matter into spirit from men to supermen.
Mahatma Gandha spiritualized politics. We find fresh scholars like Pt. Sukhalalji
and Dalsukha Malavania giving new interpretation of the Jaina philosophy.
Jaina and Buddhist Philosophy

COMMON POINTS BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES

Jaina and Buddhist darsanas have many common points between them. They
belong to the sramana current of thought. They revolted against the Vedic
ritualism of the Yajnas. Both the darsanas gave prominence to the principle of
ahimsa, although other darsanas in Indian thought have also given importance to
the principle of ahimsa, but Tathagata Buddha and Sramana Bhagavana
Mahavira went against violence committed during Yajnas for the sake of
oblations and preached the practice of ahimsa in the daily life. Mahavira gave a
subtle analysis of the concept of ahimsa. The two darsanas were also against
the classification and the distinction of society into the different types of jatis,
like the brahmana, ksatriya, vaisya and sudra. The Vedic tradition is to believe
that these distinctions were primarily concerned with the birth of the individuals
into different classes. But the Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept such a
distinction and they said that the distinctions re functional and have nothing to
do with the high or the lowly character of the individuals. Mimamsakas consider
the Vedic authority as apauruseya, but Jainas and the Buddhists gave the status
of pauruseya to the authority as apauruseya, but Jainas and the Buddhists gave
the status of pauruseya to the authority of Vedas as well as to their agamas and
tripitakas. The Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept the arguments of the
Naiyayikas about the belief in the creator God. This worldly lie (samsara) is
beginningless and the chain of action and reaction. Both of them accept the
doctrine of karma and the good and evil fruits of karma.

METAPHYSICAL DISTINCTIONS

The Buddhists are phenomenalists and nihilists in their outlook. They advocate
the transitoriness of the things of the world. They say everything is in a flux and
nothing is permanent. The Jainas accept that though there is impermanence and
flux in the world, but it is from the point of view of modes and paryayas. They
say that the Buddhist approach is from the phenomenal point of view especially
with reference to the momentary existence. It is the rjusutranaya. The Jainas
say that the origin (utpada), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (permanence)
characterize reality. But these have to be looked from different points of view.
The Jaina conception of anekanta is the basic point of view.

The Buddhist philosophy later developed into various schools both realistic and
idealistic. The Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas were realist schools, which posited
the reality of external world and ultimate substances (elements) (dharma). The
knowledge of these elements is possible, says Vaibhasika through perception
while Sautrantika make it an object of inference.
Yogacara and Madhyamika are idealistic schools of philosophy. Yogacara
advocated the reality of consciousness and the objective storehouse of
consciousness (alaya vijnana) as the ultimate reality. The Madhyamika have
denied reality except the sunya. The sunya has been interpreted in different
ways, negatively as the white, but positively as the absolute, which is
anirvacaniya. Here is comes nearer to the advaitic conception of the Brahman.1

We should realize that the sunya of the Madhyamika need not be interpreted as
the void or the nothingness. The Madhyamika darsana can be interpreted in
terms of absolute idealism as the absolute, which cannot be described either by
negation or by affirmation or by the permutations of the two, i.e., through the
catuskoti. So the absolute is indescribable. Hence it is called by the word
'Sunya'.2

Jainism is dualistic. It posits the reality of jiva and ajiva. These have been
considered from two points of view, from the noumenal (niscaya naya) and
phenomenal (vyavahara naya). Similarly, in Buddhism we have two points of
view, which may be referred to as svalaksana, which gives the noumenal point of
view, and samanya laksana, which gives the noumenal point of view, and
samanya laksana, which gives the phenomenal point of view. Similarly, things of
the world can be looked at from these points of view. Logically considered also,
we can see the general in the particular and the particular in the general. For
instance, we can see the general concept of man in individual man and we can
also see the differentiating individual man and we can also see the human
characteristics indifferent individuals. To affirm that the one alone is real and
the other is an appearance is dogmatic assertion. The Buddhists take the one
point only and i.e., as we have seen rjusutranaya, the momentary point of view.
Svalaksana has been interpreted as that which gives the functional meaning of a
word or a thing. For instance, the function of a cloth is to cover and the function
of the pot (ghata) is to hold the water. This is the arthakriya or the essential
meaning of the word and the essential characteristic of a thing.

CONCEPTION OF ATMAN

The conception of the atman as a permanent substance has been one of the
problems of controversies and the difference between the Buddhists and the
Jainas. The Buddhists advocate the conception of an atma. There is nothing
permanent like the soul. For what we call the soul or the atman is merely the
aggregate of the physical and mental states (Nama rupa). Rupa is the physical
state and nama expresses the mental states like 1. vedana (feeling) 2. samjna
(cognition) 3. samskara (disposition) and 4. Vijnana (psychic energy). These
different states are not permanent, they are fleeting. Therefore, there is nothing
like the permanent atman, yet the Buddhists believe in the cycle of birth and
death and in the rebirth.

CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA
Similar differences would be found in the conception of nirvana and moksa. The
Buddhist conception of nirvana is negative; it is the state of freedom of vision. It
is a state of nothingness. It is the flowing out of the empirical states just like the
blowing out the flame of the lamp. It is the Dukhanirodha.1 We have already
seen that attempts have also been made to interpret the state of nirvana as a
positive state of bliss. Some philosophers say that the Buddha carried the
tradition of the Upanisads. Therefore his conception of nirvana is positive in
content, as referring to the state of bliss (ananda). The Buddha very often refers
to the attainment of the Brahmatva. This type of differing interpretations has
been given due to the Buddha's silence on metaphysical problems.

The way to the attainment of moksa or nirvana has also been presented by the
Jainas. The Jainas say that the way to the highest realization of moksa is
possible through the synthesis of the triple path of samyagdarsana (right
intuition), samyagjnana (right knowledge) and samyagcaritra (right conduct).
The Buddha enunciated the eight-fold path as the forth-noble truth, which is
mentioned as the duhkhanirodha marga, the way to the cessation of the
suffering. This path is the eight-fold path: samyagdrsti (right attitude),
samyagsankalpa (right resolve), samyakvaca (right speech), samyak-karma
(right effort), samyakajiva (right way of living), samyakvyayama (right action),
samyaksmrti (right thoughts) and samyaksamadhi (right concentration). It is
also called middle path (madhyama marga).

PRAMANAVADA

There are variations in the emphasis on the importance of the different

pramanas by the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Jainas consider valid cognition
corresponding to the external reality as the pramana, (yatharthajnana). But the
Buddhist philosophers refer to the pramana as that knowledge which is
inconsistent, which is not incoherent and which leads to the knowledge of the
unknown.2 The Jainas have distinguished pratyaksa and paroksa pramanas.
Pratyaksa is that knowledge which the soul gets directly without the help of the
sense organs; and the knowledge through the sense organs and indirect
knowledge through inference etc., are paroksa jnana. For instance, avadhi,
manahparyaya, and kevala are pratyaksajnana while mati, sruta re paroksa
jnanas. But later the Jainas have modified their terminology and say that the
later the Jainas have modified their terminology and say that the later was also
pratyaksa pramana but it is vyavaharika pratyaksa. This knowledge arises
through the cooperation of the indriyas and the manas. But according to the
Buddhists coherent knowledge is pramana, knowledge which is inconsistent is
not pramana. Similarly, pratyaksa is that type of knowledge, which is free from
intellectual discrimination, or intellectual superimposition.1 Intellectual super-
imposition refers to the categories of understanding like Nama, jati, guna kriya
etc. The knowledge without the association of the activity of the mind
(kalpanarahita) is indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa). Pratyaksa has been
distinguished into indriya pratyaksa, manasa pratyaksa, and svasamvedana
pratyaksa and yogaja pratyaksa. Anumana is knowledge, which is indirect, and
which is of samanya laksana, The Buddhists recognize pratyaksa and anumana
as the pramana.

The Jainas recognize agama pramana and this can be considered to be of two
types as: (1) arthagama, which is the direct, teaching of the Tirthankara to his
disciples. (2) Sutragama is the codification of the teaching the Tirthankaras in
the form of sutras. In the case of the Buddhists contention regarding the
distinction of the sabda and the artha, the word and the meaning is different.
They find that the two may not cohere and be identical. There may be
contradictions and opposition as in the case of the enmity between the snake
and the mongoose. There is not much of a relation between the word and the
meaning is to be considered as not clarifying the meaning of the word but only
as giving the negative function of denying the contrary function for instance, the
word cow does not signify the animal cow but it only denies the possibility of
other meanings of the objects other than the cow.

THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE

The Buddhists have advocated the doctrine of impermanence (ksanikavada).

Their cardinal principle is sarvam ksanikam, sarvam prthak, everything is a flux,
and nothing is permanent. But the Jainas do not find out any contradiction in the
two categories of permanence and change. A thing may be permanent and also
it may change. Change and permanence are the two stages of existence
considered from different points of view. For instance, a thing may be
permanent from the point of view. For instance, a thing may be permanent from
the point of view of substance, but from the point of view of modes, it is
changing. For example, the gold may be turned into an ornament or an idol of
God. The same thing will be melted and turned into a necklace. In this example,
gold as a substance does not change, but its modes are changing and therefore
the modes and permanence are both real from different points of view.

Thus we find that the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers have many points of
agreement although there are certain important differences. Primarily, the two
currents of thought are the sramanic currents of thought.
Jaina and Sankhya Philosophies: a Comparison

The Jaina and Sankhya philosophies are very eminent. They belong to the
sramanic current of thought. Sankhya thought has no relation to the Vedic
tradition. It is sometimes suggested that Kapila, the founder of Sankhya thought
was the disciple of Marici and Marici was the disciple of the first Tirthankara
Rsabhadeva. Scholar has corroborated this. We cannot say anything about it.
The sramanic tradition of Sankhya thought has been accepted by other
philosophies in India. Sankaracarya was very clear that Sankhya thought was
against the Vedic tradition, and also against the sruti and smrti coming from the
Vedic tradition. The Padmapurana made it clear that Nyaya; Vaisesika and
Patanjali's Yoga philosophies also are contrary to the sruti. Therefore, it was
unacceptable. The composition of Nyaya sutra must have been in the second
century or the third century B.C. Vaisesika sutra must have been written during
the same time and also the Yoga sutra or Patanjali. The writers of these sutras
were very much influenced by the sramanic current of thought and the sramanic
thought was very popular during that period. This is also clear from the fact the
several terms like kevali, Sukladhyana, jnanavaraniya karma, samyagdarsana
etc., are to be found in the Patanjala-Yoga; and these terms are nowhere in Vedic
tradition.

Some scholars believe that the Sankhya is very ancient. Jainism must have been
influenced by the Sankhya thought. If we glance at the Jaina agamas, we do not
find such evidence that it was influenced by the Sankhya darsana. Perhaps,
those scholars who maintained the view of the antiquity of Sankhya darsana to
the Jaina darsana may not have seen the Jaina agamas. They might not have
been available to them.

The Jainas darsana is dualistic. According to the Jainas the universe is

constituted of two fundamental principles. We may call them dravyas, the jiva
and the ajiva. The jiva is pure and simple. Consciousness and upayoga
characterize it. Infinite knowledge and intuition, and infinite energy also
characterize it. It is active. Due to its activity it comes into contact with the
material karma and gets involved in the wheel of samsara. This involvement is
beginningless. But is has an end. One can attain moksa by removing the karmic
particles.

Just as Jainism is dualistic, Sankhya is also dualistic. According to the Sankhya

philosophers, there are two ultimate principles--the purusa and prakrti. The
purusa is pure consciousness, but it is passive. Prakrti is jada; it is
unconsciousness, but is active. When the prakrti comes into the proximity of he
purusa, the disturbance in the gunas of the sattva, rajas and tamas takes place
and the evolution of the universe starts. This entire universe is the product of
prakrti, in the presence of purusa. Purusa is only a spectator of the dance-drama
of prakrti through which the universe evolves.
The Jaina darsana's ajiva tattva with reference to pudgala is all used to prakrti of
Sankhya. The universe is the product of prakrti according to Sankhya and
according to Jainism the variegated universe is due to the infinite modes of the
pudgala (matter). The major aspect of the prakrti of the Sankhya can be
compared to the Jaina conception of pudgala and akasa.1

The Sankhya philosophers say that the reality of purusa is self-evident. There is
no need to prove the existence of the self. Similarly, purusa is self-illuminative,
just as the lamp illumines itself and illuminates the surrounding area. It is not
necessary to prove this essential characteristic of the purusa. Purusa is neither
the indriyas nor the body nor the manas. It is different from these. It is
characterized by caitanya; and caitanya (consciousness) is the essence of the
purusa and not its quality. The Jainas consider the atman or the jiva
characterized by bliss (anandamaya), but the Sankhya philosophers differ in this
respect and say that ananda (bliss) is not a characteristic of the purusa, but it is
the attribute of prakrti. And therefore, according to the Sankhya, in the highest
state of self-realization there is no place for ananda. We have also seen that the
purusa is only and spectator of the dance of the prakrti in its evolution of the
world. The self is pure and simple and eternal. According to the Jainas the self
has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies (dehamatra). This
is from the point of its substance. The Vedantin considers the atman as the one
with the Brahman. The Advaitin advocates the identity of the atman with
Brahman and according to Visistadvaita the atman is the nature of the Brahman
and in the highest stage of the atman merges with the Brahman, just as the
waters of river merge with the seawater.

The Sankhya philosophers postulate the plurality of selves (purusa). If the self
were one, then certain logical difficulties would have arise, to explain the variety
of experiences and status. If one self were to die, all the selves would have died.
The experiences of the one self would have been the experiences of all other
selves. But the facts of experiences are different. There are wide variety of
individual experiences and the status of different individual self. Some are rich
and some are poor. Some are happy and some are miserable. Therefore, it is
clear that there are many selves. The Jainas have also advocated the reality of
many selves. The Jainas say that an object can be studied from different points
of view and permanence and impermanence can be predicated of individual self
from two different points of view. From the point of view of substances the
selves are permanent, but from the point of view of modes as expressed in
infinite number of organism, the selves are changing and are impermanent.
Origination and destruction are characteristics of the self, if viewed from the
point of view of modes. But the self is permanent from the point of view of
substance.

What Jaina darsana calls paryaya (mode) Sankhya calls it ASAT (appearance or
unreal). Dhrauvya or permanence is analogues to sit. According to the Sankhya
philosophers, every object in action is asat but sat in its causation. The prakrti is
constituted of three gunas: the sattva, rajas and tamas. These gunas get
modified. But Jainas use the gunas as something permanent.
There is no modification of the gunas. Sattva, rajas, tamas in the Sankhya
darsana are causes of the mental states of pleasure and pain. Acarya
Samantabhadra has also presented a similar conception regarding the three-fold
aspect of origination, destruction and permanence of things.

According to the Jainas jiva is karta (doer) and bhokta (enjoyer) of the fruits of
karma. It is characterized by consciousness. Upayoga is the energy and jnana
and darsana are the expressions of upayoga. When the object is grasped in its
generality, it is darsana and when it is grasped in its specific aspect it is jnana.
In this jnana and darsana are the characteristics of jiva. Jiva is also the doer
(karta). And it says 'I see', 'I hear' and 'I do'. But in the case of the Sankhya
darsana the atman is suddha (pure) nitya (eternal) and Buddha (enlightened) in
all its parts and states, even in the empirical experiences, the atman does not
really undergo all the modifications and experiences of pleasure and pains. It is
reflections of the modifications of prakrti, which undergoes these modifications
and the atman imagines that it is undergoing modifications. Just as rose flower if
kept near a crystal, the crystal appears to be rosy, although the crystal does not
have that color. But if the atman is to experience its fruits, it must be karta also.
Bhokta and karta are inter-related. In general kartrtva or activity implies
freedom of action. Kartrtva is of two types: 1. Adhisthana kartrtva and 2.
Upadana kartrtva. In the Sankhya darsana, purusa is adhisthata as well as the
upadana. The world is the product of prakrti just as the pot is the product of
clay. In the Sankhya darsana, prakrti is also considered to be the agent
(activity). And it means that prakrti is responsible for the variety in the world.
Without the presence of the atman, prakrti cannot produce anything, although
the atman or purusa itself does not do anything. But it falsely believes it is
active. In this sense, there is the sense of the appearance of the activity in the
purusa, but really the purusa is not active.1 Gunas are necessary for the
modifications of things in the prakrti. Purusa's presence is also necessary.
Gunas are of the capacities of the production (prasavadharmi) and in this sense
they are krta. This is the causal meaning of the karta. Vacaspati Misra has
suggested that akartrtva bhava is present in the purusa because purusa himself
is not directly responsible for the production of the things of the world.2

In other sense purusa may be considered to be akarta because he is not directly

responsible for the variegated things of the world. But in another sense, we may
say that prakrti is karta, but with the presence of purusa which is responsible for
the creation of the universe. When prakrti comes in the vicinity of the purusa
evolution starts, just as the iron fillings get disturbed and are attracted towards
the magnet in the presence of the magnet.

The evolution of the universe therefore depends in a sense on the co-operation

of the purusa and prakrti. Purusa is passive, it is the spectator, but the presence
is necessary for creating the disturbance in the gunas in the prakrti. As long as
the prakrti is not in the presence of purusa the gunas are in a state of
equilibrated tension. The moment the prakrti comes into proximity of purusa,
there is a disturbance in the gunas and the evolution starts--starting from the
mahat to the pancamahabutas. We have already discussed the twenty-five
principles of evolution, which is the canvas of the universe. In this sense, we can
say that purusa or the atman according to the Sankhya is characterized by
cetana and is both karta and bhokta.3

Thus we find that there are some prominent features common to both schools of
philosophy although there are certain differences concerning the nature of
prakrti and the characteristics of purusa.
Jaina & Vedanta Philosophies

In India, philosophic development in its various aspects has been prominent.

India is the cradle of philosophic thought. Many philosophical systems have
arisen. Some of them coherent to each and some are contrary to each other.
We have seen that India has given respect to every school of thought. Even
Carvaka is considered to be a darsana. In this chapter we shall consider a
comparative picture of Jaina darsana and Vedanta.

THE PHENOMENAL WORLD

According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles

of jiva (living substances) and ajiva (the nonliving substance). Ajiva may be
considered from the two points of view. That which has a form is pudgala
(matter). And that which does not have a form and it includes substances like
dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), akasa (space) and kala
(time). These are the six substances and we have already discussed about the
Jaina conception of the universe, on the basis of these dravyas.

In the Vedanta darsana the universe or the phenomenal world is only an

appearance (asatya) while Brahman the ultimate reality is the only real. Sri.
Sankaracarya says which is always samarupa (uniform), is satya. The objects of
the universe in this phenomenal world are not always uniform. They undergo
constant change and modifications. Therefore, it is an appearance and unreal.
The ultimate reality is the Brahman. It is one, uniform and constant. Therefore,
it is real. The satya or the real is constantly real for all times. And that is
noumenal reality (paramarthika satya). From the phenomenal point of view, the
phenomenal world is real. But from the noumenal as, therefore, the reality of
the phenomenal world is unreal. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world
can be considered to be the real from the phenomenal point of view. But things
of this physical world are unreal from the noumenal point. Just as the rope
appears to be the snake so also this phenomenal world appears to be real. In
this sense, we cannot predicate absolute unreality to the phenomenal world nor
can we predicate absolute reality. There are degrees of reality and Sankara
postulated the concept of the degrees of reality. F. H. Bradley followed the
tradition of Sankara, in describing the degrees of reality. The appearance of the
phenomenal world appears be real due to ignorance (avidya).

According to the Vedanta the avidya has two functions: (i) the function of
avarana (covering), and (ii) the function of viksepa (distortion). The principle of
avarana may be considered to the power of avidya, which created intellectual
discrimination, and it is the cause of this samsara, the phenomenal world. Due
to the influence of this avarana sakti, which creates intellectual discrimination,
man considers himself to be the doer and the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain.
Similarly, due to the power of ignorance akasa was created. From akasa comes
wind, from the wind Agni (fire), from the agni comes jala (water) and from jala
comes prthvi (earth). In this way the subtle bodies ere created from subtle
elements and gross bodes were created by gross elements (sthula bhuta). From
the suksma sarira (subtle body) comes the sense organs of hearing, touch, sight,
taste and smell--these are the five jnanendriyas. Speech, pani (the hands),
pada, payu, upastha--these are the five karmendriyas. Buddhi is the determining
nature of antahkarana while manas is the expression and modifying sense of the
antahkarana.

There are three types of kosas (covers): 1. Vijnanamayakosa which includes the
jnanendriyas and the buddhi. It is responsible for the experiences and the
knowledge. 2. Manomayakosa which includes the sense organs and the manas.
It has the discriminating function and connotive in aspect. Pranamaya kosa
includes karmendriyas and pancavayus. This is the energizing source. The
suksma sarira is the expression of the synthesis of all the three kosas.

PRAMANAVADA

The Jainas presented the theory of anekantadrsti for understanding the infinite
varieties of the universe. They said that reality is complex and substance has its
infinite modes and aspects. The ekanta point of view i.e., the one-sided point of
view cannot understand the complexity of the universe. The various points of
view by which the universe was looked at and understood presents the pramana
sastra of the Jainas. It refers to the naya and pramana and we have already
discussed this topic in detail.

The Vedantin has mentioned five pramanas for the sake of understanding the
noumenal and phenomenal truth: 1. pratyaksa 2. anumana, 3. upanmana, 4.
agama and 5. arthapatti. From a very broad point of view the Jaina conception of
pramana appears to be different from that of the Vedantic conception. However,
if we look at it very closely we find that there are not much discrepancies and
differences between the pramanas. They present the same sense.

We have seen that the Jainas have mentioned pratyaksa and paroksa as two
pramanas for understanding the noumenal and the phenomenal truths.
Pratyaksa is the direct knowledge. We have also seen that the terminology was
adopted with modifications for the sake of consistent view of epistemology in the
light of other schools of thought. Jainas used the term nijapratyaksa and
samvyavaharika pratyaksa. According to the Jainas paroksa jnana can be
classified into 1. smrti (memory), 2. pratyabhijna (recognition), 3. tarka
(hypothetical reason), 4. anumana (inference) and 5. agama (testimony).
Vedantin does not use the word apratyaksa or paroksa, although the pramanas--
anumana, upamana, agama and arthapatti are indirect ways of cognition.
Anumana and agamas are considered to be independent pramanas according to
Vedanta. Jainas have classified as paroksa pramana. Upamana of the Vedantin
is analogous to the pratyabhijna of the Jainas. The Vedantic conception of
arthapatti refers to the implication involved in the perception and the
consequent implication for the sake of clarification. As we find in the
Mimamsakas for example, that 'Devadatta is getting fatter everyday although
Devadatta is fasting during day'. We have to conclude that Devadatta is eating
at night. In these forms of expression of arthapatti, there is the element of
vyapti and the presence of vyapti would make it a form of inference. Therefore,
the Jainas would consider it a form of inference.

IDEALISM AND REALISM

The Jainas have classified the philosophical theories as idealistic (paramarthika)

and realistic. This distinction depends upon the distinction of reality on
noumenal (paramarthika) and phenomenal (vyavaharika). Consciousness and
unconscious matter are the noumenal realistic. They are real and the Jainas
have accepted the realities of the external world. In this sense, Jainism is
realistic. And Jainism is dualistic also because there are two types of realities,
which are equally important and real, i.e.; conscious jiva and the unconscious are
equally important and real, i.e., conscious jiva and the unconscious world
emanating from pudgala. The Jainas say that to consider consciousness as
unconsciousness and unconsciousness as consciousness is mithyadrsti. It is
perversity of knowledge.

According to the Vedanta there are three grades of reality: 1. paramarthika satya
(noumenal reality) or ultimate reality, 2. vyavaharika satya is the phenomenal
reality and 3. pratibhasika satya, the state of reality in the state of appearance
as in the case of the experience of the real in the dream states. Brahman is the
only reality and the world is an appearance. In this sense, the pure
consciousness with characteristics may be ascribed to the Brahman only, and the
non-living physical events, as is the appearance. Right knowledge is that
knowledge which knows the distinction between the real and the appearance.

THE DUALISTIC--NON-DUALISTIC THEORY

Jainism is a spiritualist philosophy, which maintains hat the atman, is real and
independent spiritual substance. The other systems of philosophy, which accept
the reality of the atman, present in different way. The Vedantin has described
the nature of the atman following the tradition of the upanisads. According to
the Vedantin, atman is the ultimate principle and Brahman and atman are
identical. The vast expanse of the universe which is unconscious in rooted in the
atman and this theory is called Caitanyadvaitavada. Contrary to this theory,
there are philosophers who maintain that the ultimate substance is the
unconscious matter. This is the materialist or the naturalistic theory. It is called
Jadadvaitavada.

But the Jainas have reconciled the contraries in the two theories and advocate
the reality of both the conscious atman and the unconscious matter. Both are
equally real. In this sense, it may be said that there are three currents of
thought in India: 1. Atmadvaitavada which maintains the reality of the self as
consciousness. 2. Jadadvaitavada, which maintains the reality of the physical
universe and 3. Dvaitavada (dualistic) which maintains the reality of the both.
And in this sense, Jainism is dualistic because it advocates the reality and
independence of spirit and matter, which constitute the matter and the universe.

The Jainas accept the principles of permanence and change as both reals. From
different point of view of substance, i.e., permanence and form the point of view
of modes, change is equally real. Therefore, the Jainas formulate the triple
principle of origination (utpada) destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya)
as equally real. From the niscaya point of view the consciousness and the
unconsciousness are the two ultimate principles. But from the vyavahara point
of view the changing universe is equally real. But it should be realized that the
Advaita darsana does not accept the reality of the changing universe on the
same footing as the altimeter reality of the Brahman. The physical world is an
appearance and this appearance is due to avidya, which is an expression of
maya.

In this sense, we can say the Jaina anekanta view has attempted to reconcile the
conflicting claims of the living and the non-living, the one and the many,
permanence, and change for absolute reality. The anekanta outlook gives the
solution to the problems.

THE PATHWAY TO REALISATION

The Jainas have presented the triple pathway to the realization of moksa.
Samyagdarsana (right intuition), samyagjnana (right knowledge) and
samyagcaritra (right conduct). There is the need of the harmonization of the
paths for the attainment of moksa. One alone will not do. The Vedantin,
specially the advaitin, has given importance to jnana marga for self-realization.
According to this theory, the way to realization is the realization of the highest
truth of the identity of the Brahman and the atman or as in other systems of
Vedantic philosophy the oneness of the Brahman and the atman in their
essential nature. Sri Ramanuja and the other Vedantins like Madhvacharya have
given prominence to Bhakti marga. Ramanuja mentions prapatti. According to
Vedanta, the forces of ignorance are three folds. Due to this force of ignorance,
one feels that the phenomenal world is real. These three forms of ignorance are
dependent on the three levels of experience the dream level, the waking state
and the pure state, or the dreamless state, which is a pure state. When all the
stages of ignorance are removed, knowledge or the highest reality is possible
and the bondage is removed. The Vedanta also mentions the triple path of
sadhana of realization. 1.sravana (listening to the scriptures) 2.manana
(grasping the truth) and 3.nididhyasana (holding steadfast to the truth). Thus
we find Vedanta has given prominence to jnana marga in addition to the Bhakti
in Ramanuja.

Thus we find, there are many points of agreement between the Vedanta and the
Jaina darsanas.1
Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought

Jainism has occupied an important place in ancient thought. It has made

significant contributions to the stream of Indian thought. What we call Indian
philosophy, or Indian culture is a long flow and the synthesis of the two streams
of thought, the Vedic and the Sramana current of thought coming together and
harmoniously synthesizing into each other. We find that Jainism has contributed
immensely to the development of the Indian view of life. The Jainas have given
equal emphasis on reason and state. We find the same type of emphasis in
other systems of Indian philosophy. Sankara gives importance to both reason
and intuition.

Jainism may be considered from the point of view of its metaphysical structure
and also of its emphasis on ethical values. The foundational principles of ethical
structure would be anekanta, while the moral fiber is expressed and based on
the all-pervading principle of ahimsa (non-violence). The Jaina contribution to
the Indian philosophical thought may be considered to be anekanta, ahimsa and
aparigraha. These constitute the perennial philosophy of Jainism.

The concept of ahimsa is to be found in other systems of Indian philosophy, but

the systematic study of ahimsa as of theory and the way of life is presented by
the Jainas in their all-pervading principle of ahimsa. Ahimsa is the highest
principle of conduct. Therefore, Jainas have called it as paramodharmah. It
appears that the Jaina theory of ahimsa as a moral injunction has been a pre-
aryan principle, which was later assimilated in the Aryan way of life. The Jainas
made non-violence as the most fundamental principle of religious life. They
made a systematic analysis of the principle almost to the point of making a
perfect science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to ahimsa.1

The Jaina theory of ahimsa is based on the analytic conception of the universe.
Jainism is dualistic and Jainas believe in the plurality of the jivas. From the
practical point of view, the jivas have also been classified into various types on
the basis of different principles like--the sense organs, and the life forces
possessed by them. Ahimsa is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual
or any life force of the individual by the three yogas, activity and trikarana. We
are not to injure a living being, however, small it may be or a life-force of an
organism, directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our
behalf or by giving consent someone else to do injuries. We are asked not to
injure a living being physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak
about injuries nor should harbor any thoughts of injuring any living being. In the
Tattvarthasutra, himsa is defined as injury (violence) caused to the living
organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like pride
and prejudice, attachment and hatred.2 The consequence of violating the
principle of ahimsa is misery in the world and in the next world.3 He who commits
violence is always afflicted and agitated. He is actuated by animosity. He
suffers physical and mental torture in this world4. After death, he is reborn
taking a despicable life. The Jaina conception of ahimsa has influenced the lives
of many great votaries of ahimsa. Gandhiji socialized the spiritual principle of
ahimsa. Gandhiji said, 'I believe in loving my enemies. I believe in non-violence
as the only remedy opened to the Hindus and Muslims, I believe in the power of
suffering to melt the stoniest heart.5 Though the doctrine of ahimsa is negative
yet it has a positive content. It is not mere abstinence to injury to life. It is love.
Himsa causes destruction of life and destruction of one's own personality. It
lowers the personality of man, Gandhiji said "non-violence is the law of our
species and violence is the law of the brute".1 Non-violence would be panacea for
the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace to us.

The Jaina conception of non-violence as an ethical principle has permitted the

entire structure of the Jaina ethics and the way of life. Other codes of conduct
and vratas like satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha are all geared to the
promotion of the practice of non-violence as much rigorously as possible and as
far as possible according to the functions of the individual in society, be an
ascetic (muni) or a citizen (sravaka). All other virtues are expressions of ahimsa.
Therefore, it is said that Jainism advocates the universality of the principle of
non-violence--'ahimsa paramodharmah'. For instance, the individual is a social
being and he has to aim at social betterment it self-culture is to be pursued. The
Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment.
It envisages an individual as a social being; in as much as the individual depends
on society for his intellectual, moral and material gains. Even the ascetic is
incapable of transgressing this basic principle of individual and social justice.
The adoption of ahimsa and other virtues can be seen to be expressed in the
aparigraha also.

The Jaina view of aparigraha may be presented in the context of modern society
in three cardinal principles: 1. Desireless, 2. non-possession and 3. develop an
attitude of non-attachment towards the possession. An ascetic or a religious
fanatic may be desireless but it may be out of a sense of superiority and out of
arrogance of virtue, these are not the ideals of society. We should develop a
healthy attitude of renunciation and non-attachment, which would bring in us a
confident calm in our daily life. They adopt the practice of aparigraha as a social
virtue based on the spiritual principle of non-attachment. It would foster
spontaneous socialism in an age when we are trying to force upon people the
socialistic pattern of society without the spiritual basis of non-attachment.

Anekanta is the intellectual expression of ahimsa. Anekanta forbids being

dogmatic and fanatic and aggressively insisting upon expressing our attitude.
Anekanta says that reality is complex. It can be looked at from different points
of view and each point of view gives a picture of reality, which is at once true but
partial. But to insist that the particular point of view and the picture of reality
are the only true picture would be dogmatic, and i.e., ekanta. Jainas wanted to
avoid the aggressively dogmatic point of view, which gives the comprehensive
picture or reality in which all other aspects of reality are woven into a synthetic
hold.
The anekanta is an attitude of mind. It is the foundational principle. Nayavada
expresses the point of view. It is psychological while syadvada is the logical
expression of nayavada formulated in propositional forms. We have said that
anekanta is the basic principle, nayavada is analytic and syadvada is synthetic.
We have also considered the importance of syadvada in the background of the
criticisms offered against it, by philosophers like Sankara, Ramanuja and some of
the modern philosophers. These philosophers as we are aware, have considered
syadvada as a formulation of doubt and uncertainty. First, because, syadvada
mentions seven-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility.
And secondly, because, the word syat indicates the attitude of doubt as it means
'perhaps', but we have seen that syat does not mean 'perhaps, it does not
connote the expression of 'doubt', the statement made in every predication is a
certain statement but predicated from a particular point of view. All the
propositional forms present the pictures of reality from the different points of
view and syadvada presents the synthetic picture or more aptly a
comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science is slowly leaning towards the
appreciation of syadvada as a methodology of multi-valued logic for the solution
of problems, which are metaphysic-scientific. Physicists have begun to realize
that syadvada as multivalued logic and methodology, which can solve many
different problems of quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Similarly,
eminent statisticians and biologists like Mehelnobis and J.B.S. Haldane have
shown, the methodology of multi-valued logic as expressed in the syadvada
would be very useful in the study of theory of probability and the genetic
evolution.

The metaphysical structure of Jainism is based in its formulation of the six-fold

distinction of dravya like jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma, akasa and kala. We
have already seen that the cosmic principles of dharma and adharma and akasa
and kala have been scientifically analyzed like the Jainas. It is the special
contribution of the Jainas in their analysis of the distinction of akasa into
lokakasa and alokakasa. Similarly, the Jainas have made a significant
contribution to the theory of time by pointing out that time (kala) is mono-
dimensional and therefore is not an astikaya. Similarly, the Jaina theory of
atomism has its own significant contribution in the analysis of the nature of
atom. The Vaisesikas distinguished between different types of atoms like the
earth atoms, water and fire atoms, but the Jainas have not made qualitative
atoms. Those atoms can be distinguished in their combinations in forming the
objects. The same atoms can form water or earth etc. democrats come nearer to
be Jaina theory in this conception.

The Jainas have also made significant contribution in their analysis of the theory
of knowledge and their doctrine of karma. Knowledge for the Jainas is self-
illuminating. Pramanas were distinguished into pratyaksa and paroksa, but
pratyaksa was that form of knowledge which the soul gets directly without the
medium of sense-organs, they consider that sense-organs are impediments in
the way of the soul for getting clear knowledge. Knowledge received through the
sense-organs was considered to be paroksa, but later with a view to
accommodating the use of other Indian philosophers and with a view to avoiding
academic chaos in understanding the problems of epistemology, the Jainas
adopted the phrase of nijapratyaksa, for the first and samvyavaharika pratyaksa
for the knowledge arising out of the sense-organs and the contact of the mind.

The Jaina theory of karma is unique because Jainas have given a methodical and
scientific analysis of the doctrine of karma. The jiva due to its activity attracts
karmic particles which are material in nature and these karmic particles
envelope the soul and obscure knowledge, intuition and activity.

This obscuration brings bondage (bandha). The way to the spiritual salvation is
to remove karma and the removal of the karma has to pass through stages. We
have first, to stop the fresh influx of karma, i.e., called samvara and then the
annihilation of karma i.e., already accumulated by various means like
suppression of the karmic effect or destruction of karma. This is nirjara; and
once all the karmas are removed, we reach the highest state of perfection.

We have so far given a brief resume of the essential features of the Jaina
contribution, to the development of the Indian thought. The essential features of
Jaina philosophy, we may call the perennial philosophy of the Jainas. The Jaina
view of life is realistic-empiricist coupled with pragmatic outlook. It is not quietist
optimism; it advocates a struggle towards perfection and the pathway towards
the realization of the highest end of perfection. In this sense, the Jaina
Weltanschauung is meliostic.
PART 6

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Reference Books Index

Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika
Abhidharmadipa and its notes
tippana
Abhidharmakosa
Anuyogadvara
Adhyatmasara
Anguttaranikaya
Astaka prakarana
Abhidhana Cintamani kosa
Anuyogadvara Punyavijayaji
Astasati
Astasahasri
Anyayogavyavacchedika
Ashok Ke Phool Dr. Hazari Prasad Dvivedi
Amar Bharati Sanmati Jnanapitha, Agra
Avasyaka niryukti
Atmamimamsa Pt. Dalsukha Malavania
Acaranga niryukti
Agamasara
Agamayuga ka Jaina Darsana Pt. Dalsukha Malavania
Avasyaka Haribhadriyavrtti
Apta Mimamsa
Acaranga
Avasyaka Malayagiri vrtti
Alapapaddhati
Isavasyopanisad
Uttaradhyayana sutra
Uttaradhyayana: Ek Parisilana
Uttaradhyayana Brhadvrtti
Uvavai
Upayahrdaya
Rsabhadeva: Ek Parisilana
Rgveda
Aitareya Upanisad
Kautiliya Arthasastra
Cosmology
Kenopanisad
Karmagrantha
Kathavatthu
Kalpa sutra Devendra Muni
Gita
Ganadharavada Pt. Dalsukha Malavania
Gommatasara Nemicandra
Siddhantacakravarti
Gautama Sutra
Caraka Samhita
Candraprabhacaritam
Candraprajnapti
Chandogyopanisad
Jaina Darsana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta
Jaina Darsanika Sahitya ka Dr. Dalsukha Malavania
Simhavalokana
Jaina Dharma and Darsana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta
Jaina Darsana: Manana aur Muni Nathmal
Mimamsa
Jaina Darsana Dr. Mahendrakumar
Jivabhigama Sutra
Jaina Darsana aur Adhunika Vijnana
Jaina Dharma me Tapa: Svarupa aur Sri Marudhara Kesariji Maharaj
Visleshana
Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva Muni Nathamalji
Tattvanusasana
Tattvasangrahapanjika
Tarkabhasa
Tattvartha Srutsagariya vrtti
Tattvarthabhasya tika
Tattvartha sutra
Taittiriya Upanisad
Tattvasangraha ki bahirartha
Pariksa
Tejobindu Upanisad
Tandulaveyaliya
Tarka sangraha
Tattvartha sutra--Sarvarthasiddhi
Tattvartha sutra--Rajavartika
Tattvartha Sutra--Slokavartika
Tattvartha Sutra Pt. Sukhalalji
Tattvarthabhasya--Haribhadriya vrtti
Taittiriya Aranyaka
Tattvartha Sutra--Siddhaseniya tika
Tattvarthasara-- Amrtcandra Suri, Ganesha Prasad Varni
Granthamala
Digghanikaya
The Philosophy of Space and Time,
Introduction
Dravya-guna-paryaya rasa
Dravyasangraha
Darsana aur Cintana Pt. Sukhalalji
Dvadasanupreksa
Dasasruta-skandha
Dasavaikalika niryukti
Dravyanuyoga tarkana
Dvatrimsika Amitagati
Dharma sangrahani, Malayagirivrtti
Dharmabhyudayam
Dharmasangraha
Dhavala
Dhammapada
Dharma aur Darsana Devendra Muni
Dharma and Darsana Devendra Muni
Navatattva prakarana mula
Navatattva vicara mula
Navatattva vicara Sri Bhavasagara
Navatattva vicarasaroddhara
Navatattva prakarana Sri Devagupta Suri
Navatattvasara prakarana Ancalika Jayasekhara Suri
Navatattvasara
Navatattva bhasya
Navatattva balavabodha Harsavardhanagani
Navatattva balavabodha Sri Parsvacandragani
Navatattva balavabodha Kulaka
Navatattvarasa Sri Rsabhadasa
Navatattvarasa Sri Bhavasagara
Navatattvarasa Sri Saubhagya Sundara
Navatattva Joda Sri Vijayadana Suri
Navatattva stavana Sri Bhagya Vijayaji
Navatattva stavana Sri Viveka Vijayaji
Navatattva Chappai Sri Kamalasekhara
Navatattva Chappai Sri Saubhagya Sundara
Navatattva Chappai Sri Vardhamana Muni
Navatattva Chappai Lumpaka Muni
Nyayamanjari
Nyayasutra
Nyayavartika
Nyayavatara
Niscayadvatrimsika
Nyayakarikavali
Nayacakrasara
Nyayakosa
Nandisutra Punya Vijayaji. M. Edited
Nyayabindu
Nyayabhasya
Niyamsara
Nyayaviniscaya commentary
Nyayamanjari
Navatattvasahitya sangraha
Nyayopadesa
Nayarahasya
Nayakarnika
Nyayakumudacandra
Nayopadesa
Nyayavatara tika Siddharsigani
Pravacanasara
Pancastikayasara
Prajnapana
Pramanavarttika
Prajnapana vrtti
Prasnopanisad
Prasastapada bhasya
Pancastikaya & Pancastikaya vrtti
Pancadhyayi
Paschimi darsana Dr. Divanchand
Pratikramana sutravrtti Acarya Nami
Pancastikaya Amrtacandrasuri krta Samaya
Vyakhya
Pancastikaya Jayasena vrtti
Pindaniryukti
Pancasaka satika Vivarana
Pariksamukha
Pramananayatattvaloka
Pramananayatattvaratnavatarika
Pramanamimamsa
Pramana nirnaya
Paramatmaprakasa
Pancasangraha
Physics and Philosophy Burner Hoisburg: From Euclid to
Eddington
Brahmajala sutta
Brahmasiddhi
Bauddha Darsana aur Vedanta Dr. C.D. Sharma
Bauddhadarsana Baldeva Upadhyaya
Bhagavati
Bharatiya Tattvavidya Pt. Sukhalalji
Bharatiya Samskrti
Bhagavana Mahavira: Ek Anushilana Devendra Muni
Bhagavana Aristanemi aur Devendra Muni
Karmayogi Srkrisna: Ek Anucintana
Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha
Majjhimanikaya
Mimamsaslokavartika
Madhyamika karika
Mundaka Upanisad
Maitreyi Upanisad
Mandukyopanisad
Mulacara vrtti Vasunandi
Maitrayani Aranyaka
Matharakarika
Muni Hazarimal Smrti Grantha
Milinda Prasna
Mahabharata
Yoga Sastra
Yukti Sneha Prapurani Siddhanta
Candrika
Yoga Darsana
Yogadarsana bhasya
Yogadarsana tattva vaisaradi
Yogadarsana Sarasvati tika
Loka Prakasa
Laghiyastraya
Visvadarsana ki Ruparekha Pt. Vijayamuni
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
Visuddhimaggo
Vrhadnayacakra
Visesavasyaka bhasya
Vedanta sukti manjari
Vaisesika sutra
Vijnana ki Ruparekha
Vrhannavatattva
Visesavasyaka bhasya vrtti
Sarvadarsanasangraha
Siddhiviniscaya tika Akalanka
Saptatattva prakarana Hemacandra Suri
Samayasara Kundakunda
Sanmati prakarana tika
Syadvada Ratnakara
Siddhiviniscaya
Samyukta nikaya
Sankhyatattva kaumudi
Sankhya sutra
Sthananga-Samavayanga
Svarupa aur Sambodhana
Sankhya pravacana
Sutrakrtanga vrtti
Sanmati tarka
Sthananga & Sthananga Abhayadeva vrtti
Sahitya aur Samskrti Devendra Muni
Samacari sataka
Sarvarthasiddhi
Syadvadamanjari
Sutrakrtanga
Sutrakrtanga niryukti
Samkhyakarika
Satapatha Brahmana
Svetasvataropanisad
Sabdakalpadruma kosa
Santasudharasa
Sastradipika
Santisatakam
Sivagita
Saddarsana samuccaya
Satkhandagama
Sri Bhasya Ramanuja
Harivamsa purana
Haribhadriyavasyaka tippana
APPENDX 2

Index of Technical Terms

Akarmabhum The world where there is no activity like

i agriculture, writing...etc.
Akamanirjara It refers to the removal of karmic particles
by actions like--fasting, celibacy, sleeping
on the floor...etc, not voluntarily but out of
compulsion as in the case of a man who is
imprisoned and who has no undergo these
hardships.
Agurulaghu It refers to the absence of the two
characteristics of heaviness and lightness.

Agurulaghug It is the characteristic, which expresses

una neither the lightness nor the heaviness as
in the case of the characteristics of the
soul. It is infinite in character.
Ajiva Non-living substance.

Ajnana Ignorance due to the perversity of attitude

which arises due to the rise of
jnanavaraniya karma.
Anu An atom.
Atyantabhav Absolute negation; for example, the sky
a flower or the son of barren women or horns
of a rabbit.
Addhasamay It refers to time or the indivisible part of
a time.
Adharma The unrighteous attitude which is
responsible for the downfall of the soul in
the spiritual path.
Adharmadrav Principle of rest.
ya
Adhigama Sense experience of the objects.
Adholoka The lower world.
Adhruvaband The bondage of the karmic matter of a soul
ha in the cases where there is the possibility of
the non-bondage of the karmic matter and
the consequent freedom from bondage.
Adhruvaband It refers to the psychic attitude by which
hini there is the possibility of bondage or there
may not be any bondage of any karma.
Adhruvodaya The rise of the satavedaniya karma etc., on
subsequent occasions due to the non-
destructions of the previous dispositions.
Ananta Endless or infinite. For instance,
kevalajnana is ananta.
Anantavirya Infinite energy of the soul.
Anantanuban It is a process by which samyagdarsana is
dhi withheld and if the right knowledge has
already arisen it vanishes. It is an endless
series of the expressions of passions
kasaya or emotional states.
Anapavartani It refers to the exhaustion of ayukarma as
ya per schedule without any decrease in the
duration or intensity. The ayukarma of this
life is determined due to the previous
karma needs to be completely exhausted.
Anabhigrahit Mithyatva is the perversity of attitude,
a mithyatva which arises due to wrong teaching and
due to the clinging of wrong teaching.
Anakaropayo Indeterminate upayoga i.e. Darsanopayoga.
ga
Anabhigrahit This is the perversity of attitude, which
a mithyatva arises due to the belief that all other views,
and theories are equally true.
Anikacita It is contrary to nikacita in which the
processes of utkarsana increase,
apakarsana decrease and
sankramana transformation of karmic
matter are possible.
Anekanta The many sided approach to reality.
Antaraya Karma which determines and obstructs the
Karma inherent energy of the soul. For instance, it
obstructs the activity of giving alms etc.
Antyasuksma The ultimate subtlety which is to be found
in the atom.
Antyasthula Ultimate vastness for graspness. This
refers to the entire cosmos and the matter
of the cosmos.
Apakarsana Decrease in the intensity of the karmic
effect.
Apavartana It is the transformation or the decrease in
the states and intensities of the effects of
bondage.
Apavartana It is the process of the reduction of the
sankramana experience and the effects of the karmic
intensities.
Apavartya It is the premature realization of the
ayukarma as in the case of death by
 accident or poisoning.
Apratipati It is a form of avadhijnana clairvoyance
which lasts upto the kevalajnana
omniscience.
Apratyakhya It refers to the kasayas or passions which
na kasaya inhibit the expression of right conduct of a
householder i.e., sravaka.
Abadhakala It is the duration of time from the bondage
of the karma to the rise of the karmic
effect.
Abhigrahita It is the mithyatva or perversity of belief,
which is acquired due to the teaching of
others.
Arupi Formless matter. It has no characteristics
of sabda sound, rupa form, rasa
taste, gandha smell and sparsa
touch.
Arthanaya It is that point of view or naya, which is
different from vyanjana and is
distinguished from the other characteristics
like gender, number, time and agency.
Arthavagraha It is determinate confessional stage in
which there is the awareness of the
sensation.
Ardhamagad It is the ancient language spoken half the
hi bhasa part of the Magadhadesa and it included
the 18 dialects.
Aloka It is space beyond the world. It is the
limitless space.
Avagraha It is a sensational stage of experience.
Avasthita It refers to the substance like pudgala
dravya which has a determinate space points,
dharma, adharma, lokakasa and jiva have
infinite number of space points while
pudgala and alokakasa have endless space
points. These substances never go beyond
their space points hence they re called
Avasthita.
Avaya It refers to the stage of perceptual
apaya experience indriya pratyaksa. It is
perceptual judgement.
Avigrahagati Direct movement of soul. Vigraha means
obstruction or uneven direction. The jiva in
its movement gets uneven direction due to
certain obstructions and that is called
vigrahagati. Contrary to this is direct
movement, it is called rjugati. So the direct
movement of jiva for one samaya is also
 mentioned as avigrahagati.
Avipaka It refers to the karmic matter, which arises
nirjara prematurely due to certain spiritual efforts,
and the karma is destroyed, just as a
mango fruit is prematurely ripened by
artificial methods.
Astikaya It refers to the five substances, they are;
jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and akasa,
because the space points of this substance
signify the collective nature or they are in
collection.
Akasa It is space. It accommodates the
substances like jiva, dharma, adharma,
pudgala and kala.
Agama It is testimony of an authority that is pure
and perfect. It is aptavacana.
Abadhakala It refers to the duration of time between
the bondage of the karma and the fruition
of the karma i.e., the potential state of the
karmic effect.
Abhigrahika It is the state of mine, which is dogmatic,
and which affirms that a particular view is
right and all other are wrong. It is the form
of mithyatva dogmatic assertion.
Indriya Sense organs through which sense-
experience is possible, due to the contact
of the sense organs and the manas.
Iryapathakriy Irya means yoga activity. The karmic flow,
a which is accrued due to one type of
activity, is called Iryapathakarma and
activity is called Iryapathakriya.
Isvara The perfect soul which has attained
kevalajnana and which has reached the
highest stage of perfection is called Isvara.
Iha It is a stage of sensation. It may be called
associative integration by which are
stimulations are received and organized.
Uccagotra It is the state of the individual existence in
this life with reference to his position,
society, his power, form and other status in
social life. This high state of social
existence is attained due to the good
karmas.
Udirana Udirana is that process by which the karmic
matter of long duration and fruition power
is brought in udayavalika so that they can
be experienced soon.
Udvartana It is the increase in the duration and
 intensity of experience of karma.
Udvartanakar To increase the intensity of the karmas
ana which are beyond udayavalika.
Upakaranend These are the material sense organs of the
riya body, which are helpful in perception. For
example, a man seen by the help of cornea,
so cornea is upakaranendriya.
Upayoga It refers to the energy of the soul, which is
responsible for the knowledge and intuition
jnana and darsana.
Rjusutranaya It is the point of view of the momentary
present. The Buddhist point of view is an
example of rjusutranaya.
Ekatva It is recognition in which perceptual
pratyabhijnan judgement and the recollection are
a synthesized. In this form of experience we
recognize an object as the one, which has
been experienced or seen in the past, and
say it is the "same".
Evambhutana It is the point of view, which refers to the
ya sabdanaya, and it refers to the functional
use of the term.
Audarikasarir It refers to the gross body because 'udara'
a means gross.
Audayika It is the state of mind with reference to the
bhava effective state origination from the rise of
the karmic matter.
Karma It is the technical term, which refers to the
after effect of reactivity. The Jaina theory
of karma explains karma in terms of karmic
particles and makes distinction in the
karma as of eight types. Similarly, the
karmic effect may be wholesome or may be
bad. Jainas have given a scientific theory
of karma.
Kasaya It arises due to karmic influx. The kasayas
are the root cause of birth and death that is
cycle of transmigration.
Karmana It is the karmic body, is very subtle, and is
Sarira responsible for the various karmic effects.
Kala Time The Jaina theory of kala gives a realistic
picture of kala as an independent category.
It is mono-dimensional and therefore it is
not an astikaya.
Kevalajnana Omniscient perfect knowledge.
Kevala Omniscient intuitive knowledge.
darsana
Ksaya Destruction of karma.
Chadmastha Chadma means jnanavarana and
darsanavarana karma. The jiva who lives in
the state of these two karmas is
Chadmastha.
Jina One who has conquered the feelings of
attachment and aversion and all the four
types of passions. He is free from 18 types
of defects.
Tapa They are meant to destroy the eight types
of karma.
Austerity
Taijasa sarira In modern technology it can be called as
Electric body.
Trasa Nama Trasa Nama karma refers to the rise of the
karma by which are two to five-sensed
organisms are born.
Darsana It refers to the belief or faith.
Dik It refers to direction in space.
Drstivada The twelfth Holy Scripture Anga of
Jainas. In it the elements with their modes
etc., were vividly described.
Dravya It is the shelter of attributes and modes. It
has origination, destruction and
Substance permanence. It is eternal.
Dravya It is the understanding of the nature of the
niksepa object from the point of view of substance
based on the dialectical considerations.
Dravyastika It is the point of view of substance.
naya
Dvesa Hatred, krodha-anger, mana-egoity, arati-
dislike and Bhaya-fear are expressions of
dvesa.
Dharma Dharma as substance, it is the principle of
dravya motion.
Dharana It is condition of recollection also. It is an
element in avagraha.
Retention
Dhrauvya It refers to the duration or permanence of
the aspect of the substance.
Naya A point of view.
Naraka The nether world where hellish beings
reside.
Nama It refers to the understanding of a thing by
niksepa mean of its name, i.e., proper names
without reference to their nature. It is the
dialectical process.
Nikacita It is a state of karmic particles in which
 there is neither increases nor decreases in
the intensity of the karmic effect. Nor is
there transformation of karmic process.
Niksepa It is a dialectical process which presents the
various aspects for understanding the
nature of the things through the point of
view of substance, dravya, its qualities and
proper name etc.
Nigoda The particular state of jiva is nigoda, in
which it may reside for infinite period of
time.
Nidhatta It is the state of condition karmic in
which the increase of decrease of the
intensity of the karma is determined by the
capacity of the karmic condition. It does
not refer tot he rise udaya or any other
karmic state.
Niyativada Determinism as a theory.
Nirjara It is a process of the removal of the
accumulated karmas.
Nirvana Freedom from bondage of the worldly
existence.
Niscaya naya The noumenal point of view.
Nica gotra The lower and miserable state of an
individual with reference to its individual
and social status.
Naigama The point of view which has a purpose or
naya an end.
Noindriya It is the form of pratyaksa which is due to
pratyaksa the noindriya i.e. mind, without the help of
the sense organs.
Nyasa It is a method of knowing the nature of a
thing from various points of view. It is also
called niksepa.
Paryayarthika The point of view of modes.
naya
Palyopama It is a measure of time by the Jaina
standards.
Papa Demerit.
Pindaprakrti The aggregate of the many sub-types of
karma.
Pudgala Matter.
Lesya A specific theory of the Jainas which says
that the soul gets color due to radiation
from various activities.
Vyapti It is a foundational principle of inference. It
refers to the universal relation between the
 middle term and the major term.
Subhanama The Nama karma which brings auspicious
bodily organs, sweet melodious sound,
fame etc., to an individual.
Sankramana Transformation of one form of the sub-type
of karma into another form of sub-type of
the same karma.
Samjna Instincts. It refers to the instinctive urges
of all animals including even the heavenly
beings regarding hunger, fear, sex urge
and the instinct of possession.
Samjni Jiva which possesses samjna, i.e., mind, by
the help of it, they can learn, think,
understand etc.
Sanghata It is the aggregate of the particles. The
atomic aggregate.
Samvara It is a process to stop the influx of the new
karmas.
Samhanana It is a state of the bondage due to the rise
of certain types of karma. It refers to the
bones of the body.
Sat It is a reality, which refers to the
origination, the destruction and the
permanence of the state of a thing.
Samiti A form of moral rules which refers to the
control control of movement, control of speech and
control of niksepana, etc.
Suksma It neither causes hindrance to others, nor
subtle other things can hinder it.
Sthapana It is the dialectical form of understanding
niksepa the nature of a thing by the recognition of
the present state.
Sthavara It refers to the stationery souls like
Sthavara jivas, the earth and water-bodied
beings, plant...etc.
Syadvada It is the theory of seven-fold predications to
express the comprehensive nature of the
things. It is the special contribution of the
Jainas to the world thought.
Svadhyaya It is the self-study or the study of holy
scriptures means to promote the spiritual
realization of the self.
APPENDIX 3

Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors

SWETAMBARA AND DIGAMBARA

Author Time Work

132 Umasvami V. 03rd Tattvartha Sutra
cen.
133 Umasvati V. 03rd Tattvarthasutra Svopajna
cen. Bhasya
106 Samantabhadra V. 04th Aptamimamsa
cen.
107 Samantabhadra V. 04th Brhatsvayambhustotra
cen.
108 Samantabhadra V. 04th Jivasiddhi
cen.
120 Divakara V. 05th Dvatrimsika
cen.
121 Divakara V. 05th Sanmati Tarka
cen.
119 Siddhasena V. 05th Nyayavatara
cen.
50 Devanandi V. 06th Sara Sangraha
cen.
51 Devanandi V. 06th Jalpanirnaya
cen.
79 Mallavadi V. 06th Nayacakra
cen.
80 Mallavadi V. 06th Sanmatitarka Tika
cen.
91 Patrakesari V. 06th Trilaksanaka Darsana
cen.
130 Sumati V. 06th Sanmatitarka Tika
cen.
131 Sumati V. 06th Sumati Saptaka
cen.
27 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Laghiyastraya -
cen. Svopajnavrtti Sahita
28 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Nyayaviniscaya
cen.
29 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Pramana Sangraha
cen.
30 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Siddhiviniscaya
cen. -Svopajnavrttisahita
 31 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Tattvartharajavartika
cen.
32 Akalanka_deva V. 07th Astasati -Aptamimamsa Ki
cen. Vrtti
33 Amarakirti V. 07th Samayapariksa
cen.
34 Amrtananda Muni V. 07th Nyayadipavaliviveka
cen.
56 Haribhadra V. 08th Anekanta Jayapataka
cen. -With Commentary
57 Haribhadra V. 08th Anekantavada Pravesa
cen.
58 Haribhadra V. 08th Saddarsana Samuccaya
cen.
59 Haribhadra V. 08th Sastravarta Samuccaya
cen. With Commentary
60 Haribhadra V. 08th Nyayapravesa Tika
cen.
61 Haribhadra V. 08th Dharmasangrahani
cen.
62 Haribhadra V. 08th Lokatattva Nirnaya
cen.
63 Haribhadra V. 08th Anekanta Praghatta -In
cen. Jaina Grantha-Granthakara
64 Haribhadra V. 08th Tattva Tarangini
cen.
74 Kumaranandi V. 08th Vadanaya
cen.
134 Vadibhasimha V. 08th Syadvadasiddhi
cen.
135 Vadibhasimha V. 08th Navapadartha Niscaya
cen.
136 Vadibhasimha V. 08th Pramananayatattvalokala
cen. nkara
41 Anantavirya V. 09th Siddhiviniscaya Tika
-vrddha cen.
90 Padmavijayagani V. 09th Kevala Mukti Prakarana
cen.
38 Ananda suri V. 10th Vyatireka Dvatrimsika
cen. -Not Available
35 Anantakirti V. 10th Brhatsarvajnasidohi
cen.
36 Anantakirti V. 10th Laghusarvajnasiddhi
cen.
37 Anantakirti V. 10th Jivasiddhi Tika
cen.
117 Siddharsi V. 10th Nyayavatara-Tika
 cen.
141 Vasunandi V. 10th Atmamimamsa Vrtti
cen.
142 Vidyananda V. 10th Astasahasri
cen.
143 Vidyananda V. 10th Aptapariksa
cen.
144 Vidyananda V. 10th Pramanapariksa
cen.
145 Vidyananda V. 10th Patra Pariksa
cen.
146 Vidyananda V. 10th Satyasasana Pariksa
cen.
147 Vidyananda V. 10th Tattvarthaslokavartika
cen.
148 Vidyananda V. 10th Vidyananda Mahodaya
cen.
149 Vimaladasa V. 10th Saptabhangitarangini
cen.
53 Devasena V. 10th Brhatsarvajnasidohi
cen.
(990)
01 Abhayadeva V. 11th Sanmatitika
cen.
02 Abhayatilaka V. 11th Pancaprastha Nyayatarka
cen. Vyakhya
03 Abhayatilaka V. 11th Tarkanyaya Sutra Tika
cen.
04 Abhayatilaka V. 11th Nyayalankara Vrtti
cen.
05 Ajitasena V. 11th Nyayamanidipika
cen. -Prameya Ratnamala Tika
06 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Saddarsana
cen.
07 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Slokavartikatippani
cen.
08 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Saddarsanaprapanca
cen.
09 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Prameya
cen. Ratnamalalaghuvrtti
10 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Svamatasthapana
cen.
11 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Srstivada Pariksa
cen.
12 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Saptabhangi
cen.
13 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Sanmatitarka
 cen.
14 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Sabdakhandavyakhyana
cen.
15 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Pramanasiddhi
cen.
16 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Pramanapadartha
cen.
17 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Paramatakhandana
cen.
18 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Nyayabhuta
cen.
19 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Nayasangraha
cen.
20 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Nayalaksana
cen.
21 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Nyayapramanabhedi
cen.
22 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Nyayapradipika
cen.
23 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Pramananaya Prabandha
cen.
24 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Pramanalaksana
cen.
25 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Matakhandanavada
cen.
26 Ajnatakartrka V. 11th Visesavada
cen.
71 Jinesvara suri V. 11th Sanmati Tika,
cen. Prabhalaksya Satika
76 Mailladhavala V. 11th Dravyasvabhava Prakasa
cen.
83 Manikyanandi V. 11th Pariksamukha
cen.
92 Prabhacandra V. 11th Prameyakamalamartanda
cen. -Pariksamukhatika
93 Prabhacandra V. 11th Nyayakumudacandra
cen. -Laghiyastrayatika
94 Prabhacandra V. 11th Paramatajhanjhamila
cen.
109 Santi suri V. 11th Nyayavataravartika
cen. -Purnatallagacchiya
Savrtti
122 Somadeva V. 11th Syadvadopanisad
cen.
138 Vadiraja suri V. 11th Nyaya Viniscaya Vivarana
cen.
139 Vadiraja suri V. 11th Pramana Nirnaya
 cen.
140 Vajranandi V. 11th Pramanagrantha
cen.
39 Anantavirya V. 12th Prameyaratnamala
cen. -Pariksamukha Tika
43 Bhavasena V. 12th Visvatattvaprakasa
traividha cen.
49 Devabhadra suri V. 12th Nyayavatara Tippana
cen.
65 Hemacandra V. 12th Pramana Mimamsa
cen.
66 Hemacandra V. 12th Anyayogavyavacchedadva
cen. trimsatika
86 Municandra suri V. 12th Anekanta Jayapataka Vrtti
cen. Tippana
124 Sricandra suri V. 12th Nyaya Pravesa
cen.
125 Sricandra suri V. 12th Haribhadra Vrtti Panjika
cen.
126 Subhaprakasa V. 12th Nyayamakaranda
cen. Vivecana
137 Vadideva suri V. 12th Syadvada Ratnakara
cen.
40 Asadhara V. 13th Prameya Ratnakara
cen.
46 Candrasena V. 13th Utpadadi Siddhi Satika
cen.
47 Carukirti V. 13th Prameya Ratnalankara
Panditacarya cen.
52 Devaprabha V. 13th Pramana Prakasa
cen.
70 Jinapati suri V. 13th Vadasthala
cen.
75 Laghu V. 13th Astasahasri-Tippana
Samantabhadra cen.
77 Malayagiri V. 13th Dharmasangrahani Tika
cen.
78 Mallavadi V. 13th Dharmottara Tippanaka
cen. -With Pt. Dalsukhabhai
87 Naracandra suri V. 13th Nyayakandali Tika
cen.
88 Narendrasena V. 13th Pramana-Prameya Kalika
cen.
89 Nemicandra V. 13th Pravacana Pariksa
cen.
95 Pradyumna suri V. 13th Vadasthala
cen.
 96 Pravarakirti V. 13th Tattvaniscaya
cen.
97 Ramacandra suri V. 13th Vyatireka Dvatrimsika
cen.
102 Ratnaprabha suri V. 13th Syadvada Ratnavatarika
cen.
81 Mallisena V. 14th Syadvada Manjari
cen.
82 Manikanta V. 14th Nyayaratna
cen.
123 Soma tilaka V. 14th Saddarsana Tika
cen.
(1392)
44 Bhuvansundara suri V. 15th Parabrahmotthapana - In
cen. Jaina Grantha-Granthakara
Laghu-
Mahavidyavidambana
54 Dharmabhusana V. 15th Nyayadipika
cen.
55 Gunaratna V. 15th Saddarsana Samuccaya Ki
cen. Tarkarahasya Dipika
68 Jayasimha suri V. 15th Ratnakaravatarika
cen. Tippana
69 Jinadeva V. 15th Karunya Kalika
cen.
72 Jnanacandra V. 15th Ratnakaravatarika
cen. Tippana
73 Khandanakanda V. 15th Tattvadipika
cen.
85 Merutunga V. 15th Saddarsana Nirnaya
cen.
98 Rajasekhara V. 15th Syadvada Karika
cen.
99 Rajasekhara V. 15th Ratnakaravatarika Panjika
cen.
100 Rajasekhara V. 15th Saddarsana Samuccaya
cen.
101 Rajasekhara V. 15th Nyayakandali Panjika
cen.
104 Sadhuvijaya V. 16th Vadavijaya Prakarana
cen.
105 Sakatayana V. 16th Strimukti Prakarana
cen.
111 Santisena V. 16th Prameya Ratnakara
cen.
112 Santivarni V. 16th Prameyakanthika
cen. -Pariksamukhavrtti
110 Satyaraja V. 16th Jalpamanjari -In Jaina
cen. Grantha Granthakara
118 Siddhantasara V. 16th Darsana Ratnakara -In
cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
113 Subhacandra V. 16th Samsayavadana Vidarana
cen.
114 Subhacandra V. 16th Saddarsanapramana
cen.
115 Subhacandra V. 16th Prameya Sangraha
cen.
116 Subhacandra deva V. 16th Pariksamukha Vrtti
cen.
45 Bhavavijaya V. 17th Sad Trimsatjalpa
cen. Samksepa
48 Devaratna V. 17th Nyaya Ratnavali -In Jaina
cen. Grantha-Granthakara
129 Subhaprakasa Muni V. 17th Nyayadipavali Tika
cen.
127 Subhavijaya V. 17th Tarkabhasavartika -In
cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
128 Subhavijaya V. 17th Syadvad Mala
cen.
150 Vinaya vijaya V. 17th Sad Trimsatjalpa
cen. Samksepa
155 Yasovijaya V. 17th Anekanta Pravesa
-Upadhyaya cen.
156 Yasovijaya V. 17th Astasahasri Vivarana
-Upadhyaya cen.
157 Yasovijaya V. 17th Anekantavyavastha
-Upadhyaya cen.
158 Yasovijaya V. 17th Atmakhyati -In Jaina
-Upadhyaya cen. Grantha Granthakara
159 Yasovijaya V. 17th Bhasa Rahasya
-Upadhyaya cen.
160 Yasovijaya V. 17th Devadharmapariksa
-Upadhyaya cen.
161 Yasovijaya V. 17th Dharma Pariksa
-Upadhyaya cen.
162 Yasovijaya V. 17th Dravyaloka Vivarana
-Upadhyaya cen.
163 Yasovijaya V. 17th Dravya Paryaya Yukti -In
-Upadhyaya cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
164 Yasovijaya V. 17th Dvatrimsad Dvatrimsatika
-Upadhyaya cen.
165 Yasovijaya V. 17th Gurutattva Viniscaya
-Upadhyaya cen.
166 Yasovijaya V. 17th Jnanabindu -In Navya Saili
 -Upadhyaya cen.
167 Yasovijaya V. 17th Jnanarvana
-Upadhyaya cen.
168 Yasovijaya V. 17th Jaintarkabhasa
-Upadhyaya cen.
169 Yasovijaya V. 17th Mangalavada -In Jaina
-Upadhyaya cen. Grantha And Granthakara
170 Yasovijaya V. 17th Nyaya Bindu
-Upadhyaya cen.
171 Yasovijaya V. 17th Nyayakhanda Khadya
-Upadhyaya cen. -Navysaili
172 Yasovijaya V. 17th Nyayaloka
-Upadhyaya cen.
173 Yasovijaya V. 17th Naya Rahasya
-Upadhyaya cen.
174 Yasovijaya V. 17th Nayapradipa
-Upadhyaya cen.
175 Yasovijaya V. 17th Nayopadesa
-Upadhyaya cen.
176 Yasovijaya V. 17th Pramana Rahasya -In Jaina
-Upadhyaya cen. Grantha Granthakara
177 Yasovijaya V. 17th Sastravartasamuccaya
-Upadhyaya cen.
178 Yasovijaya V. 17th Siddhanta Manjari Tika -In
-Upadhyaya cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
179 Yasovijaya V. 17th Siddhanta Tarka Pariksa
-Upadhyaya cen.
180 Yasovijaya V. 17th Syadvada Manjusa
-Upadhyaya cen. -Commentary On
Syadvada Manjari
181 Yasovijaya V. 17th Tattvaloka Vivarana
-Upadhyaya cen.
182 Yasovijaya V. 17th Trisutryaloka
-Upadhyaya cen.
183 Yasovijaya V. 17th Utpadvyayadhrauyasiddhi
-Upadhyaya cen. tika
184 Yasovijaya V. 17th Vadamaharnava -In Jaina
-Upadhyaya cen. Grantha Granthakara
185 Yasovijaya V. 17th Vadamala
-Upadhyaya cen.
186 Yasovijaya V. 17th Vedanta Nirnaya
-Upadhyaya cen.
187 Yasovijaya V. 17th Vidhivada
-Upadhyaya cen.
67 Jagannatha V. 17th Kevalibhuktinirakarana
cen.
(1703)
 42 Bhavaprabhasuri V. 18th Nayopadesa Tika
cen.
151 Yasastava sagara V. 18th Jaina Sapta Padarthi
cen.
152 Yasastava sagara V. 18th Pramana Vadartha -In
cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
153 Yasastava sagara V. 18th Syadvada Muktavali
cen.
154 Yasastava sagara V. 18th Vadartha Nirupana -In
cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
84 Mayacandra V. 19th Jnanakriyavada -In Jaina
cen. Grantha-Granthakara
103 Rddhisagara V. 20th Nirnaya Prabhakara -In
cen. Jaina Grantha Granthakara
1
. Indian Philosophy, (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1966), Vol. I, p. 43.
1
. Rgveda, 10. 151, 1-5.
2
. Gita, 4.39.
1
. Manusmrti, VI. 74.
1
. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics edited by James Hastings, (New York: T & T Clark, 1956)
Vol. 10, p. 693.
1
. Ayam nijah paroveti ganana laghucetsam.
Udaracaritanam tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam.
2
. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, (Allen & Unwin: London, 1961), Vol. I, p. 31.
3
. Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Part III, 1922, p. 105.
4
. T.S. Devadoss, Sarvodaya and the Problem of Political Sovereignty, (University of Madras,
1974) p. 9.
5
. Ibid, p. 30.
1
. Sahitya Aur Samskrti, pp. 29-30.
2
. Avasyaka-niryukti, 777.
1
. Sri Devardhigani Ksamasramanena srivirad asityadhikanavasata (980) varse jatena
dvadasavarsiya durbhiksavasad bahutarasadhuvyapattau bahusrutavicchittau ca jataya...
bhavyalokopakaraya sturavyaktaye ca srisanghagrahat mrtavasistatadakalina sarvasadhun
Vallabhyamakarya tanmukhad vicchinnavasistan nyunadhikan trutitaatrutitan agamalapakan
anukramena svamatya samkalayya pustakarudhah krtah. Tato mulato Ganadharabhasitanamapi
tatsamkalanantaram sarvesamapi Agamanam karta Sri Devardhigani Ksamasramana eva jatah
- Samacari sataka.
1
. Jaina Darsana
(a) Jaina Darsanika Sahitya Ka Simhavalokana-Sri Dalsukha Bhai Malavaniya.
(B) Visva darsana Ki Ruparekha-Pandit Vijaya Muni
(c) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha.
1
. Tathagata Buddha said that the following ten questions are unanswerable- (1) Is the world
eternal? (2) Is it non-eternal? (3) Has it an end? (4) Is it endless? (5) Is the soul and body one?
(6) Are they different? (7) Does the Tathagata exist after death? (8) Does he not exist after
death? (9) Does he exist and not exist after death? (10) Does he neither exist nor no-exist after
death? -Majjhimanikaya, culamalunkya sutta-63.
2
. Bhagavati: 1, 6.
1
. Bhagavati: 13, 4.
2
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 2.
1
. Bhagavati: 2. 1, 90.
2
. Bhagavati: 11, 10.
1
. Uttaradhyayana: 19, 8; 18, 29; 5, 24; 14, 41.
2
. Uttaradhyayana tika: Acarya Atmaram, p. 1668.
3
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 57-62.
4
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 56.
1
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 50; 36, 54.
2
. Tattvarthasutra: 3, 35. : Prang Manusottaranmanusyah.
3
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 7.
4
. Tattvarthasutra 3, 10: Bharata-Haimavata-Hari-Videha-Ramyaka-Hairanyavata-Airavata
ksetrani.
1
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 195-196.
2
. Uttaradhyayana: 36, 196.
1
. Tattvarthasutra: 3, 1-2.
2
. Sarvarthasiddhi: 3, 1.
1
. Sarvarthasiddhi: 3, 1.
1
. Tattvarthasutra: 2, 52; 3, 3-5.
2
. Uttaradhyayanasutra-eka Parisilana: p. 61.
3
. Brhadaranyoka Upanishad: 3, 6, 1.
1
. Bhagavati: one, 6.
1
. Satapatha Brahmana 1, 1, 2, 3. Tad dvabhyameva pratyvaida rupena caiva namna ca.
1
. Rgveda: 10, 129 Nasadiya sukta. Nasadasinnosadasittadanim nasidrajo no vyoma paro yat.
‘Ko addha veda ka iha pravocat kuta ajata kuta iyam visrstih. Arvag deva asya visarjnernatha ko
veda mata ababhuva. ‘Iyam visrstiryata ababhuva yadi va dadhe yadi va na. Yo asyadhyaksah
parame vyomantosonga veda yadi va na veda’.
1
. Saddarsana samuccaya.
2
. Visuddhimaggo.
1
. “The illusion of permanence is ascribed to the senses. It is by reason that we arise to the
knowledge of the law of becoming.”
2
. David Hume, Ibid.
3
. William James: Principles of Psychology.
4
. Bergson, Henry: Creative Evolution.
1
. Syadvadamanjari-7. Ayuta siddhanamadharyadharabhutanam iha pratyayahetuh
sambandhah sa samavayah.
1
. Sri Bhasya of Ramanuja 3, 1, 9. ‘’Sarvam paramapurusena sarvatmana.’’
1
. Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika-25. ‘’Syannasi nityam sadrsam virupam Vacyam Na
vacyam sadasattadeva’’.
2
. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy- W. T. Stace.
3
. Dr. Mohanlal Mehta: Jainadharma aur Darsana.
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 29.
2
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 37.
3
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 30.
1
. Pravacanasara: 2, 3. Apariccattasahavenuppadavvayadhuvattasamjuttam. Gunavam ca
sapajjayam, jam tam davvam ti buccanti.
2
. Pancastikayasara, gatha 8. Satta savvapayattha, savissaruva anantapajjaya.
Bhangupadadhuvatta, sappadivakkha havadi ekka.
1
. (a) Patanjala Yogadarsana: ‘’Dravyam nityamakrtiranitya. Suvarnam kadacidakrtya yuktah
pindo bhavati, pindakrtimupamrdya rucakah kriyante, rucakakrtimupardya katakah kriyante,
katakakrtimupamrdya svastikah kriyante. Punaravrtah suvarna pindah...Akrtiranya canya ca
bhavati, dravyam punastadeva. Akrtyupabhdena dravyamevavasisyate.
(B) Mimamsa Slokavartika: 1-3 p. 619. Vardhamanakabhange, ca rucakah kriyate yada.
Tadapurvarthinah sokapraptiscapyuttararthinah. Hemarthinastu madhyastham tasmadvastu
trayatmakam. Notpadasthibhanganamabhava syanmatirayam. Na nasena vina soko, notpadena
vina sukkham. Sthitya vina na madhyasthyam, tena samanyanityata.
2
. Bhagavati sutra: 7-3-279.
1
. Bhagavati sutra: 25, 5.
2
. Prajnapana, 5, 248.
1
. Bhagavati sutra 12, 10, 466.
2
. Sthananga 8.
1
. Dr. Mohanlal Mehta: Jaindharma aur Darsana (Hindi) pp. 123-129.
1
. Brhatnayacakra 4- Tattarm taha paramattham davvasahavam taheva paramaparam. Dheyam
suddham paramam eyattha hunti abhihana. Tattva, paramartha, dravya svabhava, par-apara,
dhyeya, suddha parama-all these are synonyms.
1
. Brhaspati: Prthivyapastejovayuriti tattvani.
1
. Bhagavati: Abhigama jivajiva uvaladdha punnapava asava samvara nijjara kiriyahigarana
bandha mokkha kusala.
2
. Prajnapana.
3
. Uttaradhyayana, 28, 14.
4
. Sthananga, 2.
5
. Tattvarthasutra, 1, 4.
6
. Prajnapanavrtti.
1
. Sutrakrtanga, 1, 1, 1, 7-8.
2
. Sutrakrtanga, 1, 1, 1, 7. Santi panca mahbbhuya ihamegesimahiya. Pudhavi au teu va vau
agasa pancaya.
3
. Brahmajalasutta.
4
. Rigveda-1, 164, 37. -Na va janami yadiva idava idamasmi.
1
. Svetasvatara Upanishad, 1, 2.
2
. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, 2, 4, 12.
3
. Visesavasyakabhasya, gatha 1553.
4
. Nyayamanjari-Vijayanagaram series, p. 472.
5
. Sutrakrtanga, 1, 1, 17-18.
6
. Dighanikaya-Samanna phalasutta.
7
. Sutrakrtanga, 2, 9-10 (a) iti padhame purisajaye tajjivatacharirae tti ahie (b) docce purisajaye
pancamahabbhuie tti ahie (c) Sutrakrtanga-niryukti, gatha 30
8
. Visesavasyakabhasya-doubts of Vayubhuti
9
. Majjhimanikaya-culamalunkya sutta
1
. Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 77
2
. Sutrakrtanga, Pundarika adhyayana.
3
. Tattvopaplavasimha, p.1.
4
. Tattvasangrahapanjika, p. 205.
1
. Taittiriya Upanisad, 2, 1, 2.
1
. Taittiriya Upanisad, 2, 2,3; Kausitaki, 3, 2.
2
. Chandogya Upanishad, 3, 15, 4.
3
. Brhadaranyaka, 1, 5, 21.
4
. Atmamimamsa, edt. Dalsukha Malavania, p. 13.
5
. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 1, 5, 21.
6
. Sa mkhyakarika, 44.
1
. Atmamimamsa, p. 15
2
. Nyayasutra, 3, 2, 61.
3
. Vaisesikasutra, 7, 1, 23.
4
. Abhidharma Kosa-Sannamanantaratitam vinanam yaddhi tanmanah.
5
. (a) Nyayasutra, 3, 1, 16. (b) Nyayavartka, p. 336.
6
. Taittiriya, Up. 2, 3.
7
. Brhadaranyaka, Up, 1, 5, 3.
8
. Brhadaranyaka, Up, 4, 1, 6.
9
. Chandogya, Up., 7, 3, 1.
1
. Tejobindu Up, 5, 98, 104.
2
. Kausitaki Up., 3, 6, 7.
3
. Taittiriya Up., 2, 4.
4
. Aitareya Up., 3, 2.
5
. Aitareya Up., 3, 3.
6
. Aitareya Up., 3, 2.
1
. Kausitaki, 3, 8.
2
. Ibid., 3, 2.
3
. Ibid., 3, 5.
4
. Ibid., 3, 7.
5
. Katha Up., 1, 3, 10-11.
1
. (a) Maitreyi Up., 2, 3, 4.
(b) Katha Up., 1, 3, 3.
2
. Prasnopanisad, 3, 3.
3
. Kena Upanisad, 1, 4, 6.
4
. Taittiriya Up., 2, 6.
5
. Mandukya Up., -Sarvam hi etadbrahma ayamatma brahma.
6
. Katha Up., 1, 3, 10-12.
1
. Brhadaranyaka, 4, 3, 6-9. Vijnanatma and prajnanaghana (4, 5, 13) are distinct. The former is
prakrt and later is Purusa-cetana.
2
. Brhadaranyaka, 3, 7, 22.
3
. Ibid, 3, 4, 1-2.
4
. Ibid, 3, 7, 23; 3, 8, 11.
5
. Maitreyi Up., 3, 16, 21.
6
. Katha Up., 1, 1, 23-29.
1
. Brhadaranyaka Up., 2, 4, 3.
2
. Ibid, 4, 5, 6.
1
. Uttaradhyayanasutra, 28, 11.
2
. Tattvarthasutra, 2, 26.
3
. Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 81.
2
. Ibid, 18
3
. Samkhyakarika 19, 20.
4
. (a) Samkhyakarika 40.
(b) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 83
1
. Samkhyakarika 62.
2
. Samkhyakarika 40.
3
. Vaisesika Darsana 3, 2, 20; 3, 2, 21.
4
. Vaisesika Darsana 7, 1, 22- Vibhavanmahanakasastatha catma.
1
. Prasatapadabhasya, Dravyasadharmya Prakarana-‘’Anasritattvanityattve canyatrava
yavidravyebhyah.’’
2
. (a) Vaisesika darsana 3, 2, 4; 5, 3, 5; 9, 3, 6.
(b) Prasastapadabhasyagata Atmanirupana.
3
. (a) Nyayabhasya 1, 22.
(b) Introduction to Ganadharavada p. 105, Dalsukha Malavania.
© Bhartiya Tattvavidya-Pandit Sukhalalji, p. 86.
1
. Nyayavartka, 3, 1, 6.
1
. (a) Nyayavartika 3, 2, 68.
(b) Ganadharavada, p. 121 (Introduction)
© Bhartiya Tattvavidya, P. 89 (footnote) Pandit Sukhalalji.
1
. Refer for the three views of Buddhistic Metaphysics-Buddhist Logic, Vol. 1, pp. 3-14, also
Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 26.
2
. Visuddhimaggo-khandhaniddesa, 14.
3
. Brhadaranyaka Up., 1, 4, 7.-tadvedam tarhya vyakrtamasit tannamarupabhyameva
vyakriyata.
1
. Abhidharmodipa & notes, p. 254 ff.
(a) kah punaratra samyujyate? (p. 254),…paudgalisyapi ayakrtavastuvadinah pudgaloapi
dravyatoastiti (p. 258)…nagnatapakse prakseptavyah (p. 259).
(b) Tattvasangraha, karika 336.
2
. (a) Tattvasangraha me Traikalika Pariksa, karika 1786, p. 503.
(b) Abhidharmdipa-tippana sahita karika 299, p. 250.
1
. (a) Pramanavarttika 2, 327.
(b) Tattvasangraha ki bahirarthapariksa, pp. 550-82.
2
. Santanantara Siddhi Dharmakirti has discussed it in this book.
3
. Visuddhimaggo-14. 60; 17, 163.
1
Abhidharmodipa, p.142 with notes.
2
. (a) Visuddhimaggo, 17-163
(b) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 99.
3
. Bhartiya Tattvavidya, p. 100.
1
. (a) Brahma Siddhi, p.9-‘Jivobrahmaiva naparah.’
(b) Dr. C.D. Sharma: Bauddhadarsana and Vedanta, p.234.
1
. Vedantasuktimanjari, I paricheda, karika, 28-40.
2
. Ibid. 41.
3
. Ibid. 42.
4
. Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 104.
1
. Vedanta sukti manjari, karika, 43-44.
1
. Kathopanisad 2, 15, 18-‘’na hanyate hanyamane sarire’’
2
. (a) Kathopanisad, 2, 3, 7, 80-The mind is superior to the senseorgans, buddhi superior to the
manas, mahat greater than buddhi, avyakta greater than mahat and purusa greater than
avyakta, Purusa is pervasive (vyapaka) and alinga (without sex).
(b) Kathopanisad, 1, 3, 10, 11-There is nothing greater than purusa.
3
. Isa Upanisad-Isavasyamidam sarvam yatkinca jagatyam jagat.
4
. Bhagavadgita, 2-25.
5
. Taittiriya Upanisad, 2, 4.
1
. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4, 5, 15-Sa Esa Neti-Neti.
2
. Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 3, 9, 8.
3
. Ibid, 5, 6.
4
. Chandogya Up. 5, 18, 1-Pradesa matram.
5
. Kausitaki Up. 35, 4, 20 Esa prajnatma idam-sariramanupravistah.
6
. Mundaka Up. 1, 1, 6.-Sarvagatah
7
. Chandogya Up. 3, 14, 3.
8
. Bhagavati 2, 10-Jivatthikaye-loye, loyamette, loyappamane.
9
. Bhagavati 6, 6, 17.
1
. Nandisutra.
2
. Addaamalagupamane pudhavikae havanti je jiva. Te parevayamitta jambudive na mainti.
1
. Egammi dagabindummi je jinavarehim, pannatta. Te jai sarisavamitta jambudive na mainti.
2
. Varattitandulamitta teu, jiva jinehim pannatta. Mattha palikkha pamana; jambudive na mainti
3
. Je limvapatta pharisa vau jiva jinehim pannatta. Te jai khasakhasamitta, jambudive na mainti
1
. Sutrakrtangavrtti, 1, 8.
1
. Tandula Veyaliya. "Imammi sariraye sathisirasayam nabhippabhavanam uddhagamininam
siram upagayanam jau rasaharniotti ccai. Vujasim nam irruvaghaenam
cakkhusoyaghanajihabalam bhavai."
2
. Caraka Samhita - Pranah pranabhrtam yarta, tatha sarvendriyani ca.
Yaduttamangamanganam sirastadabhidiyate.
1
. The Modern Review of Calcutta, July 1936.
2
. Ibid.
3
. First Principles 1900
4
. The modern Review of Calcutta, July 1936
1
. Uttaradhyayana Sutra, 36, 69.
2
. Ibid, 36, 70. Pudhavi aujiva ya taheva ya vanassai Icceye thavara tiviha tesim bheye suneha
me.
3
. Ibid, 36, 78, 86, 100
4
. Ibid, 26, 72.
1
. Kautiliya Arthasastra, 11, 36.
2
. Uttaradhyayana Brhadvrtti, patra 689.
3
. Uttaradhyayana , 36, 86.
4
. Uttaradhyayana, 36, 95-96.
1
. Uttaradhyanasutra, 36, 97-100.
2
. Ibid, 36, 108-127.
3
. Ibid, 36, 112-121.
4
. Ibid, 36, 101-109.
5
. Ibid, 36, 119-120.
6
. Dasavaikalika, adhyayana 4, sutra 9.
1
. Uttaradhyayanasutra, 36, 127.
2
. Ibid, 36, 172.
3
. Ibid, 36, 173.
4
. Ibid, 36, 180.
5
. Ibid, 36, 181.
6
. Ibid, 36, 182.
1
. Uttaradhyayana sutra, 36, 188.
2
. Ibid, 6, 10.
3
. Ibid, 36, 269; 28, 30.
4
. Ibid, 14, 4.
5
. Ibid, 23, 83; 10, 35.
6
. Ibid, 14, 48; 7, 25.
7
. Ibid, 18, 38; 18, 39-40, 42, 43, 48.
8
. Ibid, 19, 68.
9
. Ibid, 36, 67.
10
. Ibid, 28, 3
11
. Ibid, 29, 44, 21, 24.
12
. Ibid, 29, 3.
13
. Ibid, 29, 58.
1
. Uttaradhyayanasutra 36, 66.
(a) Aruvino jivaghana nanadamsanasanniya. Aulam suhamsampatta uvama jassa natthi u.
(b) Uttaradhyayana 29, 28; 9, 4; 29, 41.
2
. Uttaradhyayana sutra 36, 64-
3 Usselo jassa jo hoibhavammi carimammi u.
4 Tibhagahino tatto ya siddhanogahana bhave.
1
. 154 Bhagavati 3, 3.
2
. 155 Bhagavati, 7, 1, 265-
4 Nissangayae niranganae gatiparinamenam bandhana cheyande.
5 Nirindhanaye puvvappaogenam akammssa gati pannayati.
1
. Sthananga, 2, 1, 57.
2
. Panchastikaya, 2, 122.
3
. Panchastikaya 2, 124-125.
4
. (a) Uttaradhyayana sutra, 36.
(b) Samavayanga. 149
1
. (a) Bhagavati, 18, 7; 7, 10.
(b) Uttaradhyayana sutra 36, 6.
2
. Hollywood, R and T: Instruction Lesson No.2, What is either?
I am quite sure that you have heard of Ether before now, but please do not confuse it with the
Liquid Etherized by surgeons, to render a patient unconscious for an operation. If you should ask
me just what the Ether is, that is, the Ether that conveyed electromagnetic waves. I would
answer that I cannot accurately describe it. Neither can any one else. The best that anyone
could do would be to say that Ether is invisible body and that through it electromagnetic waves
can be propagated.
But let us see from a practical standpoint the nature of the thing called 'Ether'. We are all quite
familiar with the existence of solids, liquids and gases. Now suppose, that inside a glass vessel
there are no solids, liquids or gases: that all of these things have been removed including the air
as well.
If i were to ask you to describe the condition that now exists with the glass-vessel, you would
promptly reply that noting exists within it that a vacuum has been created. But i shall have to
correct you, and explain that within this vessel there does exist 'Ether' noting else.
So neither we may say that 'Ether' is a something that is not a solid, nor liquid, nor gaseous, nor
anything else which can be observed by us physically. Therefore, we may say that an absolute
vacuum cannot be created, for Ether cannot be removed.
We get our knowledge of Ether from experiments: by observing results and deducing facts. For
example, if within the glass-vessel, mentioned above, we place a bell and cause it to ring, no
sound of any king reaches our ears. Therefore, we deduce that in the absence of air, sound does
not exist, and thus, that sound must be due to vibration in the air.
Now let us place a radio transmitter inside the enclosure that is void of air. We find that radio
signals are sent out exactly the same as when the transmitter was exposed to the air. So we are
right in deducing that electromagnetic waves or Radio waves do not depend on air for their
propagation that they are propagated through or by means of 'something' which remained inside
the glass enclosure after the air had been exhausted. This something has been named 'Ether'.
We believe that Ether exists throughout all space of the universe; in the most remote region of
the stars, and at the same time within the earth, and in the seemingly impossible small space,
which exists between the atoms of all matter. That is to say, Ether is everywhere; and that
electromagnetic wave can be propagated everywhere.
1
. Prajnapana, Pada 1, Vrtti- Dharmadharmavibhuttavat sarvatra ca jiva pudgalavicarat.
Nalokah kaschit syanna ca sammatametadarthanam. Tasmaddharmadharmau, avagadhau
vyapta lokakham sarvam. Evam hi paricchinnah siddhyati lokastad vibhuttvat.
1
. Prajnapana, Pada 1, vrtti-Lokalokavyavasthanupapatteh.
2
. Nyayavatara- Yo vyuta pattimacchuddhapadabhidheyah sa savipaksah. Yatha ghatoaghata
vipaksakah Yasca lokasya vipaksah soalokah.
3
. Bhagavati, 13, 4.
1
. Bhagavati, 13, 4.
2
. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 31
1
. Niscayadvatrimsika, 24 Prayogavisrasakarma tadabhavasthistaha. Lokanubhavavrittantah
kim dharmadharmayo falam.
2
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 18-Akasasyavagahah.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 28, 9-Bhayanam savvadavvanam naham ogahalakkhanam.
4
. Bhagavati, 13, 4.
1
. Uttaradhyayana, 36, 2.
1
. Tattvartharajavartika 5, 10, 2.
2
. Baldeva Upadhyaya: Bauddha Darsana, p. 239 (Hindi)
1
. Tarkasangraha p. 2, 9. Tatra dravyani prthivyaptejovayyakasakaladigatmamanansi
navaiva---sabdagunakamakasam. Tatryaikam vibhunityam ca...pracyadi vyavaharaheturdik.
2
. Vaisesika Sutra 2, 2, 13.
3
. Nyayakarikavali 46, 47. Durantikadidhheturika nitvadigucvate. Upadhibhedadekapi pracyadi
vyapadesabhak.
4
(a) Sadananda: Vedantasara, p. 32
(b) Samkhyakarika, 3.
1
. Acaranganiryukti, 42, 44.
2
. Ibid, 47, 48.
3
. Ibid, 51.
4
. Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain: Jaina Darsana, p.74
1
. Abhidharma Kosa 1, 5, -Tarakasamanavrttih.
2
. Ibid. 1, 28-Chidramakasadhatvakhyam alokatamasi kila.
1
. Cosmology, p. 101.
2
. Cosmology, p. 97.
3
. Refer to (a) Physics and Philosophy-Varanar Haisanavarg, p. 81. (b) From Euclid to Eddington,
p. 16-17. (c) The Philosophy of Space and Time, Introduction, p. 60.
1
. Bhagavati 25, 4, 734.
2
. Uttaradhyayana, 28, 7-8.
3
. Jivabhigama.
4
. Prajnapana, Pada 1, Sutra 3.
5
. Tattvarthasutra 5, 38-39 and see its bhasya by Siddhasena.
6
. Dvatrimsika.
7
. Visesavasyaka bhasya 926 and 2068.
8
. Dharmasangrahani, Gatha 32 tika by Malayagiri.
9
. Yogasastra.
10
. Dravyagunaparyaya rasa, see Prakarana Ratnakara, pt. I, Gatha 10.
11
. Lokaprakasa.
12
. Nayacakrasara and Agamasara.
13
. Pravacanasara, 2, gatha 46-47.
14
. Tattvarthasarvarthasiddhi 5, 38-39.
15
. Tattvartharajavartika, 5, 38-39.
16
. Tattvarthaslokavartika, 5, 38-39.
1
. Pandit Sukhalalji: Darsana aur Cintana, p. 331.
2
. Pandit Sukhalalji: Darsana aur Cintana, p. 332.
3
. (A) Bhagavati 2, 10, 120; 11, 11, 424-483; 25, 4 etc. (b) Prajnana, Pada 1. (c) Uttaradhyayana
28, 10.
4
. Sthanangasutra, 95.
1
. Uttaradhyayana, 28, 7 Dhammo adhammo agasam kalo paggala-jantavo. Esa logo tti pannatto
jinehim varadamsihi.
2
. Bhagavati 13, 4, 481. (a) Kimiyam bhante! Layette pavuccai? Goyama, pancatthikaya. (b)
pancastikaya, gatha 3.
3
. Agama yug ka Jaina-darsana, p. 214.
4
. Sthananga, 5, 3, 441.
5
. Jivabhigama, 4.
6
. Bhagavati 13, 4, 481.
7
. Pancastikaya, Gatha 3,
8
. Uttaradhyayana, 36, 6, Dammadhamme ya do ceva logamitta viyahie. Logaloge va agase,
samaye samaya-khettie.
1
. Dravyasangraha, 22.
2
. Sthananga 4.
1
. Bhagavati, 11, 11.
1
. See-Upanisad vakya kosa.
2
. Vaisesikaddarsana 2, 2, 6-9. Aparasminnaparam ugapacciram ksipramiti kalalingani.
Dravyatva nityatve vayuna vyakhyatam. Tattvam bhavanaNityesvabhavadanityesu
bhavatkarana kalakhyeti.
1
. Yuktisnehaprapurani siddhantacandrika, 1, 1, 5, 5. Nasmakam vaisesika deyadapratyaksah
kalah, kintu pratyaksa evam, asminksane mayopalabdha ityanubhavat. Arupasyaapyakasavat
pratyaksatvam bhavisyati.
2
. Samkhya pravacana 2, 12-Dikkalavakasadibhyah.
1
. Darsana one Cintana, part 2, p.1028-Bhasya of Yogadarsana, Pada 3, Sutra 52.
2
. Atthsalini 1, 3, 16.
2
. Sabdakalpadruma kosa-In the fifth temporal stage (samaya) of kevalinasamudghata the matter
that is separated from the atman pervades the entire universe and it is called
"acittamahaskandha".
1
. Sabdakalpadrumkosa-Puranat pud galayatiti galah.
2
. Tattvartharajavartika 5, 1, 24- Puranagalananyarthasamjnatvat pudgalah.
3
. (a) Tattvarthavrtti 5, 1-Puranad galanacca pudgalah. (b) Nyayakosa, p. 502-Puranad galanad iti
pudgalah.
4
. Dhavala-Chavihasanthanam bahuvihi dehehi puraditti galaditti poggala.
5
. Harivamsapurana 7, 36-Varna-gandha-rasa-sparsah-puranam galanam ca yat. Kurvanti
skandhavat tasmat pudgalah paramanavah.
6
. (a) Tattvarthasutra 5, 23-Sparsarasagandhavarnavantah pudgalah. (b) Bhagavati, 2, 10.
1
. (a) Bhagavati, 2, 10, 66. (b) Uttaradhyayana, 36, 10.
2
. Tattvarthasutra 5, 26-Bhedasanghatebhya utpadyante.
3
. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 26.
1
. Bhagavati 5, 7.
2
. Bhagavati 5, 7-Paramanu poggale nam bhante! Kim sa-addhe, samajjhe, sapaese udahu-
anaddhe amajjhe apaese? Goyama! anaddhe, amajjhe, apaese, no sa-addhe, no samajjhe, no
sapaese.
1
. Rajavartika 5, 25, 1-Sauksmyadyah atmamadhyah atmantasca.
2
. Sarvarthasiddhi, commentary, sutra 5, 25.
3
. Pancastikayasara Ek rasa, varna, gandha, dvispansa, sabdakaranamasabdam.
Skandhantaritam dravyam, paramanu tam vijanihi.
1
. Paschimi Darsana by Divanchand.
2
. Bharatiya Samskrti, p. 229.
3
. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Part II, p. 199-200.
4
. Darsanasastra ka Itihasa, (Hindi), p. 129.
1
. Anuyogadvara (pramanadvara) -Paramanu duvihe pannatte, tam jaha-suhumeya,
vavahariyeya.
2
. Anuyogadvara (pramanadvara). Anatanam suhumaparamanu poggalanam samudayasamiti
samagayenam vavahariye paramanu-poggale nipphajjanti.
1
. Bhagavati, 25, 3.
2
. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 23.
2
. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 23.
1
. Bhagavati, 5, 7.
1
. Bhagavati: 18, 8.
2
. Sthananga 2, 221-225, Dohin thanehim poggala sahannanti-sayam va poggala sahannanti
parena va poggala sahannanti, evam bhijjanti parisadanti, parivadanti viddhansanti.
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 32-35.
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 36.
2
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 37.
3
. (a) Niyamsara, 21-Kundakundacarya. (b) Gommatasara, Jivakanda, 602.
1
. Bhagavati, 8, 1, 1.
2
. Bhagavati, 14, 4.
1
. Bhagavati, 14, 4.
2
. Jainadarsana: Manana aur Mi mamsa, p. 175.
1
. Bhagavati, 5, 8.
2
. Bhagavati, 5, 8.
3
. Ibid, 5, 8.
4
. Ibid, 5, 8.
1
. Bhagavati, 5, 8.
2
. Bhagavati, 16, 8.
1
. Bhagavati, 5, 7.
1
. Avalika is 16777216 th part of 48 minutes.
2
. Jainadarsana aur Adhunika Vijnana, (Hindi) p. 37.
3
. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 16. Pujyapada.
4
. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 16.
1
. Dravyasangraha.
2
. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha, p. 374.
3
. Jainadarsana aur Adhunika Vijnana, p. 47.
1
. Bhagavati, 5, 7.
1
. Bhagavati, 2, 1.
1
. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 5, 24. (b) Dravyasangraha, gatha 16.
2
. Pancastikaya, 71.
1
. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha, p. 381.
2
. Prajnapana, Pada 11.
3
. Jambudvipaprajnapti.
1
. (a) Tattvatharajavattika, 5, 24, 2-6. (b) Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 24.
1
. (a) Prajnapana, Pada (b) Nandi sutra
1
. Tattvartharajavartika 5, 24, 10, 13.
2
. Ibid, 5, 24, 14.
3
. Tattvartharajavartika 5, 24, 15.
4
. Ibid 5, 24, 16.
1
. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24.
2
. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha, p.385.
3
. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24.
1
. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24.
1
. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha.
1
. Gommatasara Jivakanda 606-608.
2
. Tattvarthasutra 2, 38.
3
. Ibid 2, 41-44.
4
. Tattvarthabhasya vrtti 2, 44.
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 6/1-2
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 6/3.
2
. (a) Sutrakrtanga, Silanka-Vrtti, 2/5/16 p.127. (b) Mulacara-Vrtti-Acarya Vasunandi, 5/6. (c)
Samavayanga-Abhayadeva-Vrtti, one, p.6. (d) Saddarsana Samuccaya, Guna-Vrtti, p. 137.
3
. (a) Pancastikaya-Vrtti-Amrtcandracarya, 108. (b) Samavayanga-Abhayadeva-Vrtti, 1, p.6 (c)
Saddarsana Samuccaya, Guna-Vrtti, 47, p. 137.
4
. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 6/3. (b) Tattvartha-Srutsagariya-Vrtti, 6/3.
1
. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 6/2. (b) Sutrakrtanga-Silanka-Vrtti, 2/5/17, p. 128. (c) Avasyaka-
Haribhadriya-Vrtti, Mal. Hem. Hi. P.84. (d) Adhyatmasara, 18/131.
1
. Pratikramanasutra-Vrtti-Acarya Nami
2
. Dasavaikalika, 8.
1
. (a) In Anguttaranikaya (3/58, 6, 63), three kinds of asravas are described- (1) kamasrava (2)
bhavasrava) and (3) avidyasrava. (b) Jinadharma-sar (Hindi), p.121.
2
. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 472.
1
. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 9/1. (b) Yogasastra, 79.
2
. (a) Yogasastra, 79-80 (b) Sthananga, 1/14 (Tika) (c) Saptatattva-prakarana-Hemacandra Suri,
112 (d) Tattartha-sarvarthasiddhi, 9/1 (e) Dravyasangraha, 2/34 (f) Pancastikaya, 2/142,
Amrtcandra-Vrtti. (g) Pancastikaya, 2/142, Jayasena-Vrtti.
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 9/2.
1
. Navatattva-prakarana 25.
2
. (a) Sthananga, 5/2/418. (b) Samavayanga, 5
3
. There is the description of 5 great vows in-Prasna-Vyakarana, samvara dvara; Sthananga
5/2/418 and 10/1/79.
4
. Navatattva-prakarana, 42.
5
. Dvadasanupreksa-samvar anupreksa, 95.
1
. Samayasara, 190-191.
2
. Tattvartha-Sarvarthasiddhi, 9/1.
3
. Tattvartha-Sarvarthasiddhi, 1/4.
1
. Anguttaranikaya, 6/58.
2
. Ibid, 6/63.
1
. Tattvartha-Sarvarthasiddhi, 1/4.
2
. Kartikeya-dvadasanupreksa, 66.
3
. Tattvartha-bhasya, Haribhadriya-vritti, 1/4.
1
. Dharmasarmabhyudayam 21/122-23.
2
. Tattvartha-bhasya 9/7.
3
. Dvadasanupreksa-Nirjaranupreksa, 103-104.
1
. Candraprabhacaritam 18/109-110.
2
. Tattvarthasara 7/2-4.
3
. Sapta-tattva Prakarana, gatha 128.
4
. Dvadasanupreksa-Nirjaranupreksa, 104.
1
. Subhasya Tattvarthasutra, p. 378.
2
. Dasavaikalika 9/3.
1
. Navatattva-prakarana, 11, bhasya 90, by Devagupta Suri
2
. Sthananga 9/16-Ege nijjara.
3
. Santasudharasa-Nirjara Bhavana, 2-3,Vinayavijayaji.
4
. Navatattva-prakarana, 11, Devagupta Suri.
5
. Sthananga, 1/16, Tika.
1
. Bhagavadgita, 2/59.
2
. Maitrayani Aranyaka 10/62.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 29/35.
1
. Bhagavati 25/7.
2
. Uttaradhyayana 30/9.
3
. Jainadharma me Tapa: Swarup and Visleshana, pp. 181-199 by Munisri Misrimalaji.
4
. Uvavai sutra
1
. It is the special type of bondage of the bones. It is such a strong, that cannot be broken or cut
by the sharpest weapons.
2
. Astaka-prakarana 5/1.
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 30/25 (b) Sthananga, 6
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 24/11-12 (b) Pindaniryukti 92-93.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 32/10.
1
. (a) Pravacanasaroddhara Vrtti--Pratyakhyanadvara. (b) Yogasastra, 3 Prakasa-Vrtti.
2
. (a) Bhagavati 7,1 (b) Acaranga 8, 6.
3
. Avasyaka-niryukti 1547 (b) Acaranga 8, 6
4
. Uttaradhyayana, 2, 27
1
. Sthananga 7, 544
2
. Uvavai--Samavasarana adhikara,
3
. Bhagavati 25, 7.
4
. Dharmasangraha 3, adhikara.
5
. Tattvartha-Rajavartika, 9, 22, 1.
1
. Pancasaka satika, Vivarana 16-3.
2
. (a) Sthananga, 10 (b) Bhagavati, 25, 7.
1
. Sthananga, 6, Tika.
2
. (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthananga 7 (c) Aupapatika, tapavarnana.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 29, 3.
4
. Sthananga 5, 1.
5
. Sthananga 8
6
. (a) Bhagavati 35, 7 (b) Sthananga 10
1
. Sthananga, Abhayadeva vrtti 5, 3, 465
2
. Svasya svasmin adhyayah--adhyaynam--svadhyayah.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 26, 10
4
. Candraprajnapti 91
5
. (a) Brhatkalpa bhasya 1169 (b) Candraprajnapti sutra 89
6
. Taittiriya Aranyaka 2, 14
7
. Taittiriyopanisad 1, 11, 1
1
. Yogadarsana 2, 44
2
. (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthananga 5
3
. Abhidhana cintamani kosa 1, 48
4
. Avasyakaniryukti 1456
5
. Dvatrimsad Dvatrimsika 18, 11
6
. Atta ruddani vajjitta jhaejja susamahie. Dhamma sukkaim jhanaim jhanam tam tu buhavae.
7
. Tattvanusasana 74
1
. Tattvartha-Rajavartika 9, 26, 10
2
. Bhagavati sutra 25, 7.
3
. Avasyakaniryukti 1549
1
. Avasyakacurni
3
. Jainadharma me Tapa--Svarupa aur Visleshana (Hindi), p. 523.
1
. (a) Athato dharmajijnasa--Vaisesika darsana. (b) Sankhya karika 1. (c) Mimamsa sutra--Athato
dharmajijnasa. (d) Brahma sutra 1/1--Athato Brahmajijnasa.
1
. Jaina agama Bhagavati etc.
2
. Pandit Sukhalal Sanghvi--Adhyatma Vicarana. (Gujarat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad) p. 74.
3
. (a) Mundaka up. 1, 1, 6 (b) Vaisesika sutra 7, 1, 22. (c) Nyayamanjari (Vijayanagaram) p. 468
(d) Prakarana pan p-158
1
. (a) Brhadaranyaka up. 5, 6, 1. (b) Chandogya Up. 5, 18, 1. (c) Maitreyi up.
2
. Adhyatma Vicarana.
1
. (a) Atyantika dukkhanivrttih moksah. (b) Carama dukkha dhvamsah--Tarkadipika
2
. Bhasya on Nyayasutra.
3
. Vaisesikasutra 5, 2, 18
4
. Atyantika dukhabhavah--Nyayavartika
5
. (a) Nyayamanjari (b) Tadatyanta Vimoksopavargah--Sabhasya Nyayasutram.
6
. Syadvadamanjari, p. 63.
7
. Syadvadamanjari, p. 63
8
. Bharatiya darsana me moksa cintan: ek tulanatmaka adhyayana (17, Malaviya nagar, 1973).
1
. Samkhyakarika 62.
1
. History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p.212.
2
. (a) Dhammapada 154. (b) Samyuttanikaya, Oghataracna sukta.
3
. Samyuttanikaya Kematheri sutta.
1
. (a) N. K. Bhagat: Patna University Lectures, 1924-25, p. 165. (b) Samyuttanikaya Kematheri
sutta.
2
. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 416-17.
1
. Uttaradhyayana 36-65.
1
. Milindaprasna 4, 8, 62-64.
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 19, 82. Uddham pakkamai disam (b) Prasamarati Prakarana 294--bhasya
(c) Tattvartharajavartika
2
. Yogadarsana Bhasya 21, 25.
1
. Yogadarsana: sadhanapada 16
2
. Ibid 27
3
. Ibid 25
4
. Ibid 26
5
. Nyayabhasya 1, 1, 1.
6
. Majjhimanikaya, bhasabheka sutta, 4.
1
. Yogadarsana 2, 3-4.
2
. Samkhyakarika 47-48.
3
. Nyayasutra 1, 1, 2: Nyayasutra 4, 1, 3: 1. 1. 6.
4
. Kathopanisad 1, 2, 5.
5
. Bhagavadgita 5, 15.
6
. Majjhimanikaya: mahatannesamkaya sutta 38
1
. "Magganam atthangiko settho".
2
. Tattvarthasutra 1, 1.
1
. (a) Astasahasri, p. 296. (b) Puncastikayatika--Sri Amrtcandra
1
. Eyante niravekkho no sijjhai vivihayavagam davvam.
2
. Syatkarah satyalanchanah.
3
. Laghiyastraya, SL. 22.
4
. Anyayogavyavacched Dvatrimsika, sloka-25 Acarya Hemacandra.
5
. Laghiyastryaya, sl. 62. Akalanka
1
. Aptamimamsa 105
2
. aprachyutanutpannasthiraikarupam nityam.
3
. Majjhimanikaya, cula malunkya sutta 63.
1
. Yasovijaya--Jnanasara
1
. Isa. Up. tadejati tannaijati taddure, tadantike, tadantarasyasaravasya tad sarvasyasya
bahyatah.
1
. Tattvartha sutra, Adhyaya 5
1
. General Chemistry by Finus Pauling, pp. 4 and 5
2
. Pancastikay-15.
1
. Anyayoga Vyavacchedika sl. 5
2
. Bhasmibhutasya dehasya punaragamanam kutah?
3
. Sutrakrtanga, 1, 1. 11.
1
. Syadvada manjari 23 tika.
2
. Bhagavati, 7, 2, 773.
3
. Pancastikaya, Pravacanasara
1
. Herman Jacobi: Jaina Sutras--introduction.
1
. Anyayogavyavacchedika, Dvatrimsika.
1
. Pramananyatattvaloka--Vadideva.
2
. Slokavarttika--Vidyanandi.
1
. Sanmati Prakarana, Kanda 3 gatha 69
1
. (a) Syadvada manjari 23 tika. (b) Saptabhangitarangini p.1.
2
. Tattvarthasutra 1, 6.
3
. Saptabhangitarangini p.1.
4
. Anyayogavyavacchedika, karika 22
5
. Syadvadamanjari, karika 23 vrtti
1
. Tattvartha Rajavartika 1, 6. 51
1
. Bhagavati, sataka 12, 30, 10.
1
. Bhagavati 12, 10, 469.
1
. Agama yug ka Jaina darsana, (Hindi), pp. 112-113.
1
. Bhagavati sutra, sataka 12, 3010, p. 19-20.
2
. Pancastikayasara-gatha 14
3
. Bhagavati sutra, sataka 12, 2010, p. 19-20 & Visesavasyakabhasya, gatha 2-32.
4
. Pancastikaya 14.
5
. Pravacanasara jneyadhikara gatha 115.
1
. Tattvartha Slokavartika 1, 6, 52.
1
. Samkhya: Journal, Oct 1958.
1
. Pancadhyayi 1, 263.
2
. Syadvadamanjari, karika 23.
1
. Laghiyastraya, pravacanapravesa 63.
1
. Tattvarthaslokavartika 1, 6, 56.
2
. Syadvadamanjari, karika 5.
3
. Laghiyastraya 62.
1
. Tattvartha Slokavartika 1, 6, 54.
1
. Tattvartha Slokavartika 1, 6, 52.
2
. Sanmati tarka, satika, p. 446
3
. Pt. Dalsukha Malavania Ed. P. 94.
4
. Pujya Gurudeva Ratnamuni Smrti Grantha, p. 133.
1
. Rgveda 1, 164, 46.
2
. Rgveda 10, 129
1
. (a) Isopanisad--tadejati tannaijati (b) Kathopanisad 1, 2, 20--Anoraniyan mahato mahiyan. (c)
Mundakopanisad 2, 2, 1--sadsadvareryam
2
. Chandogyopanisad 6, 2--sadeva saumyedamagra asit.
3
. Chandogyopanisad 3, 19, 1--asadevedamagra asit.
4
. Taittiriya Up. 2, 4--yato vaco nivartante.
5
. (a) Kenopanisad, 1, 4--yadvacanabhyuditam. (b) Kathopanisad 2, 6, 12--naiva vaca na manasa
praptum sakyoh. (c) Mandukyopanisad 7.
1
. Samyuttanikaya
1
. Dhavala--Satkhandagama, Book 1, p. 10.
2
. Tattvarthasutra 1, 5.
1
. Anuyogadvara vrtti.
2
. Laghiyastraya svopajna vrtti. 7, 2.
3
. Tarkabhasa 3rd paricheda
1
. Laghiyastraya, p. 99
2
. Siddhiviniscaya, niksepa paddhati 1.
1
. Sanmati Prakarana 1, 6.
1
. 'agama savva nisehe, no saddo ahava desa padisehe.
1. Nyayopadesa 18

3. Naya-rahasya, p. 12

1. Haribhadriyavasyakatippane, nayadhikara.

3. Haribhadriyavasyakatippane nayadhikara.

1. Acaranga--je vinnaya se aya, je aya se vinnaya.

1. (1) Sangraha sloka

2. Anuyogadvara

3. Laghiyastraya sloka 32

4. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 14

5. Ibid 7, 15

6. Ibid 7, 19

7. Ibid 7, 20.

3. Laghiyastraya 3, 6, 70

1. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 6.

3. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 25

2. Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 96-97.

3. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 30.

3. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 33.

1. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 34

3. Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain--Jaina darsana, p. 463-64 (Hindi)

2. Jaina darsana ke Maulika Tattva, Muni Nathamalji, Part I, pp. 385-386.

3. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 38.

4. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi 1, 33 (b) Akalankagranthatraya tippana p. 147

5. Pramananyatattvaloka 7, 40

3. Nayopadesa 39

1. Samayasara gatha 11

1. Laghiyastraya 3, 6, 62.

3. Bhagavati 7, 2, 279.

4. Bhagavati 18, 10/25, 3/25, 4.

1. (a) Prajnapana, Pada 3, sutra 54-56 (b) Bhagavati 25, 4.

3. Sthananga 7, 552.

4. Prajnapana 16.

5. Anuyogadvara 148,

6. Sanmati Prakarana 3, 47.

3. Tattvarthabhasya 1, 34-35, p. 314-315.

4. Visesavasyaka bhasya

5. Tattvarthaslokavartika 1, 6 Naya Vivarana, sl. 6.

2. Samayasara 143.

3. Tattvarthabhasya 1, 35.

1. Jaina Darsana--Dr. Mahendra Kumar Jain, p. 446.

1. Jnanasara astaka 2, sl. 15.

1. Rajaprasniya sutra 165.

2. Bhagavati 88, 2, 317.

3. Uttaradhyayana sutra, adhyayana, 23.

4. Pt. Dalsukha Malvaniya, Agama yuga ka Jaina Darsana, p. 129.

5. Bhagavati 8, 2, 317.

1. Visesavasyaka bhasya 95 and its svopajna vrtti.

3. Visesavasyakabhasya 396.

4. Nandisutra sutra 77, Ed. Punyavijayaji, p. 27

5. Tattvarthabhasya 1, 14

6. Tattvarthasutra tika 1, 14.

2. Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 21-23.

3. Sarvarthasiddhi 2, 16, 179.

3. Gommatasara: Jiva Kanda. Verse 443.

4. Bhagavati 13, 7, 494 ata bhante mane anne mane? Goyama, no ata mane anne mane manijjamane....mane.

2. Dhavala, sutra 36, p. 130

3. Visesavasyakabhasya 3523

4. Caraka sutrasthana 1, 20.

3. Prakarana p. 151

4. Mathara karika 27

5. Yogasastra 5, 2

6. Darsana aur Cintana, p. 140 (Hindi)

3. Tarkasangraha

4. Sanmatiprakarana tika kanda 2

5. Bhagavati 1, 3.

6. Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 26

3. Visesavasyakabhasya, 191, 193.

3. Visesavasyaka bhasya 196.

4. Nandisutra 51 p. 22, Punyavijayaji.

5. Tattvartha bhasya 1, 15.

6. Satkhandagama 13, 5. 5 sutra 37 p. 242

2. Ibid 31

3. Tattvarthasutra bhasya 1, 15

5. Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 27

3. Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 15.

4. Tattvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 15.

5. Nandisutra, 53.

6. Tattvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 15.

1. Dr. Mohanlal Mehta: Jaina Darsana.

3. Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 15.

4. Tattvartharajavartika.

2. Tattvarthabhasya 1, 15

2. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 16. (b) Rajavartika 1, 16.

1. Mohanlal Mehta: Jaina darsana, p. 229.

3. (a) Anuyogadvara 2 (b) Visesavasyakabhasya vrtti 100

1. Visesavasyakabhasya vrtti 168

2. Tattvarthasutra--Pt. Sukhalalji pp. 35-36.

3. Tattvarthasutra 1, 28.

1. Nandisutra, sutra, 28, p. 13 edited by Punyavijayaji

2. Tattvarthasutra, Amrtacandrasuri, p. 12. Ganesaprasad Varni granthamala I.

3. Visesavasyaka bhasya

4. Avasyaka niryukti 76.

3. Visesavasyakabhasya 814.

4. Tattvarthasutra , 1, 29.

1. Jaina Darsana--Dr. Mohanlal Mehta.

3. Ibid 31.

1. Vyakhyaprajnapti 6, 10

3. Ibid 84

4. Ibid 84
5. Dasavaikalika 4, 22.

6. Tattvarthasutra I. 30.

2. Prajnapana sutra.

3. Satkhandagama, Dhavala tika 1, 1, 4

3. Dravyasangraha vrtti gatha 44.

4. Dravyasangraha vrtti gatha 44.

1. Prajnapana Pada 30, sutra 319, p. 531.

3. Bhagavati 18, 8; 14, 13.

4. (a) Gommatasara Jivakanda 730 (b) Dravyasangraha 44.

5. Tattvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 31.

6. Niyamsara, gatha 159

7. Sanmati Prakarana 2, 3.

8. Sanmati Prakarana 2, 9.

3. Ibid, 2, 22.

2. Sthananga 321.

1. Sthananga 338

2. (a) Sthananga 185 (b) Sthananga, Abhayadevavrtti

3. Nyayasutra, 1, 1, 5.

3. Anuyogadvara sutra, pramana prakarana

2.
Dasavaikalika niryukti 92.
3
. Nyayasutra, 1, 1, 32.
4
. See Jaina Darsana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 250.
1
. Jaina darsana Dr.--Mohanlal Mehta p. 251.
3
. Ibid.
4
. Avasyaka niryukti, gatha 92.
5
. Anuyogadvara sutra 470, p. 170.
1
. Mimamsa Slokavartika 184-187.
2
. Ibid, karika 5.
3
. Vasubandhukrta vimsatika.
4
. Syadvadamanjari 16.
5
. Astasati, 175.
6
. Nyayaviniscaya tika, p. 63.
7
. Pariksamukhamandana, 1, 1.
2
. Slokavartika 1, 10, 78.
4
. Nyayabindu, prathama prakarana.
3
. Tattvartha Slokavartika 175.
4
. (a) Pramananayatattvaratnakaravarika 1-2. (b) Pramanamimsa.
1
. Jaina Darsana--Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 255-257
2
. Nyayavatara 28.
1
. (a) Pramananayatattvaloka 2. (b) Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 9, 10.
3
. Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 11.
3
. Nyayaviniscaya sloka 3.
3
. Nandisutra, 2, 3.
1
. Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva (Hindi) Part I, 264-265
3
. (a) Pramanamimamsa 1, 2. (b) Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 1
4
. Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 2.
5
. Pramananirnaya p. 331.
1
. (a) Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 3 (b) Pariksamukha 3, 3.
1
. Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 12
1
. Pramanamimamsa 2, 1, 1
2
. Pramananayatattvaloka, 3, 23
1
. Pramanamimamsa, 2, 1, 11
1
. Pramanamimamsa 2, 1, 13
2
. Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 49, 50
3
. Ibid, 3, 51, 52
1
. Pramananayatattvaloka 4, 1
1
. Svetasvataropanisad 1, 2
1
. (a) See Atmamimamsa p. 86-94--Pt. Dalsukha Malavania. (b) Jaina Sahitya Brhad Itihas, part 4,
p. 8 (c) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, p. 416-424 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta.
2
. Atharvaveda 19, 53-54.
3
. Mahabharata, Santiparva 25, 28, 32 etc
4
. Sastravartasamuccaya 165-168
5
. Nyayasiddhanta muktavali 45
1
. Svetasvatara 1, 2
2
. Bhagavadgita 5, 14
3
. Mahabharata Santiparva 25, 16
4
. Buddhacarita 52
5
. Sastravartasamuccaya 169-172
1
. (a) Digghanikaya samannaphala sutta (b) Buddhacarita, p. 171--Dharmananda Kausambi
2
. Sutrakrtanga 2, 1, 12;2, 6
3
. Vyakhyaprajnapti, sataka 15
4
. Upasakadasanga, adhyayana 6-7
5
. Digghanikaya--samannaphala sutta
6
. Buddhacarita p. 179--Dharmananda Kausambi
1
. Sastravartasamuccaya 174
2
. Nyayabhasya 3, 2, 3
3
. Nyayasutra, 4, 1, 22
4
. Svetasvatara Upanisad 1, 2
5
. Mahabharata Santiparva 33, 33
6
. Nyayasutra 4, 1, 22
7
. Nyayabhasya--Translated by Phanibhusana4, 1, 24
1
. Sarva Darsana Sangraha, paricheda 1
1
. Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 55
2
. Atmamimamsa, karika 89-91
1
. Sanmatiprakarana 3, 53
2
. Sastravartasamuccaya 191-192
1
. Aptamimamsa 88-91
1
. (a) Atmamimamsa Dalsukha Malavania p 78-79-80 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, Mohanlal
Mehta
1
. (a) Bharatiya darsana: Umseha Misra, p. 39-41 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, p. 432
1
. Nyayasutra 4, 1
2
. Sankhyasutra 5, 25
3
. Milinda prasna 3, 2
1
. Anugltaranikaya, tikanipata sutra 33, 1; p. 134
2
. Samyuttanikaya 15, 5, 6 part 2 pp. 181-182
3
. Milindaprasna 3, 15 p. 75
4
. Visuddhimaggo 17, 110
5
. Abhidharmakosa 1, 9
6
. See Atmamimamsa p. 106
7
. Naumi Oriental Conference p. 620
8
. Abhidharmakosa 4th paricheda
1
. Astadhyayi 1, 4, 79
2
. Vaisesikadarsanabhasya 1, 17 p. 35
3
. Sankhyatattvakaumudi 67
4
. Gita 2, 50
5
. Pravacanasara tika 2, 25
1
. (a) Jaina Dharma our Darsana p. 443 (b) Karmavipaka ke Hindi anuvada ki prastavana --Pt.
Sukhalalji p. 23
2
. Nyayabhasya 1, 1, 2 etc
3
. Prasatapadabhasya p. 47 (Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series. Banares 1930)
1
. Yogadarsanabhasya 1, 5 etc
2
. (a) Sabarbhasya 2, 1, 5 (b) Tantravartika 2, 1, 5
3
. Sankarabhasya 2, 1, 14
4
. Sankarabhasya 3, 2, 38-41
1
. Pancastikaya 141
2
. Ibid 142
1
. Karmaprakrti--Nemicandracarya viracita 6
2
. Dharma aur Darsana--Devendramuni (Hindi) p. 42
1
. Prajnapana 23, 1, 292
2
. Bhagavati 9
3
. Bhagavati 9
1
. Bhagavati 7, 1, 226
2
. Prajnapana 23, 1, 289
3
. Sthananga 4, 8
4
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 1
5
. Samavayanga 2nd Samavaya
1
. Tattvarthasutra, 8, 4.
2
. (a) Sthananga 4th sthana. (b) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 69
3
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 2.
4
. Tattvarthasutra 6, 5.
5
. (a) Gommatasara karmakanda (b) Tattvarthasutra, Ed. Pt. Sukhalalji, p. 217
6
. (a) Sutrakrtanga 2, 26. (b) Sthananga 4, 1, 251. (c) Prajnapana 23, 1, 290
1
. Uttaradhyayana 32, 7.
2
. (a) Sthananga 2, 3. (b) Prajnapana 23. (c) Pravacanasara, gatha 95
3
. Pratikramanasutravrtti--Acarya Nami.
4
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 32, 7. (b) Sthananga 2, 2, (c) Samayasara, gatha 94, 96, 109, 177. (d)
Pravacanasara, 84-88
5
. Avasyaka tika.
6
. (a) Suttanipata 3, 12, 33. (b) Visuddhimagga 17, 302. (c) Majjhima nikaya
mahatanhasankhayasutta 38.
7
. (a) Nyayabhasya 4, 2, 1 (b) Nyayasutra 1, 1, 2; 4, 1, 3; 4, 1, 6.
8
. (a) Prasastapada p. 538--Viparyaya nirupana (b) Prasastapada bhasya--samsarapavarga
prakarana
1
. Samkhyakarika 44-47-48.
2
. Matharvrtti 44
3
. Yogadarsana 2, 3, 4.
4
. Kathopanisad 1, 2, 5.
5
. Bhagavadgita 5, 156.
6
. Pancama Karmagrantha--prastavana, p.11
1
. Pancama Karmagrantha--prastavana, pp. 11-12.
1
. Pancama Karmagrantha--prastavana, p. 12.
1
. Pancama Karmagrantha--prastavana, p. 13.
1
. Bhagavati 6, 3, 236
2
. Bhagavati 6, 3, 236-vrtti.
1
. Sthananga 4, 76, vrtti; p. 182.
2
. Sthananga 4
3
. Sthananga 4, 75-79.
1
. Prajnapana 23, 1, 293.
1
. Bhagavati, 1, 4, 40 vrtti
1
. Dasasruta-skandha 6
2
. Visesavasyaka bhasya 1, 3.
1
. Patanjalayoga 2, 13 bhasya.
1
. Vyakhyaprajnapti 1, 3, 35.
2
. Bhagavati 1, 3, 35.
1
. Vyakhyaprajnapti 1, 3, 35.
1
. (a) Pancastikaya -- Acarya Kundakunda. (b) Paramatmaprakasa 1, 59-60.
2
. (a) Pancadhyayi 2, 45, Pt. Rajamalla (b) Lokaprakasa--424 (c) Sthananga 1, 4, 9, tika
3
. Uttaradhyayana 25, 45.
1
. Ganadharavada 2, 25.
1
. Tattvarthasutra 6, 3-4
2
. Visuddhimaggo 17, 88.
3
. Samkhyakarika 44
4
. (a) Yogasutra 2, 14 (b) Yogabhasya 2, 12.
5
. (a) Nyayamanjari, p. 472. (b) Prasastapada, pp. 637, 643.
6
. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 3, 2, 13.
7
. (a) Bhagavati sutra, (b) Sthanangasutra 77
8
. Uttaradhyayana 4, 3
9
. Dhammapada 9, 12.
10
. Santisatakam 82.
11
. Dvatrimsika 30
1
. Pancastikaya 67
2
. Saddarsana samuccaya tika
3
. See; Bhagavana Mahavira: Ek anusilan by the author.
4
. Uttaradhyayana 20, 37.
5
. (a) Nyaya darsana, sutra 4, 1. (b) Gautamasutra, Adhyaya, 4, a, 1, sutra 21.
6
. Bhagavati 7, 10.
7
. Pancasangraha.
8
. Prajnapana, p. 23.
1
. Bhagavati 7, 10.
2
. Vyakhyaprajnapti 7, 10
3
. Bhagavati 7, 10.
1
. Mahabharata, Vanaparva, adhyaya 30, sl. 28.
2
. Uttaradhyayana 20, 36
3
. Uttaradhyayana 20, 37
4
. Uttaradhyayana 4, 4; 6, 3
5
. (a) Atmamimamsa--Pt. Dalsukha Malavania p. 131 (b) Sri Amar Bharatiya darsano me karma
vivevcana --Upadhyaya Amaramuni
1
. Dvatrimsika, Acarya Amitagati, 30-31.
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 2-3. (b) Sthananga 8, 3, 596, (c) Prajnapana, 23, 1, (d) Bhagavati,
sataka 6, uddesaka 9 p. 453 (e) Tattvarthasutra 8, 5 (f) Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 3,
Pancasangraha 2, 2.
3
. (a) Pancadhyayi 2, 998. (b) Gommatasara--Karmakanda 9
4
. (a) Pancadhyayi 2, 999. (b) Gommatasara karmakanda 9
1
. Tattvarthasutra 10, 1
2
. Uttaradhyayana 28, 10
3
. Niyamsara, 10
1
. Tattvarthasutra 2-9 and its bhasya.
2
. Kalghatgi (T. G.) Some Problems in Jaina Psychology (Karnataka Uni. 1961)
3
. Pramananayatattvaloka 2, 7.
4
. (a) Prathama Karmagrantha 9 (b) Gommatasara (karmakanda) 21 (c) Sthananga 2, 3, 105 tika
me uddhrta
5
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 4 (b) Prajnapana 23, 2 (c) Sthananga 5, 464 (d) Tattvartha sutra 8, 6-7.
1
. Sthananga sutra 2, 4, 105
2
. (a) Sthananga, 2, 3, 105 tika (b) Sthananga-Samavayanga, pp. 94-95 pt. Dalsukha Malavaniya
3
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20 (b) Tattvarthasutra 8, 5 (c) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 26.
1
. (a) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika. (b) Prathama Karmagrantha 9 (c) Gommatasara (karmakanda) 21,
Nemicandra
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 5-6 (b) Samavayanga sutra 9, (c) Sthananga 8, 3, 668, (d)
Tattvarthasutra 8, 8 (e) Prajnapana 23, 1.
3
. Thananga, 2, 4, 10--darisanavaranjje kamme evam ceva. Tika-desadarsanavarniyam
caksuracaksuravadhidarsanavaraniyam; sarvadarsanavaraniyam tu nidra pancakam
kevaladarsanavaraniyam cetyarthah, bhavana tu purvavaditi.
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20 (b) Tattvarthasutra 8, 15 (c) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 26
(d) Prajnapana, Pada 29 u. 2, Su. 293
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 7 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105.
3
. Tattvartha 8, 8 Sarvarthasiddhi
4
. (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, 12 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika
5
. (a) Sthananga 8, 488 (b) Prajnapana 23, 2
6
. (a) Sthananga 8, 488 (b) Prajnapana 23, 3, 15
7
. (a) Sthananga 8, 488 (b) Prajnapana 23, 3, 15
1
. Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20.
2
. Prajnapana 23, 2, 21-29
3
. Bhagavati 6, 3--Vedanijjam jaha do samaya 1
4
. (a) Tattvarthasutra 8, 19. (b) Tattvarthabhasya (c) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha; Devananda
Surikrta, Saptatattva Prakarana (d) Jaina Darsana, p. 354 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta.
5
. Vinayacandra Caubisi
6
. (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 13 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika (c) Gommatasara
(karmakanda) 21.
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 8 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 (c) Prajnapana 23, 2
2
. Tattvartha sutra 1, 2
3
. Pancadhyayi 2, 98, 6-7
4
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 9. (b) Sthananga 2, 184.
5
. Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 14-16
6
. (a) Gommatasara (karmakanda) 39 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105, tika me uddhrta
7
. Pancadhyayi 21, 6
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 31, 10. (b) Prajnapana 23, 2.
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 11. (b) Prajnapana 23, 2. (c) Sthananga 9, 700 (d) Samavayanga 16.
3
. (a) Avasyaka Malayagiri vrtti p. 116 (b) Visesavasyaka bhasya, gatha 1227.
4
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya
5
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya
6
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya
7
. Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya
1
. Gommatasara, Jivakanda, gatha 283.
2
. Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 18
3
. Gommatasara karmakanda.
4
. Kasayasahavartitvat, kasayapreranadapi. Hasyadinavakasyokta nokasayakasayata.
5
. Tattvartha Rajavartika 8, 9-10.
6
. Sarvarthasiddhi 8, 9
7
. Acarya Pujyapada--yadudayadatmadosasamvaranam paradosaviskarnam sa jugupsa.
1
. (a) Sthananga 2, 4, 105, tika (b) Gommatasara, karmakanda 39
2
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 21 (b) Tattvarthasutra, 8, 16
3
. (a) Tattvartharajavartika 8, 16 (b) Prajnapana 23, 1
4
. (a) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha; vrttyadisametam, Navatattvaprakaranam 74. (b)
Gommatasara, karmakanda 11. (c) Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 23
5
. Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika
1
. (a) Tattvarthasutra 8, 11 (b) Prajnapana 23--1 (c) Uttaradhyayana 33, 12
2
. Tattvarthasutra 2, 52. Pt. Sukhalalji ka vivecan, pp. 112-116.
3
. Uttaradhyayana 33, 22.
4
. Bhagavati 6, 3.
1
. Prajnapana 23, 1, 288 tika (b) Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika.
2
. Gommatasara karmakanda 12.
3
. (a) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika (b) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha, avacurnivrttyadi sametam,
--Navatattvaprakaranam 74
4
. Uttara 33, 13
5
. (a) Samavayanga Samavaya 42, (b) Prajnapana 23, 2-293. (c) Tattvarthasutra 8, 12
1
. This type of karma operates in the case of one-sense organism, because the body of the one-
sensed organism is first cold and then it can get hot.
1
. The Sitaprakasa (the cool night) arises from the deva, labdhidhari muni, vaikriya sarira, the
moon and the stars.
1
. Prajnapana 23, 2, 293.
2
. Gommatasara karmakanda, 22.
3
. Karmavipaka (Hindi translation) Pt. Sukhalalji, pp. 48, 105.
1
. Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha--Navatattvaprakarana 7, bhasya 37.
2
. Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha: Navatattvaprakarana 8, bhasya 49.
3
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 23. (b) Tattvarthasutra, 8/17-20.
4
. Prajnapana, 23/1288 tika.
5
. Tattvarthasutra, 8/13 Bhasya.
6
. Uttaradhyayana 33, 14.
1
. Uttara 33, 14.
2
. Prajnapana 23, 1, 292; 23, 1, 293.
1
. Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika.
1
. Pancadhyayi 2, 1007.
2
. Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika.
1
. Sthananga 2, 4, 105.
2
. Uttaradhyayana 33, 19.
3
. Jnana sutra.
1
. (a) Uttaradhyayana 32, 18. (b) Bhagavati, sataka 17, uddesa 4.
2
. (a) Visesavasyaka bhasya, gatha 1941, p. 117, II Pt. (b) Pancasangraha 284.
1
. (a) Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vrtti. (b) Navatattvasahityasangraha avacurni vrttyadisametam
Navatattvaprakarana, gatha 71 ki vrtti. (c) Navatattvasahityasangraha; Devanandasurikrta
saptatattvaprakarana adh, 4.
2
. Bhagavati 1, 6,
3
. (a) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 96--joga payadipaesam. (b) Thananga 2, 4, 96 tika.
1
. sthiti kalavadharanam.
2
. (a) Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vrtti. (b) Anubhago raso jneya. (c) Tattvarthasutra 8, 22--
vipakoanubhavah I.
1
. (a) Tattvarthasutra 8, 22 bhasya. (b) Tattvartha; 8, 22 Sarvarthasiddhi. (c) Visesavasyaka
bhasya, gatha 1938. (d) Tattvarthasutra Pt. Sukhalalji (Hindi) p. 293, 2nd edition.
1
. Bhagavati 5, 5.
2
. (a) Sthananga 4, 4, 312. (b) In the Anguttaranikaya similar discussion regarding the
transformation of the auspicious and inauspicious into their effects is to be found--
Anguttaranikaya 4, 232-233.
3
. (a) Dravyasangraha tika, gatha 33 (b) Atmamimamsa Pt. Dalsukha Malavania, p. 128. (c) Jaina
Darsana. (d) Sri Amar Bharati, varsa I.
1
. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 1, 4, Sarvarthasiddhi. (b) Uttaradhyayana 28, 24 Nemicandriya tika. (c)
Sthananga 1, 3, 9 tika. (d) Navatattvasahityasangraha: saptatattvaprakarana, gatha 133 (e)
Dravyasangraha 2, 32, Nemicandra Siddhanta Chakravarti. (f) Thananga, 1, 4, 9 tika. (g)
Navatattvasahityasangraha vrttyadisametam Navatattvaprakaranam, gatha 71, ki Prakrta
avacurni.
1
. Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma and Rebirth (L.D. Institute of Indoglogy, Ahmedabad) ch. 2.
2
. Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2.
3
. Sthananga 4, 216.
1
. Kalghatgi (T. G.): Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2.
1
. Bhagavati 2, 3.
2
. Prajnapana 23, 3, 21-29.
3
. Acaranga 12, 6.
1
. Bhagavati 2, 5.
2
. Sthananga 9, 40.
3
. Dasavaikalika 8, 39.
4
. Gita 2, 22.
5
. Gita 8, 26.
6
. Ita ekanavatikalpesaktya me puruso hatah. Tena karma vipakena pade vidhoasmi biksavah.
7
. Nyayasutra, 3, 1, 11.
8
. Nyayasutra, 3, 1, 12.
9
. Visesavasyaka bhasya.
1
. Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 94
2
. Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 99.
3
. Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 100
4
. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 1 (b) Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 103.
5
. Uttaradhyayana 28/2-3.
6
. Tattvartha 1, 4. Sarvarthasiddhi
1
. Navatattvasahityasangraha: Sri Hemacandra Surikrta saptatattvaprakarana 118-122.
2
. Uttara, 28, 35.
3
. Tattvartha 1, 4. Sarvarthasiddhi
4
. (a) Tattvartha 10, 3, krtsnakarmaksayo moksah. (b) Sivagita 13-32
5
. Tattvarthabhasyagata antima karika 8
1
. Darsana aur Cintana, khanda II, p. 216.
2
. Warren (H.C): Buddhism in Transitions (1922) p. 48.
3
. Kalghatgi (T. G.), Jaina View of Life (Jivaraja Granthamala no. 20) 1969, pp. 110-11.
1
. ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti agnim, yamam matarisvam ahuh.
1
. Yavatjivet sukham jivet, rnam krtva ghrtam pibet. Bhasmibhutasya dehasya, punaragamanam
kutah.
1
. dukha samsarinah skandhaste ca panca prakirtitah. vijnanam vedana, samjna, samskaro,
rupameva ca.
2
. Saddarsana samuccaya, Bauddhadarsana--samudeti yato loke, ragadinam ganoakhilah.
Atmatmiya bhavakhyuh samudayah sa udahrtah.
3
. Ksnikah, sarvasamskara, ityevam vasana mata. sa marga iha vijneyo, nirodho moksa ucyate.
1
. Kant: Works, p. 105.
1
. Stenius (Eric): Tractatus--A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought, (1960). P. 226.
2
. Russell (B): My Philosophical Development (1959), pp. 216-217.
3
. Ayer (A.J.): Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48.
1
. Broad (C.D): Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. Muirhead, (J.H.) Vol. (1924), Critical and
Speculative Philosophy.
2
. Kalghatgi (T. G.): Jaina View of Life, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala 1969, and p. 10.
1
. Mukhyo madhyamiko vivartamakhilam sunyasya mene jagata.
2
. Madhyamika karika 1, 7.
1
. Saudarananda 16/28, 29.
2
. Pramanamavisamvadijnanamajnatarthaprakaso va.
1
. Kalpanapodhamabhrantam pratyaksam.
1
. (a) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha, Darsana aur Jaina darsana. Muni Sri Nathamalji p. 125.
1
. Sankhya saptati, Jayamangala vyakhya--Nirgunasya purusasyaprasavadharmitvadakartrtvam.
2
. Aprasavadharmitvaccakarta--Vacaspati Misra.
3
. Rajendrasuri Smaraka Grantha, pp. 335-343.
1
. (a) Muni Nathamalji, see--Atita ka Anavarana, (b) Muni Nathamalji: Jaina Darsana: Manana aur
Mimamsa.
1
. Kalghatgi (T. G.): Jaina View of Life, p. 164.
2
. Tattvarthasutra VII, 8.
3
. Sarvarthasiddhi VIII, 5-9
4
. Ibid.
5
. Young India, Dec. 1920-Love and Hate-1922.
1
. Romain Rolland--Mahatma Gandhi, p. 48