It is recommended that you should cover the
suggested answers then try to answer the questions. This
2015 PRE-WEEK REVIEW NOTES
“DOMONDON’s CUT AND PASTE
The BAR STAR NOTES”
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
VER. 2015.10.31
copyrighted 2015
Prepared by Prof. Abelardo T. Domondon1
How to use the Notes: These Notes in the form of
textual materials and representative review questions were
specially prepared by Prof. Domondon for the exclusive
use of Bar Candidates who attended his 2015 lectures
on Legal and Judicial Ethics, conducted by the University
of the Philippines Law Center, and others he has personally
authorized.
The purpose of these Notes is to test the candidate’s
ability to answer hypothetical Bar questions, that may be
similar to previous Bar questions or which may be based on
the doctrines enunciated in selected cases decided by the
Supreme Court up to March 2015.
The questions are representative of probable
questions that may be asked in the November 2015 Bar
Examinations in Legal and Judicial Ethics.
1
AB (Econ), BSC (Acctg), LLB, MA (Econ), LLM, DCL
(Cand.). Practicing Lawyer-CPA-Customs Broker and
Management Consultant, Professor of Law and Pre-Bar
Reviewer.
method would force you to recall the applicable law and
jurisprudence. Then compare your answer with the
suggested answers.
DO NOT MEMORIZE the suggested answers. Some
of the answers were purposely made to be lengthy in order
to serve as explanatory devices. This is so because you do
not have time anymore to refer back to your review
materials. If you still could not understand the concepts after
reading these Notes, then refer to 90 Years of the Bar and
Beyond in Legal & Judicial Ethics (2015 ed.) by Prof.
Abelardo T. Domondon.
To facilitate the review the Notes are arranged in
accordance with coverage of the Bar Examination on Legal
and Judicial Ethics. The subjects that are in bold face and
underlined are the coverage of the Bar Examination. The
actual bar questions may not be so arranged.
These Notes are only indicative of the areas from
where Bar questions may be sourced. The questions shown
in these Notes may or may not be as exactly worded in the
actual Bar questions.
The reader is advised to take note of the areas
marked with BAR.
If pressed for time, the reader should read only the
items marked BAR. These areas represent 70% to 80% of
the areas that would probably be given in the 2015 Bar
exams. The reader should merely browse the areas the
unmarked areas because they represent only 20% to 30%
of the areas that may probably be given this year.
WARNING:
 2
These materials are copyrighted and/or based on the
writer’s book 90 Years of the Bar and Beyond in Legal &
Judicial Ethics (2015 ed.) and its future revisions. It is
prohibited to reproduce any part of these Notes in any form
or any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying without the written permission of the author.
These materials are authorized for the use only of Bar
reviewees the author has personally authorized.
Unauthorized users shall not be prosecuted but SHALL BE
SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF KARMA SUCH THAT THEY
WILL NEVER PASS THE BAR OR WOULD BE UNHAPPY
IN LIFE for stealing the intellectual property of the author.
I. LEGAL ETHICS
Code of Professional Responsibility
INTRODUCTION
1. What do you understand by legal ethics ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: It is that branch of moral
law which treats of the duties that an attorney-at-law owes to
his client, to the court, to the bar, and to the public. (Adapted
from Jessup)
DOCTRINE:
The highest moral and ethical standards in the law
profession is important so that the general public would
continue reposing their trust in lawyers and in the role they
play in the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
This continued trust would in turn assure the
continued existence of the law profession.
á2. What is the significance in the practice of
law of the maxim Non omne quod licet honestum est
(Not everything that is legal is honorable) ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The maxim posits that
the highest standard of morality should pervade the
conduct of lawyers in their day to day conduct of their
affairs, whether in the practice of their profession or in
their private affairs. This would assure the continued
trust by the general public and the perpetuation of the
law profession.
3. What are the sources of legal ethics ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Among the sources of
legal ethics are the:
a. Constitution, specifically Sec. 5 (5), Art. VII,
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, admission to
the practice of law and Bar integration; Sec. 13, Art. VII on
the prohibition of the President and other executive officers
to practice law; Sec. 14, Art. VI, the prohibition for members
of Congress to personally appear in certain cases; Sec. 2,
Art. IX-A the prohibition for members of the Constitutional
Commissions to practice law, and Sec. 8, Art. XI the
prohibition for the Ombudsman and his Deputies to practice
law.
b. Rules of Court such as the provisions of
Sec. 7, Rule 85 prohibiting lawyer who is an executor or
administrator to charge the estate for legal services; Sec. 21
(B), Rule 130, the privileged communication rule prohibition
a lawyer to testify on matters communicated to the lawyer by
his client; Rule 138, Attorneys and Admission to the Bar;
Rule 138-A, Law Student Practice; Rule 139, Disbarrment or
suspension of Attorneys; and Rule 139-A, Integrated bar of
the Philippines;
c. Legislation like the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines specifically Article 1491(5)
prohibiting lawyers from purchasing properties in litigation
and Article 2208 providing instances when attorney’s fees
may be awarded as damages even without stipulation; the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code like Article 209
penalizing betrayal of trust by an attorney and Article
penalizing representation of conflicting interests by an
attorney; and Articles 203 and 222 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines relative to attorney’s fees.
 3
d. Court decisions more specifically
decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting rules of ethical
conduct;
e. Canons of Professional Ethics;
f. Code of Professional Responsibility;
g. Treatises, which are books containing formal
and methodical exposition of the principles of ethics; and
h. Other sources such as interpretations of
foreign courts or other tribunals of foreign ethical rules
adopted in the Philippines.
A. Practice of law (Rule 138)
1. Concept
ááá1. What constitute the practice of law ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: To constitute practice of
law, the individual must customarily or habitually holds
himself out to the public as a lawyer and demands
compensation for any of the following services:
a. Giving legal advice or rendering any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge;
b. Appearance in court and conduct or
litigation of cases in court;
c. Preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings as well as the
drawing of deeds and other instruments of conveyancing.
(People v. Villanueva, 121 Phil. 897)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647) The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
b. Practice requires habituality. It consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
The private practice of law is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. When a respondent
(who is also a co-heir), appeared and represented not only
himself but his co-heirs, this is not isolated. This constitutes
“private practice” of the “law profession” as contemplated by law.
(Ziga v. Judge Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203, June 10, 2003)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
(Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210)
c. Publication of law books not practice of law where
they contain advice not intended to give specific advice to a
particular individual on a particular legal problem. (New York
County Lawyer’s Association v. Dacey, 21 N.Y. 2d 694)
d. Teaching law subjects not practice of law because the
law professor does not actually deal with clients whose rights are
or may be the subject of legal controversies. (Minister of Justice
Opinion No. 89, s. 1986)
e. Scrivening means filing the blanks in standard or
stereotyped forms which involves pure clerical work without need
for any legal interpretation. This is not considered as preparation
of legal documents constituting practice of law.
a) Privilege
áá1. What is the nature of the practice of law ? Is
it a right or a privilege ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The practice of law is not
a natural, constitutional nor a statutory or property right but a
mere privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess and continue to possess the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
(Bolongalanta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310, 313)
The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such it must bow to the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities. But as a guardian of the legal
profession, the Supreme Court is constrained to balance the
concern that a suspension may lead to the lawyer’s financial
 4
woes with the injury he caused to the very profession he has
vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness. (Artueza v.
Atty.Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Practice of law a mere privilege. Everyone
should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is
definitely not a right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must
show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioner's honourable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in
their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak
the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients. [Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE), etc., v.
Alibutdan-Diaz, A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014 citing Sonic Steel
Industries, Inc. v. Chua, AC No. 6942, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 340, 353]
a. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A
lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealing
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of
the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
administrative sanctions by the Supreme Court which includes
suspension and disbarment. (Re: Adm. Case No. 44 of the RTC,
Branch IV, Tagbilaran City, against Atty. Occena, A. C. No. 2841,
July 3, 2002)
b. The practice of law is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations, The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license. (Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 10,
2003)
c. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
(St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty
and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
d. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self
to the public as a lawyer. (Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A. C. No. 5712,
June 29, 2005 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Ladaga,
350 SCRA 326, January 26, 2001) Practice is more than an
isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. (Lorenzana v. Fajardo,
supra)
e. Privilege of membership in the bar is
burdened with conditions. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened by conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of
it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend based
on conduct rendering him unfit to hid a license or to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney. (St. Louis University
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
“Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege
burdened with conditions. (Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre, AC –
5365, April 27, 2005 citing Leo v. Medel, 405 SCRA 228, July 1,
2003 and various cases) It is bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral
character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and
ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest
for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a
fearless crusader. (Ibid., citing Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of
the RTC, Br .IV, Tagbilaran City against Atty. Samiuel C. Occena;
383 SCRA 636, 638, July 3, 2002, per curiam) Lawyers should
act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in
the legal profession. (Ibid., citing Malecdan v. Pekas, 421 SCRA,
7 January 26,2004 and other cases)
 5
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and
required of members of the bar. (Ibid., citing Sanchez v. Somoso,
412 SCRA 569 and other cases) Such conduct of nobility and
uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in
private lives, As officers of the court and keepers of the public’s
faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. (Ibid., citing Sanchez v.
Somoso, supra; Sabayle v. Tandayag,158 SCRA 497, March 8,
1988)
2. What is the effect of the lawyer’s oath ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: By taking the lawyer’s oath,
an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice. (Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre, AC –
5365, April 27, 2005, citing Businos v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687;
283 SCRA 407, December 22, 1997)
b) Profession, not business
áá1. Why is law not a business but a profession
because ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. It is pursued by persons of technical or
scientific training requiring years of study;
b. It is a calling which requires the passing of an
appropriate examination;
c. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
of his profession, advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares;
d. A lawyer, being an officer of the court, like
other officers takes his office cum onere (with burdens) so
the court can oblige the lawyer to serve without
compensation as counsel de oficio for destitute clients,
without violating the constitutional prohibition against taking
of property without just compensation or without due
process of law. (5 Am. Jur. 354)
e. A lawyer may not solicit cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. (ROC, Rule 138, Sec. 27)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. In this day and age, members of the bar often
forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration., Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a by-product, and the highest eminence may be
attained without making much money. (Burbe v. Atty. Magulata,
A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002)
b. Failure to pay the balance of attorney’s fees is not
sufficient to justify a lawyer’s failure to comply with his professional
obligation which does not depend for compliance with the payment
of lawyer’s fees. (Tan v. Lapak, G.R. No. 93707, January 23,
2001) This is so, because the law is a profession and not a
business.
áá 2. Who are non-members of the Bar who may
appear in court to conduct their own litigation ? (Who
are those who are not lawyers but are allowed limited
practice in Philippine courts ?)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. A party litigant. Appearance by a party
litigant for and in his own behalf is known as pro se practice
or practice in propria persona. A party litigant may appear
before any administrative or judicial body.
b. Any official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the
government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a
duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest, direct or indirect.
(ROC, Rule 138, Sec. 33)
c. A non-lawyer agent or friend of a party
litigant may, in a Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
 6
Court or Metropolitan Trial Court, be appointed by a party
litigant to conduct his litigation (ROC, Rule 138, Sec. 34),
whether in civil or criminal cases. (Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr., 126
SCRA 144, 145)
d. In localities where members of the bar are not
available the court may appoint any person, resident of the
province and of good repute, probity and ability, to defend
the accused. (ROC, Rule 116, Sec. 7)
e. A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum, enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court
(ROC, Rule 138-A, Sec. 1), under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school; all pleadings and other
documents must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic (Sec. 2, Ibid.), and that there
must be physical presence of the supervising lawyer during
the hearing. (Bar Matter No. 730)
f. Non-lawyers may appear before the National
Labor Relations Commission or any Labor Arbiter if they
represent themselves; if they represent their organization or
members thereof (Art. 222, Labor Code); if they are duly-
accredited members of any legal aid office recognized by
the Department of Justice or the IBP in cases referred to by
the latter (Kanlaon Construction Enterprises, Co., Inc. v.
NLRC, 279 SCRA 337); or if they are engaged in “law
student practice.”
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
áa. While an agent or friend of the party litigant may be
appointed by a party litigant to represent him in cases before the
MTC, it may not be prudent to do so, considering certain technical
rules, such as the complaint failing to state a cause of action,
verification for all pleadings under summary procedure, etc.
b. An arrested person who is under detention may
not practice law. All prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their
profession (including the law profession) nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while
in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention. When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is
deemed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of the offense. He may only be
released if it is so authorized by the court to be released on bond
or on recognizance. (People v. Hon. Maceda, etc., et al., G.R.
Nos. 898591-96, January 24, 2000)
ááá6. Are lawyers allowed to solicit clients and to
advertise ? Why ? (Is it ethical for lawyers to solicit or
advertise ?)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, for the following
reasons:
a. Lawyering is a profession and not a business and
lawyers are not merchants. While lawyers are entitled to
make a living, that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust
for material wealth. Law advocacy is not capital that yields
profits. (Canlas v. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 160)
b. With the present situation of our legal and judicial
system, to allow the publication of advertisements would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA
378)
áá 7. What are the rules that prohibit
advertising by lawyers ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) A lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. (Canon 3, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
2) In making a claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services, a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statements. (Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Ibid.)
3) It is unprofessional to solicit professional
employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or
by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
 7
personal relations. (1st sentence, Canon 27, Canons of
Professional Ethics)
4) It is improper for a lawyer to permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public of he profession, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession. (Canon 43, Ibid.)
5) A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. (Rule 3.04,
Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility)
b. The announcement in a newspaper that the
lawyer will give free legal advice to indigents, is a form of
self-praise hence subject to discipline. (In re: Tagorda, 53
Phil. 37)
áá 7. When are the instances where a lawyer may
advertise without violating ethical rules ? What are the
exceptions to the no advertising rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The customary use of simple professional cards.
(last sentence, Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics)
b. Publication in reputable law lists in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
Canons of Professional Ethics of brief biographical and
informative data is permissible. Such data must not be
misleading. (last par., Canon 27, Ibid., paraphrasing
supplied)
c. Where a lawyer is engaged in rendering
specialized legal service directly and only to other lawyers, a
brief dignified notice of that fact, couched in language
indicating that it is addressed to lawyers, inserted in legal
periodicals and like publications, when it will afford
convenient and beneficial information to lawyers desiring to
obtain such service is not improper. (Canon 46, Ibid.)
BAR 8. May a lawyer purchase any interest
in the subject-matter of the litigation he is
conducting ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The lawyer shall
not purchase any interest in the subject-matter of the
litigation which he is conducting. (Canon 10, CPE)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx
xxx
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property rights in litigation or levied upon on execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession. [Art. 1491 (5), Civil Code of the
Philippines, emphasis supplied]
b. The prohibition does not find application in a
contract for a contingent fee provided that the transfer or
assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after
the finality of a favorable assignment. (Biascan v. Atty. Lopez,
A.C.No. 4650, August 14, 2003
The writer does not agree with this holding as it is
clear that the contract for a contingency fee, in this case,
would constitute one of champerty.
A lawyer entered his appearance in a special
proceeding case which included the property covered by
TCT 34127. Subsequently, the property was assigned to
the lawyer to cover his contingent fees. Despite his
knowledge that the property is part of the estate, and that
the special proceedings was still pending, he had the
property registered in his name. He was suspended for six
(6) months considering that in prior cases involving violation
 8
of Art. 1491, the respondents were suspended for the same
period.
c. Assignment to a lawyer of a portion of the
property levied by the sheriff for the satisfaction of a
judgment in favor of his client does not violate the Civil Code
prohibition on prohibited acquisition if the property was not
involved in the litigation handled by the lawyer. (Daroy v.
Abecia, 298 SCRA 239)
The prohibition does not find application in a contract
for a contingent fee provided that the transfer or assignment
of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality
of a favorable assignment. Biascan v. Atty. Lopez, A.C.No.
4650, August 14, 2003 The writer does not agree with this
holding as it is clear that the contract for a contingency fee,
in this case, would constitute one of champerty.
BAR 9. Corporate practice of law is not
allowed because:
a. A lawyer is burdened with peculiar duties and
responsibilities which must be performed personally.
b. a lawyer takes an oath of office and being an
officer of the law may be subject to court discipline.
(Matter of Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 579)
BAR 10. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communication that the firm
indicates in all its communications, that said partner is
deceased. (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
2. Qualifications
1. The role of the legislature in regulating
the legal profession is merely to aid the judiciary
through statutory enactment. The legislature should
not supersede or detract from the inherent regulatory
power of the courts. (Sharod v. Hartfield, 210 N.W. 2d. 275)
2. What values must a lawyer cultivate in
order to uphold the nobility, protect the integrity,
and enhance the prestige of the law profession ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Competence. The legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation necessary for
representing a client in a specific case. It may be
defined as the educated ability of a lawyer to relate the
general body and philosophy of law into a specific legal
problem.
b. Integrity. The ethical standards of the legal
profession which are vital because of the fiduciary
nature of the attorney-client relationship. (Lawline v.
American Bar Association, 956 F.2d 1378 [7th Cir.])
3. Are you in favor of abolishing the Bar
Examinations ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Numerous
criticisms on the supposed efficacy of the Bar
examinations in determining the technical capability of
a person to practice law have been advanced. Some
of the questions given do not truly measure the entry
level technical competence of the candidates. There is
no empirical study made to determine the relation
between the questions given and the desired skills to
be measured.
Furthermore, the expenses for reviewing and
taking the Bar examinations (specially for provincial
candidates), are so high that some deserving
candidates are discouraged from taking the Bar
examinations.
COMMENTS: Despite all the criticism there are still
no viable alternatives to replace the Bar examinations,
 9
Further in-depth study should be undertaken to determine pre-bar review at U.S.T. and not at PLS as originally
the feasibility of various proposals. manifested.
The Supreme Court however noted its growing
4. If you are in favor of abolishing the Bar concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the
Examinations, what alternatives would you conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has
suggest to replace the same ? been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not
closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
comply with the requisite minimal attendance. Enrollment
Among some of the alternatives to replace the and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional
examination process are: requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those
a. Strengthening law education through a who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
revision of curricular offerings, faculty development, (Re: 1999 Bar Examinations Mark Anthony A. Purisima, B.M. Nos.
stricter monitoring of law school facilities, faculty and 979 & 986, December 10, 2002)
support services to weed out deficient law schools.
b. A uniform nationally administered and more 3. Appearance of non-lawyers
stringent law school entrance admission requirements.
c. A realistic court supervised apprenticeship a) Law student practice (Rule 138-A)
system which requires law student to undergo
apprenticeship both with the public and private sectors. b) Non-lawyers in courts
d. Transfer of supervision of law schools from
c) Non-lawyers in administrative
the Executive Department to the Judicial Department.
tribunals
e. Strict implementation of the mandatory
continuing legal education. d) Proceedings where lawyers are
prohibited from appearing
5. What are the requisites for becoming an
attorney-at-law ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Passing the bar examination; 4. Sanctions for practice or appearance without
b. Taking the lawyer’s oath administered by authority
the Supreme Court; and
c. Signing in the Roll of Attorneys. a) Lawyers without authority
Thus, a person who has passed the Bar and
took his oath is notyet a full-pledged lawyer, if he has b) Persons not lawyers
not signed in the Roll of Attorneys. (Aguirre v. Ranba, B.
M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003) BAR 4. What is the penalty to be imposed
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE upon a person who masquerades as a lawyer ?
A passer in the 1999 Bar Exams was finally allowed SUGGESTED ANSWER: Contempt of court, severe
to take his oath after it was proven that he actually took a censure and three (3) months imprisonment. Reason: The
 10
highly fraudulent and highly improper conduct tended I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
of the administration of justice. (Manangan v. Court of First So help me God.
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28, 189 SCRA 217)
If the impersonator was able to collect attorneys fees BAR 2. Duties of an attorney under the
on the representation that he is a lawyer, he may even be
charged with estafa.
Rules of Court: “It shall be the duty of an attorney:
a. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
5. Public officials and practice of law Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines;
a) Prohibition or disqualification of b. To observe and maintain the respect due to
former government attorneys the courts of justice and judicial officers;
c. To counsel or maintain such actions or
b) Public officials who cannot practice proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
law or with restrictions defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law;
6. Lawyers authorized to represent the d. to employ, for the purposes of maintaining
government the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
7. Lawyer’s oath mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law;
***1. State in substance the lawyer’s oath of e. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
office. every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
SUGGESTED ANSWER: I (name of lawyer) do client, and to accept no compensation in connection
solemnly swear that: with is client’s business except from him or with is
I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
knowledge and approval;
Philippines;
I will support its constitution and obey the laws as
f. To abstain from all offensive personality and
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
therein; of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
I will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any the cause with which he is charged;
in court; g. Not to encourage either the commencement
I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to any man’s cause, for any corrupt motive or interest;
the same; h. Never to reject, for any consideration
I will delay no man for money or malice, and personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
Will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best oppressed;
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to my clients; and
 11
i. In the defense of a person accused of a
crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to
present every defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by
due process or law.” (Sec. 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
BAR 3. A lawyer shall not after leaving the
government service accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service . (Rule 6.03, Canon 6,
Code of Professional Responsibility)
BAR: 4. Retired members of the judiciary
receiving pensions from the government should not
practice law.
BAR 5. What are the disqualification’s of
lawyers who are local government officials ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
[Sec. 90 (a), Rep. Act No. 7160, Local Government Code]
b. Sanggunian members may practice their
professions except during session hours: provided that
the sanggunian members who are also members of the
Bar shall:
1) Not appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
2) Not appear as counsel in any criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office;
3) Not collect any fee for their
appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and
4) Not use property and personnel of the
Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of
the government. [Sec. 90 (b), Ibid.]
Government lawyers prohibited to be
appointed as PLEB members. The prohibition against
government officials and employees, whether elected or
appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or
position in the government is worded as, ”Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” [Sec .7 .Article
IX-B, 1987 Philippine Constitution; Sec. 54 (3),Chapter 7, Title I
(A), Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 94 (a)
of the Local Government Code of 1991]
Sec. 43 (c), Rep. Act No. 6975 which provides “(c)
Compensation. Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty.
However, PLEB members may be paid per diem as may be
determined by the city or municipal council from city or
municipal funds,” pertains only to the compensation of PLEB
members. It cannot be construed as an exception to the
Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or
multiple appointments of appointive public employees.
The respondent lawyer failed to establish that his
primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban
Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member,
an exception to dual appointments prohibited by the
Constitution and the statures. Acceptance of the
appointment as PLEB member being contra leges is
likewise a violation of the Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and the Attorney’s Oath.
(Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A. C. No. 5712, June 29, 2005)
Government lawyers may be appointed as a
member of the Barangay’s Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Government officials and employees may sit as lupon or pangkat
members. Sec. 406 (b) of the Local Government Code,
provides “xxx While in the performance of their duties, the
lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private
employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and
shall not suffer from any diminution in compensation or
allowance from said employment by reason thereof.”
(Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A. C. No. 5712, June 29, 2005)
B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer
1. TO SOCIETY
BAR 1. Duties to the public (society):
a. Promote respect for the law;
b. Make his legal services available and
known through acceptable means;
c. Participate in development of the law;
d. Keep abreast of legal developments;
e. If in government service to apply the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in the
performance of his duties.
a) Respect for law and legal processes
b) Efficient and convenient legal services
c) True, honest, fair, dignified
objective information on legal services
d) Participation in the improvement and
reforms in the legal system
12
e) Participation in legal education
program
BAR 2. What is good moral character ?
When should a lawyer possess good moral
character ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Good moral character
is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if is wrong. (Cordon v. Balicanta, A. C.
No. 2792, October 4, 2002)
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, it’s
continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the legal profession. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to the lawyer’s care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence, he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all .
(Cordon v. Balicanta, A. C. No. 2792, October 4, 2002)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, CPR)
b. Public confidence in the law and lawyers in the
role of lawyers in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice is the foundation of the continued existence of the
law. Without this confidence the public would not consult
lawyers resulting to demise of the profession.
c. Requirement of good moral character. Time
and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted
only to those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct
and themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
[Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE), etc., v. Alibutdan-
 13
Diaz, A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014 citing Ronquillo v. Cezar, 524
Phil. 311, 317 (2006)]
It bears stressing that the respondent lawyer is a servant
of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts
with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For
this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They
are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession. [Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE), etc., supra citing Malhabour v.
Sarmiento, 520 Phil. 529, 536 (2006)]
c. Thus, a lawyer who manifested the absence of
good moral character was disbarred because he transferred
properties which he held in trust for his client to a
corporation which he controlled and fraudulently conveyed
such corporate properties or mortgaged the same without
the appropriate authority coming from his client. (Cordon v.
Balicanta, A. C. No. 2792, October 4, 2002)
d. The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin
lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity. Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. (Ong v. Atty. Unto, A.C. No. 2417,
February 6, 2002)
e. It is a time-honored principle that good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the legal profession. Integrity and
moral character are important as part of a lawyer’s
equipment in the practice of his profession, because it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. (Re: Adm. Case
No. 44 of the RTC, Branch IV,Tagbilaran City, against Atty.
Occena, A.C.No. 2841, July 3, 2002)
f. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes. Specifically he is forbidden to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles, but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to the. thus, the requirement
of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of
moral duty, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity, Good
moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character, Such character expresses itself in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence, he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all. (Cordon v. Balicanta, A. C.
No. 2797, October 4, 2002)
g. A lawyer was indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law and directed to pay the complainant
P13,800.00. He was guilty of dishonesty because he did not
turn over the proceeds of sale of the complainant’s property.
Worse, with palpable bad faith, be compelled the
complainant to go to court to recover the proceeds, and
despite his deliberate failure to pay he still appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Still bad faith attended this step because
he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Not satisfied
with his unjust and lawful acts he issued checks in payment
of his obligation, and in continued pursuit of a clearly
malicious plan not to pay the complaint, he closed the
account from which the checks were drawn. There was
deceit. He likewise abused the generosity of the Supreme
 14
Court in granting him the three extensions he prayed for, by
failing to file his comment nor explaining why he did not do
so. (Nunez v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C.No. 5054, May 29, 2002)
h. A lawyer was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months and to account for the
amount of P60,000.00 entrusted to him for gross dishonesty
and conduct unbecoming a lawyer. He deliberately
misrepresented to the complainant that he was successful in
securing a restructuring of the complainant’s loan through
his connection with a non-existing PNB legal assistant. The
loan was not restructured and the complainant’s collateral
was foreclosed. (Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona, A.C.No. 5688, April
19, 2002)
i. A lawyer was disbarred because he transferred
properties he held in trust for his client to a corporation
which he controlled, and fraudulently conveyed such
corporate properties or mortgaged the same without the
appropriate authority. The court ruled that the properties so
conveyed by the lawyer to innocent third parties should still
be considered as the properties of the client and her
daughter. (Cordon v. Balicanta, A. C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002)
The writer believes that this is a pro hac vice view
obtaining only in this particular case, and should not be
taken as a doctrinal ruling on the nullification of sales of real
property to innocent third parties.
j. A lawyer committed dishonesty and abused the
confidence reposed upon him by his client when he did not
file the ejectment case despite receipt of the filing fee and
the receipt of the registry return card of his demand to
vacate. He was suspended for six (6) months with warning.
It is to be noted that he also committed other violations.
(Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, A.C. No. 5811, January 20, 2003)
k. Good moral character is an essential qualification
for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally
essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of this privilege.
(Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre, AC – 5365, April 27, 2005, citing
Vda. De Espino v. Presquito, 432 SCRA 609, June 28, 2004, and
various cases)
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.” (Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Palma, A.C. No.2474, June 30, 2005 citing Cordova v. Cordova,
Adm. Case No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680 )
Good moral character includes at least
common honesty. Good moral character is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Lawyers are ministers of truth. No moral qualification
for bar membership is ore important than truthfulness. The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In al their dealings lawyers are expected to
act in good faith.
Law is a noble profession and the privilege to practice
it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally, important, morally.
Because, they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
Good moral character is a continuing
requirement. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of moral character, not
only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. (Soriano v. Dizon,
A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
Gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Implicit in a lawyer’s mandate to protect a client’s
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost
 15
diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal
developments, and participate in continuing legal education
programs. Thus, in championing the interest of clients and
defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the
strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should
likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest
the latter’s cause be dismissed on a technical ground.
Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural
laws. (Spouses Williams v. Enriquez, A.C. No.6353, February 27,
2006)
BAR: 3. What is meant by barratry ? Are
there any rules which penalize the same ? Explain
briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The offense of frequently
exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or
otherwise. (Bouvier)
a. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause. (Rule 1.03, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
b. A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
(Rule 1.04, Ibid.)
c. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring law suits, except in rare instances where
ties of blood, relationship or trust makes it his duty to do so.
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause. (Rule 1.03,CPR)
b. A lawyer, among other acts, offered monetary
rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in
his actions against the latter. This tactic is unethical and
runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit of proceeding and he
shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business. The lawyer was found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and was suspended from the practice
of law for five (5) months. (Ong v. Atty. Unti, A.C. No. 2417,
February 6, 2002)
BAR: 4. What is meant by ambulance
chasing ? What rules prohibit the same ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The unethical practice
of inducing personal injury victims to bring suits. the
practice of lawyers in frequenting hospitals and homes
of the injured in order to convince them to go to court.
It is disreputable:
a. to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and information thereof in order to employed to
bring suit or collect judgment;
b. to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients; or
c. to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those
who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his
office;
d. to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches, or others who
may succeed under guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the such and
the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services. (Canon 28, Canons of Professional
Ethics)
5. Distinguish ambulance chasing from
barratry.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Barratry refers to any action while ambulance
chasing refers to personal injury cases;
b. Barratry may refer to suits before judicial or
non-judicial bodies while ambulance chasing refers to
cases brought before judicial fora.
ILUSTRATIVE CASE:
 16
A lawyer was found guilty of conduct unbecoming a
lawyer because he, among other acts, offered monetary
reqards to anyone who could provide him with any
information against the complainant just so he would have a
leverage in his actions against the latter. This tactic is
unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall
not for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding and that he shall not do any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business. (Ong v. Atty. Unti, A.C. No.
2417, February 8, 2002)
BAR 6. Who is a counsel de oficio ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A counsel de officio is
an attorney assigned by the court to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if
upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute
and unable to employ an attorney, and the services of
counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice
and to protect the rights of the party. (Sec. 31, Rule 138,
Rules of Court)
BAR 7. Who is an amicus curiae ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: An amicus curiae is
an expert or authority in the law who upon the court’s
invitation” for the assistance of the court, gives some
information of some matter of law in regard to which
the court is doubtful or mistaken, such as a case not
reported or which the judge has not seen or does not at
the moment, recollect.” (Bouvier)
BAR 8. May a lawyer reject appointment as
counsel de oficio or as amicus curiae ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. It shall be the
duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required
service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for
sufficient cause shown. (Sec. 31, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
Reason: A lawyer is an officer of the court and
takes his office cum onere (with burdens or duties), (5
Am. Jur. 354) among which is to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
BAR 9. Are there any instances where a
lawyer may ethically refuse appointment as
counsel de officio or as amicus curiae of the cause
of the defenseless or the oppressed ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, in the following
cases:
a. Where he is not in a position to carry out the
work effectively or competently;
b. He labors under a conflict of interest between
him and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client. (Rule 14.03, Canon 14,
Code of Professional Responsibility)
c. Serious and sufficient causes like the
following:
1) The filing of the case would result in
multiple actions arising from the same cause.
(Rule 12.02, Canon 12, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
2) When the criminal charge to be filed is
unfounded and is presented merely to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
(Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Ibid.)
3) When it is apparent that the client
pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct
in connection with the matter being presented to
the lawyer for representation. (par., a, Rule 22.01,
Canon 22, Ibid.)
4) When the client insists that the lawyer
pursues conduct which is violative of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. (par. 2, Ibid.)
5) When engaged as a collaborating
counsel and the lawyer’s inability to work with
 17
co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client. (par., c, Ibid.)
6) When the mental or physical condition
of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry
out the employment effectively. (par. d, Ibid.)
7) When the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office. (par.f, Ibid.)
8) When the representation would,
directly or indirectly encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer.
(Rule 8.02, Canon 8, Ibid.)
BAR 10. May a counsel de oficio claim
compensation for his services ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A claim for
attorney’s fees is incompatible with the appointment of
a counsel de oficio, as the client is destitute.
Furthermore, performance of the duties as counsel de
oficio, is part of the duties of a lawyer as an officer of
the court to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
DOCTRINE:
Payment for counsel de oficio. Subject to
availability of funds, as may be provided by law, the court
may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensated in such sum as the
court may fix but shall not be less than P30.00 in any case,
nor more than the following amounts:
a. P50.00 in light offenses;
b. P100.00 in less grave felonies;
c. P200.00 in grave felonies other than capital
offenses;
d. P500.00 in capital offenses. (Sec. 32, Rule 138,
Rules of Court)
BAR 11. These canons (of professional
responsibility) shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of the their official tasks.
(Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility)
12. The misconduct of a lawyer-government
official which would affect his qualifications as a lawyer
or would show moral delinquency is subject to
discipline as a member of the bar.
Government lawyer may practice law subject
to permission. The practice of law by attorneys employed
in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes
has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding one’s
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services. (Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A. C. No. 5712, June
29, 2005 citing People v. Simplicio Villanueva, 121 Phil. 894; 14
SCRA 109, May 27, 1965)
Written permission should be had from the chief as
required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules that “(n)o officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department.” (Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A. C. No.
5712, June 29, 2005
2. TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
BAR 1. What are the duties of a lawyer to the Bar ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Uphold the integrity of the legal profession and
support the IBP;
b. Be courteous, fair and frank to brother lawyers;
c. Not to assist in the unauthorized practice of law;
d. Not to encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer
a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule
139-A)
 18
(i) Membership and dues
b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of
the profession
c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards
professional colleagues
d) No assistance in unauthorized practice
of law
BAR 2. What is the duty of a lawyer who
has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetuated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: It shall be his duty to:
a. promptly call upon the client to rectify the
same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client. (Rule 19.02, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
b. If the client refuses to forego the advantage
thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the
injured person or his counsel, so that they may take
appropriate steps. (Canon 41, Canon of Professional Ethics)
c. The court shall also be informed of the
client’s misdeed.
3. What is an integrated bar ?
SUGGESSTED ANSWER: An integrated bar is
an official state organization requiring membership and
financial support of all attorneys as a condition
precedent to the practice of law. (Bar Integration Center,
Supreme Court of the Philippines)
DOCTRINE:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is the
national organization of lawyers, created on January 16,
1973 through Rule of Court 139-A designated as the
Integration Rule and constituted on May 4, 1973 into a body
corporate by the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 181.
(Sec. 1, By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines)
4. What are the fundamental purposes of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. To elevate the standards of the legal
profession;
b. Improve the administration of justice; and
c. Enable the bar to discharge its public
responsibilities more effectively. (Sec. 2, Rule 139-A,
Rules of Court)
DOCTRINE:
The other purposes of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are:
a. Assist in the administration of justice;
b. Foster and maintain on the part of its members
high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
c. Safeguard the professional interests of its
members;
d. Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality
and brotherhood;
e. Provide a forum for the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure,
and he relation of the Bar to the Bench and to the public and
publish information relating thereto;
f. Encourage and foster legal education; and
g. Promote a continuing program of legal research
in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon. (Sec. 2, By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines)
5. Why is the rule on Bar Integration
constitutional ?
DOCTRINE:
 19
a. It is a valid exercise of police power. Practice of
law is imbued with public interest and the holder of the
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common
good. (In re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554)
b. The Supreme Court was tasked by the
constitution to promulgate rules which cover among others
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar.
c. Bar integration is not violative of the freedom of
association. Integration does not make a lawyer a member
of a group of which he is not already a member. It does not
compel a lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or no to attend meetings, or vote or refuse to vote in
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion is the
payment of annual dues. In order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, the lawyer may be obliged to share in the
cost and expenses.
6. Is a senior citizen who is engaged in
“limited practice of law” exempted from payment
of his IBP dues ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A senior citizen
engaged in limited practice of law is not exempted.
This is so because a lawyer can engage in the practice
of law only by paying his dues and it does not matter
that his practice is “limited.” While it is true that Rep.
Act No. 7432, grants senior citizens “exemption from
the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that
their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,” the
exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues. (Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749,
January 20, 2000)
7. How should a lawyer conduct himself in
his dealings with his fellow lawyers ?
SUGGESTEDANSWER: A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel. (Canon 8, CPR)
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper. (Canon 8.02,CPR)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and
other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part
of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar,
depends upon their relations with their professional
brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat be another with trust and respect. Any undue ill
feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward watch other. Mutual
bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
The highest regard that can be bestowed on lawyers
is the esteem of their professional brethren. this esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and
thrives despite conflicting interests. it emanates solely from
integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable
performance of professional duty. (Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong,
Jr., A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)
b. As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to
conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward
each other. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. Obviously,
complainant’s use of sarcasm in calling the three
respondent lawyers, “brilliant lawyers”, “legal supermen”,
and “sages” fell short of this mandate. It served no useful
purpose. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions have no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Civility among members of the legal profession is a
 20
treasured tradition that must be at no time be lost to it. Atty.
de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals Justices Sabio, Jr., et al., A.M.
No. CA-03-35, July 24, 2003
c. Examples:
1. A lawyer was fined P1,000.00 and reprimanded
with a warning (his first offense), because of his failure to
respect his fellow lawyer. He provoked the incident in
question shouting and hurling invectives at the complainant,
and a brother lawyer, and even attempted to lay hands on
the complainant. He had no right to demand from his brother
lawyer why the case of a woman had not or could not be
settled. (Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, December 3,
2002)
2. Respondent lawyer was the counsel for the
respondent in an estafa case which was filed by the public
prosecutor because of the respondent’s failure to appear
during the preliminary investigation. Subsequently the
respondent filed a civil case against the complaint, the
complainant’s lawyer and the public prosecutor.
Respondent was found guilty of violating Canon 8, and was
suspended for two (2) years. (Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr.,
A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)
Canon 1 is violated for failure to observe
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which
requires that the opposing counsel should be furnished
copies of pleadings and motions.
The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniform
procedure calculated to place in competent hands the
orderly prosecution of a party’s case. This rule is not mere
technicality, but one founded on consideration of fair play. A
party engages an attorney of record precisely because it
does not feel competent to deal with the intricacies of law
and procedure. Furthermore, as the party directly served
would have to communicate with its attorney and turn over
to him the notice received, the net result would be to
noticeably shorten the usable period for taking the proper
steps required to protect the party’s interest. (Poon v. Sig-
Chua, A. C. No. 6549, September 22, 2006)
Counsel’s authority to sign pleadings
personal to him and may not be delegated to
unqualified persons. Counsel’s authority and duty to
sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it
to just any person.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession.
Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly
proscribes.
As a consequence the Supreme Court referred to the
IBP for the commencement of disbarment proceedings
against a lawyer who allowed an unqualified person to sign
an answer to a complaint. (Republic, etc., v. Kenrick
Development Corporation, G. R. No. 149576, August 8,
2006)
A lawyer, among other acts, offered monetary
rewards to anyone who could provide him any information
against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in
his actions against the latter. This tactic is unethical and
runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit of proceeding and he
shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business. The lawyer was found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and was suspended from the practice
of law for five (5) months. (Ong v. Atty. Unti, A.C. No. 2417,
February 6, 2002)
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and
other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part
of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar,
depends upon their relations with their professional
brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat be another with trust and respect. Any undue ill
feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
 21
conduct and demeanor toward watch other. Mutual
bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
The highest regard that can be bestowed on lawyers
is the esteem of their professional brethren. this esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and
thrives despite conflicting interests. it emanates solely from
integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable
performance of professional duty. Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong,
Jr., A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and
other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part
of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar,
depends upon their relations with their professional
brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat be another with trust and respect. Any undue ill
feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward watch other. Mutual
bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior
among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
The highest regard that can be bestowed on lawyers
is the esteem of their professional brethren. this esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and
thrives despite conflicting interests. it emanates solely from
integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable
performance of professional duty. Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong,
Jr., A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003
As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to
conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward
each other. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions have no place
in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of
the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must be at
no time be lost to it. Atty. de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals
Justices Sabio, Jr., et al., A.M. No. CA-03-35, July 24, 2003
3. TO THE COURTS
BAR: 1. What are the duties of lawyers to the
courts ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Candor, fairness and good faith;
b. Respect the court and judicial officers;
c. Assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice;
d. Not to influence the court or create an
impression of being able to influence the court.
Keyword: CRAI
a) Candor, fairness and good faith
towards the courts
Illustrative case of not doing any falsehood
before the court by appearing without authority. The
respondent lawyer was presumed to have authority when he
appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The
records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for
the deeased was questioned. Neither is there any indication
that the complainant in fact questioned his authority during
the course of the proceedings. However, the respondent
lawyer knew that his client had already passed away at the
time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of
his client’s passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the
parties may have been substituted. [Villahermosa, Sr. v. Atty.
 22
Caracol, A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015 citing The Heirs of the Late F.
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer v. CA, et al., 192 Phil. 61 (1981)]
The Supreme Court highlight the important role of an
attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular
nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they
should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the
courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each
lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court
processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be
more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the
public in general as agents of the judicial system. The
respondent lawyer has been less than candid about his
representation. He has also used underhanded means to
attain his purpose. The respondent lawyer’s blatant
disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced.
In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and
in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility he was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. (Villahermosa, Sr. v.
supra)
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice
d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance
of any impropriety which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influence upon the courts
BAR 2. What is encompassed in the duty
that, “A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court”? (Canon 10, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer
a. shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
1) the contents of a paper,
2) the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or
3) the text of a decision or authority, or
b. knowingly
1) cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or
2) assert as a fact that which has not
been proved. (Rule 10.02, Code of Professional
responsibility)
Strong public interest involved in requiring
lawyers to behave in a manner consistent with
truth and honor. There is a strong public interest
involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice to behave at all
times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. The
common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel
compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not
become a common reality. (Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., A. C. No.
6198, September 15, 2006)
A lawyer signed a motion which contained scurrilous
attack upon a judge as a result of a resolution he
promulgated. She admitted that she signed the motion upon
her husband’s request but she did not know the contents
beforehand. According to her, implicit is their trust in each
other that this happens all the time. Through the years she
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by
one that is singed by the other. By her own admission, the
lawyer violated Section 3, Rule 7. This violation is an act of
falsehood before he courts, which in itself is a ground for
subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any
other ground arising from the motion she signed. (Larucom,
etc., v. Jacoba, et al., A. C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006)
 23
BAR: 3. May a lawyer criticize a court
decision ? If a lawyer is not penalized for
criticizing courts or their decisions, when should
such criticism be penalized ? What is the rationale
behind the imposition of the penalty ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. It does not
follow that because a lawyer is an officer of the court,
that he cannot criticize courts or their decisions
What is penalized is not criticism .per se, but the
nature of the criticism and the manner it is carried out .
(Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al., and its companion case, 166
SCRA 316)
False charges would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of the court and
consequently lower, and degrade, the administration of
justice. This would promote distrust in the
administration of justice (In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595), thus
eroding the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved
turn to protection and relief. (Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
724, 727-728) Instead of resorting to peaceful resolution
of their disputes through the judicial system, people
may seek recourse to violent methods.
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
a. Nature of criticism. All court criticism should
be bona fide and should not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. it is misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. (In re Almacen, 31 SCRA at 580-581)
b. Illustration: A lawyer was found guilty of indirect
contempt of court and fined P20,000.00. His utterances
pressuring the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk another series of
mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling
within the ambit of constitutionally respected speech,
because such statements are not fair criticisms of any
decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made
against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a
particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such
statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also
for the judicial system as a whole, and to promote distrust
and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating
the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve
cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have
their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal,
uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous
influences. (In Re: Published alleged threats against members of
the court in the Plunder Law Case hurled by Atty. Leonard de
Vera, A.M.No. 01-12-03-SC, July 29, 2002)
Unfounded accusations or allegations or
words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it
into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary,
they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt on
contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath
and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (In Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005, disbarred in
a resolution promulgated September 11,2006)
If a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and
malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge
in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt,
equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable
summarily. [In Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel
S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005, citing Ang v
.Castro, 136 SCRA 453 (1985)])
Illustrative case. A lawyer was indefinitely
suspended because he was found guilty of both contempt of
court and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar.
 24
Frustrated with the unfavorable outcome of and in the
manner by which the Supreme Court has resolved certain
cases filed by him, the lawyer wrote a letter addressed to
the Chief Justice copy furnished all the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Office of
the Solicitor General, denouncing the Supreme Court, as
follows:
“Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court
comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally execrable
and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of
the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of
reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of
bullies and tyrants from whom ‘might is right.’ I say, shame
on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor’s throat
a ruling, which from all appearances, it could not justify.”
Called upon to show cause why he should not be
properly disciplined “for degrading, insulting and dishonoring
the Supreme court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and
contemptuous derogatory language against it,” the lawyer
responded with two more letters, arguing for the propriety of
his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts
of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. The
Court merely noted his two letters.
The two letters contained statements disparaging the
Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory
language, which included the following:
“Something has got to be seriously and terribly wrong
with the country’s justice system..” “What is happening to
the justice system in this country, Mr. Chief Justice ?”
“I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest
term such strong-handed actuations as the Honorable Court
has displayed. hey are as one might expect in a dictatorship
or authoritarian regime.”
There were various communications the lawyer
addressed to the Court which are of the same tenor. (In Re:
Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.
05-03-04-SC, July 22, 2005)
The respondent lawyer was disbarred through a
resolution promulgated on September 11, 2006. In a
manifestation and motion dated July 18, 2006, the
respondent raised a step further the level of his obstinacy
and defiance. In a clearly insulting tone reflecting a
remorseless and boorish persons, he states that he has
from the start defied the suspension order meted him by the
Supreme Court and has continued with is professional
practice as a lawyer both in the lower courts and before the
Court. The Court’s patience has been stretched to the limit
by the respondent’s arrogance and meted him the supreme
penalty. He has proven himself to be incorrigible. By his
demeanor, as demonstrated by his penchant for addressing
malicious letters and pleadings to this Court, the respondent
is unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Criticism of courts. A lawyer is entitled to voice his
criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all,
every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, by freedom with responsibility.
Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy
one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy the Supreme Court and its magistrates. [In Re: Letter
dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-
04-SC, July 22, 2005., citing Ariosa v. Tamin, A.M. No.RTJ-92-
798, 344 SCRA 589 (2000)]
The use of intemperate language and unkind inscription can
hardly be justified not can it have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. [In Re: Letter
dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-
04-SC, July 22, 2005 citing Alonte v. Savellano, et al., 350 Phil.
700; 287 SCRA 245 (1998)]
A lawyer, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is
entitled to criticize the rulings of the Supreme Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But,
certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and
malign the Court and bring it to disrepute. Against such an
assault, the Court is duty-bound “to act to preserve its honor and
dignity. . .and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.” (In Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel
S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005 citing In Re:
Wenceslao Laureta, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 282)
 25
Duty of an attorney as an officer of the court.
An officer of the court has the duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. [In Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005
of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005, In
re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the
Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, A.M. No. 01-
12-03-SC, 385 SCRA 285 (2002 )] No less must this be and
with greater reasons in the case of the court’s highest court,
the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and
democracy. (Ibid.)
The first duty of an attorney is not to his client, but to
the administration of justice, to which his client’s success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. (In Re: Letter
dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-
04-SC, July 22, 2005) The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice, It must be done within the confines
of reason and common sense. (Ibid.)
Criticism of courts. Well-recognized is the right of
a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed in order to promote the
high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not
merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue
the client’s cause through fair and honest means. (Larucom,
etc., v. Jacoba, et al., A. C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006)
Complaint filed against a magistrate instituted
by any person must be verified and duly supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein, or by documents substantiating such
allegations otherwise the complaint shall be dismissed. .
[Rondina, et al., v. Associate Justice Eloy R., Bello, Jr., etc., A.M.
No.CA-05-43, July 8, 2005 (A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-72-CA-J)citing
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-
10 SC, promulgated 11 September 2001]
It is not proper to file a charge of misconduct
against a solitary member of a collegiate court for
alleged misconduct arising from a collegial order
or judgment. The judgment or order of a collegiate court,
such as the Court of Appeals, whose members reach a
collective judgment after due deliberation, cannot be the
subject of a charge of misconduct and unethical behavior
against a single member of the appellate court. . [Rondina, et
al., v. Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., etc., A.M. No.CA-05-43,
July 8, 2005 (A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-72-CA-J] Thus, it was held
that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is
“unjust” cannot prosper (Ibid., citing In Re: Wenceslao Laureta,
12 March 1987, 148 SCRA 282), if proffered against a solitary
member.
4. What is the duty of a lawyer if he is
unable to file pleadings and other documents,
despite extensions of time ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer shall not,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
DOCTRINE AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
a. Effect of failure to submit brief. Failure to
submit briefs may be fatal to a client’s cause. Upon appeal,
the appellate court, not being in a position to hear first hand
the testimony of the parties, can only place great reliance on
the briefs and memoranda of the parties. (Sps. Galen, et al.,
v. Atty.Paguirigan, A.C.No. 558, March 7,2002)
 26
Failure to submit a brief to the appellate court within the
reglementary period entails disciplinary action. Not only is it
a dereliction of duty to his client but also to the court as well.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to
the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to
file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. There is serious lapse in the duty
owed to the client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
Sps. Galen, et al., v. Atty. Paguirigan, A. C. No. 558, March 7,
2002
Any extension granted is always counted from the
last day of the reglementary period or the last period of
extension previously sought and/or granted. This rule is
important because unless the extension from the last day of
the reglementary period or the day of last extension is
granted, this period would become inextendible. (Ramos v.
Atty. Dajoyag, Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28, 2002)
b. Illustrative cases:
1. A lawyer was subject to reprimand for simple
neglect because of his failure to seasonably appeal an
NLRC decision, although he exerted efforts to obtain a
reconsideration of a Supreme Court denial of the petition for
certiorari involving the same case. (Ramos v. Atty. Dajoyag,
Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28, 2002)
2. A lawyer was suspended for six (6) months,
ordered to refund to his clients the sum of P10,000.00, and
warned for his failure to submit the appellee’s brief. ( Sps.
Galen, et al., v. Atty. Paguirigan, A. C. No. 558, March 7, 2002)
Lawyers as officers of the court have a
responsibility to assist in the proper administration
of justice. They do no discharge this duty by filing
frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends – the speedy, efficient, impartial correct
and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt
satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid
unethical and improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. (Prieto v. Corpuz, et al., A. C. No. 6517, December 6,
2006)
A lawyer was adjudged in direct contempt of court
and ordered to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) within ten (10) days from notice, or to suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) days in case he fails to pay the
fine.
He filed a Motion and Petition-In-Intervention based on
a spurious Supreme Court decision. Direct contempt, or
contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge so as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, and can be punished summarily
without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing
the authority or dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing
of a forbidden act.
Counsel’s actuations may even constitute a violation
of the lawyer’s oath. As an officer of the court his basic
duties include to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and to judicial officers, to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice, and to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
(Encinas, et al., v. National Bookstore, Inc. G.R. No. 162704, July
28, 2005)
BAR: 5. May a lawyer properly comment
before the media the merits of a case he is
handling presently pending before the courts or
administrative bodies ? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. It would be
unethical to do so:
a. A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
 27
public opinion for or against a party . (Rules 13.02, Canon
13, Code of Professional Responsibility)
b. Newspaper publications by a lawyer to
pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair
trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally, they are to be
condemned. (1st sentence, Canon 20, Canons of Professional
Ethics)
c. Indirect advertisements for professional
employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments or procuring his photograph to be published
in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like
self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tome
of our profession and are reprehensible. (2nd sentence,
Canon 27, Ibid.)
6. “A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.” (Canon 12, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
Forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping
is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment,
It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when
he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a
favorable decision.
An important factor in determining its existence is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following
requisites should concur:
a) identity of parties, or at least such parties s
represent the same interests in both actions,
b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for
the relief being founded on the same facts, and
c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. (Lim v. Montano,
A. C. No. 5653, February 27, 2006)
The principle of forum shopping should apply
by analogy to a case involving the principle of law
of the case. While the Court has held that forum shopping
exists only where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another, it must be recalled that the doctrines of
law of the case and res judicata are founded on a public
policy against reopening that which has previously been
decided. Both doctrines share he policy consideration of
putting an end to litigation. (Spouses Aguilar v. The Manila
Banking Corporation, G. R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006)
Permutation of forum shopping is filing
various motions for inhibition to seek friendly
branch. Through the motions for inhibition of the presiding
judges and the assignment of the case to different branches
of the same court, petitioners sought to obtain from one
branch a ruling more favorable than the ruling of another
branch. They deliberately sought a friendly branch of the
same court to grant them the relief that they wanted, despite
the finality of the resolution of one branch on the matter.
This is a permutation of forum shopping. It trifles with
the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. Be it
remembered that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the
 28
rules against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate, and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous party-litigants, taking advantage of
a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached. This would make a complete mockery of the judicial
system. . (Spouses Aguilar v. The Manila Banking Corporation,
G. R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006)
Lawyer subject to disciplinary penalty if he
resorts to forum shopping. A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished for contempt of
court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple
and repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and
are consistent with truth and honor. The filing of another
action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of
the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. (Lim v.
Montano, A. C. No. 5653, February 27, 2006)
BAR: 7. Forum shopping exists when two or
more actions involve the same transactions, essential
facts, and circumstances, and raise identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. (Ligon v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127683, August 7, 1998)
8. “A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising
from the same cause.” (Rule 12.02, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
BAR: 9. Instances of forum shopping:
a. Whenever as a result of an adverse opinion
in one forum, or it may be added, in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum through means other than by appeal or certiorari,
raising identical causes of action, subject matter, and
issues. (Ligon v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 127683,
August 7, 1998)
b. When the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other case. (Ibid.)
c. When a party attempts to have his action
tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels
he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.
(First Philippine International Bank, etc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
252 SCRA 259)
d. Filing a second suit in a court without
jurisdiction. (New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. NLRC, 196
SCRA 55)
e. Filing an action in court while the same cause
of action is still pending in an administrative
proceeding. (Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc. v. Macaraig, 194
SCRA 1)
f. When counsel omits to disclose the pendency
of an appeal, in filing a certiorari case. (Collado v.
Hernando, 181 SCRA 639)
BAR: 10. Forum shopping may result to
dismissal, upon motion, of the second suit on the
ground:
a. That there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause [Sec. 1 (e), Rule 16,
Rules of Court]; or
 29
b. That the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment. [Sec. 1 (f), Ibid.]
The mere filing of several cases based on the same
incident does not necessarily constitute forum
shopping. (Paz v. Sanchez, A. C. No. 6125, September 19,
2006)
Illustrative case: Although both cases are related
because Dizon’s property is involved, the relief prayed for
are different. In the DARAB case, Dizon prayed for the
cancellation of TCT No. 420127-R in the name of the
complainant and his partners. In the RTC case, Dizon’s
widow prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 483629-R in
the name of Sycamore. Respondent cannot be held liable
for forum shopping. (Paz v. Sanchez, A. C. No. 6125,
September 19, 2006)
BAR 11. Willful and deliberate forum
shopping shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative sanctions. (last sentence, 2nd
par., Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court)
BAR: 12. Failure to comply with the
certification against forum shopping shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal
of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. (1st sentence,
2nd par., Sec. 5, rule 7, Rules of Court)
13. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertaking therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. (2nd sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules
of Court)
BAR: 14. “A lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.” (Canon 13,
Code of Professional Responsibility)
BAR: 15. “A lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.” (Rule
13.01, Code of Professional Responsibility) Thus, a lawyer
should not make a judge his compadre.
New associate is under the supervision of
more senior lawyers. It is a common practice in a law
firm that when it hires a new associate, his or her work is
ordinarily reviewed by the more senior associates of the
firm. If the supervising lawyers were not remiss in their duty
to follow up the status of the case they should have known
of the neglect. Simply put, the law firm itself was guilty of
inexcusable neglect. (Trust International Paper Corporation v.
Pelaez, G. R. No. 164871, August 22, 2006)
In a 2005 case, the Supreme Court ruled that supervising
lawyers are responsible for their associates. Principals
should closely monitor the activities of their associates to
make sure that the same is in consonance with the Code of
Professional Ethics. Otherwise, they shall be subject to
discipline.
Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory
capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence
in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the
cases handled by the persons over which they are
exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary
efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility of persons under their charge.
Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer in this
regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant
lawyer. The actual degree of control and supervision
 30
exercised by said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia,
according to office practice, or the length of experience and
competence of the lawyer supervised. Such factors can be
taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty.
Certainly, a lawyer charged with the supervision of a
fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear
greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling
than one satisfied enough with the work and professional
ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to
his/her own devises. (Solatan v. Inocentes and Camano, A. C.
No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the
responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners and
supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers of the
law office. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court said that it is not unaware of the
custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and
even entire client accounts to associates or other partners
with limited supervision, if at all. However, let it not be said
that law firm practitioners are given a free hand to assign
cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently
forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the
profession, the integrity and advancement of which this
Court must jealously protect. (Ibid.)
Thus, the senior lawyers were held liable in the
following instances:
1. A senior lawyer was administratively liable by
virtue of his associate’s unethical acts. His failure to
exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The
term “command responsibility” principle does not abide
solely to the special meaning within the circle of men in
uniform in the military. It controls the very circumstance in
which the senior lawyer found himself.
The senior lawyer was admonished to monitor more
closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the
same are in consonance with the Code of Professional
Responsibility with the warning that repetition of the same or
similar omission will be dealt with more severely . (Solatan v.
Inocentes and Camano, A. C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
2. Lawyers were held administratively liable for
the conduct of their employees in failing to time file
pleadings. [Solatan v. Inocentes and Camano, A. C. No. 6504,
August 9, 2005, citing Adaza v. Barinaga, 192 Phil. 198; 104
SCRA 684 (1981)])
3. Partners in a law firm were admonished for
the contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court
despite, and even due to, the fact that the pleadings were
not passed upon by any of the partners of the office.
Partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of
court pleadings and other court papers that carry their
names or the name of the law firm. (Rheem of the Philippines,
Inc. et al., v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al., G. R. L-22979, 26 June 1967,
20 SCRA 441 cited in Solatan v. Inocentes and Camano, A. C. No.
6504, August 9, 2005)
4. TO THE CLIENTS
BAR: 1. What are the duties of a lawyer to the
client ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Not to refuse his services to the needy and
oppressed;
b. Observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients;
c. Hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession;
d. Owe fidelity to the cause of his client and be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;
e. Serve his client with competence and diligence;
f. Represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
the law;
g. Charge only fair and reasonable fees;
h. Preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated;
i. Withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
CREATION OF LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
 31
2. A lawyer client relationship is by mere
consultation. (Spouses Rabanal, et al., v. Atty. Tugade, A.C.
No. 1372, June 27, 2002; Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634,
June 10, 2002)
3. A lawyer client contract may be express or
implied without need of a written contract. (Spouses
Rabanal, et al., v. Atty. Tugade, A.C. No. 1372, June 27, 2002;
Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002)
4. Likewise a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the client, neither is the
relationship negated by an absence of payment of
professional fees. (Spouses Rabanal, et al., v. Atty. Tugade,
A.C. No. 1372, June 27, 2002; Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No.
99-634, June 10, 2002)
5. Retainer is the act of a client by which he
engages an attorney to manage a cause, either by
prosecuting it, when he is the plaintiff, or defending it
when he is the defendant. (Bouvier)
6. A retaining fee preliminary fee given to an
attorney to secure his future services, and induce him
to act for the client. (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 579)
The retaining fee is only for the purpose of
reserving the service of a lawyer, another fee is to be
paid for actual representation.
7. A special retainer is a contract of
employment between a client and attorney for the
particular case or service only. After the termination of
the case or the rendition of the service, the retainership
is likewise ended.
Lawyer not obliged to accept engagement. It is
axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client. He has the right to decline employment. (Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006, denial of motion
for reconsideration)
Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship . Once a
lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-client
relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client’s cause. From then on, he is expected to be
mindful of the trist and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted diligence.
(Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006, denial
of motion for reconsideration)
Duty of a lawyer who accepts an
engagement. After accepting an engagement, his duty is,
first and foremost, to enter his appearance. This despite the
fact that the case was already submitted for decision.
Where there is a failure to enter his appearance, the lawyer
should return the client’s money. Surely, he cannot expect
to be paid for doing nothing. (Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No.
5655, January 23, 2006)
When duty commences. The authority of a
lawyer begins with his or her retainer. It gives rise to a
relationship between and attorney and a client that is highly
fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and
good faith.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest
of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor
to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession. Indeed, law is an exacting goddess
demanding of her notaries not only intellectual but also
 32
moral discipline. (Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No. 5655,
January 23, 2006)
Lawyer must first file his entry of appearance
before filing any pleading. A lawyer was required to
explain why he should not be proceeded administratively for
filing pleadings without first entering his appearance.
(Spouses Regalado, et al, v. Regalado, et al., G. R. No. 134154,
February 29, 2006)
Filing of a notice of appearance by a second
lawyer is not presumption of termination of the first
lawyer. There is no question that a party may have two or
more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation.
However, a substitution should not be presumed from a
mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new lawyer. The
fact that a second attorney enters his appearance for the
same party does not necessarily raised the presumption that
the authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn.
(Elbina v. Ceniza, et al., G. R. No. 154019, August 10, 2006)
Legal formalities for dismissal of counsel
should be followed. There is an absolute need to
observe legal formalities before a counsel of record may be
considered relieved of his responsibilities. The withdrawal
for dismissal of counsel must be made in a formal petition
filed in the case. The representation of the first counsel of
record is presumed to continue until a formal notice to the
contrary is filed with the court. (Elbina v. Ceniza, et al., G. R. No.
154019, August 10, 2006)
The client’s death terminates the attorney-
client relationship. The settled rule is that attorney-client
relationship is terminated upon the client’s death. A dead
client has no personality and cannot be represented by an
attorney. Thus any pleading filed and verified by the client’s
counsel is a mere scrap of paper because the lawyer no
longer has the authority to represent his dead client. (Borlongan
v. Buenaventura, et al., G. R. No. 167234, February 27, 2006)
BAR: 8. Does the representation of a de
parte counsel end when the decision is rendered
in the lower court ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall
be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court. (Sec. 22, Rule 138,
Rules of Court)
9. May a lawyer refuse to represent an
accused whom he personally believes to be
guilty ? Up to what extent should a lawyer
represent a guilty party ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Lacking the
shield of innocence the accused must be protected with
the armor of the constitution to protect his rights.
In the defense of a person accused of a crime,
by all fair and honorable means, regardless of the
lawyer’s personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused,
to present every defense that the law permits, to the
end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty,
but by due process of law. (Sec. 20, Rule 138, Rules of
Court)
BAR: 10. A lawyer may refuse a civil case
where he cannot put up a valid or meritorious
defense because:
a. The lawyer’s signature in the pleading
constitutes a certification that there is good cause to
support it and that it is not interposed for delay.
b. It is the layer’s duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to
be just and such defenses only as he believes as to be
honestly debatable under the law.
 33
BAR: 11. Duty of a defense counsel when
the client desires to plead guilty is to fully acquaint
himself with the facts and circumstances surrounding
the case to be enabled to advise the client of the
consequences of the plea of guilty, see to it that the
proper procedure is observed, present evidence so that
the precise degree of his client’s culpability is
established and to see to it that only the proper penalty
is imposed. He must also insure that there is no room
for doubt that there was a mistake or misunderstanding
as to the nature of the charges to which his client has
pleaded guilty.
a) Availability of service without discrimination
(i) Services regardless of a person’s status
(ii) Services as counsel de officio
(iii) Valid grounds for refusal
b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
(i) Confidentiality rule
(ii) Privileged communications
Attorney-client privilege, Under the attorney-client privilege,
an attorney is to keep inviolate his client’s secrets or confidences
and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney client relationship, and continue even after the client’s
death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its
client can be depended, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer
and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in a
litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer’s tongue is tied
from ever disclosing it. (Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm. Case No. 5108,
May 26, 2005 citing In re Williams, 57 Ill, 2d 63 (1974), citing
People v. Gerold ,265 Ill. 448 (1914)] With full disclosure of the
facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal
representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of
rights, or the prosecution or defense of the client’s cause.
(Mercado, supra)
Factors to establish the privilege: Dean Wigmore
cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege, viz.: “(1) Where legal advise of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communication relating that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived.” [Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm. Case No. 5108,
May 26, 2005 citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2292
(McNaughten rev. 1961)]
In summary:.
1. There exists an attorney-client
relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that
the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a
prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even f the prospective client does not
thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
(Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm. Case No. 5108, May 26, 2005 citing
Agpalo, Legal; and Judicial Ethics, 2002 ed.,pp.186-187 citing
Comments of IBO Committee that drafted the Code, p. 81)
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective)
client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Example
was where the client and his wife leased to their attorney an
agricultural land for a period of ten years. The clients gave the
lawyer a list of creditors to whom a portion of the rentals should be
paid. A disclosure by the lawyer of the list to parties whose interest
are adverse to that of the client would partake more of a private
and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer
to his client. (Ibid., citing Pfleider v. Palanca, Adm. Case No. 927,
September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 75)
2. The client made the communication in
confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not
raise presumptions of confidentiality. [Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm.
Case No. 5108, May 26, 2005 citing Hitpold v. Stern, 82 A2d 123,
 34
26 ALR2d 852 (1951)] The client must intend the communication
to be confidential. [Ibid., citing Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance
Society, 29 Phil. 163, 165 (1915)]
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is
aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. [Ibid.,
citing Brown v. Saint Paul City R. Co., 62 NW2d 688, 44 ALR 535
(1954)]
Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the
opposing party [Ibid., citing Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance
Society, 29 Phil. 163, 165 (1915)], an offer and counter-offer for
settlement [Ibid., citing Hitpold v. Stern, 82 A2d 123, 26 ALR2d
852 (1951)], or a document given by a client to his counsel not in
his professional capacity (Ibid., citing Pfleider v. Palanca, Adm.
Case No. 927, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 75), are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being
present.
3. The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity. The communication
made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must
have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of
seeking legal advice. (Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm. Case No. 5108,
May 26, 2005 citing Agpalo, Legal; and Judicial Ethics, 2002
ed.,pp.260-261)
If the client seeks an accounting service [Ibid., U.S. v.
Kovel, 296 F2d 918 (1961), or business or personal assistance
[Ibid., citing Radiant Burners, Inc, v. American Gas Association,
320 F2d 314 (1963)] and not legal advice, the privilege does not
attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose. (Ibid.)
BAR: 4. What type of information divulged by the
client to a lawyer in the course of engagement may
properly fall under protected information which a
lawyer could not reveal ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: It covers past crimes
and, the announced intention of a client to commit a
crime is not included within the confidences which a
lawyer is bound to respect. (5th sentence, Canon 37,
Canons of Professional Ethics)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. The duty of confidentiality or privileged
communication applies only to verbal revelations and
does not protect incriminating documents or physical
evidence turned over to the lawyer by the client. Reason:
As a officer of the court, a “lawyer shall exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.” (Canon 12, Code of Professional
Responsibility) Furthermore, “A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.” (Canon 10. Ibid.)
b. The duty of confidentiality includes not
divulging the client’s name where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the client’s
advise. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122)
c. Lawyer-client privilege communication rule.
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereto in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney’s
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
[Sec. 24 (b), Rule 130, Rules of Court]
(iii) Conflict of interest
BAR: 1. What is meant by a lawyer
representing conflicting interests ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
his duty to content for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose. (Canon 6, Canons of Professional
Ethics)
DOCTRINE AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
 35
a. Meaning of conflict of interest. There is conflict
of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will
be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.
(Hornilla, et al., v. Atty. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)
Rule against representation of conflicting
interest. Based on the established facts, it is indubitable
that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides: Rule 15.03
-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. "A lawyer may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client."
(Daging v. Davis, A.C No. 9395, November 12, 2014 citing Nuique v.
Sedillo, A. C. No. 9906, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 317, 325)
b. To be guilty of representing conflicting
interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party. It is enough that the
counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting
interests with that of his original client. To require that he
also be counsel-or-record of the adverse party would punish
only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with
impunity, the highest form of disloyalty. (Artezuela v.
Atty.Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002)
c. Examples of representation of conflicting
interests.
1. A lawyer was found guilty of violating the rule on
non-representation of conflicting interests when he
undertook to represent certain defendants in indirect
contempt proceedings involving a forcible entry case
brought by the complainants who were his former clients in
the same forcible entry case. He was meted a suspension
of six (6) months. Abragan, et al., v. Atty. Rodriguez, A.C.No.
4346, April 3, 2002
2. A lawyer was suspended for six (6) months
because while he was acting as counsel for the complainant
he prepared a defendant’s answer to the amended
complaint. Artezuela v. Atty. Maderazo, A. C. No. 4354, April 22,
2002
3. A lawyer was admonished with warning because
the law firm of which he was the Managing Partner, was the
retained counsel of the complainant corporation, yet he
appeared as counsel of record of the respondent Board of
Directors. Hornilla, et al., v. Atty. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, July 1,
2003
Illustration of violation of the conflict of interest rule.
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice. [Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, 505 Phil.
126, 133 (2005) cited in Daging v. Atty. Davis, A.C No. 9395,
November 12, 2014] Respondent argues that while complainant is
a client of his Law office, her case is actually handled only by his
partner. He was not privy to any transaction between his partner
and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal
matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He
thus inveigles that he could not have taken advantage of an
information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer
Agreement. It was once held that a lawyer who takes up the cause
of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his
law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. [Hilado v. David,
84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949). reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty.
Cabucana, Jr., 515 Phil. 296, 306 (2006) both cited in Daging,
supra] Thus, respondent's argument that he never took
advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the
course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even
assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the
fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should
have immediately informed both the complainant and her
opponent that he, as well as the other members of his law firm,
cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply
advised both complainant and her opponent to instead engage the
 36
services of another lawyer. The lawyer was penalized. (Daging,
supra)
d. Representation of conflicting interests is a
felony. The protection to the client is such that,
representation of conflicting interests is a felony under the
2nd par., of Art. 209, of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that In addition to the proper administrative action,
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or
a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador
judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or
having received confidential information from said client in a
case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in
the same case, without the consent of the first client.
Meaning of conflict of interest. There is conflict
of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The existence of conflict of
interest is determined by three (3) tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a
lawyer is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client;
(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will
require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation,
to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through
their professional connection; or
(3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty. (Northwestern University, Inc., et al. v.
Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005 citing Santos v. Beltran,
418 SCRA 220, 223, July 1, 2003; Hornilla v. Salunat, 405 SCRA
220, 223, July 1, 2003. See Agpalo, The Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers )
Thus, there is conflict of interest even where the
actions are unrelated. The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same
action or in an unrelated action.
It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated.
It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one
of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients. (Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,
A. C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006)
Requirement for fidelity. The fidelity lawyers owe
their clients is traditionally characterized as “undivided.”
This means that lawyers must represent their clients and
serve their needs without interference or impairment from
any conflicting interest. (Solatan v. Inocentes, et al., A.C. No.
6504, August 9, 2005)
Attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests
shall as rule be sanctioned with suspension from practice of
law. (Northwestern University, Inc., et al., v. Arquillo, A.C. No.
6632, August 2, 2005) It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on
public policy that a lawyer’s representation of both sides of
an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when
the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It
applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions
or in good faith. (Northwestern University, Inc., et al. v. Arquillo,
A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005 citing Nakpil v. Valdes, 350 Phil.
412; 286 SCRA 758, March 4, 1998)
Meaning of conflict of interest. There is conflict
of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The existence of conflict of
interest is determined by three (3) tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a
lawyer is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client;
 37
(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will
require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously
affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation,
to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through
their professional connection; or
(3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty. (Northwestern University, Inc., et al. v.
Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005 citing Santos v. Beltran,
418 SCRA 220, 223, July 1, 2003; Hornilla v. Salunat, 405 SCRA
220, 223, July 1, 2003. See Agpalo, The Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers )
There is representation of conflicting
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his
first client in any manner in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired during
their connection. [Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A. C. No. 5128,
March 31, 2005; Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13,
2005 (Formerly CBD – 98 – 591)]
Another test to determine if there is representation of
conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. [Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A. C. No.
5128, March 31, 2005; Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656,December
13, 2005 (Formerly CBD – 98 – 591)]
Alternative statement of conflict of interest.
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties,
there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is
determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in
representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for
an issue or claim, but is also duty bound to oppose it for
another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously
affect his first client in any manner in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
during their professional connection; or (3) when the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent the full discharge
of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance of that duty. (Northwestern
University, Inc. v. Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632, August 2, 2005)
A lawyer was suspended for one year with stern
warning because he represented the complainants in a labor
case which was consolidated with another labor case where
he represented one of the respondent employers. It does
not matter that his client in one of the respondent employers
was subsequently exonerated. Having agreed to represent
one of the opposing parties that, the lawyer should have
known that there was an obvious conflict of interests,
regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the
same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed
employees were the complainants in the same cases in
which his client was one of the respondents. (Ibid.)
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is
a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a
lawyer’s representation of both sides of an issue is highly
improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter,
however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when
the attorney acts from honest intention or good faith. (Ibid.)
Good faith not a defense in conflict of interest cases.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests. (Daging v. Davis, A.C No. 9395, November 12, 2014 citing
Orola v. Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013, 705 SCRA 350,
358-359)
BAR: 2. Why is a lawyer prohibited from
representing conflicting interests ?
 38
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The relation between client and lawyer is
founded on trust and confidence. The lawyer learns
the strong and weak points of the client’s cause. In
order to have the fullest confidence the client must be
assured that his secrets would not be used against
him. (Maturan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, March 12, 1998)
b. Not only to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect an
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil,. 571)
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets
of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated. (Canon 21, CPR)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance.
because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. he may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client. Indeed good faith and honest intention on the
part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.
The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are
governed by the uncompromising rules of professional
ethics.
Inherently disadvantageous to his client’s cause,
representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires
disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved.
Artezuela v. Atty. Maderazo, A. C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002
Test of conflict of interest. One of the test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. (Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., A. C. No.
6836, January 23, 2006)
Rationale for prohibiting representation of
conflicting interests. The prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of te
lawyer-client relations is is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. (Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., A. C. No.
6836, January 23, 2006)
BAR: 3. Is there any exception to the
prohibition on representation of conflicting interest
?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility)
Criminal Penalties. The protection to the client is
such that, representation of conflicting interests is a felony
under the 2nd par., of Art. 209, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both
shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of
a client or having received confidential information from said
client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing
party in the same case, without the consent of the first client.
No conflict of interest. There is no conflict of
interest where the lawyer represented the complainant’s
nephew and other members of his family in an ejectment
suit and the complainant in a criminal case filed by the
complainant against his nephew and other members of his
 39
family involving several parts of trucks owned by the
complainant. Reason: The two civil and criminal cases are
not in any way connected with each other. (Pormento, Sr. v.
Pontevedra, A. C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005)
There is no conflicting interest where no employment
relation was offered or accepted as a result of the advice
that was offered. (Solatan v. Inocentes, et al., A.C. No. 6504,
August 9, 2005)
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a
party with an interest conflicting with that of his client
resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of
disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance of an
attorney may have afforded an individual some relief
adverse to the former’s client may be labeled as a culpable
act of disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to be
culpable mist be assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances. (Solatan v. Inocentes, et al., A.C. No. 6504,
August 9, 2005)
There was no conflict of interest involved where the
complainant was informed by the lawyer that he must prove
his ownership over certain personal properties after the
latter has already sought police assistance relative to a
controversy involving his clients and the complainant. This
is so because the statement given by the lawyer was in
response to the insistence of the complainant at the police
station that the property was his and not that of the
judgment creditor against whom the lawyer’s clients had
levied. No employment relation was offered or accepted in
the instant case. There was likewise no likewise no conflict
of interest because the lawyer’s clients were not claiming
ownership over the property. (Solatan v. Inocentes, et al., A.C.
No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
The lawyer having informed complainant that the
levied properties would be returned to him upon showing
proof of his ownership may not be considered as infidelity to
the interest of his clients because under the circumstances,
it lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the
latter’s confidence so as to deserve outright categorization
as infidelity or disloyalty to his client’s cause. (Ibid.)
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly
or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client. A lawyer may
properly act as counsel for a new client, with full
disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter
wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there
being in that instance no conflict of interest. Where,
however, the subject matter of the present suit between the
lawyer’s new client and his former client is in some way
connected with that of the former client’s action, the lawyer
may have to contend for his new client that which he
previously opposed as counsel for the former client or to use
against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.
(Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A. C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005)
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. In
essence, what a lawyer owes to his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter
in which he previously represented him. (Ibid.)
Rationale for prohibiting representation of
conflicting interests. The reason for the prohibition is
found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action
as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets.
A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client, for if
the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the
loss thereof. (Maturan v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, March 12,
1998)
 40
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance.
because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. he may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client. Indeed good faith and honest intention on the
part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.
The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are
governed by the uncompromising rules of professional
ethics.
Inherently disadvantageous to his client’s cause,
representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires
disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved.
The relation between lawyer and client is founded on
the basis of trust and confidence which is a matter of public
policy and good taste. To breach the client’s confidence
would also create the appearance of treachery and double
dealing. This would in turn discourage litigants from
entrusting their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance n the administration of justice.
(Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A. C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005)
The stern rule is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.
[Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005 (Formerly
CBD – 98 – 591)]
Defense of good faith unavailing in conflict
of interests situation. The defense of representation of
conflicting interests (criminal case) for humanitarian reasons
and with the honest belief that there exists no conflict of
interests is not acceptable. The prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions and motives were honest and he acted
in good faith. Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests
is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition
inoperative. (Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A. C. No. 5128,
March 31, 2005)
The defense that there are only three practicing
lawyers in the community where the complainant and the
respondent lawyer were residing was not also given
credence. The lawyer alleged that one of the lawyers was
already handling the case for the complainant, and the other
is a relative of the complainant while the third is the
respondent. This is not an excuse because the respondent
should have referred his clients to the Public Attorney’s
Office or to other practicing lawyers in the neighboring
towns. (Ibid.)
(iv) Candid and honest advice to
clients
(v) Compliance with laws
(vi) Concurrent practice of another
profession
c) Client’s moneys and properties
(i) Fiduciary relationship
(ii) Commingling of funds
(iii) Delivery of funds
(iv) Borrowing or lending
Illustrative case: Respondent’s receipt of the
2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by
substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on
March 23, 2006, issued three (3) East West Bank Checks, in
amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the
payee. Also, Annex “E” of the Verified Complaint shows
that respondent acknowledged receipt of the checks and
agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated
interest of five percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.
The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that
 41
respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they
were issued. With respondent’s direct transactional
involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom,
absent too any credible indication to the contrary, the
Supreme Court is thus convinced that respondent was
indeed the one who borrowed the amount of P2,500,000.00
from complainants, which amount he had failed to return,
despite their insistent pleas. Respondent’s theory that Nault
is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s
acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in
his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied
knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would
be illogical for them to extend a P2,500,000.00 loan without
any collateral or security to a person they do not even know.
On the other hand, complainants were able to submit
documents showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and
their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the -
P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact
that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainants, allowing the former to wield a greater
influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence
inherently imbued in such relationship. . [Sps. Concepcion v.
Atty. de la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015 citing Frias v. Atty.
Lozada, 513 Phil. 512, 521-522 (2005)]
Lawyer not to borrow from client. Under Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from
borrowing money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any
natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone
to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer
from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client. [Sps. Concepcion v.
Atty. de la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015 citing Junio v. Atty. Grupo,
423 Phil. 808, 816 (2001)]
Reason for the prohibition for lawyers to borrow
from the client. The rule presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. [Sps. Concepcion v.
Atty. de la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015 citing Frias v. Atty.
Lozada, 513 Phil. 512, 521-522 (2005)]
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation. (Ibid.)
Abuse of client’s trust and confidence. In unduly
borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The respondent not only violated the prohibition
to borrow money from the client, the also violated Canon 7
of the CPR which reads: CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT
ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Thus, he should be equally held administratively
liable on this score. [Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. de la Rosa, A.C. No.
10681, Feb. 3, 2015
 42
Imposable penalty for borrowing money from the
client. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts. [Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. de la Rosa, A.C.
No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015 citing Sps. Soriano v. Atty. Reyes, 523 Phil. 1,
16 (2006)]
a. In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from
the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing
P900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same
despite court order, and representing conflicting interests.
b. Considering the greater amount involved in
this case (P2,500,000.00) and respondent's continuous
refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend
him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of
the IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely. (Sps.
Concepcion, supra)
Disciplinary penalty does not include
reimbursement of amount borrowed. The Court also
deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar
as it orders respondent to return to the complainants the
amount of P2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is
settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. [Sps. Concepcion
v. Atty. de la Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3, 2015 citing Roa v. Atty.
Moreno, 633 Phil. 1, 8 (2010) See also Suzuki v. Atty. Tiamson, 508 Phil.
130, 142 (2005)]
In such cases, the Court's only concern is the
determination of respondent's administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received from
his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. A turn of
the money borrowed is beyond the ambit of the
administrative case. (Sps. Concepcion, supra)
d) Fidelity to client’s cause
e) Competence and diligence
Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-Amboy, No.10568 [Formerly CBD Case No.
102753, January 13, 2015
Duty of lawyer to owe fidelity to client’s cause.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and that he
should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. (Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-Amboy, No.10568 [Formerly
CBD Case No. 102753, January 13, 2015 citing Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 17) A lawyer is
mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence;
to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep
his client informed of the status of his case and respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information. (Ibid, Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04)
Illustration of negligence, incompetence and act
of undermining the law and the penalty imposed. The
circumstances of this case clearly show that respondent
lawyer, after receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her
professional services, failed to submit material documents
relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the
individual owners of the property. It was her negligence
which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of
title.
To make matters worse, the respondent lawyer
abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked
from the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid
to her “contact” inside the office of the RD in order to
facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further,
notwithstanding the payment of P50,000.00, the respondent
lawyer still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates
of title. Instead of procuring the release of the certificates of
title as she promised, the respondent asked for an additional
P10,000.00 from the complainant. Clearly, this is not a
simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel
in dealing with a client. The respondent lawyer’s acts
undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold
and defend. In swearing to the oath, the respondent lawyer
bound herself to respect the law and legal processes. The
 43
Court further finds improper the refusal of the respondent
lawyer to return the amount of P50,000.00 which she paid in
order to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To
reiterate, upon inquiry, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied
having received any amount from the respondent lawyer. In
not returning the money to the complainant after a demand
therefor was made following her failure to procure the
issuance of the certificates of title, the respondent lawyer
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which
requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified
withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action. [Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-Amboy,
No.10568 [Formerly CBD Case No. 102753, January 13, 2015 with a
note to See Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490, 494 (2003)]
The respondent lawyer was suspended for a period
of two (2) years from receipt of the Resolution. Furthermore,
she was ordered to return to the complainant the entire
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) she received
from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from
finality of the Resolution imposing the penalty until fully paid.
The respondent was further directed to promptly submit to
the Supreme Court written proof of her compliance within
thirty (30) days from notice of the Resolution imposing the
penalty. (Soliman, supra)
Presumption of misappropriation upon failure to
return client’s funds after demand. "A lawyer's failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in
him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment." [Soliman v. Atty. Lerios-Amboy, No.10568 [Formerly
CBD Case No. 102753, January 13, 2015 citing Adrimisin v. Atty. Javier,
532 Phil. 639, 645-646 (2006)]
(i) Adequate protection
(ii) Negligence
(iii) Collaborating counsel
(iv) Duty to apprise client
f) Representation with zeal within legal
bounds
Lack of zeal. Thee was an the improvident plea of
guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon
the advice of his counsel, the PAO lawyer. It would seem
that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he
advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t]
commit. As the ponencia observed, “outside of his
improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence
against him – presented or forthcoming. From the evidence
of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could
have been implicated.” The separate oion of Justice Isagani
Cruz wen on further to say, “It seems to me that if any one is
guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was
apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all,
and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to
condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this
case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he
prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to
submit evidence in his behalf.” (Separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza G.R. No. 80845, March 14, 1994, 231
SCRA 264, 271 cited in Villahermosa, Sr. v. Atty. Caracol, A.C. No. 7325,
January 21, 2015)
(i) Use of fair and honest means
(ii) Client’s fraud
(iii) Procedure in handling the case
 44
1. What is the duty of a lawyer relative to a
legal matter entrusted to him?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. (Rule 18.02, CPR)
A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law. (Canon 19, CPR)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Duty relative to motions for extension. Motions
for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the
sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never
presume that their motions for extension or postponement
will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time
they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should
conduct a timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of
the action on their motions and the lack of notice thereof will
not make them any less accountable for their omission.
(Ramos v. Atty. Dajoyag, Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28, 2002)
b. Excusable negligence. Negligence is excusable
where it is caused by failure to receive notice of the action or
the trial, by a genuine and excusable mistake or
miscalculation, by reliance upon assurances given by those
upon whom the party had a right to depend, as the adverse
party or counsel retained in the case, or a competent
adviser, that it would not be necessary for him to take an
active part in the case, or that the suit would not be
prosecuted, by relying on another person to attend to the
case for him, when such person promised to do so, or was
chargeable with that duty or by a well-founded belief that the
case would not be reached for trial as it was in fact reached,
or by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving
party. (Ramos v. Atty. Dajoyag, Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28,
2002)
A lawyer was reprimanded with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely for letting the court order for the submission of a
compromise agreement remain unacted upon for four (4)
years until the dismissal of the case for the parties’ non-
compliance. (Agustin v. Empleo, A. C. No. 6986, March 6, 2006)
2. What is the duty of the lawyer to inform
his client?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The lawyer should
inform the client of the status of his
case and he shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client’s request for information.
DOCTRINE AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
a. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of
confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to
be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the
case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and
manner in which his interests are being defended. it is only
thus that the trust and faith in the counsel may remain
unimpaired. (Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, A.C. No. 5811, January
20, 2003)
b. Illustrative case:
A lawyer was penalized with six(6) months
suspension and warning, for having among other violations,
failed to inform or advised the client of the status of the
case. Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, A.C. No. 5811, January 20, 2003
BAR: 3. Why is a client bound by a
lawyer’s negligence ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. A lawyer is the client’s agent; and
b. There would be no end to litigation if the
client is allowed to raise attorney’s negligence every
time he loses a case.
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Clients should suffer the consequences of the
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel
whom they themselves hired, and whom they had full
authority to fire at any time and replace with another. ( Del
Mar v.Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 139008, March 13, 2002)
 45
a. Client is bound by the counsel’s acts. The
general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts,
including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique. (Suliman v. People, G. R. No. 190970, Nov. 24, 2014 citing
Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA
328)
b. Rationale for holding client liable. The
rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds
the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in
behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by
counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the
eyes of the law, as the act or omissi on of the client himself .
(Suliman v. People, G. R. No. 190970, Nov. 24, 2014 citing Bejarasco, Jr.
v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 328)
BAR: 4. Negligence of counsel does not
bind the client where the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel
a. deprives the client of due process of law or
b. where its application results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality; or
c. when the application of the general rule will result
in serious injustice.
c. Exception to the rule that the client is
liable for the counsel’s negligence. A recognized
exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross
negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due
process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the
gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s
own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the
duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping
himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this
duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is
rendered against him. Truly, a litigant bears the
responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no
prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the
hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in contact
with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of
the progress and developments of his case; hence, to
merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that
everything is being taken care of is not enough. (Suliman v.
People, G. R. No. 190970, Nov. 24, 2014 citing Bejarasco, Jr. v. People,
G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 328, 330-331)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. The general rule is that a client is bound by
the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the
negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court. In which case,
the remedy then is to reopen the case and allow the party
who was denied his day in court to adduce his evidence. (
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002)
b. Exceptions to the general rule that negligence
of counsel binds the client:
1) Such negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of due process of
law; and
2) The application of such due process results in the
outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.(
Del Mar v.Court of Appeals, et al., supra)
c. Interesting is the resolution by the Supreme
Court of the motion for reconsideration in Legarda v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 280 SCRA 642. In the original case, Legarda v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 195 SCRA 418, the Supreme Court
held that the lawyer committed, not just ordinary or simple
negligence, but reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence,
which deprived his client of her property without due process
of law. Hence, the Court ruled that the client was not bound
by the negligence of her counsel.
In the motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court
reversed itself and held that the client was bound by the
negligence of her counsel. The Court held that the
respondents should not be made to suffer for the gross
negligence of Legarda’s counsel, “If she may be said to be
‘innocent’ because she was ignorant of the acts of
negligence of her counsel, with more reason are
respondents truly “innocent.” As between two parties who
 46
may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the
counsel of one, the party who was responsible for making it
happen should suffer the consequences.” (Legarda v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 280 SCRA 642, 659)
It is the duty of the lawyer to advise the client on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. Lawyers, as officers
of the court, must se to it that the orderly administration of justice
must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of counsel to advise his
client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse he
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s
oath to uphold the case of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable. (Spouses Aguilar v. The Manila
Banking Corporation, G. R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006)
General rule: A client is bound by a lawyer’s
negligence. Ordinarily, until his dismissal or withdrawal is
made of record in court, any judicial notice sent to a counsel
of record is binding upon his client even though as between
them the professional relationship may have been
terminated. (Grand Placement and General Services
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 142358, January
31, 2006)
Lawyer’s mistakes and blunders not a
ground for new trial. Blunders and mistakes made in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not
qualify as a ground for new trial.
If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for
reopening cases, there would never be an end to litigation
so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and
show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced, or learned. This will put a premium on the
willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with
a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.
(Spouses Regalado, et al., v. Regalado, et al., G. R. No. 134154,
February 28, 2006)
A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, otherwise his negligence of fulfilling his duty subjects him to
disciplinary action. The practice of law is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. The Supreme Court has been exacting
in its expectations for members of the Bar always to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act
or omission which lessen the trust and confidence of the public….
” [Anderson, Jr. v. Cardeno, A. C. No. 3523, January 17, 2005
citing De Guzman v. Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa, A.C. No. 5554,
June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 1, 9)
A lawyer must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Like all professionals, he is expected to devise ways to follow the
course of his cases and to keep his files updated. .(Spouses
Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., et al., G. R. No. 160976, June
8, 2005 citing Zarate-Bustamante v. Libatique, A. C. No. 4990, 2
September 2001, 366 SCRA 8) As a member of the Bar, he is
expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his
profession. Thus, every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence and diligence and he
should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. (Ibid., In Re:
Atty. David Briones, A. C. No. 5486, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA
1) Moreover, a counsel is required to inquire, from time to time,
and whenever necessary, about the status of handled cases, as
well as motions filed for a client. (Ibid., citing Oriental Assurance
Corporation v, Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 139882, 16
August 2000, 338 SCRA 305)
General rule: A client is bound by a lawyer’s
negligence. The doctrinal rule is that a client is bound by
the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. Reasons:
a. A lawyer is the client’s agent. Clients
should suffer the consequences of the negligence,
mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom
they themselves hired, and whom they had full
authority to fire at any time and replace with another .
(Del Mar v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 139008,
March 13, 2002) and
 47
b. There would be no end to a suit so
long as a new counsel could be employed who
would allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.
(GCP Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe, etc., et
al., G. R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005; Friend, et al.,
v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G. R. No. 165767,
November 29, 2005)
But a client who incurs loss on account of a lawyer’s
inexcusable negligence may recover damages from the
lawyer.
Negligence of counsel does not bind the
client when the negligence of counsel is so gross, palpable,
reckless and inexcusable
a. that the client is deprived of due process
of law or
b. where its application results in the outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty property through a
technicality (Del Mar v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
139008, March 13, 2002); or
c. when the application of the general rule
will result in serious injustice In which case, the remedy
then is to reopen the case and allow the party who was
denied his day in court to adduce his evidence (Producers
Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002), or when the counsel’s
actuations are gross or palpable resulting in serious
injustice to client (GCP Manny Transport Services, Inc. v.
Principle, etc., et al., G. R. No. 141484, November 11,
2005), or where the interests of justice so requires.
(Friend, et al., v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G. R. No.
165767, November 29, 2005)
Interesting is the resolution by the Supreme Court of the
motion for reconsideration in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
280 SCRA 642. In the original case, Legarda v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 195 SCRA 418, the Supreme Court held that the lawyer
committed, not just ordinary or simple negligence, but reckless,
inexcusable and gross negligence, which deprived his client of her
property without due process of law. Hence, the Court ruled that
the client was not bound by the negligence of her counsel.
In the motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court
reversed itself and held that the client was bound by the
negligence of her counsel. The Court held that the respondents
should not be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legarda’s
counsel, “If she may be said to be ‘innocent’ because she was
ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason
are respondents truly “innocent.” As between two parties who
may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the counsel of
one, the party who was responsible for making it happen should
suffer the consequences.” (Legarda v. Court of Appeals, et al., 280
SCRA 642, 659)
Failure of law firm to inform client of
decision is inexcusable negligence which cannot be a
ground for relief from judgment. This is in line with
jurisprudence that neglect or failure of counsel to inform his
client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of right to
appeal will not justify the setting aside of a judgment that is
valid and regular on its face. (Trust International Paper v.
Pelaez, G. R. No. 164871, August 22, 2006)
A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot ne considered as
notice to his client. (Grand Placement and General Services
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 142358, January
31, 2006)
Duty of lawyer to inquire about case status . A
counsel is required to inquire about the status of the cases
assigned to him and the motions he has filed for a client. He
cannot pass this burden to his client and blame the latter for
every mishap. It is inexcusable negligence of counsel for a
memorandum on appeal not to have been filed on time.
(Banting, et al., vs. Sps. Manlapaz, G. R. No. 15867, August 22,
2006)
Duty of clients. It must be stressed that clients are
bound to prosecute their complaint with assiduousness.
They are obli9ged to give the necessary assistance to their
counsel, as their interest in the outcome of the case is at
stake. They are wrong to expect that all they needed was to
sit back, relax and await a favorable outcome. (Spouses
 48
Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., et al., G. R. No. 160976, June
8, 2005 citing Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 112850, 27 June
1995, 245 SCRA 384)
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his client’s genuine interest and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law . (In
Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M.
No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005)
A member of the legal profession owes his
client entire devotion. While a lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client’s
genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law. (In Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No.0503-04-SC, July 22, 2005,
disbarred through a resolution dated September 11, 2006)
BAR: 1. What are the requirements for
substitution of counsel ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No substitution of counsel
of record is allowed unless the following essential requisites
of a valid substitution of counsel occur:
a. There must be a written motion for substitution;
b. It must be filed with the written consent of the
client;
c. It must be with the written consent of the attorney
to be substituted, and
d. In case such written consent cannot be obtained,
then the written request for substitution must be
accompanied with proof of service of notice of such motion
in the manner required by the Rules of Court, on the
attorney to be substituted. (Yu v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
186; Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120176,
July 20, 2001)
The procedure for withdrawal of counsel must be
observed. A lawyer may retire from a suit upon written consent
of the client filed in court. He may also retire at anytime without
the consent of the client should the court on notice to the client
and attorney and on hearing determine that he ought to be allowed
to retire. In case of substitution, the new attorney’s name shall be
entered on the docket in place of the former one and the written
notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. (Sec. 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)
Unless the procedure is complied with, the counsel of
record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with
copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be
held responsible for the case. Without such formal withdrawal
filed in the case, notice of judgment rendered in the case served
on the counsel of record, is, for all legal purposes, notice to the
client, the date of receipt of which is considered the starting point
from which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to
run. (GCP – Manny Transportation Services, Inc. v. Principe, etc.,
et al., G. R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005)
2. May government owned or controlled
corporations hire or retain private lawyers to
render legal services for them and/or to handle
their legal cases in consideration of fixed retainer
fees ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. No public funds will
be disbursed for the payment of private lawyers unless prior
to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and
acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel. The purpose of the restriction is to
curtail unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of
public funds. (Polloso v. Hon. Gangan, etc., et al., G.R. No.
140563, July 14, 2000)
BAR: 3. “An attorney who appears de parte in a
case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.”
(Sec. 22, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
 49
BAR: 4. What should be the extent of a
lawyer’s zeal in representing his client?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. (Canon
19,CPR)
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present, unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding. (Rule 19.01, CPR)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Use of lawful means. While a lawyer owes
utmost zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he also
has the responsibility of employing only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and he
should not allow the latter to dictate the procedure in
handling the case.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the
interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his
rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in
accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law in support of his
client’s cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the
full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not
be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge
or the general public. (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, Jr., A.C.No.
5394, December 2, 2002)
b. Illustrative cases:
1. A lawyer was found guilty of conduct unbecoming
a lawyer and was suspended from the practice of law for five
(5) months because he instituted criminal and administrative
complaints against his client’s opponent, which cases had
no bearing on the cause of his client for support of her son.
Furthermore, he did not participate in the proceedings
despite his motions for postponements. He has shown utter
lack of respect towards the public officers assigned to
investigate him. (Ong v. Atty.Unto, A.C.No. 2417, February 6,
2002)
2. A lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for one month with warning because this is the first time he
was found guilty of neglect of his client’s case. He failed to
file his formal offer of exhibits which led to a dismissal of the
case. To compound his inefficiency, the respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration outside of the reglementary
period. (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, Jr., A.C.No. 5394, December
2, 2002)
3. Although the legal remedy taken by respondent
lawyers was later found to be erroneous does not constitute
proof that they deliberately and knowingly intended to
forestall the hearing of the criminal case. There was no
showing that they have overstepped the norms of their
Lawyer’s oath in advocating the interest of their clients. In
the judicial forum, their clients were entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land. They were exonerated. (Atty. de la Rosa
v.Court of Appeals Justices Sabio,Jr., et al., A.M. No. CA-03-35,
July 24, 2003)
25. What are included in the duty of the
lawyer to be faithful to his client ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. (Canon 17, CPR)
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence. (Canon 18, CPR)
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Rule 18.03, CPR)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and care, less
than that, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. ( Sencio v.
Atty. Calvadores, A.C. No. 5841, January 20, 2003)
b. A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his
actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance,
 50
would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to the
client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with
the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who
deals with them has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause. ( Alcantara v.
Atty.Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, December 3, 2002)
c. Illustrative cases:
1. A lawyer who deceived his client when he claimed
that he has already filed the petition when in fact, it was filed
later. For his neglect in handling the case, he promised to
return half of the amount he was paid but he never did.
Such misconduct betrays the confidence reposed in him by
his client. The lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law with warning. He was also directed to restitute to
complainant the sum of P10,000.00. (Reyes v. Atty. Javier,
A.C. No. 5574, February 1, 2002)
2. A lawyer received P12,000.00 as other fees to
prosecute the civil aspect of reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide. He however, did not file the case and did not
return the money despite his promise to do so. He was
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months,
ordered to return the P12,000.00, and warned that a
commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. (Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, A.C. No.
5841, January 20, 2003)
26. What comprises the duties of the lawyer
as the trustee of his client’s money and
properties ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. (Canon 16, CPR)
A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client . (Rule 16.01,
CPR)
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them
are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may
be true that they have a lien upon the client’s funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into
their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may
apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not
relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they receive. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert
all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of
law.
b. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar, and to the public. (Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No.
99-634, June 10, 2002)
c. Illustrative cases:
1. A lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for one year because he used the P25,000.00 intended for
filing fee for his personal use. ( Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, A.C. No.
99-634, June 10, 2002)
2. A lawyer was penalized with six (6) months
suspension, with warning, because he failed to account and
return the P10,000.00 for filing fees despite repeated
demands. (Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, A.C. No. 5811, January 20,
2003)
Lawyers should return the filing fee they
received where the case was not filed. The ethics of
the profession demands that a lawyer should properly
account for all money or property collected from the client.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such for
filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on demand. (Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006 on the motion for
reconsideration)
 51
Lawyer who receives money for a particular
purpose should account for the same and if not
spent for the purpose should return the same,
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent
for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money o the client. (Meneses v.
Macalino, A.C. No. 6651, February 27, 2006)
A lawyer was disciplined because she
borrowed money from her client. A lawyer’s act of
asking a client for a loan is very unethical. It comes within
those acts considered as abuse of a client’s confidence.
The canon presumes that the client is disadvantages by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege
on her obligation. [Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656,December 13,
2005 (Formerly CBD – 98 – 591), motion for reconsideration
denied on May 4, 2006]
In a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the Supreme Court with finality on May 4, 2006, it was held
that an administrative complaint against a member of the
bar does not prescribe. Furthermore, it is not proper to raise
new issues on a motion for reconsideration.
g) Attorney’s fees
Kinds of attorney’s fees. There are two commonly accepted
concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services
he has rendered to the latter. The basis of the compensation is the
fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fees are deemed
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. (PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. ,et al.
,v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G. R. No. 153031,
December 14, 2006)
Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.
They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, vis: “13. Contingent Fees. – A contract for contingent fee,
where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of
a court, as to its reasonableness, and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. (Roxas, et al. v. De
Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., G. R. No. 152072, January 31, 2006, and
companion case)
Written contract governs attorney’s fees unless
unconscionable, hence court may reduce the same if
found to be unconscionable and unreasonable. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore
unless found by the court to be unconscionable, or reasonable.
(Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)
Indubitably intertwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only
reasonable fees is the power of the court to reduce the amount of
attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
(Roxas, et al. v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., G. R. No. 152072,
January 31, 2006, and companion case)
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they
affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.
It becomes axiomatic, therefore, that power to determine the
reasonableness or the unconscionable character of
attorney’s fees stipulated by the paties is a matter falling
within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. (Roxas, et al.
v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., G. R. No. 152072, January 31, 2006,
and companion case)
Illustrative case: The lawyers received an amount
equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation
paid in accordance with their written contract, or an amount
equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
 52
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in Lawyers could not charge clients a fee based on
the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise percentage absent an express agreement to that effect.
Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably unconscionable and (Pineda v. De Jesus, et al., G. R. No. 155224, August 23, 2006)
excessive under the circumstances. The Supreme Court
ordered the return of the amount of P17,073,224.84 to the Quantum meruit is permitted where no express
clients. (Roxas, et al. v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., G. R. agreement to pay attorney’s fees. The professional
No. 152072, January 31, 2006, and companion case) agreement may be governed by the principle of quantum meruit
which means “as much as the lawyer deserves.” The recovery of
The practice of law is not a money-making trade. attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted where there is no express
Lawyers are members of an honorable profession, the primary agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a
vision of which is justice. The practice of law is a decent legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from
profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
be but a mere incident. (Pineda v. De Jesus, et al., G. R. No. paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the
155224, August 23, 2006) part of the lawyer himself. (Pineda v. De Jesus, et al., G. R. No.
155224, August 23, 2006)
Illustrative case: The wife filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against the husband who Attorney’s fees must be established by the
was represented by the respondent lawyers. During the
circumstances of each case. The duty of the court is not only
pendency of the case, the wife proposed a settlement to the
to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner but also to
husband regarding her visitation rights over their minor child
ensure that a lawyer is paid his just fee. No hard and fast rule may
and the separation of their properties, which was accepted
be set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, it must be
by the husband. The respondent lawyers then sought to
established from the facts of each case. As the Court of Appeals
collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value
is the final adjudicator of facts, the Supreme Court is bound by its
of the properties awarded to the husband. The Court ruled
findings. (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Funk, G. R.
that since the respondents did not deny that payment to
No. 131260, December 6, 2006)
them in cash, checks, free products and services from the
petitioner’s business this more than sufficed for the work
Illustrative case: The respondent lawyer was
they did. The “full payment for settlement” should have
engaged to secure several properties which he
discharged the petitioner’s obligation to them.
subsequently transferred to the petitioner through a series
The Court went on to state that demanding P50
of donations for an attorney’s fee fo 10% of the market
million on top of the generous sums and perks already
value of the properties. Somehow or the other the
given to them was an act of unconscionable greed which is
respondent lawyer was not paid his attorney’s fees. As a
shocking to the Court. It is respondents’ despicable
consequence he filed suit where the lower court increased
behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of
his attorney’s fees for the transfer of the properties to
some people. The vernacular has a word for it:
P918,919.50. He was also declared co-owner of 10% of the
nagsasamantala. The award of the additional attorney’s
properties whose market values were not proven. On
fees in favor of the respondents was deleted. (Pineda v. De
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
Jesus, et al., G. R. No. 155224, August 23, 2006)
resolution entitling the respondent lawyer to 10% of the
Considering the strong words of condemnation,
market value of the remaining properties but with the
the Supreme Court should have subjected the respondents
modification that there would be no right of co-ownership.
to disciplinary penalty or should referred the matter to the
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
IBP for appropriate action.
certiorari impugning the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 53
(Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Funk, G. R.
No. 131260, December 6, 2006)
(i) Acceptance fees
Nature of acceptance fee. An acceptance fee is not a
contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which
entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the
outcome of litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with
the outcome of cases does not render void a retainer
agreement. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not
demi-gods or “magicians: who can always win their cases for their
clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how
passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. [Yu v. Bondal,
A. C. No. 5534, January 17, 2005 citing Curimatmat v. Gojar, 308
SCRA 123, 128 (1999)]
(ii) Contingency fee arrangements
4. If the contract between client and
attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal
of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall
be entitled to recover from the client the full
compensation stipulated in the contract. (Sec. 26, Rule
138, Rules of Court)
BAR 5. What is the concept of attorney’s
fees on a quantum meruit basis ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The fee which is as
much as the lawyer deserves considering the
reasonable value of the services he has rendered.
(Teerthdass v. Pohoomol Brothers, 15 Phil. 607)
BAR 6. In what instances may a court
award attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Courts may award
attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis:
a. Where the fees stipulated appear excessive,
unconscionable, unreasonable because a lawyer
being an officer of the court is subject to judicial control;
b. Where a lawyer withdraws with justifiable
cause;
c. Where there is no express contract or the
recovery of attorney’s fees;
d. Where the contract of employment is void
because of some irregularity in its execution or as to
purely formal matters;
e. there is an agreement to pay attorney’s fees
but the amount has not been agreed upon;
f. If the client prevents the successful
prosecution or defense of the action;
g. If the contingency fee arrangement is
invalidated, the legal service lawfully rendered and the
client derived some benefit from the suit.
BAR 7. What factors may be used as
factors in determining attorney’s fees ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The time spent an the extent of the services
rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. the skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as
a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;
 54
g. The amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h. the contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer. (Rule
20.01, Code of Professional Responsibility)
BAR 8. What is a contingent fee ? Is it
allowed in this jurisdiction ? Why ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: An agreement laid
down in an express contract between a lawyer and a
client in which the lawyer’s professional fee, usually a
fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action is made to depend upon the success of the
litigation. (Tagans v. NLRC, et al., 248 SCRA 133)
It is allowed because that is the only way by
which the poor and helpless can have their rights
vindicated and upheld.
(iii) Attorney’s liens
(iv) Fees and controversies with
clients
A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice, or
fraud. (CPR, Rule 20.04)
Suits for attorney’s fees should be avoided. Suits
to collect attorney’s fees should be avoided and should be filed
only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. The
respondents motion for payment of their lawyer’s fees was not
meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had
already been adequately paid. (Pineda v. De Jesus, et al., G. R.
No. 155224, August 23, 2006)
Where suit for attorney’s fees may be filed. A
lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary
petition as an incident of the man action in which his services wee
rendered or in an independent suit against is client. The former is
preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits. (Pineda v. De Jesus, et al.,
G. R. No. 155224, August 23, 2006)
13. Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a
suit against his client concerning his fees.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: “A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation
and shall resort to judicial action to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.” (Rule 20.04, Canon 20, Code of
Professional Responsibility)
Controversies with clients concerning
compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as
shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his
right to receive reasonable compensation for his
services.
BAR 14. Assumpsit is the action filed by a
lawyer against his client for collection of attorney’s
fees.
(v) Concepts of attorney’s fees
(a) Ordinary concept
 55
made nor received in payment of the services
contemplated; its payment has no relation to the
obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
(b) Extraordinary concept
services which he has retained him to perform. (Polloso
v. Hon. Gangan, etc., et al., G.R. No. 140563, July 14, 2000)
BAR 1. What are the two concepts of attorney’s
fees ? Explain each briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The two concepts h) Preservation of client’s confidences
are:
a. Ordinary, which means the reasonable (i) Prohibited disclosures and use
compensation paid to a lawyer for his services. It is
due him and he could collect it. (Traders’ Royal Bank (ii) Disclosure, when allowed
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, et al., 269 SCRA 733)
b. Extraordinary. These are attorney’s fees
awarded as an indemnity to be paid by the losing party
to the wining party. These are not the entitlements of i) Withdrawal of services
the lawyer but of the winning party litigant (Ibid.),
unless the lawyer and the client agreed that the client
shall pay to the lawyer the awarded attorney’s fees.

BAR 3. Attorney’s fees awarded as an indemnity or

damages to be paid by the losing party to the wining
party are not the entitlements of the lawyer but of the
winning party litigant unless the lawyer and the client
have agreed that the client shall pay to the lawyer the
awarded attorney’s fees.

Extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. In its

2. A retainer fee is a preliminary fee to an
attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future
services, and induce him to act for the client. It is
intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived , by
being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay
from him, and payment of such fee, in the absence of
an express understanding to the contrary, is neither
extraordinary concept, attorney’s fees are deemed indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7
thereof which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.
 56
The extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees is the one
contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides, ”In
cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party ay be
assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount
of wages recovered.” (PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. ,et al. ,v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G. R. No. 153031,
December 14, 2006)
General rule: No award of attorney’s fees. It is not
sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate, nor
should attorney’s fees be awarded every time a party wins a
lawsuit. (Ballesteros v. Abion, G. R. No. 143361, February 9,
2006; Buning, et al., v. Santos, G. R. No. 152544, September 19,
2006)
Exception: When attorney’s fees are awarded.
Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of counsel’s
fees, in the exercise of judicial discretion where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (Ballesteros v. Abion, G. R. No. 143361,
February 9, 2006)
Award of attorney’s fees is in order where the plaintiff had to
incur expenses to protect its interest. If exorbitant, the same may
be reduced to an appropriate amount. (United Planters Sugar
Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO) v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.
R. No. 126890, November 28, 2006)
Award of attorney’s fees must be supported by
evidence. The conclusion awarding attorney’s fees must be
borne out by findings of facts and law. There must be factual,
legal or equitable justification for the award. Without such
justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture, (Ballesteros
v. Abion, G. R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006)
In making an award of attorney’s fees, the court must state
in its decision the legal or factual absis for the award. (Buduhan
v . Pacurao, et al., G. R. No. 168237. February 22, 2006; Buning,
et al., v. Santos, G. R. No. 152544, September 19, 2006)
The power of courts to grant damages and attorney’s fees
demands factual, legal and equitable justifications, its basis cannot
be left to speculation or conjecture. The rule is that evidence
should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should
determine who are entitled to such indemnity. (Spouses Vizarra,
et al. ,v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 148014, December 5, 2006)
BAR 9. What is a champertous contract ?
Is it allowed in this jurisdiction ? Why ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: One whereby the
attorney agrees to prosecute suits at his own expense
for the recovery of things or property belonging to or
claimed by the client, the latter agreeing to pay the
former a portion of the thing or property recovered as
compensation.
It is not allowed being against public policy
because the lawyer becomes a party litigant instead of
an advocate for a client. “A lawyer may not properly
agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear the
expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance
expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject to
reimbursement.” (Canon 42, Canons of Professional Ethics)
Mere fact that a party is compelled to litigate, by
itself standing alone, does not necessarily justify an
award of attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees must be
deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated. What Article 2208 (2) of the Civil
Code provides, in order that attorney’s fees may be awarded, is
that “the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest.” It is settled that the fact that the party was compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim does
not justify the award of attorney’s fees. The general rule is that
attorney’s fees cannot be rcovered as part of damages because of
the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. The award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the
award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
(Francisco v. Co, etc., G. R. No. 151339, January 31, 2006)
 57
Labor cases exception to strict construction in
granting attorney’s fees.. Article 111 of the Labor Code,
which provides, ”In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party ay be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered,” is an exception to the
declared policy of strict construction in awarding attorney’s fees.
Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to
prove the merit of the award, there need not be any showing that
the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the
wages. There need only a showing that the lawful wages were not
paid accordingly. (PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. ,et al. ,v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G. R. No. 153031,
December 14, 2006)
The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be touched
only in the fallo of the decision otherwise it should be thrown
out for being speculative and conjectural. (Villanueva, et al. v.
Spouses Salvador, G. R. No. 139436, January 25, 2006)
The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be dealt with only in
the dispositive portion of the decision. The text of the decision
must state the reason behind the award of attorney’s fees.
Otherwise, its award is totally unjustified. (Ballesteros v. Abion, G.
R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006; Spouses Tamayo v. Heirs of
Dominguez, G. R. No. 133429, August 10, 2006)
BAR 10. Distinguish champertous
contracts from contingent fee contracts.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. In champertous contracts, the attorney
undertakes to bear all expenses incident to the
litigation while this is not true in contingent fee
contracts.
b. Champertous fees are payable only in kind,
out of the properties recovered while contingent fees
may be paid in cash.
c. Champertous contracts are void as against
public policy and the ethics of the profession while
contingent fee contracts are valid.
BAR 11. What are the different kinds of
attorney’s liens ? Explain each briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Retaining, general or possessory lien. “An
attorney shall have a lien upon funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his
possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.” (1st
sentence, Sec. 37, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
b. Charging, specific, particular or non-
possessory lien. The right of a lawyer to have any
awards made to his client as a security for the payment
of his attorney’s fees.
BAR 12. An attorney shall also have a lien to
the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client,
from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse party; and
he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his
just fees and disbursements. (2nd sentence, Sec. 37, Rule
138, Rules of Court, arrangement supplied)
The judgment must however be final and
executory, otherwise there is nothing to be executed
against.
DOCTRINES:
 58
a. There is authority to the effect that a lawyer
could not retain files the client needs to pursue her case
(People v. Altaver, 78 Misc. 2d 24) because the lawyer
would be delaying man for money. After all, should the
client prevails the lawyer’s fees could still be enforced
through the charging lien.
b. It is untenable for a lawyer to claim that since
his client was already in arrears with his fees, it was proper
for him to apply the filing fees to his attorney’s fees. A
lawyer’s lien is not an excuse for a lawyer’s non-rendition of
accounting.
And while a lawyer is allowed to apply so much of
the client’s funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, the lawyer is however under the
obligation to promptly thereafter notify his client.
Assuming that the lawyer’s services were
terminated, the attorney would not, nonetheless, be relieved
of his duty to render the necessary accounting for all the
moneys received by him from the client. (Garcia v. Atty.
Manuel, A.C. No. 5811, January 20, 2003)
Lawyer’s lien over client’s property is
recognized but not to be exercised haphazardly.
Although a lawyer’s lien over a client’s property in
satisfaction of his lawful fees and disbursements is
recognized by the Supreme Court, the same cannot be
exercised haphazardly.
A fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith and is designed to remove all such
temptation and to present everything of that kind from being
done for the protection of the client.
It is thus the Supreme Court’s duty to look into
dealings between attorneys and their clients and guard the
latter from any undue consequences resulting from a
situation in which they may stand unequal. (Hsieh v. Quimpo,
et al., A. C. No. 6128, December 19, 2006
Illustrative case: Spouses respondents lawyers
were engaged by the complainant to represent her and her
companion. They were arrested for drug trafficking and
possession of marijuana and the complainant’s car was
impounded. Since she did not have sufficient funds to
defray her defense the complainant authorized the
respondents, who in the meantime were able to release the
car, to sell it by signing a computerized Deed of Sale the
complete particulars of which were left in blank.
The Deed of Sale was then filled up with the name of
one of the respondents and the price of P600,000.00. The
respondents claim that they agreed to handle complainant’s
case for P20,000.00 as acceptance fee, and P1,000,000.00
success fee, but as complainant did not have money, she
convinced them to accept a computerized Deed of Sale
covering her car as a form of assurance that she would
settle any outstanding account.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to the
defense and found the respondents to have breached their
obligation to hold in trust properties of the client that may
come into their possession. The Supreme Court agreed with
the IBP Investigator that if the facts were as the respondents
claimed it to be then the computerized form should have
been completely filled up with the name of the respondent
wife and the price before it was presented for signature to
the complainant. Furthermore, the complainant should have
been advised of the eventual sale of the car and account for
the proceeds thereof. The respondents were suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three(3) months with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. (Hsieh v. Quimpo, et al., A. C. No.
6128, December 19, 2006)
15. “A lawyer shall withdraw his services
only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.” (Canon 22, Code of Professional
Responsibility)
BAR 16. “A lawyer may withdraw his services
in any of the following cases:
 59
a. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling; BAR: 1. What redress may a party litigant
b. When the client insists that the lawyer who is aggrieved by the negligence of a lawyer
pursues conduct violative of these canons and rules; seek and before what body ? ?
c. When his inability to work with co-counsel will SUGGESTED ANSWER: He could seek
not promote the best interest of the client; administrative, civil or criminal redress against the
d. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer erring lawyer, depending upon the nature of the
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment negligence.
effectively; He may file a verified administrative complaint
e. When the client deliberately fails to pay the with either the Supreme Court, the IBP (directly with
fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer the Board of Governors) or with the IBP Chapter to
agreement; which the lawyer belongs.
f. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to If he suffered pecuniary losses as a result of the
public office; or negligence he may file a civil suit for damages with
g. Other similar cases.” (Rule 22.01, Code of either the RTC or the MTC depending on the
Professional Responsibility) jurisdictional amount.
If the inexcusable negligence or ignorance of the
C. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND lawyer prejudiced the client, a case for violation of Art.
DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-B, RULES OF 209 of the RPC may likewise be filed with the MTC.
COURT)
2. What courts may impose disciplinary
1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary penalties against lawyers ?
actions against lawyers a. The Supreme Court may impose the
penalties of warning, admonition, fine, suspension,
a) Sui generis disbarment, contempt but not impose imprisonment as
a penalty for the commission of a felony which is
b) Prescription considered as violative of ethical rules.
b. The Court of Appeals as well as the Regional
2. Grounds Trial Court could impose the penalties of warning,
admonition, fine, suspension and contempt but not
3. Proceedings disbarment or imprisonment as a penalty for the
commission of a felony which is considered as violative
4. Discipline of Filipino lawyers practicing of ethical rules.
abroad The penalty of suspension imposed by the Court
of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court shall be subject
 60
to review by the Supreme Court and shall be
implemented only if so affirmed by the High Court.
c. The Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals could impose the penalties of warning,
admonition, fine and contempt but not suspension,
disbarment or imprisonment as a penalty for the
commission of a felony which is considered as violative
of ethical rules.
d. the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial Court could
impose the penalty of warning, admonition, fine and
imprisonment for violation of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on revelation of secrets and
representation of conflicting interests, but not
suspension or disbarment.
BAR 3. Misconduct of a government official
which would affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency subjects him to discipline
both as a government employee and as a member of
the Bar. (Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility)
The purpose of penalizing him as a government
employee is different from the purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, hence there is no double jeopardy.
BAR 4. Pendency of a criminal action does
not suspend disciplinary proceedings because a
criminal action has for the purpose of imposing the
penal sanctions for violation of the law while
disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of
maintaining the purity of the profession by removing
those who have shown that they are unfit to continue in
their membership in the profession. Furthermore, the
quantum of evidence required for criminal cases is
proof beyond reasonable doubt while that of
disciplinary proceedings only substantial evidence.
Neither is acquittal in a criminal case considered
as a ground for dismissal of disciplinary action cases
also based on the above grounds.
Quantum of evidence required in administrative
cases against lawyers. In administrative cases against
lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence. (Sultan v. Atty. Macabanding, A.C. No. 7919, October 8,
2014)
Preponderance of evidence defined.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the
following:
(a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony;
(c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not
mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number. (Rodica v. Lazaro, A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012, 679
SCRA 1, 9-10 cited in Sultan v. Atty. Macabanding, A.C. No. 7919,
October 8, 2014)
BAR 5. A lawyer may also be subject to acts
committed outside of his profession if it affects his
 61
moral character to continue in his membership in the
Bar.
BAR 6. Disciplinary proceedings are sui
generis, neither criminal nor civil, hence there are no
complainants nor prosecutors. Their main purpose is
to purge the profession of those who have show that
they are not anymore fit to continue as members.
Withdrawal by the complainant is not
ground for dismissal because such proceedings are
imbued with public interest.
Disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, an
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative
of an administrative case against him, nor an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case affect its course. (St. Louis
University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v.
Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
BAR 7. Reasons why disciplinary action
considered sui generis:
a. It is neither a civil nor criminal proceeding
because its purpose is to purify the profession;
b. Double jeopardy cannot be availed of;
c. It can be initiated motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or by the IBP;
d. It can proceed regardless of interest or lack
of interest by the private complainant;
e. It is imprescriptible;
f. It is confidential;
g. The principle of res ipsa loquitur finds
application.
BAR 8. A conditional pardon does not bar
disciplinary proceedings. (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No.
363, July 31, 1962)
BAR 9. Is absolute pardon a bar to
disciplinary action ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Absolute pardon
generally is a bar to disciplinary action.
However it is not a bar where the disbarment
proceedings are founded on professional misconduct
which has resulted in a conviction for a crime although
the pardon wipes out the penal consequences, it does
not operate as a bar to disbarment proceedings. (In re
Lontok, 43 Phil. 293) This is especially true, if the crime for
which he was convicted is one that involves moral
turpitude. The absolute pardon does not erase the blot
on theconvict’s moral character.
DOCTRINES AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
a. Absolute pardon does not result to restoration
of offices forfeited such as that of a lawyer. A disbarred
lawyer is not automatically reinstated to the office of a
lawyer because of an absolute pardon.
His application to reinstatement is subject to the
discretion of the Supreme Court upon evidence that he is
now a person of good moral character.a fit and proper
person to practice law. (In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293)
BAR 10. Enumerate some grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer after his
admission to the practice of law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Deceit;
b. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office;
c. Grossly immoral conduct;
 62
d. By reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; or
e. for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice; or
f. For a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or
g. For corruptly or willfully appearing as attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. ( Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. The rape committed by a lawyer constitutes
serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for
rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The
privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. “Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain
one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.” (Calub v. Suller, A.C. No. 1474, January 28, 2000)
2. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to
him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession. Not only did he
degraded himself as an unfaithful lawyer, he has
besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. (Nabor
v. Baterina, A.C. No. 4073, June 28, 2001)
BAR 11. A lawyer may not be disciplined for
failure to pay her loan obligation (Toledo v. Abalos, 315
SCRA 419), but unwarranted obstinacy in evading the
payment of a debt has been considered as gross
misconduct. (Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233)
Gross misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as
“wrong or improper conduct,” and “gross had been held to mean
“flagrant, shameful” (Webster). The Supreme Court once held that
the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. (Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, etc., v. Carandang, A.C. 5700, January 30, 2006)
Immoral conduct is “that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.” (St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-
LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28,
2006)
Grossly immoral characterizes an act that “must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” (St. Louis University
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
Contracting a second marriage or engaging in
illicit relationship constitutes grossly immoral conduct.
((St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty
and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006;
Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A. C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006)
The law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the court, may at any time be the subject of inquiry
on the part of the proper authorities. (St. Louis University
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
Gross misconduct ground for disciplinary action.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private
capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment because good moral character is an essential
qualification for the continuance of such privilege.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
 63
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Layers may be
disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private
capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor. (Tomlin, II, v. Moya, II, A. C. No.
6971, February 23, 2006)
Non-professional misconduct. Issuing bouncing
checks constitutes serious misconduct, as a lawyer is deemed to
know the law, specially B.P. Blg. 22. (Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, etc., v. Carandang, A.C. 5700, January 30,
2006)
Refusal to pay just debts and issuance of
worthless checks. A lawyer was suspended for two () years
with a warning that any further infraction by him will be dealt with
more severely for having been found guilty of gross misconduct
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Although he acknowledged his financial obligation to the
complainant the respondent lawyer never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary he refused to
recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing
worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. It is his
duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his
duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations. (Tomlin, II,
v. Moya, II, A. C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006)
Disrespect to fellow lawyers subjects a lawyer to
discipline. A lawyer was admonished to refrain from using
offensive and improper language in her pleadings. In a pleading
filed before a court she said that a fellow lawyer, “wants to be paid
an additional $75,000.00 for his services in providing coffee and
opening doors whenever there is a conference.” (Asa, et al. v.
Castillo, et al., A.C. No.6501, August 31, 2006 (CBD Case Nos.
03-1076, 03-1108,03-1109,03-1126)
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
A member of the Bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court xxx:
d. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, xxx xxx.
(ROC, Rule 138, Sec. 27, paraphrasing supplied)
Rationale why conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude results to disbarment. By such conviction,
a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice, and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25,
2006)
Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything that is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty modesty, or good
morals. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
The crime need not be related to the practice of
the profession. Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but
certainly to their moral character. When their misconduct outside
of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon
them by their license and the law, the Supreme Court may be
justified in suspending or removing them from their office.
(Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is
not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of law and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances .
(Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006. citing various
cases)
Illustrative case: The respondent lawyer who was
driving his car under the influence of liquor, chased a taxi
which had overtaken him and held the taxi driver by the
shirt. When the latter opened the door, the respondent fell
 64
to the ground. The taxi driver went out of the taxi to help
the respondent who totally enraged stood up and was about
to hit the taxi driver with a fist blow when the latter boxed
him on the chest. The respondent again fell to the ground
and got up once more and tried to box the taxi driver who
caught his fist and turned is arm around. When he was
released the respondent went back to his car to get his
unlicensed firearm which he wrapped with a handkerchief.
In the meantime the taxi driver saw the eyeglasses of the
respondent on the ground so he picked it up to return it to
the respondent. As he was handing the same to the
respondent, the latter shot him on the neck. The taxi driver
fell on the thigh of the respondent who pushed him off and
sped of. His claimed that he was ganged upon by the taxi
driver and his two companions. On the above basis the
lower court convicted him of frustrated homicide, with an
award of damages to the taxi driver. The respondent
applied for and was granted probation.
Disbarment proceedings were then proffered by the
complainant-taxi driver against the respondent. He was
disbarred.
The Supreme Court compared the instant case with
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 221
SCRA 760, 767, May 12, 1993, a labor case where it was
held that homicide did not involve moral turpitude. The
appreciation in this case of the mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance clearly
demonstrate that the employee’s character and intention
were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
It is different with the case of the respondent
lawyer, who was clearly the aggressor, as he pursued and
shot the complainant when the latter least expected it. The
act of aggression will not be mitigated by the act that the
respondent was hit once and his arm twisted by the
complainant. There was likewise present the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. To make matters worse, the
respondent in wrapping the handle of his unlicensed firearm
with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints betrayed
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. He has
likewise failed to satisfy his civil liabilities attendant to the
offense after efforts for a settlement failed. He further made
the claim that it was the complainant’ family who
approached him for settlement of the civil liability when he
was the one who initiated, through a vice-mayor, efforts to
settle his civil liability. He has shown lack of common
honesty when he claimed he was mauled by the
complainant and his two companions when the medical
records has shown that this was implausible considering the
nature of the injuries he suffered.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated
homicide, the attendant circumstances – not the mere fact
of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to
remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the
appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as
a member of the bar.
Not all convictions of homicide involve moral
turpitude. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime
of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally
but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se
and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It
follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague
and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached (Garcia v. Sesbreño, A.C. 7973 and A.C. No. 19457, February
3, 2015 citing International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, G.R. No.
97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760, 768)
Illustration of homicide that was attended by
moral turpitude. The respondent lawyer was previously
convicted of homicide and sentenced to suffer a prison term
 65
of 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor, as a minimum, to 16
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum,
with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
The circumstances show the presence of moral
turpitude. The Decision showed that the deceased and his
companion were walking and just passed by the respondent
lawyer’s house when the latter, without any provocation from
the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and
started firing at them. According to the surviving victim , they
were about five meters, more or less, from the gate of the
respondent lawyer when they heard the screeching sound of
the gate and when they turned around, they saw the
respondent lawyer aiming his rifle at them. The surviving
victim and the deceased ran away but the deceased was
hit. An eyewitness, recalled that he heard shots and opened
the window of his house. He saw the surviving victim and
the deceased running away while the respondent lawyer
was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting the house of the witness
in the process. Another witness, saw the deceased fall down
after being shot, then saw the respondent lawyer in the
middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking
back towards the gate of his house. The victims were just at
the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that
justified the indiscriminate firing done by the respondent
lawyer that eventually led to the death of the deceased.
(Garcia v. Sesbreño, A.C. 7973 and A.C. No. 19457, February 3, 2015)
.
Respondent lawyer was disbarred for his
conviction of homicide that involved moral turpitude.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President
can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. (Garcia v. Sesbreño, A.C. 7973 and
A.C. No. 19457, February 3, 2015 citing Section 19, Article VII, 1987
Constitution and a note to See Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 75025, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 356)
In this case, the executive clemency merely
"commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and
6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on
the respondent lawyer. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty. [Garcia, supra citing Cabantag v. Wolfe, 6 Phil. 273 (1906)]
Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability. (Garcia, supra citing Article 94, Revised Penal Code)
The penalty for the respondent lawyer’s crime was
never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced
penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More
importantly, the Final Release and Discharge stated that "[i]t
is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law
as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist."
Even if the respondent lawyer has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was
a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege. [Garcia, supra citing Overgaard v.
Atty. Valdez, 588 Phil. 422 (2008)]
It is granted only to those possessing good moral
character. (Ibid.)
A violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment. (Ibid.)
Contempt
Indirect contempt. Addressing a letter to Chief Justice
Davide alleging corruption in the judiciary connotes bad faith and
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral oliguity and conscious
ding of a wring. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-
will for ulterior purposes.
The honor and integrity of the court from assaults of
disrespect must be preserved. One reason why respect of the
public for the Judiciary has diminished is because of unscrupulous
lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced or
bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal profession.
Thus, a lawyer and his client who wrote the letter to Chief
Justice Davide were declared guilty of indirect contempt of court.
They were fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a repetition of
similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty. (Mercado, et al.,
 66
v. Security Bank Corporation, G. R. No. 160445, February 16,
2006)
16. A veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against
the trial court is contrary to the provisions which
mandates that “a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.” (Bugaring, et al., v. Hon. Espanol, etc., G.R. No.
133090, January 19, 2001)
17. A hurled uncalled for accusation that the
judge was partial in favor of the other party is against
the rule, which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a
judge, “motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality in the case.” (Bugaring, et al., v. Hon. Espanol,
etc., G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001)
18. Behaving without regard to the trial court’s
order to maintain order in the proceedings in utter
disregard of the lawyer’s duty to “maintain towards the
court (1) respectful attitude” in order to maintain the its
importance in the administration of justice; and the duty
of lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due to
the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.” (Bugaring, et al., v. Hon. Espanol,
etc., G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001)
19. Behaving without due regard or deference
to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making
representations in behalf of the other party, who was
rudely interrupted and was not allowed to further put a
word in edgewise in violation of the duty of a lawyer to
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues. (Bugaring, et al., v.
Hon. Espanol, etc., G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001)
20. A lawyer could not seek shelter in his duty
to protect the interest of his client. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts
in the administration of justice. Any conduct which
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty. (Bugaring, et al.,
v. Hon. Espanol, etc., G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001)
Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private
and confidential until its final determination. The
confidential nature of the proceedings has a threefold purpose, to
wit:
1) to enable the court and the investigator to make
the investigation free from any extraneous influence or
interference.
2) to protect the personal and professional reputation
of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the publication f
such charges pending their resolution; and
3) to deter the press from publishing the charges or
proceedings based thereon. (Tan, et al., v. IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, et al., G. R. No. 173940, September 5,
2006(Formerly CBD Case No. 02-967)
The disciplinary action under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is only from the practice of law
and not from the lawyer’s employment. (Maligaya v.
Doronilla, Jr., A. C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006)
Illustrative case: The suspension meted upon a
military lawyer only concerns his administrative liability as a
member of the legal profession, and not his liability as a
legal officer in the military service. Thus, the Supreme
Court did not agree with the IBP in its recommendation for
the military lawyer to be also suspended from the
government military service. It would be improper to order
as a penalty for breach of legal ethics and the lawyer’s oath,
also is suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate
General’s Office.
Of course, suspension from employment as a
military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his
suspension from the practice of law but that should be
 67
reason to impose as a penalty for professional misconduct.
(Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., A. C. No. 6198, September 15,
2006)
Purpose of disbarment. The purpose of disbarment is
to protect the administration of justice by requiring those who
exercise this important function be competent, honorable and
reliable – lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the
duties nd responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and
thus, to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
The Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. (St. Louis
University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v.
Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
Power to disbar exercised with great caution. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty
would accomplish the end desired. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No.
6792, January 25, 2006)
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle,
with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons. It must
be exercised only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an office of the court.
(Sampana v. Angara, et al., A.C. No. 5839, August 22, 2006)
Reasons for exercise of great caution. The power to
disbar or suspend a lawyer should be used with the utmost caution
and only for serious reasons so as not to unjustly deprive him of
his means of livelihood and distinct reputation in the society.
(Sampana v. Angara, et al., A.C. No. 5839, August 22, 2006)
Disbarment shall not be imposed where a lesser
penalty could accomplish end desired. Disbarment should
be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an office of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired. (Lim v. Montano, A. C. No. 5653, February 27, 2006) All
the more so, should this rule be followed were the respondent has
committed an infraction for the first time. (Spouses Williams v.
Enriquez, A. C. No. 6353, February 27, 2007)
Illustrative case: A respondent lawyer who was
found guilty violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for forum shopping was suspended from the
practice of oaw for a period of six (6) months and sternly
warned that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will
be dealt with more severely. (Lim v. Montano, A. C. No.
5653, February 27, 2006)
Where a lesser penalty shall not be imposed. This
munificence, of imposing lesser penalty which would accomplice
the end desired, should not be extended where the actions of a
respondent are so despicably and wantonly disregards his duties
to society and his profession. Thus, meting out a lesser penalty
would be irreconcilable with the lofty aspiration for the legal
profession – that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and
justice.
Furthermore, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, the Supreme
Court will not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
(Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
Illustrative case: A respondent lawyer who was
convicted of frustrated homicide because he shot a taxi
driver as a result of a traffic altercation using an unlicensed
firearm which he wrapped in a handkerchief to avoid
fingerprints, subsequently insisting that it was the family of
the victim who initiated moves to compromise when he was
the one who did so, and who has not settled his civil liability
which was a condition for his probation was disbarred.
(Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006)
 68
Complainant in administrative case required to
prove charges by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. (Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A. C. No. 7214, November
30, 2006)
Case against erring lawyer must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, the burden of
which rests upon the complainant. Only a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as member of the bar will
warrant disbarment. This so because the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. (Santos v. Cacho-Calicdan, A. C.
No. 5395, September 19, 2006)
The burden of proof rests on the complainant and the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Thus, the adage that “he who asserts, not
who denies, must prove.” (Sampana v. Angara, et al., A.C. No.
5839, August 22, 2006)
For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty. (Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A. C. No. 7214, November 30,
2006)
Illustrative case: An administrative case against
a lawyer was dismissed for lack of merit. The complainant
was not able to substantiate his charges. His bare
allegations could not overcome the presumption of
regularity in the performance by the respondent of her
official duty. Furthermore, it was previously ruled by the
Ombudsman that ad faith and malice attended the filing of
the administrative complaint. In view of the complainant’s
suspicion of bias on the part of the respondent she inhibited
herself from further conducting hearings against the
complainant. Despite this he still filed an administrative
case before the Civil Service Commission and the
disbarment complaint before the Supreme Court. (Santos
v. Cacho-Calicdan, A. C. No. 5395, September 19, 2006)
Supreme Court may refer the matter to IBP for
further investigation. The Supreme Court noticed that affidavit
of desistance alluded that the affidavit was notarized without the
affiant appearing before the notary public. Hence, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines was directed to investigate the allegation that the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of the complainant was notarized without
requiring the latter’s personal appearance. (Bautista v. Bernabe,
A. C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006)
Withdrawal of complaint. Complainant’s desistance or
withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put
an end to the administrative proceedings.
1. The Supreme Court is not bound by affidavits
of desistance in administrative cases, as they involve
public interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s exercise of
its power to take cognizance of administrative cases
against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil
remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practice in his
profession. (Gonzales v. Cabucano, Jr., A. C. No. 6836,
January 23, 2006)
2. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant what matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct had been proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings A proceeding or suspension or disbarment is
not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant, Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
 69
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
(Bautista v. Bernabe, A. C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006)
3. A disbarment case is sui generic for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.
(St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28,
2006)
Dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence not a ground for dismissing
administrative charge. The long-settled rule is that the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence against an accused who is also a respondent in an
administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the
administrative proceeding against him or carry with it the relief
from administrative liability.
The quantum of evidence in a criminal case is different
from that required in an administrative case. In the former, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is needed while the latter, substantial
evidence defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is enough.
(Jimenez v. Jimenez, A. C. No. 6712, February 6, 2006)
While dismissal of a criminal case for insufficient
evidence does not bar administrative proceedings the
complainant must prove his case. If the complainant fails to
meet the required standard of substantial evidence, or to establish
his/her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence, the
Supreme Court shall not hesitate to dismiss any disbarment
proceedings against any lawyer.
After all, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. (Jimenez v.
Jimenez, A. C. No. 6712, February 6, 2006)
Supreme Court may reduce penalty and grant
clemency. The Court is not only a court of law and justice, but
one with compassion; nor a Court of vengeance but of justice.
(Foronda v. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, January 27, 2006)
Illustrative case: A lawyer was found guilty of
“trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum
shopping” for filing multifarious petitions, motions and
actions concerning the sale of a particular property and
suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Seventeen (17) months had lapsed since he was
ordered suspended the lawyer filed an “Ex Parte Plea for
Clemency” pleading for compassion and praying that the
suspension meted against him be lifted immediately.
The Supreme Court granted his plea after it found
out that the 17 month period was more than enough time for
him to reflect and realize the gravity of his actuations. He is
contrite and remorseful. He has humbly acknowledged his
transgression and offered his most sincere apology.
In granting the plea, the Supreme Court sternly
reminded the respondent that the practice of law is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of
the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.
More importantly, while lawyers owe their entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that
they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. (Foronda v. Guerrero, A. C. No.
5469, January 27, 2006)
Supreme Court will not hesitate to dismiss charges
against lawyer. The “success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation” and “everything which
will harm his good name is to be deplored.” ’ [Sarangani v.
Asdala, et al., Adm. Case No. 4929, January 26, 2005 citing
Radomes v. Fabrigas, 204 Phil. 1, 3; 118 SCRA 374, 376 [1982] in
turn citing Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919, 923 (1926)]
And while courts will not hesitate to mete out proper
disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who failed to live up to their
sworn duties, “they will on the other hand, protect them from the
unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants.” [Ibid., citing Martin
and Aquino v. Felix, 163 SCRA 111, 131 (1988)]
 70
Withdrawal of complaint. The Supreme Court is not
bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of the complainant to the Chief Justice
imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in
disbarment proceedings. (Mercado v. Vitriolo, Adm. Case No.
5108, May 26, 2005)
21. What is the penalty for direct contempt ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent
or higher rank. fine not exceeding two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00), or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10)
days, or both. (2nd sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court)
b. If lower court, fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos (P200.00) or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) day or both. (Ibid.)
BAR 22. There is a difference between direct
contempt which could be penalized summarily without
notice and hearing and indirect contempt which
requires that it be docketed, heard and decided
separately from the principal action, unless duly
consolidated. (Fr. Guillen v. Judge Canon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-
1381, January 14, 2002)
BAR 23. Complaints against lawyers for
misconduct are normally addressed to the Supreme
Court. If, at the outset, the Supreme Court finds a
complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it
necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as
when the matter could not be resolved by merely
evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made
to the IBP for formal investigation. An ex-parte
investigation may only be conducted when the
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.
(Ingles v. dela Serna, A.C. No. 5763, December 2, 2002)
BAR 24. A practicing lawyer and officer of the
court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be
allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law
which would negate the inherent power of the court to
punish him for contempt. (Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234)
The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the Bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the desired end.
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justified the imposition
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. However, the said penalties are imposed
with great caution because they are the most severe
forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are
beyond repair. (Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4738, June
10, 2003)
Statutory grounds not a limitation. The statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend
or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted. (Velez v. De Vera, A. C, No. 6697,
July 25, 2006 and companion cases)
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor,
which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity. (St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
 71
Transferring IBP membership to another chapter
where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for
his suspension or disbarment. While a legal act may not
necessarily be ethical, there is noting wrong in transferring to an
IBP Chapter that –based on the rotation rule – will produce the
next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National
Presidency for the next term. The Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor
punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and
from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal. (Velez
v. De Vera, A. C, No. 6697, July 25, 2006 and companion cases)
Continued possession of good moral character is
an imperative. One of the conditions prior to admission to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous.
Otherwise, “membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.” (St. Louis University
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
Right to be due process. The essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met. (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No.2474, June 30,
2005 citing Montemayor v. Bundalian, G. R. No. 149335, July 1,
2003, 405SCRA 264))
In administrative cases, notice and hearing does
not connote full adversarial proceedings. Trial-type
hearing is not always necessary in administrative proceedings.
“[t]here can be no quarrel that the act of the CBD-IBP (referring to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated bar of the
Philippines) in dispensing with the hearing is fairly within the
bounds of permissible legal procedure; for after all, as observed in
the poenencia, ‘a trial type hearing is not always de riguer in
administrative proceedings.’ [Boyboy v. Atty. Victorino Yabut, Jr.,
401 SCRA 622, 631 (2003) cited in Sarangani v. Asdala, et al.,
Adm. Case No. 4929, January 26, 2005]
There are instances where trial-type hearing is
indispensable. “xxx since the CBD-IBP inexorably anchored its
Report and Recommendation in complainant’s credibility, a trial-
type hearing becomes an indispensable requirement in this case.”
’ [Boyboy v. Atty. Victorino Yabut, Jr., 401 SCRA 622, 631 (2003)
cited in Sarangani v. Asdala, et al., Adm. Case No. 4929, January
26, 2005]
IBP does not impose penalty but merely
recommends. The IBP Board resolution on its findings setting
forth its recommendations, together with the whole records of the
case shall be forthwith transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.
The “power to recommend” includes the power to give
”advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive I character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made.” (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No.2474, June 30,
2005,citing Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, No.L-16263, July 26, 1960, 108
Phil. 1147) The term “noted” means that the Supreme Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration,
without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision
on the matter. It does not imply agreement or approval. The
power to disbar belongs to the Court alone. (Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Palma, A.C. No.2474, June 30, 2005 citing In Re: Problem of
Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No.00-8-05-SC,
January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 339) The fact that the Supreme
Court “noted” the IBP’s recommendation does not mean that it has
approved the same. (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra)
Disrespect for judicial authorities. Failure to comply with
the orders of the IBP (such as failure to file and answer to
administrative charges and verified position paper despite several
opportunities, filing several motions for extension of time, motion
to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation
with motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to
recall the default order), without justifiable reason manifests
disrespect of judicial authorities.
The IBP has disciplinary authority over lawyers by virtue of
their membership therein. (Tomlin, II, v. Moya, II, A. C. No. 6971,
February 23, 2006)
Disciplinary action in a foreign jurisdiction
 72
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated. (Sec. 27, Rule 138, ROC
paraphrasing supplied supplied)
Judgment of suspension in a foreign jurisdiction
does not automatically result in suspension or
disbarment in this jurisdiction. The judgment may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines
only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie
evidence as unethical acts as lawyer. (Velez v. De Vera, A. C, No.
6697, July 25, 2006 and companion cases)
Recommendation of a foreign bar standing alone
is not proof of malpractice. The complainant must prove by
substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation
was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that
these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. . (Velez v.
De Vera, A. C, No. 6697, July 25, 2006 and companion cases)
Illustrative case: No final suspension or
disbarment was meted against therespondent by the State
Bar of California despite a recommendation of suspension
of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law
before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of
California.
He was suspended from the practice of law by the
Philippine Supreme Court for two years because his act of
depositing a check intended for his client was deposited in
his personal account. He violated Rule 16.02 which
provides that, “A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.” It was admitted by the respondent himself that he
used his client’s money for personal use. Aside from his
statement there is no other evidence presented by the
respondent that he had the permission of his client to use
the money. The testimony of his client that he expected the
respondent “might use the money for a few days,” was not
so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by the
respondent as it was an acceptance of the probability that
the respondent might, indeed, use his client’s funds, which
by itself did not speak well of the respondent’s character or
the way such character was perceived.
It is clear that the acts of the respondent made him guilty
of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior.
He caused dishonor, and not only himself but to the noble
profession to which he belongs. For it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his client. . (Velez v. De Vera, A. C, No. 6697,
July 25, 2006 and companion cases)
Suspension is not primarily intended as punishment, but as
a means to protect the public and the legal profession.2
Disbarment proceedings
Procedure. Complaints against lawyers for
misconduct are normally addressed to the Supreme Court.
If, at the outset, the Supreme Court finds a complaint to be
clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If,
however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a
referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation if the
case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to
be heard. An ex prate investigation may only be conducted
when the respondent fails to appear despite reasonable
notice.
The procedure outlined by the Rules of Court are
meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from wrongful
condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just
due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.
Subject to such highly exceptional cases as it might
deem warranted, the Supreme Court reiterated the
indispensability for a formal investigation of complaints
2
Ibid.
 73
against members of the Bar particularly, where the IBP
would recommend the serious penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. (Ingles v. Dela Serna, A.C. No. 5763,
December 2, 2002)
Right to be heard. A disbarred lawyer must have
been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. (Re:
Adm. Case No.44 of the RTC Branch IV, Tagbilaran City, against
Atty. Occena, A. C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002)
The quintessence of due process is simply that a
party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side and to adduce any evidence he may have
in support of his defense. Entrenched is the rule that due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but
simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be beard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, and opportunity to
explain one’s side. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process. (Rivera v. Atty. Corral, A.C.No. 3548,
July 4, 2002)
In administrative cases, notice and hearing does
not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual
adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of
their arguments.
DEFENSES
Forum shopping is not a defense. Forum shopping
applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment
proceedings. (Tomlin, II, v. Moya, II, A. C. No. 6971, February 23,
2006)
A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances
are attendant to the administrative proceedings, (Tomlin, II, v.
Moya, II, A. C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006)
Illustrative case: A lawyer issued worthless
checks in payment of his financial obligations. He was
charged criminally for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 after which
administrative charges were proferred against him for gross
misconduct for issuing the checks, He could not raise the
defense of forum shopping, nor the issue of prejudicial
question.
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. It
applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
disbarment proceedings.
A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of
proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt
while in an administrative case, only preponderance of
evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. (Tomlin, II, v. Moya, II, A. C. No. 6971,
February 23, 2006)
A lawyer could not raise the defense in an
administrative charge that the client refused to provide
him with vital documents and to proceed with the case
would be violative of the command that lawyers should
not handle a case without preparation,
Illustrative case. When charged administratively,
the lawyer attempted to evade responsibility by passing the
blame to his client. He claims that the client-complainant
 74
refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He
further claims that he would be violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility by handling a case without
adequate preparation.
The Supreme Court labeled the defenses raised as
“preposterous.” When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses
the requisite academic learning skill and ability to handle the
case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies
of the certificate of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted
that is Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the
authenticity complainant’s title. (Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A.
C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006)
Defense of good faith unavailing in conflict of
interests situation. The defense of good faith does not render
the prohibition as inoperative. (Gonzales v. Cabucano, Jr., A. C.
No. 6836, January 23, 2006)
Illustrative case: The lawyer defended in the
administrative case by claiming good faith. According to
him, it was his brother in representation of their law firm,
who represented the client in the first case, hence his
representation of the client’s opponent in another case,
hence he should not be penalized.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It was the
respondent’s law firm that represented the client in the
civil case. Such being the case the rule against conflicting
interests applies. The rule is not for the purpose
necessarily of preventing any injustice to the complainant
but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the
courts and of the bar. Without condemning respondent’s
conduct as dishonest, corrupt or fraudulent, the Supreme
Court believed that upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession of
which the respondent is a member, “into public disrepute
and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.” The
claim of having acted in good faith does not render the
prohibition as inoperative. (Gonzales v. Cabucano, Jr., A.
C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006)
While good faith may not be a valid defense it
may be considered as a mitigating circumstances. In
imposing the penalty the Supreme Court considered the fact that
in the first case it was the respondent’s brother who signed under
the firm name, but in the second case it was the respondent who
signed in his own name and not under the firm name, and that he
accepted the second case on a pro bono basis.
Also considered as mitigating was the respondent’s lack
of malice and bad faith in accepting the second case as shown by
the move of the complainant to withdraw the case. (Gonzales v.
Cabucano, Jr., A. C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006)
Change of theory in a motion for reconsideration
not allowed as it is contrary to the rules of fair play,
justice and due process. Respondent lawyer’s version in his
motion for reconsideration is a flagrant departure from his previous
pleadings. This cannot be countenanced.
A party should decide early what version he is going to
advance. A change of theoy in the latter stage of the proceedings
is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural
rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and
due process. (Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., A. C. No. 5655, January 23,
2006 on motion for reconsideration)
Illustrative case. A lawyer was suspended. He
filed a motion for reconsideration in which he changed his
theory of defense. The administrative case was resolved
by the IBP on the basis of respondent’s previous
admission that complainant engaged his legal service in
Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now, in his motion for
reconsideration, unbind himself from such admission and
its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been
achieved by respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to the Supreme Court. (Dalisay v. Mauricio,
Jr., A. C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006 on motion for
reconsideration)
Failure to comply with the Rules of Court not a
defense. In view of its nature, administrative proceedings
against lawyers are not strictly governed by the Rules of Court. A
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.
Hence, no defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the
proceeding or the Investigator’s Report shall be considered as
 75
substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the
whole record, finds that such a defect has resulted or may result in
a miscarriage of justice. That the copy of the Manifestation and
Reply furnished to respondent was not signed by either
complainant or her counsel is merely an innocuous error.
In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.
(Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A. C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006)
Requisites of res judicata. In order that the principle
of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely:
1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final;
2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or
order on the merits, and
4) there must be identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.
In the absence of the above, there is no res judicata.
(Velez v. De Vera, A. C, No. 6697, July 25, 2006 and companion
cases)
Illustrative case: Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled,
“In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on
Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP
Elections and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does
not constitute a bar to the filing of the present Adm. Case
No. 6697 entitled Velez v. De Vera. Although the parties
in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No.
6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby
barring the application of res judicata.
The two administrative cases involve different
subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No.
6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP
Governor in Eastern Mindanao. In the present
administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege
to practice law. In the first administrative case,
complainant’s cause of action was Atty. de Vera’s alleged
violation or circumvention of the IBP By-Laws. In the
present administrative case, the primary cause of action is
Atty. de Vera’s alleged violation of lawyer’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek
the same relief. In the first case, the complainant sought
to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as
clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being
principally sought is Atty. de Vera’s suspension or
disbarment. . (Velez v. De Vera, A. C, No. 6697, July 25,
2006 and companion cases)
D. READMISSION TO THE BAR
1. Lawyers who have been suspended
2. Lawyers who have been disbarred
3. Lawyers who have been repatriated
E. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION
1. Purpose
BAR: a. What is the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Program, and what is its
purpose or objective ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER. It is a program which
requires lawyers to show proof of having undertaken
improvement in their legal knowledge as a precondition for
renewing their license to practice.
Continuing legal education is required of members of
the IBP to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of
the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of
law. [Bar Matter No. 850, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE), Rule 1, Sec. 1]

2. Requirements
Requirements for completion of
Members of the IBP who are not exempt shall complete
every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of
continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:
a. At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal
ethics.
b. At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and
pretrial skills.
c. At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to
alternative dispute resolution.
d. At least none (9) hours shall be devoted to update
on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
e. At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal
writing and oral advocacy.
f. At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to
international law and international conventions.
g. The remaining six (6)( hours shall be devoted to
such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee. [Bar Matter No. 850, Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE), Rule 2, Sec. 2]
3. Compliance
a. What is the initial compliance period ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The initial compliance
period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the
constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial
compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
the establishment of the program, all compliance periods
shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day
after the end of the previous compliance period. [Bar Matter
No. 850, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), Rule 3, Sec. 1]
b. What constitutes the
compliance groups ?
76
1) Members in the National Capital
Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently
assigned to Compliance Group 1. [Bar Matter No. 850,
MCLE. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), Rule 3, Sec. 2]
2) Members in Luzon outside NCR shall
be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2.
[Ibid.,, Rule 3, Sec. 3]
3) Members in Visayas and Mindanao
shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group
3. [Ibid., Rule 3, Sec. 4]
4. What is the compliance period for members
admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
MCLE program ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Members admitted or
readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program
shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on
the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or
readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as
that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain
of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply
with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months
remain of the initial compliance period after
admission or readmission, the member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the
number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of education in legal
various ethics in proportion to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of
hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
 77
[Bar Matter No. 850, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education m. Those who are not in law practice, private or
(MCLE), Rule 3, Sec. 5] public;
n. Those who have retired from law practice
4. Exemptions with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors. [Ibid., Rule 7
Sec. 2]
Who are the members of the Bar exempt
from the MCLE requirement ? 5. Sanctions
a. The President and the Vice-President of the
Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of a. What is the effect of non-compliance
Executive Departments; with MCLE ?
b. Senators and Members of the House of SUGGESTED ANSWER: Any IBP member who, for
Representatives; whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
c. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee and shall
the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the be listed as a delinquent IBP Member. [Bar Matter No. 850,
judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), Rule 13]
Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the As a consequence, he may not be allowed to
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial practice law. (Ibid, in relation to ROC, Rule 139-B)
education;
d. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State 6. Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal
Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Aid Service
Justice;
e. The Solicitor General and the Assistant a. What is Mandatory Legal Aid Service ?
Solicitors General; SUGGESTED ANSWER: It is a mandatory
f. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal aid
and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel; services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or
g. The Chairmen and Members of the administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where
Constitutional Commissions; the assistance of a lawyer is needed.
h. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy It is to implement the duty of other members of the
Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special legal profession to support the legal aid program of the
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman; Integrated Bar of the Philippines. (B.M. No. 2012, February 10,
i. Heads of government agencies exercising 2009, The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service, Sec. 3)
quasi-judicial functions;
j. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and b. Who are considered as practicing
professors of law who have teaching experience for at least lawyers mandated to comply with the Rule on
10 years in accredited law schools; Mandatory Legal Aid Service ?
k. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and SUGGESTED ANSWER: Practicing lawyers are
members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies,
l. Governors and Mayors. [Bar Matter No. 850, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), Rule 7, Sec. 1] Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
 78
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and
National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. [B.M. No. 2012,
February 10, 2009, The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service, Sec. 4 (a),
1st par.]
c. Who are excluded from the definition
of “practicing lawyers” for purposes of compliance
with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service ? In
the alternative, who are the lawyers who are
exempted from complying with the requirement to
render Mandatory Legal Aid Service ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The term "practicing
lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed
to appear in court;
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students
enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited
legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples’
organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance
Group who by the nature of their work already render
free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under
subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are
employed in the private sector but do not appear for
and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-
judicial agencies. [B.M. No. 2012, February 10, 2009, The
st
Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service, Sec. 4 (a), 1 par.]
d. Who is considered as an “indigent and
pauper litigants” for purposes of the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Service ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Indigent litigants
(a) whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee and
(b) who do not own real property with A FAIR
MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION of more than THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P300,000.00) (ROC, Rule 141, Sec. 19, 1st par. in
relation to B. M. No. 2012, February 10, 2009, The Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service, Sec. 4 (b)]
e. What is meant by “free legal aid
services” for purposes of compliance with the Rule
on Mandatory Legal Aid Service ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Free legal aid services
refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in
behalf of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of
pleadings or motions. It shall also cover assistance by a
practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in court-
annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing
lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be
considered as free legal aid services and credited as
compliance under this Rule. [B. M. No. 2012, February 10, 2009,
The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service, Sec. 4 (d)]
F. NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
as amended)
1. Qualifications of notary public
a. What are the qualifications for a
person to be commissioned as a notary public ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: To be eligible for
commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:
(1)  must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(2)  must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3)  must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and maintains a regular place of work or
business in the city or province where the commission is to
be issued;
 79
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in A notary public shall not perform a notarial act
good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar outside his regular place of work or business; provided,
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of however, that on certain exceptional occasions or situations,
the Philippines; and a notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties
(5)  must not have been convicted in the first in the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
instance of any crime involving moral turpitude. (A.M. No. 02-8- (1)  public offices, convention halls, and similar
13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,, Rule III, Sec. 1, 2nd par.) places where oaths of office may be administered;
(2)  public function areas in hotels and similar
2. Term of office of notary public places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
a. What is the term of office of a notary
(3)  hospitals and other medical institutions where
public ?
a party to an instrument or document is confined for
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The term of office of a
treatment; and
notary public is two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made, (4)  any place where a party to an instrument or
unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned document requiring notarization is under detention. [A.M. No.
under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (A.M. No. 02-8-13- 02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 2 (a)]
SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,, Rule III, Sec. 11)) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document
3. Powers and limitations
(1)  is not in the notary's presence personally at
What are the powers of a notary public ? the time of the notarization; and
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A notary public is (2)  is not personally known to the notary public or
empowered to perform the following notarial acts: otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
(1) acknowledgments; evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. [Ibid., Rule IV,
(2) oaths and affirmations; Sec. 2 (b)]
(3) jurats; A notary public is disqualified from performing a
(4) signature witnessings; notarial act if he:
(5) copy certifications; and (a)  is a party to the instrument or document that
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules . [A.M. is to be notarized;
No. 02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,, Rule IV, Sec. 1 (a)] (b)  will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any
commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash,
What are some of the limitations on the property, or other consideration, except as provided by
powers of a notary public ? these Rules and by law; or
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The limitations on the (c)  is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
powers of a notary public are contained in the prohibitions descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
and disqualifications to perform notarial acts. principal within the fourth civil degree. (Ibid., Rule IV, Sec. 3)
Some of the prohibitions in the performance of
notarial acts that are imposed upon a notary public are the Give some duties of a notary public.
following: SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 80
a. To keep a notarial register. A notary public
shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological
official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered pages. [A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule VI, Sec. 1 (a), 1st par.]
b. To keep an official seal. Every person
commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to
be procured at his own expense, which shall not be
possessed or owned by any other person. [Ibid., Rule VII, Sec. 1
(a), 1st par., 1st sentence]
c. To charge only authorized fees. For
performing a notarial act, a notary public may charge the
maximum fee as prescribed by the Supreme Court unless
he waives the fee in whole or in part. (Ibid., Rule V, Sec. 1)
d. To issue receipts, keep a journal and posts
attorney’s fees. A notary public who charges a fee for
notarial services shall issue a receipt registered with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and keep a journal of notarial
fees. He shall enter in the journal all fees charged for
services rendered.
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in
his office a complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees.
(Ibid., Rule V, Sec. 5)
4. Notarial register
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of
notarization
a. In what place could the notary public
exercise his powers and duties ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A person commissioned
as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court.”
(A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule III, Sec. 11,
paraphrasing supplied)
Since the commissioning court is a Regional Trial
Court of a city or province then the notary public may
perform notarial acts only within the territorial boundaries of
the province or city where the Executive Judge sits.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a
notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with
said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Old Rev. Adm.
Code, Sec. 240)
For example, the National Capital Judicial Region
have different branches located in the different cities of
Metro Manila which have their own Executive Judge. Thus,
a notary public commissioned in the City of Manila by the
Executive Judge could perform notarial acts only within the
territorial limits of the City of Manila, not in any place within
the National Capital Judicial Region.
Furthermore, notary public shall not perform a
notarial act outside his regular place of work or business.
[A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,, Rule IV, Sec. 2
(a), 1st sentence] The term “regular place of work or business”
refers to a stationary office in the city or province wherein
the notary public renders legal and notarial services . (Ibid.,
Rule II, Sec. 6)
Exceptions or certain exceptional occasions or
situations where a notarial act may be performed at the
request of the parties in the following sites located within his
territorial jurisdiction:
(1)  public offices, convention halls, and similar
places where oaths of office may be administered;
(2)  public function areas in hotels and similar
places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
(3)  hospitals and other medical institutions where
a party to an instrument or document is confined for
treatment; and
(4)  any place where a party to an instrument or
document requiring notarization is under detention. [A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,, Rule IV, Sec. 2 (a)]
6. Revocation of commission
 81
7. Competent evidence of identity
8. Sanctions
a. Penalty for notarizing outside of territorial
jurisdiction or without commission.
1) For notarizing without the requisite
commission, barred from being commissioned as notary
public permanently and suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years. (Re: Violations of Rules on Notarial
Practice, A.C. No.09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015)
2) Three (3) years suspension for notarizing an
instrument without commission. [Ibid., citing Nunga v. Viray, 366
Phil. 155, 161 (1999)]
3) Suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2)years and permanently barred from being
commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several
documents after the expiration of the commission. [Ibid., citing
Zoreta v. Simpliciano, 485 Phil. 395 (2004)]
4) Suspension for six (6) months and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public
for a period of two (2) years for notarizing documents
outside the area of commission, and with an expired
commission. (Ibid., citing Laquindanum v. Quintana, A.C. No. 7036,
June 29, 2009, 591 SCRA 204)
b. Penalty of revocation of notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as notary for
two years and suspension from the practice of law for
one year for notarizing documents without the presence
of the party executing the same.
1) Notarizing a falsified affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy for municipal mayor without the presence of the
supposed affiant. (Sultan v. Atty. Macabanding, A.C. No. 7919,
October 8, 2014 citing various cases)
2) Notarizing an affidavit of loss without the
presence of the party acknowledging the document. [Ibid.,
citing Ang v. Atty. Gupana, A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014 in turn citing
Flores v. Atty. Chua, 366 Phil. 132, 153 (1999)]
3) Preparing and notarizing the subject affidavit
without the affiant’s personal appearance merely upon the
assurance of his client that the document was executed by
complainant. (Ibid., citing Agbulos v. Viray, A.C. No. 7350, February
18, 2013, 691 SCRA 1, 7)
4) The respondent notarized a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by the complainant. It
was proven by documentary evidence that the complainant
was in Germany at that time and therefore could not have
appeared before the respondent to have the SPA notarized.
(Ibid., citing Isenhardt v. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012, 666
SCRA 20)
5) The respondent notary public for notarized a
deed of donation despite the latter’s knowledge that the
purported donor had already passed away on an earlier
date. (Ibid., Linco v. Lacebal, A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011, 659
SCRA 130)
Duties of a notary public. The Notarial Law is
explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. it
requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall
record all his official acts as notary, and specifies what
information with regard to the notarized document should be
entered therein. Failure to perform this duty results in the
revocation of his commission as notary public.
A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The notary public is enjoined to record in his notarial
registry the necessary information regarding the document
or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document
presented to him for acknowledgment and certification
especially when it is a contract. The notarial registry is a
record of the notary public’s acts. Considering the
evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure
of the notary public to record the document in his notarial
registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the
document was notarized when in fact it was not. vda.de
Rosales v. Atty. Ramos, A. C. No. 5645, July 2, 2002
 82
Responsibility of a lawyer-notary public. Where
the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, it was held, thus: “As
a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appreciating
[sic] to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such
responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must
now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of
the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment.”
(Flores-Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4738, February 6, 2002)
A lawyer commissioned as a notary public is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and
utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct and failing therein,
he must bear the commensurate consequences. (Fulgencio
v. Atty. Martin, A.C. No.3223, May 29, 2003)
d. May a notary public notarize a document
which he signed ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A signatory to a
document cannot notarize the said document.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That
function would be defeated if the notary public were one of
the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be
interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would
placed him in an inconsistent position, and the very purpose
of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would
be thwarted. (Villarin, et al., v. Sabate, Jr., A.C. No. 3324,
February 9, 2000)
d. A notary public signed as witness to a
deed of sale then notarized the same deed as a
notary public ex officio. Is the deed of sale valid ?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Nothing in the law
prohibits a notary public from acting at the same time as
witness in the document he notarized. The only exception is
when the document to be notarized is a will. (Solarte v. Atty.
Pugeda, A.C. Nos. 4751, July 31, 2000)
e. What are the reasons why a notary public
must discharge his powers and duties with
accuracy and fidelity ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A notarized document is
allowed to be given without further proof of their execution
and delivery. Courts, administrative agencies and the public
at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed before a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. (vda. De Bernardo v. Atty. Restauro, A. C. No. 3849,
June 25, 2003)
f. Penalty for notarization of forgeries.
Notarization of a falsified deed of donation (Alitagtag v.
Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4738, June 10, 2003), forged deeds of
sale (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408; Flores v.Chua, 306
SCRA 465; Roces v. Aportadera,243 SCRA 108), were
penalized with suspension from the practice of law.
But note the caution for lawyers-notaries
public to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the
true identities of the persons executing a document before
the, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as
the Supreme Court will deal with such cases more severely
in the future. (vda. De Bernardo v. Atty. Restauro, A. C. No.
3849, June 25, 2003)
g. The Notarial Law requires a notary to keep a
notarial register where he shall record all his official
 83
acts as notary and specifies what information with
regard to the notarized documents should be entered
therein. Failure to perform this duty results to
revocation of the notarial commission. (vda. de Rosales v.
Atty. Ramos, A.C.No. 5645, July 2, 2002)
h. The failure of a lawyer to record a document
in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it
appear that the document was notarized when in fact it
was not. (vda. de Rosales v. Atty. Ramos, A.C.No. 5645, July 2,
2002) He should be disciplined.
i. Where a notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of
his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is subject
to discipline if he notarizes a document without the
parties appearing before him. So also, if he notarizes a
fictitious, spurious or forged document. (Flores-Alitagtag v.
Atty. Garcia, A.C. No.4738, February 5, 2002)
j. A lawyer/notary public who notarizes a
document in the absence of the parties violates
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law . A notary public
should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the
parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone
for what are stated therein are facts of which they have
personal knowledge. They should swear to the document
personally and not through any representative. Otherwise,
their representative’s name should appear in the said
document as the one who executed the same. That is the
only time the representative an affix his signature and
personally appear before the notary public for notarization of
the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who
executed the instrument must be the ones to personally
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
document. (Bautista v. Bernabe, A. C. No, 6963, February 9,
2006)
k. Non-appearance of the parties before
the notary public does not nullify the instrument.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document. However, the non-appearance of the parties
before the notary public who notarized the document does
not necessarily nullify nor render the parties’ transaction
void ab initio.
Thus, Article 1358 of the Civil Code on the necessity
of a pubic document is only for convenience, not for validity
or enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not
invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form
prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other
to observe that form, once he contract has been perfected.
This is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are
obligatory in whatever form they may heave been entered
into, provided all essential requisites are present . (Mallari, et
al., v. Asol, G. R. No. 150866, March 6, 2006)
l. Notarizing documents without the
requisite commission is punishable with two year
suspension. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. In the contrary it is invested with substantive
public interest, such that onl those ho re qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the
document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the pubic in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. The
 84
requirements for the issuance of a commission s notary
public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The
Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission to do so as
“reprehensible constituting as it does not only malpractice
but also xxx the crime of falsification of public documents.”
(St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty
and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A. C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006)
m. Lawyer should perform notarial work
personally, otherwise considered negligen t. The
Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP when it
found a respondent lawyer negligent in performing his
notarial functions, in the following manner. “xxx xxx
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary
public is sensitive respondent should have been more
discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such
and should not have wholly entrusted anything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been
commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other
mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary
there can be a possibility that even the respondent’s
signature which is the only one left for him to do cab be
done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had
been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the
supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the
office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by
him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.”
[Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo, A.C. No. 5838 (Formerly CBD 01-
887), January 17, 2005]
G. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
II. JUDICIAL ETHICS
1. What are the reasons for the existence
of an honorable, competent and independent
judiciary ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. To administer justice, and
b. thus promote
1) the unity of the country,
2) the stability of government, and
3) the well-being of the people. (Preamble, Old
Code of Judicial Conduct, applicable in a suppletory
capacity)
A. SOURCES
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore Draft)
1. What is the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (the Bangalore Draft of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, as amended) was adopted by
the Supreme Court to take effect on June 1, 2004.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary superseded the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the
Code of Judicial Conduct heretofore applied in the
Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts
therein are embodied in this Code.
2. Of what use is the former Code of
Judicial Conduct considering that it was already
superseded by the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In case of deficiency or
absence of specific provisions in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable
in a suppletory character.
 85
3. What is the Bangalore Draft ? b. also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Bangalore Draft, as the universal clamor for a universal code of judicial ethics.
amended, is intended to be the Universal Declaration of (4th Whereas, Adopting the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Judicial Standards applicable in all Judiciaries. (2nd Philippine Judiciary, arrangement and numbering supplied)
Whereas, Adopting the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, rephrasing supplied) 6. What are the canons of the New Code
The Bangalore Draft was adopted as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary ?
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. SUGGESTED ANSWER: The canons of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
4. What is the foundation of the Judiciary:
Bangalore Draft which was adopted as the New Canon1. Independence
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Canon2. Integrity
Judiciary ? Canon3. Impartiality
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Bangalore Draft is Canon4. Propriety
founded upon a universal recognition:
Canon5. Equality
a. that a competent, independent and impartial
Judiciary is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in
Canon6. Competence and Diligence
upholding constitutionalism and the Rule of Law;
b. that public confidence in the judicial system
and in the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary is of BAR: 7. What are the obligations to be
utmost importance in a modern democratic society; and observed by a judge under the New Code of
c. that it is essential that judges, individually and Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary ?
collectively, respect and honor judicial office as a public SUGGESTED ANSWER: The summary of the
trust, and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the obligations of a judge are:
judicial system. (3rd Whereas, Adopting the New Code of a. Independence. Uphold and exemplify
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, arrangement and judicial independence in both of its judicial and
numbering supplied) institutional aspects (Canon 1, New Code)
b. Integrity. The behavior and conduct of
5. What are the reasons for adopting the judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
Bangalore Draft as the New Code of Judicial the Judiciary. (Sec. 2, Canon 2, Ibid.)
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary ? c. Impartiality. Judges shall ensure that his
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The adoption of the or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
universal declaration of standards for ethical conduct of enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
judges embodied in the Bangalore Draft, as revised at the profession and litigants in the impartiality of judges and
Round Table Conference of Chief Justices at The Hague, of the Judiciary. (Sec. 2, Canon 3, Ibid.)
a. is imperative not only to update and correlate d. Propriety. Judges shall avoid impropriety
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Judicial Ethics and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
adopted for the Philippines, but activities. (Sec. 1, Canon 4, Ibid.)
 86
e. Equality. Judges shall not, in the 2. Integrity
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group a. Importance of integrity. Integrity is
on irrelevant grounds. (Sec. 2, Canon 5, Ibid.) essential not only to the proper discharge of the
f. Competence and diligence are judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. judges. (Canon 2, New Code)
(Canon 6, Ibid.)

2. Code of Judicial Conduct b. Duty of judge relative to integrity. The

behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
B. QUALITIES people’s faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. (Rule
2, Canon 1, New Code)
1. Independence
c. Judges shall ensure that not only is
a. Importance of judicial independence. their conduct above reproach, but that it is
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the Rule perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
of Law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. observer. (Sec.1,Canon 2, New Code)
(1st sentence, Canon 1, New Code)

b. Duty of judge relative to judicial 3. Impartiality

independence. A judge shall, therefore, uphold
and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects. (2nd sentence,
Canon 1, New Code)
c. A judge shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative
agency. (Rule 3, Canon 1, New Code)
11.1 The slightest form of interference
cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence
to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or
judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the
parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is
diminished, if not totally eroded. Thus, an appellate judge
was dismissed for interfering with investigation conducted by
an administrative body. (In re: Demetria, A.M. No. 00-09-CA,
March 27, 2001)
a. Importance of impartiality. Impartiality is
essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself, but
also to the process by which the decision is made.
(Canon 3, New Code)
b. Duty of judge relative to impartiality.
Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both
in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of judges and of the
Judiciary. (Sec. 2, Canon 3, New Code)
4. Propriety
a. What is the importance of propriety to
a judge ?
 87
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Propriety and appearance
of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. (Canon 4, New Code)
b. What rules should a judge observe in
order to comply with his principal duty relative to
propriety which is that, Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities (Rule 1, Canon 4, New Code) ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only on the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but
also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach.
(Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct cited in Marces, Sr. v.
Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503, applied in a suppletory character.)
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Old Code of Judicial Conduct, applied
in a suppletory character)
b. A judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory. (Rule 2.02, Ibid.)
c. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. (Rule 2.03, Ibid.)
d. A judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency. (Rule 2.04, Ibid.)
Concepts tested in previous Bar Examinations:
a. A judge acts improperly if he has lunch with a litigant
who has a pending case before his court. Neither is it
ethical for a judge to be seen placing his bet on certain
horses. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities. (1990)
b. It is improper for a judge to confiscate a driver’s
license for a traffic violation he has violated the law by
encroaching upon police functions. (1998)
c. A judge acted with impropriety when he received a
cash bond. It is not his duty to do, and the impropriety is
compounded when he allegedly kept the money in his
drawer, which he claimed to have been stolen. (1999)
d. It is improper for a judge to accept a paid vacation
abroad from a friend who has a criminal case pending
before another court, as this may be construed as
influencing the other court. There is thus an appearance of
impropriety. (1999)
Recent doctrines and illustrative cases:
a. A judge should constantly keep away from
any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his
official duties but also his everyday actuations for no other
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the
judiciary. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude
and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise
no doubt whatsoever about his honest. (Yu v. Judge Leanda
etc., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1463, January 16, 2001)
b. Any demeaning of a judge or court personnel
demeans the institution he represents. This is so, because
most often the public mind does not separate the judge from
the Judiciary. (City Govt. of Tagbilaran, etc. v. Judge
Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. MT No. MTJ-98-1169, January 29,
2002)
c. A judge was imposed a fine and sternly warned for
going to cockpits and placing bets. Mixing with the crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge
and undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. Ultimately
the judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a judge is a
visible representation of the Judiciary.
The Supreme Court prohibits judges and court
personnel from both actual gambling and mere presence in
gambling casinos. (City Govt. of Tagbilaran, etc. v. judge
Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. MT No. MTJ-98-1169, January 29,
2002)
 88
d. Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. A judge’s conduct must be
above reproach. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only
be pure but above suspicion. a judge’s private as well as
official conduct must at all times be free from all
appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach.
(Magarang v. Judge Jardin, Sr.)
e. The Supreme Court noted the impropriety,
without imposing any disciplinary action, of a judge having
a clerk who was neither a relative nor a court employee who
was constantly present in the judge’s chambers, thus
inviting doubts about His Honor’s propriety and moral
integrity. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sayo, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1587, May 7, 2002)
f. The standard behavior expected of all those
who don the judicial robe is that of a “cerebral man who
deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely
personal preferences and prejudice which he shares with
the rest of his fellow mortals. (Judge Pineza, etc., v. Aruelo,
etc., A.M. No. P-01-1522, July 30, 2002)
g. The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or
interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial
proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties
therein, public confidence in the judicial system is
diminished, if not totally eroded. Thus, an appellate judge
was dismissed for interfering with investigation conducted by
an administrative body. (In re: Demetria, A.M. No. 00-09-CA,
March 27, 2001)
h. A judge should be courteous both in his
conduct and in his language specially those appearing
before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the court, their clients and the public
without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing and tyrannical.
Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he
gives no reason for reproach. A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. (Pros. Ruiz v. Judge Bringas, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1266,
April 6, 2000)
i. The absence of malice or the presence of
purity of motive is not a license to resort to inflammatory
words to articulate grievances. All judges should always
observe courtesy and civility. They should be temperate,
patient and courteous both in conduct and language.
(Judge Pineza, etc., v. Aruelo, etc., A.M. No. P-01-1522, July 30,
2002)
i. A judge was admonished to exercise
prudence and restraint in his language and sternly warned.
During an administrative hearing he stated, among others,
“And it’s up to the Supreme Court to take action, as I am
emphasizing, stressing and capitalizing that justice delayed
is justice denied, xxx I am already demoralized and lost faith
in the system xxx” (Judge Pineza, etc., v. Aruelo, etc., A.M. No.
P-01-1522, July 30, 2002)
j. The people’s confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench,
but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. (Dawa v. De Asa)
k. A judge, even in the face of boorish behavior
from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a
manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.
Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice; civility is
never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of cuture
and good breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no
place in the government service in which personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.
Thus, a judge was reprimanded because he ordered
the arrest of a subordinate who was mimicking him even
before the filing of the appropriate criminal action. This
actuation was unbecoming of a judge who is expected to
exercise proper restraint and civility in dealing even with
insolent subordinates. (Bravo, v. Morales, etc., A. M. No. P-05-
1950, August 20, 2006, Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1898-P, and
companion case)
c. Misconduct, defined. Misconduct is
defined as a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
 89
negligence by a public officer. (Tormis v. Judge Paredes, RTJ-13-
2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 4, 2015)
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have
a direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of his official duties. (Ibid.)
d. Grave misconduct, defined. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. (Tormis v.
Judge Paredes, RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ],
February 4, 2015)
e. Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct, defined. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
(Tormis v. Judge Paredes, RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-
RTJ], February 4, 2015 citing Judge Buenaventura v. Mabalot, A. M.
Nos. P-09-2726 & P-10-2884, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 1, 17, in turn
citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, A.M. No. P-10-2788,
January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 633, 638)
BAR: f. Example where there is no
misconduct. The act of a judge in discussing
administrative cases against a fellow judge (one of which
was pending final resolution) and criticising the actuations
of her son, during class discussion cannot be considered as
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge
of his official functions as a judge. He cannot be held liable
for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct. (Tormis v.
Judge Paredes, RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ],
February 4, 2015)
He was disciplined for violating the subjudice rule.
(Ibid.)
BAR: g. The subjudice rule. On subjudice
matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a
proceeding is before or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness
of the process.
Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue. (Tormis v. Judge Paredes, RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No.
11-3740-RTJ], February 4, 2015)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. (Tormis, supra, citing
Marantan v. Diokno, G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA
164, 171.
h. Rationale for the subjudice rule. It is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that
courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court;
and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. [Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 238 Phil. 543 (1987) cited in Tormis v. Judge
Paredes, RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 4,
2015]
BAR: I. Illustration of violation of the
subjudice rule. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed
the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been
concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was
promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.
In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
 90
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is
Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in required to always be temperate, patient and courteous
contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, ,both in conduct and in language. (Tormis v. Judge Paredes, RTJ-
therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated 13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 4, 2015 citing
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the
reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage m. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial
scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were is not enough. [Ascano, Jr., et al., v. Judge Jacinto, Jr., etc., A.M.
carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of No. RTJ-15-2405, I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ, January 12, 2015 citing De
Guzman v. Pamintuan, 452 Phil. 963 (2003); Sinnot v. Barte, 423 Phil.
the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of 522 (2001), Lu v. Siapno, 390 Phil. 489 (2000); People v. Court of
the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes Appeals, 369 Phil. 150 (1999); Flores v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 992
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class (1996)]
discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal a charge of bias and partiality. [Ibid., citing Negros Grace
circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. Pharmacy v. Hilario, 461 Phil. 843 (2003) citing Te v. Court of Appeals,
400 Phil. 127 (2000); Gohu v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 126 (2000)]
There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the
The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to
wound,”25as Justice Diy put it. Judge Paredes in using
prove that respondent exhibited “manifest partiality, evident
intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence” in the discharge
to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in
of his judicial functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A.
his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy. Indeed, the NewCode
This Court cannot accept the contention that
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the
judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
mere fact that he did not allow the “more than 500
CANON 4 PROPRIETY SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid
members” who accompanied petitioners during the hearing
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the
activities.
standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable th
xxx SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges
at this huge group could have been accommodated inside.
must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
while Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
(Ibid. citing SECTION 15. Exclusion and separation of
office. A judge should always conduct himself in a manner
witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude
that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect
from the court any witness not at the time under
for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise
separate and to be prevented from conversing with one
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
another until all shall have been examined.
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
We now go to the claim of petitioners that
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of
respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished
a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
 91
their witnesses without basis or justification. According to
the investigating justice, respondent failed to submit the
transcript of notes for the 3 July 2012 hearing without
plausible reason.
As regards what transpired in the 2 July 2012
hearing, the
investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice
when addressing Toledo and making “abrasive and
unnecessary statements to her ,”respondent also made the
following“ insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy
statements” in open court:
1. Respondent declared that he no longer
wanted to go to the market, because he might be mistreated
by petitioners.
2. He told petitioners: “Mga taga-palengke na
nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang
kanilang ginagawa.”
3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying:
“[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman ng
abogado niyo.”
4. He asked Toledo: “You mentioned about that
‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a
violation to your lease contract that you are allowing
somebody to occupy your portion so that they can also
engage in business? Is this not an additional earning on
your part and you are violating your lease contract? Is that
not depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?”
The investigating justice found that the foregoing
statements “definitely imperiled the respect and deference”
rightly due to respondent’s position.
As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice
and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to
petitioners’ witness. Respondent failed to conduct himself in
accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil
to all persons who come to his court, [Ibid., citing De la Cruz v.
Carretas, 559 Phil. 5 (2007) in turn citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil.
335 (1979)]
It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge,
who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the
courtroom without asking for the court’s permission. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also
avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. [Ibid., Citing Re: Letter
of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
[Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange Commission], 586 Phil. 321
(2008)]
Members of the Judiciary should be beyond
reproachand suspicion in their conduct, and should be free
from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their
official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and
everyday life. [Ibid., citing Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352 (2008)]
In a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr., (Ibid., Citing
Taran v. Jacinto, Jr., 448 Phil. 563 (2003) the Supreme
Court has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto liable
for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for
issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was
found guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97
by failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official
receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing
case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of Pll ,000 and
was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section ll(C),
paragraph 1 of Rule 140 (Ibid., citing Amendment to Rule 140 of
Rules of Court Re Discipline of Justices and Judges, A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC [2001]) of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming
conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of
the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than Pl,000, but
not exceeding Pl 0,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand;
 92
(4) admonition with warning. (Ibid., citing Anonymous v. Achas,
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 18)
Considering that this is respondent judge's second
infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties of a fine
in the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as
recommended by the investigating justice, are proper under
the circumstances. WHEREFORE, this Court finds
respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming
conduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000) and REPRIMANDED with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. (Ibid.)
What are the extra-judicial activities of a
judge which he must regulate in order to minimize
the risk of conflict with judicial duties ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Avocational, civil and charitable activities;
b. Financial activities;
c. Fiduciary activities;
d. Practice of law and other profession;
e. Extra-judicial appointments; and
f. Political activities.
a. Extrajudicial duties of a judge. Subject
to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges
may:
1) Write, lecture, teach and participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
2) Appear at a public hearing before an official
body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal
system, the administration of justice or related matters;
3) Engage in other activities if such activities do
not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise
interfere with the performance of judicial duties. (Sec. 10,
Canon 4, New Code)
b. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits
justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice
to purchase even at public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective function. This prohibition
also applies to lawyers with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation to which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.
BAR: c. The purchase of the property,
subject of a litigation after the suit, at a substantial
discount may create the impression that the judge may
have favored the former owner of the property. Thus,
the judge would have violated Canon 2 which
mandates that, “A judge should avoid impropriety and
appearance of impropriety.”
While in such circumstance a judge may not
have violated the prohibition, the judge must have
comported himself in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public such that judges, like Caesar’s
wife, should be above suspicion.
BAR: d. “A judge shall refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with
the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers and persons
likely to come before the court. A judge should so
manage investments and other financial interests
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds
for disqualification.” (Rule 5.02. Old Code)
 93
Recent doctrines and illustrative cases:
a. The above Rule 5.02 supplies the void left by
the abrogation of Art. 14 of the Spanish Code of Commerce
by the case of Macariola v. Asuncion, which held that Art.
14, which prohibited justices from engaging in business, was
in the nature of political law since it was extended to this
country by Spain.
A judge requested real estate dealers to look for sellers
of a lot which a religious group wanted to buy as a site for its
church. The sale pushed through, and the judge was found
guilty of engaging in business. (Berin, et al., v. Judge Barte,
etc., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443, July 31, 2002)
e. “Subject to the provisions of the
preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as an officer,
director, manager, advisor, or employee of any
business except as director of a family business of
the judge." (Rule 5.03, Old Code)
BAR: f. There are no legal or ethical prohibitions
for the judge to head family concerns engaged in being
a bookstore/distributor or in a chain of restaurants so
long as such activities do not tend to reflect adversely
on his court’s impartiality; interfere with the proper
performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court. (Rule 5.02, Canon 5, Code of Judicial
Conduct)
A judge may not however involve himself in the
family concern which is a surety company actively
engaged in posting bonds required in court cases
because such would normally tend to arouse suspicion
that such relations would warp his judgment, or prevent
his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his
judicial duties. (1st par., Canon 25, Canons of Judicial Ethics)
BAR: g. When a judge may serve as an
executor. A judge should not serve as the executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for
the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate
family (spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity), and then only if such service will not
interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.
(Rule 5.06, Old Code)
BAR: h. Judges shall not practice law
whilst the holder of judicial office. (Sec. 11, Canon 4,
New Code)
BAR: i. When a Municipal Trial Judge may
notarize documents.
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries
public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official
functions and duties.
They may not, as notaries public ex officio,
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of
private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges.
However, in municipalities where there are
neither lawyers or notaries public, MTC and MCTC
judges assigned to municipalities or circuits may in
their capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any
act within the competency of a regular notary public,
provided that:
a) all notarial fees charged be for the account of
the Government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer; and
b) certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit. (Mendoza, Jr., et al.,
v. Navarro, etc., Am> No.P-05-2034,September 11, 2006,
 94
Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.04-1930-P; Douglas v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 3) To take reasonable steps to maintain
etc., A.M. No. MTJ-96-1076, February 9, 2000 citing Supreme and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
Court Circular No. 1-90; Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., etc., A.M. No. qualities necessary for the proper performance of
MTJ-00-1294, July 31, 2000)
judicial duties. (Sec. 3, Ibid.)
Recent doctrines and illustrative case:
4) To keep informed about relevant
a. An MTC judge violated S.C. Circular No. 1-
developments in international law. (Sec. 4, Ibid.)
90, when he notarized a revocation of a General Power of
5) To perform all judicial duties
Attorney. His claim that he inadvertently notarized the
revocation betrays a deficiency of that degree of efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness .
(Sec. 5, Ibid.)
circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial
6) To maintain order and decorum in all
robe. (Morales, Sr., v. Judge Dumlao, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-01-
1339, February 13, 2002) proceedings, be patient, dignified and courteous to
all with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
(Sec. 6, Ibid.)
5. Equality
7) Not to engage in conduct incompatible
with diligent discharge of judicial duties. (Sec. 7, Ibid.)
a. Importance of equality. Ensuring equality
of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due
performance of judicial office. (Canon 5, New Code)
c. Duty to be competent and maintain
competence. Judges shall take reasonable steps to
maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
b. Principal duty of judge relative to
qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial
equality. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose the training and
duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
other facilities which should be made available, under
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds . (Sec. 2, judicial control, to judges. (Sec. 3, Canon 6, New Code)
Canon 5, Ibid.)
Judges shall keep themselves informed about
relevant developments of international law, including
6. Competence and diligence international conventions and other instruments establishing
human rights norms.
Judges should keep abreast of the rulings and
a. Importance of competence and doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court and apply
diligence. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to them to appropriate cases regardless of their personal
the due performance of judicial office. (Canon 6, New Code) opinion.” (No. 2, General Guidelines, circular No. 13 of the
Office of the Chief Justice dated July 1, 1987)
Judges must maintain professional competence by
b. Summary of duties of judges relative
being knowledgeable and obedient to the rules and circulars
to competence and diligence: issued by the Supreme Court. (Sanchez v. Alaan, etc. A.M.
1) Judicial duties take precedence over No. MTJ-04-1570, September 5, 2006)
all other activities. (Sec. 1, Canon 6, New Code)
2) To devote professional activity to
BAR: d. Gross ignorance of the law is failure
judicial duties. (Sec. 2, Ibid.)
to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law
 95
and the Rules of court from which no one is excused
surely not a judge. (Fr. Guillen v. Judge Canon, A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1381, January 14, 2002)
Recent doctrines and illustrative cases:
a. When the law transgressed is elementary, the
failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. (Heirs of the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes v. Justice
Demetria, et al., A.M. No. CA-01-32, January 23, 2002)
b. When inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of he position and the title or is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberate due to bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. (Spouses
Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, March
18, 2002)
c. For liability to arise for gross ignorance of the
law, the assailed order, decision or actuation in the
performance of official duties must not only be found to be
erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that
he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
other like motive. (Araos v. Judge Luna-Pison, etc., A. M. No.
RTJ-02-2677, February 28, 2002; Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, etc., A.
M. No. CA-02-33, July 31, 2002)
NOTE: The author does not agree with this
conclusion. Gross ignorance is lack of knowledge, it is
independent of bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other
like motive. The better rule would be to consider the bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive as the
offense, and ignoring the law (which is different from gross
ignorance of the law), as the means for showing the bad
faith, etc.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Te v. Judge Perez, etc., A.
M. No. MTJ-00-1286, January 21, 2002 while conceding that
judges cannot be faulted for honest lapses in judgment,
also said that this defense has become shopworn through
overuse. It puts its foot down in declaring that the failure to
give notice to the prosecution before granting the application
for bail or the granting thereof to a person charged with a
capital offense without conducting the required hearing is
guilty of ignorance or incompetence.
d. A judge was fined for issuing unjust orders and gross
ignorance of the law. He failed to realize the difference
between direct contempt which could be penalized
summarily without notice and hearing and indirect contempt
which requires that it be docketed, heard and decided
separately from the principal action, unless duly
consolidated. He ordered the arrest of individuals who were
not among the defendants who purportedly violated a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction without giving notice . (Fr.
Guillen v. Judge Canon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1381, January 14,
2002)
BAR: e. Duty to act expeditiously.
Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. (Sec. 5, Canon 6, New Code)
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelvemonths for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts. [Sec. 15 (1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
f. Duty to maintain decorum. Judges shall
maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control. (Sec. 6, Canon
6, New Code)
A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses,
and others appearing before the court. A judge should
avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for
 96
litigants. (Rule 3.04, Old Code of Judicial Conduct, applied in a
suppletory character)
A judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. (Rule
3.05, Ibid.)
While a judge may to promote justice, prevent waste
of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of
truth. (Rule 3.06, Ibid.)
Recent doctrines and illustrative cases:
a. A judge should be courteous both in his
conduct and in his language specially those appearing
before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the court, their clients and the public
without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing and tyrannical.
Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he
gives no reason for reproach. A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. (Pros. Ruiz v. Judge Bringas, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1266,
April 6, 2000)
b. A judge was admonished to exercise
prudence and restraint in his language and sternly warned.
During an administrative hearing he stated, among others,
“And it’s up to the Supreme Court to take action, as I am
emphasizing, stressing and capitalizing that justice delayed
is justice denied, xxx I am already demoralized and lost faith
in the system xxx.” (Judge Pineza, etc., v. Aruelo, etc., A.M. No.
P-01-1522, July 30, 2002)
c. The absence of malice or the presence of
purity of motive is not a license to resort to inflammatory
words to articulate grievances. All judges should always
observe courtesy and civility. They should be temperate,
patient and courteous both in conduct and language.
(Judge Pineza, etc., v. Aruelo, etc., A.M. No. P-01-1522, July 30,
2002)
d. The people’s confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench,
but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. (Dawa v. De Asa)
e. It is gross misconduct, even outright
disrespect for the Supreme Court for a judge to exhibit
indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on
the accusations in a complaint. After all, a resolution of the
Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request,
and should be complied with promptly and completely.
Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a
recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the
Court’s lawful order and directive.
Deliberate and continuous failure and refusal to comply
with the resolution of the Supreme Court is misconduct and
insubordination. (Re: Audit Report on Attendance of Court
Personnel of Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila, A.M. No. P-
04-1838, August 31, 2006, Formerly A.M. No. 03-11-641-RTC)
g. Judge intervention in presentation of
evidence. While a judge may to promote justice, prevent
waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene
in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
always be borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth. (Rule 3.06, Old Code, applied in a
suppletory character)
BAR: h. A judge may not participate
intensively in the examination of witnesses.
Reasons:
1) An intensive participation by a judge in the
examination of witnesses may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto. (Canon 3.06, Code of Judicial Conduct)
2) A judge must bear in mind that witnesses
may be easily intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge
considering the unusual circumstances which they find
themselves in.. (People v. Ibasan, Sr., et al., 129 SCRA 712)

i. Instances where a judge may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence during
the trial:
1) to promote justice,
2) prevent waste of time, or
3) clear up some obscurity. (Rule 3.06,
Code of Judicial Conduct)
C. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF
JUDICIARY
1. Members of the Supreme Court
a) Impeachment. The Members of the
Supreme Court “may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” (1987 Philippine
Constitution, Article XI, Sec. 2, 1st sentence, paraphrasing supplied)
Rules on impeachment:
1. The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may
be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be
97
calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or
THE override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to
try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall
not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to
 98
prosecution, trial, and punishment,
according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Rules on
Impeachment, Sec. 3)
b) Ethical Lessons from Former Chief
Justice Corona’s Impeachment
1) Former Chief Justice Renato Corona
was convicted by the Senate on May 29, 2012 with
a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate
(20 voted guilty, 3 voted not guilty, with 1 vacant
seat) for betrayal of public trust and/or culpable
violation of the constitution when he failed to disclose
to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and
net worth as required under the constitution.
2) The 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides among others that, “A public officer or
employee shall upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and
net worth.” (Article XI, Sec. 17, 1st sentence)
With regard to the Supreme Court Justices,
“the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.” (Ibid., 2nd sentence,
paraphrasing supplied)
3) Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, has provided the manner by
which the submission known as the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) shall be
“disclosed to the public.”
4) The Supreme Court has provided for
the manner by which the SALNs of its members shall
be “disclosed to the public.”
5) Ethical lessons learned. The author
submits that members of the judiciary, specially
members of the Supreme Court, should take to mind
the description given to “Caesar’s wife.” They should
be “onion-skinned” and should always be “ultra
sensitive” to public perception. “Judges shall ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer. “ (New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, Canon 2, Sec. 1) Once there is a
widespread public perception, whether justified or
not, the author suggests that the judge or justice
should make a personal sacrifice and immediately
resign. This is to save the Judiciary from damage
that may be wrought by the media, whether
warranted or not.
Likewise, they should always bear in mind
that, “The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
Judiciary. “ (Ibid., Canon 1, Rule 2)
“A judge’s official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only on the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life should be beyond reproach.” (Old Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, applied in a suppletory
character.)
The above suggestions and observations are
particularly true for Supreme Court Justices. As
shown by subsequent events after the removal
through impeachment of the former Chief Justice
Corona, the impeachment process could be
subverted. The damage done to the person and the
institution could not be remedied any more.
Finally, the author suggests that there should
devised another method for removing Supreme
 99
Court Justices. The impeachment process is a (3) and the Canons of
political exercise that should find application only to Professional Ethics,
elective officials. (4) or for such other forms
of breaches of conduct that have been
2. Lower court judges and justices of the Court traditionally recognized as grounds for
of Appeals and Sandiganbayan (Rule 140) the discipline of lawyers. (A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC, 1st par.)
a. How proceedings against judges and 3) supported
justices of courts lower than the Supreme Court a) by affidavits of person who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged
are instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of judges of
therein
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
b) or by documents which may
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted
substantiate said allegations. (ROC, Rule 140,
1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court Sec. 1, 1st sentence, as amended by A.M. NO. 01-8-10-
2) or upon a verified complaint. (ROC, SC,paraphrasing, arrangement and numbering
Rule 140, Sec. 1, 1st sentence, as amended by A.M. NO. 01-8- supplied)
10-SC, paraphrasing, arrangement and numbering supplied)
c. Action on the complaint. If the complaint
3) or upon an anonymous complaint
is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be
supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
(Ibid., 2nd sentence, paraphrasing supplied)
served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to
comment within ten (10) days from the date of service.
b. Requisites for the verified complaint.
Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed. (Ibid., Sec. 2,
1) The complaint shall be in writing arrangement and numbering supplied)
2) and shall state clearly and concisely d. By whom complaint investigated. Upon
the acts and omissions the filing of the respondent’s comment, or upon the
a) constituting violations of expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other
standards of conduct pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer
b) prescribed for Judges the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
(1) by law, evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case
(2) the Rules of Court, for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired
(3) or the Code of Judicial member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice
Conduct. (ROC, Rule 140, Sec. 1, as of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a
amended by A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC,
paraphrasing, arrangement and numbering Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge
supplied) of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent
c) grounds which are likewise rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the
grounds for the disciplinary action of respondent is a Judge of an inferior court. (Ibid., Sec. 2,
members of the Bar for violation of arrangement and numbering supplied)
(1) the Lawyer's Oath, e. Hearing. the investigating Justice or Judge
(2) the Code of Profes- shall set a day of the hearing and send notice thereof to
sional Responsibility, both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral
and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the
 100
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed 8) Immorality;
ex parte. 9) Gross ignorance of the law or
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate procedure;
the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its 10) Partisan political activities; and
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme 11) Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. (ROC,
Court may grant. (Ibid., Sec. 4, arrangement and numbering supplied) Rule 140, Sec. 8)
f. Report. Within thirty (30) days from the b. Grounds for less serious charges:
termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or 1) Undue delay in rendering a decision
Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be 2) Frequently and unjustified absences
accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the without leave or habitual tardiness;
pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be 3) Unauthorized practice of law;
confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court. 4) Violation of Supreme Court rules,
(Ibid., Sec. 5, arrangement and numbering supplied) directives, and circulars;
g. Action. The Court shall take such action on 5) Receiving additional or double
the report as the facts and the law may warrant. (Ibid., Sec. 6, compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
arrangement and numbering supplied) 6) Untruthful statements in the certificate
of service; and
3. Grounds. The grounds for disciplinary action 7) Simple Misconduct. (ROC, Rule 140, Sec.
against a Justice of the Court of Appeals, the 9)
Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax
Appeals, or a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a c. Grounds for light charges:
Municipal Trial Court, may be classified into grounds for 1) Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
serious charges, less serious charges and light charges. 2) Gambling in public;
3) Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants
a. Grounds for serious charges: with pending case/cases in his court; and
1) Bribery, direct or indirect; 4) Undue delay in the submission of
2) Dishonesty and violations of the Anti- monthly reports. (ROC, Rule 140, Sec. 10)
Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3) Gross misconduct constituting 4. Impeachment (ethical aspects)
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4) Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order as determined by a competent
5. Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on
court in an appropriate proceeding; erring members of the Judiciary
5) Conviction of a crime involving moral D. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICES AND
turpitude; JUDGES (RULE 137)
6) Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7) Borrowing money or property from 1. Compulsory
lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the
court; 2. Voluntary
 101
BAR: a. Judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceedings
in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
the matter impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to, instances where:
a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning
a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or
was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
c. The judge or a member of his or her family,
has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as
counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was
material witness therein;
e. The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject
of review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to
a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel
within the fourth civil degree;
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child
has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.
(Sec. 5, Canon 3, New Code ; 1 st par., Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rule of
Court)
The above are the instances of compulsory
inhibition which conclusively presumes that a judge
cannot actively or impartially sit on a case.
3.1 The disqualification of judges applies to the
preliminary investigation stage where the judge would have
to act on a set of facts presented to him and determine
whether or not there is probable cause to charge the
accused.
The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a
judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well
cases where his acts be resolving motions, issuing orders
and the like. (Mayor Sales v. Judge Calvan, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-
00-1331, February 27, 2002)
BAR: b. The authority for voluntary
inhibition is found in the 2nd par., of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, “A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”
The authority for voluntary inhibition does not give
the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether or not
he will desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be
for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough grounds for a judge to inhibit,
especially when the same is without any basis.
4.1 Voluntary inhibition or discretionary inhibition.
Note that the grounds are not exclusive and a judge could
voluntarily inhibit himself when it is made of record that a
judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or with
bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state
of mind. (Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, 167-168)
BAR: c. What are the kinds of inhibition
and disqualification of judges ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: There are two kinds of
inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.
Compulsory disqualification conclusively assumes
that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for
the reasons therein stated therein.
Voluntary inhibition leaves to the judge’s discretion
whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just
and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him.
(Amarillo, Jr. v. People, G. R. No. 153650, August 31, 2006)
 102
BAR: d. Judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceeding
where The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a
party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding. [Sec. 5 (a), Canon 3, New Code)
Concepts tested in previous Bar Examinations:
a. A judge should not try a case where he has
personally witnessed the accused stabbing the victim.
Reason: Judges should disqualify themselves where they
have personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding. [Sec. 5 (a), Canon 3, New
Code) Such personal knowledge may result to actual bias
and prejudice as well result to a resolution of the case on
grounds that have not been presented in evidence. (2004)
b. The mere fact that a counsel who is
appearing before a judge was one of those who
recommended him to the Bench is not a valid ground from
voluntary inhibition. “Utang na loob”, per se, should not be a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should
recognition of such value prevent the performance of judicial
duties. However, where the judge admits that he may be
suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na
loob, and he may even succumb to it considering that he
“and members of his family, no less shall ever remain
obliged in eternal gratitude to” the recommending counsel,
the judge should inhibit himself. (Query of Executive Judge
Estrella T. Estrada, etc., Adm. Matter No. 87-9-3918-RTC,
October 26, 1987; Masadao and Elizaga, Re: Criminal Case No.
49540-M; 155 SCRA 78-79) (1989)
c. A judge should not be disqualified because
he was a classmate of one of the counsels if there is no
proof that such relationship results to actual bias or
prejudice. Reason: To allow disqualification would
unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case
will be assigned. Confusion would result, because a judge
would then be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of
his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared.
(Vda. De Bonifacio v. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc., 34 SCRA 618;
Masadao and Elizaga, Re: Criminal Case No. 49540-M; 155
SCRA 78-79) (1986)
Recent doctrines and illustrative cases:
a. Grant of bail by a judge does not establish
allegations of bias and partiality. Divergence of opinion as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and
the judge is not a proper ground for disqualification.
Opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings,
although erroneous, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do
not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a
litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases for
disqualification. In fact, the parties could have appealed the
order granting bail if they doubted the legality thereof. Such
appeal constitutes adequate remedy in law. (People v. Kho, et
al., G.R. No. 139381, April 20, 2001)
b. As held in Orola v. Alovera, G.R. No. 111074,
July 14, 2000, when a judge exhibits actions that give rise,
fairly or unfairly, to the perceptions of bias, such faith and
confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit
himself voluntarily. A judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce doubt on his honest actuation and probity in
favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to
disqualify himself. (Latorre v. Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563,
May 31, 2001)
BAR: e. May a judge who, prior to
his appointment as such, appeared as counsel de
oficio for the accused in a criminal cases only for
purposes of arraignment, be compulsorily
disqualified from hearing the criminal case after
his appointment as a judge ? It appears that the
appearance was made in the absence of the
counsel de parte.
 103
SUGGESTED ANSWER: There is no ground for
compulsory disqualification. The participation was limited
only to appraising the accused of the consequences of his
plea. Prior to and subsequent to the arraignment, the
accused had a counsel de parte. Accordingly, there is no
basis for compulsory disqualification. (Amarillo, Jr. v. People,
G. R. No. 153650, August 31, 2006)
BAR: f. It is not proper for a judge to
recuse himself because the defendant in a case
pending before the judge previously charged him
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Reasons.
The party litigants would be able to choose the judge
who would try their case.
The rationale behind the rule is that, “…if on
every occasion that the party apparently aggrieved
would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in
order to await the final decision on the desired
disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of
the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged,
may cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps
there would not be enough judges to handle all the
cases pending in all courts.” (Cruz, Jr. v. Judge Joven, etc.,
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1270, January 23, 2001 citing People v.
Serrano, 203 SCRA 171)
g. A judge’s family includes a judge’s spouse,
son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any
other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
sixth civil degree, or any person who is a
companion or employee of the judge and who lives
in the judge’s household. (3rd par., Definitions, New Code)
Judges shall not participate in the
determination of a case in which any member of
their family represents a litigant or is associated in
any manner with the case. (Sec. 4, Canon 4, New Code)
Judges shall disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which
it may appear to a reasonable observer that they
are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to,
instances where:
xxx xxx
xxx xxx
c. The judge or a member of his or her
family, has an economic interest in the outcome of
the matter in controversy;
xxx xxx
xxx xxx
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or
affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree;
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or
child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings. (Sec. 5, Canon 3, New Code ; 1 st par., Sec. 1,
Rule 137, Rule of Court, rephrasing supplied)
Concepts tested in previous Bar Examinations.
1. A judge could not participate in a case where his
son is one of the counsels.
2. Mere filing of an administrative case against
a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from
hearing a case. (Sps. De Guzman v. Judge Pamintuan,
A.M.No. RTJ-02-1736)
BAR: h. Remittal of disqualification. A
situation where a judge, who is otherwise disqualified from
hearing a case may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of
 104
disqualification. If based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers independently of the judge' participation, all
agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate
in the proceeding. The agreement signed by all the parties 1. An MTC judge convicted the client of
and the lawyers shall be incorporated in the record of the lawyer X. It is clear from the evidence that the
proceedings. (Rule 3.13, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct) Honorable Judge’s decision was evidently
rendered in gross ignorance of the law. Should
E. POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND Atty. X file an administrative charge against the
JUDICIAL OFFICERS (RULE 135) judge on this basis?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Atty. X should instead
F. COURT RECORDS AND GENERAL DUTIES appeal the case, and if it is found that the judge acted in
OF CLERKS AND STENOGRAPHERS (RULE 136) gross ignorance of the law, then administrative charges may
be proffered against him. Administrative disciplinary action
G. LEGAL FEES (RULE 141) against judge not available if there is a judicial remedy.
Administrative action is not the appropriate remedy for every
1. Manner of payment irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge
where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.
2. Fees in lien REASONS:
a. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not
3. Persons authorized to collect legal fees complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, the
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. If the
judge’s challenged act is found to be correct, there would be
no occasion to proceed against him administratively.
H. COSTS b. To hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming
1. Recovery of costs (Rule 142) that he has erred would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable. No one is
infallible in trying a case or interpreting the law in the
a) Prevailing party
process of administering justice. Sps. De Guzman v. Judge
Pamintuan, A.M.No. RTJ-02-1736)
b) Dismissed appeal or action
2. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption,
c) Frivolous appeal the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
d) False allegations erroneous. For administrative liability to attach it must be
established that the respondent judge was moved by bad
e) Non-appearance of witness faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. (Chiong v.
 105
Hon. Cosico, etc., A. M. No. CA-02-33, July 31, 2002; Sps. De
Guzman v. Judge Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736))
3. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self -interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. (Ang v.
Judge Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590, January 15, 2002; Mina v.
Judge Gatdula, A.M. No.MTJ-00-1264, February 4, 2002; Chiong
v. Hon. Cosico, etc., A.M. No. CA-02-33, July 31, 2002)
4. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the respondent to do wrong
or cause damage. (Ang v. Judge Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590,
January 15, 2002; Mina v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. No.MTJ-00-1264,
February 4, 2002; Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, etc., A.M. No. CA-02-
33, July 31, 2002)
5. A judge will be held administratively liable for
rendering an unjust judgment – one which is contrary to law
or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence – when he
acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar
motive. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment is and that it was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to so an injustice. (Araos v. Judge Luna-
Pison, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-02-2677, February 28, 2002)
6. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied
where the actuations on their face show gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross
misconduct. [The Consolidated and Trust Corporation
(Solidbank), v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47]
7. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct
on the part of the person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. it generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. To justify the taking of
drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the error or
mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in
bad faith. (Araos v. Judge Luna-Pison, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-02-
2677, February 28, 2002)
8. For serious misconduct to warrant a
dismissal from the service, there must be reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of
were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law. it must
a. be serious, important, weighty, momentary, and
not trifling;
b. imply wrongful intention and not mere error of
judgment; and
c. have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his duties. (Re: Complaint of Dr. Virata
against Judge Supnet, A.M. No. 02-2-12-SC, November 27, 2002)
BAR: 9. State very briefly the remedy or
remedies available under the 1987 Constitution and
present laws and procedures for administratively
disciplining the following persons on grounds of
gross immorality and serious misconduct in
relation to the functions of their respective offices:
(b) A Judge of a Regional Trial Court.
(c) An Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals.
(d) An Associate of the Supreme Court. (Bar:
1986 adapted)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Under the 1987
Constitution the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted. (Sec. 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
 106
Administrative complaints against Judges of a
Regional Trial Court and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals shall be filed with Supreme Court. The complaint
shall be in writing and shall set out, distinctly, clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions violative of standards of
conduct prescribed for Judges by law, Rules of Court, and
GOOD LUCK TO ALL
the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint shall be sworn AND SEE YOU AT P.I.C.C.
to and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the acts therein alleged, and shall be
accompanied by copies of documents which may
substantive said facts. (Sec. 1, Rule 140, ROC)
Justices of the Supreme Court must first be
prosecuted under the regular courts and once convicted
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
A verified complaint for impeachment is filed, and if
the Articles of Impeachment is affirmed, it is then transmitted
to the Senate which conducts the hearings.

10. Describe the nature of administrative

penalties. Do they take away the future of the
respondent judge and take away from him any
further opportunity for career advancement or
promotion ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Administrative penalties
do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public
career, judicial or otherwise. It is for the respondent judge,
by subsequently demonstrating his true worth through
observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a
misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and to
rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving.
(dela Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567,
January 19, 2001)

11. Administrative cases against erring

members of the judiciary are automatically treated as
disciplinary action cases as members of the bar. (2005)