Uniwersytet Warszawski

Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii

Katarzyna Barbara Parys

315365

Is it True that Sherlock Holmes Smokes a

Pipe? Truth Values vs. Fictional Characters

Semester Essay
Praca wykonana pod kierunkiem
dr hab. Justyny Grudzińskiej-
Zawadowskiej
w Instytucie Filozofii UW

Warszawa 2020
 "I Personaggi non dovranno infatti apparire come fantasmi, ma come
realtà create, costruzioni della fantasia immutabili: e dunque più reali
e consistenti della volubile naturalità degli Attori" (Luigi Pirandello)

Introduction

The discussion starts with the most basic consideration: some things exist, and
some things do not. The existence, as well as non-existence is as wide as a great
variation of types of beings. Some of them are fictitious, mythological, some may have
existed in the past, or can exist in the future. How can a proposition which contains a
non-existent object be ascribed a truth value? In this essay I try to present an overview
of approaches regarding the problem from the point of view of philosophy and theory of
literature.

We think and we talk about existent objects, and we also do it about non-existing
objects. Aside from the fact that the proposition “There is Sherlock Holmes” is false,
proposition “Kasia thinks a lot about Sherlock Holmes” can be as true as the proposition
“Kasia thinks a lot about the Royal Castle in Warsaw” when it is actually the case that
Kasia thinks about Sherlock Holmes/the Royal Castle (Sendłak 2018: 15). From the
truth value of those propositions we can assume that there is something Kasia thinks
about. This object does not have to exist, because the truth value does not depend on the
existence of the object, but it rests on the fact that Kasia thinks about it. Our thoughts
about both existent and non-existent objects can be formulated by sentences and those
sentences have truth value. This similarity, thought, causes problems with the
explanation of the truth value of inexistent objects. From the most popular, intuitive
point of view a proposition is true because its content corresponds with the reality
(Sendłak 2018: 15). Nevertheless, this method fails when the subject of the proposition
is something inexistent, an empty name, a name without its corresponding object.
Besides that, in the case of the sentences (1) “Sherlock Holmes is a detective”, (2)
“Sherlock Holmes is a prince of Denmark”, common sense tells us that the proposition
(1) is true and the proposition (2) is false. Even so, explaining common sense intuition
has problematic results. The subject of the sentence is a fictional character created by
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, which means that there is not an actual object named Sherlock
Holmes. The base of the truth value of the proposition is the fact that an object
possesses or does not possess given property (Sendłak 2018: 16). But what if there is no
such object?

Before proceeding, I would like to stress a distinction between fictional beings,

mythical creatures, and objects of failed scientific theories, like the planet Vulcan. The
difference between mythological creature and a fictional one is the fact that fictional
characters are meant to be inexistent, while creators of myths believed in their stories. In
the case of false scientific theories, there was a scientist who discovered something, and
he based his belief on his idea; he had a false belief about existence of something. Like
Le Verrier had a false belief, a false scientific theory, that there is a planet between Sun
and Mercury. This belief actually created a new, mythological, abstract artefact. Vulcan
is not a planet, but it is one according to false Le Verrier´s theory (Braun 2005: 614). In
my opinion, mythological entities and failed scientific theories should not be included in
the study, because it is bringing the excessive amount of epistemological and
metaphysical problems impossible to cover within the limits of the paper.

1. Theory of Literature

From the point of view of the literature studies, the narrator is the ultimate
source of information that establishes the true value of the propositions within the work
of fiction. Martínez Bonati uses the well-known case of Don Quixote, Sancho Panza
and their adventure with windmills. The question proposed is how do we know that the
Don Quixote’s affirmation that there are giants in the field is false, and the Sancho’s
one, that there are windmills in the field, is true. The reasoning is the following: in the
actual world there are no giants, but they can appear in the chivalry novels.
Nevertheless, we suppose that Don Quixote is a realistic novel, so, giants are not
admissible in the world presented in this fiction, thus, Sancho’s opinion is possibly true,
and don Quixote’s is false. However, Sancho’s statement is only possibly true. A
narrator is the instance which presents what is true and what is false within the world of
a particular fiction. All the information given by a narrator, in the classical realistic
novel, is possibly true (it is not just true as it belongs to the discourse of a work of
fiction). So, the character’s affirmations that coincide with narrator’s opinion are
possibly true and the one that are not are directly false (Martínez Bonati 1992: 34).
 Every fictional world is built only by phrases and fictional objects. For this
reason, all the phrases that construct the world are absolutely true, because they create
fictional objects and they put them into fictional world. The world of fiction in order to
be constructed needs the force of absolute truthiness of its fundamental statements
(Martínez Bonati 1992: 35). Thus, the sentences that build the fictional world are true,
while the narrator’s interventions and what characters “say” is merely possibly true. As
the world of fiction is not an actual world, presented state of affairs is a mere possibility.
So, as the plot is merely possible, the narrator´s and character´s interventions within are
also merely possible. The only thing that is absolutely true are fundamental statements
for the world of fiction.

This theory can be valid for literature but is too vague for analytic philosophy.
The distinction between something being absolutely true and something being possibly
true from the logical point of view can be read only in function of possible worlds
theory. Moreover, establishing the difference between propositions that construct the
fictional world and narrator´s statement is unclear, because the fundamental statements,
in order to appear in fiction, have to be pronounced by a narrator or by a character. It is
complicated to classify propositions that are contained in the work of fiction in
accordance with this criterion.

2. Gappy Proposition Theory

John Stuart Mill and his followers, Millianists, claim that as the proposition is
what the sentence semantically expresses, so, the sentences containing proper names are
propositions containing individuals as its components (Braun 2005: 596). This
conception becomes problematic with the case of non-referring names, so called empty
names, such as Sherlock Holmes (fictional name) or Vulcan, Pegasus (mythical names,
which won´t be treated in the paper).

One of the possible ways to save millianism is to introduce the Gappy

Proposition Theory. The sentence semantically represents a proposition whose
components are the name and a property. For example, “Sherlock Holmes is a
detective” could be represented as <Sherlock Holmes, being a detective>, but as
Sherlock Holmes is a name of a fictional character, non-referring one, the scope fails.
Nevertheless, the way to avoid the problem is to introduce the unfilled position, a gap.
The sentences would be then represented by <_, being a detective>. Unfilled
propositional structures can be asserted and believed. Also, as they can be asserted and
believed, they can be a special kind of proposition, the gappy proposition (Braun 2005:
599). Gappy propositions can be truth-bearers. Atomic gappy propositions such as
Sherlock Holmes exists. <_, existing> are false, while Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
Moreover, << _, existing>, NEG> is true, because it is true that SH does not exist. This
theory replies to the objection to the Problem of Meaningfulness for Sentences where if
a name lacks a semantic content, then the whole propositions lack semantic content.
With gappy proposition, the empty name lacks semantic content, but the proposition
itself has a gappy propositional content. This reasoning resolves also Problem of Truth
Values and the Problem of Belief, and Sincere, Assertive Utterance, because gappy
propositions are truth-bearers. Also, gappy propositions sentences have the same truth
value that would be given to them by ordinary-language speakers. In accordance with
this theory, the sentence “According to stories by Conan Doyle, SH is a detective” is
true, and the sentence “SH is a detective” expresses a gappy proposition that is
expressed, explicitly or implicitly by the propositions form Conan Doyle stories (Braun
2005: 600). This theory, by including gap propositions, permits to assign a truth value to
the propositions containing non-actual objects. Despite all the critics, I consider Gappy
Proposition Theory a decent solution to the problem. As they are not fictional
characters, but we can still ascribe properties to them, we need something to be a bearer
for properties of a certain character and a truth-bearer for propositions about them.

Fred Adams, Robert Stecker, Nathan Salmon, Kenneth Taylor, and Marga
Reimer (Braun 2005: 604), claimed that atomic gappy propositions are neither true, nor
false. The argumentation is the following: propositions (3) “Sherlock Holmes exists” (4)
“It is not the case that SH exists” (5) “SH does not exist” (6) “Sherlock Holmes is a
grapefruit” all lack truth value (Braun 2005: 607). Ordinary users of the language have
an intuition that the proposition (5) is true, because they believe gappy proposition that
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and they have an intuition that proposition (6) is false,
because they believe that SH is not a grapefruit. You can rationally believe gappy
propositions on the base of good reasons to believe that, even if they lack a truth value
(Braun 2005: 608). Moreover, in my opinion, believing something that lacks truth value
is problematic. If I believe that something, I believe that it is true. In the sentence (6) I
know, and I believe that SH is not a grapefruit. So, the solution with gappy propositions
being truth-bearers seems more intuitive and more in according with the common-sense
reasoning. If we consider that atomic gappy propositions are neither true nor false, then
sentences that express them are neither true nor false. Therefore, consider the following
sentence (3) “SH exists” and its negation (4) “It is not the case that SH exists”, being
paraphrased as (4a) “The proposition that SH exists is not the case”, and (4b) “The
proposition that SH exists is not true”. All those paraphrases are necessary equivalences
of the sentence (4). Even assuming that (3) is neither true not false, (4b) correctly says
that (3) is not true. Thus (4b) is true, as all their necessary equivalences, (4a), (4). Thus,
(4) is true on the Gappy Proposition Theory, even if we assume that (4) is neither true,
nor false (Braun 2005: 606). With this proof we can observe that the claim that gappy
propositions lack truth values is problematic. Assigning a truth value to them makes
more improvement in assigning a truth-value of sentences containing fictional
characters.

3. Fictional Characters

Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Nathan Salomon and Amie Thomasson, whose
view are described by Braun (2005: 609), claim that fictional characters are actually
existing abstract entities. Authors create characters when they create fictions.
Characters, thought, are actually existing abstract artifacts of similar category as works
of fictions. Their existence is based, as in the case of novel or other works of art, on the
pattern of activities of authors and receptors, just as like in the case of their work of art.
Cited authors (Braun 2005: 609) claim that we should accept the existence of fictional
characters even if their exact nature is still unclear to us. Moreover, this brave
metaphysical claim opens plenty semantic issues.

Let us consider (7) “There is no Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock Holmes does not
exist. Sherlock Holmes is just a fictional character” (Braun 2005: 612). The sentence, at
first sight, seems correct. Moreover, after further reflection, it results contradictory.
When we assume that, if we can ascribe property to something, like property of being a
character, there is a hidden consequence that the thing we ascribe property to actually
exist. If the third conjunct is true, then there is such a thing like Sherlock Holmes, and
this thing has the property of being a fictional character. With this point of view, the
first and the second conjuncts are false, assuming that there is, exists (against
Meinongians) SH with the property of a being a character. (Braun 2005: 613). On the
other hand, is the essence of being a fictional character being non-existent?

The confusion appears when we use the name to speak of fictional character, and
this name fails reference, as in the example above. Moreover, ordinary speakers must be
right about something, thus there are theorists (Braun 2005: 613) who claim that the
sentence (7) semantically expresses the true proposition. If we assume that SH refers to
a fictional character, the first two parts of (7) are saying that there is not such a real
person like SH, nobody who did the things spoken of in the stories, and the third part:
that there does not exist a real person that is identical with SH, SH is a mere character
(Braun 2005: 613). It appears like we are reaching a desirable result. There is one
philosophical view in which SH is in all three parts of (3) on the same level of reference
and the sentence is true. The problem is that this is the only case in which the theory
works, and this fact makes the reasoning not plausible. There is no sign from ordinary
language that the name SH can appear ambiguous, no information that our sentence (7)
is true only in accordance with some special case of philosophical theory. We do not
expect form ordinary users of language a consistent theory about fictional characters,
moreover, normal people’s intuitions can be a useful recommendation for philosophers
how their sophisticated theories should be reformed. Braun (2005: 614), moreover,
prefers to divide SH from the first and second conjunct of (7) form the SH from the
third conjunct. The first and second SH should be converted into non-referring SH 1 and
the second SH into referring SH2. SH1 is not referring because it appeals to the fact that
SH is not, and SH2 is referring, because this SH2 bares the property of being fictional
character, thus, it is. Name Sherlock Holmes is a name of fictional character. If we are
using it, or thinking of it, we always have in mind Sherlock Holmes fictional character.
Although, saying that in one sentence there are two different SH, one referring to
something and one does not refer, sounds confusing.

4. Possible Worlds Theory

Truth value in Possible Worlds Theory is to be established in a compositional

system, a double index semantics. The proposition is a function from their input to
appropriate semantic outcome, and its semantic value is assigned in the following way:
“an expression e is assigned a semantic value [[e]]f,c,t,w with respect to an assignment f of
values to variables, a context c, and a point of evaluation <t, w>” (Predelli 2008: 279).
This way of assigning a truth value seems helpful in the case of talking about fictional
events, because it takes into consideration not just the proposition itself but also the time
and possible world to which it refers (Predelli 2008: 280). Propositions about fiction
incorporates an additional clause, an operator “according to fiction x” expressed by two-
place operator FT. A sentence about fiction in this view can be seen like this: FT(The
Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, smokes a pipe(Sherlock Holmes)). The new operator is
intensional, meaning it affects the behavior of the sentences by changing the point with
respect to which the truth value of the proposition is to be established into a particular
possible world, the one determined by fiction, in according to which the proposition is
to be evaluated. From this point of view, the truth in fiction is evaluated in accordance
with this formula: [[FT(x, y)]]c,w = T iff [[y]]c,w´= T, where w´ is a world determined by
[[y]]c,w (Predelli 2008: 282). FT(The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, smokes a
pipe(Sherlock Holmes)) turns out true iff `Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe´ is evaluated
as T with respect to possible world w´ determined by The Adventures of Sherlock
Holmes. Since Sherlock Homes is a pipe smoker, we are happy to obtain a desirable
result.

This view is in a sense similar to the one from the theory of literature by
Doležel, who claims that it is hard to talk about the truth within the fictional work.
However, the situation changes if somebody in the actual world talks about fiction; in
this case the proposition possess a truth value. The true value is to be judged with the
reference to the fictional world they´re about. The proposition of this kind is true if it
describes the state of affairs form the fictional world and is false if it does not. The truth
value is given in accordance with Tarski´s correspondence theory of truth: propositions
are true, or false, according to the observable state of affairs in the fictional world
(Doležel 1999: 128-129).

Although, there is a problem with PWT solution. The worlds of fiction are not
complete, as they fail to assign a truth value to all propositions about them. For
example, we cannot evaluate the sentence “SH has a scar in his back” as there is no
information about detective´s back in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes. As those
worlds are incomplete, it is impossible to find a world of a certain work of fiction,
because we lack the data to close the world and be sure this is the one that we need.
There is no just one and only world that determines the world in which the plot of The
Adventures of Sherlock Holmes takes place. The world w´ is merely the best class of
possible worlds in accordance to which we can evaluate Sherlock Holmes´ sentences.
This theory seems plausible, as the truth value is established in function of the work of
art, something that fits well with the common-sense intuition about the subject. The
improvement from the theory of literature, which postulates merely possibly true
propositions, is the fact that we face true propositions. Moreover, those propositions are
true according to merely best class of possible worlds. There is not one possible world
in which we can move freely. The only sentences to which we can ascribe a truth value
are the ones that fit in those worlds. Moreover, how to exactly determine which worlds
are they? If we do not have a full information about those worlds, can we, at some point,
be surprised by the content of the class of possible, but incomplete worlds?

Conclusions

Assigning a truth value to the proposition about fiction is problematic. No view

presents a complete and uncontroversial solution. Theory of literature bases the
evaluation of proposition in function of the absolutely true fundamental statements that
construct fictional world. The problem is that it is unclear which parts of the work of art
are to be fundamental, and which are a regular content. Gappy Proposition Theory
claims that fictional characters in propositions are gappy elements that can be truth-
bearers. Moreover, inside the very same theory, there is a controversy about the
possibility to assign a truth value to a gappy proposition. When Gappy Proposition is a
truth-bearer, the theory seems plausible, but if it cannot have a true-value, the solution is
pointless, it does not make any progress to the solution of the problem. Possible World
Theory offers the analysis of propositions about fictional characters in function of
possible world they belong to, which is a plausible solution. Moreover, the problematic
part is that as works of fiction create incomplete worlds, there is no one world that can
be a point of reference to assigning a truth value. There is only the best class of possible
worlds. The solution seems incomplete, thus problematic. In my opinion, the PWT
solution is the most intuitive one. It is a task for both narratology and philosophy to
establish a status of a work of art in function of the Possible Worlds Theory, in order to
solve the controversies proposed by philosophers. To understand the problem properly
there is a need to understand more deeply the particular case of the works of art. Maybe
an interdisciplinary approach can contribute to a progress. But this is the story for a
different paper.

Bibliography:

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