G.R. No.
74259 February 14, 1991 A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court
dated February 27,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz
y Padre, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial
government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is
the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit.
Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the
amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting
Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received
collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals
pertaining to government accounts.
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was
terminated, and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was
effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of
Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08.1
produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159,50.
The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981.
This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to
the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from
his salary before his dismissal from the service.2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency
of P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been
met, an information for malversation of the said amount was filed
against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner.3
He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the
shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage
represented the unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and encashed
while the petitioner was on official leave of absence. He avers he was
later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to
comply although he had not actually received the said amount.
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the
corresponding vouchers dated are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the
General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB
Check No. 956637 dated December 22,1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the
Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by
PNB Check No. NS958525 dated December 23,1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the
General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB
Cheek No. 956639J dated December 22,1980.
1
 4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the
Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by
PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29,1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four
checks after the amounts thereof were disbursed, turning over to the
petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and
payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ).4
He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in
question as alleged but was in fact the one who prepared the said
checks in the morning before attending to the sick wife in the hospital,
returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll
payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on
December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital.5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's
testimony that the petitioner was not on official leave on the dates in
question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had already been
encashed on December 23 1980, the encashment was not immediately
recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of
temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage." It was only in
March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted
with it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer.6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the
shortage in the petitioner's cash book. He explained that after receiving
the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he discovered
that although the amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been
already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's
cash book. As his superior, he required the petitioner to make the
proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was
already part of the latter's accountability.7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan,
through Justice Amante Q. Alconcel, made the following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the
defense as to the amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused
must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said
amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give
credence to his claim that same has not been liquidated by the
paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued
and encashed for the same purpose, and that is, to pay salary
differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial officials
and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the
period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment
occurred on December 23, 1980, and in fact, another check
(No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day.
The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were
issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980,
respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only
entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three
(3) months after its issuance and encashment, all the other
three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as
pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the same day
as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book.
Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of
camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks
Nos. 956639 and 958525, could not have been liquidated
together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay
salary differentials of government officials and employees of
the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued
and encashed on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution
witness, swore that he duly liquidated the proceeds of the four
(4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the
payroll?
A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to
support the vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.
2
 ATTY. ESCAREAL: Q At what time?

Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated? A In the afternoon, sir.

A Yes, Your honor. ATTY. ALCONCEL:

xxx xxx xxx Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that
date?
Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these
documents? A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because
the wife was supposedly having a check-up but in the
A give them to the cashier only, no other person. afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp. 1618)

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused,
Generoso P. Corpuz.
Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he
A Yes, Your Honor. was absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness,
Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave
Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated,
Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when
shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned
did you give these payrolls to the cashier?
1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the
same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned
A On December 29, sir. monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it
were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day
ATTY. ESCAREAL: when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the
other check which was issued and encashed on the same day
Q Duly accomplished? was duly liquidated.

A Duly accomplished, Your Honor. The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial
evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent any of the
xxx xxx xxx exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On
the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point
ATTY. ALCONCEL: unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th? This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:

A At the office, Your Honor. Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing
P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
3
 First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in
March, 1981, he did not make any notation that said amount,
though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over
(Exhibit C), he did not make any certification that the amount of
P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez
misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether
civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal
omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an
1âwphi1
the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional
appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed
injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his
conviction is reversed must be rejected as an warrant
presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of
the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding
that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public
whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.

information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the

suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall petitioner. It is so ordered.
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use.8 And what determines whether the crime of
malversation has been committed is the presence of the following
requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:


(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another

person to take them.

The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold
him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than
convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to
account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a
scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by
4
 G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En
Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and to set
the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary restraining
order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238”1 filed by
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014
resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3
for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles,
Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before,
during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage
of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent
omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to
establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail),4 and (2) a
supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014,
respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20,
2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to
both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against
the accused.6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that
his arraignment would be held before the Sandiganbayan’s Third
Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before
the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for deferment
of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical examination at the
5
Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant
to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of particulars was
called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Enrile’s
counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang),
declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the
Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the
following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial
reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are
best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration,
stating that he would orally move to reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s
denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed
with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the
reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the
motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written
and oral motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill
of Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral arguments in relation
thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess to deliberate
thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments
of the parties, the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the
same motion for bill of particulars for the following reasons: (1) the
details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his
Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and for
Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Information charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with the
crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds no cogent
reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the
prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which need not be
alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during the trial of
the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration
of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars which was opposed by
the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-minute recess to
deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation
thereon, the Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES
accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s motion for reconsideration there being no
new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce
Enrile shall now proceed as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded by directing the doctors
present to determine whether he was physically fit to be arraigned.
After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s
arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting the Sandiganbayan
to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
6
denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and particular overt acts which
insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that constitute the “combination”?
the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be What are the particular overt
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. acts which constitute the
“series”? Who committed
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific those acts?
participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits that the
Information should have stated the details of the particular acts that x x x by repeatedly receiving from a. What was “repeatedly”
allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts NAPOLES and/or her received? If sums of money,
that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and the particular amount. If on
“details desired” that he sought in his motion for bill of particulars, as others, kickbacks or commissions several occasions and in
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw under the following circumstances: different amounts, specify the
before, during and/or after the amount on each occasion
Allegations of Information Details Desired project identification, NAPOLES and the corresponding date
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE a. Who among the accused gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES of receipt.
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, acquired the alleged “ill- received, a percentage of the cost
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then gotten wealth amounting to at of a project to be funded from
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s least ONE HUNDRED ENRILE’S Priority Development
Office, both public officers, SEVENTY TWO MILLION Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
committing the offense in relation EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY consideration of ENRILE’S
to their respective offices, FOUR THOUSAND FIVE endorsement, directly or through
conspiring with one another and HUNDRED PESOS REYES, to the appropriate
with JANET LIM NAPOLES, (Php172,834,500.00)”? One government agencies, of
RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN of them, two of them or all of NAPOLES’ non-government
RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and them? Kindly specify. organizations which became the
there willfully, unlawfully, and recipients and/or target
criminally amass, accumulate, implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth projects, which duly-funded
amounting to at least ONE projects turned out to be ghosts or
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED to misappropriate the PDAF
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE proceeds for her personal gain;
HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a b. Name the specific
combination or series of overt acts, person(s) who delivered the
x x x.” amount of
Php172,834,500.00 and the
b. The allegation “through a specific person(s) who
combination or series of overt received the amount; or if not
criminal acts” is a conclusion in lump sum, the various
of fact or of law. What are the amounts totaling

7
 Php172,834,500.00. x x x
Specify particularly the
person who delivered the
amount, Napoles or Lim or
De Asis, and who particularly
are “the others.”
c. To whom was the money
given? To Enrile or Reyes?
State the amount given on
each occasion, the date
when and the place where
the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project
allegedly identified, how, and
by whom was the project
identified, the nature of each
project, where it is located
and the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years
2004-2010, under what law
or official document is a
portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be
found? In what amount for
each year is ENRILE’s
Priority Development
Assistance Fund? When, and
to whom, did Enrile endorse
the projects in favor of
“Napoles non-government
organizations which became
the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’s
PDAF projects?” Name
Napoles non-government
organizations which became
the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’s
PDAF projects. Who paid
Napoles, from whom did
Napoles collect the fund for
the projects which turned out
to be ghosts or fictitious?
Who authorized the
payments for each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or
field investigations were
conducted which validated
the findings that each of
Enrile’s PDAF projects in the
years 2004-2010 were
ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, a. Provide the details of how
on several occasions of their Enrile took undue advantage,
official positions, authority, on several occasions, of his
relationships, connections, and official positions, authority,
influence to unjustly enrich relationships, connections,
themselves at the expense and to and influence to unjustly
the damage and prejudice, of the enrich himself at the expense
Filipino people and the Republic of and to the damage and
the Philippines. prejudice, of the Filipino
people and the Republic of
the Philippines. Was this
because he received any
money from the government?
From whom and for what
reason did he receive any
money or property from the
government through which
he “unjustly enriched
himself”? State the details
from whom each amount was
received, the place and the
time.
8

Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they
are material facts that should be clearly alleged in the Information so
that he may be fully informed of the charges against him and be
prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars
are cited in a context different from his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable
cause issue was interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the
same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a
different proceeding.”
Ad
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present
petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the Court issue a TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding
the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c)
the Court expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral
arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution and
his arraignment.”
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary
or despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s denial
of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not
amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the
assailed Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at based on the
procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the
ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of
particulars is “ancillary to and in implementation” of an accused’s rights
to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not “a
mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but of rights
vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the
trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that there could only be a
fair trial if he could properly plead to the Information and prepare for
trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the
relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of particulars. He
likewise claims that the “desired details” could not be found in the
bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during the
preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for
bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the
petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal
offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.14 This right has long been established in
English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987
Constitution. This right requires that the offense charged be stated with
clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the crime he is facing
in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained
the purpose of informing an accused in writing of the charges against
him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
9
conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain
acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the
crime charged. x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to
fully appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and
to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at
all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a
person’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him signifies that an accused should be given
the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding.
The Court added that the act or conduct imputed to a person must be
described with sufficient particularity to enable the accused to defend
himself properly.
Ad
U.S. International Extradition -
Call Free Consultation
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights
and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct
underlying root of the right to information in criminal proceedings –
Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” Thus, no
doubt exists that the right to be informed of the cause of the accusation
in a criminal case has deep constitutional roots that, rather than being
cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the
Court, in sustaining the Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of
particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile verbosity with
which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of
excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest
refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that respondent can properly
prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case
will proceed as expeditiously as possible.”22 The Court additionally
stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude
of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to
due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law requires no
less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all
about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the
individual respondents' minds that they are being railroaded out of their
rights and properties without due process of law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.24 The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain
matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The
requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for
his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.26redarclaw
Ad
10
U.S. International Extradition -
Call Free Consultation
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise
language; they do not necessarily need to be in the language of the
statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is charged and what
qualifying and aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court
can pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do not require the Information to
exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense,
unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential
elements of the offense, or are necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the
ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence
will support. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter
or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative,
and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests;30
they are also the essential and determining facts on which the court's
conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in
essential particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to
establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the
ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two
concepts in relation to a particular criminal case, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence
of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference between
ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are
the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of
the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful
acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are
those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. x x x.35
[Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be
alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from
the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be
alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be
alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the essential
elements of the specific crimes.36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that
the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why
he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted
only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with
full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.37 During
arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know
the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature
of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with
the nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information and the
circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.39 It is likewise at
this stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea,40 or
enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the
Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the
accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information
must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which
the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was
charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the
prosecution in light of subsequently discovered
11
evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an
accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts
to retry him for the same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the
Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure
that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him
to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material
elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails to comply with
this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to
charge an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to
withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the
accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such
instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill
of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the
charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by
motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been
defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of an
amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the
nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases
is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct
not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included
in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the
theory of the government’s case;48 to prepare his defense and to avoid
surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another
prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to
observe certain limitations in offering evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed
by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment,
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and
prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to
enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be
such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what the Information means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the
function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the
bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend
to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend
to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of
particulars.51redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the
applicable rules for criminal procedure was still General Order No.
58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of particulars
in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any
specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill
of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of
particulars was available in a criminal case for estafa after the accused
had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there was
no specific provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of
specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, and held
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the
laws existing prior thereto which requires the Government to furnish
such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it was not error
on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the
existence and applicability of a bill of particulars in criminal cases. In
this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio Cernias
with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte. In overruling the accused’s objection, the Court declared that
12
the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done by the
conspirators in the Information “did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to
prove at the trial x x x.”56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or
information is not objectionable, and that the details it contains may be
properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of
particulars, as a right that the accused may ask for from the court. In
this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with
the crime of treason before the People’s Court. The Information filed
against the accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase “and
other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to
order the prosecution to “make more specific [the] phrase ‘and other
similar equipment,’” which request the People’s Court granted. The
People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court
dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the
absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of
specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission
may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of
the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused
clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to
prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might
have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x inasmuch as in criminal
cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at
stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully
apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any
possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and
interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted
in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been
included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement
of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or
the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in
mere matters of form.”60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to
provide for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. A specific provision
granting the accused the right “to move for or demand a more definite
statement or a bill of particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule
until the 1964 Rules of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial
provision later became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill
of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a
bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the
complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a
bill of particulars as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of
particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and
particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms,
give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party
and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of
the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise
the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the
proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order
that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided,
and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering
pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the
function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify,
particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to
expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice
13
in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of
such a bill.65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of
the details desired deprives him of the right to object to evidence
that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
accused with a definite crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to
the sound discretion of the court67 it should nonetheless exercise its
discretion within the context of the facts and the nature of the
crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. As
articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to
be informed of the charges against him so that he will be able to
prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful surveillance
to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an
overzealous prosecutor attempting to protect his case or his witnesses.
Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the substance of the
accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is
especially so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of
information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant in safeguarding
the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery.
Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although
technically sufficient, does not adequately allow a defendant to
properly prepare for trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's right
to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude
towards its granting69 and order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and withholding
others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the
trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to
avoid.71The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules
designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime
charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment
and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a
considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to
quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the facts charged in the
Information does not constitute an offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in
the information are not vague because the Information needs only
allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the accused
stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts
alleged were committed. In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited
the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others, to support the
superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve
the issue of quashal of an information on the ground that the facts
charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request for bill of
particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the
validity of an information, and not a request for specificity with request
to an offense charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v.
Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v.
Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baños v. Pedro,82 which were
likewise cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information
only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the specificity of the
allegations contained in the information as to allow the accused to
prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea.83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court
mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed
ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for
a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
14
charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid
information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid
information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of
discretion for denying Enrile’s request for a bill of particulars, and not a
motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to
quash is in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are
so vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for
trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars
are distinct and separate remedies, the latter presupposing an
information sufficient in law to charge an offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on
the court where the Information is filed. As usual in matters of
discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave
abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari
to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of
power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for
bill of particulars on two grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are
best ventilated during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he
sought in his supplemental opposition to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were
evidentiary requires an examination of the elements of the offense he
is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder
are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
15
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivancesecretlywith another.91ofIt his
withmembers implies
family,
bothrelatives
knowledge
by and assent that may
either be active or passive.92redarclaw
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;

(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through Since

a combination
the crime of plunder
or series mayofbethedone
following
in connivance or in conspiracy
overt or criminal acts: with other persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile
and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with Janet
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
Lim Napoles,
funds orRonald
raids onJohn
the Lim
public
andtreasury;
John Raymund De Asis, then it is
unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the offense,
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,whether
percentage,
the ill-gotten
kickback
wealth
or amounting
any other to format least
of P172,834,500.00
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection had with been
any government
acquired by one,contract
by two
or or
project
by allorof by
the accused. In the
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each
accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
amounttoamassed,
the National acquired
Government
or accumulated
or any of itsis at least P50 million.
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
crimeof stock,
by itself
equity
but only
or any
as the
other
mode
formofofcommitting
interest the crime. Thus,
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
there is noenterprise
absolute or necessity
undertaking;
of reciting its particulars in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies orcharged.
other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
offense connection
in either of orthe
influence
following
to manner:
unjustly (1)
enrich
by use of the word
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice“conspire,”
of theorFilipino
its derivatives
people and
or synonyms,
the Republic suchofas confederate,
the Philippines; and, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,know whataccumulated
is intended, and or acquired
with suchisprecision
at leastas the nature of the
P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.] crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw

Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested
details on Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten
wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila
G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles,
Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x” expressly charges
conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer
who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x.” The term
“connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful
act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components
of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of
the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the
web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy
with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a
statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of
the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that
16
the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of
particulars for specifics sought under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official
document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year
is ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in
the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that
Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious or nonexistent projects.
Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed been
made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and
in what amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to be
reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be passed upon
at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF
allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific
particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare for his
defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these
details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be
taken by surprise during trial by the omission in the Information of his
annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been
specified or not, Enrile has been sufficiently informed that he stands
charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government organizations to
implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage
of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the
ultimate fact that the projects implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and
funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus, they are
evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with
particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would
amount to asking for evidentiary information that the latter intends to
present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the prosecution to
disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the
charges alleged in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were
(aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he allegedly
received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not
stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be
stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as John Does.
The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s reason for not
divulging the identity of these “others” who may potentially be
witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to
meet and examine the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the
prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint
or information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine them.96
Making these “others” known would in fact be equivalent to the
prosecution’s premature disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the
point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel the
prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its
case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series”
under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics
sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis
17
ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass
wealth involving at least P50 million by means of a combination or
series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply
allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at
least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth –
whether through a combination or series of overt acts under
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be
alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least
two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in Section 1,
paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public
treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government
under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of
which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or commissions
under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES
received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from
ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES,
to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly funded projects
turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun
approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly committed by
Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph
uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to
respond and prepare for his defense. These points are explained in
greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series
of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten
wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single
criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from
the congressional deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can
be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts that constitute the
“combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts
that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient
definiteness so that the accused would know what he is specifically
charged of and why he stands charged, so that he could properly
defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the
overall scheme or conspiracy must not be generally stated; they should
be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be
able to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these
alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been
repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if averred with
sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The Information should reflect with
particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of plunder, based
on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case
shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize
the transactions that would constitute the required series or
combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its
recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly
operated, thus describing its general view of the series or
combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of
18
plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or
commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been
allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously hampered.
This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s
attachment, as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the “desired
details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked
by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the
Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of
informing Enrile what these overt acts were by simply pointing to these
documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the
“combination” or “series” of transactions constituting plunder, it stands
to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park figures,
should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in
amount, and cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to
P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s right to respond after
receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very
specific sum based on a number of different acts and hence must
have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the required
specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later
given the chance to object to unalleged details, he stands to be
surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given the
opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more
than P50 Million requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the
receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare the
necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove
the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the
indictment extends from “2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of which, we
again stress that different overt acts constituting of the elements of
Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose
difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and will render
him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left guessing and
speculating which one/s from among the numerous transactions
involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered
by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile
allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles’ NGO (e.g.,
Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the
particular transactions referred to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment
is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government
agencies to implement these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for
his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile
and his co-accused, the project identification was what started the
totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project has been
identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate
government agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed
project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without the project identification,
no justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly
bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the
Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence
on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will
necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to
defend against, since he may have funded other projects with his
PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not
referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate facts.
19

D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs
are also material facts that must be specified, since they served a
necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits between
Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in
the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the
transactions, need not anymore be named in the Information, as these
are already evidentiary matters. The identification of the particular
agency vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will already
inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the
Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda
Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico
filed a motion for bill of particulars essentially alleging that the
complaint was couched in general terms and did not have the
parti-culars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal
bases. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the
particulars sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to
reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his
motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the
prosecution to prepare and file a bill of particulars. Significantly, the
Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a
specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary
in nature. The Court explained that those particulars are material facts
that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that the
defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters
are not easy to distinguish. While Tantuico was a civil case and did not
involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling nonetheless serves as a
useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable
and what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific
transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare adequately and
intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify
allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he
stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the
charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.102redarclaw
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action
or method that the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal goal. In the
alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or
methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal
goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege
that a set of acts has been repeatedly done (thereby showing a
‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the present case,
20
we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of
stating the essential or material facts of each component or predicate
act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to
mean that [w]hat the prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing
public funds on twenty different (20) occasions, the prosecution does
not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a number of these
acts of malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only
that the series or combination of transaction would amount to at least
P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions
should be averred with particularity, more so if the circumstances
surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only
way that the accused can properly prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the
details of the allegation under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x
x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several
occasions, of his official positions, authority, relationships, connections,
and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the
government? From whom and for what reason did he receive any
money or property from the government through which he “unjustly
enriched himself”? State the details from whom each amount was
received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt
act/s alleged to constitute the “combination” and “series” charged in the
Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and
commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief description of the ‘identified’
projects where kickbacks and commissions were received; the
approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions
from the identified projects; the name of Napoles’ non-government
organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies
to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it
unnecessary to require the prosecution to submit further
particulars on the allegations contained under paragraph (b) of
the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the
combination or series required by the crime of plunder, coupled with a
specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above, already
answer the question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his
position, authority, relationships, connections and influence as Senator
to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely
for public purposes. Since the Information stated that Enrile, as
“Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation to his office,” by
“repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or
her representatives through projects funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF,
then it already alleged how undue advantage had been taken and how
the Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced. These points
are fairly deducible from the allegations in the Information as
supplemented by the required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized
or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation
supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that
21
must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare
his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted through
each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary
determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary
fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired
details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning
ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we put
on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents
what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is
precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to
positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s
resolution (which found probable cause to indict the petitioner and his
co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also for violations of
several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his
argument that Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his
motion for a bill of particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive
position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was
ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper
plea and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being
repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal cases is
to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not
amount to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise
by restricting the scope of the proof;106it limits the evidence to be
presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information
as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an
accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to
object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted
under an information of more or less general terms which sufficiently
charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the
written account of the inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined
the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a person for a particular
crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule,
does not even form part of the records of the case.107 These features
of the record of investigation are significantly different from the bill of
particulars that serves as basis, together with the Information, in
specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused
pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate
criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web
out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the
various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes
that reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the
separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous
transactions and schemes that span a period of time. Naturally, in its
prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of proving a
predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the
Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition,
in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of
the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the
nature of an action from an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause
of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases is designed to achieve the same purpose
as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact, certainty, to a
reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil
and criminal, and is more especially needed in the latter where
conviction is followed by penal consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not
mean that it is unnecessary to allege such facts in connection with the
commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused on full
notice of what he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record
as will effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for that identical
offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
22
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not
less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in
the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of
those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the
administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork. The name of the
game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish
where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one
arm tied to his back.”
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty.
Estelito Mendoza did not previously find vague the Information for
plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt
act that constituted the series or combination and corresponding to the
predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with sufficient
particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction
was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following
matters had been averred with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate
acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the breakdown of how the
alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived
at; the participants involved in each transaction; and the specific
sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the
indictment of President Estrada via a motion for bill of particulars does
not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder filed
against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds
previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars were identical. He
argues, however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not
be a ground for the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the
context in which those questions were raised was entirely
different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill
of particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the
enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition
to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and
in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from
the prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state
a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he
alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits
that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and
lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare
his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its
failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile;
while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars)
are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations
in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions
and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless
specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in
the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting
for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is
alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating
the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may
still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and
prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds
invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his motion for bill of
particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his
arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar
23
Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge
to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge
determines whether the necessity exists to place the accused under
immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the
accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to better inform himself of
the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that had not
been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes
of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or
omissions in relation with the crime charged, to limit the matters and
the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed to use
against him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the
charges head on and timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility
may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused, is
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the
Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare his defense. While the grounds
cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are submitted for
different purposes and should be appreciated from different
perspectives, so that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does
not necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other. Thus, the
resolution of the issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from
seeking a more detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely
abused its discretion: it used wrong and completely inapplicable
considerations to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET
ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which
denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for
reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision,
with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts
sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of
particulars shall specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination
or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or
commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state
the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
24
G.R. No. 214497
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA,, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the May 29, 2014 Decision1 and September
15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
35509.3 The challenged rulings sustained the petitioner's conviction4 of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b ), Article III of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610.5
The Information reads:6
AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby
accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as
EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed
as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas,
Ligao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA],7 a minor of 7
years old and mash her vagina, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW
The Facts
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the Decision of the CA,
are as follows: 8
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest
among the children of XXX and YYY. XXX worked as a household
helper in Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who derived
income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC,
were then staying with YYY in Palapas, Ligao City.
On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the
ducks of AAA's grandfather. He lived with AAA's grandparents whose
house was just a few meters away from YYY's house.
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of
the house to buy kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY
was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's
grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her
siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her
siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when she felt
Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel
inserting his right hand inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel
caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he
was doing in his house. Quimvel replied that he was just
accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children went
back to sleep.
On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening
while XXX was lying down with her children, she asked them what they
were doing while she was away. BBB told her that Quimvel touched
her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she
recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her and touched her vagina.
25
Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay
Tanod and thereafter to the police station to report the incident.
Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination.
As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He
maintained that he brought the ducks of AAA' s grandmother to the
river at 7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it back at AAA's
grandmother's place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007.
After that, he rested. He said that he never went to AAA's house that
evening. When YYY confronted and accused him of touching AAA, he
was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he was
still detained at the Barangay Hall. He was then brought to the police
station for interrogation. Eventually, he was allowed to go home. He did
not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any untoward
incidents.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Lending credence to AAA' s straightforward and categorical testimony,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11 in Ligao City, Albay, on
January 23, 2013, rendered its Judgment9 finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of the judgment reads: 10
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Finding the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a.
EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMUEL Y BRAGA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and thereby sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its
medium period as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, SIX (6)
MONTHS and NINETEEN (19) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal in its
medium period as maximum; and
2. ORDERING the accused, EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA a.k.a.
EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMUEL Y BRAGA, to pay the victim the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and to pay a fine in the
amount of ₱30,000.00.
In the service of his sentence, accused EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y
BRAGA a.k.a. EDWARD/ EDUARDO QUIMVEL Y BRAGA shall be
credited with the period of his preventive detention pursuant to Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
Thereafter, petitioner lodged an appeal with the CA but to no avail. For
on May 29, 2014, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming, with
modification, the Judgment of the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the Decision provides: 11
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal
Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD
QUIMVEL y BRAGA is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA moral
damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of ₱15,000.00
each as well as ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages shall earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Aggrieved, Quimvel elevated his case to this Court and raised the
following issues for resolution:
I.
The CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court as the
prosecution was not able to prove that he is guilty of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
II.
26
Assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be
convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the CA's Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5
(b) of RA 7610.
The Information charged the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec.
5(b) of RA 7610
Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of
Acts of Lasciviousness, he should only be held liable for the crime as
penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610. According to him, to
be held liable under the latter law, it is necessary that the victim is
involved in or subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that
the failure to allege such element constituted a violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of
accusation against him. 12
His argument fails to persuade.
i. The acts constituting the offense must
be alleged in the Information
It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information before an
accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and
parcel of the rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III,
Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Sections 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, in turn, pertinently provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.-A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. (emphasis
added)
Jurisprudence has already set the standard on how the requirement is
to be satisfied. Case law dictates that the allegations in the Information
must be in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and
enable the court to know ' the proper judgment. The Information must
allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. The
facts and circumstances necessary to be included therein are
determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes. 14
The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in
the Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts
constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and the right of
an accused to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the
information cannot be waived. 15 As further explained in Andaya v.
People: 16
No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be,
an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in
the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein.
To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in
the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the
criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so
much so that it affects his substantial rights. (emphasis added)
Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts
embodied in the Information as constituting the offense rather than on
the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an investigating
prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the
offense by its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature
and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or
preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to
27
have been violated, being conclusions of law. 17 It then behooves this
Court to place the text of the Information under scrutiny.
ii. The elements of the offense penalized
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 were
sufficiently alleged in the Information
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the Information is deficient
for failure to allege all the elements necessary in committing Acts of
Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 9160.
His theory is that the Information only charges him of the crime as
punished under Art. 336 of the RPC, which pertinently reads:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.-Any person who shall commit any act
of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.
Conviction thereunder requires that the prosecution establish the
following elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: 18
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconsc10us;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
On the other hand, the prosecution endeavored to prove petitioner's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for child abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610, which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period; x x x (emphasis added)
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as
penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC earlier enumerated must be met
in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610, which are as follows: 19
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age. 20 (emphasis supplied)
28
Hypothetically admitting the elements of Art. 336 of the RPC, as well
as the first and third elements under RA 7610 -that a lascivious act was
committed against AAA who at that time was below twelve (12) years
old - petitioner nevertheless contends that the second additional
element, requiring that the victim is a child "exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse, " is absent in this case.
The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the
element that the victim is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse" should be alleged in the Information.
Guilty of reiteration, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby
accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as
EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas,
Ligao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], 21
a minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 22 (emphasis added)
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the
victim as one "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5
of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group.23
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or
connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily
for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is
abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.24 Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also
other forms of sexual abuse against children. This is even made
clearer by the deliberations of the Senate, as cited in the landmark
ruling of People v. Larin:25
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, 'who for money or profit.' I would
like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the minor
may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations
and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY,
PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the
subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we
are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual purposes
either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the
other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child
being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or
profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where
the child may not have been used for profit or...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because
the essence of prostitution is profit.
29
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading
ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is a
form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the
Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr.
President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR
MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing
none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, 'Child Prostitution,' shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any
objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Clear from the records of the deliberation is that the original wording of
Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has been expanded so as to cover abuses that are
not characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at bar,
the abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope
as there was no allegation of consideration or profit in exchange for
sexual favor. As stated in the Information, petitioner committed
lascivious conduct through the use of ''force" and "intimidation."
iii. "Force and intimidation" is
subsumed under "coercion and
influence "
The term "coercionandinfluence" as appearing in the law is broad
enough to cover ''force and intimidation" as used in the Information. To
be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as
"compulsion; force; duress " 26 while "[undue] influence" is defined
as ''persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will. " 27 On the
other hand, ''force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength
directed to an end " 28 while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as
"unlawfulcoercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. " 29 As can be
gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no
moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7 610 and by the
Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt
as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v.
People30 that:
x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section
2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse
involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms.
It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion
of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or
trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use
of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one
who wields it." (emphasis added)
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion
of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
With the foregoing, the Court need not burden itself with nitpicking and
splitting hairs by making a distinction between these similar, if not
identical, words employed, and make a mountain out of a mole hill.
30
It is not necessary that the description of the crime, as worded in the
penal provision allegedly violated, be reproduced verbatim in the
accusatory portion of the Information before the accused can be
convicted thereunder. Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is
relevant on this point:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
The Court has held in a catena of cases 31 that the rule is satisfied
when the crime "is described in intelligible terms with such particularity
as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense
charged." Furthermore, "[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient " Hence, the exact phrase "exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other abuse" need not be mentioned in the Information.
Even the words "coercion or influence" need not specifically appear.
Thus, the Court, in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,32 has similarly
sustained the conviction of therein petitioner Isidro Olivarez (Olivarez)
for violating Sec. 5, RA 7610. The Information indicting Olivarez of the
offense read:
The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of Laguna
upon a sworn complaint filed by the private complainant, [AAA], hereby
accuses ISIDRO OLIY AREZ of the crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610,
committed as follows:
That on or about July 20, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously by means of force and intimidation commit acts of
lasciviousness on the person of one [AAA], by touching her breasts
and kissing her lips, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (emphasis added)
Conspicuously enough, the Information in Olivarez is couched in a
similar fashion as the Information in the extant case. The absence of
the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse" or even the specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was
never a bar for the Court to uphold the finding of guilt against an
accused for violation of RA 7610. Just as the Court held that it was
enough for the Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense
was committed by means of "force and intimidation," the Court must
also rule that the Information in the case at bench does not suffer from
the alleged infirmity.
So too did the Court find no impediment in People v. Abadies,33 Malta
v. People,[[34]] People v. Ching, 35 People v. Bonaagua,36 and Caballo
v. People37 to convict the accused therein for violation of Sec. 5, RA
7610 notwithstanding the non-mention in the Information of "coercion,"
"influence," or "exploited in prostitution or subject to other abuse."
The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the
designation of the offense as appearing in the Information. The
designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of
the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative
to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to
prepare his defense accordingly. 38 Its import is underscored in this
case where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
In Malto v. People,39 therein accused Michael John Z. Malto (Malto)
was charged for violation of RA 7610 in the following wise:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN
Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5[b], ARTICLE III,
REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997
up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence,
31
relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years
old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for
several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law. (emphasis and words in brackets added)
Interestingly, the acts constitutive of the offense, as alleged in the
Information, could make out a case for violation of either Sec. 5(b) of
RA 7610 or Rape under the RPC.40 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed
the finding that Malto is criminally liable for violation of RA 7610, and
not for Rape.
The Court is not unmindful of its pronouncements in People v.
Abello(Abello)41 and Cabila v. People (Cabila)42 that the second element
must specifically be alleged in the Information and thereafter proved.-
However, these rulings cannot support petitioner's prayer that he be
convicted under Art. 336 of the RPC instead of under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610.
To begin with, the factual milieu of Abello significantly differs with that
in the case at bar. Our refusal to convict therein accused Heracleo
Abello was premised on the the fact that his victim cannot be
considered as a "child" within the purview of RA 7610. 43 The victim
in Abello, was 21 years of age when the offense was committed.
Although she had polio, the prosecution failed to substantiate through
evidence that the victim's physical condition rendered her incapable of
fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual
abuse. 44 Hence, Abello was only convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the RPC.
Cabila, on the other hand, is a stray division case that has seemingly
been overturned by the Court's recent en bancruling in Dimakuta v.
People (Dimakuta). 45 The latter case attempted to punctuate the
discussion on the issue at hand, but fell short as the conviction therein
for violation of Art. 336 of the RPC had already attained finality.
Instead, what the Court en bane was confronted with in Dimakuta, the
bone of contention that remained, was whether or not an accused is
disqualified to apply for probation even if such appeal resulted in the
reduction of the non-probationable penalty imposed to a probationable
one. The Court, therefore, deems it more appropriate here to
categorically abandon our ruling in Cabila.
Neither can petitioner buttress his claim by citing the dissent in the
2005 case of Olivarez v. CA46 wherein it was expounded thus:
The first element refers to the acts of lasciviousness that the accused
performs on the child. The second element refers to the special
circumstance that the child (is) exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse. This special circumstance already exists when the
accused performs acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts
of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child are separate
and different from the child's exploitation in prostitution or subjection
to "other sexual abuse."
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of
lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor
subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA
7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who
is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of
lasciviousness are committed on a child already either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of
lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from
the other circumstance that the child is either exploited in prostitution or
subjected to "other sexual abuse." (emphasis supplied)
Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child
abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim
suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the
act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b)
of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual
abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior
sexual affront.
iv. There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to
other abuse
32
The intervention by a third person is not necessary to convict an
accused under Sec. 5 of RA 7610. As regards paragraph (a), a child
may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct regardless of
whether or not a "bugaw " is present. Although the presence of an
offeror or a pimp is the typical set up in prostitution rings, this does not
foreclose the possibility of a child voluntarily submitting himself or
herself to another's lewd design for consideration, monetary or
otherwise, without third person intervention. Needless to say, the child,
would still be under the protection of the law, and the offender, in such
a situation, could still be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 5(a)
of RA 7610.
The Senate deliberations made clear, though, that other forms of
sexual abuse, not just prostitution, are within the extended coverage of
RA 7610. The offense is even penalized under the same prov1s1on as
prostitution-Sec. 5 of the law. Both offenses must then be dealt with
under the same parameters, in spite of the differences in their
elements. Thus, concomitant with the earlier postulation, just as the
participation of a third person is not necessary to commit the crime of
prostitution, so too is the circumstance unessential in charging one for
other sexual abuse.
It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed the
coercion or influence to subdue the will of the child for the latter to
submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted under paragraph
(b). Sec. 5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be
committed by "any adult, syndicate or group, " without
qualification. 47 The clear language of the special law, therefore, does
not preclude the prosecution of lascivious conduct performed by the
same person who subdued the child through coercion or influence.
This is, in fact, the more common scenario of abuse that reaches this
Court and it would be an embarrassment for us to rule that such
instances are outside the ambit Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
It is as my esteemed colleagues Associate Justices Diosdado M.
Peralta and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe reminded the Court. Ratio legis
est anima. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. In this case, the
law would have miserably failed in fulfilling its lofty purpose 48 of
providing special protection to children from all forms of abuse if the
Court were to interpret its penal provisions so as to require the
additional element of a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is
different from what is complained of, and if the Court were to require
that a third person act in concert with the accused.
The RTC and CA did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
Well-settled is the rule that, absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.49 This is so because the
observance of the deportment and demeanor of witnesses are within
the exclusive domain of the trial courts. Thus, considering their unique
vantage point, trial courts are in the best position to assess and
evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and their
testimonies. 50
In the case at bar, the R TC held that the prosecution duly established
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through AAA' s
straightforward testimony. The trial court observed that when AAA
testified, she was able to steadily recount Quimvel's immodest acts, as
follows:
Q Okay. On the same date, where was your mother, if you know?
A During that time, my mother was in Batangas, she being a household
helper.
Q Alright. How about your father, where was he on July 18, 2007, at
more or less 8: 00 o'clock in the evening?
A He was on duty at Palapas, Ligao City.
Q Okay. What was your father's job?
A He was on duty, since he was a Barangay Tanod.
Q Okay. Now, on that date and time, where were you, if you recall?
A I was in our house. Q Who were with you inside your house?
33
A I was with my two (2) siblings.
Q Okay. Now, what happened while you and your siblings were there
inside your house on that date and time?
A Eduardo went to our house with a viand vegetable for us.
Q Okay. Who is this Eduardo that you are referring to?
A He is the helper of my grandfather.
Q Okay. If you know, why was he bringing you then a viand?
A He was sent by our Lolo to bring the viand for us.
Q Alright. When he brought the viand to you, what did you say, if any?
A I told him to accompany us in our house because we are afraid.
Q Okay. What did he say, if any, when you told him that?
A He told me, it's alright.
Q Okay. So, what did you do after he told you that?
A After that, I went to sleep.
Q How about your brother or sister, what did they do also?
A They too went to sleep.
Q And then what happened, if you recall?
A Since his leg was placed over my body. I was awaken[ed] because
from that, he was also inserting his hand inside my panty.
Q Alright. Now, could you tell us which leg was it that he placed on top
of your body?
A His right leg(,) ma' am.
Q Okay. Now, you've mentioned that he inserted his hand inside your
panty, do you recall what you were wearing at that time?
A I was wearing shorts and panty.
Q Alright. How about on the upper portion of your body, what were you
wearing then?
A I was wearing a blouse, like what I am wearing now. (Witness
pointing to her blouse)
Q Alright. And you mentioned that he inserted his hand on your panty,
which hand did he use?
A His right hand.
Q Alright. And after inserting his hand inside your panty, what did he do
with it?
A After inserting his hand inside my panty, he rubbed my vagina.
(Witness is demonstrating by rubbing her left hand with her right hand.)
Q Now, could you tell us for how long did Eduardo rubbed or caressed
your vagina? (sic)
A Maybe it took for about five (5) minutes.
Q Do you know how long is a minute?
A I do not know(,) ma'am.
Q Now, if you are going to count one (1) to ten (10), each count would
be equivalent to one (1) second and if you have counted for ten (10),
on what number would you reach to approximate the time wherein
Eduardo caressed your vagina?
A It could be thirty (30) minutes.
COURT
34
Maybe she did not understand it.
PROS. CRUZ
Q Alright. Now, he (sic) took a long time for the accused to caress your
vagina, is that what you are trying to tell this Honorable Court?
A Yes(,) ma'am.
Q And what did you do when he was caressing your vagina for that
long?
A I removed his hand from inside my panty. 51
The foregoing testimonial account demonstrates that all the elements
of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, as
earlier enumerated, are present. 1âwphi1
Let us not forget the circumstances of this case, not only was the
offense committed against a child under twelve (12) years of age, it
was committed when the victim was unconscious, fast asleep in the
dead of the night. AAA, then a minor of seven (7) years, was awoken
by the weight of petitioner's leg on top of her and of his hand sliding
inside her undergarment. His hand proceeded to caress her
womanhood, which harrowing experience of a traumatic torment only
came to a halt when she managed to prevent his hand from further
touching her private parts.
As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is
deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child engages in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. 52 Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient
that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the
free exercise of the will of the offended party. 53 The law does not
require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or
ascendancy is sufficient. 54
The petitioner's proposition-that there is not even an iota of proof of
force or intimidation as AAA was asleep when the offense was
committed and, hence, he cannot be prosecuted under RA 7610-is
bereft of merit. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12)
years old, mere moral ascendancy will suffice.
Here, AAA was a child at the tender age of seven (7) when the offense
was committed. She was residing with her father in Palagas, Ligao
City, Albay while her mother works as a household helper in Batangas.
Her father, however, is out of the house most of the time, working two
jobs as a vendor and barangay tanod. Petitioner, on the other hand,
was known to the victim and her siblings as the caretaker of their
grandmother's ducks. Thus, when petitioner brought some vegetable
viand to the victim's house at the day the crime was committed; he was
requested by the children to stay with them because they were afraid.
AAA entrusted to petitioner her safety and that of her siblings, only to
be betrayed. In this situation, the Court finds that because of the
relative seniority of petitioner and the trust reposed in him, petitioner
abused the full reliance of AAA and misused his ascendancy over the
victim. These circumstances can be equated with "intimidation" or
"influence" exerted by an adult, covered by Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. Ergo,
the element of being subjected to sexual abuse is met.
That AAA is a child of tender years does not detract from the weight
and credibility of her testimony. On the contrary, even more credence
is given to witnesses who were able to candidly relay their testimony
before the trial courts under such circumstance. The child's willingness
to undergo , the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent
testament to the truth of her complaint. 55
In stark contrast, Quimvel' s defense-that he did not go to AAA' s
house on the alleged time of the incident as he was busy watching
over the ducks of AAA's grandmother at the latter's house56 -deserves
scant consideration. Jurisprudence is replete of cases holding that
denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against
positive identification. 57 A categorical and consistent positive
identification which is not accompanied by ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness prevails over mere denial. Such denial, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. It cannot be given a greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters. 58
35
For his alibi to prosper, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that
he was somewhere else when the offense was committed, and that he
was so far away it would have been impossible for him to be physically
present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time
of the commission. 59 But in his version of the events, petitioner failed to
prove the element of physical impossibility since the house of AAA' s
grandmother, where he claimed to be at that time, is only 150 meters,
more or less, from AAA's house. His alibi, therefore, cannot be
considered exculpatory.
Article 336 of the RPC was never repealed by RA 8353
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) posits that
Art. 336 of the RPC has allegedly been rendered incomplete and
ineffective by RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape law. The
good justice brings our attention to Sec. 460 of the special law, which
clause expressly repealed Art. 335 of the RPC. And since the second
element of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC is
sourced from Art. 335 of the same code,61 it is then Justice Leonen's
theory that Acts of Lasciviousness ceased to be a crime under the
RPC following Art. 335's express repeal.
We respectfully disagree.
Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if
it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done
so. Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified,
1âwphi1
or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders,
administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]."
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory
provisions that are inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere
amendment or modification would suffice to reconcile the
inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case,
Art. 335 of the RPC,62 which previously penalized rape through carnal
knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A. 63 Thus, the reference by
Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the
erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now
refer to the circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the
Anti-Rape Law.
We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor
repeals by implication for laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The
failure to particularly mention the law allegedly repealed indicates that
the , intent was not to repeal the said law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.64 Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision
other than Art. 335 as having been amended, modified, or repealed.
And as demonstrated, the Anti Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art.
336 of the RPC, on the other, are not irreconcilable. The only
construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding article" is that
Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the
repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of
Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered
inoperative by the Anti-Rape Law and argue in the same breath the
applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. The latter provision reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - x x x
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x (emphasis added)
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged
incompleteness, then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective
since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference to
the RPC provision.
36
The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per
Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA
7610 and RA 9262,65 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Law (Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA 7610,
only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated forms of
abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VA WC law limits the victims of
sexual abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women
with whom the offender has had a dating or sexual relationship, or
against her child. 66 Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection
against sexual offenders who do not discriminate in selecting their
victims. One does not have to be a child before he or she can be
victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a woman
with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey.
Anyone can be a victim of another's lewd design. And if the Court will
subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of
our demographics (i.e. adult females who had no prior relationship to
the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual abuses.
The RTC and the CA imposed the proper prison term
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Sec. 5 of RA 7610 provides
that the penalty for lascivious conduct, when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period,
which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months.67
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103,68 otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is
ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum
prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. 69 Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in
the landmark ruling of People v. Simon 70 that the situation is different
where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty
therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under
such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties
native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.
Thus, in People v. Santos (Santos),71 which similarly involved charges
for Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the Court
applied the ISL and adjusted the prison term meted to the accused-
appellant therein.
In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court
held that the maximum term of the sentence to be imposed shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, which ranges from fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9)
days. On the other hand the minimum term shall be taken from the
penalty next lower to reclusion temporal medium,that is reclusion
temporal minimum, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the prison term meted to
petitioner (i.e. fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as minimum to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and nineteen (19) days of reclusion temporal in
its medium period) must be modified to be in consonance with the
Court's ruling in Santos. Accordingly, the minimum prison term shall be
reduced to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, while the maximum term
shall be adjusted to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 35509 finding petitioner Eduardo
Quimvel y Braga also known as Eduardo/Edward Quimuel y Braga
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 23 January 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Ligao City Branch 11, in Criminal
Case No. 5530, is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDUARDO/ EDWARD
QUIMUEL y BRAGA is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as minimum to fifteen (15) years. six (6)
months. and twenty-one(21) days of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA,
moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of
P15,000.00 each as well as P20,000.00 as civil indemnity. All damages
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED
37

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH
DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
[G.R. Nos. 210141-42]
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH
DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition
of cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a
preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against
the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a
reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his
or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so
could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction1 assailing the Resolutions dated
September 12, 20122 and January 15, 20133 of the Sandiganbayan.
The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's (Cagang)
Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.
G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for
Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction4 assailing the
June 18, 2013 Order5 and September 10, 2013 Resolution6 of the
Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion to
Quash Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and
SB-11-CRM-0457.
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the
Informations and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of
the Ombudsman's alleged inordinate delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation.
On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an
anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann
Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani
Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given
as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as
"dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and
referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news
report of Sun Star Davao dated August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from
Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also docketed as CPL-M-03-0729
for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.7
On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit
report finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled millions in public
funds by sourcing out the funds from grants, aid, and the Countrywide
Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy
cooperatives and people's organizations.8 In particular, the
Commission on Audit found that:
(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for non-
governmental organizations/people's organizations and local
government units that were fraudulently and illegally made
through inexistent local development projects, resulting in a loss
of P16,106,613.00;
(2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials
and members were government personnel or relatives of
officials of Sarangani, which resulted in the wastage and misuse
38

of government funds amounting to P2,456,481.00;
(3) There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and
frequent travels of the employees of the Vice Governor's Office,
which resulted in the incurrence by the province of unnecessary
fuel and oil expense amounting to P83,212.34; and
(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers
affected by calamities, which resulted in wastage and misuse of
government funds amounting to P4,000,000.00.9
On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Order terminating Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and CPL-M-03-0729. It
concurred with the findings of the Commission on Audit and
recommended that a criminal case for Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 be filed against the public officers named by
the Commission on Audit in its Summary of Persons that Could be
Held Liable on the Irregularities. The list involved 180 accused.10 The
case was docketed as OMB-M-C-0487-J.
After considering the number of accused involved, its limited
resources, and the volumes of case records, the Office of the
Ombudsman first had to identify those accused who appeared to be
the most responsible, with the intention to later on file separate cases
for the others.11
In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to
file their counter-affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The
complainants were also given time to file their replies to the counter-
affidavits. There was delay in the release of the order since the
reproduction of the voluminous case record to be furnished to the
parties "was subjected to bidding and request of funds from the Central
Office."12 Only five (5) sets of reproductions were released on
November 20, 2003 while the rest were released only on January 15,
2004.13
All impleaded elective officials and some of the impleaded appointive
officials filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunction with Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Branch
28, Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani. The Regional Trial Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Office of the
Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003 Joint Order.14
In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the Petition on the ground that the officials had filed another
similar Petition with this Court, which this Court had dismissed.15 Thus,
some of the accused filed their counter-affidavits.16
After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a considerable
period of time," it issued another Order directing the accused who had
not yet filed their counter-affidavits to file them within seven (7) days or
they will be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on
their behalf.17
In a 293-page Resolution18 dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C-0487-
J, the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Governor Miguel
D. Escobar, Vice Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and
several employees of the Office of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and
the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019.19 Then Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo
(Tanodbayan Marcelo) approved the Resolution, noting that it was
modified by his Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004.20
In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan
Marcelo ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigations on
some of the other accused in the case. Thus, a preliminary
investigation docketed as OMB-M-C-0480-K was conducted on
accused Hadji Moner Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra Macagcalat
(Macagcalat).21
In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information
dated July 12, 2005, charging Miguel Draculan Escobar (Escobar),
Margie Purisima Rudes (Rudes), Perla Cabilin Maglinte (Maglinte),
Maria Deposo Camanay (Camanay), and Cagang of Malversation of
39
Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents.22 The Information
read:
That on July 17, 2002 or prior subsequent thereto in Sarangani,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Miguel Draculan Escobar, being the Governor of the Province of
Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes, Board Member, Perla Cabilin
Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Maria Deposo Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, and Cesar Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, and all
high ranking and accountable public officials of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani by reason of their duties, conspiring and
confederating with one another, while committing the offense in relation
to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and
misappropriate the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public
funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by
falsifying or causing to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 101-
2002-7-10376 and its supporting documents, making it appear that
financial assistance has been sought by Amon Lacungam, the alleged
President of Kalalong Fishermen's Group of Brgy. Kalaong, Maitum,
Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that
no financial assistance had been requested by Amon Lacungan and
his association, nor did said Amon Lacungan and his association
receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of
the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) through the
encashment by the accused of Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) Check No. 11521401 dated July 17, 2002, which amount they
subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and
despite demand, said accused failed to return the said amount to the
damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest in the
aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.23
The Sandiganbayan docketed the case as Crim. Case No. 28331.
Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang were arraigned on December 6, 2005
where they pleaded not guilty. Rudes and Camanay remained at
large.24
On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision25 in Crim.
Case No. 28331 acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for
insufficiency of evidence. Maglinte, however, was ordered to return
P100,000.00 with legal interest to the Province of Sarangani. The
cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the
Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over their persons.26
In a Memorandum27 dated August 8, 2011 addressed to Ombudsman
Conchita Carpio Morales (Ombudsman Carpio Morales), Assistant
Special Prosecutor III Pilarita T. Lapitan reported that on April 12,
2005, a Resolution28 was issued in OMB-M-C-0480-K finding probable
cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019.29 Thus, it prayed for the approval of the attached
Informations:
It should be noted that in a Memorandum dated 10 December 2004
and relative to OMB-M-C-03-0487-J from which OMB-M-C-04-0480-K
originated, Assistant Special Prosecutor Maria Janina Hidalgo
recommended to Ombudsman Marcelo that the status of state witness
be conferred upon Gadian. This recommendation was approved by
Ombudsman Marcelo on 20 December 2004. Hence, as may be
noted[,] Gadian was no longer included as respondent and accused in
the Resolution dated 12 April 2005 and the attached Information.
Related cases that originated from OMB-M-C-03-0487-J for which no
further preliminary investigation is necessary were filed before the
courts. One of these cases is now docketed as Criminal Case No.
28293 and pending before the Sandiganbayan, First Division. It is
noteworthy that in its Order dated 14 November 2006 the
Sandiganbayan, First Division granted the Motion to Dismiss of the
counsel of Felipe Constantino after having submitted a duly certified
true copy of his clients Death Certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office. Considering the fact therefore, there is a necessity to
drop Constantino as accused in this case and accordingly, revised the
attached Information.
An Information for Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents is also submitted for your Honor's approval considering
that no such Information is attached to the records of this case.
VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, it is respectfully recommended
that, in view of his death, Felipe Constantino no longer be considered
as accused in this case and that the attached Informations be
approved.30
40
Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation on
October 20, 2011.31 Thus, on November 17, 2011, Informations32 for
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents were filed
against Cagang, Camanay, Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta
(Zoleta), Macagcalat, and Mangalen. The Informations read:
[For Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019]
That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Provincial Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG,
Provincial Accountant MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive
Assistant to Vice Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA
CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and
now deceased Felipe Katu Constantino, all of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani, committing the offense in relation to the
perfom1ance of their duties and functions, taking advantage of their
respective official positions, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring and confederating
with Barangay Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and HADJI
MONER MANGALEN, the alleged President and Treasurer,
respectively of Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's Cooperative
("Cooperative"), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the disbursement of the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) under SARO No. D-98000987 through
Development Bank of the Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20
September 2002 and with HADJI MONER MANGELEN as payee
thereof, by falsifying Disbursement Voucher No. 401-200209-148
dated 20 September 2002 and its supporting documents to make it
appear that financial assistance was requested and given to the
Cooperative, when in truth and in fact, neither was there a request for
financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after the check
was encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, did then and there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate
and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said amount of
P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[For Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public
Documents]
That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Provincial Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, and
now deceased Felipe Katu Constantino, being then the Provincial
Treasurer and Vice-Governor respectively, of the Province of
Sarangani who, by reason of their public positions, are accountable for
and has control of public funds entrusted and received by them during
their incumbency as Provincial Treasurer and Vice-Governor
respectively, of said province, with accused Provincial Accountant
MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice
Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA CARMELA
CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and now deceased
Felipe Katu Constantino, all of the Provincial Government of
Sarangani, committing the offense in relation to the performance of
their duties and functions, taking advantage of their respective official
positions, conspiring and confederating with Barangay Captain
UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and HADJI MONER MANGALEN, the
alleged President and Treasurer, respectively of Kamanga Muslim-
Christian Fishermen's Cooperative ("Cooperative"), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified
Disbursement Voucher No. 401-200209-148 dated 20 September 2002
and its supporting documents, by making it appear that financial
assistance in the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P350,000.00) had been requested by the Cooperative, with CESAR
MATAS CAGANG, despite knowledge that the amount of P350,000.00
is to be sourced out from SARO No. D-98000987, still certifying that
cash is available for financial assistance when Countrywide
Development Funds could not be disbursed for financial aids and
assistance pursuant to DBM Circular No. 444, and MARIA DEPOSO
CAMANAY certifying as to the completeness and propriety of the
supporting documents despite non-compliance with Commission on
Audit Circular No. 96-003 prescribing the requirements for
disbursements of financial assistance and aids, thus facilitating the
issuance of Development Bank of the Philippines Check No. 282398
dated 20 September 2002 in the amount of P350,000.00 and in the
name of HADJI MONER MANGELEN, the alleged Treasurer of the
Cooperative, when in truth and in fact, neither was there a request for
financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after the check
was encashed, as herein accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, did then and there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate
and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said amount of
41
P350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the government in the
aforesaid amount.
33
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-0456 and SB-
11-0457.
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set
Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed
their own Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside
Order of Arrest. Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of
seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations. Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan34 and Roque v. Ombudsman,35 he argued that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases.36 The Office of the Ombudsman, on the other
hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that the accused have not
yet submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and that there
was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious,
whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.37
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution38 denying the Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that
Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions.39 It also found that
there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct
participation in more or less 81 different transactions.40 It likewise
found Tatad and Roque inapplicable since the filing of the Informations
was not politically motivated.41 It pointed out that the accused did not
invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman but only did so after the filing of the Informations.42
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration43 but it was denied in a
Resolution44 dated January 15, 2013. Hence, Cagang filed a Petition
for Certiorari45 with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 206438 and
206458.46
In an Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest47 dated June 13, 2013
filed before the Sandiganbayan, Cagang alleged that an Order of
Arrest was issued against him.48 He moved for the quashal of the
Order on the ground that he had a pending Petition for Certiorari before
this Court.49
In an Order50 dated June 28, 2013, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground that it failed to
comply with the three (3)-day notice rule and that no temporary
restraining order was issued by this Court.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration51 but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution52 dated September 10, 2013. Hence,
he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction,53essentially seeking to restrain the implementation of the
Order of Arrest against him. This Petition was docketed as G.R. Nos.
210141-42.
On February 5, 2014, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order54 in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
continuing with the proceedings of the case and from implementing the
warrant of arrest against Cagang. This Court likewise consolidated
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 with G.R. Nos. 210141-42.55 The Office
of the Special Prosecutor submitted its separate Comments56 to the
Petitions on behalf of the People of the Philippines and the Office of
the Ombudsman.57
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the
Informations filed against him violated his constitutional rights to due
process and to speedy disposition of cases. Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,58 he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman lost its
jurisdiction to file the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating
the preliminary investigation almost seven (7) years after the filing of
the complaint.59
Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate
delay is not because the revival of the cases was politically motivated,
as in Tatad, but because it violates Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution60 and Rule 112, Section 3(f)61 of the Rules of Court.62 He
points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2) instances of
delay by the Office of the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of
the complaint on February 10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on
November 17, 2011, and the second was from the conclusion of the
42
preliminary investigation in 2005 to the filing of the Informations on
November 17, 2011.63
Petitioner asserts that the alleged anomalous transactions in this case
were already thoroughly investigated by the Commission on Audit in its
Audit Report; thus, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have
taken more than seven (7) years to study the evidence needed to
establish probable cause.64 He contends that "[w]hen the Constitution
enjoins the Office of the Ombudsman to 'act promptly' on any
complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the
concomitant duty to speedily resolve the same."65
Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan should have
granted his Motion to Quash Order of Arrest since there was a pending
Petition before this Court questioning the issuance of the Informations
against him. He argues that the case would become moot if the Order
of Arrest is not quashed.66
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, alleges that
petitioner, along with his co-accused Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat,
and Magalen have remained at large and cannot be located by the
police, and that they have not yet surrendered or been arrested.67 It
argues that the parameters necessary to determine whether there was
inordinate delay have been repeatedly explained by the
Sandiganbayan in the assailed Resolutions. It likewise points out that
petitioner should have invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases
when the case was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman,
not when the Information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan. It
argues further that Tatad was inapplicable since there were peculiar
circumstances which prompted this Court to dismiss the information
due to inordinate delay.68
The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan
already made a judicial determination of the existence of probable
cause pursuant to its duty under Rule 112, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.69 It points out that a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and that the
appropriate remedy should be to proceed to trial.70
Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the
pendency of a petition for certiorari with this Court suspends the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, and whether or not the denial
of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. This
Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive issue of whether or
not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer
to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash
Order of Arrest on the ground of inordinate delay.
I
To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass
upon the procedural issues raised by the parties.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for
certiorari before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction. Under Rule 65, Section 771 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in
which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent
from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to
proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge.
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R.
Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be
faulted from proceeding with trial. It was only upon the filing of the
Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as
it is merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition
43
for certiorari. The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the
appeal of a judgment of conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy
remedy is to proceed to trial and to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones:72
...In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed
by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of
conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is
appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash
not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added
ground to overturn the latter's ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and
is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed
under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy
remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory
order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.73
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the
commencement of the process leading to trial. The denial of a motion
to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused.
During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the
presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and the
reception by the court. Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately
given the opportunity to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if
the case is intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of the
accused and all his suffering due to the charges can be most speedily
acquired.
The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the
immediate procurement of substantive justice. In our general
interpretation, therefore, the accused is normally invited to meet the
prosecution's evidence squarely during trial rather than skirmish on
procedural points.
A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if
the party can establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception
rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly
grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the
interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice;" the promotion
of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof;" or judgments on order attended by grave abuse
of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or
order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the
attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited
instances.74
Petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied his Motion to Quash/Dismiss, insisting that
the denial transgressed upon his constitutional rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is consistent with this theory.
II
The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases.
Under Article III, Section 16:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with
the right to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section
14(2) of the Constitution:
Section 14.
....
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
44
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal
prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is
invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil,
criminal, or administrative cases before them. As Abadia v. Court of
Appeals75noted:
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely
crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens
from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights.
Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to
a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens,
including those in the military and covers the periods before, during
and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2)
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.76
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in
the administration of justice. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:77
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition
of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by
mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an
accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative tem1
and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is
orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said
how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that
the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to
that intent.78
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right
to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or
administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may
result in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition of
cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and
preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since
neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal
prosecution. The Constitution itself mandates the Office of the
Ombudsman to "act promptly" on complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.79
As if to underscore the importance of its mandate, this constitutional
command is repeated in Republic Act No. 6770,80 which provides:
Section 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a
specific period within which to measure promptness. Neither do they
provide for criteria within which to determine what could already be
considered as delay in the disposition of complaints. Thus, judicial
interpretation became necessary to determine what could be
considered "prompt" and what length of time could amount to
unreasonable or "inordinate delay."
The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,81 where this Court was constrained to apply the
"radical relief" of dismissing the criminal complaint against an accused
due to the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
In Tatad, a report was submitted to the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command sometime in October 1974, charging Francisco S.
Tatad (Tatad) with graft and corruption during his stint as Minister of
Public Information. In October 1979, Tatad submitted his resignation. It
45
was only on December 29, 1979 that a criminal complaint was filed
against him. Then President Ferdinand Marcos accepted his
resignation on January 26, 1980. On April 1, 1980, the
Tanodbayan82 referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation
Service, Presidential Security Command for fact-finding. On June 16,
1980, the Investigation Report was submitted finding Tatad liable for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
Tatad moved for the dismissal of the case but this was denied on July
26, 1982. His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 5,
1982. Affidavits and counter-affidavits were submitted on October 25,
1982. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan issued a resolution approving
the filing of informations against Tatad. Tatad filed a motion to quash
on July 22, 1985. The motion to quash was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on August 9, 1985. The Sandiganbayan, however,
ordered the filing of an amended information to change the date of the
alleged commission of the offense. In compliance, the Tanodbayan
submitted its amended information on August 10, 1985. Tatad filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan on
September 17, 1985. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with this Com1, questioning the filing of the cases with the
Sandiganbayan.
On April 10, 1986, this Court required the parties to move in the
premises considering the change in administration brought about by
the EDSA Revolution and the overthrow of the Marcos regime. On
June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that as the charges
were not political in nature, the State would still pursue the charges
against Tatad.
In resolving the issue of whether Tatad's constitutional rights to due
process and to speedy disposition of cases were violated, this Court
took note that the finding of inordinate delay applies in a case-to-case
basis:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-
called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the
rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has
been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the
application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.83
This Court found that there were peculiar circumstances which
attended the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the most
blatant of which was that the 1974 report against Tatad was only acted
upon by the Tanodbayan when Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos in 1979:
A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as
it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed
by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding
investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a
dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the
President in the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot
emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should
avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes
alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to
any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established
procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.84
Thus, the delay of three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was found to have been inordinate delay, which was
violative of petitioner's constitutional rights:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella
of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of
46
close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in
the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may
be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In
the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of
the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file
his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act
No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to
resolve the case.85
Political motivation, however, is merely one of the circumstances to be
factored in when determining whether the delay is inordinate. The
absence of political motivation will not prevent this Court from granting
the same "radical relief." Thus, in Angchangco v. Ombudsman,86 this
Court dismissed the criminal complaints even if the petition filed before
this Court was a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the complaints against him after more than six
(6) years of inaction:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the
criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has
transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and
to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the
Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints
filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under
a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been
deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for
over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If
we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his
retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of
plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.87
As in Angchangco, this Court has applied the Tatad doctrine in Duterte
v. Sandiganbayan,88Roque v. Ombudsman,89Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan,90Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman,91Licaros v.
Sandiganbayan,92People v. SPO4 Anonas,93Enriquez v.
Ombudsman,94People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division,95Inocentes v.
People,96Almeda v. Ombudsman,97People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division,98Torres v. Sandiganbayan,99 and Remulla v.
Sandiganbayan.100
This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient"101 to rule that there was
inordinate delay. Thus, it qualified the application of the Tatad doctrine
in cases where certain circumstances do not merit the application of
the "radical relief" sought.
Despite the promulgation of Tatad, however, this Court struggled to
apply a standard test within which to determine the presence of
inordinate delay. Martin v. Ver,102 decided in 1983, attempted to
introduce in this jurisdiction the "balancing test" in the American case
of Barker v. Wingo, thus:
[T]he right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different
concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons
and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months,
and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process
when the right must be asserted or considered waived...
[A] claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is
subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should
consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's
right to a speedy trial has been denied...103
The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the
following factors when determining the existence of inordinate
delay: first, the length of delay; second, the reason for delay; third, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his or her right; and fourth,
the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.
For a period of time, this balancing test appeared to be the best way to
determine the existence of inordinate delay. Thus, this Court applied
both the Tatad doctrine and the Barker balancing test in the 1991 case
of Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan:104
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
47
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length
of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, are considered.105
The combination of both Tatad and the balancing test was so effective
that it was again applied in Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,106 where this
Court took note that:
[D]elays per se are understandably attendant to all prosecutions and
are constitutionally permissible, with the monition that the attendant
delay must not be oppressive. Withal, it must not be lost sight of that
the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors
that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.107
Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a
case is deemed to have commenced. In Dansal v. Fernandez,108 this
Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does not
only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.
Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial.
Thus, the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation
or inquest.
In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given a specific
period within which to resolve the preliminary investigation under Rule
112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.109 Courts are likewise mandated
to resolve cases within a specific time frame. Article VIII, Section 15 of
the Constitution provides:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts,
and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall
forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall
state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter
submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Under Republic Act No. 8493, or The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the
entire trial period must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise
provided for by this Court.110 The law likewise provides for a time limit
of 30 days from the filing of the information to conduct the arraignment,
and 30 days after arraignment for trial to commence.111 In order to
implement the law, this Court issued Supreme Court Circular No. 38-
98112 reiterating the periods for the conduct of trial. It also provided for
an extended time limit from arraignment to the conduct of trial:
Section 7. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred
eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit
shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month
period the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
The Circular likewise provides for certain types of delay which may be
excluded in the running of the periods:
Section 9. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental
condition of the accused;
(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal
charges against the accused;
48

(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory
orders;
(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that the delay
does not exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating to
change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial
question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30)
days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of
an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be
considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An essential
witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are
known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense,
any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date
the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent
charge had there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial
with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or
as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate
trial has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
court motu proprio or on motion of either the accused or his counsel or
the prosecution, if the court granted such continuance on the basis of
his findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial.
These provisions have since been incorporated in Rule 119, Sections
1,113 2,114 3,115 and 6,116 of the Rules of Court.
Several laws have also been enacted providing the time periods for
disposition of cases.
In Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551,
resolution of complaints against members of the Philippine National
Police must be done within ninety (90) days from the arraignment of
the accused:
Section 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Section 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. - Upon
the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: provided, however, that
if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the
complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive
suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day:
provided, further, that the preventive suspension shall not be more
than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: provided,
finally, that such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the
court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the chief,
PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused."
Republic Act No. 9165,117 Section 90 provides that trial for drug related
offenses should be finished not later than 60 days from the filing of the
information:
Section 90. Jurisdiction. -
....
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not
later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information.
49
Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15)
days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.
Republic Act No. 9372,118 Section 48 mandates continuous trial on a
daily basis for cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:
Section 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily
basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to
ensure speedy trial.
Republic Act No. 9516119 amends Presidential Decree No. 1866120 to
provide for continuous trial for cases involving illegal or unlawful
possession, manufacture, dealing, acquisition, and disposition of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives:
Section 4-B. Continuous Trial. - In cases involving violations of this
Decree, the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis
from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to
ensure speedy trial. Such case shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused.
Implementing rules and regulations have also provided for the speedy
disposition of cases. The Implementing Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases121 provide that trial
shall commence within three (3) days from arraignment:
Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. - The trial of child
abuse cases shall take precedence over all other cases before the
courts, except election and habeas corpus cases. The trial in said
cases shall commence within three (3) days from the date the accused
is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted
except on account of the illness of the accused or other grounds
beyond his control.
The Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
9208,122 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364,123 mandates the
speedy disposition of trafficking cases:
Section 76. Speedy Disposition of [Trafficking in Persons] Cases. -
Where practicable and unless special circumstance require; otherwise,
cases involving violation of R.A. No. 9208 shall be heard contiguously:
with hearing dates spaced not more than two weeks apart.
Unnecessary delay should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration
the Speedy Trial Act and SC Circular No. 38-98 dated 11 August 1998.
Laws and their implementing rules and regulations, however, do not
generally bind courts unless this Court adopts them in procedural
rules.124 In any case, this Court has already made several issuances
setting periods for the conduct of trial.
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure m Environmental
Cases125 provide that trial must not exceed three (3) months from the
issuance of the pre-trial order:
Section 1. Continuous trial. - The court shall endeavor to conduct
continuous trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date
of the issuance of the pre-trial order.
Rule 14, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property
Rights Cases126 limits the period of presenting evidence to 60 days per
party:
Section 2. Conduct of trial. - The court shall conduct hearings
expeditiously so as to ensure speedy trial. Each party shall have a
maximum period of sixty (60) days to present his evidence-in-chief on
the trial dates agreed upon during the pre-trial.
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007127 provides that trial
in cases involving the killings of political activists and members of the
media must be conducted within 60 days from its commencement:
The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial
and shall be tenninated within sixty (60) days from commencement of
trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from
submission for decision unless a shorter period is provided by law or
otherwise directed by this Court.
The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right
of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial128 provide for strict time
limits that must be observed:
Section 8. Observance of time limits. - It shall be the duty of the trial
court, the public or private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to
ensure, subject to the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the
following time limits in the prosecution of the case against a detained
accused:
(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial
court to which it is assigned within three days from the filing of the
information;
(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the
date of the raffle;
(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days
after arraignment or within ten (10) days if the accused is under
preventive detention; provided, however, that where the direct
testimonies of the witnesses are to be presented through judicial
50
affidavits, the court shall give the prosecution not more than twenty
(20) days from arraignment within which to prepare and submit their
judicial affidavits in time for the pre-trial conference;
(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case
in the pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days from the temlination
of the pre-trial conference; and
(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one htmdred eighty
(180) days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days,
reckoned from the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or
postponements specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
A dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in
quasi-judicial agencies before a formal complaint is actually filed. The
Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has no set periods within
which to conduct its fact-finding investigations. They are only
mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division,129 this Court stated that a fact-finding investigation conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman should not be deemed separate from
preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining whether there
was a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases:
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not
be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the
former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period
spent in the former should not be factored in the computation of the
period devoted to the preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of
the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or
rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is
accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate
from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the
respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been
violated.130(Emphasis supplied)
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division131 must be re-examined.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the
Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the
proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to
attend these investigations, this period cannot be counted since these
are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point,
the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable
cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of
the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its
investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal
liability through the prescription of the offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial
proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will not be
counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition
of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose
of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the
subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,132 the ruling that fact-finding
investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate
delay is abandoned.
With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman must provide for reasonable periods based upon its
experience with specific types of cases, compounded with the number
of accused and the complexity of the evidence required. He or she
must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for
decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules
and it is recommended that he or she amend these rules at the
soonest possible time.
These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged
that there was delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof
is on the defense to show that there has been a violation of their right
to speedy trial or their right to speedy disposition of cases. The
defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer
than was reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts
were exerted to protect their constitutional rights.133
What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not
determined by "mere mathematical reckoning."134 It requires
51
consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to
investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an
arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the
submission of the case for decision.135Unforeseen circumstances, such
as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken
into account.
The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be
considered in determining whether the period necessary for its
resolution is reasonable. In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan136 this
Court found that "the long delay in resolving the preliminary
investigation could not be justified on the basis of the
records."137 In Binay v. Sandiganbayan,138 this Court considered "the
complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of
the parties' lawyers"139to determine whether the delay is justifiable.
When the case is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is
possible that delay may occur even within the given periods. Defense,
however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have been
resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be
considered inordinate.
The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to
protect accused's constitutional rights. In Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan,140 the failure of the accused to timely invoke the right
to speedy disposition of cases may work to his or her disadvantage,
since this could indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay:
Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him by the indication of this Com1 as a
complementary sanction in its resolution of his administrative case. He
appears, however, to have been insensitive to the implications and
contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate
the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception
that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.141
In Dela Peña v. Sanqiganbayan,142 this Court equated this
acquiescence as one that could amount to laches, which results in the
waiver of their rights:
[I]t is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the
case was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them
in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the counter-affidavits,
[they] did nothing." Also, in their petition, they averred: "Aside from the
motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the
present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the
preliminary investigation." They slept on their right - a situation
amounting to laches. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting
their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some
over acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they
were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted
as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner
therein was "insensitive to the implications and contingencies" of the
projected criminal prosecution posed against him "by not taking any
step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which
inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems
to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his
acquiescence."143
This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the
presumption that the accused was fully aware that the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated despite a considerable length
of time. Thus, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,144 this Court stated
that Alvizowould not apply if the accused were unaware that the
investigation was still ongoing:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we
reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment,
and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in
a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four
long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to
assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.145
Similarly, in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:146
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. They were only informed of the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of
six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its
filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already
been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether...
....
52

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it
was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their
case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility
to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in
view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty
as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due
process.147
Justice Caguioa submits that this Court should depart from Dela Peña.
He explains that the third factor of the Barker balancing test, i.e.,
waiver by the accused, was applied within the context of the Sixth
Amendment148 of the American Constitution in that it presupposes that
the accused has already been subjected to criminal prosecution. He
submits that as the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked
even before criminal prosecution has commenced, waiver by the
accused should be inapplicable.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked by a
respondent to any type of proceeding once delay has already
become prejudicial to the respondent. The invocation of the
constitutional right does not require a threat to the right to liberty. Loss
of employment or compensation may already be considered as
sufficient to invoke the right. Thus, waiver of the right does not
necessarily require that the respondent has already been subjected to
the rigors of criminal prosecution. The failure of the respondent to
invoke the right even when or she has already suffered or will suffer
the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right.
While the Barker balancing test has American roots, a catena of cases
has already been decided by this Court, starting from Tatad, which
have taken into account the Philippine experience.
The reality is that institutional delay149 a reality that the court must
address. The prosecution is staffed by overworked and underpaid
gove1nment lawyers with mounting caseloads. The courts' dockets are
congested. This Court has already launched programs to remedy this
situation, such as the Judicial Affidavit Rule,150 Guidelines for
Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to
Bail and to Speedy Trial,151 and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous
Trial.152 These programs, however, are mere stepping stones. The
complete eradication of institutional delay requires these sustained
actions.
Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against
the State. Most cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman involve
individuals who have the resources and who engage private counsel
with the means and resources to fully dedicate themselves to their
client's case. More often than not, the accused only invoke the right to
speedy disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already
rendered an unfavorable decision. The prosecution should not be
prejudiced by private counsels' failure to protect the interests of their
clients or the accused's lack of interest in the prosecution of their case.
For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy disposition
of cases, delay must not be attributable to the defense.153 Certain
unreasonable actions by the accused will be taken against them. This
includes delaying tactics like failing to appear despite summons, filing
needless motions against interlocutory actions, or requesting
unnecessary postponements that will prevent courts or tribunals to
properly adjudicate the case. When proven, this may constitute a
waiver of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of
cases.
If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time
periods, the burden of proof shifts. The prosecution will now have the
burden to prove that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial
or the right to speedy disposition of cases. Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan154states that "vexatious, capncwus, and oppressive
delays," "unjustified postponements of the trial," or "when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his [or her] case tried"155 are instances that
may be considered as violations of the right to speedy disposition of
cases. The prosecution must be able to prove that it followed
established procedure in prosecuting the case.156 It must also prove
that any delay incurred was justified, such as the complexity of the
cases involved or the vast amount of evidence that must be presented.
The prosecution must likewise prove that no prejudice was suffered by
the accused as a result of the delay. Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan157 defined prejudice to the accused as:
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the
defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to
53
prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is
still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources
may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.158
In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:159
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the
administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is
to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of
the individual.160
The consequences of delay, however, do not only affect the accused.
The prosecution of the case will also be made difficult the longer the
period of time passes. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:161
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the govemment that bears the burden
of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may
make it difficult or impossible for the govemment to carry its burden.
The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exe1iion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity offairly prosecuting criminals. As held in
Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try
the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from
the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay
than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.162
The consequences of the prosecution's failure to discharge this burden
are severe. Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the
case against the accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of
the right to speedy trial:
Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time
limit. - If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required
by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of
this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused
on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall
have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have
the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the
exclusion of time under section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be
subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall
constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.
Tatad, as qualified by Angchangco, likewise mandates the dismissal of
the case if there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases. The immediate dismissal of cases is also warranted if it is
proven that there was malicious prosecution, if the cases were
politically motivated, or other similar instances. Once these
circumstances have been proven, there is no need for the defense to
discharge its burden to prove that the delay was inordinate.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a
preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process
and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of
the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on
whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or
procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the
given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove
that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred
beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove
that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through
mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a
reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution
must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and
that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely
54
invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined
on a case-to-case basis.
III
This Court proceeds to detennine whether respondent committed
inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of the preliminary
investigation against petitioner.
There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no
evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact.
Thus, this Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay.
The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10,
2003. On August 11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner. This Resolution,
however, was modified by the Resolution dated October 18, 2004,
which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigation against
some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-finding was
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005.
On August 8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file
informations against petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo,
Assistant Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the
informations for Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations
against petitioner were filed on November 17, 2011.
Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety
(90) days. The burden of proving the justification of the delay,
therefore, is on the prosecution, or in this case, respondent.
Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations was
justified since it was still determining whether accused Mary Ann
Gadian (Gadian) could be utilized as a state witness and it still had to
verify accused Felipe Constantino's death. The recommendation,
however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was approved by
Tanodbayan Marcelo on December 20, 2004.163 Felipe Constantino's
death was verified by the Sandiganbayan in its November 14,
2006 Order.164 There is, thus, delay from November 14, 2006 to
August 8, 2011.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since
2003, petitioner only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases
when the informations were filed on November 17, 2011. Unlike
in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was aware that the preliminary
investigation was not yet terminated.
Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he
asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait until the
infmmation was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.
Furthennore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged
malversation of millions in public money. The Sandiganbayan has yet
to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioner. In the Decision dated
June 17, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan acquitting petitioner in Crim.
Case No. 28331:
We wish to iterate our observation gathered from the evidence on
record that the subject transaction is highly suspect. There is a
seeming acceptance of the use of questionable supporting documents
to secure the release of public funds in the province, and the apparent
undue haste in the processing and eventual withdrawal of such funds.
However, obvious as the irregularities may be, which can only lead to
distrust in the ability of public officials to safeguard public funds, we are
limited to a review only of the evidence presented vis-a-vis the charges
brought forth before this Court. Thus, We cannot make any
pronouncement in regard to such seeming irregularities.165
The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are
complex and numerous. As respondent points out, there were over a
hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were
determined to have been involved in 81 different anomalous
transactions.166Even granting that the Commission on Audit's Audit
Report exhaustively investigated each transaction, "the prosecution is
not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit; it must rely on
its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause."167 Delays in the investigation and review would have been
inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent Ombudsman.
The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner, would
undoubtedly be prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State should not be
prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases
simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the
Ombudsman."168 The State is as much entitled to due process as the
accused. In People v. Leviste:169
[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled
to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.
55
A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging
dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a
whole and caused uncalled - for delays in the final resolution of this
and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent
court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged
the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case - in
the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such
action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of
justice.170
This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to
speedy disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver of the
delay of a complex case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan will
only prejudice the due process rights of the State.
IV
This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the
right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is
invoked.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right
to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right
to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against
courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may
be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What
is impmiant is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the
proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal
complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the
complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate
delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of
proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in
current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars,171 and the time
periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the
case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is
attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did
not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution
must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the
case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of
evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was
suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.
Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution
of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is
politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite
utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the
behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case
would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of
the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to
speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be
proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional
right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the
delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
56
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to
speedy disposition of cases.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining

Order dated February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan
is DIRECTED to resolve Case No. SB-11-CRM-0456 and Case No.
SB-11-CRM-0457 with due and deliberate dispatch.

The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was

committed shall commence from the filing of a formal complaint and
the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The periods for the
resolution of the preliminary investigation shall be that provided in the
Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars, and the periods to be
established by the Office of the Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant
to file the appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or
procedural periods shall be considered a waiver of his or her right to
speedy disposition of cases.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division172 that factfinding

investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate
delay is ABANDONED.

SO ORDERED.

57
G.R. No. L-69401
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH,
EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID
ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN
HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI,
KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND,
REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL
FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE
COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD
BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA
IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE
COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided
the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona,"
which was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the
Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting
the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them
outright (although the last part is not included in the modern
refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the
purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the
situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a
bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and
sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle
grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition
for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from
them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and
to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of their right against self-incrimination.4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for
the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred
it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court,
Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and documentary
evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations
on which this opinion is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the
ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by
the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact
admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the
time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
58
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such
warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting
under superior orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and
order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar
Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the
Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the
respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can
be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could,
the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the
arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a
criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling
weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals
or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely
suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent
and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were
guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of
the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is
not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it
does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty
need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a
deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is
entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright,
is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they
made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing
so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially
during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than
undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority
is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the
1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-
passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on
their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it
was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They
had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If
they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason
at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
59
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search
and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental
to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have
to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then
we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant
from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in
Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just
force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior,
however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected
from official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free
regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain
may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the
forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or
just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest
must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in
the recent case of People v. Burgos.14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of
the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous
tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending
determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall
remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing
of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against
self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded
operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret
marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done
with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are
supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion
in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's
legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the
force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for
all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November
25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a
result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in
any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may
later be filed against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
60
G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987 President of the Philippines, you are hereby directed to
sequester the following companies.
BATAAN SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING CO., INC.
(BASECO), petitioner, 1. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
vs. Co., Inc. (Engineering Island Shipyard
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and Mariveles Shipyard)
CHAIRMAN JOVITO SALONGA, COMMISSIONER MARY
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, COMMISSIONER RAMON DIAZ, 2. Baseco Quarry
COMMISSIONER RAUL R. DAZA, COMMISSIONER QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, CAPT. JORGE B. SIACUNCO, et al., respondents. 3. Philippine Jai-Alai Corporation

Apostol, Bernas, Gumaru, Ona and Associates for petitioner. 4. Fidelity Management Co., Inc.

Vicente G. Sison for intervenor A.T. Abesamis. 5. Romson Realty, Inc.

NARVASA, J.: 6. Trident Management Co.

Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a
private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by
President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12,
1986, respectively, and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other
orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its
Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation.
1. The Sequestration, Takeover, and Other Orders Complained of
a. The Basic Sequestration Order
The sequestration order which, in the view of the petitioner corporation,
initiated all its misery was issued on April 14, 1986 by Commissioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista. It was addressed to three of the agents of
the Commission, hereafter simply referred to as PCGG. It reads as
follows:
RE: SEQUESTRATION ORDER
By virtue of the powers vested in the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, by authority of the
7. New Trident Management
8. Bay Transport
9. And all affiliate companies of Alfredo
"Bejo" Romualdez
You are hereby ordered:
1. To implement this sequestration order with a
minimum disruption of these companies' business
activities.
2. To ensure the continuity of these companies as
going concerns, the care and maintenance of these
assets until such time that the Office of the President
through the Commission on Good Government should
decide otherwise.
3. To report to the Commission on Good Government
periodically.

61
 Further, you are authorized to request for
Military/Security Support from the Military/Police
authorities, and such other acts essential to the
achievement of this sequestration order. 1
b. Order for Production of Documents
On the strength of the above sequestration order, Mr. Jose M. Balde,
acting for the PCGG, addressed a letter dated April 18, 1986 to the
President and other officers of petitioner firm, reiterating an earlier
request for the production of certain documents, to wit:
1. Stock Transfer Book
2. Legal documents, such as:
2.1. Articles of Incorporation
2.2. By-Laws
2.3. Minutes of the Annual Stockholders
Meeting from 1973 to 1986
2.4. Minutes of the Regular and Special
Meetings of the Board of Directors from
1973 to 1986
2.5. Minutes of the Executive
Committee Meetings from 1973 to
1986
2.6. Existing contracts with
suppliers/contractors/others.
3. Yearly list of stockholders with their corresponding
share/stockholdings from 1973 to 1986 duly certified by
the Corporate Secretary.
4. Audited Financial Statements such as Balance
Sheet, Profit & Loss and others from 1973 to December
31, 1985.
5. Monthly Financial Statements for the current year up
to March 31, 1986.
6. Consolidated Cash Position Reports from January to
April 15, 1986.
7. Inventory listings of assets up dated up to March 31,
1986.
8. Updated schedule of Accounts Receivable and
Accounts Payable.
9. Complete list of depository banks for all funds with
the authorized signatories for withdrawals thereof.
10. Schedule of company investments and
placements. 2
The letter closed with the warning that if the documents were not
submitted within five days, the officers would be cited for "contempt in
pursuance with Presidential Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2."
c. Orders Re Engineer Island
(1) Termination of Contract for Security
Services
A third order assailed by petitioner corporation, hereafter referred to
simply as BASECO, is that issued on April 21, 1986 by a Capt.
Flordelino B. Zabala, a member of the task force assigned to carry out
the basic sequestration order. He sent a letter to BASECO's Vice-
President for Finance, 3 terminating the contract for security services
within the Engineer Island compound between BASECO and "Anchor
and FAIRWAYS" and "other civilian security agencies," CAPCOM
military personnel having already been assigned to the area,
62
 (2) Change of Mode of Payment of
Entry Charges
On July 15, 1986, the same Capt. Zabala issued a Memorandum
addressed to "Truck Owners and Contractors," particularly a "Mr.
Buddy Ondivilla National Marine Corporation," advising of the
amendment in part of their contracts with BASECO in the sense that
the stipulated charges for use of the BASECO road network were
made payable "upon entry and not anymore subject to monthly billing
as was originally agreed upon." 4
d. Aborted Contract for Improvement of Wharf at
Engineer Island
On July 9, 1986, a PCGG fiscal agent, S. Berenguer, entered into a
contract in behalf of BASECO with Deltamarine Integrated Port
Services, Inc., in virtue of which the latter undertook to introduce
improvements costing approximately P210,000.00 on the BASECO
wharf at Engineer Island, allegedly then in poor condition, avowedly to
"optimize its utilization and in return maximize the revenue which would
flow into the government coffers," in consideration of Deltamarine's
being granted "priority in using the improved portion of the wharf ahead
of anybody" and exemption "from the payment of any charges for the
use of wharf including the area where it may install its bagging
equipments" "until the improvement remains in a condition suitable for
port operations." 5 It seems however that this contract was never
consummated. Capt. Jorge B. Siacunco, "Head- (PCGG) BASECO
Management Team," advised Deltamarine by letter dated July 30, 1986
that "the new management is not in a position to honor the said
contract" and thus "whatever improvements * * (may be introduced)
shall be deemed unauthorized * * and shall be at * * (Deltamarine's)
own risk." 6
e. Order for Operation of Sesiman Rock Quarry,
Mariveles, Bataan
By Order dated June 20, 1986, Commissioner Mary Bautista first
directed a PCGG agent, Mayor Melba O. Buenaventura, "to plan and
implement progress towards maximizing the continuous operation of
the BASECO Sesiman Rock Quarry * * by conventional methods;" but
afterwards, Commissioner Bautista, in representation of the PCGG,
authorized another party, A.T. Abesamis, to operate the quarry, located
at Mariveles, Bataan, an agreement to this effect having been
executed by them on September 17, 1986. 7
f. Order to Dispose of Scrap, etc.
By another Order of Commissioner Bautista, this time dated June 26,
1986, Mayor Buenaventura was also "authorized to clean and beautify
the Company's compound," and in this connection, to dispose of or sell
"metal scraps" and other materials, equipment and machineries no
longer usable, subject to specified guidelines and safeguards including
audit and verification. 8
g. The TAKEOVER Order
By letter dated July 14, 1986, Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz decreed
the provisional takeover by the PCGG of BASECO, "the Philippine
Dockyard Corporation and all their affiliated companies." 9 Diaz invoked
the provisions of Section 3 (c) of Executive Order No. 1, empowering
the Commission —
* * To provisionally takeover in the public interest or to
prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises
and properties taken over by the government of the
Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to
former President Marcos, until the transactions leading
to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by
the appropriate authorities.
A management team was designated to implement the order, headed
by Capt. Siacunco, and was given the following powers:
1. Conducts all aspects of operation of the subject
companies;
2. Installs key officers, hires and terminates personnel
as necessary;
3. Enters into contracts related to management and
operation of the companies;
63
 4. Ensures that the assets of the companies are not
dissipated and used effectively and efficiently; revenues
are duly accounted for; and disburses funds only as
may be necessary;
5. Does actions including among others, seeking of
military support as may be necessary, that will ensure
compliance to this order;
6. Holds itself fully accountable to the Presidential
Commission on Good Government on all aspects
related to this take-over order.
h. Termination of Services of BASECO
Officers
Thereafter, Capt. Siacunco, sent letters to Hilario M. Ruiz, Manuel S.
Mendoza, Moises M. Valdez, Gilberto Pasimanero, and Benito R.
Cuesta I, advising of the termination of their services by the PCGG. 10
2. Petitioner's Plea and Postulates
It is the foregoing specific orders and acts of the PCGG and its
members and agents which, to repeat, petitioner BASECO would have
this Court nullify. More particularly, BASECO prays that this Court-
1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Numbered 1 and
2;
2) annul the sequestration order dated April- 14, 1986, and all other
orders subsequently issued and acts done on the basis thereof,
inclusive of the takeover order of July 14, 1986 and the termination of
the services of the BASECO executives. 11
a. Re Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, and the
Sequestration and Takeover Orders
While BASECO concedes that "sequestration without resorting to
judicial action, might be made within the context of Executive Orders
Nos. 1 and 2 before March 25, 1986 when the Freedom Constitution
was promulgated, under the principle that the law promulgated by the
ruler under a revolutionary regime is the law of the land, it ceased to be
acceptable when the same ruler opted to promulgate the Freedom
Constitution on March 25, 1986 wherein under Section I of the same,
Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the 1973 Constitution was adopted
providing, among others, that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law." (Const., Art. I V, Sec.
1)." 12
It declares that its objection to the constitutionality of the Executive Orders "as well as the
Sequestration Order * * and Takeover Order * * issued purportedly under the authority of said
Executive Orders, rests on four fundamental considerations: First, no notice and hearing was
accorded * * (it) before its properties and business were taken over; Second, the PCGG is not a
court, but a purely investigative agency and therefore not competent to act as prosecutor and judge
in the same cause; Third, there is nothing in the issuances which envisions any proceeding,
process or remedy by which petitioner may expeditiously challenge the validity of the takeover after
the same has been effected; and Fourthly, being directed against specified persons, and in
disregard of the constitutional presumption of innocence and general rules and procedures, they
constitute a Bill of Attainder." 13
b. Re Order to Produce Documents
It argues that the order to produce corporate records from 1973 to
1986, which it has apparently already complied with, was issued
without court authority and infringed its constitutional right against self-
incrimination, and unreasonable search and seizure. 14
c. Re PCGG's Exercise of Right of Ownership and
Management
BASECO further contends that the PCGG had unduly interfered with its
right of dominion and management of its business affairs by —
1) terminating its contract for security services with Fairways & Anchor,
without the consent and against the will of the contracting parties; and
amending the mode of payment of entry fees stipulated in its Lease
Contract with National Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation, these
acts being in violation of the non-impairment clause of the
constitution; 15
2) allowing PCGG Agent Silverio Berenguer to enter into an "anomalous contract" with Deltamarine
Integrated Port Services, Inc., giving the latter free use of BASECO premises; 16
64
3) authorizing PCGG Agent, Mayor Melba Buenaventura, to manage
and operate its rock quarry at Sesiman, Mariveles; 17
4) authorizing the same mayor to sell or dispose of its metal scrap, equipment, machinery and other
materials; 18
5) authorizing the takeover of BASECO, Philippine Dockyard Corporation, and all their affiliated
companies;
6) terminating the services of BASECO executives: President Hilario
M. Ruiz; EVP Manuel S. Mendoza; GM Moises M. Valdez; Finance
Mgr. Gilberto Pasimanero; Legal Dept. Mgr. Benito R. Cuesta I; 19
7) planning to elect its own Board of Directors; 20
8) allowing willingly or unwillingly its personnel to take, steal, carry
away from petitioner's premises at Mariveles * * rolls of cable wires,
worth P600,000.00 on May 11, 1986; 21
9) allowing "indiscriminate diggings" at Engineer Island to retrieve gold
bars supposed to have been buried therein. 22
3. Doubts, Misconceptions regarding Sequestration, Freeze and
Takeover Orders
Many misconceptions and much doubt about the matter of
sequestration, takeover and freeze orders have been engendered by
misapprehension, or incomplete comprehension if not indeed
downright ignorance of the law governing these remedies. It is needful
that these misconceptions and doubts be dispelled so that uninformed
and useless debates about them may be avoided, and arguments
tainted b sophistry or intellectual dishonesty be quickly exposed and
discarded. Towards this end, this opinion will essay an exposition of
the law on the matter. In the process many of the objections raised by
BASECO will be dealt with.
4. The Governing Law
a. Proclamation No. 3
The impugned executive orders are avowedly meant to carry out the
explicit command of the Provisional Constitution, ordained by
Proclamation No. 3, 23 that the President-in the exercise of legislative
power which she was authorized to continue to wield "(until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution" — "shall
give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people,"
among others to (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders
and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." 24
b. Executive Order No. 1
Executive Order No. 1 stresses the "urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth," and postulates that "vast resources of the government have
been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad." 25 Upon these premises, the Presidential Commission on
Good Government was created, 26 "charged with the task of assisting
the President in regard to (certain specified) matters," among which
was precisely-
* * The recovery of all in-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship. 27
In relation to the takeover or sequestration that it was authorized to
undertake in the fulfillment of its mission, the PCGG was granted
"power and authority" to do the following particular acts, to wit:
1. To sequester or place or cause to be placed under
its control or possession any building or office wherein
any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and
any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their
65
 destruction, concealment or disappearance which
would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
2. To provisionally take over in the public interest or to
prevent the disposal or dissipation, business
enterprises and properties taken over by the
government of the Marcos Administration or by entities
or persons close to former President Marcos, until the
transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter
can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
3. To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened
commission of acts by any person or entity that may
render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise
make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry
out its task under this order. 28
So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it was
granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of
evidence by subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum; administer
oaths; punish for contempt. 29It was given power also to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of * * (its creation). 30
c. Executive Order No. 2
Executive Order No. 2 gives additional and more specific data and
directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by
the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that:
1) * * the Government of the Philippines is in
possession of evidence showing that there are assets
and properties purportedly pertaining to former
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
which had been or were acquired by them directly or
indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or
illegal use of funds or properties owned by the
government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their
office, authority, influence, connections or relationship,
resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines:" and
2) * * said assets and properties are in the form of bank
accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions,
residences, estates, and other kinds of real and
personal properties in the Philippines and in various
countries of the world." 31
Upon these premises, the President-
1) froze "all assets and properties in the Philippines in
which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation;
2) prohibited former President Ferdinand Marcos and/or
his wife * *, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, duties, agents, or nominees
from transferring, conveying, encumbering, concealing
or dissipating said assets or properties in the
Philippines and abroad, pending the outcome of
appropriate proceedings in the Philippines to determine
whether any such assets or properties were acquired
by them through or as a result of improper or illegal use
of or the conversion of funds belonging to the
Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their
official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense
and to the grave damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines;
66
 3) prohibited "any person from transferring, conveying,
encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such
assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in
their transfer, encumbrance, concealment or dissipation
under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law;"
and
4) required "all persons in the Philippines holding such
assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines
or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or
trustees, to make full disclosure of the same to the
Commission on Good Government within thirty (30)
days from publication of * (the) Executive Order, * *. 32
d. Executive Order No. 14
A third executive order is relevant: Executive Order No. 14, 33 by which
the PCGG is empowered, "with the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and other government agencies, * * to file and
prosecute all cases investigated by it * * as may be warranted by its
findings." 34 All such cases, whether civil or criminal, are to be filed "with
the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof." 35 Executive Order No. 14 also pertinently provides that civil
suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under
Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code
or other existing laws, in connection with * * (said Executive Orders
Numbered 1 and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed
independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence;" and that, moreover, the "technical rules of
procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to* * (said)civil
cases." 36
5. Contemplated Situations
The situations envisaged and sought to be governed are self-evident,
these being:
1) that "(i)ll-gotten properties (were) amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime"; 37
a) more particularly, that ill-gotten wealth (was)
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, * * located in the Philippines or abroad, * *
(and) business enterprises and entities (came to be)
owned or controlled by them, during * * (the Marcos)
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, Connections or
relationship; 38
b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and
properties purportedly pertaining to former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees
which had been or were acquired by them directly or
indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or
illegal use of funds or properties owned by the
Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their
office, authority, influence, connections or relationship,
resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines"; 39
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of
bank accounts. deposits, trust. accounts, shares of
stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums,
mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real
and personal properties in the Philippines and in
various countries of the world;" 40 and
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties
(were) taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former
President Marcos. 41
6. Government's Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth
67
There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the
Government's plan "to recover all ill-gotten wealth."
Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming
the above described factual premises of the Executive Orders and
Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be demonstrable by competent
evidence, the recovery from Marcos, his family and his dominions of
the assets and properties involved, is not only a right but a duty on the
part of Government.
But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance
must be sought with the equally compelling necessity that a proper
respect be accorded and adequate protection assured, the
fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are
deemed pillars of a free society such as ours, and to which all
members of that society may without exception lay claim.
* * Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the
Constitution, embraces as its necessary components
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and
freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these
freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom
of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under
proper control. * * Evincing much concern for the
protection of property, the Constitution distinctly
recognizes the preferred position which real estate has
occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with
every aspect of social life in a democracy as
democracy is conceived in the Constitution.The
Constitution realizes the indispensable role which
property, owned in reasonable quantities and used
legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort
and the formation and growth of a solid social middle
class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and
the backbone of every progressive and happy
country. 42
a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit
Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot
simply be assumed. They will have to be duly established by adequate
proof in each case, in a proper judicial proceeding, so that the recovery
of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and
consummated; although there are some who maintain that the fact-that
an immense fortune, and "vast resources of the government have been
amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad," and they
have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to
disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions-is within the realm of judicial
notice, being of so extensive notoriety as to dispense with proof
thereof, Be this as it may, the requirement of evidentiary substantiation
has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed
explicitly laid down, in Executive Order No. 14.
b. Need of Provisional Measures to Collect and
Conserve Assets Pending Suits
Nor may it be gainsaid that pending the institution of the suits for the
recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" as the evidence at hand may
reveal, there is an obvious and imperative need for preliminary,
provisional measures to prevent the concealment, disappearance,
destruction, dissipation, or loss of the assets and properties subject of
the suits, or to restrain or foil acts that may render moot and academic,
or effectively hamper, delay, or negate efforts to recover the same.
7. Provisional Remedies Prescribed by Law
To answer this need, the law has prescribed three (3) provisional
remedies. These are: (1) sequestration; (2) freeze orders; and (3)
provisional takeover.
Sequestration and freezing are remedies applicable generally to
unearthed instances of "ill-gotten wealth." The remedy of "provisional
takeover" is peculiar to cases where "business enterprises and
properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President
Marcos." 43
a. Sequestration
By the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester
property claimed to be "ill-gotten" means to place or cause to be
68
placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or
office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto
may be found, including "business enterprises and entities,"-for the
purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of,
and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same-until it can be
determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the
property was in truth will- gotten," i.e., acquired through or as a result
of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the
Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises,
banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official
position, authority relationship, connection or influence, resulting in
unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and
prejudice to the State. 44 And this, too, is the sense in which the term is
commonly understood in other jurisdictions. 45
b. "Freeze Order"
A "freeze order" prohibits the person having possession or control of
property alleged to constitute "ill-gotten wealth" "from transferring,
conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such
property, or from assisting or taking part in its transfer, encumbrance,
concealment, or dissipation." 46 In other words, it commands the
possessor to hold the property and conserve it subject to the orders
and disposition of the authority decreeing such freezing. In this sense,
it is akin to a garnishment by which the possessor or ostensible owner
of property is enjoined not to deliver, transfer, or otherwise dispose of
any effects or credits in his possession or control, and thus becomes in
a sense an involuntary depositary thereof. 47
c. Provisional Takeover
In providing for the remedy of "provisional takeover," the law
acknowledges the apparent distinction between "ill gotten" "business
enterprises and entities" (going concerns, businesses in actual
operation), generally, as to which the remedy of sequestration applies,
it being necessarily inferred that the remedy entails no interference, or
the least possible interference with the actual management and
operations thereof; and "business enterprises which were taken over
by the government government of the Marcos Administration or by
entities or persons close to him," in particular, as to which a
"provisional takeover" is authorized, "in the public interest or to prevent
disposal or dissipation of the enterprises." 48 Such a "provisional
takeover" imports something more than sequestration or freezing, more
than the placing of the business under physical possession and
control, albeit without or with the least possible interference with the
management and carrying on of the business itself. In a "provisional
takeover," what is taken into custody is not only the physical assets of
the business enterprise or entity, but the business operation as well. It
is in fine the assumption of control not only over things, but over
operations or on- going activities. But, to repeat, such a "provisional
takeover" is allowed only as regards "business enterprises * * taken
over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or
persons close to former President Marcos."
d. No Divestment of Title Over Property Seized
It may perhaps be well at this point to stress once again the
provisional, contingent character of the remedies just described.
Indeed the law plainly qualifies the remedy of take-over by the
adjective, "provisional." These remedies may be resorted to only for a
particular exigency: to prevent in the public interest the disappearance
or dissipation of property or business, and conserve it pending
adjudgment in appropriate proceedings of the primary issue of whether
or not the acquisition of title or other right thereto by the apparent
owner was attended by some vitiating anomaly. None of the remedies
is meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to
the property sequestered, frozen or taken over and vest it in the
sequestering agency, the Government or other person. This can be
done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law.
That this is the sense in which the power to sequester, freeze or
provisionally take over is to be understood and exercised, the language
of the executive orders in question leaves no doubt. Executive Order
No. 1 declares that the sequestration of property the acquisition of
which is suspect shall last "until the transactions leading to such
acquisition * * can be disposed of by the appropriate
authorities." 49 Executive Order No. 2 declares that the assets or
properties therein mentioned shall remain frozen "pending the outcome
of appropriate proceedings in the Philippines to determine whether any
such assets or properties were acquired" by illegal means. Executive
Order No. 14 makes clear that judicial proceedings are essential for the
resolution of the basic issue of whether or not particular assets are "ill-
69
gotten," and resultant recovery thereof by the Government is
warranted.
e. State of Seizure Not To Be Indefinitely Maintained;
The Constitutional Command
There is thus no cause for the apprehension voiced by BASECO 50 that
sequestration, freezing or provisional takeover is designed to be an
end in itself, that it is the device through which persons may be
deprived of their property branded as "ill-gotten," that it is intended to
bring about a permanent, rather than a passing, transitional state of
affairs. That this is not so is quite explicitly declared by the governing
rules.
Be this as it may, the 1987 Constitution should allay any lingering fears
about the duration of these provisional remedies. Section 26 of its
Transitory Provisions, 51 lays down the relevant rule in plain terms,
apart from extending ratification or confirmation (although not really
necessary) to the institution by presidential fiat of the remedy of
sequestration and freeze orders:
SEC. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze
orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shag
remain operative for not more than eighteen
months after the ratification of this Constitution.
However, in the national interest, as certified by the
President, the Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only
upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the
list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders
issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the
corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be
filed within six months from its ratification. For those
issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from
the issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed
automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is
commenced as herein provided. 52
f. Kinship to Attachment Receivership
As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are
akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or
receivership. 53 By attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant
in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or
lost intentionally or otherwise, pending the action. 54 By receivership,
property, real or personal, which is subject of litigation, is placed in the
possession and control of a receiver appointed by the Court, who shall
conserve it pending final determination of the title or right of possession
over it. 55 All these remedies — sequestration, freezing, provisional,
takeover, attachment and receivership — are provisional, temporary,
designed for-particular exigencies, attended by no character of
permanency or finality, and always subject to the control of the issuing
court or agency.
g. Remedies, Non-Judicial
Parenthetically, that writs of sequestration or freeze or takeover orders
are not issued by a court is of no moment. The Solicitor General draws
attention to the writ of distraint and levy which since 1936 the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has been by law authorized to
issue against property of a delinquent taxpayer. 56 BASECO itself
declares that it has not manifested "a rigid insistence on sequestration
as a purely judicial remedy * * (as it feels) that the law should not be
ossified to a point that makes it insensitive to change." What it insists
on, what it pronounces to be its "unyielding position, is that any change
in procedure, or the institution of a new one, should conform to due
process and the other prescriptions of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." 57 It is, to be sure, a proposition on which there can be no
disagreement.
h. Orders May Issue Ex Parte
Like the remedy of preliminary attachment and receivership, as well as
delivery of personal property in replevin suits, sequestration and
70
provisional takeover writs may issue ex parte. 58 And as in preliminary
attachment, receivership, and delivery of personality, no objection of
any significance may be raised to the ex parte issuance of an order of
sequestration, freezing or takeover, given its fundamental character of
temporariness or conditionality; and taking account specially of the
constitutionally expressed "mandate of the people to recover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people;" 59 as well as the obvious
need to avoid alerting suspected possessors of "ill-gotten wealth" and
thereby cause that disappearance or loss of property precisely sought
to be prevented, and the fact, just as self-evident, that "any transfer,
disposition, concealment or disappearance of said assets and
properties would frustrate, obstruct or hamper the efforts of the
Government" at the just recovery thereof. 60
8. Requisites for Validity
What is indispensable is that, again as in the case of attachment and
receivership, there exist a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for
the sequestration, freeze or takeover order, and adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or
nullification. 61
Both are assured under the executive orders in question and the rules
and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
a. Prima Facie Evidence as Basis for Orders
Executive Order No. 14 enjoins that there be "due regard to the
requirements of fairness and due process." 62Executive Order No. 2
declares that with respect to claims on allegedly "ill-gotten" assets and
properties, "it is the position of the new democratic government that
President Marcos * * (and other parties affected) be afforded fair
opportunity to contest these claims before appropriate Philippine
authorities." 63 Section 7 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
provides that sequestration or freeze (and takeover) orders issue upon
the authority of at least two commissioners, based on the affirmation or
complaint of an interested party, or motu proprio when the Commission
has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is
warranted. 64 A similar requirement is now found in Section 26, Art.
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that a "sequestration or
freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima
facie case." 65
b. Opportunity to Contest
And Sections 5 and 6 of the same Rules and Regulations lay down the
procedure by which a party may seek to set aside a writ of
sequestration or freeze order, viz:
SECTION 5. Who may contend.-The person against
whom a writ of sequestration or freeze or hold order is
directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either
personally or through counsel within five (5) days from
receipt of the writ or order, or in the case of a hold
order, from date of knowledge thereof.
SECTION 6. Procedure for review of writ or order.-After
due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the
Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or
subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary,
taking into consideration the evidence and the
circumstance of the case. The resolution of the
commission may be appealed by the party concerned
to the Office of the President of the Philippines within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Parenthetically, even if the requirement for a prima facie showing of "ill-
gotten wealth" were not expressly imposed by some rule or regulation
as a condition to warrant the sequestration or freezing of property
contemplated in the executive orders in question, it would nevertheless
be exigible in this jurisdiction in which the Rule of Law prevails and
official acts which are devoid of rational basis in fact or law, or are
whimsical and capricious, are condemned and struck down. 66
9. Constitutional Sanction of Remedies
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing
considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze
and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
71
mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to * * * (recover ill- gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution 67 treats of, and ratifies the
"authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The institution of these provisional remedies is also premised upon the
State's inherent police power, regarded, as t lie power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property," 68 and as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers * * in the promotion of general welfare and the public
interest," 69and said to be co-extensive with self-protection and * * not
inaptly termed (also) the'law of overruling necessity." "70
10. PCGG not a "Judge"; General Functions
It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus far
been said that the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act as, a
judge. Its general function is to conduct investigations in order
to collect evidence establishing instances of "ill-gotten wealth;" issue
sequestration, and such orders as may be warranted by the evidence
thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the
assets of which it takes custody and control and prevent their
disappearance, loss or dissipation; and eventually file and prosecute in
the proper court of competent jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as
may be warranted by its findings. It does not try and decide, or hear
and determine, or adjudicate with any character of finality or
compulsion, cases involving the essential issue of whether or not
property should be forfeited and transferred to the State because "ill-
gotten" within the meaning of the Constitution and the executive
orders. This function is reserved to the designated court, in this case,
the Sandiganbayan. 71 There can therefore be no serious regard
accorded to the accusation, leveled by BASECO, 72that the PCGG
plays the perfidious role of prosecutor and judge at the same time.
11. Facts Preclude Grant of Relief to Petitioner
Upon these premises and reasoned conclusions, and upon the facts
disclosed by the record, hereafter to be discussed, the petition cannot
succeed. The writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for will not be
issued.
The facts show that the corporation known as BASECO was owned or
controlled by President Marcos "during his administration, through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using
his powers, authority, or influence, " and that it was by and through the
same means, that BASECO had taken over the business and/or assets
of the National Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., and other
government-owned or controlled entities.
12. Organization and Stock Distribution of BASECO
BASECO describes itself in its petition as "a shiprepair and
shipbuilding company * * incorporated as a domestic private
corporation * * (on Aug. 30, 1972) by a consortium of Filipino
shipowners and shipping executives. Its main office is at Engineer
Island, Port Area, Manila, where its Engineer Island Shipyard is
housed, and its main shipyard is located at Mariveles Bataan." 73 Its
Articles of Incorporation disclose that its authorized capital stock is
P60,000,000.00 divided into 60,000 shares, of which 12,000 shares
with a value of P12,000,000.00 have been subscribed, and on said
subscription, the aggregate sum of P3,035,000.00 has been paid by
the incorporators. 74The same articles Identify the incorporators,
numbering fifteen (15), as follows: (1) Jose A. Rojas, (2) Anthony P.
Lee, (3) Eduardo T. Marcelo, (4) Jose P. Fernandez, (5) Generoso
Tanseco, (6) Emilio T. Yap, (7) Antonio M. Ezpeleta, (8) Zacarias
Amante, (9) Severino de la Cruz, (10) Jose Francisco, (11) Dioscoro
Papa, (12) Octavio Posadas, (13) Manuel S. Mendoza, (14) Magiliw
Torres, and (15) Rodolfo Torres.
By 1986, however, of these fifteen (15) incorporators, six (6) had
ceased to be stockholders, namely: (1) Generoso Tanseco, (2) Antonio
Ezpeleta, (3) Zacarias Amante, (4) Octavio Posadas, (5) Magiliw
Torres, and (6) Rodolfo Torres. As of this year, 1986, there were
twenty (20) stockholders listed in BASECO's Stock and Transfer
Book. 75Their names and the number of shares respectively held by
them are as follows:
72
 1. Jose A. Rojas
2. Severino G. de la Cruz
3. Emilio T. Yap
4. Jose Fernandez
5. Jose Francisco
6. Manuel S. Mendoza
7. Anthony P. Lee
8. Hilario M. Ruiz
9. Constante L. Fariñas
10. Fidelity Management, Inc.
11. Trident Management
12. United Phil. Lines
13. Renato M. Tanseco
14. Fidel Ventura
15. Metro Bay Drydock
16. Manuel Jacela
17. Jonathan G. Lu
18. Jose J. Tanchanco
19. Dioscoro Papa
1,248 shares 20. Edward T. Marcelo 4 shares
1,248 shares TOTAL 218,819 shares.
2,508 shares
13 Acquisition of NASSCO by BASECO
1,248 shares
Barely six months after its incorporation, BASECO acquired from
National Shipyard & Steel Corporation, or NASSCO, a government-
128 shares
owned or controlled corporation, the latter's shipyard at Mariveles,
Bataan, known as the Bataan National Shipyard (BNS), and — except
96 shares for NASSCO's Engineer Island Shops and certain equipment of the
BNS, consigned for future negotiation — all its structures, buildings,
1,248 shares shops, quarters, houses, plants, equipment and facilities, in stock or in
transit. This it did in virtue of a "Contract of Purchase and Sale with
32 shares Chattel Mortgage" executed on February 13, 1973. The price was
P52,000,000.00. As partial payment thereof, BASECO delivered to
8 shares NASSCO a cash bond of P11,400,000.00, convertible into cash within
twenty-four (24) hours from completion of the inventory undertaken
65,882 shares pursuant to the contract. The balance of P41,600,000.00, with interest
at seven percent (7%) per annum, compounded semi-annually, was
stipulated to be paid in equal semi-annual installments over a term of
7,412 shares
nine (9) years, payment to commence after a grace period of two (2)
years from date of turnover of the shipyard to BASECO. 76
1,240 shares
14. Subsequent Reduction of Price; Intervention of Marcos
8 shares
Unaccountably, the price of P52,000,000.00 was reduced by more than
8 shares one-half, to P24,311,550.00, about eight (8) months later. A document
to this effect was executed on October 9, 1973, entitled "Memorandum
136,370 shares Agreement," and was signed for NASSCO by Arturo Pacificador, as
Presiding Officer of the Board of Directors, and David R. Ines, as
1 share General Manager. 77 This agreement bore, at the top right corner of the
first page, the word "APPROVED" in the handwriting of President
1 share Marcos, followed by his usual full signature. The document recited that
a down payment of P5,862,310.00 had been made by BASECO, and
1 share the balance of P19,449,240.00 was payable in equal semi-annual
installments over nine (9) years after a grace period of two (2) years,
with interest at 7% per annum.
128 shares
73
15. Acquisition of 300 Hectares from Export Processing Zone
Authority
On October 1, 1974, BASECO acquired three hundred (300) hectares
of land in Mariveles from the Export Processing Zone Authority for the
price of P10,047,940.00 of which, as set out in the document of sale,
P2,000.000.00 was paid upon its execution, and the balance stipulated
to be payable in installments. 78
16. Acquisition of Other Assets of NASSCO; Intervention of Marcos
Some nine months afterwards, or on July 15, 1975, to be precise,
BASECO, again with the intervention of President Marcos, acquired
ownership of the rest of the assets of NASSCO which had not been
included in the first two (2) purchase documents. This was
accomplished by a deed entitled "Contract of Purchase and
Sale," 79 which, like the Memorandum of Agreement dated October 9,
1973 supra also bore at the upper right-hand corner of its first page,
the handwritten notation of President Marcos reading, "APPROVED,
July 29, 1973," and underneath it, his usual full signature. Transferred
to BASECO were NASSCO's "ownership and all its titles, rights and
interests over all equipment and facilities including structures,
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable or semi-
expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island, known as the
Engineer Island Shops, including all the equipment of the Bataan
National Shipyards (BNS) which were excluded from the sale of NBS
to BASECO but retained by BASECO and all other selected equipment
and machineries of NASSCO at J. Panganiban Smelting Plant." In the
same deed, NASSCO committed itself to cooperate with BASECO for
the acquisition from the National Government or other appropriate
Government entity of Engineer Island. Consideration for the sale was
set at P5,000,000.00; a down payment of P1,000,000.00 appears to
have been made, and the balance was stipulated to be paid at 7%
interest per annum in equal semi annual installments over a term of
nine (9) years, to commence after a grace period of two (2) years. Mr.
Arturo Pacificador again signed for NASSCO, together with the general
manager, Mr. David R. Ines.
17. Loans Obtained
It further appears that on May 27, 1975 BASECO obtained a loan from
the NDC, taken from "the last available Japanese war damage fund of
$19,000,000.00," to pay for "Japanese made heavy equipment (brand
new)." 80 On September 3, 1975, it got another loan also from the NDC
in the amount of P30,000,000.00 (id.). And on January 28, 1976, it got
still another loan, this time from the GSIS, in the sum of
P12,400,000.00. 81 The claim has been made that not a single centavo
has been paid on these loans. 82
18. Reports to President Marcos
In September, 1977, two (2) reports were submitted to President
Marcos regarding BASECO. The first was contained in a letter dated
September 5, 1977 of Hilario M. Ruiz, BASECO president. 83 The
second was embodied in a confidential memorandum dated
September 16, 1977 of Capt. A.T. Romualdez. 84 They further disclose
the fine hand of Marcos in the affairs of BASECO, and that of a
Romualdez, a relative by affinity.
a. BASECO President's Report
In his letter of September 5, 1977, BASECO President Ruiz reported to
Marcos that there had been "no orders or demands for ship
construction" for some time and expressed the fear that if that state of
affairs persisted, BASECO would not be able to pay its debts to the
Government, which at the time stood at the not inconsiderable amount
of P165,854,000.00. 85 He suggested that, to "save the situation," there
be a "spin-off (of their) shipbuilding activities which shall be handled
exclusively by an entirely new corporation to be created;" and towards
this end, he informed Marcos that BASECO was —
* * inviting NDC and LUSTEVECO to participate by
converting the NDC shipbuilding loan to BASECO
amounting to P341.165M and assuming and converting
a portion of BASECO's shipbuilding loans from
REPACOM amounting to P52.2M or a total of
P83.365M as NDC's equity contribution in the new
corporation. LUSTEVECO will participate by absorbing
and converting a portion of the REPACOM loan of Bay
Shipyard and Drydock, Inc., amounting to P32.538M.86
74
 b. Romualdez' Report
Capt. A.T. Romualdez' report to the President was submitted eleven
(11) days later. It opened with the following caption:
MEMORANDUM:
FOR : The President
SUBJECT: An Evaluation and Re-assessment of a
Performance of a Mission
FROM: Capt. A.T. Romualdez.
Like Ruiz, Romualdez wrote that BASECO faced great difficulties in
meeting its loan obligations due chiefly to the fact that "orders to build
ships as expected * * did not materialize."
He advised that five stockholders had "waived and/or assigned their
holdings inblank," these being: (1) Jose A. Rojas, (2) Severino de la
Cruz, (3) Rodolfo Torres, (4) Magiliw Torres, and (5) Anthony P. Lee.
Pointing out that "Mr. Magiliw Torres * * is already dead and Mr. Jose
A. Rojas had a major heart attack," he made the following quite
revealing, and it may be added, quite cynical and indurate
recommendation, to wit:
* * (that) their replacements (be effected) so we can
register their names in the stock book prior to the
implementation of your instructions to pass a board
resolution to legalize the transfers under SEC
regulations;
2. By getting their replacements, the families cannot
question us later on; and
3. We will owe no further favors from them. 87
He also transmitted to Marcos, together with the report, the following
documents: 88
1. Stock certificates indorsed and assigned in blank
with assignments and waivers; 89
2. The articles of incorporation, the amended articles,
and the by-laws of BASECO;
3. Deed of Sales, wherein NASSCO sold to BASECO
four (4) parcels of land in "Engineer Island", Port Area,
Manila;
4. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 124822 in the name
of BASECO, covering "Engineer Island";
5. Contract dated October 9, 1973, between NASSCO
and BASECO re-structure and equipment at Mariveles,
Bataan;
6. Contract dated July 16, 1975, between NASSCO and
BASECO re-structure and equipment at Engineer
Island, Port Area Manila;
7. Contract dated October 1, 1974, between EPZA and
BASECO re 300 hectares of land at Mariveles, Bataan;
8. List of BASECO's fixed assets;
9. Loan Agreement dated September 3, 1975,
BASECO's loan from NDC of P30,000,000.00;
10. BASECO-REPACOM Agreement dated May 27,
1975;
11. GSIS loan to BASECO dated January 28, 1976 of
P12,400,000.00 for the housing facilities for BASECO's
rank-and-file employees. 90
Capt. Romualdez also recommended that BASECO's loans be
restructured "until such period when BASECO will have enough orders
for ships in order for the company to meet loan obligations," and that —
75
 An LOI may be issued to government agencies using
floating equipment, that a linkage scheme be applied to
a certain percent of BASECO's net profit as part of
BASECO's amortization payments to make it justifiable
for you, Sir. 91
It is noteworthy that Capt. A.T. Romualdez does not appear to be a
stockholder or officer of BASECO, yet he has presented a report on
BASECO to President Marcos, and his report demonstrates intimate
familiarity with the firm's affairs and problems.
19. Marcos' Response to Reports
President Marcos lost no time in acting on his subordinates'
recommendations, particularly as regards the "spin-off" and the
"linkage scheme" relative to "BASECO's amortization payments."
a. Instructions re "Spin-Off"
Under date of September 28, 1977, he addressed a Memorandum to
Secretary Geronimo Velasco of the Philippine National Oil Company
and Chairman Constante Fariñas of the National Development
Company, directing them "to participate in the formation of a new
corporation resulting from the spin-off of the shipbuilding component
of BASECO along the following guidelines:
a. Equity participation of government shall be through
LUSTEVECO and NDC in the amount of P115,903,000
consisting of the following obligations of BASECO
which are hereby authorized to be converted to
equity of the said new corporation, to wit:
1. NDC P83,865,000 (P31.165M loan &
P52.2M Reparation)
2. LUSTEVECO P32,538,000
(Reparation)
b. Equity participation of government shall be in the
form of non- voting shares.
For immediate compliance. 92
Mr. Marcos' guidelines were promptly complied with by his
subordinates. Twenty-two (22) days after receiving their president's
memorandum, Messrs. Hilario M. Ruiz, Constante L. Fariñas and
Geronimo Z. Velasco, in representation of their respective
corporations, executed a PRE-INCORPORATION AGREEMENT dated
October 20, 1977. 93 In it, they undertook to form a shipbuilding
corporation to be known as "PHIL-ASIA SHIPBUILDING
CORPORATION," to bring to realization their president's instructions. It
would seem that the new corporation ultimately formed was actually
named "Philippine Dockyard Corporation (PDC)." 94
b. Letter of Instructions No. 670
Mr. Marcos did not forget Capt. Romualdez' recommendation for a
letter of instructions. On February 14, 1978, he issued Letter of
Instructions No. 670 addressed to the Reparations Commission
REPACOM the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), the Luzon
Stevedoring Company (LUSTEVECO), and the National Development
Company (NDC). What is commanded therein is summarized by the
Solicitor General, with pithy and not inaccurate observations as to the
effects thereof (in italics), as follows:
* * 1) the shipbuilding equipment procured by BASECO
through reparations be transferred to NDC subject to
reimbursement by NDC to BASECO (of) the amount of
s allegedly representing the handling and incidental
expenses incurred by BASECO in the installation of
said equipment (so instead of NDC getting paid on its
loan to BASECO, it was made to pay BASECO instead
the amount of P18.285M); 2) the shipbuilding
equipment procured from reparations through EPZA,
now in the possession of BASECO and BSDI (Bay
Shipyard & Drydocking, Inc.) be transferred to
LUSTEVECO through PNOC; and 3) the shipbuilding
equipment (thus) transferred be invested by
LUSTEVECO, acting through PNOC and NDC, as the
government's equity participation in a shipbuilding
corporation to be established in partnership with the
private sector.
76
 xxx xxx xxx
And so, through a simple letter of instruction and
memorandum, BASECO's loan obligation to NDC and
REPACOM * * in the total amount of P83.365M and
BSD's REPACOM loan of P32.438M were wiped out
and converted into non-voting preferred shares. 95
20. Evidence of Marcos'
Ownership of BASECO
It cannot therefore be gainsaid that, in the context of the proceedings
at bar, the actuality of the control by President Marcos of BASECO has
been sufficiently shown.
Other evidence submitted to the Court by the Solicitor General proves
that President Marcos not only exercised control over BASECO, but
also that he actually owns well nigh one hundred percent of its
outstanding stock.
It will be recalled that according to petitioner- itself, as of April 23,
1986, there were 218,819 shares of stock outstanding, ostensibly
owned by twenty (20) stockholders. 96 Four of these twenty are juridical
persons: (1) Metro Bay Drydock, recorded as holding 136,370 shares;
(2) Fidelity Management, Inc., 65,882 shares; (3) Trident
Management, 7,412 shares; and (4) United Phil. Lines, 1,240 shares.
The first three corporations, among themselves, own an aggregate of
209,664 shares of BASECO stock, or 95.82% of the outstanding
stock.
Now, the Solicitor General has drawn the Court's attention to the
intriguing circumstance that found in Malacanang shortly after the
sudden flight of President Marcos, were certificates corresponding to
more than ninety-five percent (95%) of all the outstanding shares of
stock of BASECO, endorsed in blank, together with deeds of
assignment of practically all the outstanding shares of stock of the
three (3) corporations above mentioned (which hold 95.82% of all
BASECO stock), signed by the owners thereof although not
notarized. 97
More specifically, found in Malacanang (and now in the custody of the
PCGG) were:
1) the deeds of assignment of all 600 outstanding
shares of Fidelity Management Inc. — which
supposedly owns as aforesaid 65,882 shares of
BASECO stock;
2) the deeds of assignment of 2,499,995 of the
2,500,000 outstanding shares of Metro Bay Drydock
Corporation — which allegedly owns 136,370 shares of
BASECO stock;
3) the deeds of assignment of 800 outstanding shares
of Trident Management Co., Inc. — which allegedly
owns 7,412 shares of BASECO stock, assigned in
blank; 98 and
4) stock certificates corresponding to 207,725 out of the
218,819 outstanding shares of BASECO stock; that is,
all but 5 % — all endorsed in blank. 99
While the petitioner's counsel was quick to dispute this asserted fact,
assuring this Court that the BASECO stockholders were still in
possession of their respective stock certificates and had "never
endorsed * * them in blank or to anyone else," 100 that denial is exposed by his
own prior and subsequent recorded statements as a mere gesture of defiance rather than a
verifiable factual declaration.
By resolution dated September 25, 1986, this Court granted BASECO's
counsel a period of 10 days "to SUBMIT, as undertaken by him, * * the
certificates of stock issued to the stockholders of * * BASECO as of
April 23, 1986, as listed in Annex 'P' of the petition.' 101 Counsel thereafter
moved for extension; and in his motion dated October 2, 1986, he declared inter alia that "said
certificates of stock are in the possession of third parties, among whom being the respondents
themselves * * and petitioner is still endeavoring to secure copies thereof from them." 102 On the
same day he filed another motion praying that he be allowed "to secure copies of the Certificates of
Stock in the name of Metro Bay Drydock, Inc., and of all other Certificates, of Stock of petitioner's
stockholders in possession of respondents." 103
In a Manifestation dated October 10, 1986,, 104 the Solicitor General not unreasonably argued that
counsel's aforestated motion to secure copies of the stock certificates "confirms the fact that
stockholders of petitioner corporation are not in possession of * * (their) certificates of stock," and
the reason, according to him, was "that 95% of said shares * * have been endorsed in blank and
77
found in Malacañang after the former President and his family fled the country." To this
manifestation BASECO's counsel replied on November 5, 1986, as already mentioned, Stubbornly
insisting that the firm's stockholders had not really assigned their stock. 105
In view of the parties' conflicting declarations, this Court resolved on November 27, 1986 among
other things "to require * * the petitioner * * to deposit upon proper receipt with Clerk of Court
Juanito Ranjo the originals of the stock certificates alleged to be in its possession or accessible to it,
mentioned and described in Annex 'P' of its petition, (and other pleadings) * * within ten (10) days
from notice." 106 In a motion filed on December 5, 1986, 107 BASECO's counsel made the
statement, quite surprising in the premises, that "it will negotiate with the owners (of the BASECO
stock in question) to allow petitioner to borrow from them, if available, the certificates referred to"
but that "it needs a more sufficient time therefor" (sic). BASECO's counsel however eventually had
to confess inability to produce the originals of the stock certificates, putting up the feeble excuse
that while he had "requested the stockholders to allow * * (him) to borrow said certificates, * * some
of * * (them) claimed that they had delivered the certificates to third parties by way of pledge and/or
to secure performance of obligations, while others allegedly have entrusted them to third parties in
view of last national emergency." 108 He has conveniently omitted, nor has he offered to give the
details of the transactions adverted to by him, or to explain why he had not impressed on the
supposed stockholders the primordial importance of convincing this Court of their present custody
of the originals of the stock, or if he had done so, why the stockholders are unwilling to agree to
some sort of arrangement so that the originals of their certificates might at the very least be
exhibited to the Court. Under the circumstances, the Court can only conclude that he could not get
the originals from the stockholders for the simple reason that, as the Solicitor General maintains,
said stockholders in truth no longer have them in their possession, these having already been
assigned in blank to then President Marcos.
21. Facts Justify Issuance of Sequestration and Takeover Orders
In the light of the affirmative showing by the Government that, prima
facie at least, the stockholders and directors of BASECO as of April,
1986 109 were mere "dummies," nominees or alter egos of President Marcos; at any rate, that
they are no longer owners of any shares of stock in the corporation, the conclusion cannot be
avoided that said stockholders and directors have no basis and no standing whatever to cause the
filing and prosecution of the instant proceeding; and to grant relief to BASECO, as prayed for in the
petition, would in effect be to restore the assets, properties and business sequestered and taken
over by the PCGG to persons who are "dummies," nominees or alter egos of the former president.
From the standpoint of the PCGG, the facts herein stated at some
length do indeed show that the private corporation known as BASECO
was "owned or controlled by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos * *
during his administration, * * through nominees, by taking advantage of
* * (his) public office and/or using * * (his) powers, authority, influence *
*," and that NASSCO and other property of the government had been
taken over by BASECO; and the situation justified the sequestration as
well as the provisional takeover of the corporation in the public interest,
in accordance with the terms of Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, pending
the filing of the requisite actions with the Sandiganbayan to cause
divestment of title thereto from Marcos, and its adjudication in favor of
the Republic pursuant to Executive Order No. 14.
As already earlier stated, this Court agrees that this assessment of the
facts is correct; accordingly, it sustains the acts of sequestration and
takeover by the PCGG as being in accord with the law, and, in view of
what has thus far been set out in this opinion, pronounces to be without
merit the theory that said acts, and the executive orders pursuant to
which they were done, are fatally defective in not according to the
parties affected prior notice and hearing, or an adequate remedy to
impugn, set aside or otherwise obtain relief therefrom, or that the
PCGG had acted as prosecutor and judge at the same time.
22. Executive Orders Not a Bill of Attainder
Neither will this Court sustain the theory that the executive orders in
question are a bill of attainder. 110 "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial." 111 "Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt." 112
In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination or
declaration of guilt. On the contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14,
make it perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of "ill-gotten wealth"
is to be handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed
and prosecuted by the PCGG. In the second place, no punishment is inflicted by the executive
orders, as the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make apparent. In no sense,
therefore, may the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder.
23. No Violation of Right against Self-Incrimination and Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
BASECO also contends that its right against self incrimination and
unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed by the
Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce corporate records
from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails
to do so." The order was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of
Executive Order No. 1, treating of the PCGG's power to "issue
subpoenas requiring * * the production of such books, papers,
contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as
may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission, "
and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its power to
"require all persons in the Philippines holding * * (alleged "ill-gotten")
assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in
their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of
the same * *." The contention lacks merit.
78
It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no
application to juridical persons.
While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises, may
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
ofsuchprivileges * * 113
Relevant jurisprudence is also cited by the Solicitor General. 114
* * corporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protections which private individuals
have. * * They are not at all within the privilege against
self-incrimination, although this court more than once
has said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th
Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also
settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to
produce its records in its possession upon the plea that
they will either incriminate him or may incriminate
it." (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186; emphasis, the Solicitor General's).
* * The corporation is a creature of the state. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the
public. It received certain special privileges and
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the
state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are
limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized
by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its
creation. There is a reserve right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to
hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to
make use of certain franchises, could not, in the
exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of the corporate
books and papers for that purpose. The defense
amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which
is charged with a criminal violation of the statute may
plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to
produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer
it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises may
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of
such privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed.,
771, 780 [emphasis, the Solicitor General's])
At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A, amending Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 14 assures protection to individuals required to
produce evidence before the PCGG against any possible violation of
his right against self-incrimination. It gives them immunity from
prosecution on the basis of testimony or information he is compelled to
present. As amended, said Section 4 now provides that —
xxx xxx xxx
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but
no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony, or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.
The constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures finds no application to the case at bar either. There has been
no search undertaken by any agent or representative of the PCGG,
and of course no seizure on the occasion thereof.
24. Scope and Extent of Powers of the PCGG
One other question remains to be disposed of, that respecting the
scope and extent of the powers that may be wielded by the PCGG with
regard to the properties or businesses placed under sequestration or
provisionally taken over. Obviously, it is not a question to which an
79
answer can be easily given, much less one which will suffice for every
conceivable situation.
a. PCGG May Not Exercise Acts of Ownership
One thing is certain, and should be stated at the outset: the PCGG
cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered, frozen or
provisionally taken over. AS already earlier stressed with no little
insistence, the act of sequestration; freezing or provisional takeover of
property does not import or bring about a divestment of title over said
property; does not make the PCGG the owner thereof. In relation to the
property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over, the PCGG is
a conservator, not an owner. Therefore, it can not perform acts of strict
ownership; and this is specially true in the situations contemplated by
the sequestration rules where, unlike cases of receivership, for
example, no court exercises effective supervision or can upon due
application and hearing, grant authority for the performance of acts of
dominion.
Equally evident is that the resort to the provisional remedies in
question should entail the least possible interference with business
operations or activities so that, in the event that the accusation of the
business enterprise being "ill gotten" be not proven, it may be returned
to its rightful owner as far as possible in the same condition as it was at
the time of sequestration.
b. PCGG Has Only Powers of Administration
The PCGG may thus exercise only powers of administration over the
property or business sequestered or provisionally taken over, much like
a court-appointed receiver, 115 such as to bring and defend actions in its own name;
receive rents; collect debts due; pay outstanding debts; and generally do such other acts and things
as may be necessary to fulfill its mission as conservator and administrator. In this context, it may in
addition enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that
may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual its efforts to carry out its
task; punish for direct or indirect contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court; and seek and
secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the government. 116 In the case of
sequestered businesses generally (i.e., going concerns, businesses in current operation), as in the
case of sequestered objects, its essential role, as already discussed, is that of conservator,
caretaker, "watchdog" or overseer. It is not that of manager, or innovator, much less an owner.
c. Powers over Business Enterprises Taken Over by
Marcos or Entities or Persons Close to him; Limitations
Thereon
Now, in the special instance of a business enterprise shown by
evidence to have been "taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President
Marcos," 117 the PCGG is given power and authority, as already adverted to, to "provisionally
take (it) over in the public interest or to prevent * * (its) disposal or dissipation;" and since the term is
obviously employed in reference to going concerns, or business enterprises in operation, something
more than mere physical custody is connoted; the PCGG may in this case exercise some measure
of control in the operation, running, or management of the business itself. But even in this special
situation, the intrusion into management should be restricted to the minimum degree necessary to
accomplish the legislative will, which is "to prevent the disposal or dissipation" of the business
enterprise. There should be no hasty, indiscriminate, unreasoned replacement or substitution of
management officials or change of policies, particularly in respect of viable establishments. In fact,
such a replacement or substitution should be avoided if at all possible, and undertaken only when
justified by demonstrably tenable grounds and in line with the stated objectives of the PCGG. And it
goes without saying that where replacement of management officers may be called for, the greatest
prudence, circumspection, care and attention - should accompany that undertaking to the end that
truly competent, experienced and honest managers may be recruited. There should be no role to be
played in this area by rank amateurs, no matter how wen meaning. The road to hell, it has been
said, is paved with good intentions. The business is not to be experimented or played around with,
not run into the ground, not driven to bankruptcy, not fleeced, not ruined. Sight should never be lost
sight of the ultimate objective of the whole exercise, which is to turn over the business to the
Republic, once judicially established to be "ill-gotten." Reason dictates that it is only under these
conditions and circumstances that the supervision, administration and control of business
enterprises provisionally taken over may legitimately be exercised.
d. Voting of Sequestered Stock; Conditions Therefor
So, too, it is within the parameters of these conditions and
circumstances that the PCGG may properly exercise the prerogative to
vote sequestered stock of corporations, granted to it by the President
of the Philippines through a Memorandum dated June 26, 1986. That
Memorandum authorizes the PCGG, "pending the outcome of
proceedings to determine the ownership of * * (sequestered) shares of
stock," "to vote such shares of stock as it may have sequestered in
corporations at all stockholders' meetings called for the election of
directors, declaration of dividends, amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation, etc." The Memorandum should be construed in such a
manner as to be consistent with, and not contradictory of the Executive
Orders earlier promulgated on the same matter. There should be no
exercise of the right to vote simply because the right exists, or because
the stocks sequestered constitute the controlling or a substantial part of
the corporate voting power. The stock is not to be voted to replace
directors, or revise the articles or by-laws, or otherwise bring about
80
substantial changes in policy, program or practice of the corporation
except for demonstrably weighty and defensible grounds, and always
in the context of the stated purposes of sequestration or provisional
takeover, i.e., to prevent the dispersion or undue disposal of the
corporate assets. Directors are not to be voted out simply because the
power to do so exists. Substitution of directors is not to be done without
reason or rhyme, should indeed be shunned if at an possible, and
undertaken only when essential to prevent disappearance or wastage
of corporate property, and always under such circumstances as assure
that the replacements are truly possessed of competence, experience
and probity.
In the case at bar, there was adequate justification to vote the
incumbent directors out of office and elect others in their stead
because the evidence showed prima facie that the former were just
tools of President Marcos and were no longer owners of any stock in
the firm, if they ever were at all. This is why, in its Resolution of
October 28, 1986; 118 this Court declared that —
25. No Sufficient Showing of Other Irregularities
As to the other irregularities complained of by BASECO, i.e., the
cancellation or revision, and the execution of certain contracts,
inclusive of the termination of the employment of some of its
executives, 119 this Court cannot, in the present state of the evidence on record, pass upon
them. It is not necessary to do so. The issues arising therefrom may and will be left for initial
determination in the appropriate action. But the Court will state that absent any showing of any
important cause therefor, it will not normally substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG in these
individual transactions. It is clear however, that as things now stand, the petitioner cannot be said to
have established the correctness of its submission that the acts of the PCGG in question were done
without or in excess of its powers, or with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining
order issued on October 14, 1986 is lifted.

Petitioner has failed to make out a case of grave abuse

or excess of jurisdiction in respondents' calling and
holding of a stockholders' meeting for the election of
directors as authorized by the Memorandum of the
President * * (to the PCGG) dated June 26, 1986,
particularly, where as in this case, the government can,
through its designated directors, properly exercise
control and management over what appear to be
properties and assets owned and belonging to the
government itself and over which the persons who
appear in this case on behalf of BASECO have failed to
show any right or even any shareholding in said
corporation.

It must however be emphasized that the conduct of the PCGG

nominees in the BASECO Board in the management of the company's
affairs should henceforth be guided and governed by the norms herein
laid down. They should never for a moment allow themselves to forget
that they are conservators, not owners of the business; they are
fiduciaries, trustees, of whom the highest degree of diligence and
rectitude is, in the premises, required.

81
G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela,respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner
complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not
it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in
these proceedings; but the respondents contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for
by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again
which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of
section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down
in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States vs. Tan
Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735),
cited by counsel for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs.
Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code,
and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses
to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But
this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,
seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law
and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether
the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits
compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against
which these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law
which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya
en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal
Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section
56.
As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the
English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as
follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness."
Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the
Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the
United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these
various phrasings have a common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the
variations of wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is
conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the
witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by
another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving
evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These
various phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the
form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4
Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but
extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional
provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure
toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is
strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts
liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights,
82
 and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion.
Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral
testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by
other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C.
L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing
from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing
the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against
himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision
under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own
behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he
may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order
that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in
question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter,
1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as witness in his
own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378),
where the judge asked the defendant to write his name during the
hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before
us. We are not concerned here with the defendant, for it does not
appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the
supposed falsification, and still less as it a question of the defendant on
trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an
investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let
it further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant
performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form
of writing of the defendant was obtained before the criminal action was
instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs. Molineux (61
Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the
aforesaid case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily
offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there gives
prominence to the defendant's right to decline to write, and to the fact
that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said
decision referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):
The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley.
He preferred to accede to the latter's request, and we can
discover no ground upon which the writings thus produced can
be excluded from the case. (Emphasis ours.)
For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert
(41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that the defendant could not be
compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the
endorsement.
He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his
having signed papers not in the case, and was asked in
particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior
to the note in suit, and whether he would not write his name
there in the court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on
objection, and it is of these rulings that complaint is made. The
object of the questions was to bring into the case extrinsic
signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we
think that the judge was correct in ruling against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume
4, page 878), says:
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege. Nor it is the removal or replacement of his garments
or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body
83
 to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to
make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him
to move his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of his last
assertion on specimens of handwriting. We note that in the
same paragraph 2265, where said authors treats of "Bodily
Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great variety of
concrete illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many
cases, among them that of People vs. Molineux (61 N. E., 286)
which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar
because there the defendant voluntary gave specimens of his
handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and has
even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not
be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein
is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as
the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more
serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production
of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the
case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work
cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels.
— 1. It follows that the production of documents or chattels by
a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in
response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or
to other form of process treating him as a witness ( i.e. as a
person appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his
moral responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused under the
protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded.
(And he cites the case of People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119;
38 N.E., 1003)
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the
witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the
falsifier. And for this reason the same eminent author, Professor
Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of documents and
chattels, in the passage cited, adds:
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and
though the documents or chattels be already in existence and
not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or
utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line
can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a
witness; because in virtue it would be at any time liable to
make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles
produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain
a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime
would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner
is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed
in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do
not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on
behalf of the respondents, it should be remembered that in the case of
People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against
their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood
to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do.
The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while
absolute when claimed, maybe waived by any one entitled to
invoke it. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and cases
noted.)
84
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23
Phil., 145), were the defendant did not opposethe extraction from his
body of the substance later used as evidence against him.

In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated
that the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case
rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case
there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body
by physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this
court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish
evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled
to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only
enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of which is
very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present
case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive,
testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the
purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers,
it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the
case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence,
and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or
produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to
create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.

Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the

case of United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the
defendant was not compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to
take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling
him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare,
or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his own
condemnation.

Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that
the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison.

Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

85
G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Placido L. Mapa, Jr.
Filemon Flores for J. Lorenzo Vergara.
PUNO, J.:
The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a
cooperative witness who has been granted immunity is the core issue
posed in this petition. On balance are important rights in conflict: the
right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative
to be silent to the State to be exempt from further prosecution; the right
of the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a
crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an
accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of
immunity extended by the PCGG to an accused.
First, the facts.
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo
Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat,
Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr.,
and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) as amended, docketed as Case
No. 11960 in the respondent court, as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 1985 and
March 1986, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan, accused Placido L.
Mapa, Jr., J. Lorenzo Vergara, Ramon F. Aviado, Jr., Dominador
Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., Jose C. Crisanto, Jr., acting in
various capacities as management officials of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC) and/or Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI),
all government-owned and controlled corporations, as well as
Dolores Potenciano of BLTB, acting in concert in the performance
of their duties, in utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities, and
with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating with one another
and with accused Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, son-in-law of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and therefore related to the
deposed President by affinity within the third degree, and
Fernando Balatbat, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board
resolution and in disregard of better offers, promote and facilitate
the sale of a major portion of the public utility assets of the
Pantranco Express, Inc., for a consideration of SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION (P775,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to the North Express Transport, Inc. (NETI), which the
accused knew to be a newly organized paper corporation with a
purported paid-up capital of only FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00)
PESOS and owned and controlled by accused Gregorio Ma.
Araneta III, by misleading, inducing and/or unduly influencing the
Board of Directors of PNB, NIDC and PNEI into approving a
Memorandum of Agreement and later a Purchase Agreement with
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous terms and conditions
which made possible the premature delivery of said PNEI assets
to NETI without any down payment, and which, inter alia, allowed
NETI to operate PNEI's franchises and utilize, even before the
execution of the said Purchase Agreement, not only the PNEI
assets subject of the proposed sale, but also other utility buses
and properties of PNEI not covered by the sale, thereby allowing
NETI to derive an income from said operation between the period
of actual delivery and execution of the Purchase Agreement of the
sum of EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P85,689,180.00) PESOS
before the actual payment of the agreed FIFTY-FIVE MILLION
(P55,000,000.00) PESOS down payment, thereby giving accused
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages and/or
preferences and causing undue injury to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
MILLION (P400,000,000.00) PESOS, and such other amounts as
may be awarded by the Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
86
Except for petitioner Araneta, all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11960 were arraigned. Their trial started on September 20, 1988.
In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the
United States and concealing the investment of money through cronies
and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction of the Marcoses,
the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses. Among these
witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara was
interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera
and by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa
was interviewed on November 14, 1988 and August 11, 1989 also by
Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas. After
their interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO
cases against the former First Couple. They were promised immunity
from further criminal prosecution. They agreed.
On May 16, 1990, the Philippine Government through the PCGG, and
the petitioners formalized their separate agreements in writing. The
agreement with petitioner Mapa provided:
WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested MAPA to make himself
available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in the
on-going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, MAPA is a defendant or respondent in several civil
and criminal cases which the REPUBLIC has filed or intends to
file in relation to this participation in various contracts that are
alleged to have resulted in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in violation of Philippine laws,
rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, on the basis of MAPA's express intent to make
himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of the civil and criminal cases which it
has filed or intends to file against MAPA under the terms and
conditions herein below set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the parties agree as follows:
1. MAPA shall make himself available as a witness in the case
entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants MAPA
immunity from investigation, prosecution and punishment for any
offense with reference to which his testimony and information are
given, including any offense and commission of which any
information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution
for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of
REPUBLIC’s review of the cases both civil and criminal which it
has filed or intends to file against MAPA within the purview of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the REPUBLIC shall
cause the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or
respondent in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal
proceeding or investigation.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA
on the basis of and relying on MAPA's promise of cooperation as
described herein. In case of breach of his commitment to fully
cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case
entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed
revoked, and of no force and effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal
prosecution to MAPA and his exclusion from PCGG initiated civil
cases and criminal proceeding or investigations has been
undertaken in the exercise of the PCGG's authority under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Accordingly, nothing
herein shall be construed as an admission by MAPA of any
criminal or civil liability.
The agreement with petitioner Vergara stated:
87
 WHEREAS, REPUBLIC has requested VERGARA to make
himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States
of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," more particularly in
the on-going trial of the case;
WHEREAS, Vergara is a defendant in Criminal Case No. 11960
entitled "People vs. Gregorio Ma. Araneta, et al.", now pending
before the Sandiganbayan, Second Division;
WHEREAS, on the basis of VERGARA’s express intent to make
himself available as witness in the case entitled "United States of
America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.," and in the light of
REPUBLIC's re-appraisal of VERGARA's participation in
Criminal Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC approved to grant
immunity to VERGARA under the terms and conditions
hereinbelow set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the parties agree as follows:
1. VERGARA shall make himself available as a witness in the
case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
et al."
2. In consideration of the same, REPUBLIC grants VERGARA
immunity from investigation, prosecution and punishment for any
offense with reference to which his testimony and information are
given, including any offense and commission of which any
information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information is used as basis thereof, except a prosecution
for perjury and/or giving false testimony.
3. Likewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of
REPUBLIC’s review of VERGARA’s participation in Criminal
Case No. 11960, the REPUBLIC shall cause the dismissal of
VERGARA from Criminal Case No. 11960.
4. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to
VERGARA on the basis of and relying on VERGARA's promise
of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of h is
commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a
witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall
forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
5. The parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and
criminal prosecution to VERGARA and his exclusion from
Criminal Case No. 11960 has been undertaken in the exercise of
the PCGG's authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A. Accordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as a
admission by VERGARA of any criminal liability.
On the same day, May 16, 1990, former PCGG Chairman Mateo
Caparas wrote to petitioner Mapa the following letter:
Dear Sir:
With reference to the agreement executed between yourself and
the Republic of the Philippines on May 16, 1990, we would like to
confirm
that among the criminal cases which the Republic agrees to
cause the dismissal of the case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Mr. Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, et. al., " Criminal
Case No. 11960 of the Sandiganbayan. We understand that in
that case the prosecution is in the process of closing its evidence
with the submission of its offer of documentary evidence and that
it is your intention thereupon to submit a Motion to Dismiss for
failure of the prosecution to prove its case. We affirm that if,
because of the situation of the case, it would not be possible for
the Republic to file the necessary motion to cause the dismissal
thereof, then we shall upon submission of your Motion to Dismiss
offer no objection to its favorable consideration by the court in
relation to you.
We also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the
U.S. prosecutors the grant of immunity in your favor no less
broad or extensive than that granted to Mr. Jaime C. Laya.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) M.A.T. Caparas
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A similar letter was sent to petitioner Vergara.
The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They
travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare
and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the PCGG. But
despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors
decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result was a debacle
for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was
acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former President Marcos was delisted as
an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.
The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in
Criminal Case No. 11960 before the respondent court. On the basis of
the immunity granted to them, petitioners filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss on October 22, 1990. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio
B. Dionido and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no
objection to petitioners' Motion, viz:
That herein accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo
Vergara were granted immunity by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government from criminal liability arising from cases
which PCGG had or intends to file against them;
The PCGG, therefore, interposes no objection to the Joint Motion
to Dismiss filed by accused Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and J. Lorenzo
Vergara in Criminal Case No. 11960-PCGG by reason of the
immunity aforestated.
Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint
Motion to Dismiss, by a vote of 4-1. 1Petitioners were undaunted. On
April 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was
followed on May 23, 1991, by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation
reiterating PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. Respondent court, however, refused to budge from
its prior position. It denied petitioners' motions.
Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Reconsideration. They pose the following issues:
2.00.a. Does the fact that the information provided by
petitioners to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No. 11960
make the immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal
Case No. 11960?
2.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PCGG,
which would become basis of the grant of immunity, be
submitted to the Sandiganbayan in order that it may determine
whether such information is necessary to ascertain or prove the
guilt or liability of a respondent, defendant or an accused in an
action involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth?
2.00.c. Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases
did not actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the
immunity granted to them?
2.00.d. Was the immunity granted to petitioners too late
considering that when it was granted, the prosecution in
Criminal Case
No. 11960 had already rested its case?"
The proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of
Atty. David Castro as Chairman of PCGG. In its Comment dated
January 6, 1992, the PCGG somersaulted from its stance supporting
the petitioners. Its Comment states:
1. The Presidential Commission on Good Government has
indeed granted Messrs. Placido L. Mapa, Jr., and Jesus
Lorenzo Vergara immunity from investigation, prosecution and
punishment for any offense for which civil and criminal cases
have been or to be filed against them within the purview of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A but such immunity is
conditional.
2. The conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation
said petitioners shall give to said Commission by way of
information and testimony in cases now pending or to be filed
before the Sandiganbayan against other defendants therein to
prove the latter's acquisition or accumulation of property or
properties in violation of existing laws.
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 3. Failure on the part of petitioners Placido Mapa, Jr. and Jesus
Vergara to testify in favor of the government and against other
defendants on matters referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph nullifies the immunity granted to both
defendants (emphasis supplied).
It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the Reply
of petitioners dated June 10, 1992, where it adopted the respondent
Sandiganbayan's questioned Resolution and Concurring Opinions
dated
March 6, 1991. It further stressed that "[T]he granting of 'Immunity'
from criminal liability and/or prosecution is a matter subject to the
court's judicious determination and approval, after applying the test of
compliance and the standard of reasonableness with the rigid
requirements for such grant under Section 5 of Executive Order No.
14-A, as amended." The Solicitor General defended the stance of the
PCGG and the respondent court.
We find merit in the petition.
The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or
respondents immunity from suits, has a long history.
We begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these
immunities. Article XVI, section 3 provides that "the State may not be
sued without its consent." The classic justification for the non-suability
of the State is that provided by Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: ". . .
there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law
on which the right depends." 2 Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution
also grants parliamentary immunities, viz: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains the
rationale for this immunity in the following manners: ". . . The first is
intended to ensure representation of the constituents of the member of
the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its
sessions. The second enables the legislator to express views bearing
upon the public interest without fear of accountability outside the halls
of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the
usual evidence required in the court of justice. In other words, he is
given more leeway than the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters
that ought to be divulged for the public good."3 The President was also
immunized from suit during his tenure in the 1973 Constitution.
Aside from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving
immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high
political, social and economic impact against the people. Some of
these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. Thus,
PD 749 provides:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about
any violation of Articles 210, 211, 212 of the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and other provisions of the said codes
penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials
concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing
acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and
who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from
prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to
which his information and testimony were given, and may plead
or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of
such prosecution: Provided, That this immunity may be enjoyed
even in cases where the information and the testimony are
given against a person who is not a public official but who is a
principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any
of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, That this
immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the
public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving;
And, Provided, finally, That the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any
of the above- mentioned provisions of law, rules and
regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the
conviction of the accused public officer;
90
 3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession
of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its
material points; and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Likewise, under PD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created
to conduct a fact-finding inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder
case, was given the power to compel testimony of a witness. In
exchange for his testimony, such a witness was extended transactional
immunity from later prosecution. Section 5 of said PD No. 1886 states:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the
Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence
produced by him shall not be used against him in connection
with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is
compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall
he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury
committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office.
Indeed, as early as April 16, 1951, R.A. 602, establishing a minimum
wage law, extended transactional immunity to persons who testify or
produce books, papers or other records and documents before the
Secretary of Labor or a Wage Board. A similar but not identical power
is given to the prosecution under section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused to be utilized as a
state witness.
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States,
there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They
are the transactional immunity and the used-and-derivative-use
immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its
protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 4 In contrast,
by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution. 5 In Kastigar vs. US, 6 the rationale of these
immunity grants is well explained, viz:
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court
or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is
firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The
power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to
testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements
that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him,
and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. . .
xxx xxx xxx
But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a
number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most
important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our
fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important
advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in
any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard
the values that underlie the privilege.
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, are not incompatible with these
values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between
the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of
government to compel citizens to testify. The existence of these
statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that
91
 many offenses are of such a character that the only persons
capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the
crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such
offenses, and their primary use has been to investigate such
offenses . . . (E)very State in the Union, as well as the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes.
The commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have
characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective
enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .
We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive
Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution. The pertinent sections provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes
that such testimony or provision of information would tend to
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal,
the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide
information.
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement,
or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'
Sec. 3. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is
authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person who provides information or testifies in any investigation
conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner
in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or
accumulated the property or properties in question in any case
where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or
prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby
granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats
such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do
so by the latter or by the Commission.
There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the
PCGG under sections 4 and 5. Section 4 deals with the power which
PCGG can use to compel an unwilling witness to testify. On the other
hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure
information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness
compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be
prosecuted but "no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is
completely immunized from prosecution.
The case at bench involves an exercise of power by PCGG under
section 5, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is
not disputed that they furnished information to the PCGG during their
interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers and US prosecutor La Bella.
Due to their cooperation, they were extended immunity from
prosecution by the PCGG. In return, they flew to New York to testify in
the RICO trial of Imelda Marcos. As they were witnesses for the
prosecution, their expenses were shouldered by the PCGG itself. At
the last minute, however, US prosecutor La Bella decided to dispense
with their testimony. The rest is history. The prosecution failed to
convict Mrs. Marcos.
The first issue is whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to
review the immunity granted by PCGG in favor of the petitioners. We
sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent court. To be sure, we have
grappled with this once slippery issue in the case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 76, 80-81, and we held:
We first ascertain whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to look into the validity of the immunity granted by
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 the PCGG to Jose Y. Campos which was extended to his son,
petitioner-intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.
xxx xxx xxx
The powers of the PCGG are not unlimited. Its jurisdiction over
cases involving ill-gotten wealth must be within the parameters
stated in Executive Order No. 14. Necessarily, the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan which is tasked to handle the ill-gotten
wealth cases must include the jurisdiction to determine whether
or not the PCGG exceeded its power to grant immunity
pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No.14.
It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acquired
jurisdiction to try and decide Case No. 11960 where petitioners stand
accused of violating RA 3019. It has started receiving the evidence of
the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners, with the conformity
of PCGG, then claimed their immunity via a motion to dismiss
addressed to the respondent court. The motion to dismiss is thus a
mere incident well within the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
resolve.
The next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range
of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of
discretion of the PCGG granting immunity to petitioners pursuant to
section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended.
Respondent court, thru the Solicitor General, pushes the proposition
that said power of review is plenary in reach. It is urged that its
plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the
grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter's
judgment. The submission will warrant the respondent court in
examining the intrinsic quality of the given information or testimony,
i.e., whether it truly establishes the "unlawful manner" in which the
respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the
property or properties in question. Likewise, it will give a warrant to the
respondent court to change the judgment made by the PCGG that the
witness' information or testimony is "necessary" to ascertain or prove
the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.
We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition.
Neither the text nor the texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends
color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as
amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In instances, where
the intent is to endow courts of justice with the power to review and
reverse tactical moves of the prosecution, the law confers the power in
clear and certain language. Thus, under section 9 of Rule 119, the
prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to
discharge an accused to be a state witness but its decision is made
subject to the approval of the court trying the case. It has to file a
proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the
prosecution fails to prove that it has satisfied the requirements of the
rule on discharge of a witness. The rule is crafted as to leave no iota of
doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the
prosecution on the matter. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended,
is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of
the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG
granting a section 5 immunity. This silence argues against the thesis
that the respondent court has full and unlimited power to reverse
PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity.
Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.
We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of
E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant
immunity alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is
not shared with any other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to the
approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The basic
reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the
principles of separation of power. The decision to grant immunity from
prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for
government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be
guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular
need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or
not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended
the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to
the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute
includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of
93
the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is
to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or
failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the
prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors
are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct
the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the
scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due
process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing
field perfectly even and perpetually level.
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing
the grant of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners,
the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass upon
its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain:
(a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or
testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge
of its functions;
(b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or
testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the
respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the
property or properties in question; and (c) whether in the bona fide
judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant
or accused. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the
discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and
without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice.
Applying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss
based on a claim of immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of
E.O. 14, as amended.
The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG
relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in
New York. They gave the information in the course of interviews
conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US
prosecutor Charles
La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution.
Sec. 5 requires that the information should relate to "any case" which
PCGG can prosecute as mandated by the Constitution and E.O. Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not limit said information to be given only in a
case where the informant is himself an accused or a respondent. Such
a reading adopted by the respondent court is unduly restrictive of the
intendment of section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain
language.
It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the
petitioners would in the judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful
manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or accumulated their
properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt. The totality of the
circumstances of the case established this element. Thus, after their
interview, the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value
of the information given by the petitioners. It forthwith signed and
sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from
prosecution. In the case of petitioner Mapa, "the Republic shall cause
the dismissal or exclusion of MAPA as party defendant or respondent
in all PCGG initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or
investigation." In the case of petitioner Vergara, "the Republic shall
cause the dismissal of Vergara from Criminal Case No. 11960." This
commitment was reiterated by former Chairman Mateo Caparas of
PCGG in his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, as related above.
The parties' agreements were then implemented. Petitioners travelled
to New York to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses. It was
even the PCGG that shouldered their expenses. All these
circumstances prove the judgment of the PCGG that the pieces of
information given by petitioners would establish the "unlawful manner"
with which the Marcoses acquired their wealth.
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners
to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not
nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of the
law and the parties' implementing agreements. Under section 5 of E.O.
No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information to the
prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement,
they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the said
RICO cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they
were not called to testify by the US prosecutors of the RICO case.
Their failure to testify was not of their own making. It was brought
about by the decision of the US prosecutors who may have thought
that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses. Since
94
petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it
due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be
penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the
PCGG itself adopted the posture that the immunity of petitioners
stayed and should not be disturbed. It joined the motion to dismiss filed
by petitioners in the respondent court. When the respondent court
denied the motion, PCGG stuck to its previous position as it again
joined the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in this
petition for review on certiorari that PCGG, after a change of Chairman,
flip-flopped in its position.
We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a
section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing
trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended,
does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already
charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of
immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining
its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to
exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5
immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the
benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition
and before his final conviction. Our regard for the rights of an accused
dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held that laws that
decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive
effect. They constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their
beneficiaries' regardless of the appearance of their guilt. To be sure,
the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 has yet to be
established beyond doubt. The PCGG itself does not appear certain
and confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in
said criminal case. The records show that petitioners Mapa was
granted immunity not only because of the information he gave to the
prosecution but also ". . . in light of Republic's review of the cases both
civil and criminal which it has filed or intends to file against . . ." him.
Similarly, petitioner Vergara was granted immunity ". . . in light of
Republic's reviewof Vergara's participation in Criminal Case No. 11960
. . . ." After reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PCGG
appears to have sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their
prosecution. Its former chairman, M.A.T. Caparas, learned that
petitioners would file a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 11960
after PCGG rest its evidence, "for failure of the prosecution to prove its
case." In his May 16, 1990 letters to the petitioners, he assured them
that "we shall . . . offer no objection to its favorable consideration." This
is a patent admission that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has merit and
that the PCGG cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal
Case No. 11960.
Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5
immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It
simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege, as if it was
gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread
the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-
incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.
The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses
against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of
coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To
guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right
against self-incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all
civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist
government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a
necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate
the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its
absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which
would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea
of the right
against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as
transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore
discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza
from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high
price for it — the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our
hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination
and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and
protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights
must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the
individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it,
rightly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions of the respondent court dated
March 7, and June 3, 1991 are annulled and set aside and the
Amended Information against the petitioners in Criminal Case No.
11960 is ordered dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.
95
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Esmeraldo U. Guloy for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano
Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes
and Paulino Gonzal.1
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against
petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused,
being then the driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep
Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas '85, and
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and
without taking the necessary care and precautions to avoid
damage to property and injuries to persond (sic), did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and
opefate (sic) said Owner Jeep in a careless, reckless, negligent
and imprudent manner, as a result of which said motor vehicle
being then driven and operated by him, hit and bumped a
tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas
'85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra and owned by Ernesto
Antonel, thereby causing damage to the Suzuki tricycle in the
amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver and the
passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained physical
injuries which required medical attendance as stated opposite
their respective names to wit:
1. Ernesto Reyes — More than thirty (30) days
2. Paulino Gonzal — More than thirty (30) days
3. Patricio Quitalig — Less than nine (9) days
and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor
for the same period of time.
which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 64294
and assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and (b) an Information for violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on
Abandonment of one's victim reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused,
being the driver of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313
UV Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized tricycle with
Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a
consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto Reyes
sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic)
them and failed (sic) to help or render assistance to them,
without justifiable reason.
which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig (Branch 71) and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.
On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its
decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the
crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and to pay the costs.
96
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the appeal as Criminal Case No.
70648.
In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
He entered a plea of not guilty.2
Petitioner's appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was decided on 31 July
1989. The court affirmed with modification the decision appealed from.
The modification consisted merely in the reduction of the penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months.3
Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals on 31 August 1989 a petition for its review, docketed as C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 07351, assigning therein the following alleged errors:
I AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT "THE TRICYCLE
DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP
DRIVEN BY THE PETITIONER."
II
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG. METRO MANILA, THAT THE PETITIONER, "LOSING
PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO WOULD
INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED,
PERHAPS INSTINCTIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY,
APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER THE ENORMITY OF HIS
MISDEMEANOR AND THUS DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD
ASSISTANCE TO HIS FALLEN VICTIMS."
III
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT, "AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID
COURT GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION'S
WITNESSES" FOR NOT BEING (SIC) SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
IV
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ABANDONMENT
UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO
MAYOR AND TO PAY THE COSTS.
V
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING NULL AND VOID ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG AND ALL
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.4
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in
its Decision promulgated on 9 November 1989.5 Pertinently, it ruled:
We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of
Art. 275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since
the evidence allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the
tricycle driver, who negligentlycaused the accident. Petitioner
misses the import of the provision. The provision punishes
the failure to help or render assistance to another whom the
offender accidentally wounded or injured. Accidental means
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention
and design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen
(Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary, 1972 ed., p. 7 citing De La Cruz
97
 v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17 SCRA 559).
Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner accidentally
injured the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or
render them assistance. There is no need to prove that
petitioner was negligent and that it was his negligence that
caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is
involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code will come into
play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides that "the penalty
next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to
the injured party such help as may be in his bands to give."
Petitioner was charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 not under Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he strongly urged
for reconsideration because:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be
penalized twice for an "accident" and another for
"recklessness", both of which arose from the same act. We
submit that there could not be a valid charge under Article 275,
when, as in the case at bar, there is already a pending charge
for reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. It is our view that the charge under Article 275
presupposes that there is no other charge for reckless
imprudence.
having been denied in the Resolution of 17 May 1990,6 petitioner filed
the instant petition.7
Before Us he raises this sole issue:
Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under
Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help
another whom he has accidentallywounded or injured" when,
he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under
Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?8
He maintains the negative view and supports it with the argument that
"[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular collision, one could not be
indicted in two separate informations at the same time based on
"accident" and "recklessness', for there is a world of difference
between "reckless imprudence" and "accidentally'." As expanded by
him:
. . . since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila . . . which offense carries heavier
penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he
could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for
abandonment . . . for having allegedly failed "to help or render
assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or
injured".9
In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required respondents to
comment on the petition.
In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, putting the
issue squarely, thus:
. . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for
abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code.
answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in
effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
In Our resolution of 13 March 1991 We gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda. Petitioner submitted his on 22 April 199110 while the
People moved that its Comment be considered as its memorandum.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually
invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to
1âwphi1
directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured
98
it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two
informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely
that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have
been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he
was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional
Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former
was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took
place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy
to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous
case.11 In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised
Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez,12 We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.
A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.13
In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-
machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed.
Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to
dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same
offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different
provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a
person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot
be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate
offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence
1âwphi1
(Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title
Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code.
The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim
(par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of
Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two
of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa.
Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.14
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither
an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its
presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. The last
paragraph of the Article specifically provides:
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on
the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in hand to
give.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information.
The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another
whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code which reads:
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
99
 xxx xxx xxx

2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another

whom he has accidentally wounded or injured.

The foregoing distinctions satisfy the guidelines We made in People vs.

Relova, et al.,15 wherein We held:

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the

constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where
the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a registration
thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to
be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the
second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of
an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.

Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle

barred the filing of the two informations against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DENIED without

pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

100
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the
Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12
August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an
information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia
on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together
with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a
search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and
examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from
the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of
the building" 1owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were,
in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During
the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused
the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric
meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed
before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel
Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas
City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a
fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in
relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of
ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City
Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said
ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease
the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant
situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such
unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by
the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged
and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND,
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to
February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City
Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of
P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above
information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the
information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already
prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an
order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion
to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time
of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was
filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense
charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for
theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
101
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as
follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y
Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in
relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and
the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light
System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total
amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light
System, owned and operated by the City Government of
Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be
arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5
May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof
was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the
accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist
of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case
can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the
prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec.
3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of
Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government
of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it
appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It
also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in
effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city
government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric
installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which
were done at one instance on a particular date between
November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information
states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis
supplied), it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the
accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The
information could not have meant that from November 1974 to
21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment
before the City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he
was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened
between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 which had
allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the
amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and parentheses in the
original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the
petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus
was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on
behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or
later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner
stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of
Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an
ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are
needed to constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that
102
there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor had been
obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical
System or the District Engineer. The petitioner urges that the relevant
terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their
connection with the Electrical System shall be done either by the
employee of the system duly authorized by its Superintendent or
by persons adept in the matter duly authorized by the District
Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of
installation or connection with the system to be undertaken by
the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered
guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that
electrical installations on residences or buildings be done by
persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires and
accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is primarily a
regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of
electric fluid which is already covered by the Revised Penal
Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's
argument continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices
without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To
constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to
establish any mens rea on the part of the offender generally speaking,
nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential
elements. These elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity
can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations of any
kind by, for instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not
register the actual electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the
rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the
second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct.
This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved — which reads as follows:
103
 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied;
Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the
1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently
under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No.
16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of
Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15,
Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information charged him with
having "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an
automobile — "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby
endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street."
Three months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No.
16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him
with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as
amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating
an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result
thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to
quash the second information upon the ground that it placed him twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by
the respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal judge
had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a
petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside
the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First
Instance of Iloilo having reversed the respondent municipal judge and
having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case No.
16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court
for review on appeal. In affirming the decision appealed from and
holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was
available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through
reckless driving — with which Diaz stood charged in the court
of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal Code
(third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act
No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz
was not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly,
reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless
driving are punishable under different provisions of said
Automobile Law. Hence — from the view point of Criminal Law,
as distinguished from political or Constitutional Law — they
constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain
conditions, one offense may include the other, and,
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double
jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz
case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in the
original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if
an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas
the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for
the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged
in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation
of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same
act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction
or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the
same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
104
 The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or
not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner could
— if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the
same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already
been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges,
substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated,
petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven
and operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an
automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand,
the information in case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the
same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and
operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and
negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended
by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if
the theories mentioned in the second information were not
established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in
case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal
ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded
double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred
eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either
by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only
where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the
accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given
rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two
offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under
different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another
offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double
jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution,
conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by
definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses
would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by
different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the
other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The
discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that
the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of
extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged,
as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of
the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are
claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance
and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by
examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts
of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken
place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved
by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or
negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously
under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the
Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the
same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a
reckless manner. The additional technical element of serious physical
injuries related to the physical consequences of the operation of the
automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the
body of the offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the
same occasion that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly).
105
The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time
frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the
accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of
electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the
necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The
accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This
corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his
electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and
devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The
Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity:
the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense"
where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense
is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the
constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to
prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets
of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned
in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for
the same offense, it seems elementary that an accused should
be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made
out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission
may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability
of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many
offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply
adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of
appellant, the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of
coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the
accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88
Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the
same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or
negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented
and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are
offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of
the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the
ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for
certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any
empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by
stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape
criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence
or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should
have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by
the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double
jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by the
Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with
the criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the
Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability
whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In
the present case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted
during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and use of
unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the
City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is
no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel
Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court
106
of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have
appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been
waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City
for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted
by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED.

Let the civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated
above. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

107
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two
cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later,
the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss
of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.
2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration
but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A.
No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the
line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil
action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of
conviction.7
108
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s
decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A.
2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries)
cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution
was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide
and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner
forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain
the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from
custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to
review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the
Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s
reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia.
The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule
124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at
his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders
his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
109
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation
why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought
the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
110
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-
groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6
and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and
"simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal
act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of
the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply
a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object
of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2)
the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as
opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of
minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by
their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence
in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and
dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty
should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime
when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way
from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series,
of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is
to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or
property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without
jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
111
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present
day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid
conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in
People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x
[but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected
Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes
under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from
an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting
act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage
to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.),
Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.),
People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966
by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by
the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring
a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains
one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely
extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
112
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this
unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court
in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his
previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same
reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war
Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate,
all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There,
we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge
was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed
on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November
14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains
one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of
his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which
did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s
plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be
set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries.
then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular
collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a
motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts
erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not
be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was
charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries
thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the
issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
113
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2,
1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited,
Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one
of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96)
signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two
complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case
was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he
had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial
Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the
vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage
of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose
Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in
the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30,
1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City
with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to
prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense
of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test
is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is
to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would
have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the
contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
114
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine
Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing
the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the
lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose
of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that
further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will
yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is
nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court
has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical
case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which
the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules
in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works
to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling
under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper;
Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can
produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article
48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately
following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none
of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless
one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges
were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to
grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level
courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the
approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has
now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
115
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a
single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double
jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light
offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage
to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are
also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the
latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis
supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme
under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.
Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and
Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-
crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II
under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in
the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication
in the Diaz line of cases.
1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies
under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does
not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only
the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
116
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of this ruling.
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders
dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of double jeopardy.
First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the
splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed

from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article
365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty
of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting

117
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman through
the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20, 2004
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No.
27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando’s Demurrer
to Evidence2 and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment
under Article 2443 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative
of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998,
Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the
Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.4 A Contract of
Consultancy5 dated February 8, 1999 was executed between the
Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the former
employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and
Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor
for a period of six months from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a
monthly salary of ₱26,953.80.
On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez
charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.6 The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and
the following Information7 dated March 19, 2002 charging the two with
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the
Sandiganbayan:
xxxx
That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime herein
charged, in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions,
conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M. Tiape, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously appoint ORLANDO M.
TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San Vicente, Palawan, accused
Alejandro A. Villapando knowing fully well that Orlando Tiape lacks the
qualification as he is a losing mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the May 1998 elections, hence is
ineligible for appointment to a public office within one year (1) from the
date of the elections, to the damage and prejudice of the government
and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and raffled
to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not
guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the
prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000.9
After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file
a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied
his motion but gave him five days within which to inform the court in
writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer to Evidence
for resolution without leave of court.10 Villapando then filed a
Manifestation of Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence,11 and was given
15 days from receipt to file his Demurrer to Evidence. He filed his
Demurrer to Evidence12 on October 28, 2003.
In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division
found Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as follows:
The Court found the "Demurrer to Evidence" impressed with merit.
118
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 244. Unlawful appointments.–Any public officer who
shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. (underscoring
supplied)
A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following
elements, to wit:
1. the offender was a public officer;
2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public office;
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications [therefor;]
and,
4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not
have the legal qualifications at the time he made the
nomination or appointment.
Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed.
1. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed.
2. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.
3. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called
upon to determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his]
designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal
qualification. Stated differently, does "legal qualification"
contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on appointment as
provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94
(b) of the Local Government Code, mandating that a candidate
who lost in any election shall not, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government?
The Court answers in the negative.
In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a
public office, "there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a
person to be nominated or appointed" therein. To illuminate further,
Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that the
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the
government is provided for by law, which may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience:
As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer who
nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The person
nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of qualification is
known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the
government is provided by law. The purpose of the law is to ensure
that the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the
office, thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.
The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience. For instance, for one
to be appointed as judge, he must be a lawyer. So if the Judicial and
Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as judge knowing him
to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such act constitutes a
violation of the law under consideration.
In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of
Municipal Administrator. As such, the law that provides for the legal
qualification for the position of municipal administrator is Section 480,
Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit:
"Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.–(a) No
person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good
moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public
administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized
college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and
administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the
provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the
municipal administrator.
119
 xxx xxx x x x"
It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much
less prove that Mayor Villapando’s appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked
any of the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal
Administrator. Prosecution’s argument rested on the assertion that
since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked the
required legal qualifications.
It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who possessed the
required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily
disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one
year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand,
one may not be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not
be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications
imposed by law.
4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to discuss
the same.
WHEREFORE, finding the "Demurrer to Evidence" filed by Mayor
Villapando with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor
Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.13
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the Philippines.
Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the
petition. Despite several notices, however, he failed to do so and in a
Resolution14 dated June 7, 2006, this Court informed him that he is
deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the case shall be
resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN INTERPRETING THAT
THE "LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION" IN ARTICLE 244 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ONE
YEAR PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING CANDIDATES
AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE.
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE COURSE
TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING, THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.15
Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate
who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the government or any government-
owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that
except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who
lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues
that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not
synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a
position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who
possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
120
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason
of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However,
there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a
person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long
as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the
contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall
knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking
the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials;
Candidates Who Lost in Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate
who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government
or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
Villapando’s contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division’s
interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification
in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan16 that
once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to
an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the
same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion. 1avvphi1
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers
to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.17
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic
rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification
cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to
exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal
maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
121
Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapando’s
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated
Villapando by giving him five days within which to inform it in writing
whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without
leave of court.

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without

due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus,
cannot be the source of an acquittal.18

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of

discretion in disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction
resulting in its decision granting Villapando’s Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision null
and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20,

2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No.
27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando’s Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment
under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL
and VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

122
G.R. No. 151912 September 26, 2005
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY and GLORIA BERMOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 14 November 2001
of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner and its Resolution dated 24 January 2002 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank
("petitioner"), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy ("respondent
spouses") were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public
document in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 ("trial court").
The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154193, alleged:
That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a
banking institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws
xxx, thru falsification of a public document in the following manner, to
wit: the said accused prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be
prepared, forged and falsified an owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 207434, which is an imitation of, and similar to the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by the Regist[er] of Deeds for the
City of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and there
typing on the blank spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel
of land containing an area of 350 square meters, located in Malate, this
City, the names of the accused as the registered owners thereof, and
then signing, falsifying and simulating the signature of "ALICIA D.
GANZON", Register of Deeds, appearing on the lower right hand
portion of the 1st page of said document; the name "EDGARDO C.
CASTRO", Actg. Deputy, appearing on the right hand middle portion of
the 3rd page, and imprinting thereon several entries purportedly
showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C.
Aguila and Sons, which was cancelled on February 17, 1994, thereby
making it appear, as it did appear, that accused are the registered
owners of the said property, under said TCT No. 207434 which
purportedly is the owner’s copy of said title, when in truth and in fact,
as the said accused fully well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as
the owner’s duplicate copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
207434 is in possession of the spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO
by reason of the previous mortgage of the said property in favor of the
latter since February 17, 1994 and which was later sold to them on
June 19, 1995; that once the said document has been forged and
falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused presented the
same to the Philippine Savings Bank and used the said title as
collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they did obtain a loan in the sum of
₱1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of the said
amount of ₱1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted
the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid amount
of ₱1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.3
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge.
The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on
that day, the trial court issued the following Order ("11 June 1997
Order"):
When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion
Puruganan, who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and
Atty. Albino Achas, defense counsel, appeared and upon their
stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities
of the accused.
Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public
prosecutor Antonio Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the
123
initial hearing for the reception of the evidence for the prosecution be
set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as previously
scheduled.4 (Emphasis supplied)
The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore
the following handwritten notation under the heading "remarks":
"Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels."5 This was the only
notation made under "remarks." Nowhere in the one-page minutes of
the hearing did it state that any of the accused made any stipulation or
admission.
During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo
("Crisostomo"), manager of petitioner’s Libertad Manila Branch, and
one Hermenigildo Caluag ("Caluag"), also an employee of petitioner.
Crisostomo testified that she came to know respondent spouses when
they applied for a loan in February 1994. Crisostomo stated that
respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No.
207434 ("TCT No. 207434") issued in their name over a parcel of land
in Malate, Manila ("Malate lot") which they offered as collateral for the
loan. Crisostomo further stated after the approval of respondent
spouses’ loan application, respondent spouses executed in her
presence a real estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner
as security for their loan. Caluag testified that he was tasked to register
petitioner’s certificate of sale over the Malate lot6 with the Register of
Deeds of Manila but the latter refused to do so because the Malate lot
had been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.7
After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the
prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of
court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed
to identify respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No.
96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed
the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified
respondent spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by
the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their
identity during the pre-trial.8
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order of 21 April 1998 ("21 April 1998 Order"), the trial court
granted respondent spouses’ motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-
154193, and acquitted respondent spouses. The 21 April 1998 Order
reads:
The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination
of whether the accused were identified by the prosecution witnesses as
the perpetrators of the act complained of during the trial of the case
and whether they admitted their identities as the accused named in the
information.
After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of
the two prosecution witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which
would slightly indicate that they identified the accused as the persons
who obtained a loan from the Philippine Savings Bank and executed
the corresponding documents. The identification of an accused [by the
witness] may be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or
[by] stepping down from the stand and tapping his shoulder. If the
accused is not present during the trial, his identification may be
effected through his pictures attached to the bail bond or some other
means. The identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an
offense is essential in the successful prosecution of criminal cases. By
the accused’s entering a negative plea to the allegations in the
information, he denies that he committed the offense. He cannot even
be compelled to give his name during the arraignment and for which
the Court may enter a plea of not guilty for him.
As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction
of the court and the identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the
Order of June 11, 1997 reveals that their express conformity to the
stipulation of facts entered into by their counsel with the private
prosecutor was never asked of them. Considering that the admission of
the identities of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime here
charged is a matter which adversely affects their substantial rights,
such admission must have to involve their express concurrence or
consent thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial
order containing such admissions. As to the minutes of the
proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it to state that there is nothing to
it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.
124
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the
same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria
Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de oficio.9
The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought
reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28
May 1998.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Solicitor General joined the petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as
earlier stated, denied the petition. It held:
In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued
that neither of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to
identify the accused as allegedly those who committed the crime they
were prosecuted for.
xxx
Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses
they presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of
the crime. xxx
We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a
couple purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to
the Bank and obtained the loan. Whether they are the same husband
and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The failure
of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of the accused
as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal
omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title,
presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title.
The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the
two accused as the same couple who appeared before the Bank to
obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal
liability.
Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways
to identify the accused, xxx [.]
True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the
accused. Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is
usually identified by the witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either
pointing at him or stepping down the witness’ stand and tapping him on
the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial court correctly
pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked.
The petitioner also argues that "the identities of private [respondents]
were clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between
the prosecution (thru the private prosecutor) and the defense." It insists
that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the
accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by them and
their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever
stipulations were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in
writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their
conformity to such stipulations. The records, however, show that the
Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated what transpired during that
particular hearing and what the counsels signed was the minutes for
the same hearing. Hence, the identities of the accused were not
stipulated upon for failure to comply with the requirements under the
Rules of Court. The trial court correctly ruled that "there [was] nothing
xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place."
xxx
In fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in
granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on
account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But even
assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it
would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. xxx
In the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the
judgment of the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and of the persons of this case. The trial court had
jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused,
either by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient
125
evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting [in] the dismissal of the
criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be
reviewed unless it can be shown that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this
case, assuming the trial court committed an error, the petitioner has
not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack [or] excess xxx of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error
of judgment.10
Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals
contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial court’s error
did not amount to grave abuse of discretion and stated, on the other
hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be
reviewed without violating respondent spouses’ right against double
jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for the first time, that it is the trial
court’s duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-trial order or
agreement embodying respondent spouses’ admissions and that its
failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion in the Resolution of 24
January 2002 which reads:
The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the
issue on double jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari.
Petitioner argues that our ruling has been contradictory for saying on
one hand that "even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of
the accused can no longer be reviewed either by appeal or on petition
for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy" while saying on the other hand "assuming that trial court
committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of
jurisdiction." Petitioner asks: "Which is which then?" – meaning, it has
not understood what a petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read
the decision carefully, in between the above-quoted statements of the
decision is the case of People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8,
1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the Supreme Court explicitly explained that
"review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the
acquittal of the accused [as a result of the grant of the demurrer to
evidence] lies outside the function of certiorari." True, a petition for
certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision
did it mention that the trial court in this case committed an error. We
merely made an assumption, without saying that there was an error
committed by the trial court, to make a point. We meant that if the trial
court did commit an error in ruling that there was insufficient evidence
resulting in the acquittal of the accused, such error can no longer be
reviewed since it would be one of judgment, which is not within the
ambit of a certiorari. xxx
The petitioner again asks us: "Who has the duty of requiring the
accused to sign the pre-trial order, the prosecution or the trial court
itself?" It answers that it is the trial court because it "has the sole and
exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in such proceedings
be duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the act of requiring
or compelling the accused to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly
fundamentally erroneous to suppose that such duty can be delegated
by the trial court to the prosecution." The petitioner further argues that
"the respondent Court was right off ousted of jurisdiction when it
deliberately and without legal basis refused to consider the stipulation
of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial order x x x despite
the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial order."
The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on
Pre-Trial on the Revised Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it
require the prosecution or the accused to sign the pre-trial order. All
that is required for the trial court to do is to hold a pre-trial conference
and issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated upon
by the parties, and evidence marked. And if there were any
agreements or admissions made or entered into by the parties during
the pre-trial conference, these should be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his or her counsel. Otherwise, such agreements or
admissions may not be used against the accused. xxx
Hence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to
sign the pre-trial order to make the agreements and admissions as
evidence against the accused. If the parties made such admission as
to the identities of the accused in this case, it is the look-out of the
counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require the accused to sign.
Why should the trial court remind the counsels what to do? If the
private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence against the
accused, then she should have required the admission in writing [sic]
and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules.
But, as the records show, all that was signed was the minutes of the
126
pre-trial conference. As already discussed in our decision, the trial
court committed no error on this point.11
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE
TRIAL COURT TO REQUIRE THE ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-
TRIAL ORDER;
II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11
JUNE 1997 PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE
PARTIES AND SHOULD THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;
III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED
WERE SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE TRIAL BY THE
WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION; [AND]
IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY
ATTACHED IN THE CASE.12
In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner.
The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.13
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On Whether Double Jeopardy is Applicable Here
Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 ("Section 7") of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure14 on double jeopardy provides:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.
For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements
in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without
his express consent.15
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express
consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the
dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the
right to speedy trial.16 A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls
under the first exception.17 Since such dismissal is based on the merits,
it amounts to an acquittal.18
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in
Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the
Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against
respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the
persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned
during which they entered "not guilty" pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No.
96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently,
the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense became vested on respondent spouses.
127
 The Extent of the Right Against Double Jeopardy
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is
charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b)
the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had
been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution
appeals from a judgment in the same case.19 The last is based on
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court20 which provides that "[a]ny
party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the
accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in
effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution21 and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining
such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.
Thus, we held in an earlier case:
In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety
of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused,
as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of
a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of
the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In
the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was
based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly
falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy
therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred
from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not
without any basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco23 —
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by
the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State x x x x" Thus, Green [v. United
States] expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know
the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even
those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ociety’s
awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness
to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very
vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is
prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the
finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,
"(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that
the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse
of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has
been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
On Petitioner’s Claim that the Trial Court’s Dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 96-154193 was Void
Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court
can inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses
128
because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They as earlier stated, cannot be done without violating respondent spouses’
contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion right against double jeopardy.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded
evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses’ identity.24 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
14 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the
The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from Court of Appeals.
judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is
narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the trial court "act[ed] SO ORDERED.
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trial was a
sham xxx."25

None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the

prosecution, through petitioner’s counsel as private prosecutor, was
afforded its day in court. Neither is there any question that the
proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as
basis for the trial court’s alleged grave abuse of discretion really
concerns its appreciation of the evidence. However, as the Court of
Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this
point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this
Court held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals26 applies with equal
force here —

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of
the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby
in double jeopardy." The argument that the judgment is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed
because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court
was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect
the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no
longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious
the error may be xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner

The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner
— on who has the responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement
is signed by the accused, on the effect of the 11 June 1997 Order, and
on whether respondent spouses were identified during the trial. All
these entail an inquiry into the merits of the 21 April 1998 Order, which,
129
G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUENAVENTURA BULING, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Emerito M.
Salva for appellee.
Francisco A. Puray for appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Hon.
Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding, finding the accused Buenaventura
Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
year of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the
offended party.
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On December
7, 1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical injuries for
having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which
according to the complaint would "require, medical attendance for a
period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba
from the performance of his customary labors for the game period of
time." The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on
December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to
1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the
offended party in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence
and has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated,
and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges that
the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical
attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1 ½ months to 2
½ months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious physical
injuries and sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph
hereof. This is the decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in
this appeal.
The only question for resolution by this Court whether the prosecution
and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to
the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been enunciated by
this Court, one in the cases of People vs.Tarok, 73 Phil., 260 and
People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil., 881, and the other, in the cases of
Melo vs. People, 85 Phil., 766, People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil., 829 and
People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil., 395. But in Melo vs. People, supra, we
expressly repealed our ruling in the case of People vs. Tarok, supra,
and followed in the case of People vs. Villasis, supra. In the
Melo vs. People case, we stated the ruling to be that:
. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant
is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be
said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
(85 Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new ruling?
In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in the case of
Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the offense into one
which was not in existence at the time the case for less serious
physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new fact
supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. What
happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the
offended party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as
follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and
that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated
(the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work
(Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on December 8,
1956, defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious physical
injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day
of arresto mayor, etc.
130
But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended
party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which
had been wounded. The examination discloses, according to the
physician, the following injuries:
Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm,
right. X-ray plate finding after one month and 12 days —
Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius right, with
slight calus. (Exh. "E").
and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1 ½
months to 2 ½ months barring complications.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the
case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been ommitted. It
is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the same when
the first examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when the
examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact
had been disclosed in the latter examination failure of this new fact to
be disclosed in the previous examination may be attributed to the
incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We find much
reason in this argument. What happened is no X-ray examination of
the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was
merely superficial. The physician who made the first examination could
not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this
could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.
Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree
with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no new
supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the
offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong, supra,
and argues that our ruling in said case should apply to the case at bar,
for the reason that in the said case the first crime with which the
accused was charged was less serious physical injuries and the
second one was serious physical injuries and yet we held that there
was no jeopardy. We have carefully examined this case and have
found that the first examination made of the offended party showed
injuries which would take from 20 to 30 days to heal, whereas the
subsequent examination disclosed that the wound of the offended
party would require medical attendance and incapacitate him for labor
for a period of 90 days, "causing deformity and the loss of the use of
said member". No finding was made in the first examination that the
injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand.
As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume that
such fact was not apparent or could not have been discernible at the
time the first examination was made. The course (not the length), of
the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only
be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the
reason why the court considered that there was a supervening fact
occurring since the filing of the original information.
But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-ray
examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957,
that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made
on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no now or supervening fact
that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the
original action, which would justify the application of the ruling
enunciated by us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs.
Manolong, supra. We attribute the new finding of fracture, which
evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very
superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956.
Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture would have
certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay
was caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we
have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred
which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs.
People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained
to apply the general rule of double jeopardy.
We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting
officers that before filing informations for physical injuries, thorough
physical and medical examinations of the injuries should first be made
to avoid instances, like the present, where by reason of the important
Constitutional provision of double jeopardy, the accused can not be
held to answer for the graver offense committed.
131
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of
conviction is set aside and the defendant-appellant acquitted of the
charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs.

132
 [G.R. NO. 130106. July 15, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. HON. PERLITA
J. TRIA-TIRONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 102, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and CHIEF
INSPECTOR RENATO A. MUYOT, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the
accused after trial on the merits without violating the
constitutional precept against double jeopardy?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorariseeking the
annulment of the decision1 of respondent Judge Perlita J. Tria-
Tirona dated 11 August 1997 acquitting accused-private
respondent Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot and in lieu thereof a
judgment be issued convicting the latter of the crime charged.
Armed with two search warrants,2 members of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Organized Crime Division,
together with members of the NBI Special Investigation Division
and the Presidential Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Task
Force Hammer Head serving as security, conducted a search on
the house of accused-private respondent located on Banawe,
Quezon City. The alleged finding of 498.1094 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) thereat led to the filing
of an information charging private respondent with Violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,3 as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659. The information4 reads:
That on or about October 15, 1996 in Quezon City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused did
then and there knowingly have in his possession, custody and
control Four Hundred Ninety-Eight point One Thousand Ninety-
Four (498.1094) grams of methamphetamine hydroc(h)loride
(shabu) a regulated drug without any license, permit,
prescription or authority coming from any government office,
bureau, agency, or department authorized to issue such license,
permit, prescription or authority in blatant violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by RA 7659.
The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent - - Branch
102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
When arraigned on 27 November 1996, private respondent,
assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 After trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a
decision6 acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable
doubt.
The decision, more particularly the acquittal of private
respondent, is being assailed via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that public
respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed grave
abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on
record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable
conclusion of the latter's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It added
that the appealability of the trial court's decision of acquittal in
the context of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy should be resolved since it has two pending
petitions7before the court raising the same question.
Petitioner informs the Court that in its prior petition in People v.
Velasco,8 it has presented and extensively discussed the now
settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does permit a review of acquittals
decreed by trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial will
be required even if the judgment should be overturned. It thus
argues that appealing the acquittal of private respondent would
not be violative of the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
In a resolution dated 12 November 1997, the Court required
private respondent to comment on the petition within ten days
from notice.9 On 8 January 1998, the latter filed his Comment.10
On 26 January 1998, the Court required petitioner to file its
reply.11 It did on 13 November 1998.12
133
On 13 September 2000, the Court promulgated its decision
in People v. Velasco.13 In said case, the government, by way of a
Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
appealed the decision of Hon. Tirso D.C. Velasco acquitting
accused Honorato Galvez of the charges of murder and double
frustrated murder due to insufficiency of evidence, and of the
charge of unauthorized carrying of firearm on the ground that
the act charged was not a violation of law. This Court dismissed
the petition. We ruled:
. . . Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on
the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a
judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court
on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial,
as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. . . .
...
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked
after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the
"criminal trial was a sham" because the prosecution representing
the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process.
...
. . . Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals"
notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary
considerations cannot be appealed by government. The
jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy having
been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue
of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a
determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed
right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should
now be finally put to rest.
...
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of
the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with
suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the
extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent judge acquitting the accused . . . goes deeply into
the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the
evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned
decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence
received at trial . . . While the appreciation thereof may have
resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless
does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered
and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the
writ's limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As
such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-
reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not
to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
On 10 November 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.14
Private respondent Muyot filed his memorandum on 4 March
2005.15 Invoking the Rule of Double Jeopardy, he prays that the
petition be dismissed.
On 20 April 2005, petitioner filed its memorandum. It raised the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT COURT
ACQUITTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN BE REVIEWED ON A
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
II
134
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE
CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUG ACT OF
1972 ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that notwithstanding our
decision in People v. Velasco,16 the fact that we gave due course
to the petition means that the issue on the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case may be reviewed. It added that a Petition
for Certiorari should be an available remedy to question the
acquittal of the accused.
On the second issue, petitioner maintains that respondent court
abused its discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI
agents on the discovery of the dangerous drug despite the
absence of any evidence to show that they were impelled by any
improper motive.
To settle the issue of whether or not an acquittal can still be
appealed, this Court pronounced in People v. Velasco17 that as
mandated by the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the
Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial
court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of
mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.18 Only when there is a
finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not
invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution,
were denied due process.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction
that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final
and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The
only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is
where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due
process.
We find petitioner's argument that, despite our ruling in People
v. Velasco,19 since we gave due course to the petition, the issue
on the sufficiency of the evidence may be reviewed, to be
untenable. The fact that the petition was given due course does
not necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency of the
evidence since the issue to be resolved is the appealability of an
acquittal. We have categorically ruled in People v. Velasco20 that,
except when there is a finding of mistrial, no appeal will lie in
case of an acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before
us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do
so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on an acquittal
which would clearly be in violation of the accused's right against
double jeopardy.
Petitioner, via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, prays for the
nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public
respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the
former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of
the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition
smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the
evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public
respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the
parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may
have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain
is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was
considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.21 An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.22 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and
its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law.23 Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public
respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not
lie.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
135
G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges
against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate
relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision,
claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case
in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed
grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses."1
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because
it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides
in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been
absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In
criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for
the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:2
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The
provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. Society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.3
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal
is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the
court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting
in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such
cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.4
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has
been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such
exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "must ensure that
due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of
discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence."5But he has
not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave
136
abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that
"the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints
with serious doubts the validity of the decision"6 is, without more, a
mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v.

Sandiganbayan7 as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal
of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in
Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the
judgment of acquittal in that case was "dictated, coerced and
scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not
allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He
has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this
case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the
four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not
really go through the process.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s

appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution
witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding
that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned
by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private
complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render
another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not
constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure
Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final
and can no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro

G. Vizconde’s motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for
leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R.
Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez,
representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of
former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.

137
 G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970 The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the
pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION
OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes
OF R.A. No. 6132. an ex post facto law is likewise untenable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which:.

MAKASIAR, J.: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
library
chanrobles virtual law

This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami,
Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and committed; chanrobles virtual law library

praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No.

6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it than the law annexed to the crime when committed; chanrobles virtual law library

has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and

program of government, which materials include Annex B; and
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional time of the commission of the offense;
Convention who will propagate its ideology.
chanrobles virtual law library

chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the when done was lawful; and
ground that it violates the due process clause, right of
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association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
facto law.
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation

The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held of amnesty.3
that the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due
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process, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom

From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post
of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is
facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin
laws which are given retroactive effect.4
substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process
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and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under

the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision
process, the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is
the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden to no imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law
one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the
should be accorded primacy.1 law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other
provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
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138
approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law
shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August
24, 1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and

paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional.
Without costs.

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