II2202, Fall 2019, Period 1-2 Final project report January 14, 2020

Modeling and Simulation of the Interaction Between

Conventional and Autonomous Vehicles Using a Utility
Function
A LEXANDROS N ICOLAOU G IULIO M ARCON
Alexandros | alenic @kth.se Giulio | gmarcon @kth.se

January 14, 2020

Abstract
The objective of this research is the study of the interaction between human drivers and autonomous
vehicles at an unsignalised intersection. The contribution of this research is twofold. On the one hand,
the impact of social norms on human behavior during driving is emphasized, while on the other hand
the modeling of a human’s decision – making behavior while driving is carried out using a utility
function and game theory. This can give a better understanding of human driving behavior which is an
important factor for the autonomous vehicle – human driver interaction. The quantitative and qualitative
results derived from a drivers’ interaction study using eye tracking glasses coupled with participants’
commentary are analyzed. The behavior of drivers at the intersection is modeled as mathematical
and social-based rules using data extracted from the earlier study by E. Portouli, et al. An utility
function is used to model the decision-making human’s driving behavior considering their utility and
cost. Subsequently, a simulation of the interaction of drivers is carried out by pairing the VISSIM and
Matlab environments, to realize the behavioral model of the drivers. Simulation with an enhanced utility
model showed that 39% of the on-coming drivers yielded, giving priority to the drivers of a secondary
road that were waiting to enter the main road at an unsignalizsed intersection. This compares well to the
41% value observed by E. Portouli, et al. in their observation of real drivers.

Contents
1 Introduction 3

2 Related Work 3

3 Method 3

4 Modeling Human decision – making behavior 4

4.1 driverA continuously yields to consecutive B vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2 driverB continuously yields to consecutively A vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3 Interaction of a new A – B vehicles couple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

5 Simulation of the proposed modeling 7

6 Results of the simulation 7

6.1 Results of the basic TTC model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2 Results of the utility function model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3 Comparison between the TTC and the utility function model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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7 Conclusion 11

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1 Introduction
Road accidents are one of the main causes of death in the world. Research has shown that 90% of
road accidents are caused by human error, and that autonomous vehicles (AVs) are expected to reduce
this percentage, by up to 80% by 2040 [1] . The automation of transport is expected to increase the
safety and the efficiency of transport. The full automation of transport without the need for human
supervision or intervention is estimated to occur in less than 50 years. However, the period of simultaneous
coexistence of conventional and autonomous vehicles – a period estimated to last more than 20 years
– raises concerns about the harmony and safe co-operation between man and machine. To that end,
the development of human’s decision – making driving behavior tools used by autonomous vehicles is
imperative. Understanding and predicting the human’s behavior is a very complex problem. It might even
be formally uncomputable as it requires predictions of and actions dependent on one’s future behavior
(by means of the other party’s models of it), which are notable in Computer Science as this can lead to
paradox as in Gödel’s theorem and the Halting problem [2] . This paper aims to further the understanding
of the human driving behavior by highlighting the impact of social norms on driving, by implementing a
simulation model of human behavior.

2 Related Work
In previous work the interaction between human drivers and pedestrians has been explored, resulting in a
timeline of actions and patterns preceding the decision of the pedestrian to cross the road or not. Camara
et al. [3] performed sequence analysis to discover and report common short n-gram motifs and they also
applied two regression models to discover which of them predict the winner of each interaction. Rasouli
et al. [4] introduced a novel dataset composed of 650 video clips of driver-pedestrian interactions as well
as an analysis of their data from the point of view of joint attention using the time – to – collision (TTC)
parameter. Interaction between drivers in normal straight traffic flow has also been studied intensively.
Markkula et al. [5] , apart from driver – pedestrian interaction, using parameters related to the difference
in TTC between two vehicles to examine the scenario of an AV handing over control to a human driver in
a critical rear-end situation. A 2010 research showed that junction conflicts were due to insufficient driver
attention by 44.1% compared to 7.3% on a normal road [6]. Also, according to the U.S. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) statistical data [7] , approximately 46% of intersection crashes in
the United States in 2014 occurred at unsignalised intersections. Therefore, it is clear that the interaction
of drivers at unsignalised intersections needs particular attention. Furthermore, human behavior has been
analyzed using game theory tools at an unsignalised intersection. Miaomiao et al. [8] developed a driver’s
behavior model based on risk perception using game theory tools between two straight-moving vehicles at
an unsignalised intersection where they used speed, distance, and time difference fuzzy variables to achieve
that. Fox et al. [9] modeled a driver’s decisions through the ”chicken game” utility model in which two
car drivers are heading towards each other at speed and the one who yields first turns their wheel. Cost
for both drivers will be much higher if neither of them yields. Agents use TTC in a one-on-one game
that determines which vehicle that should yield first. The results of this study were the dissemination of
information regarding the decision flow and their modeling with the aim of a mathematical representation
of the problem.

3 Method
For the sake of fully understanding a driver’s decision – making behavior, interactions between drivers from
the perspective of the participating drivers were previously observed, while performing a turn to various
unsignalised interaction scenarios. The scenarios considered a main road and a byway crossing the main
road. Our study is based on the results previously presented in [10]. From this earlier drivers’ interaction
study, informal norms that apply in these cases were extracted for subsequent design and modeling of
the appropriate interaction strategies in an autonomous vehicle. The main means of observing a driver’s

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behavior were eye tracking glasses worn by participants while driving, followed by their explanation of
their actions as recorded in a video, such as that shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Video examples of the drivers’ interaction study, using eye tracking glasses.

From this study, conclusions were drawn for the sequence of communication signals as well as motifs
that appear during the interaction between the participating drivers and the other drivers while turning. An
important result that sprang from this research, is that under these circumstances, the percentage of byway
vehicles that take priority over main road drivers is up to 41%. This value will be used in the subsequent
evaluation of our proposed model. Moreover, the qualitative results from this research have shown that
apart from TTC, other social – based parameters such as traffic congestion and drivers’ nobility showing
their willingness to yield, also play an important role in driver’s decision – making behavior. To that end,
two different models will be implemented: one using only the TTC parameter and another one using the
parameters that affect the decision of turning or yielding, as observed in the drivers’ interaction study, based
on utility theory. Then a simulation of the two models is carried out to confirm the reliability of the proposed
model and by extension, the effect of social norms on driving. Verification is performed by comparing the
simulation results with real data.

4 Modeling Human decision – making behavior

As mentioned above, the utility function is considered to be ideal to handle decision – making scenarios in
the interaction of two vehicles – conventional or autonomous. Utility theory was also used in [9]. Our study
extends the research on utility function tool by defining the main factors on which the yielding behavior
depends, based on more than 400 hours of data from a real driving environment. To validate the proposed
model, a basic model that makes use of only the TTC parameter will be used. In contrast, the final utility
function model, taking advantage of the interaction study’s results will be compared to the basic model
in order to check the reliability of it. The ultimate goal is to create a compact utility function, describing
and realistically simulating the yielding probability, thus the driver’s decision – making behavior, based
on mathematical and social parameters. For simplicity the drivers involved in an intersection, will be
symbolised as shown in Figure 2, where driverA is the conventional vehicle attempting to turn, and driverB
is the oncoming vehicle that is interacting with the local human driver, and is considered as autonomous
with a stochastic behavior, for the case of the other car’s right turn. For the design of the utility function’s
form, the results of the drivers’ interaction study have been used, in order to distinguish the main parameters
on which the yielding decision of a driver depends.

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Figure 2: Symbolism of the two interacting vehicles in an intersection.

These meters are:

1. The difference of the time to collision (DTTC) of the two interacting vehicles. In other words, which
vehicle will reach the interaction first.
DT TC = T TCA − T TCB
 
 ux , uA,B 6= 0
A,B
T TCA = h a i
 x2 . uA,B = 0
A,B
uA,B : velocity of A,B vehicles
aA,B : acceleration of A,B vehicles
xA,B : distance of A,B vehicles to intersection

2. Parameter of time to distance ratio cost, indicating whether or not there is traffic on the road and thus,
the corresponding cost that it imposes on each vehicle if priority is given to any driver. For example,
in the case of traffic congestion, this parameter will take low values, increasing the chances of the
driverB giving priority to A, since he will not lose time, letting him pass. In contrast, if the road
ahead is free, then the probability of the driverB giving priority to A, call it yielding probability, is
reduced.

3. A parameter showing the number of the consecutive vehicles to which he already yielded and the
effect it has to a driver’s yielding decision. In the drivers’ interaction study at an intersection, it was
observed that the longer the driverA was waiting still in the byway road indicating his intention to
the main road’s oncoming drivers B to enter, the greater the increase in the probability of the next
driverB to yield, giving the priority to the driverA . The opposite scenario also applies; the longer a
driverB was yielding to drivers A, giving them that way priority, the less likely he was to also yield
to the next driverA .
It is noted that the above 3 parameters are directly or indirectly related to time. Thus time plays a key
role in designing the utility function. The basic model makes use only of the first parameter, TTC parameter,
thus the form will be:
DT TC = T TCA − T TCB (1)
The proposed utility function model that can realistically describe and simulate the interaction of the drivers
is as follows,
tA
yieldingCost = ∈ (0, 1) (2)
tB + tA

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The yieldingCost function express the cost of giving priority to A from driverB , as a percentage (%).
Therefore increasing the yieldingCost results in reducing the probability of giving priority to the driverA .
In the yieldingCost function, the variables tA and tB represent the total time estimation for A and B vehicles
respectively, needed to reach a certain point on the road called Flag as shown in Figure 2. If there is another
leading vehicle before the Flag, then variables tA and tB represent the time needed for A and B vehicles to
reach the leading vehicle. Flag was taken at such a strategic distance from A or B vehicles so that its use
indicates the presence or not of traffic congestion on the road. That is, taking into account the speeds of A
and B vehicles, if their time to reach the Flag is higher than expected then there is a high probability that
there is a high density of vehicles in the road and hence traffic congestion. That way, the second parameter
on which human driving behavior is dependent is taken into account. Flag was set at 35m from A or B
vehicle, which is enough to describe the traffic situation on the road. These being said, there are three
possible scenarios for the case of the right turn. These scenarios are described in the following subsections.

4.1 driverA continuously yields to consecutive B vehicles

In this case, tA remains stable:
tA = TimeToFlagA (3)
while in variable tB , the sum of all the consecutive B vehicle time is added, converting it to a variable:
tB = TimeToFlagB + PreviousTimeToFlagB (4)
TimeToFlag is the time needed for a vehicle to reach the Flag point, PreviousTimeToFlag = ∑ki=0 TimeToFlagi
is the sum of times of the passing B vehicles to reach the Flag point, for as long as a specific driverA yields,
giving priority to the others. That way, as time goes by, the variable yieldingCost tends to zero, thus
increasing the probability of driverB to yield. Therefore, the third and last parameter on which human
driving behavior is dependent is taken into account.

4.2 driverB continuously yields to consecutively A vehicles

Similarly, variables tA and tB will be,
tA = TimeToFlagA + PreviousTimeToFlagA (5)
tB = TimeToFlagB (6)
Meaning that as time goes by, the variable yieldingCost tends to 1, decreasing that way the probability
of driverB to yield again.

4.3 Interaction of a new A – B vehicles couple

Variables tA and tB will be,
tA = TimeToFlagA (7)
tB = TimeToFlagB (8)
Meaning that the variable yieldingCost will have a stochastic value between 0 and 1. The yieldingCost’s
values are assigned a probability value, P(GrantPermissionProb = 1) ∈ (0, 1) that represent the driverB ’s
likelihood of yielding, giving priority to the driverA . Therefore, the procedure of the algorithm is the
following: The information extracted from modeling is the location, the speed and the acceleration of
vehicles. By using them, the time a vehicle needs to reach a certain point can be calculated. Based on each
vehicle’s assigned time, the value of the yieldingCost utility function is calculated. The value of the function
reflects the cost of the B vehicle to yield, and therefore the probability attached to it, to give priority to the
A vehicle. Based on the yielding probability, the algorithm decides whether to prioritize the A vehicle, or
continue the main flow of the main road. Eventually, the utility function gives us an idea of the situation
in each interaction of drivers in an intersection, modeling their behavior, producing a numerical result that
reflects the probability that driverB will yield on the basis of stochastic events through fuzzy logic.

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5 Simulation of the proposed modeling

The proposed utility function model has been used in a simulation, in contrast to the basic TTC model in
order to check its reliability. The simulation was implemented under the assumptions that only normal cars
with no pedestrian interaction are involved, for the right turn case only. The software used for that purpose,
was the microscopic traffic flow simulator of VISSIM paired with Matlab. The Wiedemann car-following
model of VISSIM was used in the simulation as a standard, and once the vehicles entered a critical area
defined by the boundaries of an intersection, then the Matlab control is triggered and the vehicles follow
the rules of the control model, i.e. TTC or utility function models.

Figure 3: Snapshot of the drivers’ interaction simulation.

6 Results of the simulation

The simulation took place for a total of about 1000 interactions of the A and B drivers, for the two models
separately. From the simulation, metric results were exported, for the right turn, with and without traffic
congestion. These concerned:
• The rate of giving priority to an adjacent driver.

• The distribution of the number of consecutive vehicles to which priority was given or not.

• Statistical measurements of the difference of the TTC of the two vehicles.

Subsequently, the main results associated with the simulation of the basic TTC and the final utility model,
are being analysed.

6.1 Results of the basic TTC model

The results of the basic TTC model for human driving behavior, based on Table 1, have shown that given
only the TTC parameter, there was 36% probability for a driverB to yield, giving priority to a driverA ,
compared to 41% of the real data. For the cases of traffic congestion, the same probability of yielding rate
decreased to 20%. This is contrary to the observation that prioritization increases with traffic congestion.
Furthermore, when driverA was about to reach the intersection by an average of 0.72 seconds faster than
driverB , then there was a high probability for the driverB to yield, giving priority to driverA . On the other
hand, when driverA was about to reach the intersection by an average of 2.04 seconds later than driverB ,

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then there was a high probability for the driverB of not yielding consequently not giving priority to a
driverA .

Table 1: Results of the basic TTC model.

Feature Value
Yielding rate 36%
Yielding rate with traffic 20%
Successful TTC -0.72 sec
Unsuccessful TTC 2.04 sec

Figure 4: Distribution of the consecutive B vehicles been given priority by the driverA of the basic TTC
model.

Figure 5: Distribution of the consecutive A vehicles been given priority by the driverB of the basic TTC
model.

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According to the Figures 4 and 5 it is concluded that most of the drivers’ yielding action, to prioritize
the other involved driver, mainly happens after one vehicle. Meaning that the first vehicle arriving at the
intersection was most likely to take the priority, forcing the other driver to yield. This fact also overrides the
parameter related to the dependence of giving priority to a vehicle with the number of consecutive vehicles
been given priority before, associated with atypical rules of nobility. However, it is noted that there is a
greater likelihood of giving priority to more than one consecutives B vehicles than that of A vehicles, and
that is reasonable since B vehicles are on the main road.

6.2 Results of the utility function model

Based on Table 2, the results of the utility function model for human’s driving behavior, have shown that
there was 39% probability for a driverB to yield, giving priority to a driverA , which is improved with respect
to the 41% of real data compared to the TTC model. For the cases of traffic congestion, the probability of
yielding rate increased to 50%. This verifies the observation that prioritization increases on the existence
of traffic congestion. Furthermore, when driverA was about to reach the intersection by an average of 0.62
seconds faster than driverB , then there was a high probability for the driverB to yield, giving priority to
driverA . On the other hand, when driverA was about to reach the intersection by an average of 0.4 seconds
later than driverB , then there was a high probability for the driverB of not yielding consequently not giving
priority to a driverA .

Table 2: Results of the utility function model.

Feature Value
Yielding rate 39%
Yielding rate with traffic 50%
Successful TTC -0.62 sec
Unsuccessful TTC 0.4 sec

Figure 6: Distribution of the consecutive B vehicles been given priority by the driverA of the utility function
model.

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Figure 7: Distribution of the consecutive A vehicles been given priority by the driverB of the utility function
model.

According the Figure 6 it is concluded that using the utility function, there is a balanced distribution over
the number of consecutive vehicles, having been given priority by the other involved driver. In particular,
the number of times driverA got priority after one B vehicle is less than or equal to the number that took the
priority after 2 or 3 vehicles. This is justified by the fact that the traffic on the main road, i.e. B vehicles, is
more important and therefore has priority over the traffic to adjacent roads. Thus the driverA gives priority
to consecutive B vehicles to pass. However, the number of cases of giving priority to the A vehicle is
reduced as the number of consecutive B vehicles increases until it is completely zeroed. This is justified by
the fact that rules of nobility require drivers to give priority to the other driver, as he prioritises more and
more vehicles to go through. According to the Figure 7, 91% of cases are concentrated in giving priority
to a single or two consecutive A vehicles. The reason is, according to drivers’ comments, that when the B
drivers give priority to other vehicles, they interrupt the normal traffic on the main road, forcing them not
to be as receptive as opposed to the A drivers. The above mentioned, verify the observation that the priority
rate depends on the number of consecutive vehicles that have already taken priority before.

6.3 Comparison between the TTC and the utility function model
According to the simulation results, it is observed that the model based on the utility function satisfies all
three parameters from which the human behavior depends, as noted in the drivers’ interaction study, in
contrast to the simple model based only on the TTC parameter. Moreover, in the utility model, the yielding
ratio of 39% is closer in the real ratio of 41%, in contrast to the TTC model’s 36% ratio. The difference of
the yielding ratio between the proposed model and the real data, is likely to be due:

• The simulation’s assumption that only normal sized vehicles were involved, as opposed to the drivers’
interaction study where motorcycles, trucks, taxis, buses, etc. were also involved.
• The simulation’s assumption that pedestrians are not involved, which plays an important role in the
driver’s behavior.
• The density of the traffic flow of A to B vehicles of reality may differ from the one of the simulation,
which is around a constant average.
• Some additional factors such as visibility, vehicle performance, driver’s caution, driver’s temperament,
etc.

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II2202, Fall 2019, Period 1-2 Final project report January 14, 2020

6.4 Sensitivity analysis

The results of the E. Portouli, et al. study derived from a total of 200 minutes of recorded driving and
another 200 minutes of complementary recordings of the drivers commenting and explaining their actions.
On the contrary, the simulation had been carried out for a total of 800 cycles in which 152 interactions
between secondary and main road’s drivers have been spotted, and 59 of them were successful.
Based on the rate in which the number of successful yields occurs, compared to the number of total
interactions, it was calculated that a total of more than 118 interactions needed to be investigated in order to
have statistically significant (¡5% significance level) results. Then, for every 10 extra interactions, there is
a decrease of 0.089% on the error of the proportion of the successful yields, reaching up to 2% significance
level for the investigated number of 152 interactions.

7 Conclusion
Briefly, the results of the study of the interaction between drivers detect the three main parameters that
the human driving behavior is dependent on. These were used in the formation of the proposed utility
function that satisfactorily describes the human’s decision making behavior, at an unsignalised intersection.
A simulation was performed to evaluate the proposed model’s credibility. The model was compared with a
simple model based only on the difference of the TTC of the involved vehicles, as suggested by the majority
of literature. Finally, the utility function model is compared to the real data we receive from the drivers’
interaction study. The comparison between the TTC and the utility function model reveals the efficiency of
using the proposed model to imitate the human’s decision – making behavior in a drivers’ interaction.
It is therefore interesting to further develop and improve the existing model in order to cover a wider
range of scenarios and model the global behavior of the drivers’ interaction more precisely. Apart from
reduction of the assumptions, additional improvements that could take place are the adjustment of the
flag’s position, based on each vehicle’s features, such as position, speed, and acceleration. Last, the
utility function’s form could be replaced by the regression method’s result that would produce a one-to-
one relationship of the input, i.e. the times needed for A and B vehicles to reach the flag point, and output
which is the yielding probability. Definitively, the latter requires a sufficiently integrated and robust real-
world database of human’s driving behavior. The modeling of human’s driving behavior has a lot of room
for improvement and development, but it is considered necessary to ensure safety for the time period of
autonomous and conventional vehicles interaction; a period that it is estimated to begin in the very near
future.

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