DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE
SECTION 94 OF IPC

SUBJECT
INDIAN PENAL CODE

NAME OF THE FACULTY

ASST.PROF. Dr. P. VARALAXMI

NAME OF THE STUDENT

N. KAUSHIK

18LLB112

SEMESTER – III
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

I would like to express my gratitude to ASST.PROF. P. VARALAXMI who have given me the
golden opportunity to do this wonderful project, which also helped me in doing a lot of research
and through which I came to know so many new things. I am thankful to her.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my friends who also helped me a lot in completion of project
within the limited time.
CONTENTS

 SECTION 94 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 –...........................................................2

 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................5

 EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE OF DURESS....................................................................6

 ELEMENTS OF DURESS..................................................................................................7

 FORMS OF DURESS.........................................................................................................8

 WHETHER SECTION 94 OF IPC EXCLUDE PARENTS WHO COMMIT ANY

OFFENCE IN THE THREAT OF THEIR CHILD'S LIFE?............................................11

 RELEVANT CASES.........................................................................................................12

 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................20
SECTION 94 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 –

Act to which a person is compelled by threats:

SECTION 94 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

Act to which a person is compelled by threats.—

Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which
is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it,
reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the
consequence: Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable
apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he
became subject to such constraint.

 Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being
beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of
this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do
anything that is an offence by law.

 Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant
death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take
his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled
to the benefit of this exception.

The defence provided under this section is also known as the defence of compulsion, or of
duress, or of coercion. At the outset the section exempts from its purview the cases of murder
and offences against the State punishable with death. Consequently, this defence is not available
where a murder or an offence against the State punishable by death has been committed under
compulsion.

The section says that except these cases, when something is done by a person who is compelled
to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, causes a reasonable apprehension in the mind of
the doer that if he does not do it instant death to him may result, his act does not amount to an
offence.

The proviso clause under this section states that this defence is not available where the accused
has done the act of his own accord by placing himself in such a situation by which he became
subject to such constraint or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant
death, he has placed himself in such a situation. The first explanation attached to the section
states that if a person joins a gang of dacoits of his own accord Knowing their character, or he
does so under a threat of being beaten, this defence will not be available to him.

The second explanation appended to the section says, on the other hand, that if a person is seized
by a gang of dacoits and is forced under threat of instant death to do something, such as a smith
under such circumstances compelled to take his tools and to force open the door of a house for
the dacoits to enter and plunder it, his act does not amount to a crime.

The basis of the principle under this section is the famous maxim ‘acts ne invito factus est mens
actus’ which means an act which is done by me against my will is not my act. The defence is not
available in murder cases because of the principle ‘to save one’s own life no one is entitled to
take another’s life’.

Similarly, the defence is not available in cases of offences against the State punishable with
death because of the principle that State has to protect the interest of the community at large and
consequently has a right to effect its own preservation.

Murder

Murder is defined under section 300 of the Code. The defence of coercion under this section is
not available to a person who commits murder under fear of instant death. Any other offence
(except offences relating to State punishable with death) including culpable homicide not
amounting to murder committed under threat of instant death is protected. It has been held that
abetment of murder being different from murder, a person charged with having abetted a murder
is entitled to the benefit of this section if he has been compelled to abet murder under fear of
instant death.
Offences against the State punishable with death

The section does not protect a person who commits offences against the State punishable with
death even though committed under fear of instant death. Sections 121 to 130 of the Code relate
to offences against the State but punishment of death in such cases has been provided only under
section 121 and consequently the defence of coercion is not available when the act of the accused
falls under section 121 of the Code.

There are three kinds of offences provided under section 121—waging war against the
Government of India, attempting to wage such war and abetting waging of such war. A person is
not protected under section 94 of the Code if he commits either of these three offences even
under fear of instant death.

Instant death

For this section to apply it is necessary to prove the existence of fear of instant death. Any other
kind of fear, including fear of distant and not instant death, does not provide any protection under
this section. For instance, if A threatens В that he would kill him in a week’s time unless he
steals Z’s car by then, and В steals the car, В is not protected under this section.

The Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972 vide clause 31 had recommended the widening
of the scope of section 94 of the Code by including within it the threat of instant death or instant
grievous bodily harm either to that person or to any near relative of that person present when the
threats are made. The Bill sought to include parent, grandparent, spouse, son, daughter, sister,
brother, son-in-law, daughter-in-law and grand children within the expression ‘near relative.’
The Bill, however, never saw the light of the day.

English Law

Under the English Law the defence of duress is available not only in cases of fear of instant
death but also in cases of fear of instant serious bodily harm. The threat also may not be against
the person of the accused always.
Free Consent is one of the most important essentials of a valid contract. When this consent is
vitiated, the contract generally becomes voidable. Consent can be vitiated through duress. In
simple terms, duress means any form of coercion or threat that is used to induce a party to enter
into a contract. Initially, duress was only confined to actual or threatened violence. Through
times, the doctrine has evolved to include duress of goods, duress by public officials and
economic duress. Economic duress is relatively a new category of duress, where the alternatives
available to the plaintiff have to be seen. This form of duress, is however difficult to prove.”

Introduction

Duress is a situation whereby a person performs an act as a result of violence, threat or other
pressure against the person. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, duress may be “any
unlawful threat or coercion used… to induce another to act [or not act] in a manner [they]
otherwise would not [or would]”.

Duress is the weapon with which the common law protects the victim of improper pressure. The
court intervenes where a party enters into a contract as a result of pressure which the law regards
as unacceptable. There is a thin between acceptable and unacceptable pressure, which has been
shifting over time. The boundaries of what is considered unacceptable pressure have been pushed
outwards to encompass many more forms of pressure, including economic pressure. In the case
of economic duress, some judges are already adopting a restrictive approach, which makes it
more difficult for relief to be available on this ground.

The conceptual framework for allowing a duress defense generally stems from the laudable
notion that one should not be forced into contracting with another, but should come to the
bargain voluntarily. Volition is the touchstone of the freedom to contract. At common law, when
an agreement is the product of coercion and not entered into voluntarily, it was considered
void ab initio.

The nature of the coercion that would support a defense was limited historically to threatened or
actual imprisonment or fear of loss of life and limb. As the law developed in the early part of the
last century, the threats that could qualify under the duress doctrine broadened in scope to
include threats to detain goods. In addition, courts began to find that threatened breaches of
contract resulting in irreparable harm constituted duress.
EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE OF DURESS

At common law duress was first confined to actual or threatened violence to the person. For the
next seven centuries the common law required a “wrongful” or an “unlawful” act before it could
provide redress for duress, but the presence of fear in the victim would be relatively less
important.

Common law duress of the person was often assimilated to crime or tort; indeed these categories
often overlapped, and for that reason perhaps it failed to develop much beyond the narrow scope
of threatened personal violence. Victims of more subtle forms of pressure had to seek equitable
redress in Chancery which acted generally to protect mentally and physically handicapped
persons who had been impoverished by the exercise of undue influence. Equity was concerned
with promises which had been extracted by the unethical or immoral use of a superior bargaining
position, such as was found in confidential or fiduciary relationships, which inhibited the
victim’s free exercise of his will. The inequity in the equitable doctrine of “pressure” was that
the victim had been compelled to do what he did not want to do.

Historically, there was one exception to the common law rule that duress would create a voidable
contract when it was induced by threatened personal violence, that is, duress of goods. This
single, early incursion into the area of economic duress began in the eighteenth century in simple
cases of wrongful seizure or detention of personal property. There were no parallel developments
in England. Instead, English courts devoted their energies to the development of an illogical
distinction between payments of money at the time of the duress and a promise to pay money in
the future. In the former case the victim was given restitution of his money, whereas in the latter
case he was ordered to pay the money to his coercer.

In summary, common law distress was a crude, ill-defined and obscure notion, little used and of
little use except in cases of overt threats. Equally, while invoked by the courts more often, undue
influence or pressure have lacked sufficient definition to be effective controls when economic
coercion in the marketplace was at issue.
ELEMENTS OF DURESS

It is a fact that people enter into contracts on a daily basis as a result of pressure of one kind or
another. As Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon remarked in Barton v Armstrong  1, “in life
including the life of commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure so that one can
say that the actor had no choice but to act.” Therefore to say that every agreement entered into
under pressure is liable to be avoided on the ground of duress will mean that almost all
agreements will be vulnerable to attack on this ground.

The law has to determine the pressure which is unacceptable and so amount to duress and
pressure which is acceptable and therefore should not constitute duress. This has been done by
laying done two requirements which must be satisfied for relief to be available on the grounds of
duress. There must be pressure which amounts to compulsion of will of the complainant and the
pressure must be one that the law does not regard as legitimate. As Lord Scarman explained
in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v. ITF  2, there are

Two elements in the wrong of duress

 pressure amounting to compulsion of will of the victim, and

 (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted.

The first element concerns the coercive effect of pressure on the complainant. It inquires whether
the complainant’s consent was truly given. However, the complainant’s defective consent alone
is not sufficient to constitute duress. The second element is necessary. The pressure that impairs
the complainant’s free exercise of judgment must be illegitimate. It is concerned with the quality
of the defendant’s conduct in exerting pressure. The defendant must have behaved in a way
which makes the pressure affecting the complainant’s consent to be regarded as illegitimate.

1
[1976] A.C. 104.
2
[1983] 1 A.C. 366.
FORMS OF DURESS

Originally, the parameters of the doctrine were very narrow in that an agreement could be
avoided for duress only where the duress was in the form of a threat to the person. Subsequently,
it was accepted that duress of goods can also vitiate consent to an agreement, and recent
developments in respect of economic duress show that the categories of duress should not be
regarded as closed.

DURESS OF PERSON

Duress of the person may consist in violence to the person, or threats of violence, or in
imprisonment, whether actual or threatened. The threat of violence need not be directed at the
claimant: a threat of violence against the claimant’s spouse or near relations and a threat against
the claimant’s employees has been held to constitute duress. It is suggested that even a threat
against a stranger should be enough if the complainant genuinely that the submission was the
only way to prevent the stranger from being injures or worse.

The complainant only needs to prove that the pressure was the reason why he entered into the
contract and the court will conclude that illegitimate pressure induced the contract unless there is
evidence that the illegitimate pressure in face contributed nothing to the decision to enter the
contract. It is not necessary for the claimant in case of threat to person to demonstrate that he had
no practical alternative but to enter into the challenged contract.

In the case of Antonio v Antonio3 where a wife succumbed to a long campaign of threats of

violence and intimidation by her husband and transferred him half the shares in her company and
enter into a shareholders agreement with him, the court found that the transfer and the agreement
were both induced by duress. The court did not even enquire into whether she had any practical
alternative such as seeking legal remedy.

3
Antonio v. Antonio [2008] EWHC 1199 (QB).
DURESS COLORE OFFICII

In cases where the illegitimate pressure is in the form of an unlawful demand for payment by a
public official, a distinction is to be drawn between cases where the complainant paid the money
in order to obtain a service from the public official (such as granting of a license or permit) and
cases where the complainant paid the money by way of tax or similar impost. In the first
category, the court readily infers that the claimant had no practical alternative but to submit to
the demand of the public official since, as Littledale J. put in the Morgan v. Palmer4, the
complainant could not otherwise obtain the services he required. But in cases where the payment
is by way of tax, there is a practical alternative open to the claimant in the form of legal
proceedings to challenge the legality of the public official’s demand for tax.

DURESS OF GOODS

A threat to destroy or damage property may amount to duress. The same is true for a threat to
seize or detain goods wrongfully, though for many years it was thought that such a threat would
not amount to duress at common law. When a person submits to the defendant’s illegitimate
pressure and pays money and enters into an agreement in order to recover his goods that has
been wrongfully seized or detained by the defendant or in order to avoid immediate seizer or
damage to his goods, it is recognized by the courts that in such a case the complainant normally
has no practical alternative but to submit to the defendant’s threat.

In the case of Astley v. Reynolds5, where money was paid under duress of goods, the availability
of a legal remedy did not prevent the court from reaching a conclusion that the payment was
caused by illegitimate pressure.

In Maskell v. Horner6, tolls were levied on the plaintiff under a threat of seizure of goods. The
tolls were in fact unlawfully demanded. Their payment was held to be recoverable as it had been
made to avoid seizure of the goods and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the payments he had
made under the illegal demand.

4
Morgan v. Palmer (1824) 2 B. & C. 729 at 739.
5
Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915 at 916.
6
Maskell v. Horner (1915) 3 K.B. 106.
ECONOMIC DURESS

Certain threats or forms of pressure, not associated to the person, nor limited to the seizure or
withholding of goods, may give grounds for relief to a party who enters into a contract as a result
of threat or pressure. In cases of economic duress the main question is whether the claimant had
practical or adequate alternative or not. The alternative must be practical or reasonable in the
sense that it was adequate for the claimant’s purpose in the circumstances. In the case of a threat
to breach a contract, for example if the circumstances are such that the claimant can easily obtain
the required goods or services from an alternative source at a reasonable prize then the court is
likely to regard this as a reasonable alternative and therefore may regard this as a strong evidence
that the claimant’s decision to enter into the agreement was not induced by illegitimate pressure;
but it is different where the circumstances are such that it would be difficult or impossible to find
the substitute for the contracted goods or services within the time available at a reasonable cost.

In North Ocean Shipping Company Limited v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd.[vii]7, the builders
building a ship under a contract for the plaintiffs, threatened, without any legal justification, to
terminate the contract unless the plaintiffs agreed to increase the price by 10%. It was held that
this amounted to a case of economic duress and that the plaintiff would be entitled, on that
ground, to refuse payment of the additional 10%.

In B. & S. Contracts and Design Ltd. V. Victor Green Publications Ltd. 8, the plaintiffs had
contracted to erect an exhibition stand for the defendants at Olympia, but their workmen went on
strike. To get the work done, the defendants agreed to contribute £4500 to pay off the workmen’s
claims. It was held by the court of appeal that this promise was made under duress as the
defendants had no realistic alternative but the promise to pay, given the serious threat to their
economic interests.

7
North Ocean Shipping Company Limited v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd. (1979) QB 705.
8
B. & S. Contracts and Design Ltd. v. Victor Green Publications Ltd. (1984) I.C.R. 419.
WHETHER SECTION 94 OF IPC EXCLUDE PARENTS WHO COMMIT ANY
OFFENCE IN THE THREAT OF THEIR CHILD'S LIFE?

 BRIJMOHAN VS UNION OF INDIA (1997)9

Was a clear case in this case law from Calcutta High Court and was upheld by SC.

94 IPC extends to any situation wherein a person is compelled to commit crimes other than
murder to terrorism or serious crimes carrying the death sentence - due to threats to the persons
life.

CHC interpreted threat to persons life as threats to persons associated with the main person and
ruled that threat to childrens life qualified as threat enough to force a person to commit crimes
without intent and due to pure pressure.

Brijmohan was forced to fake a passport during his tenure in the passport office as the
perpetrator had threatened to abduct and kill his child. Brijmohan was arrested under 467,
468,471 and 409 IPC. A Lower court sentenced Brijmohan for 10 Years Imprisonment in 1993
ignoring the fact that the Main perpetrator Avishek Nandy and Bahlul Sanyal had threatened to
kill his daughter and he had made four complaints at Salt Lake Police Station in Kolkata. Lower
court rejected the 94 IPC claiming that threat to ones daughters life did not fall under 94 IPC.

High Court quashed the case claiming that sufficient evidence existed to prove that Brijmohans
daughters life was at risk and he committed the crimes purely because of threat to his daughter
which the police refused to take seriously. HC also ruled that Brijmohan did not materially gain
any money or any other benefits from committing the crime

West Bengal state appealed against the HC verdict but SC upheld the verdict.

9
 [(1993) 4 SCC 44.
RELEVANT CASES

NAME:- Ajay Mukherji vs The State And Ors.

DATE AND YEAR: 27 April, 1971

CITATION: 1971 CriLJ 1329

BENCH: N Talukdar

ACTS USED

 Section 94 in The Indian Penal Code

 Section 342 in The Indian Penal Code
 The Indian Penal Code
 Section 257 in The Indian Penal Code
 Section 500 in The Indian Penal Code

FACTS

The facts leading on to the Rule can be put in a short compass. A petition of complaint was filed
in the court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta by the complainant opposite-party No.
2, Sri Sushil Kumar Dhara, against the accused opposite-party No. 3 Sri Hiren Basu, Editor and
Publisher of the "Darpan" a Bengali News Weekly, and Mohini Mohan Roy Choudhury, the
proprietor of Modern India Press and the printer of the "Darpan" Under Section 500 of the Indian
Penal Code alleging inter alia that by publishing a report in the said Weekly on the 5th
December, 1969 the accused persons committed an offence Under Sections
501 and 502, IPC The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, examined the complainant
and issued summons upon the accused persons Under Section 500. IPC The case proceeded
thereafter in the court of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta.

Four witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and a charge was framed against the
accused opposite-party No. 3, Sri Hiren Basu on the 6th October, 1970 Under Section
500, IPC The accused pleaded not guilty and witnesses were cross-examined. On 7-12-1970 the
learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta adjourned the case to the 28th December, 1970 for
the examination of the accused Under Section 342, Criminal P.C. On the said date, the
complainant was absent by petition while the accused was present. The learned Chief Presidency
Magistrate directed the records to be put up on the 9th January, 1971 for the examination of the
accused Under Section 342, Criminal P.C. and for hearing of the petition, filed in court on that
date regarding the summoned witnesses, Sri Ajay Kumar Mukherji. On the 9th Janaury, 1971 on
hearing the learned lawyers of both the parties, Sri H. S. Barari, Acting Chief Presidency
Magistrate, Calcutta directed Sri Ajay Kumar Mukherji to produce or cause to be produced
through some competent person all available documents and account books relating to the
Satyagraha movement by 16-1-1971 while ordering that the question of examining Sri Mukherji
as a defence witness will be considered after the account books were produced after 15-3-1971
and fixing the date of examination Under Section 342, Criminal P.C. on 8-2-1971. These orders
were impugned and form the subject-matter of the present Rule.

JUDGEMENT

In the result, the Rule is made absolute; the impugned orders dated the 7th December, 1970, 12th
December, 1970 and 9th January, 1971 are set aside; and the case is sent back to the court below
for being tried in accordance with law and expeditiously by the learned Chief Presidency
Magistrate, Calcutta, from the stage reached on the 7th December, 1970.
NAME: Hari Charan vs The State

YEAR AND DATE: 29 November, 1951

BENCH: Soni

FACTS

This is a revision petition against the order of Shri G. L. Mittal, Magistrate 1st Class, dated 11-6-
1951, made on an application Under Section 94, Criminal P. C, filed by the petitioner as an
accused in a case Under Section 408/420, IPC for the production of certain documents. On this
application, the learned Magistrate passed the following order:

“Heard, the learned Counsel for the applicant and the P. S. I, There is no necessity for the
prosecution to wait for the documents prayed for in the application. The prosecution shall
proceed. These documents, If at all be needed in defence, they may be summoned Prosecution
'need not wait.”

JUDGEMENT

he learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, has cited 'Bijai Raj v. State' A.jmer 25(2) (B)
and 'Vishambhar Dayal V. Emperor' 10AIR 1941 Oudh 33 (C). It was held In the first case that it
was not for a Court of revision to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in the
matter of deciding which of the witnesses desired to be summoned by the prosecution were
necessary witnesses. In the second case, it was held that the Court was not bound to summon all
the witnesses cited by an accused person Under Section 257, Criminal P. C, and It has power to
refuse to summon all the witnesses, on the ground, that the application was made for the purpose
of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of Justice. These authorities, however, are
distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In view of the authority cited on behalf of the
petitioner

10
AIR 1941 Oudh 33 (C).
“I am of the opinion that Under Section 94, Criminal P. C, the trial Court should have called
these documents or else should have recorded the reasons for not calling these documents at that
stage. The learned Magistrate could not refuse to call these documents, merely on the ground
that these could be summoned in defence, if at all needed.”

Accordingly, I submit the record of the case to the Hon'ble High Court With the recommendation
that the order of the learned Magistrate, dated 11-6-1951 may be set aside and he may be
directed to summon these documents.

ORDER:

For reasons given by the Additional Sessions Judge, the recommendation is accepted. The
Magistrate will summon the documents.
CASE NAME: In Re: Lloyds Bank Limited vs Unknown

DATE AND YEAR: 10 October, 1933

CITATION: (1934) 36 BOMLR 88

BENCH: Broomfield, Divatia

FACTS:

On May 25, 1933, the accused stole a blank cheque form belonging to the complainant, who has
an account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. On this form he drew a cheque
for Rs. 6,000 and forged the complainant's signature thereon. He then obtained a sum of Rs.
6,000 from the Chartered Bank in the form of six notes of one thousand rupees each. These notes
he changed in the Currency Office into sixty notes of one hundred rupees. On May 29 he opened
a savings bank account in Lloyds Bank, Bombay, with Rs. 5,000 of this money. Subsequently on
June 5 he withdrew Rs. 1,000 by a cheque leaving a balance to his credit of Rs. 4,000. He is
being prosecuted for offences under Sections 380, 467, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
On July 7, 1933, the police made an application to the Court requesting that the manager of
Lloyds Bank should be ordered to produce Rs. 4,000, the balance to the credit of the accused in
his account with the bank. On July 10 the Magistrate issued a letter of request to the manager of
the bank asking him to depute a clerk to attend the Court and give evidence in the case on behalf
of the prosecution and to produce Rs. 4,000, "the balance to the credit of the accused in his
savings bank account out of Rs. 5,000 deposited by him on May 29." The bank objected that
there was no property of the accused capable of production but only a credit entry. The
Magistrate adjourned the matter for arguments and after a full discussion made the order, which
is the subject of this revision application, on July 28, 1933. By this order Lloyds Bank was given
time until 2-30 p. m. on that day to produce the sum of Rs. 4,000 in Court failing which it was
ordered that a search warrant should issue for the production of the same. The money was not
produced, and the Magistrate then on the same day issued a search warrant authorizing the police
to search for "the amount of Rs. 4,000 in the Lloyds Bank, Limited, and to produce the same
forthwith before the Court." It appears that the police-officer went to the bank and called upon
the manager to produce Rs. 4,000. The manager told his cashier to bring a sum of Rs. 4,000, and
he did so in the form of four notes of one thousand rupees. No particular significance attaches to
the form in which the money was paid, or rather the only thing that is significant is the absence
of any significance. The money might just as well have been paid in small notes or in cash. It
was simply a sum of Rs. 4,000. In this revision application Mr. Bahadurji appears on behalf of
the bank, and contends that the orders of the learned Magistrate are not justified by the
provisions of Section 94 of the Code. That section provides that " whenever any
Court...considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for
the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before
such Court...,such Court may issue a summons,...to the person in whose possession or power
such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it,
at the time and place stated in the summons..." Mr. Bahadurji has adopted the very full argument
which was placed before the learned Magistrate. Very briefly his contentions are that it cannot be
said that any notes amounting to Rs. 4,000, not being the particular notes received by the alleged
forger, could be necessary or desirable for the purposes of the investigation of the charges of
theft, forgery and cheating. These notes which have been produced can afford no assistance to
the Court whatever. Moreover, there was no money in the possession of the bank which could be
claimed as the property of the depositor, i. e., the accused, or the complainant, or could be
claimed as in any way connected with the case before the Court. On deposit of the money the
bank became the owner of it. The relationship between the bank and its client is that of debtor
and creditor. The learned Counsel referred to Grant on Banking, pp. 2 and 3, and the cases there
cited, also to Halsbury's Laws of England, 1st Edition, Vol. I, Article 1192, and the case of Foley
v. Hill11. It is not necessary to refer to these authorities because the learned Advocate General has
conceded that the money deposited by the accused became the property of the bank.

Mr. Bahadurji has also contended that the " thing " referred to in Section 94 must be some
specific thing which may be evidence of the offence to be inquired into, or, at any rate, is in
some way connected with the offence. He concedes that an order under Section 94 might be
passed with reference to an order to be passed by the Court under Section 517 disposing of the
property produced before it, but as in this case the Court must in any event return the money to
the bank, no order under Section 94 with that object could be either necessary or desirable under
the circumstances.

11
(1848) 2 H.L.C. 28.
JUDGEMENT:

The use of extraordinary powers ought to be reserved as far as possible for extraordinary cases.
They are not usually invoked when there is another remedy available, as there is here by a civil
proceeding. There is no precedent for aft order of the kind suggested being made by the High
Court under its inherent powers. Orders in the nature of attachment before judgment are not
altogether consistent with the spirit of criminal proceedings, in view of the presumption that the
accused is innocent until he is found guilty. No doubt, the Criminal Procedure Code does confer
some purely preventive powers upon Magistrates and police and it may be desirable that criminal
Courts should have power in a case like the present to prevent persons charged with offences
against property from enjoying the fruits of the alleged crime pending the trial. But, in my
opinion, these are matters for the legislature rather than for the High Court acting under Section
561A.

I consider it doubtful whether it can properly be said to be necessary to secure the ends of
justice that the Court should make the order suggested, especially when, as I say, the necessary
relief must be obtainable somehow or other from the civil Court. In any case I am of opinion that
it is not desirable that we should make use of our inherent power to make the order.

Therefore, the only order we can make is to set aside the orders of the learned Presidency
Magistrate in connection with this money and direct that the money be returned to Lloyds Bank.
CONCLUSION

Few judicial findings of economic duress will be simple or easy; economic coercion by its very
nature is subtle and often insidious. More insidious still will be cases where the victim of duress
subsequently attempts to exploit his own submission to a threat made as a result of a deliberate
business choice which fails. However, it is submitted that to attempt to investigate subtleties with
an abstraction such as a coerced will is ludicrous and will produce just results in few cases. Nor
will it provide practical guidelines on the basis of which contracting parties can regulate
themselves: not all threats are wrongful and some are perfectly valid forms of commercial
pressure.

Given the difficulties in satisfying these requirements, it is not surprising that the economic
duress doctrine is often alleged but seldom allowed in U.S. litigation. Courts will not bail out
parties who have placed themselves in sticky predicaments that forced them to agree to onerous
terms to overcome self-inflicted wounds. Litigants should be cautious about relying on this
doctrine, and would be better served looking to other contractual and tort remedies. The
economic duress doctrine remains a doubtful alternative for rescinding a contract.