EVIDENCE TOPIC

TITLE: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. GR NUMBER: 156052

ATIENZA DATE: February 13, 2008
PONENTE: Corona, J.
PETITIONERS: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY RESPONDENT: HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in
(SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON

FACTS

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified a certain area in Pandacan from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the Shell, Petron and Chevron (oil
companies). City of Manila and DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies.

They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option." Social Justice Society (SJS) et al filed a mandamus case in order to enforce said Ordinance. On
March 7, 2007, SC ruled that Mayor Atienza (the mayor) had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city,"
including Ordinance No. 8027. After this decision, the oil companies sought to intervene in the case and
filed motions for reconsideration.

The oil companies called the court’s attention to the fact that, Chevron, Shell and Petron had filed a
complaint against the mayor and the City of Manila in RTC-Manila, for the annulment of Ordinance No.
8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted (another) Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.

Aggrieved anew, Chevron, Shell and Petron filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for
the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. The court issued a TRO enjoining the City of Manila and
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the courts are required to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances enacted by local
governments.

RULING
NO.
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto" which was approved by respondent
on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to
local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that:
SEC. 50.Judicial notice of ordinances. — All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the
ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken
steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about
it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is
not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access.
The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court
take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local
ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute
does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the
ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No.
8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other. In the same way that we deem the intervenors' late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

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