to experience, It was a rather meager, scraggy, sparse someth ing in that

it represeIHcd a general quality that was equally inherent in all func-

tions, from the most elementary to the most complex, was cxtracted
frol1l evcrythill); tll;\t W;lS full-blown ill lhl.: ;lctivilY 01"con"ci,)usncss,
from everything that constitutcs the esscnce of this activity in its con-
crelC, 1l1~lllif()ld r(\rlllS.
The Psychology of Schizophrenia In tht.: second vLHiant of :his prohlcm. consciousncss was scen as a
kind ol"l1lcnlal SP;\(C cOllt~lining ;t1II"Ullctil)lls ;llld ollllliogically preced-
ing then\. [n this case, psychologists and psychi;ltrists alike said that
In the' clinical symptoms of schizophrenia the psychologist Finns an funct ions could ullJl.:rgo t!cvclopl1lcnt l1f Ck\llge, but cl)flsciousness
ex.traordill:..lry and almost unique phenomenon, in any event, a phenom- remained in1ll1utable; functions could be illlpaired, but cllnsciousness
enon that cannot be comp:tred with ~\Ilything previously descrihed. It is renlained illlact.
a uniyue and e\tr;lnru inary case of a type of psychological dcvelopmcnt In buth thcsc variants consciousness was Jescrihed m~linly in formal
and al{Cr~llion of consciousncss and its functillns that can shed li~hl on tcrlllS, Illainly in lerms of such ;ittributes as continuity, clarity, and the
I the n\.HI11:11 or~~l!1i7.;1lion of consciousness. Most importanlly. it can unity or this consciousness: hut always and cverywhere inquiry dealt
shed li\!ht onll~e norillal org~lI)iZalion of the relations ofconscinusiless with CO[lSCiUll\IlCSS ;IS "oJl)cthing cxtr;q)o/all'd rrolll its activitics.
to its f~;ncti,)ns and nn its normal course of development. In this sensc, Of course. it W;IS a nccessary poslulate that consciousncs<; itself
the ps) cholo~icJ\ study of schizophrenia perhaps contains thc key to could neither change nor evolvc: hence. it is nut surprising [llat the
understanJing the ~trUl·turc of [wrm;l! consciousness. In ;'1I1Y case, the science of consciousness, as psychology has conceived of itself for
psychological study of schizophrenia, which hJS not yet advanced very many centuries, should have studit.:d very altenti\'ely a \\hu!c series of
far, should cn;lble us to approach normal human consciousness from activities of consciousness, hut said nothing intelligible about the na-
the st:1flopoint of a psychological laboratory experimellt. . . ture of consciousness itscl I' and it,; development. It is also interest ing in
The essence of the novclty revealed by clinical studies 01 schlzo- this respect tklt the sciellcl.: of Illcnt;1! illnesses or diseases of con-
phreniJ f0r the psychological analysis of pathological ano normal con- sciousness. as pSyl'hiatry conceives of itself, d iLla grcat deal in the way
sciousness may best be cxplJined if we pose the question of how the of studying dis(lnkrs of v,lriuus aspects of consciousncss, but Jis-.
telat ion of con'sciousness to its fundions has usually beeh interpreted in cerned only the grossest and most m;lssi\'c forms of alteratinns of
psycho log ica I and psych iatric invest igat ions. I th ink 1. should not b,e consciousness, \\hich. strictly speaking, shnuld instead be classified 41S
\vronQ if I SJid that throughout the history of psychological and psychi- the actu;1! extinction of consciousness rather th~ln as a change' in it.
atric ~csearch. consciousness has always been regarded as something The second aspect th;lt distinguished earlier study of these qucstions
extrapolated from its functions. w\~ h:1\'e two main variants in ap- was that even thc acti\itics of consciousness themselves. i.e., the
proaching this problem, if we leave aside a number of other variants specific functions of consciousness, werl.: usually studied in isoLJted
. that we cannot deal wi'th here because they would restrlct our efforts to and abstract form, although it was postulated th;lt these functions
convey schcl11Jtically the essence of the question at hand,. . operated jointly. It \vas repeatl.:dly asserted, by both psychopathologists
In the first variant, which was most prevalent in old psychiatry and and psychologists, that the activity of each particuIJr function of con-
old psychology, consciousness was seen as an abstract a.ttribute, inher- sciousness was always inseparahly connected to the activity of the other
ent in all types of activity and all functions, as the capacity to know and functions, that memory presupposed the Jctivity of attention, attl.:ntion
presupposed the activity of thought, etc. However, this postulate itself
From SI):Tt'IIlt'IIIWYll problt'lIlll shi:(lf~cllii. Dok/ad IlCl kOllfcrclI/sii po Shi~of,.el~i \' was never ~n'. estigated, and it \Vas thus implicitly assumed th,)(, al-
[CO;l[CmpOrJry problcms oi schizophreniJ. Report of a conference on sc ILOp re-
t;lOugh all functions acted l()gcther, their joint activit)' \\,;IS nl)[ cssL'nli;l!
niJ]. :-'1oscow, 1933. Pr, 19-:'.8. \
.
~~~~~,1\l~~~:J"'.1'!'~~~~r!!'
. .•~"HM'mi&JQq"O-;YJ"!'F.1"Jf!"2
.
.• eklEtQu
~'~~~~_~':~~
~E:~~_':_.?::~:,~!~U
::::Hl:LI.n..~t_i~:n.~
..s.~~~~!_.:li~:lin~..i~_~~.~,>.~~s:~I.n_~cJ -
that these fu nct ions.-always acted together in the same ident ical, un- Iy on this function: "The capacity for dissociJtion, cven in an experi-
chang ingmanne r. mental situation, is so conspicuous that, on the bJsis of {his fact alone,
Hence, \ve see that in the study of consciousness and its functions in one would be fully wQ.rranted in calling this cap:lcity 'schizothymic,'
psycholugy anJ psychopathology, two postulates, which modern psy- even if the psychosis of 'schizophrenia' d tJ not ex ist at all. .. This is an
chology has made into problems, reigned for a long time. And the most excellent, concise, and Q.ccurate forlllU!:ltioll, expressing the real state
importJnt change in the way these problems were formulated, a change . of affairs with regard to the problem of dissoci:ltion.1
that has had very valuable effects on experimental research in the Ifwe now turn to study of this function in sL·ilizophrenics. wc see that
psychologic3.1 laboratory, whether in a psychiatric hospital or in a initially the psychological laboratory contributed very little on this
psychological institute, is that both these postulates (i.e., about the score. It cncountcred the following. In addition tu diss()ciation, which
relation of consciousness to its functions and about the relation of the was very clearly evident, we encountered the photogrilphic negat ive, as
functions to eJch other in different forms of movement of the mind it were, of this symptom, its double, i.e., :1 phenomcnon about which
through its development and decay) have now become a speciflc object V. A. Vnukov was speaking when he callcd attention to the cxistence of
of empiric3.1 inquiry. internally contradictory symptoms in the psychiatric picture of schizo-
In contemporary research these problems (the problems of con- phrenia. We encounter this phenomenon at every step in the clinical \ V
sciousness
functions)
and its functions and the problem of the rclationship
h:1\'e moved to the center of Gttention. Psychology
among
hGS only
laboratory, and the clinical picture leaves no doubt that e\'ery major l..t
~ymptomor' schizophrenia has a countersymptoll1. its negative double, '{:;.. ~
just recently been llble to Gpproach these problems sufficiently con- ItS opposite. ytCCI> ~"l
"L

cretely and empirically, since previously many of the connecting links. We observe a disturbance of affectivity, emotional dullness, a cold- ch <.v.~.
between comciousness :ll1d its functions were missing. But when some ness of affective life; but at the s:Jll1e time, no one would deny that ~ ..
of these connecting links-i.e., certain psychological structures of a affective aspects acquire ahnormally great importance in the thought of ~
hii!her order. or of a more complex structure and a morc. recent origin a schizophrenic. No one would dcny that schizophrenics are incl incd
;h;n elemcntary llcti\'ities-were described in their normal and patho- towarJ abstract thinking. Dut on the other hand, a kcy 3spect of their
lo;;ical aspects. they cn3bkd us to pose this problem as a subject of j./J :O:',..f<v.!:}ll.\. thinking is a tcndency toward a graphic, primitive type of intellcctu:l1
dircct investig:1lion. { I~ processes. We know that the schizophrenic form of thinking is often
The most important thing thQ.t rnoder~ empirical psychological re- . called symbolic, by which is me3nt thllt peculiar property of taking
search h:1S done for the stuJy of schizophrenia and thQ.t the psychologi- nothing literally, but everythinn alle"oricall'. On the other hand, as we
cal IJbor:1tory has acquired from clinical study of schizophrenia is that have seen, comprehension of metaphorical, symbol ic meanings su ffers
the function of the dissociation of the mind has been made accessible as severely in schizophrenia; the schizophrcnic patient is unable to cre:.tte
a direct object of empiricl1 investigJtion a nonsensical construct; but. on the oth..::r hand, most schizophrenics. Vl"MM':
This phenomenon hQ.sbeen described in various psychologicallabo- produce only utt<::r nonsense.
ratories, under difkrcnt names, in connection with a variety of pro- At each step we find that every symptom is matched by a countcr- J i<..-.
ec<,scs. An elucidation of it that fits its clinic~11 forms most closely is. as symptom, which rellects the same phenomenon negatively. We have
far a<.,we J..:now, found in the anQ.lysis of this function made by Kibler
been unable to find a sufficiently clear cxplan:.ttion of the complex
and, bter, by Kretschmer, who generalized Kibler's findings.
structure of the schizophrenic syndrome-perhaps bccau~e of insuffi-
Essentially, in this new formuilltion of the problem the dissociQ.tjon
cient knowledge in the clinical study of schizophrenia-but we are
of the' mind is secn as a function inherent equ:1lly in both pJthological
inclined to believe that the explanation for this phenomenon is to bej ~-'
and nClrrJ1;1! cO[l';cioIJ\n(:ss. and hence as a p';ychol0r-icll1 function hy
/lJture, ~b a function t!iJt is as llccessary for abstractioll, voluntary found. by ;IPI~lying thc hYPulhes~s of lhe~ystenlic and ~ structure. ~ ~'(...NaJ'
consClousncss to an undcrstandll1g of the psycho!0L!.Y of!;chl/orhrcnJa,
attention, and concept form:nion as it is for the genesis of thc clinical
picture ofth~ schizophrenic proCl:ss. Krctschmer c(jl'11ml:nled eloqll!~nt- Let us attempt to show how, from the standpoint of this hypothcsis,
! WC IllightIL':;olve till: qu,~~tiulll)f the ull;l!ity ofthl: SYIlIPlllJllS in Sdlil.,)-
phrenic disorders of consciousness in terms of the phenomenon of that in the schizophrenic process we must not regard the ill human
dissociation and its countersymptom, which we mentioned above, i.e., being solely as l\ patient. We must pay attention to the activc role of the
the tendency for disparate processes and aspects to merge together in personality th:lt is undergoing this disintegrating process. I[ is conceiv-
consciousness. The starting point of our discussion will be the follow- able that , in addition to the traces of destruction of the personality,
ing: the function of dissociation, like all functions of consciousness, which is under the innuence of a prolonged pathological process th:lt
d('1es not remain unchanged; it develops as consciousness develops, destroys the highest, most cOlllpkx, sem~1I1tic and systctl1ic rebtinns
changing qualitatively ill the process. \Ve know that new structures that and connections of consciousness, we shall tind contrary traces, that
did not exist in preceding stages and are not simple combinations or this personality will, in S01l1e way, resist, Illodify itself, reorg:.lnize
modifications of rudiments present at the outset are generated in the ~ ""- d--if../W'Vt _ itself, and that the clinical picture of schiwphrenia can never be under-
process of development. The same takes place with regard to the func-) Uf"N"I} stood merdy as something enwl:1ting directly frl)m the Llying-bJrc of
tion of dissociation. . .~ ~ the uestructive consequences of the process itself, but must be scen as a
This function enters as a subordinate instance, a derivative aspect, a ~ complex reaction of the personality to a process so destructive for it.2
coherent force, into structures of a higher order of which it itself is a I think that a biologic:!1 orientation toward the study of schizophrenia
prl.'condition in the history of evolution. If I say that the flJnction of (which we in psychology have to thunk for the introduct ion of the
dis . ;ociation is a precondition of voluntary attention and abstraction in. problem of d issociJt ion into empirical rcsearch) W,IS correct when it
the hi~tory of development and in ongoing functioning, what I mean is S-~-t emph:lsized the role of the personality in the disorder, but was elllph:.lti-
th~lt it servcs as a cohei\:nt force in the internal structure, in the psycho- WVVJJ<:lV'-"
cally wrong in that it understood the personality itself incorrectly,
Ing.i,a! system of concerts, in every fully dcvelorect adul t human being. positing a biological concept of the organism in place ofa snciopsycho-
It then becomes understandable that the system of concepts through logical conc..:.pt nf the personality. And if modern psychology and
whil'h consciousness ~eneralizes the reality given to it and the entire psychor~ltll()lngy wer·.; t~) grasp that one basic <lnJ, from my point of
intcfnJI world of subjective experiences, that precisely this system in a view, important idea, namely, that it is not the depths but the heights of
certain sense defines the boundaries of dissociation and combination of' thc personality that arc decisive for understanding the disorders and
spheres or domains in consciousness. reactions of the personality and for the f:ltc of In individual's con-
But this brings us to a curiou~ observation: in experimental study, the sciousness, then, it would seem to me, this understanding of individll:ll
fl1nction of dissociation h3s its countersY1l1ptom in [he form of counter- reactions as coming from the heights, not the dcplhs, of the personality
dis!;ociation, i.e., a fu~ion of everything into a whole, a .syncretic should contain the key to deciphering the dual picture presented by
cOil1binJtinn of the m\lS[ varied bycrs and aspects of conscicllsncss. schizophrenia.
III other words, in ~Jdition to the cxtre1l1ely well developed destruc-
tive force of dissoci:Jtion, in schizophrenic consciousness we find as-
pects that act in the npposite direction. A complete description of
schizophrenic consci()l!~;ness therefore necessarily reCjuires, in addition I. Of contemporary psye!loillgists, K. l.ewin came the closest to a correct solution
to t:Jking into account the tenJcncy toward dissociation, recognition of of this pmbkm. In discussing the probkm of the ui'\ity of conseiousnc\S, he showed that
an ind ispensable cond it ion for this unity was the division of consciou,ness into inu ivid-
a contrary force, which also is unleashed by the disintegration of
ual sphcres, mcntal systems, layers, whieh were relatively well Jernarl'ated and inde-
concepts Jnd blurs the distinct dividing lines between the JiCkrent pendent of one another.
sphe res and processes 0 f conse iousness. Both are linked to the break- 2. In particul:Jr, S,)Il1C cases of dissociation may. from this point of view, be vcry
well regarded as defense reactions oflhe consciousness to the process of disintegration
down of the meaning of words and of the entire sense and systemic
and fusion.
structure of consciousllcss of whieh I spoke earlicl'.
J am inclined (l) think that the second point that mJy be adduced to
c\.phin the dual picture of the ~chi7.ophrcnie sy ndromc Iics in an idea
• \, • T ,.. •. 1 ". , .' ,. ...•. I :. • . •. •• •• _ •• ~ t..... . ...•• • 1 • . • • .•.•.•.•. , •• 1 : •• • • .' .••..••.••• I ., • • • . • ., .. I• ,