DOI: 10.1002/pa.

1718

SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER

Interest groups in Croatia: Institutional development,

strategies, and influence
Zdravko Petak | Igor Vidačak | Dalibor Dvorny

Faculty of Political Science, University of

Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
Correspondence
Zdravko Petak, Faculty of Political Science,
University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia.
Email: zdravko.petak@fpzg.hr
As it transitions to democracy from a history of authoritarianism, Croatia's interest
group system is a work in progress. It is slowly moving from a fluid, informal, and
behind the scenes group system to one more institutionalized, with wider partic-
ipation, and some transparency of group activity. In this article, we explain the
evolution of Croatia's interest group system. The main argument is that specific
features of institutional design and structures have very much influenced political
advocacy behaviour and lobbying strategies of both informal and organized
interests.

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N
In June 2016, an estimated 50,000 Croatians gathered in the main
square of Zagreb, the capital, as well as other towns across the coun-
try. The purpose was to advocate for continuation of long‐needed
education reforms and to oppose attempts by a staunchly right wing
group in government to impose its perspective in teaching materials
on controversial social issues, such as gender identity, and sexual
minority rights, among others. The last time Croatians had taken to
the streets in such numbers was way back in 1996 to protest the
government's attempt to shut down the country's last independent
radio station, Radio 101.
The 2016 protests brought together several diverse segments
of society: Over 300 groups including civil society organizations,
trade unions, sports clubs, and local parents' organizations united
under the slogan “Croatia can do better!” These protests increased
discussion about the role and influence of interest groups in
policymaking, as well as on the factors shaping political advocacy
behaviour.
Yet, the role of interest groups in Croatia's political process has
not attracted significant attention of social scientists, and there is no
comprehensive treatment of group activity. There are, however,
several studies on the impact of different types of stakeholders on
policymaking and some studies examining connections between
political parties and interest groups, referred to later in this article.
Besides consulting various secondary sources for this article, a
survey was used to acquire original data. The data was gathered
from a set of interviews conducted in spring 2016 based upon a
more or less common set of questions as set out in the introductory
article in this volume (section 5.5 and Box 3). Fifteen interviews
included respondents divided into four groups: business leaders;
officials from trade unions and NGOs; senior civil servants; and
elected and politically appointed officials (ministers and deputy
ministers). The survey identifies a number of patterns or themes
that, when combined with the secondary sources, enable us to
provide an overview of the various aspect of interest group activity
in Croatia.
This article examines Croatia's developing interest group
system and its contemporary characteristics. It traces the evolution
of the group system as it moved from a traditional to a more
institutionalized system. The article also looks at how various
aspects of group activity relate to its developing democracy. First,
we briefly review the development of interests and interest groups
in Croatia.
2 | C R O A T I A 'S P O L I T I C A L D E V E L O P M E N T
A N D TH E EV O LU T I O N OF I NT E RE S T G R O U P
ACTIVITY
Because much of Croatia's political development has been under
authoritarian regimes, until the recent move to pluralism, the activities
of interest groups have been largely constrained. The most significant
periods in their development have been the experience under the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and after its dissolution
and the transition to democracy. However, the growth and operation
of interest groups can be traced long before the establishment of
the SRFY.

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https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1718
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2.1 | Developments down to the establishment of
the SFRY
As a former part of the Austro‐Hungarian monarchy, Croatia has a
tradition of both formal and informal citizen engagement. In the
second half of the 19th century, the development of civil society
was strongly influenced by the Catholic Church, industrialization and
modernization, which led to numerous social, cultural, and educational
civic initiatives. Bežovan (2004) identifies 241 educational and
scholarship foundations active in 1913.
A study of economic policy during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
(1918–1929) by Fogelquist (2011), mentions business, trade, and
other interest groups, as well as business associations. Regarding the
activities of trade unions, he identifies significant limitations and
strong state control of their operations. After the establishment of
the dictatorship in 1929, the role of business interest groups is unclear
because of lack of research, but trade unions and related associations
were forbidden.
2.2 | Croatia's experience under the SFRY
As an authoritarian communist system, the SFRY theoretically had no
interests other than those of the party and the common interest. As
explained in the second article of this volume (“The development of
interest groups in the Balkans,” Section 3) communist Yugoslavia
was, however, a much less monolithic system than many in Eastern
Europe. Rusinow (1977, p. 346) labelled the SFRY's political system
as the “polycentric polyarchy,” in which, after the market economy
and decentralization reforms of the mid‐1960s, there was moderate
political space for various groups to influence policymaking.
This allowed several semi‐autonomous and some autonomous
interests to develop, particularly in the last decade or so of the SFRY's
existence (Rusinow, 1988). Besides federal‐wide interests and interest
groups, there were several that developed in Croatia, including social
organizations and citizens' associations. This enabled Croatia to move
towards reasserting its long tradition of relatively independent
associations.
The Act on Social Organisations and Associations of Citizens,
adopted in 1982 by the Croatian parliament, provided a legal frame-
work regulating the right to free association. Partly as a consequence,
in 1985, 6 years before the dissolution of the SRFY, there were
10,844 social organizations and 547 citizens' associations registered
in Croatia. In effect, this was a limited form of interest group pluralism
(Bežovan, 2004). Yet, the formal association of interest groups with
even a low public profile were allowed only through social organiza-
tions. Religious communities had no legal framework for their estab-
lishment and activities; plus freedom to express and practice
religious beliefs was very restricted. As to trade unions, these were
not freely established organizations working to advocate on behalf
of their members.
Despite all obstacles and suppression of individual action and
critical thinking, a tradition of association substantially facilitated a
quick growth in the number and capacity of civil society organiza-
tions once the basic legal provisions for their work were
established.
PETAK ET AL.
2.3 | The Croatian War of Independence,
1991–1995
After the demise of the SFRY, however, the development of interest
groups were stymied by the Croatian War of 1991–1995, known as
the Homeland War. The war resulted from Serbia's attempt to maintain
a version of the SFRY, including Croatia, to establish a Serb republic. As
Croatia strongly favoured independence a war ensued pitting the
forces loyal to the Croatian government against the Serb‐controlled
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).
The conflict involved war crimes and human rights violations, of
which many cases are remaining unresolved. These issues have
undermined Croat–Serb relations and divided civil society groups
and public opinion. After the United Nations Protection Force (UNPF)
was deployed, the fighting became intermittent. Eventually, Croatia
was victorious and become fully independent in 1995.
As we will see, the war had a major influence on interest group
development and operations.
2.4 | Patterns of group activity since the transition
to pluralism
The development of Croatia's interest group system since the advent
of pluralism falls into two phases: the restricted period of the 1990s,
and the more open period since 2000.
2.4.1 | The 1990s
Throughout the 1990s, political and economic life was marked by the
absolute domination of one party: the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica
(HDZ‐the Croatian Democratic Union). As a massive political movement
founded in 1989, HDZ asserted itself as the central and only legitimate
advocate and guardian of national (ethnic) sovereignty, which was the
essence of its political program identity. Totally intertwined with
the state, HDZ had complete control over the military and the police, the
national media, and key economic resources (Lalović, 2000, pp. 49–50).
These factors constrained the processes of liberalization and pluralization
of society as well as the development of a modern interest group system.
Although the new Constitution guaranteed freedom of thought,
free association, and assembly for various purposes, it did not provide
a favourable legal framework for the development of civil society. One
explanation lies in the composition of the Croatian post‐communist
political and economic elite during the 1990s, which was virtually
the same as under the SFRY. In addition, the government manifested
totalitarian tendencies and conducted openly negative campaigns
against most prominent civil society activists and human rights groups.
Laws to create an enabling environment for the development and
activities of civil society were adopted only after strong pressure from
international institutions. These laws included: a 1995 Labour Act, reg-
ulating establishment and activities of trade unions and employers'
associations; and an Act on Associations in 1997. These laws aided
the continuation of the work of social organizations and citizens' asso-
ciations tolerated during the years of socialism. In addition, a growing
number of humanitarian and human rights nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) developed to deal with the consequences of the war. On
the other side of the organized interests' spectrum, war veteran
PETAK ET AL.
groups, mostly connected with the ruling party, demanded higher
benefits, including veteran pensions. The number of those receiving
pensions and the amount paid to them increased substantially during
the 10 years after the war.
In the 1990s, the development and operation of interest groups
was very much influenced from abroad. This influence had both posi-
tive and negative effects. On the positive side, various organizations,
such as NGOs, trade unions, and employers' associations, enjoyed
substantial support from the European Union (EU), the United States
Agency for international Development (USAID), the agencies of the
United Nations (UN), and a number of other international public and
private donors. On the negative side, some authors argue that external
supporters unintentionally contributed to weakening the role of
domestic civil society groups (Dvornik, 2009; Stubbs, 2006). Others
draw attention to the development of parallel structures of interna-
tional civil society organizations and similar domestic organizations
established during the initial phase of massive international humanitar-
ian and financial assistance during the 1990s. These international
NGOs often bypassed local public institutional networks.
In summary, during the 1990s, although some progress towards
interest group pluralism was made, the institutional channels of
interest representation and intermediation were substantially
constrained, in some cases purposely undermined. The dominant
way of conducting interest group activity was through informal
avenues at both the central and local levels of decision‐making,
along with numerous power groups closely connected with the
ruling party.
2.4.2 | Since 2000
In 2000, the ruling coalition of parties changed the Constitution
transforming Croatia from a semi‐presidential to a parliamentary sys-
tem. This led to the increased influence of the executive and the prime
minister. The reforms were a positive development in two ways: they
gave an impetus to relations with the EU, and helped to establish a
number of new ways to facilitate dialogue between government and
interest groups in national policymaking.
Croatia's desire to join the EU is an important explanatory factor
of the development of the institutional framework for interest repre-
sentation and the actions of interest groups after 2000. This included
the impact of EU pre‐accession funds, which resulted in increased
transparency of interest group activity, and substantial support of
the development and professionalization of a range of interest groups,
especially many NGOs.
The EU's influence in promoting transparency of group involve-
ment in policymaking, included a Code of Practice on Consultation
with the Interested Public in the Procedures of Adopting Laws, as well
as establishing Regulatory Impact Assessments tools in governmental
decision‐making. After joining the EU in 2013, the Croatian govern-
ment increased the level of transparency, the process of shaping and
adopting public policy, as well as increased access to public sector
information.
Action by the national government also increased the access of
interest groups to the policy process. In addition to the Economic
and Social Committee (ESC), as a tripartite dialogue involving
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representatives from trade unions, employers' associations, and gov-
ernment, the government established more than 100 cross‐sector
advisory bodies (committees, councils, standing working groups, and
so on) involving over than 800 representatives of various organized
interests. Among the most active of these is the Council for Civil Soci-
ety Development, established in 2002. It operates as a government
advisory body composed of representatives from various ministries
and government agencies, as well as representatives of NGOs (chosen
by the NGOs themselves) from diverse fields of activity.
In addition, parliamentary working committees include more
than 100 representatives of interest groups. They are selected
through a request to the public of those interested in being
involved. These representatives serve as permanent committee
members and enjoy regular access to decision‐makers in parliament.
Several of those we interviewed pointed out the excessive
standardization and regulation that had long negatively impacted the
formation of interest groups. The action that raised awareness of this
situation was a motion for review of the constitutionality of the Act of
Associations. It was the first time that the highest court in the country
issued an opinion that positively affirmed freedom of association. In
2013, another court decision struck down provisions implemented
by the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports that prevented dia-
logue on proposed laws that directly affected particular interest
groups.
The case of Croatia's group development and institutionalization
also shows the importance of regulating the funding of interest
groups. In the last decade, the introduction of a regulatory frame-
work for standards of public funding for NGO programs and projects
has enhanced transparency. This has helped to undermine the wide-
spread practice of clientelistic funding as a way of buying political
support.
3 | T H E C O N T E M P O R A R Y CR O A T I A N
INTEREST GROUP ENVIRONMENT
As shaped by Croatia's political development, six aspects of the con-
temporary group environment are especially important: (a) the politi-
cal and governmental structure; (b) the persistence of informal
lobbying; (c) the attitude to interest groups; (d) the political aftermath
of war; (e) international influences; and (f) the legal framework of
lobbying.
3.1 | Institutional structures and procedures
Four aspects of the institutional structure shape the patterns of access
and involvement of interest groups in the policy process: government
bias; the dominance of executive; procedural rules; and formal consul-
tative bodies.
First, in the contemporary Croatian political system policymakers
are generally not responsive to most interest groups. Instead, the
government often favors certain political elites (Cerami & Stubbs,
2011, p. 15). This has been the case since the early 1990s where
particular elites have benefited from the gradual development of a
state‐influenced market economy (Cerami & Stubbs, 2011) based on
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selective governmental policy intervention. For the most part, key
policymakers are not attuned to information and argumentation
regarding the concerns of their constituents and of major interest
groups, including both business and those in the social sector.
Second, the constitutional reforms of the early 2000s mean that
the executive remains the predominant force in government and the
sponsor of laws adopted by parliament. There are, however, an
increasing number of cases where amendments to laws are adopted
based on proposals from other authorized sponsors of laws, namely,
parliamentary working bodies, political groups, and individual members
of parliament.
3.1.1 | Rules of procedure
These rules include how policy proposals are introduced, how they are
amended, and how they become law. This determines the openness of
access points available to interest groups and the political and admin-
istrative structural environment in which they operate. This, in large
part, determines the extent to which they can influence policy.
Reforms that were part of the EU pre‐ and post‐accession process
have generally contributed to a more formalized policymaking system.
This was largely due to the enactment of several laws and other
actions by the Croatian government, including adoption of the Code
of Public Consultations in Procedures of Adopting New Laws in
2009 and amendments to the Law on Access to Information. Added
to these developments was the central government's portal for
e‐consultations that became fully operational and compulsory for
use by all ministries and other national state bodies.
As a result of these developments, there is now a more transpar-
ent policymaking process, an increase in access points for interest
groups, as well as empowerment of those domestic interest groups
involved in European advocacy (Vidačak & Škrabalo, 2014).
Fourth, Croatia's interest representation system still largely relies
on some classic formalized corporatist structures and official interest
group consultation mechanisms with groups working closely with
policymakers. This aspect of the policy process involves a long‐standing
group of participants, essentially “insiders” called upon for their exper-
tise and their wide representation of particular sectors of society.
The two major bodies are the Economic and Social Council and
the Council for Civil Society Development. In theory, these are key
central government cross‐sector consultative bodies for development
of social and civil dialogue. They are, however, largely dysfunctional
and do not provide an avenue for the interest groups involved to exert
substantial influence on policymaking. Faced with this, many interest
groups increasingly use other ways to get the attention of
policymakers.
3.2 | The persistence of informal lobbying
Despite the growing number of institutionalized channels of access
and influence, various informal aspects of lobbying continued to be
used. Analysis of responses from our interviews confirms the continu-
ing significance of personal contacts and behind the scene activities,
including those of many power groups.
For many groups and interests, informal lobbying remains the
dominant form of political operations. This is evident in the activities
PETAK ET AL.
of some of the most influential groups. Among these are the Croatian
Employers' Association, the Coordination of Croatian Trade Unions,
and Platforma 112 (a coalition of watchdog NGOs monitoring protec-
tion of human rights and democratization). At the same time, these
groups are increasingly engaging in formal, transparent lobbying,
mostly by publicizing their opinions on draft laws, regulations, and
other acts through the central e‐consultations platform.
3.3 | Attitudes to interest groups and lobbying
There is a predominantly negative perception of lobbying among the
public at large, but also in the media. The public consider interest
groups and lobbyists as primarily promoters of individual, private inter-
ests. In particular, many perceive business lobbyists unfavourably
based largely on the impression of its financial strength as a key instru-
ment of buying political influence and business engaging in activities
behind closed doors. On the other hand, a national survey on public
perception of NGOs conducted in 2012, showed that 60% of Croa-
tians have positive attitudes of NGOs. More than 80% believe that
NGOs should have more influence on decision‐making, at both the
national and local levels (Franc et al., 2012).
Although some of our respondents stressed that conservative
right wing political groups tend to have more negative views, the lib-
eral, left wing perception tends to be more informed and accepting
of the role of interest groups and lobbyists. Furthermore, as a former
top government official put it, “there is a difference in perception of
lobbyists between citizens and political elites.” Political elites have a
more extensive understanding of the role of lobbyists and interest
groups and their advantages. For instance, public officials use certain
interest groups as a bellwether of public attitudes and concerns.
Regarding the media, research by Sinčić Ćorić and Vuković (2012)
shows that where lobbying is mentioned in a story, whether the term
is the main subject of the story or used incidentally, its use is predom-
inantly negative. This attitude of the media is a major factor in shaping
the negative public attitude to interest groups and lobbying because
the media is the public's major source of information on political advo-
cacy activities. As in virtually all democracies, the media report mainly
on scandal and other untoward activities by interest group and virtu-
ally never their positive involvement in the policy process.
3.4 | The political aftermath of war
Even more than 20 years after the Homeland War, a range of war‐
veterans groups play a prominent and influential role in policy making.
These often have privileged access to key decision‐makers, especially
right wing party politicians. This clientelistic relationship is built
around these groups defending a wide range of financial and nonfi-
nancial benefits, often through aggressive, negative pressure strate-
gies and tactics.
At the same time, several human rights watchdog NGOs continue
to deal with war victims, war crimes, and fact‐finding about other
war‐related human rights violations in Croatia and across the former
SFRY. The interpretation of the nature of war crimes, and related
breaches of human rights, has become a source of polarization of a
PETAK ET AL.
number of interest groups in Croatia, as well as in other countries
affected by the war.
3.5 | The role of international and external interests
As we noted earlier, international and other external forces have had
both positive and negative effects on Croatia's interest group system.
This situation remains evident today. On the one hand, initiatives by
external forces have established a positive environment for interest
groups. On the other, this international presence has distorted the
make up and operation of the domestic interest group community.
One of our respondents from the business sector stated that the con-
temporary system of interest groups in Croatia is more a product of
external factors, such as the accession to the EU, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and other international associations, than the
result of internal, organic democratic development.
Regarding the involvement of domestic interests in international
advocacy, Croatia's joining the EU has had a major impact on the
strategies of the most important interest groups. These have had to
adjust their political focus to the challenges of the EU's multilevel
decision‐making arena. Realizing this, major interest groups began to
lobby EU institutions and open offices in Brussels. At the same time,
Europeanization has been used by these groups to strengthen their
position and impact in domestic policy arenas.
3.6 | The legal framework of lobbying
Although there are laws and regulations to prevent the abuse of
power by public officials and others involved in the policy process,
including interest groups and lobbyists, there is no specific regula-
tion of lobbying activities. There is a Law on Conflict of Interest
Prevention and a 1‐year waiting period regarding the so‐called
“revolving door” preventing top public officials from
being employed in lobbying directly related to their former area
of policy activity or other government responsibility. There are also
provisions in criminal law against trading in influence and related
abuse of office.
Some of those interviewed for this project pointed out that, in the
absence of lobby regulation and without transparent criteria applying
to the few firms and individual that engage in lobbying, there is no
public information on the fees they charge or evidence of complying
with basic professional standards or rules. In addition, one of our
interviewees stressed that “top government officials still do not have
to publish lists of meetings with those who are not part of the
government, including interest groups.” A provision regarding this
would contribute to increasing public trust in institutions and improve
transparency of lobbying.
There is, however, support for enacting lobby laws and other
regulations concerning interest groups. This includes many lobbyists,
particularly those who are members of the Croatian Lobbyist
Association (CLA) established in 2008 and now has more than 100
members. The CLA is seeking support from the government for adop-
tion of a law regulating lobbying (Vlahović & Jelić, 2015). In the mean-
time, like many lobbyists across the members of the EU, the CLA has
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voluntarily instituted self‐regulation and put in place a code of
lobbying ethics (McGrath, 2009: xiv; Bitonti & Harris, 2017, p. 11).
However, this code of ethics is not well‐known among the public,
and no lobbyist can be prevented from continuing to lobbying if they
violate the code. Thus, in the absence of legal regulations—most
importantly to require lobbyist and group registration, financial
disclosure, and contact with public officials—much lobbying remains
far from public view. As a result, the public suspicion of lobbying
continues to be widespread.
4 | T H E R A N G E O F I N T E R E S TS A N D
I N T E R E S T G R O U P S A N D TH E I R S TR A T E G I E S
A N D TA C T I C S
The range of groups in the Croatian lobbying community and the strat-
egies and tactics they use are more or less similar to those of devel-
oped democracies with some exceptions. As we have seen, the
major difference in the range of groups is the continuing existence
of a wide range of informal interests and power groups and a signifi-
cant presence of the international community. In most cases, there is
less need for employing sophisticated strategies and tactics. Further-
more, there is often a low‐level of skill in applying the tactics that
are used; this is particularly the case with many NGOs and social issue
groups.
4.1 | An overview of the range of organized interests
Since the 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the pluralization
of the group system. According to data from June 2016, there were
more than 53,000 registered NGOs. These are by far the most numer-
ous types of organized interests. In addition, there are 650 individual
trade unions and 26 trade union associations; 63 industry and service
specific employers' associations, plus three cross‐sector employers'
associations; 2,386 cooperatives (mostly agriculture, tourism, fisheries,
among others); over 600 not‐for‐profit institutes (private homes for
elderly, kindergartens, for example); 210 foundations (cultural, scien-
tific, educational, religious, humanitarian, health protection, etc.); 14
endowment funds; and 52 religious communities, which includes
2,038 legal entities of the Catholic Church and 429 organizational
components of the Orthodox Church.
Not all of these engage in political advocacy, but could do so if
they chose. This list of formal registered organizations, however, is
only a part of the number of groups involved in political advocacy.
There are many informal interests and lobbying entities, particularly
government and public bodies, that are not part of the official statis-
tics. Table 1 provides a more complete picture of the range of inter-
ests and interest groups operating in contemporary Croatia. It is
adapted from a framework developed by Oliveira and Thomas (2014,
pp. 225–226). The table includes a wide range of interests from tradi-
tional groups and interests, such as business and trade unions, to
newly formed interests, to political advocacy by government, to the
activities of an emerging lobby corps. It also shows that Croatian inter-
est groups use various tactics to promote their causes with
government.
6 of 12
TABLE 1 Major interest groups in Croatia
Main characteristics of interest and interest group activities
1. Political elites and traditional power groups.
Among these are powerful entrepreneurs and leading executive managers
from big business, which include the largest corporations. These
business elites can be divided into four major groups:
1. Key business people from the socialist period who preserved and
expanded their business endeavours after privatization in the 1990s
and early 2000s.
2. Tycoons: the owners of small businesses from socialist days (often
working as craftsmen during that time) who became part of the big
business elite by participation in the privatization process.
3. Senior managers of large foreign‐owned corporations and banks.
4. Politically appointed directors of public companies.
In addition to business elites this group includes senior officials in the
Catholic Church, who can exert considerable influence on key policies of
importance to them.
2. Business sector groups
Small and medium‐sized businesses, together with their associations, such
as chambers of commerce and craft chambers.
3. Trade unions and labour lobbying
Public sector unions, such as those in education (divided into primary,
secondary, and higher education and science), health (doctors, nurses),
and the civil servant union.
Private sector unions, including those in various industries, services, and
agriculture.
4. Professional groups and lobbying
These include the Croatian Bar Association, the Croatian Medical
Association, the Croatian Association of Hospital Doctors, various civil
engineering associations and institutes (EIHP—Energy Institute Hrvoje
Požar, IGH—Croatian Construction Institute).
5. Lobbying by national government agencies and local governments
Various national agencies, such as the Environmental Protection and
Energy Efficiency Fund (EPEEF), as the central agency for collecting and
investing budgetary funds in environmental and nature protection,
energy efficiency, and use of renewable energy sources.
The association of counties (županije), cities, and communities (općine).
6. International interests and interest groups
These include a range of international public and private interests and
interest groups, including:
1. The United Nations (UN) and its various agencies, such as the United
Nations Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO),
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
2. Regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and its
agencies and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
3. Foreign governments, their embassies and ambassadors.
4. International interest groups, such at the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), and the International Labour Organization (ILO).
5. International and regional NGOs, such as Transparency International
and the Red Cross.
PETAK ET AL.
Their major strategies and tactics
Personal meetings and phone communication with top state officials.
Facilitating contacts of friends and close associates in dealing with all
levels of government.
Informal networking.
Providing direct and/or indirect financing for campaigns and/or citizen
initiatives.
Technical lobbying targeting middle management or low‐level civil
servants responsible for policy dossiers.
Using institutional channels of access, such as the Economic and
Social Council (ESC—a forum for tripartite social dialogue) and various
working groups for drafting laws.
Using the central government's e‐consultations platform for submitting
formal amendments to legal or policy proposals.
Proposing legislation to the appropriate ministries.
Organizing press conferences and high visibility events.
Direct communication with top officials.
Using institutional channels of influence, such as the ESC and various
working groups for drafting laws.
Press conferences.
Coalition building, including cross‐sector alliances with NGOs
(nongovernmental organizations) and civic initiatives.
Strikes and protests.
Monitoring legislative activity and reacting to legal and policy proposals
having impact on their interests.
Direct communication including meetings with top officials.
Mobilizing group members to ensure support and visibility of association
issues to public officials and the public.
Holding press conferences and presenting policy positions, sometimes
based on research.
Providing data and expert information on issues related to their
responsibilities.
Securing allies both within and outside of government to achieve their goals.
Working with and attempting to influence members of parliament.
A combination of advocacy techniques much depends on the type of
international entity doing the lobbying, for example:
Besides contacting government officials in both formal and informal
ways, bodies such as the EU and NATO are also “silent lobbyists,” as the
government's need for them leads it to do things that will not
alienate these organizations. International bodies also work with, and
sometime fund, domestic NGOs to aid their advocacy efforts.
Foreign governments, also through formal and informal channels, use
their ambassadors and embassy staff to work with the government by
using traditional forms of lobbying.
Other international organizations and NGOs also use traditional forms of
lobbying. In some cases, the fact that they provide services for the
government gives them increased access and potential influence.
(Continues)
PETAK ET AL.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Main characteristics of interest and interest group activities
7. Lobbying and social issue groups.
This category includes a broad range of interest groups that can be
divided into liberal and conservative interests.
Liberal groups include NGOs, which differ according to their value
orientation. These range from those involved in environmental protection,
human rights, gender, and sexual equality, among other social issues.
The more conservative groups and organizations include those promoting
family values, such as traditional access to sex education; various
veterans' groups; and interest groups connected to the Catholic Church.
8. Contract lobbying and consulting firms
This group includes various individuals and organizations that are hired to
lobby on various issues and policies.
There are only a few specialized contract lobbying firms. As a result,
many of those hired to lobby are from related firms, including public
relations agencies; law firms; independent firms involved in finance; and
European Union‐funded consultants.
Source: Developed by the authors based on a classification by Oliveira Gozetto and Thomas (2014, pp. 225–226).
4.2 | Strategies and tactics
Table 1 also shows the strategies and tactics used by major interests
and interest groups. Some additional comments will be useful,
however.
Our interviews conducted with top officials and interest group
leaders viewed the choice of strategies and tactics as determined by
various constraints. These included time available, room for manoeu-
vre, credibility of lobbyists, as well as available human and financial
resources. They also noted that strategies and tactics are increasingly
proactive and utilize several channels of influence.
Our interviewees also identified some lobbying tactic used by
traditional power players. A significant one is “parachuting friends” at
all levels (including top positions) into key ministries to ensure continual
and open channels of influence on policy decisions of interest to these
power players.
A representative of the largest business association stressed the
need to combine lobbying tactics and “also regularly focus on middle
and low‐level civil servants in charge of policy dossiers in various
government bodies.” On the other hand, an interviewee from a major
trade union explained that he “always had the mobile phone numbers
of the prime minister and other top government officials and could
talk directly to them”. In general, the perception of interviewees
confirms that lobbying through direct communication with top officials
is still predominant, especially among traditional power players.
4.2.1 | Indirect and outsider strategies and tactics
Business representatives interviewed perceive NGOs (especially in the
field of environment and human rights) as most skilful in outside
lobbying, due to their close relations with the media and solid
credibility with the public. Among recent examples of effective NGO
outside/grass roots lobbying strategies are the campaigns against oil
7 of 12
Their major strategies and tactics
Bringing legal cases before the Constitutional Court, to strike down
particular laws.
Mass lobbying techniques—sending mass e‐mails, letters, etc.
Building coalitions and alliances.
Launching referenda campaigns.
Using the central e‐consultations platform to lobby for amendments to
policy proposals.
TV video spots and billboard ads.
Taking part in working groups for drafting laws, and involvement in
formal dialogue with government bodies.
High‐visibility events, including protests and demonstrations, with
increasing use of social media to mobilize citizens for such events.
Monitoring and analyzing legislative, executive, and political activity for
their clients.
Advising on lobbying strategies and tactics to achieve their clients' goals
(arranging meetings with policymakers, including speaking opportunities
at high‐visibility events attended by top officials, etc.).
Providing technical expertise needed for drafting new legal and policy
proposals, and amending existing laws and regulations.
Developing media and other communication strategies.
exploitation in the Adriatic. In the past few years, new coalition
building strategies have been developed among groups that have
never been traditional allies but share the same values. An example
of such a “transversal alliances” (Gueguen, 2007, p. 128) is the “We
Are Not Giving Away Our Highways.” It put together a coalition of
trade unions, NGOs, and civic initiatives and sought a referendum
against highway privatization.
Regarding the lobbying activities of state agencies, they are very
effective, due to specific government‐dominated institutions that
often reduces parliament to a mere “voting machinery.” In addition
to seeking allies within the government, state agencies often pursue
allies among supportive interest (client) groups to push forward certain
policy initiatives.
Finally, in recent years, judicial lobbying has become a very
important lobbying tool, especially in the form of legal cases against
certain government acts brought to the Constitutional Court by
certain interest groups. This has resulted in annulment of several laws
that had produced intense substantial ideological conflicts and public
debates.
4.3 | The Croatia lobbying community
Among Balkan countries, and together with Slovenia, Croatia has the
closest equivalent to a public affairs profession as it exists in the
advanced democracies in Western Europe. Most of those engaged in
political advocacy for major organizations, such as business, labour,
and professional groups, are in‐house lobbyists. They are employees
of their organization who spend part or all of their time representing
their organization to government. By contrast, as noted in Table 1
(section 8), the for‐hire or contract lobbying community is small.
Furthermore, there is a low‐level of professionalism among contract
lobbyists. Why does the for‐hire lobbying community exhibit these
8 of 12
two characteristics? There are four major reasons some of which were
identified in our interviews.
First, the predominantly negative perception of lobbying
hinders furthering professionalism and regulation of lobbying,
despite the efforts of the CLA. Second, the dynamics of public
participation in decision‐making, and overall relations between
interest groups and public authorities, are still in an early,
transitional stage of development and institutionalization. This may
partly explain a low demand for the services of professional
lobbyists. Third, the value of contract lobbyists is still not fully
understood even among large companies, most of them still prefer
to rely on umbrella business associations or in‐house lobbyists.
Finally, only a few public relations agencies and law firms, that
provide professional lobbying as part of their services, advertise
these lobbying services. This is an indication of the widespread
stigma attached to the lobbying profession.
5 | I N T ER E S T A N D I NT E RE S T G R O U P
INFLUENCE
There is no comprehensive systematic research on the influence of
interest groups in Croatia: neither on the influence of individual
groups and interests, nor of the group system overall. In particular,
there is no comprehensive study on what in most countries is the
interest with the most influence—the business community. Neverthe-
less, there are some sources that provide an indication of group influ-
ence. The two sources we use are our interviews and our own
research on legislation. Then, we offer additional observations on
the influence of the international community.
5.1 | The findings from the interviews
Figure 1 provides a compilation of the opinions of those we
interviewed regarding the most influential Croatia‐based interests.
We supplement the table with some comments from those interviews.
FIGURE 1 The perception of the most effective interest groups in
Croatia
PETAK ET AL.
5.1.1 | Business
Business and some trade associations are seen as the most influential.
Within this category, most interviewees singled out key businessmen,
the owners and managers of the largest corporations, including the
media, as dominant power players. Some respondents saw foreign
business interests as most effective. Among the most influential asso-
ciations are the chambers of commerce, employers' associations, the
Croatian Banking Association, the American Chamber of Commerce
(AmCham), and the Foreign Investors Council.
In identifying the effectiveness of business and trade associations,
and in line with their strategies and tactics, many of our respondents
stressed unofficial methods and channels of influence more so than
formal approaches. This applies especially to the umbrella organization
of employers, the Croatian Employers' Association. Several
respondents emphasized the enormous influence of the “secret side”
of the business sector. In part, based upon a tactic identified earlier
that of parachuting their group members and supporters into key
government positions. Furthermore, some of our respondents from
trade unions consider “hidden employers” as the most influential
interest group in Croatia. In essence, this is a significant power group,
the members of which often act independently of the Croatian
Employers' Association.
5.1.2 | Religious interests, particularly the Catholic
Church
The second placed interest, religious communities and particularly the
Catholic Church, is evidence of their widespread trust and support.
This is not lost on politicians of all parties, those in the legislature
and the executive branch. An example of its political influence is its
recent support for several initiatives to promote traditional family
values. One was to write into law the sanctity of traditional marriage.
To promote this, the Church supported the “On Behalf of the Family,”
a conservative organization that gathered over 700,000 signatures for
a referendum. The referendum passed overwhelmingly in 2013 by a
two‐thirds majority.
Despite some successes, the Church has been unable to repeal
legal abortion, enacted in 1979, the provisions allowing work on Sun-
days, and a law preventing discrimination against sexual identity,
expression, or orientation. This is evidence that even the most influen-
tial interests do not always win politically.
5.1.3 | Law firms
According to some of our interviewees, in third place, besides the
largest law firms is the bar association, along with professional asso-
ciations, such as associations of doctors. One interviewee pointed
out that, “several lawyers have strong ties with the political estab-
lishment and thus participate in political life.” More specifically, this
influence likely reflects their role in representing large interests, such
as business, professional, and trade associations, as well as the
prominence of some lawyers as members of the social elite with
many political connections.
Examples of strong professional associations can also be found
in the health sector, where powerful interest groups have already
PETAK ET AL. 9 of 12

proven able to prevent the passage of laws that would endanger TABLE 2 Number of accepted amendments from interests and
their interests. interest groups to draft legal and policy proposals during e‐consulta-
tions in 2015 and 2016 (listed in order of number accepted in 2015)

5.1.4 | Trade unions Yearsa

Although trade unions are ranked at fifth, they have been losing Type of interest or interest group 2015 2016

influence since the 1990s. This is confirmed by academic studies Nongovernmental organizations—NGOs 165 91
and, in large part, is due to declining membership, which fell Private companies 163 139
dramatically from close to 90% in 1990 to 55% in 1999 and continues Institutes 58 25
to decline (Bagić, 2010; Kokanović, 1999). Besides, the lack of Chambers of commerce 51 46
coordination and coherence in action among the main national trade Local and regional government bodies 42 28
union associations further contributes to the weakening of their political Academic community 10 3
influence. State bodies 10 24
As pointed out by a trade union leader, “even during the left Trade unions 10 2
coalition government of 2011‐2015, trade union influence on shaping Foundations 4 0
labour legislation was marginal.” Other interviewees felt that this Religious communities 1 4
lack of influence is partly due to some government officials being less Crafts 1 1
open to dialogue with some unions than to others. As a way of Political parties 1 0
strengthening their position in national policy arenas, unions increas- Other entities 9 1
ingly rely on partnerships with EU level associations (the European Source: Central Government E‐Consultations Platform, https://esavjetovanja.
Trade Union Confederation, among others) but also on ad hoc coali- gov.hr
a
tions with NGOs and citizen initiatives sharing similar values. The data for 2015 are from April 27 (the official launch of e‐consultations
platform) until December 31, 2015, whereas the data for 2016 is from
January 1 to August 20, 2016—approximately 8 months covered in each year.

5.2 | An Empirical Assessment of influence

Here, we argue that another indicator of group influence in
policymaking is the number of accepted amendments of legal and
policy proposals. The measure used were those submitted by various
interest groups during official internet public consultations, through
a central government e‐consultations platform. This platform was
launched in April 2015. All government bodies are legally obliged to
use it for conducting public consultations. The most important interest
groups use this channel as a way of influencing draft policy proposals.
Potentially, this is also a channel of influence by individual citizens,
who are the most numerous users of the platform. They comprise
80% of all users. Table 2 provides an overview of the number of
accepted comments categorized by legal entity in 2015 and 2016.
Based on the data, it could be concluded that NGOs and
individual companies are the most influential. On the other hand, it
could mean that some of the most influential players (as perceived
by those interviewed) do not rely much on this formal mechanism as
a channel of influence. This is particularly true for the largest trade
unions and employers' associations. These tend to use more direct
communication with state officials and rely on proactive lobbying in
the early stages of drafting policy proposals.
5.3 | The influence of the international community
Besides major international organizations and foreign embassies,
several of our respondents saw foreign business interests as most
influential. This was particularly so with AmCham and the Foreign
Investors Council, which have had influence on labour legislation.
With accession to the EU, Croatia's interest group system became
exposed to influence by both European and national EU‐member state
groups in all policy areas. Europeanization of domestic interest group
strategies and influence is visible in increasing networking with
EU‐level umbrella associations. Some major Croatian interest groups
have opened offices in Brussels. The names of an increasing number
of those working for these interests can be found on the EU Register
of Lobbyists.
6 | I N T E R E S T G R O U P S A ND CR O A T I A N
DEMOCRACY
There is wide agreement among scholars that a comprehensive and
well‐functioning interest group system is essential to a strong pluralist
democracy (Thomas, 2001, chapters 1 and 15). Given this, to what
extent is the Croatian interest group system aiding in the promotion
of the country's majoritarian democracy? We begin by looking at the
strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary group system, followed
by consideration of an important part of the group‐democracy
relationship, that of group regulation, and finally how this all relates to
Croatian democracy.
6.1 | Strengths and weaknesses of the group system
According to Klimovich and Thomas (2014, p. 185), as explained in the
introductory article to this volume (sections 5.6 to 5.9), a bifurcated
interest group system is the result of the reality of two advocacy
communities operating in a country: a small insider elite and the mass
of society as outsiders. This is in contrast to a more developed or
integrated system. These systems are marked by an institutionalized,
competitive environment with a broader range of groups using
insider tactics as well as more sophisticated indirect tactics, such as
use of media.
As the Croatian interest group system is in the process of transi-
tion, as yet it is not fully integrated. Despite an increasing
10 of 12
institutionalization and competitiveness of the system and improved
access of interest groups to policymaking, there remains minimal
knowledge in society of lobbying strategies and tactics. This is in
contrast to a small number of organizations and advocacy groups able
to use more sophisticated influence techniques.
It is also evident that many dimensions of the institutional system
are not working or functioning effectively. A good example is the tripar-
tite social partnership, as indicated earlier. Several respondents to our
interviews evaluated it as a formal body that does not work. In addition,
despite the establishment of new ways of consulting the public in
policymaking, including the e‐consultation platform, some analysis
point out that the major weakness still lies in the quality of government
feedback to inputs from interest groups (Prkut, 2015, p. 12). This often
reduces consultations to a “ticking off the boxes exercise” that discour-
ages participation of various advocacy groups in policy dialogue.
6.2 |Differing views on the need and extent of
lobbying regulation
It is generally considered that increased transparency of policymaking,
as well as regulation of lobbying, can contribute to the modernization
of the group system and a movement towards an integrated group
system, and thus the advancement of democracy.
Interestingly, however, findings from our interviews revealed two
competing views on the need for lobbying regulation. One
emphasized that legal regulation is not justified because the domestic
scene of organized interests and lobbying groups is at an early stage
of development. So there are only a small number of self‐declared
professional lobbyists acting more as self‐image boosters without
any real influence. In other words, the demand for services of
professional lobbyists is minimal. In that context, strict legal regulation
would be like raising a roof without having a foundation and walls to
support it.
Other respondents view regulation as key to raising public
awareness and enhancing recognition of lobbying as a legitimate
and essential aspect of policymaking. They see legal regulation as
contributing to the advancement of democracy.
Some attempts have been made. In 2012, a draft of a lobbying law
was proposed by the Ministry of Justice. But it failed to get support
from key stakeholders, mostly due to disagreement over the types of
interests that should be required to register. Then, in April 2015, the
CLA presented their own draft to parliament. This included compul-
sory registration of all interest groups working to influence state
authorities; an online registry open to the public; and an accreditation
system for all lobbyists and sanctions imposed on those who do not
register.
In the light of the government's lack of success to regulate
lobbying but the CLA's interest in doing so, one solution might be a
law combining both proposals. This could overcome the opposition
of some policymakers and stakeholders.
6.3 | Interest groups, policymaking, and
democratization
Bringing all this together, we make the following observations about
the extent to which interest groups are able to promote democracy.
PETAK ET AL.
As indicated at various places in this article, for several reasons, the
record is mixed.
On the plus side, the increasing institutionalization of interest
groups has influenced the development of democracy by providing
more formal and visible parts of the policy process. Groups, particu-
larly advocacy NGOs, have also advanced democratization by increas-
ing government accountability. For example, in the early 2000s, the
Croatian Law Center, an NGO, initiated legislative initiatives to regu-
late party funding and election campaigns to increase transparency
of those elected officials receiving funds and from whom (Bovens,
2007). The government is also slowly coming around to consulting
interests on various aspects of policymaking. The EU has also been
instrumental in promoting transparency in government contact
with interest groups. Because of these developments, Croatia is
much closer to becoming a consolidated democratic state than it
was immediately after independence.
On the negative side, perhaps the biggest problem is a combina-
tion of the lack of knowledge and the negativism of the public
towards interest groups. This means that a group system with a
wide range of groups that embraces a membership of all segments
of civil society has not developed to provide the representation
and group competition that underpins a healthy pluralist democracy.
Much unofficial group activity takes place behind the scenes and
power groups and powerful individuals still carry a lot of sway in
policymaking. In many cases, along with this informal activity goes
corruption. Despite some advances, government has been slow to
embrace interest groups in the policy process. In any case, many
interest groups lack the professionalism to be effective participants
in the policy process.
The upshot is that Croatia's bifurcated group system has made a
contribution to the advancement of majoritarian democracy. But until
it becomes a more integrated group system, democracy will not
become fully consolidated.
7 | CO NC LUSIO N
At the beginning of this article we made the statement that specific
features of institutional design and structure affect the advocacy
behaviour and lobbying strategies of both informal and organized
interests. Here, we sum up our findings.
Looking at the big picture, since independence, there has been a
predominant trend in the pluralization and institutionalization of
organized interests and an increase in access points for their
involvement in the public policymaking process. At the same time,
the state continues to be the major political force in most areas and
phases of policy formulation and implementation.
The predominant strength of the executive branch, and the very
centralized government structure, force groups to adjust to fit the
institutional context within which they work. They must carefully
consider the various venues in which they argue their positions,
particularly the central government units or ministries they target.
The active role of the state is seen in the reliance on institutional-
ized corporatist structures with formal interest group consultation
mechanisms. This leads the groups involved to work closely with
PETAK ET AL.
policymakers in a policy environment with a stable set of participants.
These are primarily insiders consulted for their expertise or wider
representativeness of their social or economic sector.
Another major institutional influence has been the EU. The EU
accession process, and the domestic reforms that resulted, have
contributed to more formalization of the policymaking system and
also had a positive influence on improving its openness. EU
actions also increased access points for interest groups, as well
as empowering Europeanized interest groups in domestic policy
processes.
Partly as a result of these developments, a professional lobbying
corps is emerging but is still in its infancy. As yet, no equivalent of
the profession of public affairs has developed, though Croatia is one
of the countries in the region that will likely develop such a profession
in the near future.
At the same time, various informal avenues of access and lobbying
continue to be used, with a perceived substantial influence of informal
power groups. Most interviewees commented that key individual
businessmen, owners, and managers of the largest corporations, law
firms, the media, and the Catholic Church are dominant power players.
However, several institutionalized groups are also seen as influential,
including the Croatian Bar Association, the Croatian Employers
Association, and the Croatian Banking Association. The predominant
interest, as in most countries, is business.
As to the influence of an increasingly institutionalized interest
group system aiding in the consolidation of democracy, it has made
some contribution. But as Croatia's group system is still largely
bifurcated, mainly because of cultural and some formal impedi-
ments, including acceptance of interest groups by government, this
contribution has not been as extensive as it could have been. An
increased contribution depends primarily on the acceptance of
interest groups and their role in the pluralist system by the wider
public and the media.
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L I S T O F I NT E R V I EW S
Members of the government
Darko Lorencin, Minister of Tourism in the Government of the
Republic of Croatia (March 2013–January 2016)
Anka Mrak Taritaš, Minister of Construction and Physical
Planning in the Government of the Republic of Croatia (November
2012–January 2015)
Mirela Holy, Minister of the Environment in the Government of
the Republic of Croatia (December 2011–June 2012)
Mirando Mršić, Minister of Labour and Pension System in
the Government of the Republic of Croatia (December 2011–
January 2016)
Joško Klisović, Deputy Minister of Foreign and European
Affairs in the Government of the Republic of Croatia (December
2011–January 2016)
Senior civil servants
Davorka Hajduković, Ministry of Agriculture, Assistant Minister for
Rural Development
Iva Prpić, Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, Assistant Minister
Ana Markuz, Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds,
Head of Division
12 of 12
Kristijan Turkalj, International law and jurisprudence expert,
previously the head of division in the Ministry of Justice
Members of the business community
Petar Lovrić, Croatian Employers' Association
Milka Kosanović, Croatian Employers' Association
Natko Vlahović, Founder and Managing Director of lobbying
firm Vlahovic Group LLC and President of Croatian Society of
Lobbyists
Trade‐unions and NGOs
Lidija Pavić Rogošić, ODRAZ‐Održivi razvoj zajednice (ODRAZ–
Sustainable Development of Community)
Vilim Ribić, The Independent Union of Research and Higher
Education Employees of Croatia, President of the Great Council
Ana Miličević Pezelj, Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of
Croatia, Executive Secretary for Social Dialogue and Public Policy
How to cite this article: Petak Z, Vidačak I, Dvorny D. Inter-
est groups in Croatia: Institutional development, strategies,
and influence. J Public Affairs. 2019;e1718. https://doi.org/
10.1002/pa.1718
PETAK ET AL.
Zdravko Petak is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of
Political Science, University of Zagreb. His research focuses on pub-
lic policy theory, European public policy, local politics, interest group
politics, and political finance. He was the President of the Croatian
Political Science Association (1999–2002) and the editor‐in‐chief
of the journal Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva (2004‐2013). He
is the Vice‐chair of the IPSA (International Political Science Associa-
tion) section on Public Policy and Administration.
Igor Vidačak is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political
Science, University of Zagreb. He had been the Director of the
Croatian Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs, a
research fellow at the Institute for Development and International
Relations. He is an international team leader of EU‐funded techni-
cal assistance projects, which supports the South East European
(SEE) governments in developing more effective cooperation with
civil society. His research interest include interest groups, lobby-
ing, and the Europeanization of governance.
Dalibor Dvorny is a PhD student at the Faculty of Political
Science, University of Zagreb. He was Deputy Head of the Prime
Minister's Office in Croatia, responsible for policy coordination.
His research focuses on the Europeanization of policy processes
in Croatia, mainly strategic planning and policy evaluation.