MACABAGO v COMELEC
—This Rule shall govern the review of
392 SCRA 178
FACTS:
Private respondent Jamael Salacop filed a petition with the
COMELEC against petitioner Sabdullah Macabago and the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, to annul the
elections and the proclamation of candidates in the
Municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur.
 Private respondent alleged that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive
irregularities in voting procedures in four precincts
and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material
allegations in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-
proclamation controversy.
 He further alleged that the grounds relied upon by
private respondent would be proper in an election
protest but not in a pre-proclamation controversy.
The COMELEC En Banc issued an order directing the Election
Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce
before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the
questioned precincts for technical examination.
 In the same order, the COMELEC declared that
contrary to petitioner’s claims, the petition did not
allege a pre-proclamation controversy. The
Commission characterized the petition as one for the
annulment of the election or declaration of failure of
election in the municipality, a special action covered
by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, the COMELEC set aside the docketing of
the petition as a Special Case (SPC) and ordered the
redocketing thereof as a Special Action (SPA).
Forthwith, petitioner filed with this Court the instant special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of the
order of the COMELEC En Banc. 
 Petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant
petition without first filing with the COMELEC a
motion for a reconsideration of its order because under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for a
reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the
COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited pleading, and that
the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed order.
 Private respondent on the other hand insists that
under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court is
proper only for the nullification of a final order or
resolution of the COMELEC and not of its interlocutory
order or resolution such as the assailed order in this
case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s recourse to this Court Under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is in
order.
RULING: YES.
Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads:
“SECTION 1. Scope.
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.” 8
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by the aggrieved
party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended,
except as therein provided. We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al.
vs. Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal, et al. 9 that Rule 64 of the Rules
applies only to judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply
to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions or to its administrative orders. In this
case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring private
respondent’s petition to be one for annulment of the
elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in the
municipality and ordering the production of the original
copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is
administrative in nature.10 Rule 64, a procedural device for
the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule
65 from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the
exercise of its administrative function.11
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is
not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. 12 But
when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may
seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.13
Private respondent cannot find solace in the pronouncement
in Ruperto Ambil, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et
al. 14 because the subject matter of the petition therein was an
interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC. This Court
held that the remedy of the aggrieved party was first to file a
motion for a reconsideration of the order with the COMELEC En
Banc. The raison d’etre therefor is that under Rule 3, Section
6(c) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any motion for a
reconsideration of a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division of the COMELEC has to be referred to and resolved by
the Commission sitting En Banc. A motion for reconsideration
filed with the COMELEC En Banc of an order, ruling or
resolution of a Division thereof is a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy therefrom.
FLORES v COMELEC
GR 89604, April 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections in
Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 6679,
providing in part as follows:
Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly
constituted barangay which shall be the legislative body and
shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by the
registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains
the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay x
x x.
However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora,
herein private respondent, who placed second in the election
with 463 votes, or one vote less than the petitioner.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained
Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the
petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s
total.1
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which
affirmed the challenged decision in toto.
 Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four
votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing
first name or initial, should all have been considered
invalid instead of being divided equally between the
petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for
kagawad. The judge held that the original total
credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2,
to 462, demoting him to second place.2
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but
his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the public
respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional
trial court.  several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
 The Commission on Elections was obviously of the
opinion that it could not entertain the petitioner’s
appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679
that the decision of the regional trial court in a
protest appealed to it from the municipal trial
court in barangay elections “on questions of fact
shall be final and non-appealable.”
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
RULING: YES.
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the
decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay
election case should be appealed to the regional trial court,
must be declared unconstitutional.
The petitioner was only acting in accordance with the said law
when he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is
what the statute specifically directed in its Section 9 which, at
the time the appeal was made, was considered constitutional.
The petitioner had a right to rely on its presumed validity as
everyone apparently did.  List
The appeal to the Commission on Elections as having been
made directly from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum,
Abra, disregarding the detour to the Regional Trial Court.
Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner’s appeal was validly
made to the Commission on Elections under its “exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all contests x x x involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.” Its decision was in turn also properly elevated to
us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution,
stating that “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.”
Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution that “decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable” applies only to questions of fact and not of law.
That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of
its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the
judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. 6  that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARY v COMELEC
359 SCRA 698
FACTS:
 Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the
Rales of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution
No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in
the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received
organizations and political parties. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations
takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a
result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus
Resolution and individual resolution on political parties.
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed
under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000,
the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the
party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed
Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations
of their intent to participate in the party list elections. Still
other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the
deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations
(or accreditations) of 151 parties and organizations, but denied
those of several others.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that “the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the ‘Certified
of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party
List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and that said
certified list be accordingly amended.” It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter’s nominees not be
proclaimed.4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the
two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days
from notice. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph
C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before the
Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before the Supreme Court
a Petition, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it. The SC added
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred
the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of
the Court.
 Respondents contend that the recourse of both
petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification
 or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections
19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-
A18 dated November 9, 2000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the
premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
RULING: YES.
The petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in
the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by
Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading
under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed
before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The
Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor
from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the
time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner’s
action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved
the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that
certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.23 It has been held that certiorari
is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
“where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency.”24 Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of
20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules.”25
Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought
to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.”26
PADILLA v COMELEC
137 SCRA 424
FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos M. Padilla and private respondent Leonardo B.
Perez were candidates4 for the position of Assemblyman for
Nueva Vizcaya in the national elections of May 14, 1984.
On May 15, 1984, Quirico Pilotin, an independent candidate,
filed a petition contesting the composition of the Board of
Canvassers for Nueva Vizcaya, which led to the suspension of
the canvass; this was followed by Piloting telegraphic petition
requesting the respondent Commission to transfer the canvass
to Manila. On May 17 petitioner Padilla filed a Counter-Petition
likewise contesting the said board’s composition and praying for
dismissal of Pilotin’s petition (PPC No. 19-84); and on May 21
the Board submitted a manifestation asking for replacement of
its members.
On May 24 petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition
with a prayer for a restraining order to prevent the transfer of
the venue of the canvass to Manila, which was granted by this
Court in G.R. No. 67444.
In PPC No. 19-84, petitioner also filed an urgent ex parte motion
to direct the said Board to commence with the canvass of
election returns and “thereafter, to proclaim the winner.” 5 On
May 30 the respondent Commission issued in said case its
resolution (a) denying Pilotin’s petition to transfer the situs of
the canvass, (b) replacing all the members of the Board, and (c)
directing the new Board to meet at the PC/INP provincial
headquarters at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, “where the election
return copies . . . are safely deposited, and to immediately
resume, until terminated, the canvass and to immediately
proclaim the winner in the May 14, 1984 elections for
Assemblyman of Nueva Vizcaya.” 6
On June 1 the new Board canvassed the returns as instructed;
written objections were seasonably made by both petitioner and
private respondent to the inclusion/exclusion of certain
returns; the respondent Board ruled on said objections; after
the completion of the canvass the returns were: private
respondent obtained 56,182 votes against 53,063 votes for the
petitioner; and the respondent Board forthwith proclaimed, on
June 2, private respondent Perez as the duly elected
Assemblyman to represent Nueva Vizcaya in the Batasang
Pambansa.
Both petitioner and private respondent appealed to the
respondent Commission the adverse rulings of the respondent
Board on their respective written objections. On August 7,
1984, the respondent Commission promulgated its decision
upholding the rulings of the respondent Board and affirming
the proclamation of the private respondent.
Petition for certiorari brought pursuant to Section 11,
Article XII (c) of the 1973 Constitution, to annul and set
aside the decision dated August 7, 1984 of respondent
Commission on Elections (Second Division), which
sustained and affirmed the rulings of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Nueva Vizcaya (excluding from the canvass of
votes sixteen (16) election returns from 6
municipalities,1 and including seventy six (76) election returns
2
from 5 municipalities,  of Nueva Vizcaya with a prayer that
respondent Commission be ordered to direct respondent Board
to reconvene and recanvass the election returns after taking
into account the said excluded returns and excluding the
above-mentioned 76 returns.
ISSUE:
WON the recourse to the SC is proper.
RULING: No.
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11,
Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, “not as broad as it used to be” under
the old Constitution and it “should be confined to instances
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process.” Moreover, the legislative
construction of the constitutional provision has narrowed down
“the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to
undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as
distinguished from review.” And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a
case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court,
speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled that
“this Court can not x x x review rulings or findings of fact of the
Commission on Elections,” as there is “no reason to believe that
the framers of our Constitution intended to place the [said]
Commission—created and explicitly made ‘independent’ by the
Constitution itself—on a lower level” than statutory
administrative organs (whose factual findings are not
“disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely
no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings”). Factual matters were deemed not proper for
consideration in proceedings brought either “as an original
action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the
main issue in . . . certiorari is one of jurisdiction—lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction” while “petitions for review on
certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of
law.”

It is readily seen, upon examination of the 115-page petition

(with annexes consisting of 395 pages) and the other pleadings
filed, that the questions raised therein are mostly factual.
We are called upon to look into the credibility and probative
value of evidence presented and relied upon by one party and
weigh the same in relation to that submitted by the adverse
party. A review of the respondent Commission’s factual
findings/conclusions made on the basis of the evidence
evaluated is urged by the petitioner, “if only to guard
against or prevent any possible misuse or abuse of power.”
To do so would mean “digging into the merits and
unearthing errors of judgment” rendered on matters within
the exclusive function of the Commission, which is
proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this Court.
And the possibility of abuse is not a valid argument for, as
observed in Angara: “All the possible abuses of the government
are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary”; “if any
mistake” was committed in investing the respondent
Commission with such “exclusive jurisdiction . . . the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through ordinary
processes of democracy.”