MEJIA vs.

REYES
4 SCRA 648

FACTS:
Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio
Branch of the Philippine National Bank. While still holding such position his professional services were engaged by
Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine
National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as
successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of
land situated in Baguio City.

[C]omplainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that they had desired to take an appeal from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the respondent’s advice; that thereafter
for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public of the Baguio Branch of the
Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch
he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection with the Bank, constitutes
malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Reyes is guilty of malpractice and should be disbarred.

RULING:
YES. But the malpractice committed is not so serious. Respondent was just admonished and warned not to
repeat it.

Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case. The respondent’s act of appearing
and acting as counsel for the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the
Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However,
it does not appear satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the
respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. Evidence shows that the Philippine National
Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his
appointment as bank attorney and notary public.

JIMENEZ vs. FRANCISCO

A.C. No. 10548 June 10, 2014

FACTS:
Clarion Realty and Development Corporation (Clarion) is a corporation where Mark Jimenez owned
substantial number shares of stock. Later, Mark Jimenez filed an estafa case against the complainant for her
alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling his properties. Instead of remitting all the proceeds of the sale
to Mark Jimenez, complainant and her co-respondents misappropriated and converted the funds for their personal
use and benefit. Mark Jimenez and the complainant were former lovers.

Caroline Jimenez filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Edgar Francisco for allegedly violating the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client when the respondent submitted an affidavit in support of
the estafa case. According to the complainant, she usually conferred with the respondent regarding the legal
implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by the respondent or the members of his law office.

On the other hand, respondent countered that he was not the complainant’s lawyer as he was the lawyer of
Mark Jimenez and of the Clarion. He also argued that he might have assisted the complainant in some matters, but
these were all under the notion that Mark Jimenez had given him authority to do so. While he admitted that the legal
documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by
the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. He also opined that the complainant failed to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship existed between them so as to make
operational the rule on privileged communication.
 Respondent was found guilty by the Commission on Bar Discipline’s Investigating Commissioner of violating
the rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in
violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR. For this, he was recommended to be suspended for one (1) year from the
practice of law. On appeal, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed in toto the assailed ruling and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed later by the respondent.

ISSUE:
Did he violate the rule on privileged communication between him and the complainant?

RULING:
No, because there was no lawyer-client relationship.

The factors in determining the existence of lawyer-client privilege are the following: (1) there exists an
attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that
the client made the communication; (2) the client made the communication in confidence; and (3) the legal advice
must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. (Mercado v. Vitriolo)

The Court ruled that based on the records of the case, there was no indication that the “advice” regarding
the sale of the Forbes property was given to the respondent in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what the complainant had communicated to the respondent nor a recital of circumstances under which the
confidential communication was relayed. All that the complainant alleged in her complaint was that “she sought the
legal advice from respondent in various occasions.”

Considering that complainant also failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by the respondent without her consent. It is therefore difficult, if
not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication.

It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege as the complainant has the burden of proving
that it exists and applies. However, while she failed to prove this, the respondent’s actions were found to have
constituted malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney when he actively and passively allowed
Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents. For this, the respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

STA. MARIA vs. TUASON

11 SCRA 562

FACTS:
This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta. Maria.
Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and Chincuanco in a
collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this
case was declared in default and was ordered to pay. By virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of
Pampanga was able to obtain the amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following manner : P10,000
attorney’s fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to have advanced during the prosecution
and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle.

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent failed to comply
and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General who made the findings and recommendation that: respondent Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle
Chincuanco in depriving petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of partnership assets, however, the collection
of P10,000 as attorney’s fees after the case was terminated after one brief hearing is unreasonable. There was also
no evidence presented to show that Tuason actually spent P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve,
respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more severe penalty be imposed for
the repetition of the same of similar acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:
The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients
constitutes a breach of the lawyer’s oath, to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the
cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the health growth of the legal profession. Respondent is hereby
admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

275 SCRA 505

FACTS:
The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who was formerly
the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for
and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has
already been designated and reserved as a school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came forward and filed a case of perjury
against him. However, the same was dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Then again, another case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by respondent Atty.
Sansaet, a practicing attorney.

Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the same
evidence where such complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned) has already been dismissed. Hence,
double jeopardy has already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and transcripts as proof
of his arraignment in the perjury case.

However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk of
court where the perjury case was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment was ever received
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then
that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes, claiming that the latter
contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him and co-
respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.

But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could
not testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must have been disclosed by
Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by attorney-client
privilege.

RULING:
No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies only if the information was
relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was
given, not when the lawyer was made to testify.

The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.

It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with the criminal cases since the latter served as his counsel therein. The privilege is not confined to
verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by other means. IOW, including physical acts. The acts and words of the parties, therefore, during
the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have
invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.

However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which
his attorney is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications are concerned, those crimes were
necessarily committed in the past. But for the privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or
with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.

IOW, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which he has already committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime a
client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.

Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to
him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the
documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a
future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the
guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.

To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to
a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the
rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.