Chapter 4: Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications

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Chapter 4: Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications
Article in Review of Research in Education · January 1997

DOI: 10.2307/1167376
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Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications
Author(s): William F. Tate IV
Source: Review of Research in Education, Vol. 22 (1997), pp. 195-247
Published by: American Educational Research Association
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Chapter4
CriticalRace Theoryand Education:History,Theory,
and Implications
WILLIAM F. TATEIV
Universityof Wisconsin-Madison
In 1993 PresidentClintonnominatedProfessorLaniGuinierof the Universityof

PennsylvaniaLaw School to be assistantattorneygeneral in charge of the Civil
Rights Division. Her nominationfor this governmentpost resultedin a large con-
troversycenteringon her scholarship(Guinier,1991a, 1991b). Guinier'sresearch,
whichexaminedvoting systems,askedthe followingquestion:Aretherefactorsthat
guaranteewinnersandlosers?She contendedthatsuchfactorsdo exist andthatrace
is too often an importantfactorin the constructionof votingdistricts,theoutcomeof
elections, and ultimatelypolitical influence, includingthe control of educational
systems. Guinier(1989) arguedthatthe political system mustbe rejuvenatedto be
more inclusive. Specifically, she called for the creationof electoralschemes that
would allow Blacks to elect candidates representing their interests. These
schemes-proportionalvoting, in particular-were alreadya realityin manysouth-
ern localities and had received endorsement from the Reagan-Bush Justice
Departmentandthe SupremeCourt.ProfessorGuinieralso was criticalof political
bargainingbetween leading civil rightsgroups,AfricanAmericanpoliticians,and
Republicansthatresultedin the constructionof guaranteedAfricanAmericanleg-
islative districtsandconservativeWhitedistrictsin adjacentjurisdictions.Guinier's
position sparkedgreatcontroversyamongboth liberalsandconservatives.
In the epilogueof Racial Formationin the UnitedStates,Omi andWinant(1994)
posited thatthis controversyhad little to do with Guinier'spositionon the issue of
voting districts;rather,her "sin"was her eagernessto discuss the changingdimen-
sions of race in contemporaryU.S. politics. Omi andWinant(1994) remarked:
Guinier's recognitionthat, in the post-civil rightsera as previously,racialinjustice still operates,that
it has taken on new forms, and that it needs to be opposed if democracyis to advance, in our view
located her in a far more realistic position. Guinierunderstoodthe flexibility of racial identitiesand
I would like to thankMichael Apple (editor) and Gloria Ladson-Billings(editorialconsultant)for

their feedback on this chapter.Also, a special thanks to Carl Grant,Ron Jetty, KimberlyTate, and
Jessica Trubekfor theirvaluableassistancewith this project.
195
196 Reviewof Researchin Education,22
politics [italics added], but also affirmedthat racism still shapes the U.S. social structurein a wide-
spreadfashion. She resisted the idea of closing Pandora'sbox; in fact she denied the possibility of
closing it, arguingthe racial dimensions of U.S. politics are too complex, too basic, and too subtleto
be downplayedfor long. (p. 156)
Ladson-BillingsandTate(1995) assertedthat,despitethe salienceof racein U.S.

society, it remainsuntheorizedas a topic of scholarlyinquiryin education.'Over
the past three decades, theoretical and philosophical considerationsof gender
have been delineatedand debated(Chodorow,1978; Damarin,1995; DeBouvoir,
1961; Harding,1986; Hartsock,1979). Similarly,Marxistand neo-Marxistanaly-
ses of class continue to frame many explanations of social inequality (Apple,
1992; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy, 1974; Frankenstein,1987).2 Although
gender-andclass-based analyses continue to struggle for legitimacy in academe,
educational studies conceptualized on these theoretical precepts abound (see
reviews by Ewert, 1991; B. M. Gordon, 1995; Noddings, 1990; Schmitz, Butler,
Rosenfelt, & Guy-Sheftall,1995).
Ladson-BillingsandTate(1995) recognizedthe importanceof gender-andclass-
based analyses;however, they assertedthatthe significanceof race in the United
States,and more specifically"raced"education,could not be explainedwith theo-
ries of genderor class.3Similarly,McCarthyandCrichlow(1993) arguedthat
the subject of racial dominationhas, to say the least, been treatedproblematicallyin modem educa-
tional and social theories. Racial logics and mechanismshave been difficult to specify, their persis-
tence difficult to explain, and their dynamics and trajectoriesdifficult to predict. Indeed, the very
slipperynatureof what has come to be known in the educationalliteratureas the "racequestion"chal-
lenges in fundamentalways the entire tapestryof curriculumand educationalthought,particularly
with respect to nonclass social antagonismsand dominationrelationsin general. That is to say, the
race questionbringsinto the foregroundomissions and blind spots. (p. xvii)4
These omissions and blind spots suggest the need for theoreticalperspectives
thatmove beyond the traditionalparadigmaticboundariesof educationalresearch
to providea more cogent analysis of "raced"people andmove discussions of race
and racism from the marginsof scholarly activity to the fore of educationaldis-
course. King (1995) stated:
Conceptualinterventionin the educationalresearchliteratureis needed to facilitatea systemic exam-

inationof scholarshipthataddressesideological influenceon knowledge in curriculumandeducation
practice,particularlywith regardto the educationof Black people. (p. 270)
To this end, one importantquestionfor scholarsinterestedin educationalequity

and the politics of educationis, In what theoreticalframeworkdid Lani Guinier
embed her analysesof race, voting systems, andpolitical equality?5The answerto
this questioncan be found in an emergingliteraturein legal discoursereferredto
as criticalrace theory (CRT).Calmore(1992) remarked:
As a form of oppositionalscholarship,criticalrace theorychallenges the universalityof white experi-
ence/judgementas the authoritativestandardthat binds people of color and normativelymeasures,
Tate:CriticalRace Theory 197
directs,controls,andregulatesthetermsof properthought,expression, presentation,andbehavior.As
represented by legal scholars,criticalracetheorychallengesthe dominantdiscourseson raceand
racismas theyrelateto law.Thetaskis to identifyvaluesandnormsthathavebeendisguisedandsub-
ordinated in thelaw.As criticalracescholars,we thusseekto demonstrate thatourexperiencesas peo-
ple of colorarelegitimate,appropriate, andeffectivebasesforanalyzingthelegalsystemandracial
subordination. Thisprocessis vital to ourtransformative vision.This theory-practice approach,a
praxis,if youwill,findsa varietyof emphasesamongthosewhofollowit....
Fromthisvantage,considerfora momenthowlaw,society,andculturearetexts-not so muchlike
a literarywork,butratherlikethetraditional blackminister'scitationof textasa verseorscripture
that
wouldlendauthoritative supportto thesermonhe is aboutto deliver.Here,textsarenotmerelyran-
domstories;likescripture, theyareexpressions of authority,
preemption, andsanction.Peopleof color
increasingly claimthattheselargetextsof law,society,andculturemustbe subjected to fundamental
criticismandreinterpretation.(pp.2161-2162)
This chapteris structuredaroundthe exposition of varioussources (authorsof

CRT articles and philosopherswho influencedthese authors),followed by com-
mentariesthatsummarizeandcritiquethe moredescriptivediscussions.The reason
for this unusualstructurerelatesto the twofoldpurposeof the chapter.The firstpur-
pose is to describethe majortheoreticalelements undergirdingCRT. The second
purpose is to discuss the potentialimplicationsof this body of literaturefor the
scholarlyarticulationof race and equity in educationalpolicy and research.This
discussion will offer a critiqueof CRT writingthat asks whetherthe methods of
analysisandargument,andthe researchagendarepresentedby the CRT scholarship
describedhere,are valuablein two ways. First,do they provideinsightscapableof
radicallytransformingeducationalpolicy or the study of education?Second, do
they provideinsightsinto equityissues in educationthatare substantialandnovel?
OUTLINEOF THEDISCUSSION
This chapterdoes not include a comprehensivereview of the wide rangeof top-
ics analyzed by scholars employing tenets of CRT; rather,it attemptsto outline
elements of this theoryespecially relevantto educationalresearchers.With this in
mind, the first topic exploredis the paradigmatickinshipof educationalresearch
and the legal structuresof U.S. society. The intentof this discussionis to describe
how both educationalresearchand legal structurescontributeto existing belief
systems and to legitimating social frameworksand policy that result in educa-
tional inequities for people of color. The section concludes with a call for con-
ceptualintervention.
In the next section, the historical origins and shifting paradigmaticvision of
CRT are discussed. CRT is a productof and response to one of the most politi-
cally active and successful eras of social change in the United States and cannot
be divorcedfrom it withoutlosing analyticalinsight. The CRT movementin legal
studies is rooted in the social missions and strugglesof the 1960s that soughtjus-
tice, liberation,and economic empowerment;thus, from its inception, it has had
both academicand social activist goals. Furthermore,the movementis a response
to the retrenchingof civil rightsgains and a changing social discoursein politics.
198 Review of Research in Education, 22
Fixing the origin of the CRT movement in the 1970s does not deny the pre-
movement intellectualhistory and legal strategiesthat served as its foundation.
Rather,this pre-1970s history both provides a rich resourceof data on which to
build and reflects an intellectualcontinuitycentralto the movement's mission.
The intellectualcontinuityof CRT shouldalso be viewed as a shift in paradigm
from critical legal studies (CLS). The distinctions between CRT and CLS are
importantfor those interestedin how race and racism are framedin intellectual
discourse. Scholarsusing both methodsof legal analysis have concurredthat the
law serves the interestsof powerful groups in society; however, scholars in the
CRT movement have argued that civil rights discourse in CLS does not ade-
quately address the experiences of people of color. Ultimately, this argument
serves as a point of departurebetween the two theoreticallydrivenmovements.
RESEARCHANDTHELAW:
EDUCATIONAL
RACEDREPRESENTATIONS
The purposeof this section is to briefly describe how the law and educational
researchhave been influencedby a paradigmaticview thatcharacterizespeople of
color as inferior. Considerable debate has centered on the appropriatenessof
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies in educational research
(Gage, 1989; Jacob, 1987; Schrag, 1992; Shulman, 1986). This debate has
focused largely on ideology and conceptions of social science. Shulmanargued
that some of the ideological differencesdeveloped as a result of contrastingcon-
ceptions of education in general and teaching in particular;others developed in
relation to views on acceptable forms of research; and yet others developed
around political commitments. Research programs often are developed and
accepted because of their consistency with favored ideological positions
(Shulman,1986). Earlier,Durkheim(1965) made a similarpoint when describing
the role of theoryin scholarlythoughtand society:
Itis notatalltruethatconcepts,evenwhenconstructedaccordingto rulesof science,gettheirauthor-
ityuniquelyfromtheirobjectivevalue.Itis notenoughthattheybetrueto getbelieved.If theyarenot
in harmony withotherbeliefsandopinions,or,in a word,witha massof othercollectiverepresenta-
tions (the concepts taken for grantedby most people in a given time and place), they will be denied;
mindswill be closedto them;consequently
it will be as thoughtheydo notexist.(p.486)
Durkheim's (1965) analysis suggests that, for a theory to become acceptable,

it must be consistent with otherrepresentationsor belief systems that reflect the
prevailing culturalethos of a people. Wynter (1995) arguedthat belief systems
are mechanisms by which humanorders are integratedon the basis of artificial
or symbolic modes ratherthan on the basis of genetic modes of classification.
Wynter stated that the systemic goal of belief systems is to motivate culture-
specific ensembles of behavior ratherthan to deal with truth. Instead, truth is
found in the behavior motivated by belief systems and the systemic effects to
which the behaviors collectively lead.
The theories and belief systems predominantin educationrelatedto people of
color and the representationsof these citizens in Americanjurisprudencehave
shareda commontrait.Both have been premiseduponpolitical,scientific,andreli-
gious theoriesrelying on racial characterizationsand stereotypesaboutpeople of
color thathelp supporta legitimatingideology andspecific politicalaction(Allport,
1954; Bullock, 1967; Cone, 1970; Marable,1983; Takaki,1993). Some of the ear-
liest studies with educationalimplicationscenteredon the intellectualassessment
and school achievementof African Americanand other ethnic minoritystudents
(Hilliard,1979; Kamin, 1974; Madaus,1994). This researchlegacy, referredto as
the inferiorityparadigm,is built on the belief thatpeople of color are biologically
and geneticallyinferiorto Whites (Carter& Goodwin, 1994; Gould, 1981; Selden,
1994).6 The inferiority paradigm is characterizedby its fluidity and dynamic
nature,an ever-changinghegemonic discourse.However, despite its fluid nature,
some scholarshave attemptedto describeelementsof the inferiorityparadigm.
Padilla and Lindholm (1995) argued that a set of identifiable characteristics
inherentin the inferiorityparadigm-particularly IQ studies-are still apparent
today in educationalresearchinvolving ethnic minorities.These complex, con-
nected assumptionsconformto a societal dispositionthatmakes them appearnat-
ural and appealing.The identifiableassumptionsof this paradigmare as follows:
(a) The White middle-classAmerican(often male) serves as the standardagainst
which othergroupsarecompared;(b) the instrumentsused to measuredifferences
are universallyappliedacross all groups,with perhapsslight adjustmentsfor cul-
turally diverse populations;and (c) although we need to recognize sources of
potential variance such as social class, gender, cultural orientation,and profi-
ciency in English, these factorsare viewed as extraneousand can laterbe ignored
(Padilla & Lindholm, 1995). Otherscholars also have recognized these assump-
tions and viewed them as biased against African Americans,Latinos, and other
ethnic minorities(Lightfoot, 1980; Pang, 1995; Rodriguez, 1995).
In MinorityStudents:A ResearchAppraisal,Weinberg(1977) arguedthatedu-
cational researchstudies should move beyond the conceptualframeworksassoci-
ated with the inferiority paradigm. Moreover, he contended that educational
researchconcerningchildrenof color should include (a) pertinenthistoricaland
legal background,(b) the ideology of racism, (c) a continuingreexaminationof
prevailingviews of the role of race and social class in learning,and (d) the influ-
ence of minoritycommunitieson schools.
Although many scholars have called for a change in the way educational
researchis conductedin communitiesof color, the influence of past researchis
persistent(e.g., Lomawaima,1995; Moran& Hakuta,1995). Carterand Goodwin
(1994) stated:
The conventionalbelief in the intellectualinferiorityof visible racial/ethnicindividualshas hada pow-
erful impact on educationalpolicy and curriculumdevelopmentsince before the 1800s. Because dif-
ferences in achievement between White and non-White students were assumed to be genetically
based, the inferiority paradigm allowed slavery to be condoned, which resulted in racial/ethnic groups,
particularlyBlacksandIndians,beingconsidereduneducable andbarredfromformalor adequate
schooling.... Theinferiority continuesto manifestitselfin thequalityof education
paradigm offered
non-White children.(p. 296)
The assumptionsof the inferiorityparadigmhave not been limited to discus-

sions by the educationalresearchcommunity.The assumed intellectualinferior-
ity of African Americans,Native Americans,Latinos, and other people of color
also has a long history in the legal discourse of the United States (Clay, 1993;
Takaki, 1993). In fact, a relationshipexists between educationalresearchbuilt on
assumptionsof the inferiorityparadigmand the constructionof education-related
policy and law (Elliot, 1987). For example, ArthurJensen (1969) illustratedthe
interrelationshipbetween science and public policy in an article in the Harvard
EducationalReview. Chargedby the editors of the journalto considerwhy com-
pensatoryeducationprogramsof the "Waron Poverty"had not producedbetter
results,Jensenarguedthatthe programswere boundto have disappointingresults
because the target population of students-disproportionately African
American-had relativelylow IQ scores. Similarly,HernsteinandMurray(1994)
arguedthatsociety has experiencedand continuesto experiencea dramatictrans-
formationresultingin a groupof largely White cognitive elite:
Thetwentiethcenturydawnedon a worldsegregated intosocialclassesdefinedin termsof money,

power,andstatus.Theancientlinesof separation basedon hereditaryrankarebeingerased,replaced
by a morecomplicated set of overlappinglines.... Ourthesisis thatthetwentiethcenturyhascon-
tinuedthetransformation,
so thatthetwenty-firstwillopenona worldin whichcognitiveabilityis the
decisivedividingforce.Theshiftis moresubtlethanthepreviousone butmoremomentous. Social
classremainsthevehicleof sociallife,butintelligencenowpullsthetrain.(p.25)
Herrnsteinand Murray(1994) posited that low intelligence is at the root of

society's social ills, andpolicy formulationmust take this into consideration.The
argumentsof both Jensen (1969) and Herrnsteinand Murray(1994) have been
subjected to considerable scholarly critique (e.g., Fraser, 1995; Gould, 1994;
Hilliard, 1984; Hirsch, 1975); however, theirposition reflects an ideology with a
long history in Western civilization (Gould, 1981). Of importancehere is the
binary opposition of White-Black (Allen, 1974; Anderson, 1994; Crenshaw,
1988): Whites are an intelligent,diligent,and deservingpeople; Blacks are a sim-
ple, lazy, and undeservingpeople. These socially constructedrepresentationsof
subjective identity have categorized specific groups of society in terms of per-
ceived abilities to think logically and justified the construction of oppressive
social policy and law thatreflect these categories(Jefferson,1954).7
Perhapsnowhere is this reality more obvious than in the developmentof the
Constitution(Black, 1988). It would be difficult to understandthe constructionof
law withoutunderstandingthe individualand collective mind-setof the original
framersof Americanlaw. Anderson(1994) arguedthatthe men who constructed
the Constitutionformed the foundationfor the subordinationand exploitationof
AfricanAmericans.In 1786, the framersof the Constitutionlaid the legal ground-
workfor a White-Blackbinaryoppositionby (a) countingBlacks as threefifths of
a person,(b) delaying for 20 years the effective datefor outlawingthe slave trade,
and (c) obligating the governmentto uphold fugitive slave laws and to use its
troops to end Black insurrectionsand violence. Thus, by constitutionallaw, the
federalgovernmentwas legally empoweredto supporta culturalethos of African
Americaninferioritymanifestedas slavery.8HaroldCruse(1984) stated:
of Americansocietyrecognizesthe rights,privilegesandaspirations
The legal Constitution of the
whileAmericahasbecomea nationdominated
individual, by thesocialpowersof variousethnicand
religiousgroups.Therealityof thepowerstrugglesbetweencompetingethnicor religiousgroupsis
thatanindividualhasfew rightsandopportunities
in Americathatarenotbackedupby thepolitical
andsocialpowerof onegrouporanother.(pp.7-8)
Cruse's (1984) argumentis consistent with the laws, policies, and folkways
that have regulatededucation. For a majorityof the 1800s, laws in many states
prohibitedthe education of African Americans. For instance, teaching a Black
person to read would lead to fines, imprisonment,or flogging for the educator.
These laws were partly a productof White capitalists attemptingto secure con-
trol over an importantmeans of theireconomic growth:slavery (Marable,1983).
However, these laws cannot be separatedfrom the inferiorityparadigmin edu-
cation. The following excerpt from the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision of 1857
illustrates the relationshipbetween Americanjurisprudenceand the inferiority
paradigm:
Theyhadformorethana centurybeforebeenregarded as ... so farinferior... thatthenegromight
justlyandlawfullybe reducedto slaveryforhis benefit.... Thisopinionwasat thattimefixedand
universalin thecivilizedportionof thewhiterace.It wasregarded as an axiomof moralsas in poli-
tics,whichno one thoughtof disputing... andmenin everygradeandpositionin societydailyand
habituallyacteduponit ... withoutdoubtingfora momentthecorrectness of thisopinion.(p.407)
The power and dangerof the inferiorityparadigm,and paradigmsin general,is

thatits adherentsoften fail to seek differentconceptions.Oh andWu (1996) stated:
A conservative Congressor anelectoratevotingon a ballotproposition mightbelievethearguments
andacceptthepublicpolicyproposalsadvancedin TheBell CurveandAlienNation,whichargue,
thatracedetermines
respectively, intelligencewhichin turn,determines socioeconomic success,and
thatthenationhasbeenandshouldremainraciallyWhiteandculturally homogeneous. Withenough
socialscienceandempiricaldata,courtscouldsustainthose[discriminatory] laws.Moreover,the
courtsmaybe compelledto sustainthoselawsbecausetheywouldlackauthority to takeanapproach
thatwasmorecriticalorthatdeviatedfromlegalratification data.Thecourtsarelimited
of statistical
[italicsadded]by thedata.(p. 186)
Instead,the concepts and theories of the "accepted"paradigminfluence social

problem solving, policy development, policy interpretation,and policy imple-
mentation.For example, in his analysis of the Brown decision, Lawrence(1993)
arguedthatBrownshouldbe viewed as an attemptto regulatesocietal conceptions
of AfricanAmericaninferiority:
The key to this understandingof Brownis thatthe practiceof segregation,the practicethe Courtheld
inherentlyunconstitutional,was speech. Brown held that segregationis unconstitutionalnot simply
because the physical separationof Black and white childrenis bad or because resourceswere distrib-
uted unequallyamong Black and white schools. Brownheld thatsegregatedschools were unconstitu-
tional primarilybecause of the message segregationconveys-the message thatBlack childrenarean
untouchablecaste, unfit to be educatedwith white children. Segregationserves its purposeby con-
veying an idea. It stampsinferiorityupon Blacks, and this badge communicatesa message to othersin
the community,as well as to Blacks wearingthe badge, that is injuriousto Blacks. Therefore,Brown
may be readas regulatingthe contentof racistspeech. As a regulationof racistspeech, the decision is
an exception to the usual rule thatregulationof speech contentis presumedunconstitutional.(p. 59)
Carterand Goodwin's (1994) review of social scientific paradigmsrevealed

that social scientists have historically used race as a determinantof intellectual
and educationalaptitude.Similarly,the framersand interpreters(i.e., policymak-
ers) of our legal system have used race as a factorin the constructionand imple-
mentationof laws influencingeducation(Bell, 1987;Omi & Winant,1994). Both
educationalresearchand law have often characterized"raced"people as intellec-
tually inferiorand raised doubts about the benefit of equitablesocial investment
in educationandothersocial services (Ford& Webb, 1994; Herrnstein& Murray,
1994). This paradigmatickinship built on conceptions of inferioritysuggests the
need for a theorythatexplicates the role of race in educationand law.
A GENESISOF CRITICAL
RACETHEORY
It is importantto view the origins of CRT from both a historical and philo-
sophical perspective.A historicalperspectiveis requiredto provide a context for
understandingthe origins of contemporarylegal debates concerning the effec-
tiveness of past civil rights strategiesin today's political climate. For example,
currentdiscussions of equal opportunityand "colorblindness"have little mean-
ing unless framedhistorically (Culp, 1991). Over the years, both concepts were
guiding principlesfor a model of equalityclosely aligned with the dominantview
of justice (Aleinikoff, 1991; Ming, 1948). However, the complexityof civil rights
doctrinecan be seen by examiningthe concept of color blindness.
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
reflects a normativeprincipleof color blindnessthatruns deep in Americancivil
rights discourse:
In view of the Constitution,in the eye of the law, thereis in this countryno superior,dominant,ruling
class of citizens. Thereis no caste system here. OurConstitutionis color-blind[italicsadded],andnei-
therknows nor toleratesclasses among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are equal before
the law. (p. 559)
From Justice Harlan'sdissent to MartinLutherKing's desire that his children

be judged by the "contentof theircharacter"ratherthanthe "colorof their skin,"
the color-blindprinciplehas existed in civil rights discourse.Moreover, despite
what may appearto be an obvious tension between race-conscious and color-
blind principles, individual supportersof race-conscious measuresmay actually
Tate: CriticalRace Theory 203
be guided by logic associated with a color-blindphilosophy. For example, many

liberal advocates of race-consciousmeasuresjustify the implementationof affir-
mative action policy on the basis of past violations of the color-blindprinciple
(Aleinikoff, 1991). One example is Justice Blackmun's dissentingopinion in the
Bakke decision (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978). He
argued, "In order to get beyond racism [to color blindness], we must first take
account of race. There is no other way" (p. 407).
Similarly,many conservativeadvocatesof color-blindmeasurescannotignore
the importanceof race. For example, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, an
outspoken supporterof color-blind policy, argued that Blacks, like the Irish,
Italians,and Jews before them, must overcome oppressionwith hardwork (Pitts,
1995). When asked what he would tell a Black child growing up in America,
Gingrich responded: "If you're black, you have to work harder,and if you're
black and poor, you have to work twice as hard"(Pitts, 1995, p. 3A). In his
remarks, Speaker of the House Gingrich acknowledged the reality of racial
inequality; however, his color-blind approachto policy-making impeded him
from moving beyond the recommendationof "pullingyourself up by your boot-
straps."CongressmanGingrich's remarkreflects a paradoxby many who assert
strongly they are color blind: To be color blind in this way requiresrace con-
sciousness; one must notice race. Aleinikoff (1991) describedthe process:
Itis apparently
important,as a matterof widespreadculturalpractice,forwhitesto assertthattheyare
in thesensethattheydo notnoticeoracton thebasisof race.Onecansee thisat
stronglycolorblind,
workin suchstatements as:"Ijudgeeachpersonas anindividual." Ofcourse,it cannotbe thatwhites
do notnoticetheraceof others.Perhapswhatis beingsaidis thatthespeakerdoesnotbeginhereval-
uationwithanypreconceived notions.Butthistoo is difficultto believe,giventhedeepandimplicit
ways in whichourmindsarecolor-coded.To be trulycolorblindin this way ... requirescolor-
consciousness:one mustnoticeracein orderto tell oneselfnotto triggertheusualmentalprocesses
thattakeraceintoaccount.(p. 1079)
Many legal and political scholars of color question whetherthe philosophical

underpinnings of traditional liberal civil rights discourse-a color-blind
approach-are capable of supportingcontinuedmovement toward social justice
in a climate of retrenchment(e.g., Lawrence, 1987; Wilkins, 1995; P. J. Williams,
1991). In fact, some critical race theorists argue that there is little difference
between conservative and liberal discourse on race-related law and policy.
Crenshawand colleagues (1995) remarked:
Liberalsandconservatives seemedto see issuesof raceandlaw fromwithinthe samestructure of
analysis-namely,a policy thatlegal rationalitycouldidentifyanderadicatethe biasesof race-
consciousness in socialdecision-making. as a generalmatterdifferedover
Liberalsandconservatives
thedegreeto whichracialbiaswasa factof Americanlife:liberalsarguedthatbiaswaswidespread
whereconservatives insistedit was not;liberalssupported
a disparateeffecttestfor identifyingdis-
crimination,whereconservatives advocateda morerestricted intentrequirement; liberalswantedan
expandedstateactionrequirement, whereasconservativeswanteda narrowone. The respective
visionsof the two factionsdifferedonlyin scope:theydefinedandconstructed "racism" the same
way, as the opposite of color-blindness.(Crenshaw,Gotanda,Peller, & Thomas, 1995, p. xvii)
Criticalrace scholarsfind themselves questioningthe philosophicalunderpin-
nings of civil rightsdiscourseduringa period of ideological attackfrom the right
by neoconservativesseeking to eliminate past civil rights gains. Thus, to under-
standCRT within legal discourseit is importantto recognize this scholarshipas a
critiqueof both liberaland conservativelegal ideologies.
OVERVIEWS
ONE HISTORICAL
The United States has a long history of attemptingto use the courts and legal
remediesto resolve racialinjustice(Allen, 1974;Robertsv. Cityof Boston, 1850).
However, by the turnof the 20th centurythe doctrineof "separatebut equal"was
the law of the land (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). The separate-but-equaldoctrine
reflected the prevailingsocial temperament,a belief in the inherentinferiorityof
African Americansthat made it impossible for Whites to see themselves sharing
public accommodationswith Blacks (Bogle, 1989; Dred Scott v. Sandford,1857;
Jefferson, 1954; Peters, 1982; Selden, 1994). African Americans in the South
were requiredby law to use racially segregatedschools, trains,streetcars,hotels,
barbershops,restaurants,and other public accommodations.The job marketwas
also segregated, resulting in low-paying employment opportunitiesfor African
Americans (Margo, 1990). Moreover, African Americans were denied political
equalityby restrictivevoting laws. The flawed legal concept of separatebut equal
resulted in the maintenanceof African American subordination(Tate, Ladson-
Billings, & Grant,1993).
The need for legal remediesto addressthis subordinateposition was articulated
o
by CarterG. Woodson (1933/1990). However, he argued that many African
American lawyers were not preparedto litigate and resolve issues of race and
Americanlaw:
Thereare, moreover,certainaspects of law to which the white man would hardlyaddresshimself but
to which the Negro should direct special attention.Of unusualimportanceto the Negro is the neces-
sityforunderstanding
themisrepresentations
in criminalrecordsof Negroes,andracedistinctions
in
the laws of modernnations.These mattersrequirea systemic study of the principlesof law and legal
procedureand, in additionthereto,furtherstudy of legal problemsas they meet the Negro lawyer in
the life which he must live. This offers the Negro law school an unusualopportunity.(p. 174)
Woodson was not the only intellectual to recognize the need for African
American professionals capable of fighting racial injustice (see, e.g., Bullock,
1967)." A case in point is thatof MordecaiW. Johnson.In 1926, Dr. Johnsonwas
appointedto the presidency of HowardUniversity, a historicallyBlack college.
He broughta set of strictacademicstandardsto the position and a commitmentto
fight social inequities (Davis & Clark, 1992). Johnson recruited some of the
nation's finest scholars.Moreover,on the advice of SupremeCourtJusticeLouis
Brandeis, the new presidentmoved to develop a first-ratelaw school to address
racism and the law. Brandeisremarked,"Builda law school and trainmen to get
the constitutionalrights of [your] people. Once you trainlawyers to do this, the
SupremeCourtwill have to handyour people theircivil rights"(as cited in Davis

& Clark, 1992, p. 47).
Johnson responded by hiring Charles Hamilton Houston to rebuild the law
school with a focus on creating a cadre of lawyers capable of challengingracial
injustice. An outstandinglegal scholar, Houston was creditedwith the develop-
ment of a social engineering approach to achieving racial equality (McNeil,
1983). NathanielJones,judge of the United States Courtof Appeals for the Sixth
Circuitand formergeneralcounsel of the NAACP, remarked:
It was CharlesHamiltonHoustonwhopersuasively arguedthatone of themosteffectivemeansof
educatingthepublic,of buildingpoliticalcoalitions,andtherebyobtainingmeaningful change,was
throughlitigation.Moreover,it washisviewthatlitigationundertheFourteenth Amendment couldbe
a powerfulmeansof racialminoritiesto confrontgovernmental authorities
withtheirdutyto acton
behalfof thosewhoseconstitutional rightswerebeingdenigrated. He initiatedlitigationon a broad
frontandcarriedit forward.(ascitedin Jones,1993,p. 98)
After rebuildingHowardUniversity's Law school, Houstonresignedhis dean-

ship to assumethe positionof chief counsel of the NAACP, with responsibilityfor
organizing the NAACP's campaign against legalized racial discrimination.
Incorporatingthe meta-strategyof social engineeringvis-a-vis litigation,Houston
and his colleagues at the NAACP won impressive legal victories that led to
changes in the natureof race relationsin the United States (e.g., Brown v. Board
of Education, 1954; McLaurinv. OklahomaState Regentsfor Higher Education,
1950; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938; Sipuel v. Board of Regentsof the
Universityof Oklahoma,1948).
During his tenure as chief counsel of the NAACP, Houston hired Thurgood
Marshall,his formerstudentat HowardUniversity Law School and a protege in
the NAACP, to assist with the implementationof the social engineeringlitigation
strategy. In 1938, Houston's health forced him to leave the NAACP (Davis &
Clark, 1992). At the age of 30, ThurgoodMarshallreplacedCharlesHouston as
chief counsel of the NAACP. Marshallcontinuedthe path chartedby Houstonof
using carefully plannedlawsuits to challenge the doctrineof separatebut equal.
The social engineeringstrategyultimatelyled to the Brown (1954) lawsuit and a
decision thathelped legally overturnPlessy v. Ferguson (1896).
A few years after the Brown decision, Thurgood Marshall, then director-
counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, visited Pittsburgh,where Derrick
Bell, a lawyer by training, was serving as executive director of an NAACP
branch (Bell, 1993). Marshall offered Bell a position on his staff, and Bell
accepted. From Marshall and from NAACP general counsel Robert L. Carter,
Bell (1993) learned that "the role of the civil rights lawyer was not simply to
understandthe legal rules but to fashion argumentsthat might change existing
laws" (p. 75). Thus, Derrick Bell received first-hand experience in Charles
Houston's meta-strategy of using litigation to socially engineer civil rights.
Moreover, it is this experience that Bell broughtto his academic career in law.
The connection between DerrickBell the civil rights lawyer and DerrickBell
the academicis importantin chroniclingthe origins and philosophicalundergird-
ings of CRT. In 1969, Bell accepted a position on the law faculty of Harvard
University.In his negotiationswith the dean of the law school, Bell (1994) made
it clear thathe viewed teachingas an opportunityto continuehis civil rightswork
in a new arena.His legal scholarshipwas greatlyinfluencedby his perspectiveas
a Black man and his experience as a practicingcivil rights lawyer. Bell (1994)
noted, "Practitioners,often throughstorytellingand a more subjective, personal
voice, examine ways in which the law has been shaped by and shapes issues of
race"(p. 171). His methodsof writingaboutrace and law were at the forefrontof
a new school of scholarlythoughtin law: critical race theory. However, it is not
possible to separate Bell's scholarship and CRT from the African American
scholarshipthatemergedduringand afterthe civil rights movement.
Although no identifiable date can be assigned to the conception of CRT, its
foundation is linked to the development of African American thought in the
post-civil rights era: the 1970s to the present (Bell, 1980a, 1980b; Matsuda,
Lawrence,Delgado, & Crenshaw,1993). The civil rightsmovementof the 1960s
had slowed, and many opportunitiesassociated with the movement were under
attack(e.g., Regents of the Universityof Californiav. Bakke, 1978). Many schol-
ars and activists of this era noted the limitationsof achievingjustice using domi-
nantconceptionsof race, racism,and social equality.For example,Ladner(1973)
in sociology, Cone (1970) in theology, Allen (1974) in political science, and
Banks (1971) in educationall moved beyond the traditionalparadigmaticbound-
aries of their fields to provide a more cogent analysis of the African American
experience. This boundarycrossing representsa significant contributionof the
Black studies movementto the academiccommunity.
This intellectualmovementpermeatedthe boundariesof legal educationas law
professors and teachers committed to racial justice began to correspond,meet,
talk, and engage in political actionin an effort to resist institutionalstructuresthat
facilitated racism while claiming the objective of racial harmony and equality
(Matsudaet al., 1993). Thus, the foundationof CRT as a movement and as an
intellectual agenda was connected to the development of the new approachto
examining race, racism, and law in the post-civil rights period (Barnes, 1990;
Crenshaw, 1988). Matsuda and colleagues (1993) stated, "Both the movement
and the theory reflected assertionsof a communityof values that were inherited
from generationsof radicalteachersbefore us" (p. 3). CRT should be understood
as an effort to build upon andextend the legal scholarshipand activism thatled to
the civil rightsmovementratherthan an attackon the thinkingand efforts associ-
ated with the legal scholarshipand strategiesof that era (Crenshaw,1988).
SHIFTING PARADIGMS: BEYOND CRITICALLEGAL STUDIES
The developmentof CRT cannot be fully understoodwithout a descriptionof
its relationshipto the CLS movement.'2According to Matsudaand colleagues
(1993), many legal scholars of color sought refuge within this intellectualcom-
munity. The CLS movement emerged in the late 1970s as a small group of aca-
demics devoted their scholarly efforts to reappraisingthe merits of the realist
traditionin legal discourse. Livingston (1982) describedrealism as a dominant
philosophical influence on American legal thought for most of the 1920s and
1930s (see also White, 1972). The realistmovementdeveloped out of dissatisfac-
tion with tenets of classical legal thoughtthatcastjudicial decision as the product
of reasoningfrom a finite set of determinedrules (White, 1972).13In contrast,the
realists arguedthat legal rules were limited and could not guide courtsto definite
answers in specific cases (Llwellyn, 1931). Moreover,the realists contendedthat
legal scholarshipfailed to recognize the impact of social forces on legal change
and discourse.
Legal realists built on the philosophical traditionsof pragmatism,instrumen-
talism, and progressivism.Closely connected to the New Deal, the realists sup-
ported the notion of identifying a coherent public interest and aligning political
strategies to furtherit (Lasswell & McDougal, 1943). To supportthe develop-
ment of political strategy, the realists advocated removing the dogmas of legal
theory thatobstructedlaw reformand substitutinga "rational,scientific"method
of legal scholarship(Livingston, 1982). Specifically, the realists assertedthatthe
applicationof behavioralsciences and statisticalmethod to legal analysis would
lead to better and more creative forms of legal thought and, ultimately, social
policy.
Livingston (1982) providedinsight into the connectionbetween the realist tra-
dition and CLS:
LegalRealismwasnotsimplya clarioncallforenergeticempiricism, however,butalsotheheraldof
a characteristic
criticalmethodologyorientedtowardpragmatic policyreform.Today'scriticallegal
scholarcanclaima particularlyclosekinshipto Realistforebearsin adoptionof theRealists'twinori-
entationstowardan iconoclastichistoriography anda rigorousanalyticjurisprudence. Theworkof
criticallegalscholarscanbe understood
as thematuration of theseRealistmethodologies-maturation
in which critical scholars explore incoherences at the level of social or political theory and critical
scholarship is linked, not to reformist policy programs, but to a radical political agenda. (pp.
1676-1677)
In broadestterms, scholars within the CLS movement have attemptedto ana-

lyze legal ideology and discourse as a mechanismthat functionsto re-createand
legitimate social structures in the United States. Critical legal scholars con-
structed their view of legal ideology in part from the scholarship of Antonio
Gramsci,an Italianneo-Marxisttheoristwho conceptualizeda frameworkto ana-
lyze dominationthat transcendedthe perceived limitationsof traditionalMarxist
analyses (Collins, 1982).14More traditionalMarxistaccountsdescribedthe law as
a vehicle that supportsoppression and assists in the pacificationof the working
class. Borrowingfrom Gramsci,CLS scholars arguedthat this instrumentalper-
spective is limited because it fails to accountfor the significant supportthe state
and legal system receive from the dominatedclasses.15
According to Unger (1983), scholarshipwithin the CLS movement is distin-

guished by two main tendencies.'16The first tendencyviews past or contemporary
legal doctrineas a particularperspectiveof society while illustratingits internal
contradictions(usually by exposing the incoherenceof legal arguments)and its
external inconsistencies (often by describing the contradictorypolitical views
embeddedin legal doctrine).The second tendencydevelopedout of the social the-
ories of Marx and Weber and the mode of political analysis that combines func-
tionalistmethodswith radicalgoals (Unger, 1983).17
Both tendencies undergirdthe theoreticalchallenges to the dominantstyle of
legal doctrine and the legal theories that supportthis style. More specifically,
CLS is a critiqueof formalismand objectivism. Unger (1983) describedformal-
ism as a belief in the possibility of a methodof legal justificationthatcan be con-
trasted to open-ended debates that are philosophical or ideological. Although
philosophicaldebates may not totally lack criteria,they fail to maintainthe level
of rationalitythat the formalistclaims for legal reasoning.Formalismis charac-
terized by impersonalpurposes,policies, and principlesthat serve as the founda-
tion for legal reasoning. According to Unger, formalism in the traditional
sense-the search for a method of deduction from a coherent system of princi-
ples-is only the "anomalous, limiting case of this jurisprudence"(p. 564).
Objectivism is the belief that the legal system-statutes, cases, and accepted
legal concepts-represents and sustains a defensible frameworkof humanasso-
ciation (Unger, 1983). It provides, although not infallibly, an intelligible moral
order.
The CLS critiqueof formalismand objectivismhas led to a far-rangingattack
on American legal and social institutions, including the bar, legal reasoning,
rights(includingcivil rights),precedent,doctrine,hierarchy,meritocracy,the pre-
vailing liberalvision, and conventionalviews of the free market(Brosnan,1986;
Delgado, 1987; R. W. Gordon,1984; Hutchinson& Monahan,1984; Stick, 1986).
The focus and method of CLS critique have been seen as positive to scholars
within the CRT movement.However, many criticalrace scholarshave noted the
limitationsof the CLS critiquefor mattersof race and the law.
Delgado (1987) and P. J. Williams (1987) arguedthat the CLS critiqueof the
social orderdemonstratesthat currentconfigurationsand distributionsof power
are neither necessary nor naturaland that hierarchyirrationallyresults in part
from judicial support and authority. Similarly, critical race scholarship has
employedcritiquesof formalism.Forexample, Greene(1995) arguedthata series
of 1989 SupremeCourtdecisions involving civil rights issues were built on for-
malistic interpretationsthat ignored contextual reality and the impact on tradi-
tional victims of racial discrimination.Thus, Greene illustratedthe importance
and appeal of critiquingformalismwithin the critical race movement.However,
both Delgado (1987, 1988a) andWilliams (1987) posited thatthe CLS positionon
rights-basedtheory is especially problematicfor people of color seeking justice.
Williams (1987) stated:
Therearemanygoodreasonsforabandoning
a systemof rightswhicharepremisedoninequalityand
helplessness; yet despite the acknowledgedand compelling force of such reasons, most blacks have
notturnedawayfromthepursuitof rightsevenif whatCLSscholarssay aboutrights-thattheyare
contradictory, reifiedandmarginally
indeterminate, decisive-is so. I thinkthishashappened
because
the so-called"governing or metalanguage,
narrative," aboutthesignificanceof rightsis quitediffer-
entforwhitesandblacks.(p.404)
Williams (1987) arguedthatfor most Whites, includingthe mostly White elite

of CLS, social relationshipsare influenced by a world view that links achieve-
ment to committed self-control. In contrast,for many Blacks, including acade-
mics, lawyers, and legal clients, relationshipsare viewed frequentlyas a function
of historical patterns of physical and psychic dispossession. According to
Williams (1987), this difference is both semanticaland substantive;moreover,it
is reflected in how the CLS critiquehas ignored the extent to which rights asser-
tion and the benefits of rights have helped people of color and the underclassof
society. Williams (1987) was carefulnot to idealize the importanceof rights in a
society in which rights often are selectively employed to create boundaries.
However, she contendedthatto condone analyses that symbolically diminishthe
significance of rights is to participatein one's own disempowerment.
Delgado (1987) contendedthat much of the misfit between the CLS program
and the agendaof people of color is a productof the informalityof the CLS pro-
gram. According to Delgado (1987), CLS themes and methods criticize formal
structures such as rights, rules, and bureaucracies while promoting informal
processes that build on goodwill, intersubjectiveunderstanding,and community.
Delgado (1987) arguedthat the dangerof structurelessprocesses is an increased
likelihood of prejudice,a threatCLS theoristsavoidedreckoningwith given their
lack of political or psychological theory concerning race and racism (see also
Crenshaw, 1988; Delgado, 1984). Instead, CLS theory simply assumes that
racismis analogousto otherforms of class-basedoppression,largelya functionof
hierarchalsocial structure(Bell, 1984; Crenshaw,1988; Delgado, 1987).
Delgado (1987) namedthreeotherelements of the CLS movementthat were a
threatto people of color. First,he objectedto the rejectionby some CLS scholars
of incrementalreform.This rejectionof incrementalreformis built on the theo-
retical premisethat an unfairsociety uses piecemeal reformas a disguise to legit-
imize oppression. Delgado (1987) argued that this critique was imperialisticin
that it tells people of color how to interpretevents in their lives. Moreover, it
diminishesthe role incrementalchange can play in catalyzingmorerevolutionary
change. It is worthy to note that, in a later article, Delgado (1990) arguedthat a
theme of CRT was to question the basic premises of moderate/incrementalcivil
rights law. However, the CRT argumentagainst incrementalcivil rights law is
often based on experientialknowledge and personal interpretationby people of
color ratherthan on strictlytheoreticalproposition.
Second, Delgado (1987) assertedthat the CLS programis idealistic; that is, it
assigns a large role to reason and ideology. However, reason and ideology alone
do not explain all evil. Specifically, racism will not be understoodor go away
because critical legal scholarshipshows that legalisms are indeterminate,rights
are alienating and legitimizing, and the law reflects the interest of the power
structure.
Third,Delgado (1987) challengedthe CLS concept of false consciousness.The
notion of false consciousness suggests that workersand people of color buy into
a system that degradesand oppressesthem and defend the system with a kind of
false honor. Delgado (1987) questionedwhetherthe concept of false conscious-
ness holds true for people of color. Much of the CLS argumentconcerningfalse
consciousness representsa distrustof liberal legalism and evasive promises of
court victory. Delgado posited that many minorities have already acquiredthis
distrust, a product of life's lessons. The aforementionedargumentsrepresent
importantpoints of departurebetween the CLS and CRT movements.
CRITICALRACETHEORY
The elements that characterizeCRT are difficult to reduceto discretedescrip-
tions, largelybecausecriticalrace theoristsare attemptingto integratetheirexperi-
ential knowledge into moral and situationalanalysis of the law. Delgado (1990)
arguedthatpeople of color in our society speakfromexperienceframedby racism.
This frameworkgives theirstories a common structurewarrantingthe termvoice.
For the critical race theorist, social reality is constructedby the creation and
exchange of stories about individualsituations(Bell, 1989; Matsuda,1989; P. J.
Williams, 1991). Much of the CRT literaturetacks between situatednarrativeand
more sweeping analysisof the law. Many of the argumentsfound in CRT arebest
describedas an enactmentof hybridityin theirtexts, thatis, scholarshipthatdepicts
the legal scholaras minimallybiculturalin termsof belongingto both the worldof
legal researchandthe worldof everydayexperience.'8Barnes(1990) stated:
Minorityperspectivesmakeexplicittheneedforfundamental changein thewayswe thinkandcon-
structknowledge.... Exposinghow minorityculturalviewpointsdifferfromwhiteculturalview-
pointsrequiresa delineationof the complexset of social interactionsthroughwhichminority
consciousness
hasdeveloped.Distinguishing
theconsciousness of racialminorities acknowl-
requires
edgement of the feelings and intangiblemodes of perceptionunique to those who have historically
beensocially,structurally,
andintellectually in theUnitedStates.(p. 1864)
marginalized
The notion of voice in the critical race literatureand the form of legal analysis
associatedwith this scholarshiphave implicationsfor the organizationof this sec-
tion of the chapter.To understandthe CRT literature,it is importantto understand
the voice of a particularcontributorwithin the criticalrace conversation.19 Thus,
three legal scholars who employ CRT methods will be reviewed: DerrickBell,
RichardDelgado, and Kimberl6Crenshaw.Eachof these scholarshas madea sig-
nificant contributionto the CRT literature.Moreover,each was chosen because
his or her scholarshipuniquely intersectswith importantissues raised in debates
of race and the politics of education.However, the review will not be limited to
these three scholars.Scholarshipthatis a partof the CRT conversationandbuilds
on or is critical of the argumentsmade by Bell, Delgado, and Crenshawwill be
incorporatedto provide a more comprehensiveview of the theoreticalunderpin-
nings of CRT.
Derrick Bell and the Critical Race Theory
The ideas of Derrick Bell are key to understanding the CRT movement
because, withinthis groupof scholars,Bell is arguablythe most influentialsource
of thought critical of traditionalcivil rights discourse and a premierexample of
CRT. Bell's critiqueof civil rights laws and efforts to implementthem was stim-
ulated by a recognition of their importanceand a challenge to rethinkdominant
liberal and conservativepositions on these matters.Bell's (1984) descriptionof
the goal of his book Race, Racism and AmericanLaw provides insight into the
purposeof his scholarship:
It is, though,not the goal of Race, Racismto providea social formulathatwould solve eitherall or any
of the racialissues thatbeset the country.Rather,its goal is to review those issues in all [italicsadded]
theirpolitical and economic dimensions,and from thatvantagepoint enablelawyers and lay people to
determinewhere we might go from here. The goal for us, as it was for all those back to the slaveryera
who laboredand sacrificedfor freedom,was not to guaranteean end to racism,but to work forcefully
towardthat end. (p. 14)
Bell's (1984) remarkreveals the dual purposeof his scholarship.His first pur-
pose has been to contribute to intellectual discussions concerning race in
American society. However, unlike many mainstreamlegal scholars who often
have declaredthat certainaspects of a legal problemare not relevant-for exam-
ple, particularstoriesof individuals-Bell (1987, 1994) has soughtto use allegory
as a methodto examine legal discoursein an ironicallysituatedfashion.In his cri-
tique of narrativeand law, and more specifically the scholarshipof DerrickBell,
Winter(1989) posited:
The attractionof narrativeis that it correspondsmore closely to the mannerin which the humanmind
makes sense of experience than does the conventional,abstractedrhetoricof law. The basic thrustof
the cognitive process is to employ imaginationto make meaning out of the embodied experience of
the human organism in the world. In its prototypicalsense as storytelling, narrative,too, proceeds
from the groundup. In narrative,we take experience and configure it in a conventionaland compre-
hensible form. This is what gives narrativeits communicativepower; it is what makes narrativea
powerfultool of persuasionand therefore,a potentialtransformative[italics added]device for the dis-
empowered.(p. 2228)
A second purposeof Bell's scholarshiphas been to promotepolitical activism

to achieve racialjustice. This goal can be found throughouthis chain of inquiry
(e.g., Bell, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1994). For instance, in the preface to Confronting
Authority:Reflectionsof an ArdentProtester, Bell (1994) stated:
This book does not aim to convince readersthat a passive responseto harassmentand ill treatmentis
always wrong, a confrontationalone always appropriate.Few, if any, of us could survive in modern
societyby challengingeveryslight,everyunfairnesswe experienceor witness.I do believe,though,
thatmostpeoplearetooreadyto acceptunwarranted andevenoutrageous treatment aspartof theprice
of working,of gettingalong,evenof living.(p.x)
After warningthe readerabout the difficulty of a protester'slife, Bell (1994)

remarked:"Of course, I will be pleased if my experiences encouragereadersto
consideropenly confrontingwrongsthatafflict theirlives, and the lives of others"
(p. xi). Many scholarsassociatedwith CRThave attributedBell's scholarlymeth-
ods, political activism, and mentorshipas pivotal to the movement'sdevelopment
(Barnes, 1990; Calmore, 1992; Crenshaw,1988; Delgado, 1991). His work pro-
vides a model and a standardby which to discuss CRT.
For example, Bell's (1987) And WeAre Not Saved, an expansionof his 1985
HarvardLaw Reviewessay, "TheCivil Rights Chronicles,"is aboutthe legal bar-
riers to racialjustice in the United States.20Bell employed a scholarlymethodto
express mattersof jurisprudencein a language and style more usual in literature
thanin legal discourse.Throughthe vehicle of 10 "chronicles,"metaphoricaltales
devised to illuminate society's treatmentof race, combined with discussions of
those tales by the book's protagonistand his alter ego, Geneva Crenshaw,Bell
exploredsocietal tendencies with respectto race-remedylaw.
To understandthe discussionsthattakeplace between Geneva andthe narrator,
it is importantto know Geneva's background.As depicted in the book, Geneva
had been a civil rights lawyer at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. She is
described as one of the most gifted of the fund's litigators until she suffered a
mentalbreakdowncaused by a heavy workload,racist violence, and the pressure
of battlingfor legal remediesthatoften seemed to recede. Geneva was committed
to a mentalinstitutionfor 20 years, duringwhich her thinkingraced,out of touch
with reality.As the book begins, Geneva regainsher mentalfaculties. She leaves
the mentalinstitutionand searchesfor Bell's narratorin an attemptto become cur-
rent with, and come to terms with, race-relatedcivil rightslaw.
The book develops by having Genevarevisit visionarychronicles(she presents
9 of the 10) and then debatethem with Bell's narrator.The chroniclesand subse-
quent debatebetween Geneva and the narratorprovidethe readeran opportunity
to explore the progressof race relationslaw in the United States. For instance,in
"TheChronicleof the ConstitutionalContradiction,"Genevajourneysback to the
ConstitutionalConventionof 1787. Addressingthe delegates, she introducesher-
self as a Black woman from the 21st century. The delegates listen to her com-
pelling argumentaboutthe historicallegacy of slavery and the compromisesthey
are preparedto enact, but in the end they compromisethe rightsof Blacks on the
basis of nationaleconomic interestsand White unity.
The narratorand Geneva then discuss how these compromisesframe current
racial politics:
ThemenwhodraftedtheConstitution, howevergiftedor rememberedas great,werepoliticians,not

so differentfromthepoliticiansof ourowntimeand,likethem,hadto resolveconflictinginterestsin
orderto preserveboththeirfortunesandtheirnewnation.Whattheysawas therequirements of that
nationpreventedthemfromsubstantiating theirrhetoricaboutfreedomandrightswithconstitutional
provisions-andthustheyinfringedon therightsandfreedomnotonlyof slaves,whothenwereone-
fifthof thepopulation,
butultimately,of all Americancitizens.(Bell,1987,p. 50)21
In anotherchapter, "The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren,"

Bell (1987) considers the influence of litigation, specifically the Brown decision,
on the educationalexperiences of African Americanchildren.At the completion
of the tale, Geneva and the narratordiscuss the limitations and strengthsof the
NAACP litigation strategy,the goal of racial integrationthat led to Brown, and
the failure of court-mandatedschool desegregationto achieve educationalequal-
ity. The debatebetween the narratorand Genevarepresentsa long-standingargu-
ment in the African American community: Is segregated or desegregated
education best for African American children?This question, never stated yet
implicit in the subtext of the chronicle, results in a dialogue on the philosophy
undergirdingvariouspositions takenon the question.
The narratordefends the position taken by civil rights litigators in the pre-
Brown era who sought to eliminate the social doctrine of separatebut equal by
attackingsegregationin public schools. The narratorand Geneva agree that the
doctrine was morally wrong; however, Geneva is convinced a better desegrega-
tion policy was possible. She contendsthatif we recognize thatthe motivationof
segregation was White dominationof public education,then the SupremeCourt
should have given priorityto desegregationof money and controlratherthan stu-
dents. Moreover, Geneva argues that although separatebut equal no longer ful-
filled the constitutionalequal protectionstandard,the court shouldhave required
immediateequalizationof all school facilities and resources.Also, Genevaposits
that the court should have requiredAfrican Americanrepresentationon school
boards and other policy-making bodies to reflect the proportion of African
American students in each school district. This final point would have been
intendedto give African Americanparentsaccess to the formaldecision-making
process, a condition still not realized in many predominantlyAfrican American
school systems (Bell, 1987).
Similarly, each of the other eight chronicles-"Celestial Curia," "Ultimate
Voting Rights Act," "Black ReparationsFoundation,""DeVine Gift," "Amber
Cloud," "Twenty-Seventh-YearSyndrome,""Slave Scrolls," and "Black Crime
Cure"-describes the tensions for both Blacks and Whites in the construction,
interpretation,and implementationof race-relatedcivil rights law. In the context
of each chronicle, Bell (1987) builds on three argumentsthat appearin his earlier
legal writings and that reoccurthroughouthis subsequentscholarshipand that of
other legal scholarsbuilding on CRT.
One argument, the constitutional contradiction, is based on the U.S.
Constitutionand subsequentlegal decisions. This argumentis more specifically
an analysis of propertyin American society and the role of governmentin pro-
tecting propertyinterests.In his discussions with Geneva Crenshaw,Bell (1987)
examines the events leading up to the ConstitutionalConventionand concludes
thatthe framersof U.S. law grappledwith the tensionbetweenpropertyrightsand
humanrights. This tension was apparentin the debate over slavery. Bell (1987)
contends that the slavery provisions in the original Constitutionreflected prag-
matic, political compromisesby the framers.When confrontedwith the decision
between White racism and justice, the framersof the Constitutionchose racism
andthe rewardsof property.Bell (1987) relatesthis constitutionalcontradictionto
laterpolitical debatesand policy by asking, "Does slaveryhave any value in ana-
lyzing contemporaryracial policies and civil rights doctrine?"(p. 260). For Bell
(1987), race and propertyare linked in complex ways that often result in racial
oppression (see also P. J. Williams, 1991).22 Advancing this argument,Harris
(1993) posited thatracialidentityand propertyare deeply interrelatedconcepts:
Even after the period of conquest and colonization of the New World and the abolition of slavery,
whiteness was the predicate for attaining a host of societal privileges, in both public and private
spheres.Whitenessdeterminedwhetherone could vote, travelfreely, attendschools, obtainwork, and
indeed, defined the structureof social relationsalong the entire spectrumof interactionsbetween the
individual and society. Whiteness then became status, a form of racializedprivilege ratified in law.
Materialprivileges attendantto being white inheredin the statusof being white. After the dismantling
of legalized race segregation,whiteness took on the characterof propertyin the modem sense in that
relativewhite privilege was legitimatedas the statusquo. In Plessy v. Ferguson andthe case thatover-
turnedit, Brown v. Board of Education,the law extendedprotectionto whiteness as property,in the
formerinstance,as traditionalstatus-property,in the latter,as modem property.(pp. 1745-1746)
A second argumentfound throughoutBell's scholarly writing is the interest-

convergenceprinciple(e.g., Bell, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1987, 1992). The interest-
convergence principle is built on political history as legal precedent and
emphasizesthatsignificantprogressfor AfricanAmericansis achievedonly when
the goals of Blacks are consistentwith the needs of Whites. Bell (1980b) stated:
Translatedfromjudicial activity in racialcases bothbefore and afterBrown,this principleof "interest
convergence"provides:The interestof blacks in achievingracialequalitywill be accommodatedonly
when it converges with the interestsof whites. However, the fourteenthamendment,standingalone,
will not authorizea judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy
sought threatensthe superiorsocietal statusof middle and upperclass whites. (p. 523)
As an example of the interest-convergenceprinciple,Bell (1987) offered:

I often cite the NAACP and governmentbriefs in the Brown case, both of which maintainthat the
abandonmentof state-supportedsegregationwould be a crucialasset as we compete with Communist
countriesfor the heartsand minds of ThirdWorldpeople just emerging from the long years of colo-
nialism. As far as I'm concerned,the Court's decision in the Brown case cannot be understoodwith-
out consideringthe decision's value to whites in policy-makingpositionswho areable to recognizethe
economic andpolitical benefitsat home andabroadthatwould follow abandonmentof state-mandated
racial segregation.(p. 62)
Dudziak (1988) conducted a historical study designed to develop additional

insight into the Brown case and Bell's interest-convergenceprinciple. Dudziak
carefully detailedthe internationalattentiongiven to U.S. racial discriminationin

the era following WorldWarII. She documentedthe Soviet Union's exploitation
of poor U.S. race relations and the State Department'sconcern with this serious
foreign policy problem. Dudziak described the Truman administration's
response, particularlythe Justice Department'sargumentsin civil rights amicus
briefs that racial segregation was a detrimentto U.S. foreign policy interests.
Dudziakdescribedthe positive foreign policy benefits that accruedafterBrown:
AfterBrown,theStateDepartment couldblameracismon theKlanandthecrazies.Theycouldargue
thatthe AmericanConstitutionprovidedfor effectivesocialchange.And,mostimportantly, they
couldpointto theBrowndecisionasevidencethatracismwasatoddswiththeprinciples of American
democracy. Thisforeignpolicyangle,thisColdWarimperative, wasone thecriticalfactorsdriving
thefederalgovernment'spostwarcivilrightsefforts.(p. 119)
Dudziak (1988) concluded that Bell's interest-convergencetheory character-

ized correctlythe events leading up to and following the Browndecision.
A thirdmajorargumentfound in Bell's scholarship-a corollaryto the interest-
convergence theory-is that many Whites will not supportcivil rights policies
that appearto threatentheir superiorsocial status (Bell, 1979, 1987, 1989). Bell
(1979) referredto this argumentas the "priceof racialremedies."For example, in
an analysis describing the commonalities between the Brown and Bakke cases,
Bell (1979) stated:
TheCourtdidnotoverestimate thetimeneededforthecountryto accepttheBrowndecisionas law.
Buttherewerecompensatory aspectsof thecaseoverlooked by theCourt,costissuesthathavebeen
framedin sharper reliefbytheBakkelitigation.InBrown,thefocuswasontheSouth.Atissuewasthe
of themostonerouskindof educational
constitutionality apartheid.Thenationwasmorethanreadyto
blamewhiteSoutherners, traditionally thecountry'sscapegoatwhenthereis a needto assignrespon-
sibilityforracialinjustice... . Whentheschooldesegregation effortsmovednorth,theattitude toward
theSouthchangedfromcondemnation to complicity,withNortherners rallyingto preserveneighbor-
hoodassignmentpatterns,avoidbusing,andmaintainthe "educational integrity"of whiteschools.
Althoughtherehasbeenviolencein BostonandPontiac,mostNorthern whitesdo notopposedeseg-
regationin theabstract. Whattheyresistis thepriceof desegregation. Theyfearthattheirchildrenwill
be requiredto scufflefor an educationin schoolsthatfor decadeshavebeengoodenoughonlyfor
blacks.... Theproblemof costis aggravated whentheissueis collegeandprofessional schooladmis-
sions.As opponentsof minorityadmissionstakepainsto pointout,no one is totallyexcludedfrom
schoolunderpublicschooldesegregation plans.Underpreferential admissionsprograms, however,
minorityapplicants areadmittedto collegeandgraduate schoolsinplaceof whites.Moreover, most
publicschooldesegregation plansdonotaffectuppermiddle-class whitefamilieswholive in suburbs
or whosechildrenattendprivateschools.... Thereis a patternto all this.It is recognizable in the
oppositionof NewYorkCityschoolteachersto community control.It is apparent in theresistance of
unionsto plansthatrequirethattheystopexcludingminorityworkers.Andit is reflectedin suburban
zoningandreferendum practicesdesignedto keepoutlow-income housing.Ineachinstance,theprin-
cipleof nondiscrimination is supported, butits implementation is avoidedand,necessarily, opposed.
Theimportant question,of course,is whetherthedebilitating effectsof racialdiscrimination canbe
remediedwithoutrequiring whitesto surrender aspectsof theirsuperiorsocialstatus.(pp.11-12)
Bell's analysis of Bakke and his subsequentscholarshipprovide a full-scale

structural theory combined with the detail required for microlevel analysis of the
individualstory. It is this qualitythatmakes his scholarshipa uniquecontribution
to academicwritingon issues of race, law, and society.
A Commentary on Derrick Bell
The three major arguments found in Bell's analyses of racial patterns in
American law-the constitutionalcontradiction,the interest-convergenceprin-
ciple, and the price of racial remedies-convey a different message than that
found in traditionalrace scholarship, that is, civil rights or antidiscrimination
scholarship.
Bell's scholarshiprepresentsan effort to dismantletraditionalcivil rights lan-
guage-for example, color blindness and equal opportunity-to provide a more
cogent historicaland legal analysis of race and law. Moreover,his scholarshipis
directly connected to educationalpolicy analysis of such issues as school deseg-
regation,admissionsand financialaid, school choice, school finance, and univer-
sity recruitment(Bell, 1979, 1980b, 1987, 1989; Ladson-Billings& Tate, 1995).
Elsewhere, I crossed the paradigmaticboundariesof mathematicseducation-
mathematicsand psychology-to illustratethe limitationsof recent school math-
ematics reformproposalscalling for opportunity-to-learn standardsanda national
assessment (Tate, 1995a, 1995b). These boundary-crossinganalyses were built
with theoreticaltools found in the scholarshipof DerrickBell and other critical
race theorists.
Anotherarea of educationalpolicy that seems especially relevantfor the kind
of criticalrace critiquefound in Bell's writingsis school finance.23For example,
Clune (1993) arguedthatthe standards-basedvision of educationalpolicy-making
requiresa change in school finance structures(see also Moskowitz, Stullich, &
Deng, 1993; O'Day & Smith, 1993; Odden, 1992). Clune posited that school
finance discussions should shift from fiscal equalityto fiscal adequacyand from
debatesaboutfinancialinputsto a focus on standard-basedoutcomesas the objec-
tive of both educationalpolicy and school finance.A shift in federaland statepol-
icy from fiscal equality to adequacy is part of a larger federal programthat is
moving attentionaway from traditionallyunderservedstudents(Chapter1, spe-
cial education,andbilingual)towarda discourseon high standardsfor all students
(National GovernorsAssociation, 1993; Tate, 1995a). This shift in policy war-
rantsfurtheranalysis by scholarsinterestedin equity, and Bell's interest-conver-
gence principlecould provideinsightfulconceptualguidance.
The shift in policy directionfrom fiscal equality to a call for fiscal adequacy
and high standardsfor all representsan attemptto converge the interestsof more
affluent suburbancommunities that wish to limit their tax burden and benefit
directlyfrom tax contributionswith classical ideas of governmentand taxationof
serving the common good. However, this shift has the potential to create even
greatereducationalinequality.For example, Harp(1996) reportedthat Governor
ChristineTodd Whitmanof New Jerseyplans to addressdeep inequitiesbetween
wealthy and poor schools by establishingnew educationstandardsratherthanby
providing new money from the state. Note that New Jersey has been orderedto
resolve its school finance problems by the 1997-1998 school year. Governor
Whitmanremarked(in her state of the state address),"We must stop chasing dol-
lars and start creating scholars" (as cited in Harp, 1996, pp. 1, 25). Governor
Whitman'sremarksreflect a shift in political rhetoricfrom equalizing spending
and resources to adopting standards.However, those employing this rhetoric
rarelyhave a plan for addressingequity problems.
The scholarshipof Derrick Bell has provoked an alternativemethod of legal
analysis of race and U.S. society. Moreover,his scholarshiphas importantrele-
vance to issues of educationalequity. However, his work has not gone without
criticism. The legal writings of Derrick Bell and many other CRT scholars are
associatedwith a growing genre of narrativeresearchin the academy(Scheppele,
1989; P. J. Williams, 1991); however, the narrativemovementhas not been uni-
versally accepted in academe. The criticism of narrativeresearchvaries depend-
ing on the paradigmaticperspectiveof the writer.Some scholarsargueagainstthe
form;otherschallenge the absence of neutralityand objectivity.Still other schol-
ars question the validity and power of narrativeresearchgiven the institutional
stories that may counter the narrativedeveloped by the legal storyteller. For
example, Winter(1989) stated:
Narrative is nottheprimary mediumforthekindof institutionalized meaningthatis necessaryif a pre-
vailingorderis to makepersuasive itsclaimsof legitimationandjustification.
Narrative doesnotmeet
the threefolddemandsof generality,unreflexivity, andreliabilitythatarenecessaryif a prevailing
orderis crediblyto justifyitself.Themorelimitedroleof narrative in theprocessesof socialcon-
structionis as a linkbetweenexperienceandtheeffectivecrystallizationof socialmores.(Itis justthis
prefiguring rolethatmakesnarrative a potentially
effectivetransformative device.)But,although nar-
rativemayalsobe employedon behalfof theexistingorder,thisuseof narrative as authorityis per-
suasivepreciselybecauseit evokesmeaningthatis alreadyinstitutionalized. Accordingly,legal
narratives of thissortareconstrainedby preexistingsocialprocesses.(p. 2228)
Winter's (1989) critiqueof Bell's use of legal story telling, as well as narrative
scholarshipin general,is importantfor educationscholarsinterestedin equity and
policy-making.Winterrecognizednarrativeas a persuasivetool to catalyze legal
and social change. Furthermore,Winteracknowledgedthe role of narrativeschol-
arshipin the social constructionof meaning.However,he warnedthatnarrativeis
not the only means by which social meaningis institutionalized.24
Despite Winter's criticism of Bell and other narrative scholars, education
scholarsand policymakersshould examine the power of legal storytelling to illu-
minate educational equity issues in public debates. Perhapsno recent example
from educationillustratesthis point betterthan JonathanKozol's (1991) detailed
chronicleof school inequity,Savage Inequalities.The power of this volume is the
story. The statistics on school finance inequality have a long history in educa-
tional researchliteratureand the popularpress. However, they often have lacked
the ability to catalyze democraticdeliberation.Reich (1988) describedthe impor-
tance of democraticdeliberation:
The reigning Americanphilosophyof policy making has drawnon these three currentsof thought-
bureaucraticexpertise,democraticdeliberation,andutilitarianism-but in unequalparts.Especiallyin
this century,beginningwith the Progressives'efforts to insulatepolicy making from the politics and
continuingthroughthe modem judiciary's oversight of policy making, there has been a tendency to
subordinatedemocraticdeliberationto the other themes. As the "administrativestate"has grown, its
legitimacy has increasingly rested on notions of neutralcompetence and proceduralregularity.The
"publicinterest"has been defined as what individualmembersof the public want for themselves-as
such wants are expressedthroughopinion surveys, dataon the public's willingness to pay for certain
goods, and the special pleadingsof interestgroups.The ideal of publicpolicy has thus become almost
to maximizeindividual
entirelyinstrumental-designed satisfactions.
(p. 10)
Criticalrace theoristsrecognize that the way public problemsare defined can

influence how laws and policies are constructedand interpreted.One purposeof
legal storytelling by Bell and othercriticalrace scholarsis to engage the readerin
democraticdeliberationconcerningthe ironies andcontradictionsassociatedwith
laws constructedto appease White self-interest ratherthan address notions of
equity.
Anotherscholar,Haney Lopez (1996), noted the importanceof Bell's scholar-
ship, yet offered a criticism. Specifically, Haney Lopez arguedthatBell's (1992)
casebook, Race, Racism and AmericanLaw, treated"Black"and "White"as nat-
ural categories ratherthan concepts created throughsocial constructionand, at
least partially,throughlegal strategies.Despite this criticism of Bell's casebook,
Haney Lopez acknowledged that critical race scholars have generateda move-
ment to rethinkrace, law, and U.S. society. Haney Lopez (1996) remarked:
The tendencyto treatrace as a prelegalphenomenonis coming to an end. Of late, a new strandof legal
scholarshipdedicatedto reconsideringof the role of race in U.S. society has emerged.Writersin this
genre, known as critical race theory,have for the most partshown an acute awarenessof the socially
constructednatureof race. Much critical race theory scholarshiprecognizes that race is a legal con-
struction.
(p. 12)
The importanceof examiningthe social constructionof race throughthe law is

a paramountconsiderationin CRT. As such, RichardDelgado's scholarshiphas
contributedto theoreticalmethods that provide insight into the interrelationship
between the constructionof race and the law.
Richard Delgado and Critical Race Theory

The scholarship of Richard Delgado is pivotal to understanding CRT.
Crenshawet al. (1995) placed Delgado and his scholarshipat the historicaland
conceptualorigins of CRT. Delgado has engaged in extensive debate with other
scholarsin the legal communityregardingthe meritsandpotentialcontributionof
CRT to legal analysis. Delgado (1990) argued that critical race scholarshipis
characterizedby the following themes:
(1) an insistenceon "namingourown";(2) the beliefthatknowledgeandideasarepowerful;(3) a
readinessto questionbasicpremisesof moderate/incremental civil rightslaw;(4) the borrowing
of
insightsfromsocialscienceon raceandracism;(5) criticalexamination of themythsandstoriespow-
erfulgroupsuse to justifyracialsubordination;(6) a morecontextualized of doctrine;(7)
treatment
criticismof liberallegalisms;and(8) an interestin structural
determinism-thewaysin whichlegal
toolsandthought-structures canimpedelawreform.(p.95)
The CRT themes delineated by Delgado can be seen in his scholarship.

Building on theories found in the sociology of knowledge, Delgado (1990)
argued:
Sociologistsof knowledgeknowthatknowledgeis power,andpoweris something thatpeoplefightto
obtainandstruggleto avoidgivingup.Physicalscientists,forexample,havestrenuously
resisted"par-
adigmchanges"evenin theirostensiblyobjective,value-freeworld.Legalchangecomesfreighted
withevenmoremeaningthanthescientificversion,forit oftenportends changesin powerandwell-
beingforspecificpersonsorgroups.Itis thusnotsurprising thattheNewRaceTheorists,
whoarerais-
ing suchideasas thatcivil rightsdoctrineperpetuatesandlegitimizesdiscrimination,meetfierce
resistance.(p. 110)
A significant portion of Delgado's scholarshipis devoted to explaining and

clarifyingthe role of story, counterstory,and "namingone's own reality"in CRT
(see also Ross, 1989; Russell, 1995; Torres& Milun, 1990; P.J. Williams, 1987).
Delgado (1988a) identifieda structuralfeatureof humanexperiencethatseparates
people of color from White friends and colleagues. Simply stated,"Whitepeople
rarelysee acts of blatantor subtle racism,while minoritypeople experiencethem
all the time"(p. 407). Similarly,Lawrence(1987) stated:
Americans sharea commonhistoricalandculturalheritagein whichracismhasplayedandstillplays
a dominant role.Becauseof thissharedexperience, we alsoinevitablysharemanyideas,attitudes, and
beliefsthatattachsignificanceto an individual'sraceandinducenegativefeelingsandopinionsof
nonwhites. To theextentthatthisculturalbeliefsystemhasinfluencedall of us, we areracists.At the
sametime,mostof us areunaware of ourracism.Wedo notrecognizethewaysin whichourcultural
experiencehas influencedourbeliefsaboutraceor the occasionson whichthosebeliefsaffectour
actions.In otherwords,a largepartof thebehaviorthatproducesracialdiscrimination is influenced
by unconscious racialmotivation.(p. 322)
According to Delgado (1988a), most minorities,in contrastto Whites, live in a

world dominated by race (see also Clark, 1963; Comer & Poussaint, 1976).
Moreover,the exchange of tradestories among people of color concerningracial
treatmentand ways of dealing with racism is common (Delgado, 1987). These
stories are importanthistories that help illustratethe irony and contradictionof
traditionallegal analysis and argument.
Delgado (1989) posited four reasons as justification for legal analysis and
scholarshipthatincorporatestories or voice chroniclingthe experiencesof people
of color: (a) Reality is socially constructed,(b) stories are a powerful means for
destroyingand changing mind-sets, (c) stories have a community-buildingfunc-
tion, and (d) stories provide members of out-groups mental self-preservation.
Elsewhere, Delgado (1990) linked thisjustificationfor voice scholarshipto CRT.
The first reason critical race theorists use stories or voice scholarshipis to
address the mannerin which political and moral analysis is conducted in tradi-
tional legal scholarship(Delgado, 1989, 1990). Many legal scholarsembraceuni-
versalism over particularity.Legal analysis and reasoning in Anglo-American
legal jurisprudenceis characterizedby the acceptanceof transcendent,acontex-
tual, universaltruths(P. J. Williams, 1991). This paradigmaticperspectivetends
to minimize anythingthat is historical,contextual,or specific with the unschol-
arly descriptors"literary"or "personal."In contrast,critical race theoristsargue
thatpolitical, legal, and moralanalysis is situational.Delgado (1989) stated:
Realityis not fixed,not a given.Rather,we constructit throughconversations, throughour lives
together.Racialandclass-based isolationpreventsthehearingof diversestoriesandcounterstories. It
diminishesthe conversationsthroughwhich we createreality,constructour communallives.
Deliberately exposingoneselfto counterstoriescanavoidthatimpoverishment, heighten"suspicion,"
andcan enablethe listenerandthe tellerto builda worldricherthaneithercouldmakealone.On
anotheroccasion,thelistenerwill be theteller,sharinga secret,a pieceof information,oranangleof
visionthatwill enrichtheformerteller;andso on dialectically, in a richtapestryof conversation,
of
stories.(p. 2439)
The second reason for the voice theme in CRT is the potential of story to
change mind-set (Delgado, 1989). Most oppression does not seem like oppres-
sion to the oppressor(Lawrence, 1987). The dominantgroup of society justifies
its position with stock stories (Delgado, 1989, 1990; R. A. Williams, 1989).
These stock stories construct realities in ways that legitimize power and posi-
tion. Stories by people of color can counter the stories of the oppressor.
Furthermore,the discussion between the teller and listener can help overcome
ethnocentrismand the dysconscious way many scholars view and constructthe
world. Delgado (1989) posited:
Storiesandcounterstories can servean equallyimportant destructivefunction.Theycanshowthat
whatwe believeis ridiculous,
self-serving,orcruel.Theycanshowusthewayoutof thetrapof unjus-
tifiedexclusion.Theycanhelpus understand whenit is timeto reallocate
power.Theyaretheother
half-the destructivehalf-of thecreativedialectic.
Storiesandcounterstories,
to be effective,mustbe or mustappearto be noncoercive. Theyinvite
thereaderto suspendjudgement, listenfortheirpointormessage,thendecidewhatmeasureof truth
theycontain.Theyareinsinuative, notfrontal;theyoffera respitefromthelinear,coercivediscourse
thatcharacterizesmuchof legalwriting.(p. 2415)
The thirdreasonofferedby Delgado (1989) for incorporatingstoryinto CRT is

the role story telling can play in communitybuilding. Stories help to build con-
sensus, a common culture of shared understandings,and a more vital ethics.
Despite the potentialfor building consensus, Delgado (1989) warnedof the dan-
gers in story telling, particularlyfor the first-timestoryteller.The listener to an
unfamiliarcounterstorymay reject it, as well as the storyteller,because the story
reveals hypocrisy and increases discomfort.25Moreover, the hearer may con-
sciously or unconsciously reinterpretthe new story, framing the content of the
storywithinthe hearer'sown belief system, thusmutingor reversingthe meaning.
Delgado (1989) explainedthatthe fourthreasonfor incorporatingvoice into legal
analysisis to help ensurethe psychic preservationof marginalizedgroups.A factor
contributingto the demoralizationof membersof out-groupsis self-condemnation.
People of color may internalizethe stock storiesthatvariousgroupsof society pro-
mote to maintaintheir influence (Crenshaw,1988). Historically,people of color
have used story telling to heal wounds caused by racialdiscrimination.26Delgado
(1989) stated:"Alongwith the traditionof storytellingin black culturethereexists
the Spanishtraditionof the picaresquenovel or story, which tells of humble folk
piquingthe pompousor powerfuland bringingthem down to more humanlevels"
(p. 2414). Accordingto Delgado(1990), the storyof one's conditionleadsto greater
insightinto how one came to be oppressed.Moreover,Bell (1987) arguedthatthis
allows the oppressedto stop inflictingmentalviolence on themselves.
Delgado (1984) not only wrote aboutthe philosophicalunderpinningsof voice
scholarship;he also questionedwhose voice is heardin legal discourseaddressing
civil rights. In "The ImperialScholar:Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature,"Delgado (1984) showed that an inner circle of 26 legal scholars, all
male and White, occupied the key venues of civil rights scholarshipto the exclu-
sion of scholarsof color. Delgado (1984) noted that when a memberof this inner
circle wroteaboutcivil rightsissues, he referencedalmostexclusively othermem-
bers of the innercircle for supportwhile ignoringthe scholarshipof minoritiesin
the field. Delgado (1984) offered the following explanationfor this practice:
In explainingthe strangeabsenceof minorityscholarship fromthetextandfootnotesof thecentral
arenasof legalscholarship dealingwithcivil rights,I rejectconsciousmalevolence orcrassindiffer-
ence.I thinktheexplanation lies in a needto remainin control,to makesurethatlegalchangeoccurs,
butnottoofast.Thedesireto shapeeventsis a powerfulhumanmotiveandcouldeasilyaccountfor
muchof theexclusionary scholarship I havenoted.Themomentonemakesa statement, however,one
is reminded thatit is thesesameliberalauthorswhohavebeenthestrongestsupporters of affirmative
actionin theirownuniversity communities, andwhohaveoftenbeenprepared to takechances(asthey
see it) to advancethegoalof an integrated society.Perhapsthe two behaviorscanbe reconciledby
observingthattheliberalprofessormaybe pleasedto haveminoritystudentsandcolleaguesserveas
figureheads, ambassadors of goodwill, andfuturecommunity leaders,butnotnecessarily happywith
thethoughtof a minoritycolleaguewhomightgo gallopingoff in a newdirection.(p.574)
Several years later, Delgado (1995a) revisited the "ImperialScholar"debate.

He arguedthat a new breed of imperialistshad emerged in legal discourse who
deploy a different set of strategies to mute, devalue, and/orco-opt the voice of
critical race theorists. Delgado (1995a) identified 13 mechanismsused by these
"neo-imperialists"to marginalizecriticalrace scholarship.27One mechanismdis-
cussed by Delgado (1995a) is the co-option of anotherperson's experience that
leads to a refocusing of the original story:
Someof thenewwriters[neo-imperialists] makeaneffortto identifywiththestoriesandaccountsthe
areoffering,butin a waythatco-optsor minimizesthesestories.Themajority-
outsidernarrativists
raceauthordrawsa parallelbetweensomething in theexperienceof theoutsiderauthorandsomething
thathappenedto him.Thereis nothingwrongwithusinganalogiesandmetaphors to dealwiththe
experienceof others,forthatis howwe extendoursympathies.If,however,we analogizeto refocusa
conversationoranarticletowardsourselvesexclusively,something is wrong,especiallyif theexperi-
ence to which we liken another'sis manifestly less serious. For example, the authorof one article on
campusracialharassmentobservesthateveryoneexperiences or"upsetting"
"insulting" speechatone
timeoranother,so whatis so specialabouttheracistversion?(p.406)
According to Delgado (1995a), a second mechanism to minimize the critical

race critiqueis to praise the writing for its emotional or passionatequality, ulti-
mately classifying the article in a category of its own-for example, individual
soul searching-and thus selectively ignoring the uncomfortabletruths about
race, society, and injustice. A third mechanism is for the neo-imperialist to
translatea novel, hard-edge,and discomfortingthesis by a critical race scholar
into a familiar, safe, and tame conceptual state. Here the neo-imperialistscholar
often forces the criticalrace critiqueinto a discourse of liberal-legalisttermsthat
the critical race scholar has intended to avoid. The other 10 mechanisms are
equally as troubling;however, they have not deterredDelgado from exploring
voice scholarshipand other nontraditionalmethods of analyzing race, law, and
U.S. society.
Another theme found in the scholarship of Delgado and other critical race
scholars is the examination of structural determinism (see also Bell, 1992;
Greene, 1995). Critical race scholars examine the legal system for categories,
methods of legal analysis, and doctrinesto help illuminateways the legal system
maintainsthe status quo. For example, Delgado and Stefancic (1989) described
how three importantresourcesthat lawyers use in legal research-the Libraryof
Congress subject heading, the Index of Legal Periodicals, and the West Digest
System-function like DNA; that is, they allow the currentsystem to replicate
itself. Delgado and Stefancic (1989) assertedthat the three informationsystems
function like a double helix in molecularbiology: They reconstructpreexisting
ideas, arguments,and methods.Withinthe boundariesof the threesystems, mod-
erate, incrementallegal change is possible, whereas structural,transformative
innovationis much more difficult. Delgado and Stefancic (1989) stated:
A glanceatthestandard categoriesshowswhy;eachsystembearsa strongimprintof theincremental
civil rightsapproach
thesewritersdecry.TheIndexto LegalPeriodicalsandDecennialDigest,for
example,leadthereaderto workson civil rights,employment andschoolintegration
discrimination,
or desegregation,butcontainno entryfor hegemonyor interestconvergence.TheIndexto Legal
Periodicalslackedan entryforcriticallegalstudiesuntilSeptember 1987,nearlya decadeafterthe
movementbegan.TheDecennialDigestcontainsentrieson slumsandmiscegenation. To findcases
on ghettos,one mustlookin the DescriptiveWordIndexunderslums,whichrefersthe searcherto
publicimprovements underthetopicmunicipal Anotherindexcontainsanentrylabeled,
corporations.
simply,races.None of the majorindexescontainsentriesfor legitimation, false consciousness,
or
manyotherthemesof the"new"orcriticalrace-remedies scholarship.Indeed,a researcher
whocon-
finedhimselforherselfto thesourceslistedunderstandard civilrightsheadingswouldbe unlikelyto
comein contactwiththeseideas,muchless inventthemon his orherown.(pp.218-219)
Delgado and Stefancic (1992) have not limited their analysis of structural
determinismto legal informationsystems. Buildingon postmoderninsights about
language and the social constructionof reality, Delgado and Stefancic (1992)
arguedthat conventionalFirst Amendmentdoctrineis most helpful in resolving
small, clearly bounded disputes. However, free speech is less able to deal with
systemic problemssuch as racism or sexism and, thus, is least helpful with some
of society's most difficult dilemmas. Delgado and Stefancic (1992) offered two
interrelatedreasons for the boundedrange of free speech in resolving mattersof
racial discrimination.First, their review of 200 years of ethnic depiction in the
United States revealed that society simply does not see many forms of discrimi-
nation at the time they are occurring.Delgado and Stefancic (1992) posited:
This time-warpaspect of racism makes speech an ineffective tool to counterit. . . . Racism forms part
of the dominantnarrative,the group of received understandingsand basic principles that form the
baseline from which we reason. How could these be in question?Recent scholarshipshows that the
dominantnarrativechanges very slowly and resists alteration.We interpretnew stories in light of the
old. Ones that deviate too markedlyfrom our pre-existing stock are dismissed as extreme, coercive,
political, and wrong. The only stories about race we are preparedto condemn, then, are the old ones
giving voice to the racismof an earlierage, ones thatsociety has alreadybegun to reject.We can con-
demn Justice Brown for writing as he did in Plessy v. Ferguson, but not university administrators
who refuse remedies for campus racism, failing to notice the remarkableparallelsbetween the two.
(pp. 1278-1279)
Delgado and Stefancic (1992) describeda second, relatedinsight from modern

scholarshipthatfocuses not on how existing narrativeslimit reformbut, rather,on
the relationshipbetween ourselves and those narratives.Specifically, they argued
that individuals are confined to their own preconceptionsfrom which escape is
difficult. Delgado and Stefancic (1992) offered:
The emphaticfallacy holds thatthroughspeech and remonstrancewe can surmountour limitationsof
time, place, and culture, can transcendour own situatedness.But our examination of the cultural
record,as well as postmodernunderstandingsof languageand personhood,bothpoint to the same con-
clusion: The notion of ideas competingwith each other,with truthand goodness emergingvictorious
from the competition,has provenseriouslydeficientwhen appliedto evils, like racism,thataredeeply
inscribedin the culture.We have constructedthe social world so thatracismseems normal,partof the
statusquo, in need of little correction.It is not until much laterthatwhat we believed begins to seem
incredibly,monstrouslywrong. How could we have believed that?(p. 1281)
One implicationof structuraldeterminismis that it limits how individualsand

society at large are able to analyze and critiqueoppression.Criticalrace theorists
have attemptedto addressthis tunnelvision by examiningthe law throughmulti-
ple lenses. One of the newer trendsin CRThas been the examinationof race, gen-
der, and class and how they operatein society and the law. For example,building
on the writings of such scholars as hooks (1991), hooks and West (1991), and
Harris(1990), Delgado (1993) constructedand narrateda story between himself
and his alter ego, Rodrigo. The story explores the tensions that exist when a
group--that is, all women-attempts a singular, unitarymovement to catalyze
change. Specifically, Delgado examined the essentialist debate in legal scholar-
ship and the broaderacademy.28
Delgado (1993) constructeda story thatillustrateshow the scholarlyfocus and
action of a women's law caucus to achieve its goals of gender equality could
potentiallyresultin theirfailureto addressotherforms of oppression(e.g., racial).
After the story, Delgado, along with his alter ego, Rodrigo, offered a theory of
social change and small groupsthatrepresentsan effort to explain the process of
social reform.Delgado (1993) borrowedfrom Dewey (1933) and otherAmerican
pragmatistswho arguedthathumanintelligence and progressspringfrom adver-
sity, thatis, the notionthatthe society is not providingthe individualwith whathe
or she needs to survive. Similarly,Delgado arguedthat subgroupswithin a social
movementrecognize thatthe largergrouplacks the vision to include theiragenda
within the movement.Thus, the subgroupdevelops its own agendaand moves on
to continue the process of social change. Delgado (1993) theorized that social
change is, by its nature,an iterativeprocess with reformand retrenchmentcom-
ing in waves.
A theme that permeates critical race scholarship is the concept of cultural
nationalism (e.g., Bell, 1987; Calmore, 1992; Delgado, 1992; Johnson, 1993).
Rooted in DuBois's (1906/1990) philosophy of double consciousness and the
Black power movementof the 1960s and 1970s, culturalnationalismis definedby
the belief that Black and Brown communitiesshould develop their own schools,
colleges, and businesses.29 Cultural nationalism served as one philosophical
underpinningof Delgado's (1995b) critiqueof affirmativeaction.
Delgado (1995b) challenged the way affirmative action is framed in policy
debates. He arguedthataffirmativeaction debatestypically structurethe issue of
minorityrepresentationwith the following question:Shouldwe as a countrysanc-
tion the appointmentof some specific numberof people of color to achieve cer-
tain political objectives, such as social stability, a diverse workforce, and
integration?According to Delgado (1995b), the political objectives are always
forwardlooking:Affirmativeactionis seen as a tool for socially engineeringsoci-
ety from state A to state B. The process ignores the fact thatminoritieshave been
treatedunfairly in employment practices, deprived of their land, and enslaved.
Moreover,the affirmativeaction debateoften framesthe issue so thateven small
accomplishmentsare seen as painful, requiringcareful thinking by liberals and
conservativesalike about the opportunitybeing denied White citizens. Delgado
(1995b) called for careful analysis of affirmativeaction by people of color. He
concludedwith an analysisof one aspectof affirmativeaction mythology:the role
model argument.
The role model argumentis a story thatexists in currentdiscourseon affirma-
tive action;its majorpremiseis thatif a personof color is hirednow and this per-
son is a good role model, things will be better for the next generation of
minorities.Delgado (1995b) posited thatthe role model argumentis instrumental
and forward looking, like the larger programof affirmative action. Delgado's
(1995b) assessmentof the role model argumentas being instrumentalandforward
looking is a criticism. He provided five reasons a person of color should avoid
employmentlinked to this argument.Two of these reasonsare especially relevant
to scholars interestedin educationalequity. The first is that, to be a good role
model, one must be an assimilationist,never a culturalor economic nationalist,
separatist,radicalreformer,or anythingconnected to any of these.30The second
is that the job of the role model requiresone to lie. Delgado (1995b) suggested
thatpromotingan academiclaw careerto childrenof color is akin to promotinga
careerin the National BasketballAssociation. He arguedthat the currenteduca-
tional conditions for childrenof color-diminishing federal and state supportfor
scholarshipsdevoted to these childrenand increasingcampusharassment-have
limited real opportunity.31
A Commentary on Richard Delgado
Delgado (1990) argued that scholars of color and female scholars are able to
provide insights and stories differentfrom those traditionallyheardin legal dis-
course. Moreover,he contendedthat storieshave a community-buildingfunction
and the potential to change mind-set.32Delgado's scholarship has combined
analytical discussions of the philosophical undergirdingsof narrativemethods
with argumentsagainst structuraldeterminism,essentialism, and academic neo-
imperialism.Furthermore,Delgado describedthe functionof culturalnationalism
in the criticalrace critique.Delgado's scholarship,like Bell's, is characterizedby
texts that weave together lively narrativeand rigorous theoretical analyses of
legal constructs.Moreover,Delgado's scholarship,like Bell's, has been subjectto
criticism.
Randall Kennedy (1989) noted the contributionsof critical race theoristssuch
as DerrickBell, RichardDelgado, and MariMatsudato the literatureon race and
law; however, he arguedthatthey tendedto evade or suppresscomplicationsthat
render their conclusions problematic. Kennedy (1989) specifically challenged
(a) the notion that, on intellectual grounds, White scholars are entitled to less
standing to engage in race-relatedcivil rights discourse than scholars of color;
(b) the argumentthat, on intellectual grounds, the racial status of scholars of
color should serve as a positive credential for the purposes of analyzing their
writings; and (c) argumentsthat contend the currentposition of minority schol-
ars has been influenced by prejudiceddecisions of White colleagues.
In a VirginiaLaw Review article,Delgado (1990) respondedto Kennedy'scrit-
icisms. He remarkedthat Kennedy is a believer in dominantdiscourse:the col-
lection of ideas, arguments,and concepts thatcompose liberallegalism. Delgado
(1990) described dominant discourse as incremental and cautious. Moreover,
Delgado (1990) arguedthatdominantdiscourseis a homeostaticdevice by which
our society ensures that most race-relatedreform will last a short time. What is
clear from Kennedy's argumentand Delgado's response is that they operate in
very differentparadigms.Delgado (1990) stated:
The CriticalRace Theoristsare impatientwith that discourse [dominant],and the outlook associated
with it. It neithersquareswith our experiencenor permitsus to hope for the kind of futurewe want for
ourselves and our communities. Unlike a naturallanguage, which simply adds new concepts and
words when its speakersneed them, dominantlegal discourse resists expansion. Indeed, one of its
principalfunctionsis to makereformdifficultto achieveorevento imagine.Kennedy'sopposition to
alternative
voicesandinsistencethatwe speakin thecurrent idiomtherefore is notmerelyaboutlegal
styleormanners. Itis aboutthingsthatmatter.Inseekingto confineusto a singlemodeof thoughtand
expression evenin lawreviews,a traditional
forumforexperimenting withnewideas,he vergesclose
to intolerance.
(pp.103-104)
Despite the criticism of Delgado's scholarly methods, the implicationsof his

writingsfor researchon educationand equity arefar-reaching.I will discuss three
potential areas in which Delgado's argumentsinform equity-relateddebates in
educationalliterature.
First, Delgado and Stefancic's (1989) critique of structuraldeterminismand
librarianshipin legal scholarshipis applicableto educationalresearch.Scholarsin
education should ask, Are educationalinformationclassification systems assist-
ing in the replicationof preexistingthought?If so, what can be done to expand
beyond indexing and researchsystems thatconfine thoughtto the traditionalcat-
egories of educationaldiscourseto include boundary-crossingscholarshiprelated
to civil rights and education?This questionhas been, in part,examinedby Apple
(1993):
Whilethereis a formalrightforeveryoneto berepresented in thedebatesoverwhoseculturalcapital,
whoseknowledge'that,''how,'and'to,'will be declaredlegitimatefortransmission to futuregener-
ationsof students,it is still the case that... a selectivetraditionoperatesin whichonly specific
groups'knowledgebecomesofficialknowledge. Thus,thefreedomto helpselecttheformalcorpusof
schoolknowledgeis boundby powerrelationsthathaveveryrealeffects.(pp.65-66)
Second, Delgado's (1995b) discussionof culturalnationalismis partof a larger

programof scholarshipwithinthe criticalrace movement.This theme of CRT has
importantapplicationsfor the educationof studentsof color. For example, in his
analysis of the Fordice case, Johnson(1993) concludedthat the case represented
a quest for equality through an assimilationist version of integration, without
respect for the culture of African Americans. Similarly, Brown (1993) argued
that, on cultural and educational grounds, a powerful case exists for African
Americanimmersionschools; however, he illustratedhow the abstract,individu-
alistic natureof the legal system is an impediment.The culturaland educational
grounds found in Brown's analysis are strengthenedby additionaleducational
researchthat illuminatesthe importanceof culturallyrelevantpedagogy for chil-
dren of color (Deyhle, 1995; Ladson-Billings, 1994, 1995; Nieto, 1992; Perry,
1993). However, Brown's (1993) most importantcontributionto the literatureon
educationalequity is, arguably,his ability to examine the nexus of K-12 peda-
gogy, policy, and law. Some educationalresearcherswhose scholarshipis cen-
tered on equity have been less inclined to grapplewith this combination,instead
focusing on one of the three. For example, James Banks (1992), known for his
importantwork in multiculturaleducation,remarked:
Theradicalcriticscanmaintain
theirinnocencebecausemanyof themareprofessorsin educational
policystudiesandfoundations
departments. theyhavethe luxuryto write,talk,and
Consequently,
dream about schools without having to confront directly the daily challenges that teachers,students
teachers,and studentsmust experienceeach day. By contrast,most multiculturaltheoristsare former
teachersand are curriculumand instructionprofessors.They generallyare amongthose who construct
lesson plans and units and teach methodscourses for use by their studentswho must take theirplaces
on the firing line in the schools. The curriculumand instructionorientationof most multiculturalthe-
orists is a majorfactor thatexplains why they cast theirlot with schools and teachers,and try to bring
change within the system. (p. 283)
Banks's (1992) argumentis compelling, yet somewhatreductive.The change

process requires a theoretical lens capable of examining classroom-level and
more macrolevel aspects of the educationalsystem and society. Educationalsys-
tems are built on laws, policies, and folkways requiringmacrolevel analyses that
overlap with microlevel issues such as curriculumand pedagogy. Thus, the need
to build on and expandbeyond the theoreticaltenets associatedwith multicultural
classroompracticeis a paramountconsiderationfor scholarsinterestedin equity-
relatedresearch(Grant& Tate, 1995; Ladson-Billings& Tate, 1995).
Third,Delgado (1993) posited a theoryof social change and explainedthe role
of race, class, and gender in oppositionalgroups. His theory provides important
insight into the essentialism debate. Specifically, Delgado (1993) and othercriti-
cal race scholarssuch as Angela Harrisarguethat some of the feminist legal the-
orists (e.g., CatharineMacKinnon and Robin West) at times rely on a unitary,
essential women's experience that is describedindependentlyof race, class, and
other experiences of reality. C. I. Harris(1993) offered two reasons that gender
essentialismis problematic:
First, the obvious one: As a black woman, in my opinion the experienceof black women is too often
ignored both in feminist theory and in legal theory, and gender essentialism in feminist legal theory
does nothing to address this problem. A second and less obvious reason for my criticism of gender
essentialismis that,in my view, contemporarylegal theoryneeds less abstractionandnot simply a dif-
ferent sort of abstraction.To be fully subversive, the methodology of feminist legal theory should
challenge not only law's content but its tendency to privilege the abstractand unitaryvoice, and this
genderessentialism also fails to do. (p. 585)
This insight is timely given that scholarsinterestedin equity in educationhave

called for scholarshipthat recognizes the relevance of multiple group member-
ships for an issue (e.g., Grant& Sleeter, 1986; Secada, 1995). Moreover,an edu-
cation problem may be analyzed with constructsthat build on race, class, and
gender positions. Here is where the scholarshipof Kimberl6Crenshawmakes a
significantcontributionto the criticalrace literatureand potentiallyto educational
research.
Kimberle Crenshaw and Critical Race Theory

Matsudaand colleagues (1993) placed the social origins of CRT as a scholarly
movementto a studentboycottandalternativecourseorganizedin 1981 at Harvard
Law School. The purpose of the boycott was to convince the administrationto
increasethe numberof tenuredfaculty membersof color. DerrickBell, Harvard's
first AfricanAmericanprofessor,had left Harvardto assume the deanshipat the
Universityof Oregon'slaw school. Harvardstudentsrequestedthatthe university
hire a person of color to teach Race, Racism and AmericanLaw, a course orga-
nized and taughtby Bell, the authorof a ground-breaking book on the topic (Bell,
1980a). The administrationfailed to meet the student demand, and students
respondedby organizingan alternativecourse on the topic. Kimberl6Crenshaw,a
HarvardLaw School student,was one of the primaryorganizersof the alternative
course (Matsudaet al., 1993). The studentsinvited legal scholarsand activists to
lectureon sections of Bell's book. This action led to collaborationand discussion
among a small cadre of legal scholarsaboutdifferentways to conceptualizerace
andlaw. Overtime, membersof this initialgroup-for example,RichardDelgado,
CharlesLawrence,and Mari Matsuda-became instrumentalin the development
of critical race scholarship (Delgado, 1990; Lawrence, 1987; Matsuda, 1989).
Anothercontributorto this new genre of scholarshipis Kimberl6Crenshaw.
Crenshaw's 1988 HarvardLaw Review articlechallengedboth the neoconser-
vative and CLS critiques of the civil rights movement. Crenshaw (1988)
describedthe neoconservativecritiqueof the New Right as a set of argumentsthat
reducedcivil rights to mere special-interestpolitics.33The New Right view law
and politics as essentially distinct; they presume that illustratingthat the civil
rights vision is largely political rendersthe vision illegitimate(Crenshaw,1988).
For example, the neoconservativeargumentthat more recent leaders of the civil
rightsmovementhave shiftedthe movement's focus on equal treatmentunderthe
law to a demand for equal results delegitimized the movement in a democratic
society (Sowell, 1984). According to Crenshaw (1988), neoconservatives like
Thomas Sowell built on
a formalistic,
color-blindviewof civilrightsthathaddevelopedin theneoconservative "thinktanks"
duringthe1970's.Neoconservative civilrightspoliciesas oneof the
doctrinesinglesoutrace-specific
mostsignificantthreatsto the democraticpoliticalsystem.Emphasizing theneedfor strictlycolor-
blindpolicies,thisviewcallsfortherepealof affirmativeactionandotherrace-specificremedialpoli-
cies,urgesanendto class-based remedies,andcallsfortheAdministration to limitremediesto what
itcalls"actual of discrimination.
victims" (p.1337)
However, Crenshaw(1988) arguedthat the neoconservativecritiquefailed to

identify the "real"law and instead embracedlanguage from antidiscrimination
texts while ignoring contradictorypurposes and interpretations.For example,
Crenshaw(1988) identifiedtwo distinctrhetoricalvisions of equalityin the body
of antidiscriminationlaw: one termedthe expansiveview andthe otherthe restric-
tive view. The expansive view stresses equalityas an outcome and seeks to enlist
the power of the courtto eliminatethe effects of racialoppression.In contrast,the
restrictiveview of equality,which coexists with the expansive view, treatsequal-
ity as a process (Crenshaw, 1988). The primarygoal of antidiscriminationlaw,
accordingto the restrictiveview, is to stop futureacts of wrongdoingratherthan
correctpresentforms of past injustice.
According to Crenshaw(1988), the tension between the expansive and restric-

tive visions of equalityis presentthroughoutantidiscriminationlaw; however,the
neoconservativecritiqueoften dismisses the full complexity of the dual interpre-
tation by simply stating that equal process is unrelated to equal results.
Unsatisfied with this declaration,Crenshaw(1988) remarked:
As theexpansiveandrestrictive lawreveal,theresimplyis no self-evident
viewsof antidiscrimination
of civilrightsinherent
interpretation in thetermsthemselves. Instead,specificinterpretationsproceed
largelyfromtheworldviewof theinterpreter. Forexample,to believe,as Sowelldoes,thatcolor-blind
policiesrepresenttheonlylegitimateandeffectivemeansof ensuringa raciallyequitable society,one
wouldhaveto assumenotonlythatthereis onlyone"proper role"forlaw,butalsothatsucha racially
equitablesocietyalreadyexists.Inthisworld,oncelawhadperformed its "proper" functionof assuring
equalityof process,differencesin outcomesbetweengroupswouldnotreflectpastdiscrimination but
ratherrealdifferences betweengroupscompeting forsocietalrewards.Unimpeded by irrational
preju-
dicesagainstidentifiablegroupsandunfettered bygovernment-imposed preferences,competition would
ensurethatanygroupstratification wouldreflectonlythecumulative effectsof employers' rationaldeci-
sionsto hirethebestworkers fortheleastcost.Thedeprivationsandoppression of thepastwouldsome-
howbe expunged fromthepresent.Onlyin sucha society,whereallothersocietalfunctions operatein
a nondiscriminatoryway,wouldequalityof processconstitute equalityof opportunity.(pp.1344-1345)
A belief in color blindnessand equalprocess, accordingto Crenshaw(1988), is

illogical in a society in which specific groupshave been treateddifferenthistori-
cally and in which the outcomes of this differentialtreatmentcontinue into the
present.Moreover, society's adoptionof antidiscriminationlaw is subjectto the
condition that it does not overly burdenmajorityinterests (see also Bell, 1987,
1992).
Crenshaw(1988) also conducteda critiqueof CLS. She interpretedCLS as an
attemptto examine legal ideology and discourse to determinehow it re-creates
and legitimatesAmericansociety. Specifically, to discoverthe compositionof the
law, CLS scholarsdeconstructlegal doctrineto illuminateboth its internalincon-
sistencies (often by exposing illogical legal arguments)and its externalinconsis-
tencies (generally by noting the paradoxical political perspectives embedded
within legal doctrine) (see, e.g., R.W. Gordon, 1984; Livingston, 1982; Unger,
1983). The CLS analysis exposes the ways in which legal ideology has helped
construct,maintain,and legitimateAmerica's presentclass structure.
Moreover, Crenshaw (1988) argued that CLS provides a useful analysis in
understandingthe limited transformativepotential of antidiscriminationdis-
course. However, Crenshawidentifieddifficultiesin attemptingto employ critical
themes and ideas to analyze the civil rights movement and to describe possible
policy options the civil rights constituencycould possibly pursue.More specifi-
cally, Crenshawofferedthreereasonsthe CLS critiqueis inadequatefor people of
color.34
First, many CLS scholarsfailed to groundtheir analyses in the realities of the
racially oppressed.This deficiency, accordingto Crenshaw(1988), is especially
apparentin critiques related to racial issues. Thus, the CLS literatureshares a
characteristicwith mainstreamscholarship:It fails to speak to or about African
Americansand otherpeople of color.
Second, the CLS critique fails to analyze the hegemonic role of racism, thus
renderingits prescriptiveanalysis unrealistic(Crenshaw,1988).
TheCritics'principalerroris thattheirversionof domination by consentdoesnotpresenta realistic
pictureof racialdomination.Coercionexplainsmuchmoreaboutracialdomination thandoesideo-
logicallyinducedconsent.Blackpeopledo notcreatetheiroppressive worldsmomentto momentbut
ratherarecoercedintolivingin worldscreatedandmaintained by others.Moreover, theideological
butracism.If racismis justas important
sourceof thiscoercionis notliberallegalconsciousness, as,
if not moreimportantthan,liberallegalideologyin explainingthepersistence of whitesupremacy,
thentheCritics'single-minded effortto deconstruct
liberallegalideologywillbe futile.(p. 1357)
Third,accordingto Crenshaw(1988), the CLS critique,while exaggeratingthe

role of liberal legal consciousness, minimizes the potentialtransformativepower
that liberalism offers. Crenshaw supportedher claim by reexamining the civil
rights movement.She noted thatBlacks challengedtheirexclusion from political
society by using methodsrecognized and reflected in U.S. society's institutional
logic: legal rights ideology. Specifically, civil rights activists articulatedtheir
demandsthroughlegal rightsideology by exposing a series of contradictions,the
most importantbeing the constitutionalguaranteeof citizenship and the public
practiceof racial subordination.Crenshaw(1988) remarked:
Ratherthanusingthe contradictions to suggestthatAmericancitizenshipwas itselfillegitimateor
false,civilrightsprotestors
proceeded as if American werereal,anddemanded
citizenship to exercise
the"rights" thatcitizenshipentailed.By seekingto restructure
realityto reflectAmerican mythology,
Blacksrelieduponandultimately benefitedfrompoliticallyinspiredeffortsto resolvethecontradic-
tionsby granting formalrights.Althoughit is theneedto maintainlegitimacythatpresentspowerless
groupswiththeopportunity to wrestconcessionsfromthedominant order,it is theveryaccomplish-
mentof legitimacythatforeclosesgreaterpossibilities.Insum,thepotentialforchangeis bothcreated
andlimitedby legitimation. (p. 1368)
In conclusion,Crenshaw(1988) arguedthatthe task at handis to develop meth-

ods to engage in ideological and political strugglewhile minimizingthe costs of
waging in an inherentlylegitimatinglegal discourse.Centralto this process is the
creationof a distinct political thoughtthat is the productof the lives and condi-
tions of Black people.
In an effort to createthis kind of political thought,Crenshawhas soughtto the-
orize about race and apply this theory to social problems. Crenshaw (1993)
arguedthat social issues emphasizinggender often minimized the interactionof
gender and race and class. She contendedthat this practiceis largely consistent
with doctrinaland political discoursesthatconstructracism and sexism as mutu-
ally exclusive. In response, Crenshaw(1993) called for an intersectionalframe-
work to addressmultiple systems of subordination:
On the simplestlevel,an intersectional
frameworkuncovershowthedualpositioningof womenof
coloras womenandasmembers racialgroupbearsuponviolencecommitted
of a subordinated against
us. This dual positioning,or as some scholarshave labeled it, doublejeopardy,renderswomen of color
vulnerableto the structural,political, and representationaldynamicsof both race and gender subordi-
nation. A frameworkattunedto the various ways that these dynamicsintersectis a necessary prereq-
uisite to exploring how this double vulnerabilityinfluences the way that violence against women of
color is experiencedand best addressed.(p. 112)
Crenshaw's (1993) argumentfor an intersectionalframeworkbuilds on her

examinationof rhetoricalstrategiesthat characterizeantiracistand feminist poli-
tics merging in ways thatconstructnew problemsfor women of color. The inter-
sectional critique is importantfor discovering the methods in which reformist
interventionsof one discourse establish and reinforce subordinatingaspects of
another.
Crenshaw(1993) developed an intersectionalityframeworkthat exploredrace
and gender while noting thatthe concept can and should be expandedby includ-
ing issues such as class and age. She describedintersectionalityas a provisional
concept that links contemporarypolitics with postmodem theory. The specific
purposeof intersectionalityis to framethe following inquiry:"How does the fact
thatwomen of color are simultaneouslysituatedwithin at least two groupsthatare
subjected to broad societal subordination bear upon problems traditionally
viewed as monocausal-that is, gender discriminationor race discrimination"
(Crenshaw,1993, p. 114).
In her analysis, Crenshaw(1993) used three constructsor metaphorsto guide
her examinationof race and genderin U.S. law and popularculture:(a) the struc-
tural dimensions of domination (structuralintersectionality), (b) the politics
engenderedby a specific system of domination(political intersectionality),and
(c) the representationsof the dominated(representationalintersectionality).The
intersectionalitymetaphorsattemptto map the space in which women of color are
situated:between categoriesof race and genderwhen the two aretreatedas mutu-
ally exclusive.
Crenshaw (1993) describes structural intersectionalityas the way in which
women of color are often situatedwithin overlappingstructuresof subordination.
Any area of vulnerabilityis sometimes exacerbatedby yet another set of con-
straints emerging from a separate system of subordination. According to
Crenshaw(1993), scholarly analysis built on the examinationof structuralinter-
sections would provide insights into the lives of those at the bottom of complex
layers of social hierarchiesto determinehow the interactionswithin each hierar-
chy influence the dynamics of another.For Crenshaw(1993), the materialout-
comes of these interconnecteddynamicsboth within and acrosshierarchiesin the
lives of women of color are the essence of structuralintersectionality.Crenshaw
(1993) provided an example of how structuralintersectionalitylimits legal pro-
tection and political intervention:
Structuralintersectionalityis the way in which the burdensof illiteracy,responsibilityfor child care,
poverty, lack of job skills, and pervasive discriminationweigh down many batteredwomen of color
who are tryingto escape the cycle of abuse. Thatis, gendersubordination-manifested in this case by
withraceandclassdisadvantage
battering-intersects to shapeandlimittheopportunities
foreffec-
tiveintervention.
(p. 115)15
Accordingto Crenshaw(1993), the termpolitical intersectionalityrefersto the

various ways in which political and discursivepracticesassociatedwith race and
gender interrelate,often minimizing women of color. On some political issues,
the arguments focusing on race and those focusing on gender work at odds.
Manifestationsof this oppositionality are found in antiracistand feminist dis-
course that supports the dynamics of either racial or gender subordination.
Crenshaw(1993) remarkedthat a common example of political intersectionality
is the practiceof "protecting"the political andculturalintegrityof the Black com-
munity by silencing public discussions of domestic violence. In other cases,
women of color are overlooked when genderpolitics fail to recognize the plight
of women of color. Crenshaw(1993) arguedthatthis was the case with rhetorical
appealsmade by sponsorsof the Violence Against Women Act.
Whitemalesenatorseloquentlyurgedpassageof the bill becauseviolenceagainstwomenoccurs
everywhere,notjustin theinnercities.Thatis, thesenatorsattemptedto persuadeotherwhitesthat
domesticviolenceis a problembecause"theseareourwomenbeingvictimized." Whitewomenthus
comeintofocus,andanyauthentic, to ourimagesandourexperience,
sensitiveattention whichwould
probablyhavejeopardized thebill,fadedintodarkness. (Crenshaw,1993,p. 116)36
Political intersectionality, as it relates to issues affecting women of color,

reveals the methodsin which politics built on mutuallyexclusive notions of race
and gender provide women of color an inadequatepolitical frameworkthat fails
to contextualizetheir experiences and realities (Crenshaw,1993). Thus, tokenis-
tic, objectifying, voyeuristic inclusion within a political discourse is at least as
harmfulto women of color as exclusion because both fail to adequatelycontextu-
alize theirlived realities and concerns (Crenshaw,1993).
The final metaphorof the intersectionalframeworkis representationalinter-
sectionality,which describesthe mannerin which race and genderimages, abun-
dant in our culture,merge to constructunique narrativesconsideredappropriate
for women of color (Crenshaw, 1993). Representationalintersectionalityis sig-
nificantfor the explorationof issues involving women of color because it seeks to
understandthe subtle and explicit ways their experiences are weighed against
counternarratives thatbuild on stereotypes.
Crenshaw (1993) suggested that media images provide insights into under-
standing the ways Latina, African American, Asian American, and Native
Americanwomen are constructedthroughpermutationsof accessible racial and
gender stereotypes.Crenshaw(1993) conducted an analysis using the intersec-
tionality frameworkof culturalimages widely disseminatedin four mainstream
movies, a video game, and a rapalbum.37A goal of her analysis was to determine
whetherculturalartifactssuch as media images can influence legal and political
thinking. In Crenshaw's (1993) words, "Whatever the relationship between
imageryandactionsis, it seems clearthatthese images do functionto createcoun-
ternarrativesto the experiences of women of color that discreditour claims and
renderthe violence we experienceunimportant"(p. 120).
A Commentaryon KimberleCrenshaw
Kimberl6Crenshaw'sscholarshipcharacterizesthe interdisciplinaryand eclec-
tic natureof CRT. Like other criticalrace scholars,Crenshawborrowsfrom sev-
eral traditions,including culturalnationalism,postmodernism,CLS, and black
feminist thought,to provide a more comprehensiveexaminationof race, society,
and U.S. law. For example, Crenshaw's (1988) critiqueof neoconservativeand
CLS argumentsin antidiscriminationlaw provides unique insight into how both
groups,for differentreasons,have failed to addressthe complexityof race in U.S.
society and the laws governing the society. Instead,Crenshaw(1988) called for
scholarship that demonstratesthe racist nature of ostensibly neutral norms-a
response to neoconservative arguments-and the development of proactive
strategiesfor change that include the pragmaticuse of legal rights,a position that
differs from that of scholarsin the CLS movement. Crenshaw'scall for a differ-
ent approachto antidiscriminationlaw and relatedscholarshiphas more recently
been appliedto scholarshipin education.
In Tate et al. (1993), two colleagues and I built on Crenshaw'snotionof expan-
sive and restrictiveforms of equality. Specifically, we arguedthat many policy-
makersare unawareof the potentialfor divergentconstructionsof equality;thus,
the implementationof policy and law derivedfromthe restrictiveinterpretationof
antidiscriminationlaw continues to inhibit African Americanstudents' opportu-
nity to learn. We concluded with a description of a more expansive vision of
desegregatedschooling thatconsideredstudentdiversity,curriculum,instruction,
and parent-communityinvolvement.This articlerepresentsan effort to negotiate
macrolevel policy issues with pragmaticclassroom-level concerns, a challenge
for all scholarsconcernedwith equity in education.The criticalrace critiquepro-
vided importantconceptual intervention in this effort, and, more specifically,
Crenshaw's(1988) analysis of antidiscriminationlaw was central.Otherpotential
areas of education and related scholarship where Crenshaw's perspective on
antidiscriminationlaw would be applicableinclude (a) school choice and voucher
plans, (b) standards-basedreform efforts, and (c) school desegregationefforts,
including those in higher education (see Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Tate,
1995a).
Another way Crenshaw's (1993) scholarshipcan make a potentially unique
contributionto educationalresearchon equity is with her intersectionalityframe-
work. Recently, many progressivescholarshave called for or actuallyincluded a
close examinationof the intersectionof race, class, and gender in their research
programs(Apple, in press;Grant& Sleeter, 1986; Morrow& Torres, 1995; Reid,
1995; Secada, 1995). The three variantson the intersectionaltheme-structural,
political, and representational-provide a conceptionalframeworkfor analyzing
the interplayof race, class, and genderin educationalcontexts.
Despite the potential of the intersectionalityframework,its postmodernroots

have been subjectto criticism.Apple (in press) warnedof the problemsinherentin
the tendencyby some postmodernistsand poststructuraliststo see any focus on political economy and
class relationsto be somehow reductive,to analyze the state as if it floats in air, to expandthe linguis-
tic turnuntil it encompasses everything,to embraceoverly relativisticepistemologicalassumptions,
and the stylistic arroganceof some its writings.
This warning is worth noting. However, it is Crenshaw'scareful attentionto

structuralartifacts,the political economy, and culturalrepresentationsthatmakes
her intersectional frameworkmost appealing to education scholars seeking to
build on postmodernand criticaltraditionsto betterunderstandthe role of race in
U.S. schools and society.
FINALREMARKS:THEDEFININGELEMENTSOF
CRITICALRACETHEORY
One purposeof this review is to answer the question,What is CRT? A major
goal of CRT is the eliminationof racial oppressionas part of the larger goal of
eradicatingall forms of oppression (Matsudaet al., 1993). To this end, several
defining elements emerge from the CRT literature.Althoughthese elements are
distinct,they each reflect the goal of achievingracialjustice. In this sense, the ele-
ments of CRT are interrelated.Moreover,each of these elements provides guid-
ance for the development of questions related to the systematic inquiry of the
political dimensionsof equity in education.My literaturereview of CRTrevealed
the following defining elements and relatedquestions.
1. CRT recognizes that racism is endemic in U.S. society, deeply ingrained
legally, culturally,and even psychologically. Thus, the questionfor the education
scholaremploying CRT is not so much whetheror how racialdiscriminationcan
be eradicatedwhile maintainingthe vitality of other interestslinked to the status
quo such as federalism,traditionalvalues, standards,establishedpropertyinter-
ests, and choice. Rather,the new questionwould ask how these traditionalinter-
ests and cultural artifacts serve as vehicles to limit and bind the educational
opportunitiesof studentsof color.
2. CRT crosses epistemologicalboundaries.It borrowsfrom severaltraditions,
including liberalism, law and society, feminism, Marxism, poststructuralism,
CLS, culturalnationalism,and pragmatism,to provide a more complete analysis
of "raced"people. This element of CRT suggests that scholarsin educationinter-
ested in equity researchmust begin to questionthe appropriatenessand potential
of theirtheoreticaland conceptualframeworks.For example,does functionalism,
a particularmulticulturalperspective,or critical theory provide the most cogent
analysis of the experiencesof studentsof color in educationor the many "raced"
representations?
3. CRT reinterpretscivil rights law in light of its limitations, illustratingthat
laws to remedy racial inequality are often underminedbefore they can be fully
implemented.Interestingly,multiculturaleducationand some multiculturalper-

spectives arebuilt on or closely associatedwith the civil rightslaws developed in
the 1960s. Thus, an importantquestionfrom a criticalrace theoreticalperspective
is, Whatlimitationsdo these perspectiveshave and how can they be reinterpreted
to the advantageof traditionallyunderservedstudents of color? Moreover, this
question can be appliedto each theoreticallydrivenmovementin education.
4. CRT portraysdominantlegal claims of neutrality,objectivity, color blind-
ness, and meritocracyas camouflages for the self-interestof powerfulentities of
society. Do currently employed theoretical perspectives in education address
these practices?If not, how do they fail, and what does CRT offer to remedythis
lack of conceptualdepth?
5. CRT challenges ahistoricismand insists on a contextual/historicalexamina-
tion of the law and a recognitionof the experientialknowledge of people of color
in analyzing the law and society. Do we in educationchallenge ahistoricaltreat-
ment of education, equity, and students of color? Moreover, what role should
experientialknowledge of race, class, and genderplay in educationaldiscourse?
These elements of CRT representa beginning point. Criticalrace scholarsare
engaged in a dynamic process seeking to explain the realities of race in an ever-
changing society. Thus, their theoreticalpositions and, more specifically, these
elements should be viewed as a part of an iterative project of scholarshipand
social justice.
Secada(1989) arguedthattherearethreeareasintowhichresearchon educational
equity might move. First, futurescholarshipshould seek to set equity apartfrom
equality of education while building on the importantcontributionsthat have
emergedfrom thatparadigmaticview. It is here thatCRT makesa directcontribu-
tion to equity-relatedresearchin education.Criticalrace scholarshave reinterpreted
civil rightslaw anddominantlegal claims of equality,colorblindness,andmeritoc-
racyas partof an interest-convergence ploy. They havedescribedin detailthe origin
and intentof these claims of neutralityand offeredalternativesolutionsto difficult
social problems.
Second,Secada(1989) calledfor equityresearchin educationthatfocused on the
individualand on the groupcase. This is where the power of legal storytelling is
most illuminating.The voice of the individualcan provideinsightinto the political,
structural,and representationaldimensionsof the legal system, especially as they
relateto the groupcase. Similarly,narrativeresearchin educationcan providecom-
parableinsightsinto the educationalsystem (see Casey, 1995).
Finally, Secada (1989) argued that the link of educational equity to justice
needs examiningwith respectto how changingnotions of justice may give rise to
different interpretationsof educationalequity. A centralpart of the critical race
critiqueis to examine ever-changingconceptionsof justice. Thus, scholarsinter-
ested in educationalequity should benefit from the CRT literature.
Throughoutthis chapter,I have attemptedto delineatethe possibilities andlim-
itations of CRT, specifically for debates concerningequity in education.A chal-
lenge for those interestedin the politics of educationandrelatedresearchin equity
is to find theoreticalframeworksthatallow for an expansive examinationof race
that moves beyond those associated with the inferiorityparadigm.Such inquiry
mustbegin with the recognitionthatthis paradigmis a tool for the maintenanceof
racial subordination.The defining elements of CRT suggest that this theoretical
perspectivecan providenovel and innovativeways of exploringeducationalpol-
icy, research,and practice.
NOTES
1 Despite the ground-breakingwork of such scholars as Woodson (1933/1990) and
DuBois (1919), many researchershave continuedto use race as only a categoricalvariable
to compareand contrastsocial conditionsratherthana theoreticallens or analyticaltool.
2 Race and genderhave more recently emerged as importantconsiderationsto scholars
in this tradition.For example, Apple (1992) remarked:
We cannot marginalizerace and gender as constitutivecategoriesin any culturalanalysis.
If there is indeed basic culturalforms and orientationsthat are specifically genderedand
raced, and have their own partlyautonomoushistories, then we need to integratetheories
of patriarchaland racial forms into the very core of our attemptto comprehendwhat is
being reproducedandchanged.At the very least, a theorythatallows for the contradictions
within and among these dynamicswould be essential. (p. 143)
3 Historians,social scientists, and other scholars have arguedthat race is not a natural
culturalartifactbut, rather,a social construction(see, e.g., Apple, 1992; Apple & Weis,
1983). Thus, people are "raced"based on certaincharacteristicsand for differentreasons
(Harris,1993; McCarthy& Crichlow, 1993; Morrison,1992; Roediger, 1991).
4 Haney Lopez (1996) providedan insightfuldescriptionof race:
Race can be understoodas the historicallycontingentsocial systems of meaningthatattach
to elements of morphology and ancestry.This definition can be pushed on three interre-
lated levels, the physical, the social, and the material.First,race turnson physical features
and lines of descent, not because features or lineage themselves are a function of racial
variation,but because society has investedthese with racialmeanings.Second,becausethe
meanings given to certainfeaturesand ancestriesdenote race, it is the social processes of
ascribingracializedmeaningsto faces and forbearersthat lie at the heartof racial fabrica-
tion. Third, these meaning-systems, while originally only ideas, gain force as they are
reproducedin the materialconditions of society. The distributionof wealth and poverty
turnsin parton the actions of social and legal actorswho have acceptedideas of race, with
the resulting materialconditions becoming part of and reinforcementfor the contingent
meaningsunderstoodas race. (p. 14)
5 Anotherimportantquestion is, What was it aboutGuinier's thinkingand writingthat
alarmedboth liberal and conservativewriters and critics? Although this chapterwill not
specifically deal with this question, StephenL. Carter'sforewordin LaniGuinier's(1994)
The Tyrannyof the Majorityprovidesexcellent insight into the issue.
6 Despite the effort to associate intelligence testing with genetic classification, this
movementis more consistent with Wynter's(1995) notion of artificial/symbolicmodes of
classification. I contend that one goal of intelligence testing is to create a symbolic mode
(i.e., test score) that affirms a belief system and justifies and motivates political action.
HernsteinandMurray(1994) illustratedthis point when they raisedthe following question:
"How shouldpolicy deal with the twin realitiesthatpeople differin intelligencefor reasons
that are not their fault and thatintelligence has a powerfulbearingon how well people do
in life?" (p. 535).
The authorsargued that the interrelationshipbetween race and intelligence is a fixed
genetic reality. One limitationof this argumentis capturedin the following statement:
"Race"is not a biological category that can serve as a justifiable scientific tool for repre-
senting and comparinghumanpopulations.Rather,it is a marker[italics added]for histor-
ically oppressed groups whose domination was perpetuated and reproduced through
reference to accidental phenotypical features, those of "visible" minorities. (Morrow &
Torres, 1995, p. 385)
7 Walker(1991) arguedthat race has evolved beyond being an ideological construct:
To most nineteenth-centurywhite Americansthe Negroes' racialdifferenceand inferiority
were not mere abstractions.Race was a physical fact. To argue as one recent studentof
southern history has that for nineteenth-century whites race was a pure "ideological
notion" is arrant,ahistoricalnonsense. Those American historians who have noted that
racial antipathy was a major factor in the history of the United States have not been
engaged in some sort of exceptionalism, as has sometimes been alleged. Nor have they
accordedrace a transhistorical,almost metaphysical,statusthat removes it from all possi-
bility of analysis and understanding.On the contrary,what scholars such as Carl Degler,
George Fredrickson,WintropJordon,Leon Litwack,Michael Rogin, RichardSlotkin, and
Joel Williamsonhave done is to pay close attentionto race andracialthinking,as it evolved
in Euro-Americanthought.(p. 5)
8 Fields (1990) provides additionalinsight into the relationshipbetween racial oppres-
sion and inferiority:
Race as a coherent ideology did not spring into being simultaneously with slavery, but
took even more time than slavery did to become systematic. A commonplace that few
stop to examine holds that people are more readily oppressedwhen they are alreadyper-
ceived as inferior by nature. The reverse is more to the point. People are more readily
perceived as inferior by nature when they are already seen as oppressed. Africans and
their descendants might be, to the eye of the English, heathen in religion, outlandishin
nationality,and weird in appearance.But thatdid not add up to an ideology of racial infe-
riority until a furtherhistorical ingredient got stirredinto the mixture:the incorporation
of Africans and their descendants into a polity and society in which they lacked rights
that others not only took for granted,but claimed as a matterof self-evident naturallaw.
(p. 106)
9 According to Anderson(1994), "As a generalrule, the category of race has been dis-
tortedor omitted in the writing and teaching of Americanhistory"(p. 87). To avoid con-
tributingto this problem,I use the heading "OneHistoricalOverview"to indicatethatmy
historical interpretationof the origins of critical race theory is subject to critique and
debate. Moreover,the heading reflects my belief that it is possible to constructmore than
one history of this scholarlymovement.
0oWoodson's argumentextended beyond legal education. He arguedthat schools and
universities, in general, taught about Europeancivilization and from Europeanperspec-
tives while ignoringthe Black experience.He contendedthat this practicewas harmfulto
the esteem and thinkingof AfricanAmericanyouth.
" For a discussion of educatorswho participatedin this struggle,see Banks (1993).
12 The purpose of this section of the chapteris to provide the reader insight into the
thinkingof criticalrace legal scholarsaboutscholarshipassociatedwith criticallegal stud-
ies. Thus, I am not attemptingto representthe criticallegal studiesmovementas a scholar
in that movementmight; rather,the intentis to presentthe conceptualsimilaritiesand dif-
ferences as interpretedby individualscholarswithin the criticalrace group.
13 Accordingto Unger (1982):
Classical legal thoughtwhich flourishedbetween approximately1885 and 1940, conceived
of law as a networkof boundariesthat markedoff distinct spheresof individualand gov-
ernmentalpower. Judicial authoritieswere thoughtto arbitrateconflict throughimpartial
elaborationof a mechanicallegal analytic.(p. 1670)
14I am not
attemptingto suggest that every scholarassociatedwith the CLS movement
borrows from the work of Gramsci. Instead, I suggest that this is a tendency within the
movement (see, e.g., Gordon, 1984).
"15Gramsci(1971) conceptualizedthe notion of hegemony, the methodby which a net-
work of attitudesand beliefs, influencing both popularvalues and the ideology of power-
ful members of society, sustains existing social configurationsand convinces dominated
groupsthatexisting social relationshipsare natural.
16Unger's (1983) use of the word tendenciesis more appropriatethan tenet or method-
ology. CLS scholarshipis closely associated with a variety of currentsin contemporary
radicalsocial theorybut does not reflect any agreedupon set of political tenets.
"17Livingston (1982) contendedthat these two tendenciesdistinguishedrealist tradition
from CLS. Whereasthe realists employ analyticcritiqueto discreditlegal argumentsand
suggest specific methods of legal reform, critical legal scholars are more focused on the
entire frameworkof liberal thought,exploring the tension between normativeideals and
social structure.
"18Narayan(1993) providedimportantinsight into the enactmentof hybridity:
One wall stands between ourselves as interestedreadersof stories and as theory-driven
professionals;anotherwall stands between narrative(associated with subjective knowl-
edge) and analysis (associated with objective truths).By situating ourselves as subjects
simultaneouslytouched by life-experience and swayed by professionalconcerns, we can
acknowledge the hybrid and positioned nature of our identities. Writing texts that mix
lively narrativeandrigorousanalysisinvolves enactinghybridity,regardlessof our origins.
(p. 682)
'9 I use the term conversationto indicate the dialogue that exists between critical race
theoristsand otherscholarsoutside this genre of legal analysis.
20
For an excellent review and critiqueof And WeAre Not Saved, see Delgado (1988b).
21
Throughoutthis chronicle,Bell (1987) buildshis argumentson researchconductedby
constitutionalscholars (e.g., Beard, 1913; Wiecek, 1977). His analysis differs in that he
uses story to introduceideological contradictionand raise questions.
22 The notion of propertyas "thing"is the popularconception.A second conceptionof
propertyas the relationshipbetween variousentities is the more sophisticatedconception.

In this analysis, I am discussing the latter.
23 am using the terms critical race theoryand critical race critiqueinterchangeablyin
1
this chapter.
24
See Casey (1995) for a review of narrativeresearchin education.
25
For additionaldiscussion of this issue, see Tatum(1992).
26
For a powerful example of this, see Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot's(1994) I've Known
Rivers.
27
Each of these mechanisms should be read and understoodby scholars interestedin
equity and education.They provide a power mirrorfor self-reflectionand a lens for cri-
tiquingthe scholarshipof colleagues in the field.
28Harris(1990) providedan excellent summaryof the tension createdby genderessen-
tialism in political action and scholarlywriting:
The notion that there is a monolithic "women's experience"that can be described inde-
pendentof other facets of experience like race, class, and sexual orientationis one I refer
to in this essay as "genderessentialism." A corollary to gender essentialism is "racial
essentialism"-the belief that there is a monolithic "Black Experience," or "Chicano
Experience."The source of genderand racialessentialism (and all otheressentialisms,for
the list of categories could be infinitely multiplied) is the second voice, the voice that
claims to speakfor all. The resultof essentialismis to reducethe lives of people who expe-
rience multiple forms of oppression to addition problems: "racism+ sexism = straight
black women's experience,"or "racism+ sexism + homophobia= black lesbian experi-
ence." Thus, in an essentialist world, black women's experience will always be forcibly
fragmentedbefore being subjectedto analysis, as those who are "only interestedin race"
and those who are "only interestedin gender"take their slices of our lives. (pp. 588-589)
29DuBois (1990) stated:
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this
Americanworld-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him
see himself throughthe revelationof the otherworld.It is a peculiarsensation,this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self throughthe eyes of others, of
measuringone's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contemptand pity.
One ever feels his two-ness-an American,a Negro; two souls, two thoughts,two unrec-
onciled strivings;two warringideals in one darkbody, whose dogged strengthalone keeps
it from being torn asunder.(pp. 8-9)
For additionalreading on DuBois and implicationsfor the law, see Barnes (1990). For a
discussion of DuBois's philosophy and African American education, see, for example,
Lee, Lomotey, and Shujaa(1990) and Shujaa(1993).
30 Delgado's argumentis groundedin reality. For example, an article in USA Today
naming the newspaper's academic all-star team described an African American student
who, despite mediocre schooling and an unstable family structure,was able to maintain
outstanding grades and admission to Stanford (della Cava, 1996). The article casts the
young woman as a leader and role model for other studentsin similar social conditions.
However, a remarkby the student'scounselorwas confirmingof Delgado's argument.The
counselor stated, "Tonya has grown [italics added] in the last four years, moving from
being a black nationalistto being less ethnocentric"(p. 8E). It appearsthat, in the eyes of
the school counselor,Tonya's growthand role model statuswere predicatedon more than
overcoming her personalhurdlesand includedTonya's view of the world.
31 See Bell (1994) for a detailed description of the resistance he encountered when
attemptingto get a woman of color on the Harvardlaw faculty.The process describedcon-
firmsDelgado's NBA analogy.See Frierson(1990) andTate (1994) for similardiscussions
aboutthe academyand educationfaculty.
32Similarly,Gordon(1992) arguedthatbiographicalinformationaboutscholarsof color
helps to forge relationshipsbetween minorityscholarsacross the academy.
33 Crenshaw (1988) used the term New Right to reflect the significant changes in the
social and political fabric that have influenced the rhetoricand composition of tradition
political coalitions.
34 Recall thatDelgado (1987, 1988a) and Williams (1987) offered additionalreasonsthe
CLS critiquedoes not meet the needs of people of color. However,Delgado, Williams,and
Crenshaw(1988) remarkedthatCLS providedimportantinsightsinto civil rightsdiscourse.
35 This illustrationof structuralintersectionalityprovidedby Crenshaw(1993) is espe-
cially relevantto the way childrenof color arelabeled"atrisk."Often, school systems label
children of color "at risk" if they are the products of illiterate parents, poverty, and/or
homes where abuse is present.This label is often a signal to school systems to offer limited
interventionandthen abandonresponsibility,claiming the role of schools is to educateand
not mediate social "dysfunction"(see Jackson, 1993).
36 This point is consistent with Bell's (e.g., 1979, 1987, 1992) interest-convergence
argument.However, Crenshawprovides a unique frameworkfor understandingmultiple

intersectionsof a woman of color's reality.
37 The four movies were "Angel Heart,""Colors,""Yearof the Dragon,"and "Tales
from the Darkside."The video game and rapalbumwere "GeneralCuster'sRevenge"and
2 Live Crew's "Nastyas They WannaBe."
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In 1993 PresidentClintonnominatedProfessorLaniGuinierof the Universityof

I would like to thankMichael Apple (editor) and Gloria Ladson-Billings(editorialconsultant)for

Ladson-BillingsandTate(1995) assertedthat,despitethe salienceof racein U.S.

Conceptualinterventionin the educationalresearchliteratureis needed to facilitatea systemic exam-

To this end, one importantquestionfor scholarsinterestedin educationalequity

This chapteris structuredaroundthe exposition of varioussources (authorsof

Durkheim's (1965) analysis suggests that, for a theory to become acceptable,

The assumptionsof the inferiorityparadigmhave not been limited to discus-

Thetwentiethcenturydawnedon a worldsegregated intosocialclassesdefinedin termsof money,

Herrnsteinand Murray(1994) posited that low intelligence is at the root of

The power and dangerof the inferiorityparadigm,and paradigmsin general,is

Instead,the concepts and theories of the "accepted"paradigminfluence social

Carterand Goodwin's (1994) review of social scientific paradigmsrevealed

From Justice Harlan'sdissent to MartinLutherKing's desire that his children

be guided by logic associated with a color-blindphilosophy. For example, many

Many legal and political scholars of color question whetherthe philosophical

SupremeCourtwill have to handyour people theircivil rights"(as cited in Davis

After rebuildingHowardUniversity's Law school, Houstonresignedhis dean-

In broadestterms, scholars within the CLS movement have attemptedto ana-

According to Unger (1983), scholarshipwithin the CLS movement is distin-

Williams (1987) arguedthatfor most Whites, includingthe mostly White elite

A second purposeof Bell's scholarshiphas been to promotepolitical activism

After warningthe readerabout the difficulty of a protester'slife, Bell (1994)

ThemenwhodraftedtheConstitution, howevergiftedor rememberedas great,werepoliticians,not

In anotherchapter, "The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black Schoolchildren,"

A second argumentfound throughoutBell's scholarly writing is the interest-

As an example of the interest-convergenceprinciple,Bell (1987) offered:

Dudziak (1988) conducted a historical study designed to develop additional

carefully detailedthe internationalattentiongiven to U.S. racial discriminationin

Dudziak (1988) concluded that Bell's interest-convergencetheory character-

Bell's analysis of Bakke and his subsequentscholarshipprovide a full-scale

Criticalrace theoristsrecognize that the way public problemsare defined can

The importanceof examiningthe social constructionof race throughthe law is

Richard Delgado and Critical Race Theory

The CRT themes delineated by Delgado can be seen in his scholarship.

A significant portion of Delgado's scholarshipis devoted to explaining and

According to Delgado (1988a), most minorities,in contrastto Whites, live in a

The thirdreasonofferedby Delgado (1989) for incorporatingstoryinto CRT is

Several years later, Delgado (1995a) revisited the "ImperialScholar"debate.

According to Delgado (1995a), a second mechanism to minimize the critical

Delgado and Stefancic (1992) describeda second, relatedinsight from modern

One implicationof structuraldeterminismis that it limits how individualsand

Despite the criticism of Delgado's scholarly methods, the implicationsof his

Second, Delgado's (1995b) discussionof culturalnationalismis partof a larger

Banks's (1992) argumentis compelling, yet somewhatreductive.The change

This insight is timely given that scholarsinterestedin equity in educationhave

Kimberle Crenshaw and Critical Race Theory

However, Crenshaw(1988) arguedthat the neoconservativecritiquefailed to

According to Crenshaw(1988), the tension between the expansive and restric-

A belief in color blindnessand equalprocess, accordingto Crenshaw(1988), is

Third,accordingto Crenshaw(1988), the CLS critique,while exaggeratingthe

In conclusion,Crenshaw(1988) arguedthatthe task at handis to develop meth-

Crenshaw's (1993) argumentfor an intersectionalframeworkbuilds on her

Accordingto Crenshaw(1993), the termpolitical intersectionalityrefersto the

Political intersectionality, as it relates to issues affecting women of color,

Despite the potential of the intersectionalityframework,its postmodernroots

This warning is worth noting. However, it is Crenshaw'scareful attentionto

implemented.Interestingly,multiculturaleducationand some multiculturalper-