James Dewey Psicologia

The Influence of William James on John Dewey in Psychology
Author(s): Andrew J. Reck

Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 87-117
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320040
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AndrewJ. Reck
The Influenceof WilliamJames

on JohnDeweyin Psychology*
In the well-known intellectualautobiography, "From Absolutism to

Experimentalism" (1930), John Dewey expressed ". . . envy . . . [of]
those who can writetheirintellectual biography in a unifiedpattern,
woven out of a few distinctly discernible strandsof interestand in-
fluence."1 By contrasthe describedhis own philosophical careeras
"unstable,chameleon-like, yieldingone after another to many diverse
and incompatibleinfluences;struggling to assimilatesomething from
each and yet striving in
to carryit forward waya that is logicallycon-
sistentwithwhathas been learnedfromits predecessors" (AE, p. 22).
An exponentof a formof Hegelianidealismin his earlycareer,Dewey
has listedthefactorsthatled to his driftawayfromHegelianism, stress-
ing, above all, the influence of William James; an influence coming
"fromhis Psychologyratherthan fromthe essays,collectedin the
volume called Will to Believe, his Pluralistic Universe,or Pragmatism"
(AE, p. 23). This claimis reconfirmedin the biography
preparedby
s
Dewey' daughters: "WilliamJames'sPrinciples wasmuch
ofPsychology
of
thedirection Dewey'sphil-
the greatestsingleinfluencein changing
osophicalthinking."2
My aim in the presentpaperis to tracethe influenceof Jameson
Dewey, focussingin particular on the effectsof James'sPrinciplesof
Psychology. When James's work appeared,Deweywas alreadya dis-
tinguishedphilosopher-psychologist committed to an idealistprogram.
James'sworkdid not divertDewey fromhis program, but it altered
Dewey's philosophical foundations, and consequently redirected him
oncehis originalintentions had been exhaustedor abandoned.Because
of influence
attribution is entangledin difficulties
surrounding thevery
notionof "influence,"I willrestrictmyselfto consideration ofDewey's
88 AndrewJ. Reck
citations,quotations,and paraphrasesfromJames.
My paper traversesground covered in previousstudies,most notably
by Morton White3 and Neil Coughlan.4 To some extent, it may be
regardedas a minor revisionof the interpretativeemphasis of Morton
White'smonograph,The Originof Dewey 's Instrumentalism.Publishing
in 1943, Whitecould reasonablyassume that his readerswere honed in,
or at least adequately informedabout, James's thought to ascertain
for themselvesthe lines of James's influence. No such assumptioncan
be made today. Whiterecoveredthe Hegelianoriginsof Dewey's thought,
and so impressivehas White's own influenceon Dewey studies been,
that too often Dewey's mature positions are mislabelled as neo-Hegel-
ian. Undoubtedly,Whitedeservescreditfor establishingthe continuity
between Dewey's idealism and his later experimentalism. As White
reported, "They [Dewey's absolutism and experimentalism]share, as
we have emphasized frequently,activism,organicism,and opposition to
formalismand dualism" (White,p. 111). I wish instead to stressthe
discontinuitybetween Dewey's early idealism and his laterexperimental
naturalismby underscoringthe impact of James's Principles of Psy-
chologyon his thought.
My study is restrictedboth in termsof subject-matterand in terms
of time frame. I will probe the influenceprimarilyin psychology,al-
though intrusionsinto ethics and logic will be unavoidable. In regard
to time frameI will include Dewey's contributionsto psychologyin the
1880's and terminatewith the publicationof Studies in Logical Theory
in 1903. James's influenceon Dewey properlybeginswith the publica-
tion of The Principlesof Psychologyin 1890. Examination of Dewey's
pre-1890 writingswill serve to illuminatethe kind of idealism he es-
poused. Terminationwiththe 1903 publicationsis justifiedby consider-
tion of the fact that these publications unambiguouslysignalize the
emergenceof Dewey as the leader of a new movementin pragmatismand
instrumentalism. The intervalbetween 1890 and 1903 is the period
in which Dewey's study of James's psychology,and James's influence
on Dewey were most intense. Indeed, it is a unique episode in intel-
lectual history,for it exhibitsclearlythe influenceof a singlebook on
an establishedthinker.
The Influenceof WilliamJames on JohnDewey 89
II
At Johns Hopkins, the neo-HegelianGeorge SylvesterMorrisand the

psychologistG. Stanley Hall led the young John Dewey in diverging
directions,the one toward systematicspeculativephilosophy and the
other toward experimentalpsychology. The intellectual upshot was
astonishing. Caught in the cross-firebetween his idealist allies who
sought to dissociate philosophy frompsychologyand the experimental
psychologistswho aimed to reduce philosophy to psychology,Dewey
undertookto synthesizeboth sides by confirming philosophicalidealism
within the new psychologyitself. While on both sides of the Atlantic
philosophers and psychologistswere engaged in the task of separating
psychologyfromphilosophy,relegatingthe questions of metaphysicsto
the latter,subject to dismissalfromscience, and assigningto the former
the restrictedrole of an experimental science, Dewey, by contrast,
moved in the opposite direction:he united psychologyand philosophy.
In the article,"The New Psychology" (1884), Dewey hailed physiology
for furnishingthe experimentalmethods by which to investigatethe
psychical life. Physiology is to psychology,he asserted, "what the
microscopeis to biology, or analyses to chemistry."5 Of course psy-
chology would continue to study the same subject-matteras in the
past-consciousness, or the psychical life. But nourished by social
studiesin additionto physiology,psychologywould demonstrate,Dewey
declared, "the unity and solidarityof psychical life" (EW, I, p. 60).
Although this 1884 article weds Dewey*s Hegelian organicismwith his
growingconcern for the biological organism,the idealism remainspara-
mount.
Two articles Dewey published in Mind in 1886 make palpable the
primacyof idealism.
In the firstarticle, "The Psychological Standpoint" (1886), Dewey
definedthis standpoint"as it has developeditself"purelyas the affirma-
tion that "all that is, is forconsciousnessor knowledge" (EW, I, p. 130).
From the psychological standpoint everythingis determined to be
"as it is found within conscious experience" (EW, I, p. 142). Dewey
praised the British philosophers for having followed the method of
psychologyin philosophy,for havingadopted "the psychologicalstand-
90 Andrew
J. Reck
point" in theirinvestigations; but he faultedthemforadhering to a

doctrineof finite,relative,temporalconsciousnessconditionedby
something outsideconsciousness.Germanidealism,he argued,offered
the remedyfor the defectsin Britishphilosophy. "The businessof
the psychologist is to give a geneticaccountof the variouselements
within. . . consciousness, and therebyfixtheirplace,determine their
validity,and at the same time show definitelywhat the real and eternal
natureof thisconsciousness is" (EW,I, p. 130). Inspecting conscious-
ness as it existsin theindividual discovers thatit is in
always a process
of becoming,and that,furthermore, it is consciousof itself,or self-
conscious. As self-conscious, it is universalconsciousness.Dewey
statedhis idealisticdoctrinedogmatically: "The individualconscious-
nessis but therealization of theuniversal consciousness through itself"
(EW,I, p. 140). Thuspsychology, whenit studiesindividual conscious-
ness,opens the way to studyuniversalconsciousness - the Absolute
itself.
The second article,"Psychologyas PhilosophicMethod" (1886),
amplifiesDewey's marriageof philosophyand psychology.Whereas
philosophyis the "science" of "an absoluteself-consciousness," psy-
chology is the science of the "manifestation" of this absolute self-
consciousness "in the knowingand actingof individualmen" (EW, I,
p. 156). Thus Dewey insistedthat"Psychology, and not Logic,is the
methodof Philosophy"(EW, I, p. 149). Since the absoluteself-con-
siousness, thesubject-matter of philosophy, manifests itselfin individual
consciousness, Dewey asked rhetorically, "what else can philosophy
in its fullnessbe but psychology, and psychology but philosophy?"
(EW,I,p. 157).
Hence it is clearthatin the 1880's Deweywas a committed absolute
idealistseekingto save the individualand theprocesswithina holistic
metaphysics, and endeavoring to do so my meansof psychology.For
himphilosophy was the scienceof thewhole,conceivedas an internally
relatedsystemwhosepartsfellwithinthe provincesof thespecialsci-
ences,and psychology, thougha specialscience,was privileged sinceit
studiesthat part of the whole,the individualconsciousness, through
whichand in whichabsolute,universal consciousness is realized. By
promoting psychology, Dewey demotedlogic,esteemedby Hegeland
TheInfluence JamesonJohnDewey 91
of William
themajority ofhisepigoneto offerexclusiveaccessto theAbsolute.Ac-

cording Dewey,logicis too formalandabstract
to to serve.It freezesthe
dynamics of the processesthrough which individualconsciousness
realizesthe universe.It loses the concretecontentsof experience and
swallowsup the individualin a relentlessdialectic. Hence forDewey
in the 1880's psychology,notlogic,was theproperwayofphilosophy.
Ill
Dewey's textbookin Psychologywas firstprintedin 1886. It was

designedto integratetraditionalpsychology, represented by the text-
books of Noah Porterand JohnBascom,and the New Psychology of
the Germanuniversities which
and laboratories, was discreditingthe
former and ushering in a neweraofexperimentalism. "Withthewisdom
of hindsight,we can now say thatDeweywas movingout of oneworld
into the other" (Coughlan,p. 66). The 1886 Psychologycontains,
in HerbertSchneider'sphrase,"dynamicidealismand psychological
ethics" (EW,II, p. xxiii).
Deweydefinedpsychology as the"Scienceof theFactsorPhenomena
of the II,
Self' (EW, p. 7). The fundamentalfactoftheselfis conscious-
ness. Whereasa stickor a stoneexistsand undergoes changesand has,
in a neo-Leibnizian mode of expression, experiences,it is unawareof
thesefacts. Consequently, existingnot for itselfbut only forsome
consciousness,it has no self. On the otherhand,Deweyemphasized,
. . . thesoul not onlyis, and changes,but it knowsthatit is,

and whattheseexperiences are whichit passesthrough.It
existsfor itself.Thatis to say,itis a self.Whatdistinguishes
the factsof psychology fromthefactsof everyotherscience
is, accordingly, theyareconsciousfacts.(EW,II, pp. 7-8).
that
Dewey distinguished threeaspectsof consciousness:

knowledge, feel-
ing,and will. Althoughhis distinctions resemblethe partitionof the
soul into faculties,Dewey's Psychologyis not facultative;it is too
dynamic and to
unitary posit mental from
agenciesseparate each other
and actingeach in its own segmented sphere.RatherDewey considered
92 AndrewJ. Reck
cognition,feeling,and will to be integralfunctionsof each self,"giving

knowledge or information" in its cognitive operation, "existing in
certainsubjectivestates" that have eithera pleasurable or painfulaffect
in its emotional operation, and "exertingitself for the attainmentof
some end" in its volitional operation (EW, II, p. 18). The tripartite
functionsof the self,moreoever,are unifiedin the will.
Anticipatinglater attempts to formulatethe dynamic structureof
cognition that were to culminate in the pattern of inquiry presented
in Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (1938), Dewey in the 1886 Psychology
analyzed knowledge in regardto elements,processes, and stages. The
elements of knowledge consist of sensations; the processes comprise
apperception,inclusive of association, dissociation,and retention;and
the stages are perception,memory,imagination,thinking,and intuition.
Idealism is regnant. Dewey held that every element of cognitive
consciousness - e. g., the sensations - is transformedby conceptual
interpretationand that both the nature and the test of truthreside
in coherence. He portrayedthe finiteself as a developingmomentin
the life of an absolute, objective individualwho is the finiteselPs object
and end, the ultimaterealizationof its being.
Superior to the stage of thinking,on Dewey's 1886 account, is intui-
tion. But the conception of intuitionis idiosyncratic;intuitionis not
immediate,but like every other cognitivestage it is mediated,suffused
with cognitiveinterpretations, enrichedwith feelings,an arrestingphase
in the profoundlyactive life of the self. The climacticstage of know-
ledge, nevertheless,qualifies as intuition, because, though mediated,
its object is "self-related"- that is, the knowerknows the whole and
so he knows himselfas part of the whole. It grasps"every fact ... as
dependent upon and necessitatedby its relations to every fact" (EW,
II, p. 208). Seeing everyfact as mirroringthe whole in which it dwells
as a necessarilyrelated part, intuitionalso recognizes the self as "the
bond of unity"in all our knowledge.
For Dewey in 1886 the intuitionof God is the beginningand the end
of all knowledge. As he insisted,"Every concrete act of knowledgein-
volves an intuitionof God" (EW, II, p. 212). In the beginning,even
the simplestformof knowledgepresentedin a primalintuitioncontains
implicitlyrelations constitutiveof the whole systemof truth. Explicat-
ing these relationsis the task of science and philosophy,a task fulfilled
only in an ultimateintuitionthatrecognizes
. . . complete truth,the perfectunificationof intelligence. . .

It is the intuition of God as perfectlyrealized intelligence
that forms the cognitiveside of the religiousconsciousness.
It is the most concreteand developed formof knowledge. . .
(EW, III, p. 212).
Of feelingDewey distinguishedand examined the fundamentaltypes:

sensuous, formal,qualitative,intellectual,aesthetic,and personal. "Feel-
ing," to reiterate,does not denote a special class of psychicalfactsbut
rather"one side of all mental phenomena" - namely,its "internalas-
pect" (EW, II, p. 215). It pertainsto the self so far as its experienceis
unique and unsharable. Dewey's "psychological ethics" comes to the
forefront in his treatmentof personalfeelings.
Dewey's treatmentof will continues the presentationof his "psy-
chologicalethics." Willunitesknowledgeand feeling.
Rooted in the sensuousimpulses,whichendow it withcontent,the will
develops into volition. Dewey defined volition as "regulated,harmon-
ized impulse . . . consciouslydirectedtowards the attainmentof a recog-
nized end which is felt as desirable" (EW, II, p. 309). Physicalcontrol,
prudentialcontrol, and moral control are stagesin the developmentof
volition. They also indicate phases in the realizationof the self,the end
of moral action in the Hegelianized Aristotelianethics that Dewey bor-
rowed fromhis fellowidealists,foremostamongwhom was T. H. Green.
This ethicsin Dewey's formulationis emphaticallyvoluntaristic.
While Dewey's entire programin psychologyin the 1880's is idealist
in tenor and thereforerejects traditionaldualisms, nonethelessa kind
of dualism surfacesbetween the actual selfand the ideal self,the former
particularand subjective and the latter universaland objective. It is
incumbentupon will to overcome the dualism. Knowledge resolvesthe
fragmentariness of the part by locatingit in the whole. The will,on the
other hand, operates by both movingthe finiteself toward its realiza-
tion and originatingthe ideals toward which it moves and in which its
self-realizationconsists. As Dewey said, "moral will is the conscious
94 AndrewJ.Reck
realizationby manthattherealand theidealoughtto be one,and the

resultingattemptto makethemone in specific actsandin theformation
will. Dewey
of character"(EW,II, p. 362). Moralwillleadsto religious
continued,"Religious will is realization
conscious thatthey(the ideal
and thereal) are one becausemanis a self-determiningpower. It is the
realizationof freedom through of theunionof finiteand
therealization
theInfinitePersonality"(EW,II, pp. 362-63).
IV
I have indulgedin this expositionof Dewey's earlypsychological

writings in orderto depictthecharacter of his thinking priortoJames's
influenceand, by suggesting a comparisonof hisbetterknownmature
philosophy withhis idealism,to conveya senseof the radicalshiftin
histhinking thattranspired in the 1890's as a consequenceof his study
ofJames'sPrinciples ofPsychology.While a depositof Hegelianideal-
ism maybe ingredient in Dewey'smaturephilosophy, it is sublated in
a systemof thoughtrestingon extraordinarily un-Hegelian and anti-
Hegelianfoundations.
Dull, dry,and unscientific as we may findDewey'sPsychologyon
it
reading today, it did exciteitscontemporary readers(Coughlan, p. 66).
Its popularity is attestedby the factthat,althoughthetextwas never
revisedafter1891, it wentthrough 26 printings to remainin printuntil
1930,longafterDeweyhimself haddiscarded itsteachings.
Nonetheless, Dewey's criticswere numerous,manyadhering to the
new psychology whichDeweyhimself espoused. The first shot against
Dewey'spsychology targeted notthetextbookbutthetwo1886 articles
thatappearedin Mind;it was firedby theBritish philosopher-psycholo-
gist, Shadworth Hodgson, in an article
entitled "IllusoryPsychology."6
And Dewey'sold teacher,G. StanleyHall,published a "scathing review"
ofthebook.7
Dewey faredlittlebetterin the handsof the gentlerWilliam James,
whomhe had citedoften. Dewey mentioned James's articles on the
associationof ideas (EW,II, p. 135),**on theperception of space (EW,
II, p. 153),9 on emotion(EW, II, p. 255),10 and on thesentiment of
11 Yet none of thesecitations,
rationality(EW, II, p. 266). excepting
of William
perhapson the associationof ideas,revealsthatJames'stheorieshad

penetratedthe speculativeidealismthat enshroudedDewey's mind;
theyare, for the most part,references in listsof suggestedreadings.
As forJames'sreactionsto Dewey'sPsychology, theyare recordedin
two personallettershe wrote. In thefirst,
an 1886 letterto theBritish
CroomRobertson,
psychologist, he confided:
Deweyis outwitha psychology whichI havejustreceivedand

but one-halfread. I feltquite'enthused'at thefirstglance,
hopingforsomething reallyfresh;but amsorelydisappointed
whenI come to read. It's no use trying to mediatebetween
the bare miraculousself and the concreteparticulars of in-
dividualmentallives;and all thatDeweyeffects by so doingis
to takeall theedgeanddefiniteness awayfromtheparticulars
whenit fallsto theirturnto be treated.12
In the secondletter,writtenin 1887 to introduce his student,George

Santayana,to ShadworthHodgson,Jamestossedout a passingremark:
"Also yourpaperon poor Dewey,whichI approvein the main. . ."
(Perry,I, p. 641).
PoorDewey,indeed! In 1890 whenJames'sPrinciples ofPsychology
was published, Deweywas "so delighted" withit thathe "was teaching
it to his students a baremonthor two afterhe receivedit" (Coughlan,
p. 162).
The publicationof James'sPrinciplesofPsychology markeda water-

shedinAmerican psychology.
Jamespioneeredscientific psychologyin America. The Prefaceto
thePrinciplesof Psychology maybe readas a charterfortheestablish-
mentof psychology as a natural(or experimental)science, although
in the Epilogueto Psychology, BrieferCourse (1892) Jamesadmitted
that,inasmuch as psychology as a naturalscienceled to metaphysical
questionsit could not answer,such as therelationof consciousness
to
the brainand the relationof statesof mindto its objects,thescience
96 AndrewJ. Reck
of psychologywas a very fragileaffairrestingupon unprovenassump-

tions, and that psychologywas as yet "no science,it is only the hope
of a science."14 Still The Principlesof Psychology incorporatedthe
data of experimentalists,presented and criticized their theories, and
articulateda theory of mind grounded in biology as revolutionizedby
Darwinian evolution. To formulatehis protofunctionalisttheory of
mind as a fighterfor ends, James masteredthe voluminousliteraturein
the field.
In the Principles of Psychology James cited Dewey four times. In
the Preface (PP, I, p. 7), he mentioned Dewey's Psychology,among
others, as a useful bibliographicalsource for recent references. On
the relation between psychologyand generalphilosophy(PP, I, p. 184
nl), James cited, among articles by others,Dewey's article,"The Psy-
chological Standpoint." When discussinguniversals,James, while de-
scribing Dewey as a "modern and independent" author, quoted the
Psychology to illustrate traditionalistdoctrine of abstraction which
his own theorydiscards(PP, I, p. 447 nil). When discussingsensation,
James again quoted Dewey to illustratea theory differentfrom his
own (PP, II, p. 654 n4). Interestinglythe statementby Dewey on
sensations which James quoted was deleted by Dewey himself from
his 1891 edition of thePsychology.
Despite its avant garde theory of mind based on physiologyand bi-
ology and its appreciation of experimentationas a proper method
in the study of mind, James's Principles of Psychology clung to the
dualisms of traditional thought, assuming both the psychophysical
dualism of consciousness and brain and the epistemologie al dualism
of mental states and their objects.15 It also contains an idealist meta-
physics.16 For all that is backward looking in The Principlesof Psy-
chology, it broke new groundin the theoryof cognition. It anticipated
pragmatismby overhaulingthe extant views on conception,abstraction,
belief,reasoning,necessarytruths,17and placing thoughtsquarelywith-
in life, flowingwith emotions and volitionsas fundamentaland
perhaps
more fundamentalthancognition.
Dewey's response was immediate and favorable. He has recorded
his praise of The Principlesof Psychologymany times. On the occasion
of the centenary of James's birth celebrated at the New School for
TheInfluenceof William
JamesonJohnDewey 97
Social Researchin New YorkCity,he extolledit as "thegreatest

among
the greatworksof WilliamJames."18Dewey's promotional paragraph
forthePrinciplespublishedin James'sTalks to Teachers(1900) reads
as follows:
A remarkable unionof widelearning, oftreatment,

originality
and, above all, of never-failing
suggestions.To me the best
treatment of thewholematterof advancedpsychology in ex-
istence. It does moreto putpsychology in scientific
position,
bothas to thestatement ofestablishedresultsandas stimulat-
ing to further problems,and theirtreatment,thananyother
bookofwhichI know.19
Dewey's most illuminating

statementon James'sPrinciplesof Psy-
chology is to be foundin his intellectual "FromAb-
autobiography,
solutismto Experimentalism."20 Dewey distinguished he called
what
. . . twounreconciled strainsin thePsychology.One is found

in theadoptionof thesubjective tenorof priorpsychological
tradition;evenwhenthe specialtenetsof thattraditionare
radicallycriticized,an underlying subjectivismis retained,
at leastin vocabulary. . . The otherstrainis objective,having
itsrootsin a returnto theearlierbiologicalconception ofthe
psyche, but a return possessed of a new force and valuedue
to the immenseprogressmade by biologysincethe timeof
Aristotle.(AE, p. 24).
Although Deweyconcededthatthesubjective strainyielded,inJames's

employment of the method,
introspective the newidea of "thestreamof
consciousness," and that this discoverymarked an advanceupon the
traditionaltheory,whichviewed consciousnessas composedof dis-
creteelementary psychicalstates- atomisticsensationsand ideas,it
stillfellon the sideof "a realmof consciousnessset offby itself"(AE,
p. 24). So it was the objectivestrainthatcaughtDewey's attention.
Jamesapproachedpsychology from biology, awareofthedifference
and
between"the categories of thelivingand themechanical," he reshaped
98 AndrewJ. Reck
the theoryof thinking in accordwiththe primacyof biologicalcate-

gories. James,moreover,construed"life in termsof life in action.
Thispoint... is fundamental whentheroleofpsychology in philosophy
is underconsideration" (AE, p. 24). WhenJamesappliedhis biological
criterionof mind "as the pursuanceof futureendsand thechoiceof
meansfortheirattainment" (PP,I, p. 21), he exposedtheroleofinterest
in thought,and in individual chapters,recastourwaysofunderstanding
attention,discrimination and comparison(analysisand abstraction),
conception,and reasoning. As Dewey observed(DP, p. 29), James
presentedconceptionas "a ideologicalinstrument."And he quoted
Jamesfromthe chapteron reasoning:"the onlymeaningof essenceis
and . . . classification
teleological, andconception arepurelyideological
weaponsof the mind" (PP, II, p. 961). Hence it was the objective,
biologicalstrainin James'sPrinciples ofPsychology thatworkeditsway,
as Deweyconfessed, "moreand moreintoall myideasand . . . [acted]
as a fermentto transform old beliefs"(AE, p. 24).
VI
Of Dewey's revisions of hisPsychology in 1889 and 1891 it has been

said thatthey"werein each instanceawayfromphilosophical idealism
and towardscientific statement of the processesof mind"(Coughlan,
p. 134). Althoughthe 1891 revisions presentedDeweywithhisearliest
opportunity to reflect the influence of James,studyof theserevisions
*
yieldslittlefruiton thetopic. Deweydeletedsomepassagesexpound-
ing idealisticmetaphysics, and introduced experimental materials,but
he surprisingly backtrackedon methods,and the idealisticemphasis
persistsandprevailsin the1891 edition.
Sensation,definedin thefirsteditionas "theelementary consciousness
which arises fromthe reactionof the soul upon a nervousimpulse
conductedto the brainfromsome sensorynerve-ending by a physical
stimulus" (EW,II, p. lxi), is defined in thethird edition as "anypsychical
conditionwhosesole characteristic antecedent is a stimulation of some
peripheralnervestructure" (EW, II, p. 29). And in the thirdedition
Dewey condemnedas "erroneoustheory"thedoctrinethatsensations
are "independentseparatementalstates" (EW, II, p. 34), although
JamesonJohnDewey 99
he subscribedto thisdoctrinein the firstedition,depictingsensation

as "an elementary consciousness"on analogywith the unanalyzable
units,the atomsand moleculesof chemistry and physics(EW, II, pp.
lxi-lxii). In place of the first edition doctrine of atomicsensations,
Deweypresented in the third edition a sensation continuum theory, and
he arguedin its behalfwithreasonsfrombrainphysiology, evolution,
the experimental data of phonismand photism,and psychological anal-
ysis, reasons discerniblein and perhaps taken from James's Principles
ofPsychology.Accordingto thethirdeditiontheoryof thesensation
continuum, "Thereis a certainoriginalcontinuoussubstratum of sensa-
tion out of whichthe variousapparently distinctsensationshavebeen
slowly differentiated" (EW, II, p. 35). Thus Dewey renderedprosaic
and technical James'simage of "the great,blooming buzzing confusion"
thatis theinfant's sensation(PP,I, p. 462).
The discussionof the feelingof effortor muscularsensationdiffers
in languageand in argument in the thirdeditionfromthe first(EW,
II, pp. 53-55 and pp. lxx-lxxii). In the firsteditionDewey distin-
guishedthreetheories:(1) the innervation theory,accordingto which
themuscularsensationis a sensationof a current of nerveenergygoing
out of the brainto the musclesin question,(2) the theorythatmus-
cularsensations are feelings of specificsensorynervesthatneverend in
themusclesthemselves, and (3) thetheorythatmuscularsensations are
actuallyproducedby the tension, the push and pull of the muscles
againstthe skin,ligatures, joints,and so forth.He preferred thethird
listedtheory.In thethirdeditionDeweypresented only two theories:
(1) the innervation theoryand (2) the afferent theory. Dewey cited
Jamesand used his terminology, and likeJameshe preferred the af-
ferenttheory.It is similarto thetheoryhe upheldin thefirstedition,
but its formulation is morephysicalistic, as whenDewey,paraphrasing
James, wrote "the consciousness of effort is reallya consciousness
of thepushand pull of themuscles..." (EW,II, p. 54). I willreturn
to thefeeling ofeffort inJamesandDeweylater.
In the treatment of associationDewey followedJamesmoreclosely
in the thirdeditionin regardto languageand doctrine(EW, II, pp.
85ff). He evencitedJames'sexampleof thetasteof lemonade(PP, I,
p. 160 nl3) to illustrate the principleof the fusionor integration of
100 AndrewJ. Reck
various sensationsinto a new experientialwhole, although,to be pre-

cise, James by the example seems to have meant not that thereare two
or more tastes combined to produce the taste of lemonade but that
thereis the singularlemonade taste.
The role of interestin the processes of knowledge,while recognized
in the firstedition, where already James's article on association was
cited, receivedgreateremphasisin the thirdedition. Dewey even defined
interestin termsof feeling.
While Dewey adhered to the doctrine of knowledge as self-develop-
ment in all editionsof thePsychology,the profusemetaphysicalidealism
that opens Chapter 5 on perception in the firstedition is dropped out
in the thirdedition (EW, II, p. 137 and pp. lxxvii-lxxviii).Most con-
spicuously,the theoryof conception is overhauledin the thirdedition,
bringingit closer to James's teleological account. In the firstedition
Dewey had defined conception as "the simplestact of thinking;it is
the apprehensionof the universal,as perceptionis the apprehensionof
the particular. We perceive this man; we conceive man1' (EW, II, p.
lxxx). In the third edition Dewey, followingJames,distinguishedper-
cept fromconcept not in termsof theirexistence as mentalstates(they
are both images); ratherpercept and concept are distinguishedby refer-
ence to theirdifferentfunctions. It is noteworthythat Dewey's theory
of conception in the third edition, influencedby James,manifestlyin
the suggestedsolution of the realist-nominalist
controversy,anticipates
his later alism.
instrument In 1891 Dewey wrote:
A concept is an image having the function of symbolizing

some law or principle in accordance with which a thing or
numberof thingsmay be constructed. The numberof things
constructedon the basis of thissingleprincipleis a class,kind,
or genus . . . The concept is the power, capacity,or function
of the image or train of images to stand for some mode of
mental action, and it is the mode of action which is general.
(EW, II, p. 179).
The third edition evinces one major instance of backsliding,surpris-

ingly on the matter of methods, and induced perhaps by James's in-
fluence. In the firstedition Dewey emphaticallydeclared that "intro-
The Influence of WilliamJameson JohnDewey 101
spection can never become scientificobservation,since the objects of

introspection,unlike those of observationin the case of physicalphe-
nomena, are changed in beingobserved" (EW, II, pp. lxi-lx). In the third
edition, despite the concession that there are defects in introspection,
these defectsare alleged to pertainalso to physical observation,so that
introspectionregains a place in scientificinvestigations.In this regard
Dewey recapitulatedJames's position on introspectionin the Principles
of Psychology(PP, I, pp. 185-191). Like James,Dewey subscribedto the
experimentalmethod with its orientationtoward physiology,and also
to the comparativemethod. A fourth method proposed by Dewey
but lacking in James is called "the objective method." The "objective
method" studies "the objective manifestationsof mind . . . Such ob-
jective manifestationsof mind are, in the realm of intelligence,pheno-
mena like language and science; in that of will, social and political
institutions;in that of feeling,art; in that of the whole self,religion"
(EW, II, p. 15). As early as 1886 Dewey appreciated the central im-
portanceof social studiesforpsychology.
VII
I will now attempt to trace James's influenceon Dewey in the writ-

ings Dewey published that led up to Studies in Logical Theory. I will
-
begin at the heart of the matter the idealist notion of the universal
consciousness or mind, which Dewey espoused in 1886 and which
Jameshad ridiculedin his letterto Croom Robertson.
Dewey's paper, "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive" (1892), signals
his departurefrom the idealist doctrine of the universalconsciousness
or mind. It was followed by the article, "Self-Realization as a Moral
Ideal" (1893). Here Dewey probed the concept of the individualor
finite self. In the idealist ethics of self-realization,which Green had
expounded and to which Dewey had subscribed, the finite self had
always as its ideal the universalmind which it was meant to realize in
its own fragmentary existenceas well as it could. Now Dewey re-exam-
ined the concept of the finiteself and re-interpreted it in James'sem-
piricalterms.
From James Dewey borrowed the idea that capacity is empiricaland
functionalratherthan metaphysical. Citingthe already quoted passage
from James on the ideological character of essence (PP, II, p. 961
102 AndrewJ.Reck
in EW,IV, p. 47), Deweyappliedthispracticalcriterion to theconcept

of our own activity;he pointedout thatwe deemthepartof ouractiv-
ity whichinterests us to be the activityand thatwe assignthe other
partsof our activityto capacity. Thus the self'scapacities,though
existent,mayeludepresentinterests and be excludedfromouractivity
as we experienceor understand it. However,in factactivityembraces
capacityempirically. For example, the artisticcapacity a child
of
in
consists his having now "a certain and plastic-
quickness,vividness,
ityof vision,a certaindeftnessof hand,and a certainmotorcoordina-
tionby whichhis handis stimulated to workin harmony withhiseye"
(EW, IV, p. 46). In a fundamental sense,then,thiscapacityis already
"action itself,"and it determines the end appropriate forthe child's
conduct.As Deweysummedup:
To realizecapacitydoes notmean,therefore, to act so as to

fillup some presupposedideal self. It meansto act at the
heightof action,to realizeitsfullmeaning.The childrealizes
his artisticcapacitywheneverhe acts withthecompleteness
ofhisexisting powers.(EW,IV, p. 49).
Dewey's breakwithGreen,whosetheoryhe labelled"abstractself-

realization,"was now complete. In place of Green'stheoryDewey
a conceptionhe reachedunderthe
proposedempiricalself-realization,
influence of James. The implicationof thisnewpositionforDewey's
developing moraltheorywas profound.Interpreting capacityin terms
of activities
thatcan be observedhereand now,and thatare associated
with goals achievedin past experience,Dewey soughtto formulate
the ends for conductby meansof the observation of actualhuman
behavior. He came to hold thatthe moralideal growsout of human
experienceand that the selfthatis realizedis no transcendent meta-
physicalentity,but ratherthe presentempiricalselfcontinuouswith
its past and futureexperience. Dewey'sidealismbecame,to use his
ownterm,experimental.
Dewey'spaper,"The Ego as Cause" (1894), advancedhisrevoltagainst
the metaphysical selfof idealismin favorof a Jamesianempiricalself,
anditinvadedunsuspecting territory.
Dewey wrote:
JamesonJohnDewey 103
Whenone mansaysto another, "You didthatand I shallhold

you responsible forit," he meansby his "you," not a meta-
physicalego, but a definiteindividual - JohnSmith. Every
step away fromthe concreteindividual, JohnSmith,with
his special aptitudes,habits,desires,ideas, and ignorances,
everystep towardsan ego in general,meansa weakening of
theconnection betweenthemanand theact,anda releaseof
themanfromresponsibility fortheact. (EW,IV, p. 94).
In a footnoteDeweycriticized Jamesforplacingthe existentselfout-

side the streamof experiencein orderto assurethatits will is free.
In anotherfootnoteDewey raisedagainstthe Jamesof 1890 an ob-
jectionhe was to iteratenearlya halfcenturylaterin hisarticle,"The
VanishingSubject in the Psychology of William James" (1940).22
In 1894 Deweysaid:
It is strangethatProfessor James,who recognizesso faras

knowledgeis concerned,the entireuselessnessof an ego
outsideand behind,who indeedhas giventhat theorythe
hardestknocks it has yet receivedfromthe psychological
whenhe
side . . . , shouldfeel boundto setup its correlate
comes to deal withwill. If the streamof thoughtcan run
itselfin one case, the streamof thoughtmay administer it-
selfin theother. Whyshouldhe denyto thetranscendental-
ist ego in knowinga powerwhichhe claimsforattention
in acting?Historically I thinkthe independentEgo in know-
ledge is a survivaland from
transference the action of an
entity of Will in choice. IV,
(EW, p. 95).
AnalyzingDewey's 1894 article,Gordon Allporthas surmised:"So

to the functional
is his conversion
wholehearted positionthatDewey
And reflecting
accusesJamesof faint-heartedness."23 on James'scriti-
cismof Dewey's1886 Psychologyin theabovequotedletterto Croom
MortonWhitehas commented
Robertson, on the ironyof thesituation:
"Deweywouldnowout-James James"(White, p. 107).
104 AndrewJ. Reck
VIII
Dewey has praisedJamesforrecognizingand teachingthat "experience

is an intimateunion of emotion and knowledge" (WJ,p. 57). Emotion
for Dewey, as for James before him, ranked high as a topic for psy-
chological investigationand philosophicalreflection. In 1894-95 Dewey
publisheda two-partessay, "The Theory of Emotion." This essay grew
out of Dewey's study of James's theory. In a footnote Dewey ampli-
fied:
In my Psychology, e.g., p. 19 and pp. 246-49 [EW II, pp.

21-22 and pp. 215-17], it is laid down, quite schematically,
that feelingis the internalizingof activityor will. There is
nothingnovel in the doctrine;in a way it goes back to Plato
and Aristotle. But what firstfixed my especial attention,
I believe, upon James's doctrine of emotion was that it fur-
nished this old idealistic conception of feeling, hitherto
blank and unmediated, with a medium of translationinto
the termsof concretephenomena. I mentionthis list of per-
sonal historysimply as an offsetto those writerswho have
found Mr. James's conception so tainted with materialism.
(EW, IV, p. 171).
James had proposed his theory of emotionsas an alternativeto Dar-

win's. Although Dewey, like James, was critical of Darwin's phrase
"the expressionof emotions" on the groundsthat it mistakenlyconnotes
their existence antecedent to their expression, he nonetheless under-
took to synthesize the theories of Darwin and James. From Darwin
he took the idea that during the course of evolution certain bodily
movements,at one time useful to animals, have been reduced to ten-
dencies to action - i.e., attitudes. When aroused, these tendencies
come into play, movingthe animal to realize its ends. Action ensues.
When, however,there is difficultyin adjustingthe activityto the end
of the action as anticipated by the animal, struggleand inhibitionre-
sult. The report of the struggleand inhibitionof these tendenciesto
consciousness is what James called "emotion," or more properly"emo-
tional seizure." Thus, to illustrateby a crude example intendedto ciar-
ify James's theory of emotions, we feel angrybecause we clench our

fists, so that our feeling of anger consists simply in the feelingof
these muscular sensations and associated organicchanges. On Dewey's
account James is correctabout the feelingof anger; it does not precede
the organicchanges in the organismbut ratherreportsthem. But Dewey
went beyond James. Anger differsfrom the feelingof anger; it is the
tendencyto act rooted in the organism. The feeling,occuringwhenthe
tendencyis blocked, is released when activityis resumed. Thus Dewey's
revisionof James's theory stressesthe functionof emotions as phases
in activity. Again he out-JamesedJames.
IX
Dewey's most famous single paper is "The Reflex Arc Concept"

(1896), reprintedin 1931 under the title "The Unit of Behavior."24
James's influence on this paper is incalculable, but its main features
may be brieflysketched.25
In 1881 in a remarkablearticle,"Reflex Action and Theism," James
employed the then latest contributionof physiologicalpsychologyto
make a case for theism. Equally remarkable,he stated the concept of
reflexaction in incipientlyfunctionalistlanguage.
The structuralunit of the nervous systemis in fact a triad,

neither of whose elements has any independent existence.
The impressionexists only for the sake of calling forththe
final act. All action is thus reaction upon the outer world;
and the middle stage of considerationor contemplationor
thinkingis only a place of transit,the bottom of a loop,
both whose ends have theirpoint of application in the outer
world.26
In the Principlesof Psychology(I, pp. 36-38) James illustratedreflex

action by means of the example of the child and the flame.The stimulus-
response mechanismthat James criticizedas well as the example of the
child and flame he borrowed from the Austriananatomist,Theodore
Meynert,and so he called the scheme "the Meynertscheme." James
focussed on the theory of brain physiology necessaryto explain the
106 AndrewJ.Reck
reflexaction; his discussionof these technicalmattersis irrelevant

to our presentinquiry.To returnto theexample,thestimulus is repre-
sentedby theflame,theresponseby thereaching and touching.After
beingburnedonce, however,the childsees the flame,remembers his
past experience,and blocks the responseof reachingand touching,
actingin someotherway. NowJameswasconcerned to showthe role
of thoughtin actionand also to delineatethephysiological mechanisms
thatoperatedin the cerebrum to liberatetheorganism fromthoughtless
automaticreflexes.At the sametimehe revealed,in his analysisofthe
example,the complexity of reflexaction,distinguishing a multiplicity
of phases in the act, the stimulus complicated by the requirement of a
dispositionon the part of the to
organism respond and the response
its possible occurrence in the lifeof an organism with
complicated by
memories, and so on. These considerations in James'streatment of
reflexaction,introducing the functionality of thoughtin actionand
undermining the hard and fast separation stimulusand response,
of
furnishthebackground forDewey's1896 article.
The historyof the development of Dewey'sconceptof reflexaction
beginswithhis treatment of the topicin the 1886 Psychology.There
reflexaction is discussedmerelyin termsof such automaticreflexes
as the winkingof an eye in brightlight. However,in the 1891 edition
Dewey,in the sectionon reflexaction(EW, II, p. 300), used thechild
and the flameexamplewhichJameshad employed.Fromthenon the
storybecomesanotherepisodein thehistory ofhowDeweyout-Jamesed
James.
A decade afterthe publicationof James'sstriking articleon reflex
action and theismDewey was to be similarly excitedabout the pos-
of
sibility what he called"the type action"formetaphysical speculation.
This excitementis recordedin the syllabus prepared his intro-
he for
ductorycoursein philosophyat the University of Michigan. In this
syllabushe elucidated"the type action of the individualorganism"
as "the processinvolvedin everycompleteact." He declared:"Such
an activityas findsexpressionthenin an entirereflexarc is a whole,
a concrete,an individual.It is theSelfin moreorlessdevelopedform"
(EW,III, p. 212). Deweysaw in thestructure of typeaction(thereflex
arc) "the whole (universe)in concentrated form,"and he soughtto
readfromit "themainphilosophic ideas"(EW,III, p. 212).
WhatDeweywas doingin 1892 parallelsJames's1881 use of reflex

action. Similarly,Dewey's 1896 critiqueof the reflexarc concept
reflectsJames'streatment in 1890. CitingJamesas his source,Dewey
evenused the child-flame example,althoughJames'suse is superior to
Dewey's since it is illustratedby meansof a visualdiagram.Dewey
deemed the reflexarc conceptto be defectivebecause it brokeup
the continuityof experiencewith the rigidseparationof stimulus
and response,and further becauseeach termin theconcepthad a com-
plexityinvolving the of the termfromwhichit was
characteristics
-
distinguished e.g., the stimulation itselfa response,theresponse
was
a furtherstimulation, and so on. Whereas Jameswas concerned to cor-
relatethephasesof reflexactionwithphysiological processesandevents
in the body,particularly in thebrain,Deweyemphasized the coordina-
tion of observable bodily movements, the
including motions of the
organsor the organism. Both, however,pointedtowarda fluidact
in whichthedistinction betweenstimulusand responseis not rigid,but
flexible. As a functionalist Dewey took more steps down the path
James had opened, and he clearedit more thoroughly than his pre-
decessorhaddone.
Two sentencessumup the positiveconclusionsof "The ReflexArc
Concept":
It is the coordination[of organicactivities]whichunifies

thatwhichthe reflexarc conceptgivesus onlyin disjointed
fragments.It is the circuit[of action] withinwhichfall
distinctionsof stimulusand responseas functionalphases
of itsownmediation or completion.(EW,V, p. 109).
As GordonAllporthas reported,in lateryearsDewey abandonedthe

conceptof the circuitof actionforthe conceptof habitas the basic
unitof behavior,and thisstep beyondJamesnecessitated thatDewey
purge habit of the that
rigidity Jameshad attributedto it (Allport,
p. 270).
108 AndrewJ.Reck
Dewey's article,"The Psychologyof Effort"(1897), is interesting

becauseof its intrinsic content,becauseof the influence of Jamesthat
it reveals,but also becauseit showshow Deweyworkedand reworked
the same materialsuntilhe had an intellectual productthatsatisfied
him. In thisarticlehe treatsa topic he firstdealtwithin the 1886
Psychology, and, influencedby James,he had reworkedin the 1891
edition,as I have alreadyremarked.Whereasin 1891 he had concen-
tratedon James'safferent theory,forwhichhe avoweda preference,
in 1897 he describedJames'stheoryas a mixedone. For whileJames
proposedtheafferent theoryto explainphysicalactionandheldthatfor
suchactionas lifting a stone"thesenseofeffort is ... dueto theorganic
reverberations of the act itself,the 'muscular,'visceral,and breathing
sensations"(EW,V, p. 152), he embraced, inregardto moralactionsuch
as resisting temptation, a spiritualist
theory.According to thespiritua-
ist theory,effortin moralactionis psychical;it springs froman act of
will or of attentionthatoccursoutsidethe streamof experience.In a
footnoteDewey ponderedJames'sinconsistency in mixinghistheories
ofthesenseof effort (EW,V, p. 152).
AgainstJames'svacillation,stemming perhapsfromthe dualismshe
had presupposedin The Principlesof Psychology , Dewey endeavored,
bymeansof introspection, to support
. . . the positionthat the sense of effort(as distinguished

fromthefactor category)is sensationallymediated;andthen
to pointout thatifthisis admitted, therealproblemof the
psychology of effortis onlystated,not solved;thisproblem
being to find the sensationaldifferentiabetweenthe cases
in whichthereis, and thosein whichthereis nota senseof
effort.(EW,V, p. 152).
Analyzing particular to answera questionor trying

casessuchas trying
to recalllinesof a poem,Dewey introspectivelyfoundthatthe sense
of tensionand release,so that
of effortconsistsin muscularsensations
appeal to some kind of spiritualagencyis unnecessary.Whatcauses
The Influenceof WilliamJameson JohnDewey 109
the need for effortand produces the sense thereof,accordingto Dewey,

is the contrastand even the conflictbetween means and ends in action.
In Dewey's words,
. . . the sense of effortis the awarenessof this conflict. The

sensational characterof this experience,which has been such
a stumblingblock to some, means that this tension of ad-
justment is not merely ideal, but is actual (i.e., practical);
it is one which goes on in a strugglefor existence. Being a
strugglefor realization in the world of concrete quales and
values, it makes itselffeltin the only media possible,- specif-
ic sensations,on the one hand, and muscular sensations,on
the other. (EW, V, p. 159).
Hence Dewey adopted James's afferenttheory of the sense of effort

for physical action and extended it to all cases, includingmoral action,
which James had exempted. So here, too, he out-JamesedJames!
He required no spiritualagency to initiate effort,no matterwhat the
situation, and he located the sense of effortwithin activityitself,in
the feelingsissuingfrom the organism'scoordinationof the means and
the end of its action in a singlewhole experience. As Dewey concluded:
We have here, I think,an adequate explanationof all that can

be said about the tremendousimportanceof effort,of all that
ProfessorJames has so conclusivelysaid. This importanceis
not due to the fact that effortis the one sole evidence of a
free spiritual activity strugglingoutward and material re-
sistance. It is due to the fact that effortis the criticalpoint
of progressin action,arisingwheneverold habitsare in process
of reconstruction,or of adaptation to new conditions;unless
they are so readapted, life is given over to the rule of con-
servatism,routine,and over-inertia.(EW, V, p. 162).
XI
The strandsof argumentthat culminatedin Dewey's instrumentalism,

which Studies in Logical Theory (1903) unveiled, are numerous. For-
110 AndrewJ.Reck
tunately,my taskis limitedto pursuing onlythosestrandsthatreflect

James's influence. Harking back to the 1891 Psychology I havecalled
attention to how Deweyhad revisedhis theoryofconceptsin thedirec-
tion of James'snotionof conceptsas "ideologicalweapons." Perhaps
becauseof a morepacificdisposition, Deweychoseto dub theminstru-
ments, tools by which the intelligentorganism betterrealizesits ends.
The development of Dewey'sthoughtin thedirection of instrumental-
ismis embeddedin a largenumber ofwritings. I willselectforconsider-
ation only those that exhibitJames'sinfluence. My selectionomits
not only writings thatare pertinent to Dewey'smaturation as a phil-
osopher,but also - and thismaybe startling - thosewritings which
probably influenced the older thinker, impelling him in the direction
of the positionstakenin thearticlesRalphBartonPerrycollectedand
published underthetitleEssaysinRadicalEmpiricism (1912).
In the article,"How Do ConceptsArise fromPercepts?"(1891),
Deweyrepeatedthe theorythatconceptionis a modeof actionwhich
he had presented in the 1891 Psychology; he explicated morethorough-
ly how concepts,whichare existentially the same as percepts,arise
fromthepercepts.In "The Logicof Verification" (1890) he attributed
the originof thoughtto situationsof conflictand tension. In "The
Significance of the Problemof Knowledge"(1895) he pressedthe
case firstmadebyJamesagainstthegeneraltheoryofknowledge, buthe
gave it the sociologicaland culturalslantthatinspiresRichardRorty.
In "Some Stagesof LogicalThought"(1900), he sketchedthepattern
of inquiry,foreshadowing the model explicatedlater in Studies in
Logical Theory, and refinedin How We Think (1910) and in Logic:
The Theoryof Inquiry(1938). However,it is the fouressaysDewey
contributedto Studiesin LogicalTheorythatcall forspecialattention
in tracingand assessingthe influenceof James,essaysthathave been
laudedas "the climacticworkof his [Dewey's] career"(White,
p. 134).
WiththeirappearanceDewey'sbreakfromidealismwas completed, and
hisinstrumentalismwasunleashed.
In thePrefaceto Studiesin LogicalTheoryDeweyacknowledged, on
behalf of himselfand the other contributors,^their"pre-eminent
obligation"for "both inspirationand the forgingof the tools with
whichthe writershave worked"to WilliamJames(MW,II, p. 297).
Deweyalso articulatedthebasicpropositionsuponwhichall theauthors
of William
Jamesianin content,althoughnot in
agreed. Some are conspicuously
are:
style.Thesepropositions
. . . thatsincetheact of knowingis intimately and indissol-

ubly connected with the like yet diversefunctions of affec-
and
tion,appreciation, practice, only it distorts resultsreached
to treat knowing as a self-enclosedand self-explanatory
whole - hence the intimateconnectionsof logicaltheory
withfunctional psychology; thatsinceknowledge appearsas
a functionwithinexperience, and yet passesjudgment upon
both the processesand contentsof otherfunctions, itswork
and aim mustbe distinctively reconstructive or transforma-
tory;. . . thatthere is no reasonable standard of truth(or of
successoftheknowing function) ingeneral,. . .exceptthrough
reference to the specificofficeswhichknowingis calledupon
to perform in readjusting and expanding themeansand ends
oflife.(MW,II, p. 296)
Dewey'sfouressaysin the volumeare devotedto an intensive, dev-

astatingcritiqueof Lotze's logic and the idealism withwhich it is af-
filiated. Bearingthe generaltitle "Thoughtand its Subject-Matter,"
theytake up seriallytherelationship of thoughtand itssubject-matter,
the antecedentsand stimuliof thinking, data and meanings,and the
of
objects thought. As George Dykhuisen has correctly
pointed out,
"Dewey used the logical theoriesof Lotze and transcendentalism as
foilsfor his own doctrines."28 And these doctrinesowed muchto
James.
ParticularJamesiannotionsare discernible, such as the thesisthat
associationpertainsnot to ideas as mentaleventsas muchas to their
meaningsor objects(MW,II, p. 324). Like James,moreover, Dewey
locatedthinkinginlife,andaffirmed thecontinuity ofthesamethought-
processesfromcommonsituationsin naivelife to the mostabstruse
ofscientific
investigations.Reflectivethought, he declared,
and secondary.It comesaftersomething,

is derivative andfor
the sake of something.. . . Thinkingis a kind of activity
112 AndrewJ. Reck
which we performat specific need, just as at the other need

we engage in other sorts of activity. (MW, II, p. 298 and p.
299).
And like James,who had denounced epistemologyas the generaltheory

of knowledge,Dewey condemned epistemologicallogic. As Dewey said,
What we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How

can I think überhaupt?but, How shall I think righthere
and now? Not what is the test of thoughtat large,but what
validatesand confirmsthisthought?(MW, II, p. 290).
Whereas Dewey had begun his career as an idealistwho favoredpsy-

- the
chology over logic, he embarked upon a new venture in 1903
elucidation of the logic embedded in psychology. Still opposed to
formal logic divorced from the natural historyof thinkingprobed by
psychology,Dewey proposed a singulartheory of psychologicallogic.
In Studies in Logical Theory he offeredan explicationof the patternof
inquiry that was to be articulated,with minor variations,in his later
works. Accordingto this pattern,thinkingis preceded by (1) a stage
in which there is no inquiry "because no problem or difficultyin the
quality of experience presents itself to provoke reflection" (MA, II,
p. 307). When a problem dawns, there follows (2) an empiricstage,
in which the gatheringof facts is paramount. (3) A speculativestage
comes next; it involvesboth the framingof hypothesesand the scho-
lastic regimen of distinction-making and classification. (4) The final
stageis:
... a period of fruitfulinteractionbetweenmereideas and the

mere facts: a period when observationis determinedby ex-
perimentalconditionsdependingupon the use of certainguid-
ing conceptions; when reflectionis directed and checked at
every point by the use of experimentaldata, and by the
necessityof findingsuch a formfor itselfas will enable it to
serve in a deduction leading to evolution of new meanings,
which bringsto light new facts. In the emergingof a more
orderly and significantregion of fact, and a more coherent
and self-luminoussystem of meaning, we have the natural

limit of evolution of the logic of a given science. (MW, II,
p. 307).
Dewey's instrumentalist logic was a programto reconcilethe normative

functionof logic with the naturalhistoryof thinking,whichpsychology
describes,by delineatingthe patternsof actual processes of successful
thinking. Dewey illustratedthe activityof thoughtby an analogy with
the activityof the carpenter.He wrote:
Thinking is adaptation to an end throughthe adjustmentof

particularobjectivecontents.
The thinker,like the carpenter,is at once stimulatedand
checked in every stage of his procedure by the particular
situationwhichconfrontshim. (MW, II, p. 364).
And he firmlystatedthe instrumentalist

position:
The test of the validityof thoughtis beyond thought,just as

at the otherlimitthoughtoriginatesout of a situationwhichis
not dependent upon thought. Interpret this before and
beyond in a historicsense, as an affairof the place occupied
and role played by thinkingas a functionin experience in
relation to other non-intellectualexperiences of things,and
then the intermediateand instrumentalcharacterof thought,
its dependence upon unreflective antecedentsforits existence,
and upon a consequent experiencefor its final test, becomes
significantand necessary. (MW, II, p. 367).
XII
In 1939 Dewey pointed to the 1903 Studies in Logical Theory as the

firstwritingsto publish the basic elements of the philosophical view
that was to preoccupy him in the thirty-fiveyears thereafter.29 And
writingJames in March 1903 Dewey reported,"As for the standpoint
[of the Studies] , - we have all been at work at it for about twelve
114 AndrewJ.Reck
-
years"(Perry,II, p. 520). That fixestheyearin whichit all began
inspiredby James,whichled to instrumentalism
the investigations and
thereafter -
thephilosophicalproblemsthatwereto preoccupyDewey
as 1891, the year afterthe publicationof James'sPrinciplesof Psy-
chology,thesameyearas thepublication of thethirdeditionofDewey's
Psychology.
WhenJamesread Studiesin Logical Theory,his opinionof Dewey
changed."Poor Dewey"of thePsychology was transformed intoa hero.
Commenting on the Studiesin a letterto F. C. S. Schillerdated No-
vember15, 1903, Jamesconfided:"It is splendidstuff, and Deweyis a
hero" (Perry,II, p. 501). Andin hisreviewof thevolume,whichwas
publishedinThePsychological Bulletinin 1903Jameswasalmostlyrical:
Chicago has a School of thought!- a school of thought

which,it is safe to predict,will figurein literature
as the
School of Chicago for twenty-five years to come. Some
universities
have plentyof thoughtto show,but no school.
The University of Chicago,by its DecennialPublications
showsrealthought anda realschool.30
Dewey'sdebt to Jamesis inestimable.In a letterto Jamesin 1903,

by whichhe transmitted a copyof StudiesinLogicalTheory,he wrote:
". . . so faras I am concernedyourPsychologyis the spriritual pro-
genitorof the wholeindustry . . ." (Perry,II, p. 52). And in another
letterwrittenlaterduringthe same year,he respondedto James'ssug-
gestions:
But when you say it [Studies in Logical Theory] needs a

psychologicaldevelopment I wondersometimesif you fully
appreciatehow much all of thisis in yourtwo volumesof
psychology.I havea good mindsometimeto makean inven-
tory of all the pointsin whichyour psychology'already'
furnishesthe instrumentalities for a pragmaticlogic,ethics
andmetaphysics. (Perry,II, p. 525).
. TulaneUniversity
of William
NOTES
* A revisedversionof a paper presentedbeforethe Society for

the Advancement of AmericanPhilosophyin Baltimore,Md., on Decem-
forthecomments
ber 28, 1982. I am grateful ofJohnMcDermott, theremarks
ofPeter Hareand Elizabeth and
Flower, a from
letter BruceKuklick.
1. JohnDewey,"FromAbsolutism to Experimentalism," in G. P. Adams

and W. P. Montague, American
eds.,Contemporary Philosophy (NewYork:Mac-
millan,1930), II, p. 22. Hereafter
citedwithinparentheses in the textas AE
followedbypagenumbers.
2. "Biography ofJohnDewey,"in P. A. Schilpp,ed., ThePhilosophy of
JohnDewey(Evanston: Northwestern Press,1939),p. 23.
University
3. MortonG. White,The Originof Dewey 's Instrumentalism
(New York:
ColumbiaUniversity Press,1943). Hereafter citedwithinparentheses in thetext
as Whitefollowed bypagenumbers.
4. Neil Coughlan,YoungJohnDewey (Chicago:University of Chicago
Press,1973). Hereafter citedwithinparenthesesin thetextas Coughlan followed
bypagenumbers.
5. JohnDewey,The EarlyWorks,I, p. 54, in theedition, JohnDewey,
TheEarlyWorks, 1882-1898,5 volumes(Carbondale:Southern IllinoisUniversity
Press,1969-1972). Hereafter citedwithinparenthesesin thetextas EW followed
byvolumeandpagenumbers.
6. Shadworth Hodgson,"IllusoryPsychology," MindXI (1886), 478-94;
reprintedin EW, I, pp. xli-lvii.
7. G. StanleyHall,reviewof Dewey'sPsychology, American Journal of
Psychology, I (1887), 156-67.
8. William James,"The Association of Ideas,"PopularScienceMonthly,
XVI (1880),577-93.
9. William James,"TheSpatialQuale,"Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy,
XIII (1879), 64-87.
10. William James,"WhatIs an Emotion?" Mind,IX (1884), 188-205.
11. William James,"The ofRationality,
Sentiment "Mmd,IV (1879),317-46.
12. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Characterof WilliamJames
(Boston:LittleBrown,and Company,1935), II, p. 516. Hereafter citedwithin
inthetextas Perryfollowed
parentheses byvolumeandpagenumbers.
13. William James,ThePrinciples of Psychology(1890), I, pp. 5-7,in the
edition,The Worksof WilliamJames(Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press). In
the HarvardeditionThePrinciplesof Psychologywas published in threevolumes
in 1981. Hereafter
citedwithinparenthesesin thetextas PP followed byvolume
and pagenumbers.Fora discussionofJames'sconception ofpsychology as science
116 AndrewJ. Reck
and as philosophy, see my article, "The Philosophical Psychology of William

James,"SouthernJournalof Philosophy, IX (1971), 293-312.
14. WilliamJames, Psychology,BrieferCourse (New York: Henry Holt
and Company,1908), p. 468.
15. See my article,"Dualisms in WilliamJames'sPrinciplesof Psychology,"
Tukne Studies in Philosophy,XXI (1972), 22-38.
16. See my article,"Idealist Metaphysicsin WilliamJames'sPrinciplesof
Psychology,"IdealisticStudies,IX (1979), 214-21.
17. See my article, "Epistemology in WilliamJames's Principlesof Psy-
chology," Tulane Studiesin Philosophy,XXII (1973), 79-115.
18. John Dewey, "William James as Empiricist,"in H. M. Kallen, ed.,
In Commemorationof WilliamJames 1842-1942 (New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1942), p. 50. Hereaftercited withinparenthesesin the textas WJ followed
by page numbers.
19. JohnDewey, The Middle Works,I, p. 321, in the edition,JohnDewey,
The Middle Works,1899-1924, 12 volumes(Carbondale: SouthernIllinoisUnivers-
ity Press, 1976-). Hereaftercited withinparenthesesin the text as MW followed
by volumeand page numbers.
20. In "From Absolutism to Expenrnentalism"Dewey's comment on
James's psychology reiteratesthe judgment first published in French (1922),
then retranslatedinto English under the title, "The Development of American
Pragmatism"(1925). See "The Development of AmericanPragmatism"in John
Dewey, Philosophyand Civilization(New York: CapricornBooks, 1963), pp. 28-
30. Hereaftercitedwithinparenthesesin the textas DP followedby page numbers.
21. Compare my ensuingdiscussionwith HerbertSchneider'scomparisons
of the texts of 1886 with the 1889 and 1891 revisionsin his article,"Dewey's
Psychology,"in JoAnn Boydston, ed., Guide to the Worksof JohnDewey (Car-
bondale: SouthernIllinoisUniversity Press,1970), pp. 3-5.
22. John Dewey, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychologyof William
James,"Journalof Philosophy,XXXVII (1940), 589-99.
23. Gordon Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," in
Schilpp, op. cit. p. 268. Hereaftercited withinparenthesesin the text as Allport
followedby the page numbers.
24. It was reprintedin Philosophyand Civilization.See note 20 above. In
the table contentsits titleis "The Unityof Behavior."
of
25. See D. C. Phillips,"James,Dewey, and the Retlex Arc," Journaloj
theHistoryof Ideas, XXXI (1971), 555-68.
26. WilliamJames, The Will to Believe and Other Popular Essays (Cam-
bridge,Mass: HarvardUniversity Press,1979), p. 92.
27. The other contributorsto Studies in Logical Theorywere Helen Brad-
ford,Thompson Wooley, Simon FraserNlcLennan,MyronLucius Ashley,Willard
Clarke Gore, WilliamArthurHeidel, HenryWaldgraveStuart,and AddisonWebster
Moore.
28. George Dykhuisen,The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale:
Press,1973), p. 83.
SouthernIllinoisUniversity
29. JohnDewey,"Experience,Knowledge,Value:A Rejoinder,"

inSchilpp,
op. cityp. 520.
30. WilliamJames,Essaysin Philosophy
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1978),p. 102.

James Dewey Psicologia

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James Dewey Psicologia

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The Influence of William James on John Dewey in Psychology

Author(s): Andrew J. Reck

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The Influenceof WilliamJames

In the well-known intellectualautobiography, "From Absolutism to

At Johns Hopkins, the neo-HegelianGeorge SylvesterMorrisand the

point" in theirinvestigations; but he faultedthemforadhering to a

themajority ofhisepigoneto offerexclusiveaccessto theAbsolute.Ac-

Dewey's textbookin Psychologywas firstprintedin 1886. It was

. . . thesoul not onlyis, and changes,but it knowsthatit is,

Dewey distinguished threeaspectsof consciousness:

cognition,feeling,and will to be integralfunctionsof each self,"giving

. . . complete truth,the perfectunificationof intelligence. . .

Of feelingDewey distinguishedand examined the fundamentaltypes:

realizationby manthattherealand theidealoughtto be one,and the

I have indulgedin this expositionof Dewey's earlypsychological

perhapson the associationof ideas,revealsthatJames'stheorieshad

Deweyis outwitha psychology whichI havejustreceivedand

In the secondletter,writtenin 1887 to introduce his student,George

The publicationof James'sPrinciplesofPsychology markeda water-

of psychologywas a very fragileaffairrestingupon unprovenassump-

Social Researchin New YorkCity,he extolledit as "thegreatest

A remarkable unionof widelearning, oftreatment,

Dewey's most illuminating

. . . twounreconciled strainsin thePsychology.One is found

Although Deweyconcededthatthesubjective strainyielded,inJames's

the theoryof thinking in accordwiththe primacyof biologicalcate-

Of Dewey's revisions of hisPsychology in 1889 and 1891 it has been

he subscribedto thisdoctrinein the firstedition,depictingsensation

various sensationsinto a new experientialwhole, although,to be pre-

A concept is an image having the function of symbolizing

The third edition evinces one major instance of backsliding,surpris-

spection can never become scientificobservation,since the objects of

I will now attempt to trace James's influenceon Dewey in the writ-

in EW,IV, p. 47), Deweyappliedthispracticalcriterion to theconcept

To realizecapacitydoes notmean,therefore, to act so as to

Dewey's breakwithGreen,whosetheoryhe labelled"abstractself-

Whenone mansaysto another, "You didthatand I shallhold

In a footnoteDeweycriticized Jamesforplacingthe existentselfout-

It is strangethatProfessor James,who recognizesso faras

AnalyzingDewey's 1894 article,Gordon Allporthas surmised:"So

Dewey has praisedJamesforrecognizingand teachingthat "experience

In my Psychology, e.g., p. 19 and pp. 246-49 [EW II, pp.

James had proposed his theory of emotionsas an alternativeto Dar-

ify James's theory of emotions, we feel angrybecause we clench our

Dewey's most famous single paper is "The Reflex Arc Concept"

The structuralunit of the nervous systemis in fact a triad,

In the Principlesof Psychology(I, pp. 36-38) James illustratedreflex

reflexaction; his discussionof these technicalmattersis irrelevant

WhatDeweywas doingin 1892 parallelsJames's1881 use of reflex

It is the coordination[of organicactivities]whichunifies

As GordonAllporthas reported,in lateryearsDewey abandonedthe

Dewey's article,"The Psychologyof Effort"(1897), is interesting

. . . the positionthat the sense of effort(as distinguished

Analyzing particular to answera questionor trying

the need for effortand produces the sense thereof,accordingto Dewey,

. . . the sense of effortis the awarenessof this conflict. The

Hence Dewey adopted James's afferenttheory of the sense of effort

We have here, I think,an adequate explanationof all that can

The strandsof argumentthat culminatedin Dewey's instrumentalism,

tunately,my taskis limitedto pursuing onlythosestrandsthatreflect

. . . thatsincetheact of knowingis intimately and indissol-