Operation GOODWOOD-“The

Caen Carve-Up”’
Martin Samuels

“This bat& too resembled thepreuious battlesprecire[y. A massiveplanning and an enomtous material commitment uwefollowed by a
timid tank altack, wilhoul drive or dynamism. up lo now, the Brilish armoured units had onb euer captured .shalleredground. Of the
offensive spirit of the Light Brigade at Bnlaclaun in the Crimea was there no sign. The enemy tanks crept like tortoise.7ouer the
ground-lheir concentrated&e was nof exploited.“’

GOODWOOD was probably the most spectacular larger than when first captured, measuring Less than
operation carried out by the British in Normandy. four and a half kilomares at its widest.’ Into this
Supported by a bombardment by 2000 bombers and constricted area the British had already squeezed two
700 guns, three armoured divisions, over 800 tanks, entire infantry divisions, 3 and 5 I (Highland). No more
were launched against the German defences south-east troops could be accommodated.
of Cam. Despite this enormous commitment of The problems caused by the limited space inside the
resources, the attack ground TV a halt after three days, Orne bridgehead were made worse by restrictions on
having gained only 10 kilometres at a cost of some both entry to and exit from it. At the start of GOOD-
500 tanks. WOOD there were only three routes across the Ome,’
Forty-six years on, GOODWOOD still arouses con- while a minefield laid by 51 (Highland) Division
siderable interest, battlefield tours are common and it blocked the path of any advance. Only eighteen gaps
provided the basis for General Scatter’s “Goodwood could be cleared in time for GOODWOOD, sufficient
concept” for the use of non-mechanised infantry. for but one armoured regiment to pass through at a
Despite this interest, key features of the battle are often time.6 As a result of these two bottlenecks, any British
missed or misunderstood. It is the intention of this tank attack was limited to a trickle. Furthermore, the
article to pinpoint and analyse some of these key whole area was in full view of German observation
features. posts perched in the factory chimneys of Colombelles.’
The final factor affecting British plans was a growing
shortage of infantry. Not only had overall casualties
The British Plan been twice as high as expected,’ but these had also been
The ground chosen for GOODWOOD was nn the more concentrated among the inlantry than antici-
eastern limits of the Allied perimeter in Normandy, pated. The Americans had anticipated that 70.3% of’
where the British held a small bridgehead across the their losses would be among the infantry. In the event,
River Ome. South of this was the only decem tank the figure was 85°hI.9 Since infantrymen made up only
country in the region. Here was an area (map p7) 14% of the British personnel in Normandy,” there was
of&i+o,benagricul6ural land studded with a number of soon a severe shortage of replacements. By mid-July,
compacl stone built uillages surrounded by orchards British infantry replacements were sufficient for only
Belween the villages the ground is completely open two more weeks of fighting, after which it might be
with no banks or hedges and vep fewfences.’ necessary to start breaking up units.” By coritrast, the
From a military point of view, four features were of British enjoyed a large surplus of tanks and crews.
particular importance. First, the ground rises gently GOODWOOD would therefore be a predominantly
from the north in a series of minor undulations up to armoured battle. As Dempsey put it:
the Bourguebus Ridge before falling away again. The I was prepared to lose e auple of hundred tanks. So long
defender around the ridge was presented with an ideal OSI didn’t lose n~en.‘~
field of fire, while having an area of dead ground Montgomery decided to make up for the limited
behind the ridge for his reserves, Second, the villages number of infantrymen available for GOODWOOD
scattered over the region are rarely more than 1500 m by lavish use of firepower. Thirty-five regiments of
apart, forming a natural network ofmutually-support- artillery, totalling 712 guns, were to support the
ing strongpoints. Third, the front was cut by two attack, with an allocation of almost 300,000 rounds of
railways, Caen-Troarn and Caen-Vimont, running ammunition.‘” However, due to the congested nature
directly across the line of advance. Both presented of the Orne bridgehead, most of these guns had to be
considerable obstacles to vehicles. Finally, any advance held west of the river, severely reducing their effective
to the south would have to expose its right flank to the range. Beyond this range, artillery support would be
industrial suburbs of Caen, still in German hands. delayed until the guns could relocate forwards, a
One more problem presented itself to the British difficult task due to the mass of vehicles in the
planners: the size and security of the Orne bridgehead. armoured divisions which had to cross the Orne first.
Initially seized by 6 Airborne Division on the night of The limitations in the artillery support available led
5/6 June, by mid-July the bridgehead was hardly Montgomery to request a massive aerial bombard-

4
ment of the German defences. A total of eleven targets at 0845 hours, and then only along a single route.” All
was chosen, falling into three groups, allocated to 1056 three divisions were to advance with their armoured
heavy night bombers from RAF Bomber Command, brigades preceding the infantry. This was in
482 medium bombers of 9th USAAF and 539 heavy accordance with Dempsey’s instructions to O’Connor:
day bombers of 8th USAAF respectively.” Between What we ulanl oucr there are tanks. I1 doesn’t matler
them, these aircraft were to drop almost 8000 tons of aboul anything else. Don’1 wony about your
bombs. infanlry Just gel the tanks and the motor battalions
Subconrciou.rly, the slaffs relaxed. The bombers would ouul~
wiin Ihe balfleJor lhem Asforjighting-what would Broadly, the British plan was to rush a large force of
the Germans haue leJ LoJighl with, after their positions tanks into the rear of the German defences under the
had been pounded into Ihe duslfor a depth ofmany miles? cover of a massive aerial bombardment. Once in the
“Goodwood” was an apl& chosen name: line up Ihe gee- rear, these tanks would engage and “write down” thr:
ps by Ihe rlarter’s box,Jire theguns and drop the bombs, enemy’s armoured reserves. Meanwhile, the German
lhen racefor fhejnlshing tape, hell-bent.” defaces themselves were to be reduced by the infantry
Despite the apparently overwhelming weight of brigades of the armoured divisions. The success of this
material to be used, the planned bombardment w’as plan depended on two assumptions. First, that the
seriously flawed. First, while much of the battlefield aerial bombardment would be sufficient to suppress
was to be bombed, only a few areas were allocated the German dcfcnces until the British infantry arrived.
more than a light preparation. The areas to be most Second, that the German anti-armour defence was
heavily bombed were those on the flanks of the based upon tanks, rather than anti-tank guns.
armoured thrust. In the actual path of the attack, only
Cagny was to receive substantial attention. The
remaining areas were accorded little more than a
The German Defensive
standard artillery bombardment. This was clearly System
insufficient to deal with defenders in stone built The German line opposite the GOODWOOD attack
villages, and suggests that the British planners had was held by two divisions, 16th Luftwaffe Fclddivision
largely discounted the German infantry as a factor in and 21st Panzer-Division. Elements of two more
the battle. panzer divisions, 1st SS and 12th SS, were in reserve.
Second, substantial periods oftime were left between Unlike the full-strength British divisions which were
the completion of the aerial bombardment and the about to attack them, the German formations were all
projected arrival of ground forces. Over an hour was much reduced by the severe casualties of the rexnt
allowed at Area A, and almost three hours at Area M fighting.
(Cagny). This time slippage was permitted, despite The 16th Luftwaffe Felddivision was one of twenty-
considerable experience that, given time, troops two created in mid-1942 from 170,000 surplus air
could recover liom even the most devastating of personnel. Much to the Army’s anger, the men made
bombardments. available were formed into independent Luftwaffe divi-
As one recent historian has written, “ this bom- sions, rather than used to bring existing Army forma-
bardment, it war hoped, would reduce the German infants and tions up to strength.‘o As Field Marshal van Manstein
tanks lo helplessness. To veterans of the First World VK0te:
War it sounded too much like the Somme To form1he.w exxcellen~lroops inlo diuisions within !he
apin.“‘” (Emphasis added) JGnemork OJ’ the I~uftwaffe ulas sheer lunacy. Where
The scale of the commitment in the air was to be were thy lo gel the necessary close-combal training and
matched on the ground. While infantry attacked on practice in working wifh other formations?Where were
either flank, the British VIII Corps was to sweep down they lo get Ihe bale experience so oilal. ? And where
the ccntrc with its three armoured divisions, a total of WQSthe I.ufkoaffe
loJnd diuirional, regimental, and
877 tanks.” ball&on commanders?”
The VIII Corps plan was restricted in its flexibility The 16th Luftwaff‘e Felddivision had suffered
due to the difficulties of congestion and movement in severely in the fighting around Caen during Operation
the Orne bridgehead noted above. The corps was EI’SOM, 8 July 1944, and had been reduced to three
forced to advance initially on a single brigade frontage, weak battalions, though with full-strength artillery.”
with this in turn moving on a single regimental front- The Germans had a fair idea as to where the British
age. The deployment offurther forces depended on the Schruerpunkl would be, and had deployed the division to
successful operations of the forward units in seizing face it.21 The infantry were considered expendable.
ground in which to debouch. For GOODWOOD, Their tasks was merely that of an Infanterieschleie?’
O’Connor arranged his armoured divisions in the (Infantry smoke screen), designed to protect the main
order I I, Guards, 7. body of the deface from British patrols and surprise
I I Armoured Division was to move off at H-hour, attacks. The divisional artillery was held to the rear,
0745 hours. At the same time the Guards Armoured behind the Bourguebus Ridgczi
Division would begin to cross the Ornc, using two Thr 21st Panzer-Division consisted of Panzer-
routes. 7 Armoured Division would only start to move Regiment 22 and l’anzergrenadier.Regimentt: 125 and
192. dus SUDDO~L Each oanzerzrenadier rerimcnt engineer battalions: Panzer-Aulhlarungs-Abtpilunp 21
consisted of two battalions, achYwith a the&rical and Panrer-Piotreer-Bataillon 220.* These forces, act-
strength of 868.26 Heavy casualties had reduced them ing as infantry, served to protect a substantial artillery
to about three hundred me” each,” with companies park.
averaging forty to sixty men:” The divisional comman- ‘l‘his consisted of the artillery of 16th Luftwaffe
der, Feuchtinger, reported a total rifle strength of 1200 Felddivision, some thirty-six*” 7.5 cm guos;‘6 2lsr
men, including attached elements of 16th Luftwaffe Panzer-Division’s Panzer-Artillerie-Regimrnt 155,
Felddivision.2” with thirty-six self-propelled 10.5 cm guns and twrlve
The four panzergrenadier barralions formed the rowed guns; the divisional Panzerjager-Abteilung, with
second layer of the German dcfeoce. The 192nd regi- twclvr towed 8.8 cm anti-tank guns; and three Luli-
ment held the south-eastern suburbs of&en, while the wai%z Flak battalions equipped with 8.8cm dual-
125th regiment held the central sector, in the path of purpose guns. ” In addition, LXXXVI Corps had
the British armoured thrust. I/l25 was deployed with a deployed Werferbrigade 9 in this area, with one of its
rifle company in ach of Cuverville, Demouvillc and Abteilungcn, twelve six-barrelled Nebelwel-fer (72 bar-
Giberville,” and its headquarters company in Lc rels), around Greolheville.” The total arrillery posi-
Mesnil Frementel. I’ II/125 was positioned on the right tioned here amounted to some sevenry-eight 8.8 cm
of the main corridor, in the area Touffrcville- Flak guns, twelve other heavy Flak guns, 194 artillery
Emieville,32 while the regimental headquarters com- pieces and 272 Nebelwrrfer (1632 tube~).~ Obsrrvers
pany occupied Frenouville.‘3 from these batteries wcrc deployed forward io the
In support of I/l 25 was the assault gun battalion of fortified villages.“o
the 21st Panzer-Division: Sturmgzschut~.Abteilung Behind these forces were held elements of two
(SGabt.) 200. The battalion’s commander, Major armoured divisions: 1st SS Panzer-Division “Lcib-
Becker, was also the designer ofits unique equipment.” starrdarte Adolf Hitler” sod 12th SS Panzer-Division
Becker was an engineer officer, and his unit’s vehicles “Hitler Jugend”. t\s with all the Germao units in
had bee” “amslruded by him JIom captured or discarded GOODWOOD, both divisions were well under
tracked chosrir in a Paris faclov ,j’ on which he had strength.
mounted heavy anti-tank guns. The battalion was Total German forces in the area were approximately
organ&d into five batteries, each of six long Pak 4300 infantry, 118 tanks and at least 370 guns. This
7.5 cm and four 10.5 cm howitzers. may be compared to the Allied forces assigned to
The batteries of SGabt.200 were deployed with GOODWOOD, which numbered 10449 infantry, 877
l/200 in Demouville, Z/ZOO in Giberville, 3/200 in tanks and 750 guxi
Grentheville, 4/200 in Le Mesnil Frementel and 5/200 The defensive orgaoisation employed by the Ger-
in Le Prieurc.‘” The battalions task was, mans east of the Orne bears a striking resemblance to
in close cqberation wilh the panzergrenadier.r lo refndse that developed to face similarly overwhelming British
enemy breaking Ihroqh lhrfronl line, by means of a material supPriority during the First World War.” The
mobile conduct of battle." (Emphasis added) Vofeldzone (Outpost Zone) was some 1500 m deep and
21sr Panzer-Division’s amour was provided by was held by the expendable infantry of the 16th
Panzer-Regiment 22. Normally consisting of two tank Luftwaffe Felddivision. As in the original system, their
battalions, the regiment was temporarily reduced to task was primarily to block enemy patrols and to delay
one battalion at the time of GOODWOOD, as II/22 any enemy attack.
was refitting in Germany. In its place, a battalion Behind the Vwfildzone was the Kampfield (Bartlc
of heavy Tiger tanks, schwwes Panzer-Abtrilung Zone), 2500 m deep. ‘l’his was held by the motor&d
(sPzabr.) 503 had been allocated from army rcsc~ve.~~ panzergrenadiers of l/l25 and the tanks of l/22. As in
The theoretical strength of I/22 was four companies of the 1917 system, both units were intended to fight an
twenty-two Panzer Mark IV’s each,j’ but casualties otTensive mobile battle (Ge~ens1o.r.r in der Slellung), with
had reduced the battalion to only thirty-four tanks.” only limited forces deployed as static garrisons. To the
sPzabt.503 had a theoretical organisation of three rear of the Kampffeld lay the Crosses Kaqbffeld (Greater
companies each of fourteen tanks, but casualties had Bartlezone), about 5000 m deep sod occupied by the
reduced this. Far GOODWOOD, l/503 fielded ten assault guns of SGabt 200 and thr panzergrcnadiers of.
Royal Tigers (Tiger II), while 2/503 and 3/503 con- 11/125. Again, both units were to operate in a mobile
sistrd of ten Tiger- I’s each.” fashion. ‘l‘rue IO the First World War doctrine, rhc
I/22 and 3/503 were deployed in the area San- whole area was under the command of the man on the
nerville-Emieville.‘2 Feuchtinger had wanted 10 bold spot. I” addition to his “WI, Panzergrenadier Regiment
them further back, as a mobile reserve, but Rommel 125, Oberstleotnant van Luck had foul1authority OKI
had refused, due to the extremr weakness of 16th Pzregt 22, sPzabr 503 and SGabt 200.“z’
Luftwaffe Felddivision.‘3 However, l/503 and 2/503 Due to the improvements in technology of the
were held in the rear. previous lwcnty years, and rhc rrsulling incrux in
The final section of 21st Panzer-Division was artillery ranges, the Artillery Protective Lint: around
deployrd on and behind the Bourguebus Ridge. On the Caen w’as some IO 000 m behind the lionr lint, almost
ridge itself were the divisiooal reconnaissance and twice the First World War distance. As a result, it now

6
7
lay behind, rather than in front of, the Grosses the latter village. Although the neighbouring village of
Kampffeld. Despite this increase in depth, the line still Giberville was to be captured by Canadian forces
acted as the rear marker for the zone in which any attacking from Caen, Cuverville and Demouville were
attack was to be held. assigned to 11 Armoured Division’s 159 Infantry
Behind the Artillery Protective Line were the Ein- Brigade.
greifformations, the two SS Panzer divisions. providing Roberts had complained to O’Connor about this
the equivalent of one division between them. As the task being given to his division. He
British interwar writer, Captain GC Wynne, had wanted to keep [ 159 Brigade] as close to his leading
predicted,‘” the Gegenstoss aus der Tiefe (Immediate amour as pmible in the event of being held up by
counterstroke from behind the position) WTS still the German defended localities, which could only be mtisfac-
basis of the German defensive doctrine. Held well to torily cleared out by infantry. To hauc this uilnl brigade
the rear, and so out of British artillery range, these left behind tackling villages which he reckoned should be
formations possessed the mobility to intervene in the by-passed by hi5 men, and left to others to capture, upset
battle before the attacker had time to recover from the Roberts considerab~.55
disorganisation caused by the counterstrokes within As Roberts himself later said,
the defensive position. 11 meant lhnt half the division lum engaged on the front
The British formations attacking on 18 July 1944, linsr I not on& spoke to Dick O’Connor about it but I
despite their more modern equipment, could expect zurote to him and said that this is a great disaduantage to
the fame reception as their fathers in 1917: after a my diuirion, and I W(IStold that if I didn’t like the plan
relatively easy penetration, they would encounter ever because my experience and soforth, then one of the other
stronger resistance, while minor counterstrokes from diui.rions could lead.56
by-passed defenders reduced their cohesion and Part ofO’Connor’s intransigence may have been due
threatened to cut off their rear. Finally, as the advance to a sense of personal professional inadequacy, having
ground to a halt, a sudden counterstroke by the- frrsh taken over VIII Corps only a few months before the
Eingreif divisions would threaten to overwhelm the Normandy landings after a considerable period in an
exhausted remnants of the attacking forces before they Italian prisoner of war camp.” However, the problem
could consolidate their gains. was more a result of the confusion as to the aims of
GOODWOOD. Roberts wanted the villages to be left
The Battle to 51 (Highland) Division, which would otherwise be
The villages of Cuverville and Demouville were each largely idle, but this was refused for reasons which were
held by a company of I/Panzergrenadier-Regiment not explained to him.
125, with I /Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 200 in support in Montgomery’s “Notes on Second Army Opera-

Major General Roberts and Brigadier Harvey

8
dons” had included the statement that, This incident illustrates well the faults of Restrictive
the easlern~%~%nk
is a b&ion on which Iha whole&we of Control and also the necessity within Directive Com-
Ihe campaign 2 jliorth West Europe defiends; it must mand of thinking two-up.” O’Connor, in the rear, was
remain ajirm bastion; if il became unrlable lhc opera- controlling the movement of an individual battalion
tions on the western&k would cease. 7herefore, while [three-down), and at the same time ignoring the pro-
taking advantage of eucry opporluni& 1o des&slroythe tests of Roberts, whose Tat HQ was just north of Le
enemy, we musl be very careful to m&loin our own Mesnil Frementel.‘z Conversely, Roberts was giving
balance and ensure afm bose.s8 Churcher freedom to act on his own initiative, and
The emphasis Montgomery placed on the need to finding himself let down. While Churcher may have
hold the Orne bridgehead accounts for the seemingly been correct on a local level in delaying the attack on
timid holding back of 51 (Highland) Division and the Demouville until 3 MONMOUTH had been relieved,
resulting need to divert 159 Brigade to capture the two an analysis of the situation two-up would have shown
villages. the need for speed, in order to promote the overall
Cuverville and Demouville lay within the aerial plan. It is possible that his failure to do so was due to
bombardment area, and received a concentration that his having been promoted to command 159 Brigade
was sufficient to make the German defenders only three weeks before, on 28 J~ne,‘~ plus the fact that
“thoroughb ‘bomb happy’ ‘i.59 Even so, the villages were Directive Command was not ingrained in the British
not finally cleared until about 1500 hours,60 over seven system, in that the concept of Operational Directives
hours after the advance began. lay half-way between the British Restrictive Control
159 Brigade advanced with two battalions up, 3 and the German Directive Command.
Monmouthshire on the right, 1 Herefordshire on the 159 Brigade finally moved against Demouville at
Irft, with 4 King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in about H+5,” 1245 hours. A patrol of the Inns of
rcse~ve,~’ and the Cromwell tanks of 2 Northampton- Court Yeomanry had discovered the village to be
shire Yeomanry in support.“’ Cuverville was reached at firmly held.‘5 As a result, “The brigade gathered its&e
0830 hours,63 and entered by 3 MONMOUTH “look- fir a deliberale assault. Il would lake time lo prepare and
ing& Germans who wuhed 10 surrender”, while 1 HERE- deliuer.“‘6 It should be noted that Demouville was
FORD captured some orchards to the east, where they garrisoned by one under-strength rifle company of
took fifty prisoner~.~ I/l25 and ten assault guns of l/ZOO, and that it had
How long this operation took is unclear. One official been subjected to a considerable aerial bombardment.
British account states that Cuverville L‘~n~ occupied z&h Demouville was captured by 3 MONMOUTH
lillle resi,rlonce” and was cleared in fifteen minutes,65 by “a& a st~~ballle”.” 1 HEREFORD seized woods to
0845 hours. However, the divisional historyK6 and one the east of the village, “the leading companies caenluolly
of the battalion histori&’ put the linal capture of the [fighting] their way onto their objectiuess, despite considerable
village at about 1015 hours, almost two hours after the enemy opposition”, taking about eighty prisoners.”
initial attack. The village was cleared by 1530 hours, but once
At this point, the confused objectives of GOOD- again the brigade was held back until relieved by 51
WOOD became critical. Since Montgomery had (Highland) Division. The formation finally established
emphasized the necessity of ensuring the security of the a firm position around Le Mesnil Frementel by 1945
Orne bridgehead above all else, 51 (Highland) Divi- hours,lg and bedded down for the night.
sion had been held in rescrvc in case of any German The village of Cagny lay directly in the path of the
counterattack, although Roberts considered this British armoured corridor. Its capture was therefore a
“impo~siblc”.“8 This policy of extreme caution led matter of priority. Although the RAF dropped 650
O’Connor to order 3 MONMOUTH to hold fast once tons of bombs on it, the projected concentration was
it had captured Cuverville and to wait for 7 Argyll and not achieved, being less than half that intended.” In
Sutherland Highlanders to relieve it. The relief was reality, the weight of bombardment hardly mattered,
delayed by enemy shell-fire and so was only completed as Cagny’s total garrison consisted of one Luftwaffe
around midday.“g Thus 159 Brigade was left sitting idle anti-aircraft battery.”
For almost two hours, despite its presence being The first British tanks reached the area of Cagny at
required urgently further south. about 0935 hours.” Even without the delayed 159
Roberts subsequently wrote: Infantry Brigade, 29 Armoured Brigade had more than
I should have got hold of Brigadier Churther on the enough infantry, in the form of8 (Motor) Battalion the
radio, and instructed him either to use the rewue Rifle Brigade (8RB), to take the village. However,
ball&n (4 KSLO or the Herefords. to lake on lhe orders were to press on,83 The whole of 3 RTR and the
task of capturing Demouuille. But I was so much lead two squadrons of 2 Fife and Forfar Yeomanry
concerned wilh lhe d@culf battle that Ihe nrmoured passed by to the west of Cagny, leaving the latter’s C
brigade were hauirlg, that I lefl Churcher to his oum Squadron to mask the village.8’ At this moment, the
de&.<. In relrospeccl, I cannel think u&v I did not do Germans acted.
something. I lhink if was because I zoos so soured up by If Iha German army prided ilself and excelled in one
Ihe corps commander’s orders 10 be responsible&r taking nclivity ofwar, it UJ(ISsnalching slabilib from lhcjaws
these lluo damned uillage,r!‘O of polmtial disosler regular German units WCTZnot
 g&n to quibbles aboutfunctional demarcation [This been so soured by the disagreements over Cuverville
produced] a pattern of rmarkableflexibili(y, in which and Demouville that he was determined not to take on
cled~ and cooks would turn out as riflemen in an any other extra tasks. He deployed 23 Hussars to mask
emergency 85 the village and informed thr Guards that it was
The man of the moment was Obentleutnant Hans strongly held.
van Luck, commander of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 2 (Armoured) Grenadier Guards, the lead unit of 5
125. Having spent the previous three days on leave in Guards Armoured Brigade were still 2000m from
Paris, van Luck returned to his headquarters in Cagny when three tanks were destroyed by fire from
Frenouville at 0900 hours on 18 July, unaware of the the village. Unable to manoeuvre due to limited space,
British attack. His reaction to the news that all com- the whole brigade halted.g’ Within minutes, half a
munication with his battalions had been lost was to squadron of tanks had been lost.92
make a personal reconnaissance in his tank.R6 He Two troops were sent around the left flank, along
reached Cagny at about 0930 hours, only to see the the only covered approach to Cagny. Heavy opposi-
lead tanks of 2 FF YE0 rumbling past. tion was encountered and three tanks lost. The
Von Luck immediately withdrew back into Cagny, remainder reached the outskirts of the village about
located the garrison and persuaded the Luftwaffe 1600 hours,91 some five hours after the engagement
commander (at pistol point!) that his four 8.8 cm AA began. Meanwhile, the other two armoured battalions
guns would be better employed shooting at British of the brigade had attempted to outflank Cagny. 1st
tanks. With these guns, and one other 8.8 cm AT gun, Coldstream Guards moved to the west, but was
blocked at Le Poirier,!” by 4/200, redeployed from Le
Mesnil Frementel. 2nd Irish Guards went to the east,
where it was halted by German tanks in some woods,
which could not be cleared due to a lack of infantry.95
Cagny was entered by King’s Company, 1st (Motor)
Grenadier Guards at 1800 hours, quickly followed by
two infantry battalions of 32 Guards Brigade. It then
took until 1930 hours to clear the villagcg6 This points
to excessive caution on the part of the Guards. Not
only had the five guns in Cagny been reinforced by only
eight riflemen during the day,97 but the Germans had
already withdrawn even before the King’s Company
attack!g8
Since the delay to the Guards Armoured Division
meant that 7 Armoured Division was also held up, it is
clear that the capture of Cagny should have been a
matter of extreme urgency. That it took an entire
British armoured division almost nine hours to expel
live AT guns from the village suggests severe flaws in
British tactical performance.
The actions around Cuverville-Demouville and
Cagny reveal how effective small static garrisons could
be at reducing the cohesion and momentum of an
attack. The distinct tendency towards caution dis-
played by the British only served to increase the impact
of the German tactics. Such static defence was only one
part of the German doctrine. Of at least equal import-
Oberstleutnant van Luck ance in halting an attack was the Gegenstoss in der Stellung
(Immediate counterstroke within the position).
VOD Luck engaged the rear squadron of the Fife and 3/sPzabt 503, consisting of ten Tiger tanks under
Forfar. Within seconds, twelve Sherman tanks had Captain van Rosen, had been deployed with the
gone up in flames?’ Panzer Mark IV’s of I/Panzer-Regiment 22 in the
Colonel Scott of 2 FF YE0 was just organising an region Sannerville-Emieville. This area was targeted
attack on Cagny by the accompanying F Coy 8 RB,88 by the RAF, and received the highest concentration of
when Roberts arrived and told him not to bother. The the bombardment.” This was later described by van
regiment was to press on instead.” Roberts later wrote, Rosen:
Now when I arrived in the area, seeing the damage that I war awakened early in Ihe morning by engine-noise and
had been done IJell that Cagny ~USL be&i+ strongly saw theJirsl bomber waucs approaching. From this moment
held and I did not want to get inuolued.go on, our concentration zone was subject to air bombardment by
Cagny was the responsibility of the Guards hmy bombs, which lastedfor two and a halfhours without
Armoured Division, and it may he that Roberts had interruption. We uwe located in the my middle of thir

IO
 bombardmenl, which mar like hell, and I am .rlill a.rtonirhed regiment moved across the railway running south-
lo haue survived if. I ulas unconsciousjor a while q’ier a wards and headed towards Hubert Folie.‘05 Although
bomb had explodedjust infront of my tank, almosl burying one section of three carriers of G Coy 8 RB was able to
me nliue. I couldsee lhal an&her lank, al n distance of aboul drive through the village unopposediw at about 1200
thirly melres, received a direct hit, which set il on jre hours, the tanks were halted by heavy anti-tank fire,
inslant~. A third tank UJUSturned upside down by lhe air eleven tanks being lost in a few minutes.lO’ No further
pre.i.rure. The Tiger had a weigh1 of58hum,which shows advance was achieved.
you injusl whaf a hell wefound ourselves. The Fife and Forfar’s battle told a similar story.
Asfar us my company UJUSconcerned, ~UJOTzgcrs were Passing between Soliers and Four, B Sqn was halted by
completely neufralised, lluo others zuere $0 seuere!y damaged fire”’ from 5/200, which had redeployed to Four from
lhal they could nol be employed. All tanks were completely Le Prieure.‘“’ No attack on the village was possible, as
covered with e&h, andpart ofthem had to be dug oul. The F Coy 8 RB was still busy near Cagny. Although one
engines were full of sand and the air-cooling systems were troop did penetrate almost to Bourguehus,“’ the
nol~‘!unctioning FEfteen men of Ihe company zuere dead, advance ground to a halt here also.
two soldiers who had nol been able lo stand up under the The British armoured attack had heen absorbed by
terrible nerwu sfrain committeed suicide during Ihe bom- the German defences by ahout 1200 hours. Of the four
bardment, another soldier had to be senl lo a lunolic asylum brigades committed, 159 Infantry Brigade was hung up
for obreruolion.‘OO at Demouville, 32 Guards Brigade and 5 Guards
Despite this traumatic experience, six ofvon Rosen’s Armoured Brigade were occupied by Cagny and van
Tigers were ready for action only one hour after the Rosen, and 29 Armoured Brigade had been halted by
bombardment ceased. After engaging 23rd Hussars, the assault guns of SGaht 200. The only British to
the rear regiment of 29 Armoured Brigade, from penetrate to the German gun lines were two troops of
.Mannrville at about 1015 hours, van Rosen launched a scout cars from D Sqn Inns of Court Yeomanry, which
counterstroke at about midday. This action, six tanks hastily withdrew.“’ With the British confused and
attacking an entire British armoured regiment (72 disorganised, and with their strength already consider-
tanks), was fully within the German doctrine. Such ably reduced, the time had come for the second stage
sudden and unexpected attacks by small mobile forces of the German defence, the Clegenr1o.r.r (IUS der 7ieJ”
on the Ranks of an enemy attack were a key element of (Immediate counterstroke from behind the position).
the German defensive system. The Germans had two E&zgreiJformations available
Von Rosen’s attack initially made considerable in the Caen area, 1st and 12th SS Panzer-Divisions.
progress. The units of the Guards Armoured Division, Due to fears of a further Allied landing, Hitler had
already held up unexpectedly at Cagny, began to ordered the latter to move to cover the coast east of
hesitate and w’aver. Had the German tanks reached Le the Ome, and it was unable to return to the Caen area
Prieure, the situation would have become potentially until the evening of 18 J~ly,“~ too late for an immedi-
disastrous for the British. The Tigers would have ate counterstroke. The only Eingrelf formation
enjoyed an excellent field oftire right across the British immediately available was 1st SS Panzer-Division.
armoured corridor. Given the performance of the five Only two battlegroups, including 46 Panthers, were
8.8 cm guns in Cagny, the identical guns mounted in available initially. “’ Arriving on the Bourguebus
van Rosen’s tanks would have been able to cut OK the Ridge at about 1200 hours, these forces took immedi-
two leading British armoured brigades. Trapped ate advantage of the stalling of the British attack. Their
within the enemy defensive system, deprived of orders, fully in accordance with the Eingrelfdocrrine,
reinforcement and short of infantry, these formations were to throw the British back behind the Caen-
would have been quickly eliminated by the German Troarn railway. This was not possible, as a complete
Eingreifforces, as in so many identical situations in the lack of air cover prevented any decisive concentration
First World War. of forces.“’ Instead, the battle developed into a con-
At the critical moment, two of the T‘igers were shot fused series of small-scale skirmishes:
through the front plate. This had never happened Rouing ha&r of enemy lanks, mainly Pnnlhers, and self
before in Normandy, as no Allied gun could defeat the propelled guns .rtarled lo appear working in froops oftwo
Tiger’s heavy armour. Fearing a powerful new Allied or lhree, OI euen on occasion singb, and making @e&e
anti-tank weapon, van Rosen w,ithdrew.‘“’ It was only ue of lheir superior range from posilions cleuer() con-
after the war that this mystery was explained. While cealed among the debris ofthe bomb-.rma.rhed villages or
lecturing on a British Army Staff College battlefield Ihe occasional clump of tree~.“~
tour, van Rosen first learned of the four Luftwaffe German counterstrokes against the unsupported
8.8 cm guns in Cagny, and realised that it roust have tanks of 29 Armoured Brigade were recorded at 1300,
been these that fired at him by mistake. 1445, 1545 and 1615 hours.“” They were greatly
3 RTR and the leading two squadrons of 2 FF YE0 assisted by forward observers in positions behind the
had passed by Cagny and reached the Caen-Vimont British line~“~, and were repulsed only with difficulty.
railway by about 0935 hours.“’ 3 RTR carried on to Despite the assistance of rocket-firing Typhoon air-
the west ofGrenthcvillc, by-passing the guns of3/200’03 craft, the brigade was largely forced hack behind the
at the cost of several tanks.loi About II00 hours, the Caen-Vimont railway. Towards nightfall, the Ger-

II
mans launched another series of attacks, probably operations, with the Guards Armoured Division taking
hoping that the British air support might be reduced in nine hours to clear a village held by five anti-tank guns
the growing darkness. Assisted by a number of tanks and tight riflemen, was compounded by O’Connor’s
infiltrated into Soliers, these attacks went in at 1900, excessive caution over-ruling the better knowledge of
2000, 2145 and 2240 hours, but were all rcputsed.“’ his subordinates on the ground. Both factors were
The defeat of all of these counterstrokes was by no characeristic of British operations in the First World
means due to British tactical skill. On the contrary, the War.
fact that the British were sore pressed, despite enjoying The Germans t”” continued their First World War
three-to-one odds in tanks and the support of twenty- practices. The defensive zone was under one comman-
f&t: squadrons of fighter-bombers from No. X3 Group der, who was on the spot. His personal initiativr and
RAF, serves only t” highlight the Germans’ tactical energy were instrumental in hatting the Guards. Stub-
superiority. born defence of localities disorganised the British
29 Armoured Brigade had been all but destroyed, attack, white small mobile forces took full advantage of
having lost I28 ofits initial 214 tanks. The total British the confusion to launch local counterstrokes on their
tank losses for the day were 270,‘19 whereas German own iniliative, which further reduced British cohesion.
losses were in the region of fifty tanks only, many of Finally, fresh mobile forces were brought forward t”
these being destroyed in the initial bombardmrnl. As throw back the exhausted attackers. The fact thar the
for Sturmgeschutz-Abteil”ng 200, this unit suffered no Germans were able to halt the British thrust in its
losses apart from one battery destroyed in Demouville, tracks, and indeed come near to inflicting a major
despite having formed the backbone of the German ddeat, despite the werwhetming Allied material
defence.‘20 superiority (5:2 in in&try, 8:l in tanks, 3:l in artil-
lery), testilics to the eiTcctivcness of German tactical
ductrine.
Conclusion A last picture of”Go”dw”“d” is worth recalling.
GOODWOOD revealed that, despite five years of Ilurin~ lhe eariy lhruds, General O’Connor, commg
warfare and considerable advances in technology, the forward lo .reeforhimself whnf mu holding things up,
British and German Armies each retained much Ihe jumped on lo a lank conlaining one of lhe tank bnflalion’s
same approach to tactics as in the First World War. commanders in 6e pmcm of ordering Jorward his
The British were still unable f” integrate a variety of Squadrons. On the back of lhis lank was also the Brigade
arms into one smooth flowing whole. Rather, as i” the Commander and behind him lhe Iliui.rional Commander,
previous war, rach arm acted in isolation in a series of Mczjor-Geneml Adnir, all urgently ordering one another
separate phases. Thus at GOODWOOD, the air forces on in descending order of rcniori~, lhe Jinal version
comptetcd their bombardmcnt before the armour doubtless reaching (in wirelers form) home harassed
began to move, white only one Forward Air Controller sub&m as he slruggled lhroyh Cagny.“’
accompanied the advance. \\‘ithin the armoured divi-
sions, the infantry and armourcd brigades operated
independently. Even within the armoured brigades
themselves, the motor battalions tended to be assigned Scllar R J 8. The ,$ andFor/, rhnanry, 1911956, (London,
separate tasks from the tank units. 1960), p.lb7.
The concept of separate arms stands out clearly in 2 I’anzcrmc)rr. Grmndim, swell,,, cdirion, (bf”rKl>rn, I!mj,
the initial conception of GOODWOOD: p.274.
3 Jac!wmLieu,crlan,-C”l”“cIG s. oprroiionioJ.ki&h c<qr. Iliruunr
From the earliesl days oJnrmoured ~roo,m, rhe idea of a
o/ *pm,im ji’lrn J,~“VI?m~~
1” IheKiwr Khinr, (L”ridon, IY48),
pi&ed battle between Ihe opposing hosts had probably p.78.
exercised a powerfulfascinnlion uponthe mindr of their a ~non~mour. 7?nmi Pursuant: A Iliilary oJ ihr iiih drmaured
commanden. “To seek oul lhe enemy’s armotn and Iliai,rian, (r,.p., c. 1945), p.23.
destroy it”; lhe old slogan slill sounded good. And iJhrs i Jackr”n. 0perali”n.l OJ Eighih cop,, p.87.
u Jackson. Ofmli~minr oJLigh!h Co:or@,,,p.W88.
champions kepl their tenls, why lhen we mus, dare them lo
7 Jackrcm Oprrolianr oJKizh!h Corps, p.82.
/hefray,Jlaunting ourpnnop~ before lheir lines unlilfir ” .\,cKee .A. km: Anoil of IkiO~“, (London, 1966). p.268.
uery shame /hv should ‘ome ou, andJigh1.” q Hastings A,. Owriord. I)-&y and iiir Balik ,jb Amiir~d~ ,944,
This desire to engage the enemy armour negtectcd (LwKlon. 19841, p.210.
the fact that the German defensive doctrine was based ‘” Ellis 1”1ajor L I’. Vktoy in lhe ll’esl: Vdumr I ‘The BnUL u,f
x”rmnru!“, (I.ond<m> 1962), p.536
on self-propelled anti-tank guns protcctcd by infantry,
” McKee. Cam, p.268.
against which armoured forcrs were all but incffectivc. rJ “‘Exe C. ,le&ion in Jommd~. The I;n,,iiien Slog oJ Mon!yamrr~
Conversely, “rid ,hr Allied ca”zppui,~“, (hndnn, 1983), pp.370.
lhe German.r admitled how uulnerable lheir uiliage “’ ,jackson. Opemiions a[!/Ei~hliz Corps, p.86.
strongholds would have been lo infantry atlack supporled ‘+ lucks< ,I,. Odemioni afEi~hi,i C’ortx. v.89.
Ii :\lcKec. &, ,,.274: -’
by armo~r.‘~~
“/ Lamb K. M”“r~omrry,,, ,%rOpp’,943.,.!74,5 Suma 07 rniiurr.
The British also displayed cunsiderabte timidity, the (L”ndon. 1983), p.27.
negative effect of this being increased by a tendency ‘7 ‘TUKC-24178: “r,dr S,wly: Opcra,iw G,x,dwood. .\lil. 0,‘.
towards Restrictive Control. The stow tempo ofBritish Rcrearc,, Vni, Rcp,,rt 11”.23. Ocmhcr ,946, p.24.
1sJackson.Operolionr OfEi~M carp, p.84. TORoberts Major-General G P B. From l/h Dexrl lo Ihr Hollir,
‘9 D’Estc. “airion in Jvorormon*>,
pp.372. (London, 1987), p.179.
m Wray Major ‘L‘A. StandinpFax: C&man Drfenrive Doctrineon 71 See E,,io,t-Bamnan !vf. \‘ocabulav: The Srcond Prublem OC
he Russian Front During World War II, Prrwar t” March 19‘l3, Milky Kcfurm, Dgen.w A”“&3 1990.
KassorhSuy 5, (Fort Lca”cnw”rth, 19&i), p.125. 72 Ruber,s. Fmm Ihe Dewi to dle Kahr, p. 174.
2’ MansreinE. YUO.Lorl Victor& (Chic-agu, 19X3),p.268. 7s I’nrfit, c Arclrrr. “istorid Kecordi OJInr //m/urdihire Ii@ In,bii~
22Heywod Lieutenant A c. Goodwood,.%usahilldBTigodc and Lr Predemon, (Herchd, 19621, p.145.
Mago& (wi”tcr 1956,7), p., 73. ” TUKC-241x%, p.E
2’ hlcvcr H. Kriqgigexhichlede,12. ss Panrerdivirion
“Hiiirrju,~end”. ji Jacksm Operations qfEi,$dit Corps, p.95.
76 Kwgan. six Armb in ilbrmo*dJ, p.204.
‘7 Kemp, <K.SI.I, p.89.
7” P&i,,. Herr/dhn Lighi h,ani7y, p. 146.
‘Q Jacksun. “prmlioni o/E&hth C”rpr, pp. 1OG101.
8” ‘TORC-2417B, p.15.
6’ Mcvcr, 12. 3s l’anwdiai,~i”rr. p.1278.
m Jacknon. Operntion~ afE&hih Corpr, p.95.
83 XlcKee. Cm, p.288.
“4 Kccgan. sir hmicr in NormondJ, p.207.
* Kccgan. sir Armi<r in JVmmdy, p.21 I.
19d?July 1944.30 May 1979. L* Rubcrtr. hm ihe Iherr io rlir Uak, p. 175.
:‘aMcycr,12.ss Pnnrdiaiiion, p.1274. “’ Hevwmd, Goodwood, pp. 174-l 75,
ZY’Hewood, Goodwood, p.174. e+9.?,nonymwr. F c”mponj, 8th Anuoli”n The K,q?eHr@dr, (r1.p.. n.d.),
I* Hc;wmd, G,odwuod, p.173. p.12.
J* TdRC-5041, ,p.7. “9 R”,,rrrr. f+om ,/Is Lkrrr LONir Lhn<c, p. IX
a Meyer, 12. SS Pmrerdiuiiian, p.1274. *‘I Rohcrts. Fr’lm dr “em, lo ihr f?airic, p. 175.
3’ .Mcycr, 12. ss P”nirrdi”iiion, p.1275. *’ Forks P. The Crrnadlrr Cuorh in ihr we, ff 1939-19~5. voiumr I:
I” Heywood, Goodwood, p.173. 7hc Cmpaigm in North-W’e.ri Europe, (Aldcrshnr. 1949), p.74.
19 Dwics “J K. German Amy Hondbaok, ,9X&,945, (London, 1973), O1 Fitzgerald Major D J I. Hiilorq Q rhr hh Guardi bz liie kand
p.33. ,~VVid war, (Aldershot, 194Y), p.377.
* Heywod, Goodwood, p.173. -’ Forbes. Genodier Cuordr, p.75.
” Hcvwoud, Guudwood, p.173. 94 Jackson. *prrarionr “J.Qh,h carpi, p.,rll.
VJ .MA 12. ss Ponrrrdi~irion, p.1275. p5 Koarc. Captain he Earl OF, and Hill, Chnel E K. ‘The iory $/me
v Hc;wr;od, Cuodwood, p., 73. Guards Amourrd Diuirion, (London, 19X), p.41.
+’ myer, 12. ss P”nreduision, p.I275. y* Jxknon. Operniioni 0JE~ghih C”rp’, p. 101.
* Davies. German Amy ffandboak, p.39. 91 Robcrtr. i?“rn the “eicrl to Iha Adir, p.175.
j‘ Davies. German drmt ffendbook. p.50. 98 Rvrre. Guardr Armo”rcd “iuihz, p.40.
j7 Hcywmd; Goodwood, p., 73. IXJTDKC-241x3, p.15.
‘” .Meyer, IZ. ss I’anrdiui~ion, p.1275. ‘XJ McKee. cm. p.2YI.
‘” Mever. 12. .ss I’anrerdiuision. 0.1215. ‘0’ hfcyrr, 12. ss I’anz-erdiui~ion, p.1278.
I’ TLiRc&oal, p.10 “11 Jackson. *prrarrons oJEi&*h carps, p.95.
5’ ‘I‘DKC-5041, B-I. ‘“1 .\leyer, 12. ss hudi”ision, ,>. 1278.
3 see\\‘ynnrcapin c c. I/G’rmiany
mocks:The Halllr in LkpLhin “I’ CkKce. cm, p.292.
lhr W’eri; (London, ,940). “F Jackrc’n. Opernlionr ~/Ei~hhlh carpi, p.95.
33 Meyer, 12. 5s l’anzer*i”uion, p.LvGm ‘3, Be,, N. .+“rn ihr Bearlies lo tizc Ha& -I-h SlOC” of “G” c”mpn”y,
3’ wunnc Captain c c. Thr Lrgacy, Arme”!&U&,iJ 39( I), (“ctohcr 807 Bn*t,dian The xq+ Hri&dr duriq t,zr “mpa@ in Xorbrih-Wrsl
I,;,,, pm Europe, (Aldrrrhu,, ,943 p.28.
ii Bayncs J. nr Forgallen “ic,or. Genera, Sir Ri’hrd O’C”nnar, ‘“’ hlclirr. C”rn, p.293.
(London, 1989), pp.203~204. IM Jackson. opmii”m “fE@lh corps, p.95.
$6 D’Ertc. Lkiiian in ~hk7n~, pp.373. ‘I* TDRC-4924, p.2”.
3’ Baynes. I~or&won mar, P.184. 11’0Jacksm oprmianr uJEighih COI/)I, p.96.
7” Jxkrun. *prrorionr oJEi&lrn carp’, p.79. ‘1’ Taggar, A F. ,\eeds Murl me His@) OJl/x inns opk,, Regiment
” Hevan .Major D G. The l.rt ond~“nd~~vorriiompto~~i,~ ~mnon~, i!73!- W-,%5, (London, ,949). p.30.
,!M (Bmnswick, 1946). p., 19. “2 hlcyer, 12. ss Pmrrrdi”iiion, p.128”.
m Km,, R PI’, Licutcnant-Commander 1’ K. The ,,irioy OJ he ‘I7 tllis. I’iriory in Ihr Wed, p.1342.
&h Holralion Kin~‘s Shopshire Li$zi In@ziy (7.111) 17LW945, “4 Ellis. vict,clory
in he WEAL,p.1342.
(Shrewsbury, 19553, p.89. I’; Jackson. *perdons tiEi,@ Corps, p.97.
b’ Krmp, 4 Km, pp.88-89. “6 Jackson. opemim ofti@ carp,, pp.99-101.
a Ellir. mory in ihe wei,, p.134”. “3 Hell. Ihn Ihe &o&s to riie Aok, p.%
6:’ li+45 rni”UfCS, ‘TDRC-24,7B, p.16. “” Jarkron. *pmli”“i rgEigh,h “‘p.7, p. 102.
6. Krcgar, J. six drmier in Jvmnandy. .eo’romu-Lhj 10 ihr ,.ihrro*ion “/ “(1 TDRC-2417B, p.24.
Pens> (Harmondrwwth> 1983); p.204. ‘ln Hcuwood. Guodwuud, p. 174.
63 TDRC-241 m, p.16. ‘2’ A”;“ym<,“s, Te”mi Pmuoni, p.21.
* .An”“ym”“s, ‘I-aormi Pmuont, p.23. ‘12 Heywood, Gondwood, p.177.
6: Kemp, 4KSU p.89. ‘U Orde K. The .%urrhoid Couoiry a1 War: Smnd Hourhid hairy
h” D‘F.str. Dmisian in i\‘armnn~y, p.374. Regimen,, (Aldcmhu,, 1953), p.72.
b- Jdsm opmzrim,~ oJEi&h c*,p,, p.96.

(7hr authur giatchlly acknowlrdgcs hc lrclp or ,hc Tactical

hctrinc Rcwirval Cell at SraRCdlege Cnmberley wilh dx rcncarch
k,r dlir article)