League of Cities v.
Comelec cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject
Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to
the Cityhood Laws.
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting
33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However,
the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the
Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the
Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities
constitutional?
RULING:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is
unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that
such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other
laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the
LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law,
are material in determining the “just share” of local government units
(LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec
GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for
reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and
declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs)
converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’
deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income
requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and
RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood
bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only
affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added.
The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood
applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the
much higher income requirement after what they have gone through
would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness
dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city
status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18,
2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its
November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.
“Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc
Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc
Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on
the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the
main decision where there is no prior decision,” the Court said. In the
latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that
the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which
expressly provides that “no city…shall be created…except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code.” It stressed
that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied
exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws
provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the
creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The unconstitutionality of
the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded
and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood
Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.
The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply
to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No. 176951, League of Cities
of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the
fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in
2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not
ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws
not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have
also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code]
LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair
play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of
PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the
Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed
out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress
was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in
Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said
Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the
same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it.
Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in
the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also
unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that
the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are
but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009.
Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.”(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews
%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100
million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the
Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must
comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to
insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the
LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to
the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization,
countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.” (GR No.
176951, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499,
League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of
City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al . 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the
government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its
Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were
held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which
consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.)
rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various
negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5,
2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over
the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro
to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in
addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor
of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With
regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility
and authority between the Central Government and BJE was
provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With
the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the
negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation,
as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information.
They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws.
Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and right to
information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the
Constitution and the laws.
HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information
under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of
full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28
complements the right of access to information on matters of
public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of
public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with
the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of
the State to be accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to
the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public
disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress
cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public
concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the
State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot
thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an
excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these
freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be
corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public
consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident
in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the
duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation
regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided
by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares
that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing
the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying
principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should
be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and
principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not
by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups
only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a
component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-
building and empowerment for peace, which includes
―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the
peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the
conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations,
contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than
sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the
functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum
(NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate
and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be
―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace
Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the
peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of
society on both national and local levels, on the implementation
of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on
peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes
petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-
AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the
BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE
exceed those granted to any local government under present
laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been
vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a
general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different
provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law
concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly
alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually
framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to
in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES,
and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned
provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government.  Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by
shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The
nature of the ―associative relationship may have been intended
to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD
– by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR–
placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of
the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains
many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s
capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign
countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN
and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external defense.
Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official
missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted
by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting
them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it. The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not
even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
―associative‖ relationship with the national government.
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s
provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the
following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of
its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is
a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that
―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region in
the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY
in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte
which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A
and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present
components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,
does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then
was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended
if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within
the framework of national unity and development. An
associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While
there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing
a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework
will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same
does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-
AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1,
2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as
the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be
put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (G.R. No. L23825) - Digest
FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of
the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well
as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binañgonan
ISSUE:
W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio,
can create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities
RULING:
On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said
case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of
territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said
transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
— involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect
the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the
exercise of legislative power”
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby
arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and
this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the
end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out
or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any
of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them
the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments
than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him
more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so
ordered.
Miranda vs. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133064
Facts:
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 was signed into law.
In effect, the municipality of Santiago, Isabela was converted into an
independent component city. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago
ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted to
amend R.A. No. 7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said act on the
ground that there was a lacking provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting
the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite. However, the respondents maintain that said act was
constitutional. Further, they contend the standing of petitioners and the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
In his reply, Solicitor General contends that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city
to a component city. It did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the said petition?
 3. Whether or not Republic Act No. 8528 is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1. Yes
The court applied the direct injury test. In the case-at-bar, it is
clear that the change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component city will
affect petitioner Miranda’s powers as mayor. Hence, the injury
that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is
direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance
shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the other
petitioners are residents and voters in the city of Santiago.
They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city
through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The
denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
2. Yes.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
the court has the duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." Clearly, there exists a justiciable issue because
petitioners in light of Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No.
8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. Further, it is
within the jurisdiction of the court to assess whether a law
passed by Congress comply with the Constitutional
requirements.
3. Yes.
Upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7720, it upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent
component city. Consequently, it required the approval of its
people through a plebiscite called for the purpose. In the same
way, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 8528, it downgraded the
status of their city. So, there is a more compelling reason to
require a plebiscite in accordance to Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. 1 Which is further reiterated in Section
10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
and Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.2 It is
clear that the said enactments have substantially alter the status
of Santiago City which in effect resulted in a material change
in the local government unit that eventually created a change in
the political and economic rights of its people. Only the
Congress has the power over such matter. Hence, R.A. No.
8528 is unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to comply
with the requisite of holding an actual plebiscite.
Dispositive:  Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
PADILLA v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735
Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation
1
“ No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
2
“No creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing
such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.”

FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155 and Resolution No. 2312 enacted by the
respondent, the respondent conducted a plebiscite in both the proposed
municipality and the mother municipality. In the plebiscite, the creation of
the proposed municipality was declared rejected. Petitioner herein
contends that the plebiscite is invalid because the Constitution requires that
the plebiscite should only be conducted in the areas comprising the
proposed municipality. He claimed further that the ruling in Tan v. COMELEC
has been abandoned by the Court, readopting the ruling in Paredes v.
COMELEC, and that this is justified  by the deletion of the phrase "unit or" in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor.
ISSUE:
(1) WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312.
(2) WON the plebsicite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
municipality and the remaining areas of the mother municipality is valid.
(3) WON the court readopted the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC.
HELD:
(1) No. We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected
the creation of the proposed Municipality, is valid.
(2) Yes. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall
be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that
residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by
the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly
affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the
plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte.
(3) No. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been
superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating
our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines
that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision
deleted the words "unit or". The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in the 1987
Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution not affected the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO
vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued,
pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating
the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from
the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of
San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along
with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal
council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later
officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he
conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed
in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo
warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of
EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor
General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning
the creation of the new municipality and that the case had become
moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160
(Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as
of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the
Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally
existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had
been void ab initio.
Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.”
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 161414

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto Re: Municipal Corporations
municipal corporation.
FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor
HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San General was EO No. 107 creating the Municipality of Andong.
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence and the
thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays,
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive public officials, high school, etc.
order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for ISSUES:
being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly (1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by
could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal statute.
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the (2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six corporation.
years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but
HELD:
it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts
all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of
(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107
the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a
establishing Andong was declared void ab initio (from inception) by
municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the Pelaez
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having
case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts,
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
a duly constituted municipality.
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of
a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban,
was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality had never been
challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order
creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was
later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in
the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there
might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be
deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of
1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."