[ A.M. No.

10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011 ]

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,

[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]

RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF
THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A
SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL
and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE T

HE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE "TRIAL OF THE DECADE"
TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF
THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak
in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic
incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge
of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-
163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.  Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases,
the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.

Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,[1] individual journalists[2] from various media entities, and members of the
academe[3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. [4] The Court docketed the petition
as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines[5] (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag[6] (AFIMA) filed on
November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on
the Maguindanao  Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the
courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the
court.[7] The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.

President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010[8]  addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of
those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed "earnest hope that
[this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation,
attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits." [9] The Court docketed the matter as A.M.
No. 10-11-7-SC.

By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,[10] the Court  consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC  with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.  The
Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.

Meanwhile, various groups[11] also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters.

The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M.
No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.  The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed
their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011.  Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.

On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.  They principally urge the
Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case[12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Joseph E. Estrada[13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional
rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the
crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and
searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast
coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter[14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a
dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases.  Judge Solis-Reyes replied,
however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Court's attention through appropriate motion." [15] Hence,
the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to
assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association,  subject to
regulations to be issued by the Court.

The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the
guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.

Putt's Law[16] states that "technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those
who manage what they do not understand."  Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts' gown,
so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.

A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate balance
between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.

The indication of "serious risks" posed by live media coverage to the accused's right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored
in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.

The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation
which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety
nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.

In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of
justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. 
Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative
matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ? "[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned
and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and
departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated."  The observation that
"[m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary
atmosphere and decorum" stands.

The Court concluded in Aquino:

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice,
and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during
the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in
the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated. [17]

The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
in a criminal case. It held that "[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial."  The Court disposed:

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any
person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are
aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[18]

In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope
when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:

x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be
held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the
audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the
original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.[19]
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas[20] which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a
jury system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily
schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence.  To petitioners,  Estes also does not
represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence [21] and statistical figures revealing
that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.

Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage.  Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdom's Supreme Court are filmed,
and sometimes broadcast.[22]  The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet. [23]

On the media coverage's influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack
empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion.  They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly
supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People
v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.  Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a
proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right.  As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change
of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of
the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of
accommodating even the parties to the cases - the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses - inside the
courtroom.  On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.  A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. [26] (underscoring supplied)

Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject
criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families.  It cannot be gainsaid that the
families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings
as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants.  It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed
more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough.  What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general
public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.  Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.

In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the
following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to
live radio and television broadcasting.

(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to  carry out the same, with
an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until
promulgation of judgment.

No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed.  No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an
application duly approved by the trial court.

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of
the sala of the trial court.  No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the
proceedings.  The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee
of the Supreme Court.  The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs
showing the equipment is operating should not be visible.  A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not
wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.

The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-
up of the camera and equipment.

(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that
the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the
access to the media entities.

The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the
account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the
courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical
glitches.

If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities' facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-
visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web
broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.

At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.

(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof
where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses
from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the
security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of
the witness).

The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or
both.

(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the
day's proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings
wherein the public is ordered excluded.

(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without
any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of
the scene.  Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still
images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe
the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

(j)  The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue
supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media
entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements,
implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro
hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements.  It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology.

(l)  All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still
cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these
guidelines.

Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional
precepts into the workable context.  Technology per se has always been neutral.  It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-
tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of
defined guidelines.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live
broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein
outlined.

SO ORDERED. 

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 197291, April 03, 2013 ]

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., PETITIONER, VS. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, AS CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE,
AND PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, HEADED BY RSP PETER MEDALLE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to
act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a
certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.

The Case

This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No.
10-124777[1] by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus.[2]

Antecedents

History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio
Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province.  Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the
Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009
at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a
hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.[3]

Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to
conduct the preliminary investigation.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against
petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. [4]  On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. [5]

On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the
venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.[6] On December 8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. [7]  However, on December 9,
2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of
15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the Cotabato City RTC. [8]  Later on, additional informations
for murder were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution
of the Court.[9]

The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was arraigned on January 5,
2010,[10] February 3, 2010,[11] and July 28, 2010.[12]

In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation
to the Maguindanao massacre.[13] It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly
relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009. [14]

On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. [15] On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC
issued its amended pre-trial order,[16] wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. [17]

On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had
already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.[18] Petitioner reiterated the request twice
more on October 22, 2010[19] and November 2, 2010.[20]

By her letter dated November 2, 2010,[21] however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.

Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777),
[22]
 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC
RTC.
On January 19, 2011,[23] the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.  At the close of
the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.

In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 2011 [24] and February 18, 2011,[25] respondents questioned the propriety of the
conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus.  Petitioner opposed.

On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, [26] which the RTC in Manila granted on March 21,
2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.

Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.

On March 21, 2011,[27] the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ,
requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.

On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. [28]  Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the subpoena on April 15,
2011.[29] The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26, 2011; [30] petitioner an opposition on May
12, 2011;[31] and respondents another reply dated May 20, 2011. [32]

On June 27, 2011,[33] the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus.[34]

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY
DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN
LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR
AND THE QC RTC; and,

2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES
EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN
THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND
EXECUTION.[35]

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to
see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
their violators.  The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. [36] 
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause
to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent.  Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. [37]

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to
interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice,
exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. 
By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.” [38]

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the
196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre.  It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint
resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also
investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations.  However, his
exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of
Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section
2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that “the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from
the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission
into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act).[39] These modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its
commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from
reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.

These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with their
consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court
shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the
discharge.  The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said
accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State,
can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the
following circumstances are present:

a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under
special laws;

b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to
Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the
other requirements of this Act.  Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State
Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules are essentially the same.
Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also
be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged
as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future
prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge.[40]  The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the
exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. [41]

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may be
utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, [42]  such discretion is not absolute and may not be
exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. [43] Anent the requisite that there must be an
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and
the information provided by the public prosecutor.  The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the trial
court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state
witness.  The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his
case,[44] as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most
guilty’ one, and the like.[45]
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one
of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under
Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information
except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should
such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of
admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. [46] The Court shall then
order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information. [47]

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was
warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges.  Apparently, all the
conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of
the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that
was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in
the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in
accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.  It is proper when the act against which it is directed is
one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.  In matters involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, [48] or to compel the retraction
or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. [49]

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to
act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.  Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the
letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner’s recourse.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case
No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[ A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, January 13, 2015 ]

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.); A.M. NO. 10-11-6-SC (RE: PETITION FOR
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS,
INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS
CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL AND FOR THE SETTING UP OF
VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR THE JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE
PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE 'TRIAL OF THE DECADE' TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS
COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION); AND A.M. NO. 10-11-7-SC (RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S.
AQUINO III FOR THE 'LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL').

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JANUARY 13, 2015, which reads as follows:

"A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC (Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.); A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC (Re: Petition for the Constitution of the Present
Court Handling the Trial of the Massacre of 57 Persons, Including 32 Journalists, in Ampatuan, Maguindanao into a Special
Court Handling This Case Alone for the Purpose of Achieving Genuine Speedy Trial and for the Setting Up of Videocam and
Monitor Just Outside the Court for the Journalists to Cover and for the People to Witness the 'Trial of the Decade' to Make It
Truly Public and Impartial as Commanded by the Constitution); and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC (Re: Letter of President Benigno S.
Aquino III for the 'Live Media Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial').-

Before the Court for resolution are the following Motions for Reconsideration of the October 23, 2012 Resolution in these
consolidated cases:

1. Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2012 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for President
Benigno S. Aquino III;
 2. Motion for Reconsideration dated December 5, 2012 filed by petitioners National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), et al.; and

3. Motion for Reconsideration dated December 6, 2012 filed by petitioners Editha Mirandilla-Tiamzon (Tiamzon) and Glenna
Legarta (Legarta).

Previously, or on June 14, 2011, this Court promulgated a Resolution[1] (the June 14, 2011 Resolution) partially granting pro hac
vice the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the "Maguindanao massacre" cases,
[2]
 subject to specific guidelines. Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the June 14, 2011
Resolution on June 29, 2011, while accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan) filed his Motion for Reconsideration on June 27, 2011.

On October 23, 2012, this Court partially granted reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution and disallowed the live media
broadcast of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre cases (the October 23, 2012 Resolution). This Court, however, still allowed the
filming of the proceedings for real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, as well as the documentation of the trial, subject to
the following guidelines on audio-visual recording and streaming of the video coverage:

a. An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to
specified closed-circuit viewing areas: (i) outside the courtroom, within the Camp Bagong Diwa's premises; and (ii) selected trial
courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General Santos City where the relatives of the accused and the victims reside.
Said trial courts shall be identified by the Office of the Court Administrator. These viewing areas shall be under the control of the trial
court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision.

b. The viewing area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to observe the proceedings within the Camp Bagong
Diwa premises. The streaming of this video coverage within the different court premises in Mindanao will be installed so that the
relatives of the parties and the interested public can watch the proceedings in real time.

c. A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of
the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the
proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee
of the Supreme Court.

d. The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the closed-circuit viewing areas shall be conducted in
such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings.

e. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial courts involved on the
physical set-up of the camera and equipment.

f. The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

g. The audio-visual recording of the proceedings and its transmittal shall be made under the control of the trial court which may issue
supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, subject to this Court's supervision.

h. In all cases, the witnesses should be excluded from watching the proceedings, whether inside the courtroom or in the designated
viewing areas. The Presiding Judge shall issue the appropriate orders to insure compliance with this directive and for the imposition of
appropriate sanctions for its violation.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2012, for President Benigno S. Aquino III,
alleging that "the trial of the deplorable, heinous and inhuman Maguindanao Massacre - a crime that is an illustration of the culture of
impunity prevalent in the country - is imbued with public interest; thus, the need for its live radio and television coverage to ensure
transparency and maintain integrity in the administration of justice" which would not prejudice the rights of the accused. The OSG
maintained that the prosecution of the Maguindanao massacre is a matter of transcendental public concern which stirred public outcry
and attracted wide international attention. According to the OSG, "[i]t is through public showing of the trial that transparency in the
administration of justice is achieved." Moreover, the OSG contended that "whatever apprehension there may be on a full media
coverage resulting in 'trial by publicity' remains purely conjectural and speculative."

In the Resolution dated December 4, 2012, this Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motion for reconsideration filed
by President Aquino.

Petitioners NUJP, et al. also filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 5, 2012, citing the following as grounds for
reconsideration: 1) compelling circumstances militate against blind adherence to stare decisis; 2) the balancing-of-interests test
applied in the resolution runs contra to the Court's established rulings on freedom of speech, and in truth, the rights of the accused and
those of a free press, to information and to a public trial are not repugnant to each other; 3) there are no factual bases to sustain the
conclusion that live televised coverage will unduly influence judges and witnesses; and 4) regulation is to be preferred over outright
prohibition; neither should prohibition in the guise of regulation be preferred. NUJP, et al. also prayed that this Court reconsider its
earlier Resolution and convene the special committee to formulate the appropriate guidelines for live coverage of
the Maguindanao massacre trial.

In the Resolution dated December 11, 2012, this Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motion for reconsideration filed
by NUJP.
Counsels for petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Honorable Court's October 23, 2012
Resolution dated December 6, 2012, alleging that the banning of the live coverage of the Maguindanao massacre trials bucks the
international trend towards judicial transparency and openness in matters that pertain to the public interest. Petitioners Tiamzon and
Legarta also maintained that this Court's "refusal to allow live coverage of [the] trial seriously impairs the right of the public - and not
just of the families of the massacre victims - to be informed of what ought to be the litmus test of the Philippine criminal justice
system." The petitioners also prayed that this Court take due note and appropriate when applicable the models provided by the
Supreme Court of the State of Michigan and the 20th Judicial Circuit of Florida in dealing with the live media coverage of court
proceedings.

In the Resolution dated January 8, 2013, this Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta.

Accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr., in his Comment dated February 21, 2013, stated that this Court had consistently taken the stand that "in
balancing the competing rights of the public to know and of the right of the accused, the latter must prevail." Ampatuan further cited
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states:

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights
and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of moral, public order
(order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;
but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.

In a Manifestation and Motion dated February 18, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III alleged that the issues and arguments
involved in NUJP's Motion for Reconsideration dated December 5, 2012 were consistent with the issues and arguments succinctly
discussed in his own Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2012. President Aquino then prayed that his motion for
reconsideration be reproduced by reference and considered as comment on NUJP's motion for reconsideration.

In a Comment dated April 11, 2013, accused Ampatuan stated that he was adopting his earlier Comment dated February 21, 2013 as
his comment to the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta. Ampatuan further alleged that according to a
report by the Subcommittee of the Legislative Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference of Committee to Study Extended
Media Coverage, not all states in the United States of America approve of courtroom media coverage. Those that were either
experimenting or had already approved of broadcast even had further qualifications such as first obtaining the consent of the accused
or other participants, disallowing coverage upon objection, and prior approval of the court.

After considering the arguments in the three Motions for Reconsideration before us, we see no reason to reverse our October 23, 2012
Resolution disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-
66, and Q-10-163766.

Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta point us to certain models from the United States, but we are not persuaded because even in that
jurisdiction, there are, to this day, conflicting rules and theories on the effect of cameras in courtroom proceedings. To study this, the
federal Judiciary has an ongoing digital video pilot to evaluate the effect of cameras in courtrooms, and fourteen (14) federal trial
courts are currently taking part in this project that has been extended to run until July 18, 2015.[3] It is noteworthy that the guidelines
for this pilot project provide that media or its representatives will not be permitted to create recordings of courtroom proceedings. The
pilot is limited to civil proceedings in which the parties have consented to recording. [4] Moreover, although allowed in certain cases
by district courts, photographing in the courtroom, as well as broadcasting of judicial proceedings, is prohibited in criminal cases by
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.[5]

The issue of whether to allow cameras in federal courtrooms is still raging. Opponents of cameras in federal courtrooms view the state
court criminal trial of O.J. Simpson as a glaring example of a case in which the presence of cameras in the courtroom detracted from
the dignity of the proceedings.[6] In her article "The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom,"[7] Prof. Nancy S. Marder wrote "[e]ven
though developments in technology have led to cameras that no longer require wires, cables, and camera crew members everywhere,
the presence of a camera, no matter how unobtrusive, can still contribute to a circus-like atmosphere, as several high-profile cases in
state courts have suggested."[8] Prof. Marder further wrote, "[th]e message of these cases is that when things go wrong with cameras in
the courtroom, they go very wrong. The cases that serve as warnings are cases like the state criminal trial of O.J. Simpson for the
murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman in California, the dispute over the burial of Anna Nicole Smith in Florida, and
the first state criminal trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez for the murder of their parents in California. In each of these cases, the camera
was omnipresent and seemed to alter the behavior of judge and lawyers alike."[9]

The judge needs to protect the rights of the parties and the dignity of the court as well as ensure the orderly conduct of the
proceedings. In these high profile cases, this was not so easily achieved, and according to Prof. Marder, "[a]lthough there are no
studies proving that cameras 'caused' these effects, the view of many in the legal community is that they did. And although these and a
few other cases should be seen as outliers, the damage they did was far-reaching and disproportionate to their numbers." [10]

Prof. Marder further wrote:

Opponents of cameras in federal courtrooms are concerned about the effects that cameras will have on the participants in the
courtroom. In trial courts, they worry that witnesses' behavior could be changed by the presence of cameras. Witnesses could become
reluctant to testify. Witnesses could become concerned about their own safety if they are seen by television viewers. Opponents are
also concerned that witnesses could be nervous about testifying before the camera and that their nervousness could be misunderstood
by jurors. x x x
xxxx

Opponents of cameras in federal courtrooms also worry about the camera's effects on lawyers and judges. They worry that lawyers
will play more to the cameras than to the courtroom. Lawyers could become more dramatic, argumentative, or long-winded as they
think about their image on television. Meanwhile, judges could become stricter or more lenient, more garrulous or taciturn, as they too
think about television coverage.[11]

xxxx

High-profile cases, such as the state criminal trial of O.J. Simpson for the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman, serve
as warnings for some in the legal community about the ways in which judges' and lawyers' behavior can change when cameras are
present in the courtroom. Even if the judge and lawyers were not aware of the camera at every moment of the O.J. Simpson criminal
trial, they were sufficiently aware of the camera that their behavior became more exaggerated [12] x x x.

Opponents of cameras in federal courtrooms conceive of the camera as affecting behavior, rather than as a neutral, passive, all-seeing
eye. As one federal judge observed: "[Cameras] affect peoples' performance and manner of behaving - and it's not always for the
good." Another federal judge who participated in a pilot study that permitted cameras in some federal courtrooms on a limited basis
found that "the camera is likely to do more than report the proceeding - it is likely to influence the substance of the proceeding." [13]

Although cameras are unobtrusive and no longer require the lights, wires, and crew that they once did, their presence can still create a
media spectacle that could undermine a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. The images from the courtroom that become
ubiquitous on cable television and the Internet twenty-four hours a day can create a new form of media spectacle. State court judges
who handle high-profile jury trials are acutely aware of this problem. Their priority is a fair trial, even if the media does not see it that
way.[14]

Prof. Marder suggests moving incrementally in a more open direction, and writes, "Cameras may eventually become commonplace in
federal courtrooms, but it seems wise to proceed with caution before making such a policy change. The decision to conduct a three-
year pilot program to study cameras in federal courtrooms is an important step and suggests waiting until the results are
known."[15] She further writes:

Judges need to recognize that neither television nor Internet images are neutral or objective. What viewers see is shaped by the way
cameramen or individuals frame, light, and focus on the subject and the way that producers - professionals or amateurs - put together
the story. The traditional view of cameras is as the all-seeing eye: they are turned on and they simply record what is before them. What
is missing from this account is that the placement of the camera, the focus on a particular subject to the exclusion of all others, the
editing of the images, and the voice-over that accompanies the images, give shape to the story. Because images are powerful and the
story is woven seamlessly, it is easy to lose sight of what has been omitted and what choices have been made in the process. [16]

The OSG alleges that it is through a public showing of the trial that transparency in the administration of justice is achieved. Prof.
Marder points out in her article that the notion of "public" may have taken on a new meaning in light of developments in technology.
[17]
 The "Maguindanao massacre" trial is already open to the public in several different ways, as outlined in the dispositive portion of
our October 23, 2012 resolution and discussed above. Prof. Marder recognizes that it is important that the work of courts remains
accessible to the public, but raises another reason to proceed slowly, and that is, once cameras enter federal courtrooms, they will be
difficult to remove, and if it proves to be a mistake, the damage will be difficult, if not impossible, to undo. This Court agrees with the
OSG about the transcendental importance of this trial, but cannot afford to open the door for even one detrimental mistake that could
undermine the dignity and efficacy of the proceedings, or in any way affect the impartial administration of justice.

Petitioners NUJP, et al. allege that this Court continues to ignore Chandler v. Florida[18] and the "many authorities cited in the petition
pertinent to constitutional rights, history and current events, which persuasively establish that prohibiting television cameras inside
courtrooms finds no home in the open and transparent atmosphere of the 21st century." In Chandler v. Florida, the United States
Supreme Court found that new advances in technology and changes in the public perception of television gave reason to no longer
presume prejudice from the mere broadcasting of a trial, thus leaving open the possibility for increased television broadcasting of
criminal trials.[19] But as mentioned before, this has led to some problems. As put forth by one United States criminal defense attorney
in an article published in the New York Law School Law Review, "[t]he Simpson case had a great effect on the legal community and
the public as a whole. It has forced many to reconsider the wisdom of allowing cameras in the courtroom."[20] Even former President
Bill Clinton joined the ranks of critics after the O.J. Simpson trial, saying that television coverage of the trial created a "circus
atmosphere."[21]

Summarizing the lessons learned from the O.J. Simpson trial, Judge Sharen Wilson and Judge Cynthia Stevens Kent in their article
"Handling Capital Cases Dealing with the Media," published in the Texas Wesleyan Law Review, wrote:

Perhaps all that needs to be said on the issue of media and trials is People v. O.J. Simpson. The lessons of that trial are obvious. The
trial judge is directly and personally responsible for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the courtroom proceedings. The media's
interests do not involve issues of fair trial and due process. Rather, the media's interests involve issues of public information, ratings,
and financial benefits from coverage of a particular trial. Further, when dealing with media coverage, the attorney should determine
how media coverage might affect the resolution of the client's case and how he or she can appropriately deal with a capital case so as
to protect the client and the integrity of our system of justice. Also, the trial judge must be aggressively involved in media
management to ensure the defendant's Constitutional right to a fair trial and the societal right to justice in a properly conducted trial.

xxxx
Although the United States Supreme Court maintains its prohibition of any broadcasting from its proceedings, in Chandler v. Florida
the court unanimously held that permitting radio, television, and photographic coverage of criminal proceedings over the defendant's
objections was constitutional absent a showing of abuse or actual prejudice. x x x.

xxxx

Thus, clearly the press does not have a First Amendment right of access to broadcast court proceedings. This decision has been
challenged repeatedly but the Court has consistently held that the First Amendment protection of a free press does not require
unlimited access to televise from the courtroom.

xxxx

Thus, the Chandler court not only held that broadcast coverage was not presumptively unconstitutional or inherently prejudicial; it
also reiterated the holding that a media organization does not have a First Amendment right to broadcast court proceedings. Further,
the court held that a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a publicly broadcasted trial. Rather, the Court decided that
the trial court had the discretion as to whether or not to allow in-court broadcasting after balancing the procedure for such
broadcasting and the fundamental right to a fair trial.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)

Professor Kyu Ho Youm, who specializes in U.S. and international media law, wrote:

D. Cameras Still Banned from Federal Courts

xxxx

In 2011, the Judicial Conference authorized another three-year experiment with cameras in the courtroom similar to the one of the
1990s conducted by the Conference. The latest experiment of the federal courts is an exception to a local camera ban on federal courts.
It is designed to address the request from Congress and some federal judges who positively view broadcast of court proceedings. The
experiment is still limited in that it is only confined to civil trials and requires the approval of the presiding judge and the consent of
all parties. In addition, the pilot program will not involve the news media organizations' "independent" cameras. Rather, court
personnel will make the recordings, and it is up to the judge's discretion to make the recordings available to the public and the press.
Moreover, the judge can switch off the recording "at any time."

The Supreme Court demonstrated indirectly but unmistakably that it has no inclination to broadcast its own proceedings. In early
2010, the Court by a 5-4 vote barred a federal district court from broadcasting a trial in San Francisco that concerned Proposition 8, an
amendment to the Constitution of California that outlawed same-sex marriage in California. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court held
that "without expressing any view on whether such trials should be broadcast," the broadcast should be prohibited on the ground that
the trial court failed to follow the appropriate judicial procedures under federal law relating to such broadcasting. The Court, citing
Estes [Estes v. Texas], was concerned about the impact of broadcasting on witnesses. "Witness testimony may be chilled if broadcast,"
the majority wrote. "It is difficult to demonstrate or analyze whether a witness would have testified differently if his or her testimony
had not been broadcast. And witnesses subject to harassment as a result of broadcast of their testimony might be less likely to
cooperate in any future proceedings."[23]

The critics of broadcasted proceedings in the United States validly raise a lot of concerns, including "the potential for intimidation of
jurors and witnesses, the possibility of a biased jury, grandstanding by the judge and/or the participating attorneys, and lastly, the
threat to general courtroom decorum and the likelihood of chilled advocacy and judicial questioning."[24] The critics have this in their
favor: the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair and public trial has been interpreted to be the defendant's right alone, not to be shared
by the public.[25]

To summarize and highlight the above considerations, we quote below a portion of the Comment, "Does the First Amendment's 'Right
of Access' Require Court Proceedings to be Televised? A Constitutional and Practical Discussion," by Audrey Maness, published in
the Pepperdine Law Review:

b. Practical Considerations

The crux of the critic's practical argument is that adding a camera to a trial "significantly alters the judicial process in ways
which pad and pen never did." Many of the critics maintain that the past decade of widespread camera usage lends support to
their argument, providing ample examples of what can - and does - go wrong. Furthermore, many critics argue that the use of
cameras infuses courtrooms with politics, making "trials more political and less judicial." Finally, critics readily note that the
potential adverse effects of cameras extend beyond the courtroom, infringing upon trial participants' privacy and safety,
wrongfully encouraging civil litigants to settle, and causing a general public misperception of the court system and a given
trial.

xxxx

Furthermore, even if judges were forced to value the educational effect of broadcasted proceedings, they should do so with caution, as
the education provided from a televised proceeding is an incomplete and imperfect one. Critics note that the trials that which are
likely to be broadcast are atypical high-profile cases, and even those are often edited or summarized with two-minute "wrap-
ups" at the end of the day.[26] This provides the public with a distorted view of both trials in general and of the specific trial
under the spotlight.
Of even greater importance in the critics' argument is the potential adverse effect media coverage of a trial can have on trial
participants. As mentioned above, proponents contend that the judicial procedures in place provide adequate safeguards against
prejudice to the defendant. However, critics claim that such safeguards merely act as "legal Band-Aids," minimizing prejudicial
decision-making to some extent, but failing to "ameliorate media's potential disruptive influences on the trial itself." Consider how
media coverage affects the star of the show, the defendant. Many critics suggest that media coverage portrays the defendant in an
inaccurate, unflattering, and incriminating light, which follows the defendant into his personal life even after an acquittal is handed
down. Furthermore, regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately found innocent or guilty, the camera's incriminating eye affects
the public, which in turn affects jurors, as many do not want to return an unfavorable verdict and then face criticism from their
community. x x x.

The concerns as applied to witnesses are similarly substantial, but on different grounds. Whereas the defendant is often an involuntary
trial participant, witnesses are regularly voluntary, and participation is fueled by a need to see justice done. However, some argue that
witnesses are less inclined to participate in trial proceedings when cameras are present, either because they do not wish to be thrust
into the public eye or because they are simply intimidated by the presence of cameras in the courtroom. This could potentially harm a
defendant's case. Even those witnesses who voluntarily participate may give altered testimony, either because they have listened to
other testimony on television against a judge's orders, or merely because the idea of their words being broadcast to an audience of
thousands is frightening and unnerving. Broadcasted witness testimony even follows the witness after the trial has ended - Pablo
Fenjves of the notorious O.J. Simpson murder trial noted that he had strangers approach him in the supermarket and he had even
received death threats. This raises another substantial concern: the safety and privacy of trial participants. Though most trial
participants realize that some level of privacy is readily sacrificed when one is involved in a public trial, this sacrifice becomes
exponentially greater when cameras provide exposure to the national, rather than just local, community.

These arguments are further supported by studies evaluating the effect of cameras in the courtroom. Even though some critics admit
that the available studies are generally in the proponent's favor, others have found differently. For example, consider once again the
Federal Pilot Program of the early 1990s. While many proponents have cited the evaluation favorably, others have focused on the
specific results, noting the following "disturbing" statistics: 64% of the participating judges stated that cameras made witnesses more
anxious, 46% thought "cameras made witnesses less willing to appear in court," and 41% found that cameras distracted witnesses.
These statistics were supplemented by serious concerns from trial attorneys, who stressed that cameras may prevent witnesses and
parties from testifying on sensitive matters, and that damaging accusations made at trial might persist after the trial, even if the
defendant were vindicated. At least one defense attorney stated that "the threat of a televised trial would [encourage] the defendant to
consider settlement regardless of the [strength] of the case [on the merits]. Critics citing these results understandably conclude that the
"disadvantages of cameras in the courtroom far outweigh the advantages.

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Finally, many critics argue that televised reporting will necessarily be biased, as networks will rarely be able to cover a trial in its
entirety. Even with a network solely committed to uninterrupted coverage (much like C-SPAN for the national legislature), it would
be difficult to cover all trials in full, and even if the possibility existed, snippets of proceedings would likely be borrowed by other
multi-purpose networks. Such selective cuts could misconstrue statements of the participants, possibly resulting in prejudice during
trial or a distorted view of the attorneys, witnesses, or judges that would persist even after the trial ended. These arguments present no
easy task for proponents; they set forth serious concerns that should be heeded by the judicial community. x x x. [27] (Emphases
supplied.)

Considering the above discussion on the practical aspects of broadcasted criminal trial proceedings, this Court is therefore not
persuaded by the OSG's claim that "whatever apprehension there may be on a full media coverage resulting in 'trial by publicity'
remains purely conjectural and speculative."

As for other foreign jurisdictions, despite what petitioners NUJP, et al. describe as the "open and transparent atmosphere of the
21st century," most countries still do not allow cameras in their courtrooms. [28]

The Constitution states that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof."[29] In resolving the issues raised by the parties in this case, this Court was mindful that it was dispensing this constitutionally-
enshrined duty, which it never takes lightly, and has thus decided accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2012 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for President
Benigno S. Aquino III; the Motion for Reconsideration dated December 5, 2012 filed by petitioners National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines (NUJP), et al.; and the Motion for Reconsideration dated December 6, 2012 filed by petitioners Editha Mirandilla-
Tiamzon and Glenna Legarta, all of our October 23, 2012 Resolution, are hereby DENIED." Brion, J., on leave. Jardeleza, J., no
part.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL

Clerk of Court