A G A I N S T the D A Y

Mark Duffield

Total War as Environmental Terror:

Linking Liberalism, Resilience, and the Bunker

Introduction

T otal war is usually understood in terms of the dissolution of the juridi-

cal distinctions among governments, armies, and people. It is associated
with the industrialization of warfare and the advent of mass social mobili-
zation. Total war, however, is more than this. It is a modus operandi of vio-
lence that, in the broadest sense of the term, demands the destruction of
an enemy’s environmental lifeworld.1 The targets of this war include the
climate regimes, vital urban infrastructures, ecological systems, and social
networks, together with the neurological and cellular processes that collec-
tively support life and make it possible. Since the essence of such warfare
is surprise and uncertainty, especially the dread of not knowing when or
where the blow will fall, total war operates through terror. More specifi-
cally, it works as environmental terror.
Emerging from a deepening science-­led dialogue between war,
nature, and economy that began with World War I, environmental terror
calls forth the attributes and skill sets of resilience. Resilience provides
a defense against the unpredictability and uncertainty of environmental
terror. Together with the ability to recover from surprise and shock, resil-
ience denotes the capacity to forge new conditions of existence while still
retaining system functionality.2 Rather than a direct confrontation and
elimination of the causes of environmental terror, however, resilience is
a defense that relies more on constant adaptation to surrounding uncer-
tainty. Indeed, the ability to change and adapt becomes a virtue in itself.
The South Atlantic Quarterly 110:3, Summer 2011
DOI 10.1215/00382876-1275779 © 2011 Duke University Press
758 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

For resilient systems and relationships, uncertainty is not necessarily nega-

tive. Because it has the potential to foster new and, by implication, more
robust conditions of existence, unpredictability can be positive. For most of
the twentieth century, however, modernity offered an essentially different
approach to uncertainty, an approach that sought to limit its effects.3
The emergence of environmental terror is intrinsically linked to
the neoliberal crusade against modernity that surfaced during the 1970s.
Reaching its zenith in the mid-­twentieth century, political modernity was
shaped by, among other things, social insurance and the welfare or New
Deal state that, coupled with an ethos of comprehensiveness and stan-
dardization in urban and public planning, aimed to protect against the
contingencies and pathologies of everyday life.4 Emerging from the class
struggles and political compromises associated with industrial capitalism,
modernity, unlike resilience, attempted to banish want and anxiety. For
resilience, however, uncertainty is an essential antidote to the psychologi-
cal and material dependency that welfarism and public planning are held
to entrench. For liberalism, anxiety is necessary if the desirable attributes
of foresight, enterprise, and self-­reliance are to flourish.
Uncertainty, however, does not exist outside the military and politi-
cal conditions of its creation. Regarding the wider economy, now located
in neoliberal processes of privatization, deregulation, and globalization,
environmental uncertainty is a fabrication. Having its origins in warfare,
the bunker, in all its many forms and variable scales, provides a generic
response to environmental terror. For example, when linked by secure cor-
ridors to form archipelagos of privileged circulation, bunkers provide a
solution to the problem of maintaining good circulation in a fragmented
and threatening lifeworld. Defended archipelagos bridge the buttressed
development-­underdevelopment divide. At the same time, in a postpoliti-
cal age, the bunker furnishes a secure space of private consumption from
which international elites can safely strategize power without the need for
negotiation or compromise.

Total War and the Problematization of Society

World War I was instrumental in the emergence of environmental ter-
ror. It saw the first use of poison gas on the battlefield and the beginnings
of the aerial bombardment of cities. The possibility of strategic bombing
revealed society as having new spatial, logistical, and ecological dimen-
sions. Enemy society was discovered to be an interconnected set of vital
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 759

technical systems or critical infrastructure. Economy was redefined eco-

logically in terms of its strategic industries, electricity stations, sewage sys-
tems, and workers’ housing, interconnected by networks of railways, tele-
phone systems, bridges, and canals.5 This spatial understanding demanded
new forms of intelligence, not only to catalog critical infrastructure but
also to note the habits and characteristics of the people that depended on
it. Known as morale bombing, the destruction of critical infrastructure from
the outset was imbued with mass effects. That is, by destroying the enemy’s
environmental lifeworld, it was argued that the will to fight could be broken
and popular insurrection and calls for appeasement could be encouraged.
There is, however, an obvious reflexivity to morale bombing: it can
work in both directions. The doctrine of interwar strategic bombing nec-
essarily called forth a system of civil defense. Rather than protecting civil-
ians, however, civil defense during the 1930s was essentially concerned
with controlling the expected civil unrest and the wholesale abandonment
of the towns and factories. If strategic bombing can be said to target the
external enemy, civil defense is concerned with the enemy within. In the
United Kingdom, the idea of civil defense is colored by the short-­lived
modernist program of protection and insurance during World War II that
included mass shelters, warden and rescue services, and the evacuation of
children from exposed urban areas.6 Civil defense against nuclear attack
during the Cold War, on the other hand, essentially reconnected with, and
rejuvenated, its interwar iteration as defense against the internal enemy.
There is another less well-­known strand in the genealogy of critical
infrastructure. The radical interconnectedness of large-­scale urban techni-
cal systems concerned with energy, communications, transport, and essen-
tial commodities also became evident at the turn of the twentieth century
with the appearance of the mass strike as a potential political weapon. By
this time, the concentrated energy embodied in coal had encouraged urban
agglomeration and the growing logistical integration of industry and com-
merce. Exploiting this coupled dependency, the contagious mass strike
emerged as a political possibility. The coevolving fears of revolution and
advances in warfare contain a premonition of the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure or, more precisely, the vulnerability of the city. At its incep-
tion, the modern city, through the exposure of its vital technical systems,
was laid bare to unpredictable and nonterritorial external and internal ene-
mies. Environmental terror erases the distinction between the inside and
the outside. Moving into the political foreground following the emerging
critique of political modernity in the 1970s, this erasure, together with
760 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

the breakdown of other established dichotomies and limits, would gather

momentum with the ending of the Cold War.
During the 1920s, for example, The Hague Commission on Air War-
fare attempted to bring aerial bombardment within the rules of war. Lib-
eral states, not wishing to renounce the new weapon, would agree to out-
law only the deliberate bombing of civilian targets.7 However, since total
war required mass mobilization and a country’s entire industrial output
was now required to support and equip that mobilization, everything from
rope to jam acquired a military significance. At the moment of attempt-
ing to legislate against strategic bombing, the entire urban infrastructure
was exposed as a legitimate target. War and economy blur on the terrain
of critical infrastructure. Likewise, in the United States, during the 1950s,
it was realized that preparing for and responding to a hurricane was not
unlike preparing for a nuclear attack.8 The skill sets of the responders were
similar, and one could learn from the other. Thus, everything within the
frame of environmental terror has a potential dual use and latency; every-
thing that touches or supports life can be turned around. Everything can be
weaponized.

Internalizing Environmental Terror

In the emergence of environmental terror and its ability to blur war, nature,
and economy, the decade of the 1970s is key. During this time, the liberal
critique of modernity broke out on many fronts and, significantly, marked
the beginning of contemporary environmentalism. Because of the uncer-
tainties over location and severity, civil defense against nuclear attack had
already pioneered technologies of imaginative enactment and scenario-­
based role-­playing. These technologies allow policy makers to bring an
uncertain future into the present as an object of policy—if the future can-
not be predicted, at least preparedness can be improved through gaming
a scientifically informed scenario. Reflecting its dual-­use potential, by the
1970s imaginative enactment had begun to migrate into catastrophe insur-
ance.9 Imaginative enactment and role-­play techniques to address uncer-
tainty are by now well established within the business world, disaster man-
agement, and the security state.
Another important expression of dual-­use potential and latency was
the creation of a public all-­hazard disaster capacity within the leading lib-
eral states. During the 1970s, government bodies previously concerned
with nuclear civil defense began to redefine themselves as responding to
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 761

disasters more generally, including floods, hurricanes, air-­traffic accidents,

critical infrastructure failure, industrial accidents, civil unrest, and pan-
demics.10 The international humanitarian system also assumed its present
shape and organization during this time. Some of the impetus for the trans-
ference of the disaster technologies pioneered in war to wider environmen-
tal emergencies came from civil activists. They were concerned that nuclear
civil defense had abandoned any effective measures to actually protect
people. They argued that if public money was to be spent on disaster and
recovery, it was preferable to spend it on public all-­hazard preparedness.
Although activists at the time saw themselves as civilianizing the technolo-
gies concerned, one can argue that the 1970s was a decisive moment in the
militarization of the environment. In particular, the decade saw risk per-
ception shift from external military threats to all-­encompassing environ-
mental terror that threatened society’s vital systems.

Imagining Resilience
If, in public, the trend was to all-­hazard preparedness, then gaming how to
survive nuclear attack not only continued but civil defense became increas-
ingly secretive. From the 1950s to the 1980s, countless attack enactments
took place.11 Many of these were large-­scale events that took months to plan
and execute and frequently involved many government, scientific, and pri-
vate sector participants, sometimes functioning internationally. Operating
in private from hardened bunkers, starting in the 1960s civil defense quite
literally went underground. In the UK, the problem of the enemy within
was an important component of these enactments, especially how to con-
trol a postattack population that, effectively, was reduced to self-­reliance.
The 1982 “square leg” scenario described in Duncan Campbell’s War Plan
UK depicts in some detail a devastated landscape menaced by marauding
gangs of desperate postattack survivors attempting to break into guarded
food stores and the protected regional seats of government.12 Within this
scenario, survivors were triaged by bunkered authorities according to
their age, their health, and, significantly, their social usefulness measured
against the technical and manpower requirements of the surviving critical
infrastructure.
This scenario evokes the feel of contemporary humanitarian opera-
tions in Africa. Rather than operating out of protected regional seats of
government, international aid workers work in fortified aid compounds
while making sovereign life-­and-­death decisions about otherwise aban-
762 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

doned populations. Instead of a devastated landscape of marauding gangs,

we have the total threat environment of poverty, violence, and enviro-­
economic maladaptation that underdevelopment is now held to represent.
Whereas modern forms of public protection were destroyed in the imag-
ined nuclear attack, in Africa they have been devastated for real by decades
of neoliberal economic reform and looting by state incumbents and private
companies. Besides offering a premonition of our direction of travel, the
gaming of nuclear survival, especially the ability to fight on under radi-
cally changed circumstances, provides a glimpse of the practical origins of
resilience.
Gamed by teams of government, academic, and private-­sector officials
and experts, continuity of government exercises were initially technically
quite basic. They involved pens, paper, and slide rules and were limited in
size by the number of referees able to calculate manually the probabilities
concerned. As the 1950s progressed, the introduction of computers and
systems theory enabled enactments to become progressively more com-
plex. Computers created more demanding and multileveled models of eco-
nomic logistics and generated time lapses and random events. Enactments
could involve a wider range of players, and not least, computers allowed a
greater feeling of realism. Government exercises explored the probability
of surviving societal extinction and developed a lexicon of adaptability and
improvisation within a framework of real-­time crisis management. Enact-
ments gamed the ability to reconstitute a government around surviving
critical infrastructure and, importantly, the probability of being able to fight
on in such conditions. In all but name, they enacted resilience in terms of
the ability to move between different socioeconomic configurations while
still retaining system functionality.

From Inclusion to Abandonment

The discovery of resilience as a diagram of war provides a template for
departures in ecology and economy also taking place in the 1960s and
1970s. In the work of Crawford S. Holling in ecology, for example, we see
reflected in nature how contemporary society mobilizes for war.13 Through
the medium of predator-­prey relations in the natural world, ecology refined
the conceptual tools of complexity and resilience. In giving voice to these
concepts, ecology naturalized war. This departure was part of the growing
critique of modernist notions of equilibrium and steady-­state systems. In
distinction, ecology pronounced it normal for natural systems to exist on
the edge of extinction and to derive their dynamism from this condition.
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 763

As its acolytes would argue, the same ideas could be applied to the social
world. A resilient species is that which can avoid extinction through the
ability to constantly adapt to uncertainty; life and lifelike cyborg systems
were ordained as complex, emergent, and adaptive.14
As with war and nature, so with economy—the template of war also
maps onto neoliberalism, especially the work of Friedrich van Hayek on
self-­organizing markets.15 Through the Stockholm Resilience Centre, van
Hayek’s work has been extended to the valorization of nature and the estab-
lishment of markets in ecological services, of which carbon trading is the
best known. Not only do we see a diagram of war in nature, but nature itself
has been rediscovered to function as a market. In the space of a decade,
through this growing realization, resilience has established itself as a lin-
gua franca of risk, preparedness, and survivability operating across the
physical, natural, and social sciences. In particular, it has become the lan-
guage of choice for disaster and risk management. Resilience is the official
response to the environmental terror embedded in the radically intercon-
nected and emergent lifeworld that liberalism has created.
Both war among the people and dangerous climate change are
expressions of environmental terror. They describe interconnected and
self-­reinforcing threat terrains where nothing can be taken for granted
and where everything has latency and dual use. They are expressions of an
environment that, operating through uncertainty and surprise, has itself
become terroristic. The emergence of environmental terror, with self-­
reliance as its ordained response, suggests that biopolitics has changed.
Since the inception of liberalism, abandonment to life’s contingencies has
been intrinsic to its approach to security through resilience. Arising from
the class struggles and compromises associated with industrial capitalism,
modernity aimed to temper that history. Providing you were not black,
gay, or a woman, modernism operated an inclusionary logic. As part of
the neoliberal project that has dismantled political modernity, resilience is
indicative of a biopolitics that has once again realigned around processes of
remedial abandonment. Only life that is exposed to environmental uncer-
tainty can properly develop the desirable attributes of foresight, enterprise,
and self-­reliance.

Fabricating Uncertainty
While environmental uncertainty appears natural, it does not exist out-
side the methods of its creation. Just like the comprehensive, standardized,
and protective welfare technologies of modernism, uncertainty has to be
764 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

politically realized. The privatization of critical infrastructure is indicative.

Since the 1980s, urban critical infrastructure has been subject to wide-
spread privatization, deregulation, and globalization. It was made possible
by the prior deregulation of the financial markets and the move from a
productive to a speculative economy. Compared to early postwar decades,
when the key utilities were nationalized and governed by command and
control management systems, together with standardized forms of pricing
and investment in system redundancy, critical infrastructure has been frag-
mented.16 It is now governed through market-­based decision making and
the normalization of just-­in-­time crisis management. In the United States
and Europe, between 80 and 90 percent of critical urban infrastructure is
privately owned. We know from control room ethnography and disasters
like the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the ash cloud following the
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland in the same year that critical infra-
structure now functions dynamically on the edge of collapse, at the limits
of known system science, sociotechnical tolerances, and commercial lia-
bility. This fabrication of environmental terror, as it were, led Bill Clinton’s
administration in 1998 to initiate the program of interventions, knowledge
exchange, and cataloging that is known as Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion (CIP).

The Bunker
The classic military response to environmental terror has been the bunker.
With the generalization of environmental terror to form the basis of
national and international security, as a strategic spatial form, the bunker
has grown in societal prominence. Bunkers are defended spaces that can
be hermetically sealed against a threatening and unknown environment.
Contemporary bunkers exist in many forms and at variable scales. They can
be physical as well as digital, often combining both as in offices or work-
places that are increasingly segregated through selective forms of keypad
and card access mechanisms. Some bunkers have hardened boundaries,
while other barriers are more symbolic or cultural. To list the most obvi-
ous, they range from gated communities through shopping malls and pri-
vately policed central business districts to tourist enclaves, military green
zones, and the fortified compounds of the international aid industry. In
a neoliberal world, where people are speculatively abandoned to a fabri-
cated uncertainty, bunkers are necessary sites of refuge and strategization
for the political, economic, and cultural elite. To serve this function, they
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 765

exhibit varying degrees of self-­sufficiency, from private security to a full

range of vital services. They are sites of private consumption and, impor-
tantly, defended spaces from which liberalism’s permanent emergency can
be managed safely.
Some argue, following Giorgio Agamben, that the nomos of the camp
now defines urban space. However, others suggest we should see urban
space primarily in relation to a nomos of circulation.17 The restriction of
bad circulation has received significant attention, especially the enforced
stasis and deepening surveillance of the global sans papiers abandoned to
their own self-­reliance. This global lockdown is embodied in the rise of
Fortress Europe (or America or Australia, for that matter). Such restric-
tions and exclusions, however, highlight the problem of maintaining good
circulation in a fragmented, exclusionary, and threatening global environ-
ment. Nodal bunkers, linked by secure corridors and formed into defended
archipelagos of privileged circulation, provide a regressive solution to this
problem.
We can trace the imprint of this spatial design in the blurring of total
war into environmental terror. As noted, by the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, the urban concentration and interconnection of critical infrastruc-
ture had made the general strike a possibility. During the early 1920s, to
counter the possible isolation of London and the breakdown of essential
communications and supplies, the British government established a decen-
tralized system of more than a dozen regional command centers. Armed
with emergency powers, each of these centers had the ability to act inde-
pendently to maintain continuity of government. As it happens, this sys-
tem was never used, but it was taken over in the interwar years and adapted
for the purpose of civil defense—defense against the internal enemy, that
is.18 This network was progressively physically hardened during the Cold
War, and the command bunkers, or regional seats of government, were
connected by dedicated telecommunication links, discrete energy supplies,
and priority roads. They represented a networked or nodular form of sov-
ereign power. Bunkers were part of an archipelago of defended circulation
that in the event of war could be secured against a population abandoned
to self-­reliance, and from which continuity of government could be played
out for real.
With the collapse of the modern dialectic of class struggle and its asso-
ciated politics of negotiation and compromise, power now operates as pure
strategy.19 Bunkers are defended sites from which nonnegotiable power can
be strategized in the face of induced uncertainty. The bunker, in its many
766 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

different forms, is neoliberalism’s signature architecture for the postpoliti-

cal age. As a general principle, the privatization of critical infrastructure
equates with the privatization of space and hence the proliferation of private
security. Since the 1980s, one visible expression of a bunkered response to
environmental terror has been the global spread of the gated community,
which allows elites across the development-­underdevelopment divide to
extricate themselves from the decaying public realm.20
During the 1960s and 1970s, urban planners approached the prob-
lem of insecurity through the concept of defendable space. In response to
terrorism in Northern Ireland, the idea of rings of steel first entered the UK
security lexicon in the 1970s. With razor wire and steel gates, Belfast’s cen-
tral business district became a laboratory for security-­determined rezon-
ing. This practice became more sophisticated during the 1990s with the
protection of London’s key financial districts, this time incorporating more
subtle barriers and advanced CCTV, including automatic number plate rec-
ognition technology for reading license plates. These security technologies
have subsequently coevolved and migrated to the business districts and air-
ports of other cities. Since 9/11, however, there have been important devel-
opments in policing the nomos of circulation including, for example, the
appearance of the mobile or collapsible bunker.21
Complementing the fixed defensive structures of a fragmenting city-
scape, temporary bunkers offer flexible continuity of government and
business support services. In providing outreach to a threatening hinter-
land, they are especially useful in maintaining the spectacle of democracy
at work. Supplying what is called island site security, they are associated
with the policing of political party conferences, international business con-
ventions, major sporting and cultural events, and visits by foreign digni-
taries. Such security spectaculars involve a well-­rehearsed menu of road
closures, flight exclusion zones, heavy policing presence, snipers, sewer
and river inspections, mobile CCTV coverage, and Internet surveillance.
These mobile rings of steel patch into the existing local resilience forums
and thus the standing regional mechanisms for evacuation, decontamina-
tion, and major incident access. Similar to Cold War enactments, such con-
tinuity of democracy exercises are typically rehearsed beforehand.

Global Civil War

A major consequence of liberal interventionism, from the Balkans through
Africa to Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, has been to accelerate the frag-
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 767

mentation of multicultural or otherwise open societies and the disap-

pearance of urban conviviality. Postinterventionary societies have been
demodernized and retraditionalized. To increase security, cities have been
disaggregated into ethnic enclaves and defended international spaces that
are physically defined by road closures, bypass highways, and various bar-
riers. In supporting good circulation, bunkered archipelagos seamlessly
connect desired spaces and times across the ramparts of the development-­
underdevelopment divide. While the fragmenting effect of elite gated com-
munities on the urban environment in the global South is well known,
in seeking to protect itself from the threat environment of underdevelop-
ment, the aid industry’s demand for its own gated compounds and secure
residential complexes is joining with and further accelerating this fragmen-
tation.22 Together, national elite and aid industry requirements for secure
space in postinterventionary cities are driving radical processes of social
polarization, rezoning, and defended international circulation. Aid archi-
pelagos, for example, interconnect fortified compounds in the global South
with guarded agency headquarters in the privately monitored business dis-
tricts of the global North. With the emergence of concierge-­style security
consultants providing protection and rescue packages that cover risk avoid-
ance, civil disturbance, kidnappings, and pandemics, the technologies of
elite circulation are becoming increasingly comprehensive in terms of the
protection they can provide.
If, under conditions of environmental terror, bunkers and defended
archipelagos are an integral part of the nomos of circulation, the result-
ing circuits of movement and elite refuge expose and mark out contrary
spaces of exception; secure corridors delineate the global camps, as it were.
Complementing the places of obvious confinement and rendition, today’s
camps are more generalized and open-­ended, with porous and ambigu-
ous borders. Camps denote the multiplying areas, zones, and social con-
ditions in which rule is through administrative decree rather than by law.
Camps range from marginalized social housing projects and airline pas-
sengers in transit to suspected disease carriers, potential terrorists, and
the management of postindustrial international development programs.
Such conditions and spaces are increasingly governed through combina-
tions of administrative fiat, enforced self-­reliance, disaster management,
and resilience.
The fragmentation of urban space under the complementary logics
of bunkers and camps marks out the spatial parameters of a deepening
global civil war. Its bunkered architecture, however, is neither a celebration
768 The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

of victory nor a monument to a system that is confident of being able to

achieve one. It is the spatial imprint of a former world system that, while
fighting increasingly desperate rearguard actions on many fronts against
terminal decline, is now under siege and being pushed back. To paraphrase
Agamben, when a weak system is provoked or threatened, it easily becomes
terroristic itself. Given that liberalism’s struggle for survival now extends
from the cellular to the planetary, the stakes have never been higher. More-
over, from what we know, we can expect that this will be a fight to the death,
a struggle to the final catastrophe. As many have already eloquently argued,
the need to recover a political existence is more pressing than ever.

Notes
1 Peter Sloterdijk, Terror from the Air (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009).
2 Crawford Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,” Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics 4 (1973): 1–23.
3 Pat O’Malley, “Governable Catastrophes: A Comment on Bougen,” Economy and Society
32.2 (2003): 275–79.
4 Melinda Cooper, Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008).
5 Philip S. Meilinger, “‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine
Before World War II,” Journal of Military History 60.2 (1996): 243–70.
6 Duncan Campbell, War Plan UK: The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain (London: Bur-
nett Books, 1992).
7 Paul K. Saint-­Amour, “Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism,” Comparative Litera-
ture Studies 42.2 (2005): 130–61.
8 Arthur S. Flemming, “The Impact of Disasters on Readiness for War,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 309 (1957): 65–70.
9 Stephen J. Collier, “Enacting Catastrophe: Preparedness, Insurance, Budgetary Ratio-
nalization,” Economy and Society 37.2 (2008): 224–50.
10 Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2007).
11 Ibid.
12 Campbell, War Plan UK, 61–78.
13 Crawford S. Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,” Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics 4 (1973): 1–23.
14 Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (Abing-
don, UK: Routledge, 2009).
15 See Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, “Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems
Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation,” Security Dialogue 14.2 (2011),
forthcoming.
16 Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism (London: Routledge, 2001);
and Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-­
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
 Duffield • Total War as Environmental Terror 769

17 Brad Evans and Michael Hardt, “Barbarians to Savages: Liberal War Inside and Out,”
Theory and Event 13.3 (2010).
18 Campbell, War Plan UK.
19 Evans and Hardt, “Barbarians to Savages.”
20 Mike Davis and Daniel Bertrand Monk, eds., Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberal-
ism (New York: New Press, 2007).
21 Jon Coaffee and David Murakami Wood, “Security Is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale
and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk,” Interna-
tional Relations 20.4 (2006): 503–17.
22 Mark Duffield, “Risk-­Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life
in Post-­interventionary Society,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4.4 (2010):
453–74.
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