ALONTE VS SAVELLONA

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R.
No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the
decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila
finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte,  an incumbent
Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:

That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without having participated as principal or accessory assisted in the
commission of the offense by bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani `Arthur Alonte at
Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who
subsequently raped her.

Contrary to Law.[1]

The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian,
Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and
tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted
by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:

1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani `Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the
RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;

2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with
the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to
the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State
Prosecutors Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;

3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my college
residence. And when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still
indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and
mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;

5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my
family, where we can start life anew, and live normally once again;

6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other charge for child abuse wherein the
Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information
has not been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases, whether, criminal,
civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;

7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-
complainant;

8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a corresponding commitment that there
will be no reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or any other official of officer, my
relatives and friends who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.

"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Complainant

"Assisted by:

(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN

Private Prosecutor

"In the presence of:

(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father

(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother

"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer"[2]

On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of
venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22
August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of
the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect
since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action.  He prayed
for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the
petition for change of venue. The Court said:

"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that
the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the
probability that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some
illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition
to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The
Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to
whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in
Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light
of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court
of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the
complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this Resolution."[3]

On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of
Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.,
presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a
"compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the
light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties
manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on.Per Judge Savellano, both parties
agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. [4] According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed
the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of
desistance.[5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and
voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in
support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action.  Punongbayan
confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media,
(ii)that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she
nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who
affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughters decision to desist from the
case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was
signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely
and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents
not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused.  She,
then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor
Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed no objection to the granting of
bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
 On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail.  On even date, ASP
Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated
motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th
December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively,
in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a
notice from the RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of
the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled
promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that
Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was
confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to
have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the
reading concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura
`Wella Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under
Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which
each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAor
imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force and effect.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration.  Without waiting
for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for"Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus,
Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge."  Petitioner Concepcion
later filed his own petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the
case remanded for new trial; thus:

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due
process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
rendered a Decision in the case a quoin violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex
A).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total
disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor
offered into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant
was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous
offenses can result in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the
same result).[8]

On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:

1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss the
case is a patent nullity for having been rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total
violation of the petitioners right to due process of law.

2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is concerned.

3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and
neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of
media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.

4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a principal
even though he has been charged only as an accomplice in the information.[9]

The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of
petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below.  Per Judge
Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that
-

"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness
stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and
submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them,
was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the private
complainant."[10]

According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997,
aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court
in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance
executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.  Perhaps the
problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken
lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable."
 Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:

"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following order:

"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any
provisional remedy in the case.

"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the
parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.

"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."

In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that -

"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.

"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the
parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not
only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has
an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.[15]

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -

"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel
of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even
after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two
affidavits - one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was
missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a
personal one and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of
waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." [16] Mere silence of the holder of the right should
not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
[17]
 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the
regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have
dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; [18] (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present
rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; [19] and (3) petitioners have not
admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. [20] There can be no
short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court.  Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable
right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to
the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued
as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case.  The Court likewise deems it
appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper
disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any
statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to
withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case
of People vs. Junio,[21] should be instructive. The Court has there explained:

The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her
mother supported the `inherent incredibility of prosecutions evidence is specious. We have said in so many cases
that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of
having accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring
the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over
the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.

Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who
has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and
place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such
affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]

The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder
case, the Court has ruled:

The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a
recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND
PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant
what she had said during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:

3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer interested to
prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby
WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my fathers desire;

It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because
an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation
must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her
affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he
testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessies affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not
involved in the perpetration of the crime.

In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place
the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA
128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction,
this circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with
disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a
witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the
recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
525.] In this case we think the trial court correctly ruled.[24]

It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to
testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private
crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit,
nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any
other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold -

While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be, [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised
Penal Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of
the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is
cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is
attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case.And, affiant did not appear to be serious in `signifying
(her) intention to refrain from testifying since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit
of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated `April 1992, it was only submitted
sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quoon 6 April 1992,
perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the case.[26]

In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in
full, states -

"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.

"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.

"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
mentioned crimes." -
the Court said:

"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor,
in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not
prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been
instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the
penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offended and the offended
party."[28]

In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:

"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated
on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this
attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which is in question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.'This
provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution,
and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435
of the old Penal Code provided: 'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case
the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the
same. The Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the
effect of reviving any of its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph
of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery.Once
more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution
and must be for both offenders to be effective - circumstances which do not concur in this case." [30]

The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has heretofore already
held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity
between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old
case of Luque vs. Kayanan[31]could again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is
the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of  the Judge.[32] It is
not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before the
courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple
courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among
members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty.[33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in the past,
although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that -

(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997,
having been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE
DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is
declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings; and

(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled
for raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.

HEIRS OF JOSE DELISTE VS LAND BANK OF THE PHIL

The Case
 
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the October
28, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005 Resolution [2] denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
 

The Facts
 
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said spouses were
childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by
the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by still another
woman.[3]
 
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property. [4] On February 16,
1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. [5] The deed of sale
was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears in the payment of
taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then on, he paid the taxes on the property.[6]
 
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.[7] Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator
of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate.[8]
 
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed before
the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the
subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698. [9] Said case went up to this Court in Noel v. CA, where We
rendered a Decision[10] on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject property was the
conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share
of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were
held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.[11]
 
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October 21, 1972,
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was
placed under the said program. [12] However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes relative to the coverage were
sent to these heirs.[13]
 
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation of Iligan City,
reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. [14]
 
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private
respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. [15] The CLTs were registered on July 15,
1986.[16]
 
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. [17] The survey of a portion of the land consisting of 20.2611
hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8, 1999. [18] The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was
submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001
and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of Title
(OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their
respective portions of Lot No. 1407.[19]
 
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the expropriation.
Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject property had not
yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the
expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was deposited with the Development
Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City.[20]
 
 On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents EPs. [21] This was docketed as
Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
 
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision [22] declaring
that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the
subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners constitutional right to due
process of law.
 
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 2, Rule
XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated August 4, 2003 despite strong
opposition from private respondents.[23] On January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified the Order dated August 4, 2003
granting the writ of execution.[24]
 
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
[25]
Decision  dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who
should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject property was placed
under the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated that
the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that
whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the
jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latters authorized representative. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the DARAB in its Resolution[26] dated July 8, 2004.
 
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of
execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers, as
required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
 
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our Resolution [27] dated
February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure to show sufficiently any reversible error in the
assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
 
 On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [28] On April 11, 2008, they also filed a
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.[29]
 
In Our Resolution[30] dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners motion for
reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
 

The Issues
 
 
I.                   [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
 
II.                [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS
JUSTIFIED; AND [WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
IS JUST CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
 
XXXX
 
III.             [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM
GIVEN THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313
RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.
 
IV.             [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO
AGRARIAN REFORM.
 
V.                [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
 
VI.             [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS
CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.
 
VII.          [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL
GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.
 
VIII.       [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT THEY
WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS
VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.[31]

Our Ruling
 
The petition is meritorious.
 
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements
under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
 
 
 In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated:
 
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of
the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and
other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material
dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the petition, as
well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal as stated in
Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:
 
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners failure to attach
the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to
in the petition and other supporting papers.[32]
 
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing documents required
by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of the case. Specifically:
 
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?
 
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?
 
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?
 
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs were
already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
 
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?[33]
 
 
 Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when they
appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the challenged
resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners motion for reconsideration; (2) the duplicate
original copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March
15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the
order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ
of execution earlier issued; and (5) the Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original
proceedings for the cancellation of the EPs.[34] The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such
technical ground.
 
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court, instead of
dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary documents. In Spouses
Espejo v. Ito,[35] the Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals,[36] the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to submit additional documents as may be
necessary to promote the interests of substantial justice.
 
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. [37] In Jaro v. CA,
this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
Particularly:
 
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had
but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner
and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court for it to depart
from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard stance taken by
the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the circumstances.
 
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-
Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled
that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two
cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found
noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the
formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of
Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court
clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. [38] (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it
tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. [39] As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:[40]
  
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation.  Law
and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural
rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put
an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard.
 
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
 
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside
technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with
the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods
set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given
the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant case.
 
On the coverage of the subject property
by the agrarian reform program
 
 
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the
agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the
area into a residential/commercial land.[41]
 
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city
ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the reclassification
over the subject property.[42] It further noted that whether the subject property is exempt from the OLT Program is an
administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the
DARAB.
 
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. [43] However, this will not prevent the
Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in it may already be resolved on
the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary
would only cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the
recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary,[44] where We held:
  
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of
injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the
position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
 
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as
where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA could
not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal
ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the subject
property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment
by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.
 
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural
lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,[45] this Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. It was
also emphasized therein that [t]he power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to
non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR].[46]
 
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of  Iligan in
1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes that the
approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.
 
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975.
Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human Settlements,
the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that time, having been created on September
19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the Task Force was not empowered
to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with
the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit their existing land use
plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and
ratification. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of
Human Settlements.[47]
 
 Significantly, accompanying the Certification[48] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo, Deputy
Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the letter [49] dated October 8,
1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local
zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City
Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The
validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question.
 
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City
Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. As
this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,[50] To be exempt
from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly
authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect.
 
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the local zoning
ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already taken as of
October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights which accrued from said date
must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassification of the subject property did not alter its agricultural
nature, much less its actual use.[51]
 
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the expedience of issuing a
local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial area. As this Court
extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:[52]
 
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the
subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as
residential.
 
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of
whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National
Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are
covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
 
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes
agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands
 are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include
commercial, industrial and residential land.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus
 
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans
and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use.
 
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is
bound by such conversion. . . . .
 
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04,
Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage under
Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990. It reads:
 
I. Prefatory Statement
 
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
 
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-1990 for
brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12
August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural
land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of
its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
 
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to
divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
 
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to
defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
 
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,
where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is
agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as park since 1979 under the
Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert
lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.
Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by
the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial,
 industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces.
It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as
shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the
retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that
an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should
be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing
agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not
disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into
residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the
subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not
provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights
previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor
light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we
must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further
implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in
the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
 
 
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case. In this
respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of the land they till
as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given
effect by the following provision of the law:
 
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed
owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3)
hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21, 1972,
this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they
were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just compensation, before full
ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was elucidated by the Court in Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:[53]
 
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October
21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers
cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
 
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
 
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
 
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
 compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2
that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.
 
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.  Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate right over
the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a provisional title of
ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of [just compensation] or for as long as
the [tenant-farmer] is an amortizing owner. [54] This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land [55] he was
tilling.
 
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be considered as full
owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations due them. This is because it is only
upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.
 
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages. The
first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the
farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the second stage is the issuance of an
EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by
the farmer-beneficiary.[56]
 
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was only
in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the
subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering that the local zoning
ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still
had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were
issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
 
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had taken place
twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification
and its approval. Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the
agrarian reform program.
  
On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law
 
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. [57] Citing De Chavez
v. Zobel,[58] both the DAR and the private respondents claim that the enactment of PD 27 is a statutory notice to all
owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, [59] implying that there was no need for an actual
notice.
 
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian
reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of
administrative due process of law.[60] Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA[61] is particularly instructive:
 
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due
process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied
due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to
the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name
of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The
ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice
should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
 
xxxx
 
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR
certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject
property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the
fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to
verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The
absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives
Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due process.
 
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since there
was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be
conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there
proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in
those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential
Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
 
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating
private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated
lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia
A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence,
any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with
the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and
should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
  
 
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does not show that
this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27, its enactment being a purported
statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production that their lands are
subjected to the OLT program.
 
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR,[62] this Court underscored the significance
of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it stated that notice is part of the constitutional right to
due process of law. It informs the landowner of the States intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise
excused from the agrarian law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not denied the right
to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. Particularly:
 
Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given the
notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with petitioners who
did not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972. It was only
in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme Court dividing the 34.7
hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27
was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was considered in his name only (see Art.
777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2
was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the whole country as a land reform area, this was
followed by PD 27. This should have alarmed them more so when private respondents are in
actual possession and cultivation of the subject property.
 
 
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It
should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and
such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by
Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
 
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds
third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.[63] x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to notify other persons not parties to a contract
that a transaction involving the property has been entered into. [64] There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign
ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.
 
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the
fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of
Deleste.[65] Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.[66]
 
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
 
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,[67] where, despite a finding that
there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform program when the
petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquiring
the property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area
in those portions to be acquired,[68] this Court nonetheless ruled that such violation does not give the Court the power
to nullify the certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
 
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and should first ask the
DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, [69] stated that
[i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should
be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must
be declared null and void. She also noted that [i]f CLOAs can under the DARs own order be cancelled
administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in
issue.
 
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take
action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were
improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. [70] The same holds true with respect to the EPs
and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs
on which they were grounded are void.[71] Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are clearly warranted in the instant case
since, aside from the violation of petitioners right to due process of law, the subject property is outside the coverage
of the agrarian reform program.
 
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
 
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already been settled by this Court in Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[72] where We held that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted the case in 2005;
hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed.[73]
 
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a relitigation of the issue
concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.
 
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) bar by prior judgment,[74] wherein
the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action;[75] and (2) conclusiveness of judgment,[76] which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another
action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[77]
 
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,[78] this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,[79] expounded on the difference
between the two aspects of res judicata:
 
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two
aspects of res judicata as follows:
 
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
 
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of
judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
 
 
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a fact or question has been squarely put in
issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. [80] Elucidating
further on this second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in Spouses Antonio, stated:
 
x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that
action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely
motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future
or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or
 in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[81] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 
 
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBPs contention that this Courts
ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents
does not hold water.
 
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the instant case.
Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are totally different. In Heirs of
Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who claim to be descendants of Fulgencio
Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who collectively assert their right to a share in Gregorios estate, arguing that they
were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without
notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case, petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of
the EPs issued to private respondents on grounds of violation of due process of law, disregard of landowners right of
retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the agrarian reform program, among others.
Evidently, there is even no privity among the petitioners in these two cases.
 
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the issue was
whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the petitioners therein, considering that the
EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the filing of said petition in 2005. In the
instant case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of private respondents are void, thus
warranting their cancellation.
 
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the necessity of applying the
rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petition for
prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs had already
been issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that [p]rohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain
an act that is already a fait accompli, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to hold that:
 
x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become
indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in
2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.[82] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents EPs and OCTs was
filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1, 2001 and October
1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was well within the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the
defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the
Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree, [83] this should necessarily have the
same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and
even of certificates of title issued by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias:[84]
 
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its
regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on
all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian
reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the
DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to
cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.
 
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent
does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations.
Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian
Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued
under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB
under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
 
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment
a certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but
merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the
CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of
title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.
 
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular
courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the
names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners Torrens titles emanated from the
emancipation patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries
identified by the DAR under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said
emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of
respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action filed by respondents with the
DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the case
squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
 
 
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 does not bar Us
from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs issued to private respondents are, indeed, void.
 
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised by the parties.
 
 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October
28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents
are herebydeclared NULL and VOID.
 
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of
Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.
 
No pronouncement as to costs.

LYNVIL FISHING VS ARIOLA

 E C I S I O N
 

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] of the Decision[2] of the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 dated 10 September 2007, granting the Writ of Certiorari prayed for
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure by herein respondents Andres G. Ariola, Jessie D.
Alcovendas, Jimmy B. Calinao and Leopoldo Sebullen thereby reversing the Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 31, 2004 rendered by
the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED, except as to the award of
attorneys fees, which is ordered DELETED.[3]
 
The version of the petitioners follows:
 
1. Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. (Lynvil) is a company engaged in deep-sea fishing, operating along the
shores of Palawan and other outlying islands of the Philippines. [4] It is operated and managed by Rosendo S. de
Borja.
 
2. On 1 August 1998, Lynvil received a report from Romanito Clarido, one of its employees, that on 31 July
1998, he witnessed that while on board the company vessel Analyn VIII, Lynvil employees, namely: Andres G.
Ariola (Ariola), the captain; Jessie D. Alcovendas (Alcovendas), Chief Mate; Jimmy B. Calinao (Calinao), Chief
Engineer; Ismael G. Nubla (Nubla), cook; Elorde Baez (Baez), oiler; and Leopoldo D. Sebullen
(Sebullen), bodegero, conspired with one another and stole eight (8) tubs of pampano and tangigue fish and
delivered them to another vessel, to the prejudice of Lynvil.[5]
 
3. The said employees were engaged on a per trip basis or por viaje which terminates at the end of each
trip. Ariola, Alcovendas and Calinao were managerial field personnel while the rest of the crew were field
personnel.[6]
 
4. By reason of the report and after initial investigation, Lynvils General Manager Rosendo S. De Borja (De
Borja) summoned respondents to explain within five (5) days why they should not be dismissed from
service. However, except for Alcovendas and Baez,[7] the respondents refused to sign the receipt of the notice.
 
5. Failing to explain as required, respondents employment was terminated.
 
6. Lynvil, through De Borja, filed a criminal complaint against the dismissed employees for violation of
P.D. 532, or the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Malabon City.[8]
 
7. On 12 November 1998, First Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio found probable cause for the
indictment of the dismissed employees for the crime of qualified theft[9] under the Revised Penal Code.
 
On the other hand, the story of the defense is:
 
1. The private respondents were crew members of Lynvils vessel named Analyn VIII. [10]
 
2. On 31 July 1998, they arrived at the Navotas Fishport on board Analyn VIII loaded with 1,241 baeras of
different kinds of fishes. These baeras were delivered to a consignee named SAS and Royale.[11]
 
The following day, the private respondents reported back to Lynvil office to inquire about their new job
assignment but were told to wait for further advice. They were not allowed to board any vessel.[12]
 
3. On 5 August 1998, only Alcovendas and Baez received a memorandum from De Borja ordering them to
explain the incident that happened on 31 July 1998. Upon being informed about this, Ariola, Calinao, Nubla and
Sebullen went to the Lynvil office. However, they were told that their employments were already terminated.[13]
 
Aggrieved, the employees filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission-
National Capital Region on 25 August 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages, salary
differential reinstatement, service incentive leave, holiday pay and its premium and 13 th month pay from 1996
to1998. They also claimed for moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees for their dismissal with bad faith. [14]
 
They added that the unwarranted accusation of theft stemmed from their oral demand of increase of salaries
three months earlier and their request that they should not be required to sign a blank payroll and vouchers. [15]
  
On 5 June 2002, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes found merit in complainants charge of illegal
dismissal.[16] The dispositive portion reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding that
complainants were illegally dismissed, ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainants (a) separation pay at one half month pay for every year of service; (b) backwages; (c)
salary differential; (d) 13th month pay; and (e) attorneys fees, as follows:
 
 
1) Andres Ariola
Backwages P234,000.00
(P6,500.00 x 36 = P234,000.00)
 
Separation Pay P74,650.00
 
13th Month Pay P6,500.00
P325,250.00
 
2) Jessie Alcovendas
Backwages P195,328.00
(P5,148.00 x 36 = P195,328.00)
 
Separation Pay P44,304.00
 
13th Month Pay 5,538.00
 
Salary Differential 1,547.52
P246,717.52
 
3) Jimmy Calinao
Backwages P234,000.00
(P6,500.00 x 36 = P234,000.00)
 
Separation Pay 55,250.00
 
13th Month Pay P6,500.00 P295,700.00
 
4) Leopoldo Sebullen
 
Backwages P154,440.00
(P4, 290.00 x 36 = P154,440.00)
 
Separation Pay P44,073.00
 
13th Month Pay 2,473.12
 
Salary Differential 4,472.00
P208,455.12
5) Ismael Nubla
 
Backwages P199,640.12
 
Separation Pay P58,149.00
  
13th Month Pay 2,473.12
 
Salary Differential P5,538.00
P265, 28.12
___________
TOTAL P 1, 341, 650.76
 
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.[17]
 
 
The Labor Arbiter found that there was no evidence showing that the private respondents received the
41 baeras of pampano as alleged by De Borja in his reply-affidavit; and that no proof was presented that the
8 baeras of pampano [and tangigue] were missing at the place of destination.[18]
 
The Labor Arbiter disregarded the Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio on the theft case.  He
reasoned out that the Labor Office is governed by different rules for the determination of the validity of the
dismissal of employees.[19]
 
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the contractual provision that the employment terminates upon the end of each trip
does not make the respondents dismissal legal. He pointed out that respondents and Lynvil did not negotiate on
equal terms because of the moral dominance of the employer.[20]
The Labor Arbiter found that the procedural due process was not complied with and that the mere notice given to the
private respondents fell short of the requirement of ample opportunity to present the employees side.[21]
 
On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioners asserted that private respondents were only
contractual employees; that they were not illegally dismissed but were accorded procedural due process and that De
Borja did not commit bad faith in dismissing the employees so as to warrant his joint liability with Lynvil. [22]
 
On 31 March 2004, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.  The dispositive
portion reads:
 
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo and a new one entered DISMISSING the present
complaints for utter lack of merit;
 
However as above discussed, an administrative fine of PhP5,000.00 for each complainant,
Andres Ariola, Jessie Alcovendas, Jimmy Canilao, Leopoldo Sebullen and Ismael Nobla or a total
of PhP25,000.00 is hereby awarded.[23]
 
The private respondents except Elorde Baez filed a Petition for Certiorari[24] before the Court of Appeals alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.
 
The Court of Appeals found merit in the petition and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter except as
to the award of attorneys fees. The appellate court held that the allegation of theft did not warrant the dismissal of
the employees since there was no evidence to prove the actual quantities of the missing kinds of fish loaded to
Analyn VIII.[25]It also reversed the finding of the NLRC that the dismissed employees were merely contractual
employees and added that they were regular ones performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the business and trade of Lynvil. Finally, it ruled that the two-notice rule provided by law and jurisprudence is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith rendered the dismissal of the employees illegal.
 
The following are the assignment of errors presented before this Court by Lynvil:
 
I
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY V.
NLRC HOLDING THAT THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE THE
PROSECUTORS OFFICE CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A VALID
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
AND/OR LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
 
II
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TERMINATION
OF RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
III
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE
RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT, IN ANY EVENT, WERE CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE
BEING ON A PER VOYAGE BASIS. THUS, THEIR RESPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATED AFTER THE END OF EACH VOYAGE
 
IV
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
WERE NOT ACCORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
 
V
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF THEIR MONEY CLAIMS.
 
VI
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
PETITIONER ROSENDO S. DE BORJA IS NOT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
THE JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WAS NO FINDING OF BAD FAITH.[26]
 
The Courts Ruling
 
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Under Rule 45,[27] parties may raise only questions of law. We are
not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below.
Generally when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

 
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied)[28]

The contrariety of the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC prevents reliance on the principle of
special administrative expertise and provides the reason for judicial review, at first instance by the appellate court,
and on final study through the present petition.
 
In the first assignment of error, Lynvil contends that the filing of a criminal case before the Office of the
Prosecutor is sufficient basis for a valid termination of employment based on serious misconduct and/or loss of trust
and confidence relying on Nasipit Lumber Company v. NLRC.[29]
 
Nasipit is about a security guard who was charged with qualified theft which charge was dismissed by the
Office of the Prosecutor. However, despite the dismissal of the complaint, he was still terminated from his
employment on the ground of loss of confidence. We ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's
misconduct is not required when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal.  It is sufficient if the employer has
"some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral
conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation
therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. [30] It added that the
dropping of the qualified theft charges against the respondent is not binding upon a labor tribunal.[31]
 
In Nicolas v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] we held that a criminal conviction is not necessary
to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employees acquittal in a criminal case,
especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor
case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employers interests. [33] In the reverse, the finding of probable cause is not
followed by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals.
 
In other words, whichever way the public prosecutor disposes of a complaint, the finding does not bind the
labor tribunal.
 
Thus, Lynvil cannot argue that since the Office of the Prosecutor found probable cause for theft the Labor
Arbiter must follow the finding as a valid reason for the termination of respondents employment. The proof required
for purposes that differ from one and the other are likewise different.
 
Nonetheless, even without reliance on the prosecutors finding, we find that there was valid cause for
respondents dismissal.
 
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause.[34]

Just cause is required for a valid dismissal. The Labor Code[35] provides that an employer may terminate an
employment based on fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on the employee. Such breach is considered willful
if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must also be based on substantial evidence and not on the
employers whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer. Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the
dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of
must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In
addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with
confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets of
the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. [36]

Breach of trust is present in this case.

We agree with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and Court of Appeals that the quantity of tubs expected to be
received was the same as that which was loaded. However, what is material is the kind of fish loaded and then
unloaded. Sameness is likewise needed.

We cannot close our eyes to the positive and clear narration of facts of the three witnesses to the
commission of qualified theft. Jonathan Distajo, a crew member of the Analyn VIII, stated in his letter addressed to
De Borja[37] dated 8 August 1998, that while the vessel was traversing San Nicolas, Cavite, he saw a small boat
approach them.When the boat was next to their vessel, Alcovendas went inside the stockroom while Sebullen
pushed an estimated four tubs of fish away from it. Ariola, on the other hand, served as the lookout and negotiator of
the transaction. Finally, Baez and Calinao helped in putting the tubs in the small boat. He further added that he
received P800.00 as his share for the transaction. Romanito Clarido, who was also on board the vessel, corroborated
the narration of Distajo on all accounts in his 25 August 1998 affidavit. [38] He added that Alcovendas told him to
keep silent about what happened on that day. Sealing tight the credibility of the narration of theft is the
affidavit[39] executed by Elorde Baez dated 3 May 1999. Baez was one of the dismissed employees who actively
participated in the taking of the tubs. He clarified in the affidavit that the four tubs taken out of the stockroom in fact
contained fish taken from the eight tubs. He further stated that Ariola told everyone in the vessel not to say anything
and instead file a labor case against the management.Clearly, we cannot fault Lynvil and De Borja when it dismissed
the employees.

The second to the fifth assignment of errors interconnect.

 
The nature of employment is defined in the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal
in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding

paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists.
 
Lynvil contends that it cannot be guilty of illegal dismissal because the private respondents were employed
under a fixed-term contract which expired at the end of the voyage. The pertinent provisions of the contract are:
 

xxxx

1.      NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa

patakarang por viaje na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at
pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila;
xxxx

1.      NA ako ay nakipagkasundo na babayaran ang aking paglilingkod sa paraang por viaje sa
halagang P__________ isang biyahe ng kabuuang araw xxxx.[40]
 

Lynvil insists on the applicability of the case of Brent School,[41] to wit:

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already
observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in
said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting
with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the
substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
 circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress
or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the
former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to
purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary,
unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.

Contrarily, the private respondents contend that they became regular employees by reason of their
continuous hiring and performance of tasks necessary and desirable in the usual trade and business of Lynvil.

Jurisprudence,[42] laid two conditions for the validity of a fixed-contract agreement between the employer
and employee:

First, the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or

Second, it satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the
latter.[43]

Textually, the provision that: NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa
patakarang por viaje na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at pagbabalik sa pondohan ng
lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila is for a fixed period of employment. In the context, however, of the facts that: (1)
the respondents were doing tasks necessarily to Lynvils fishing business with positions ranging from captain of the
vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they will again be hired for another trip with new contracts; and (3)
this arrangement continued for more than ten years, the clear intention is to go around the security of tenure of the
respondents as regular employees. And respondents are so by the express provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 280, thus:
 
xxx Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity
in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
 
The same set of circumstances indicate clearly enough that it was the need for a continued source of income that
forced the employees acceptance of the por viaje provision.
 

Having found that respondents are regular employees who may be, however, dismissed for cause as we
have so found in this case, there is a need to look into the procedural requirement of due process in Section 2, Rule
XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. It is required that the employer furnish the employee
with two written notices:  (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written
notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.

From the records, there was only one written notice which required respondents to explain within five (5)
days why they should not be dismissed from the service. Alcovendas was the only one who signed the receipt of the
notice. The others, as claimed by Lynvil, refused to sign. The other employees argue that no notice was given to
them. Despite the inconsistencies, what is clear is that no final written notice or notices of termination were sent to
the employees.

 
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of [due] process in cases of employee's
dismissal.  The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly, to defend himself therefrom
before dismissal is effected. [44] Obviously, the second written notice, as indispensable as the first, is intended to
ensure the observance of due process.

Applying the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, this, pursuant
to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines, Inc. [45] Due to the failure of Lynvil
to follow the procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to respondents despite their
dismissal for just cause.
 
Given the fact that their dismissal was for just cause, we cannot grant backwages and separation pay to
respondents. However, following the findings of the Labor Arbiter who with the expertise presided over the
proceedings below, which findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we grant the 13 th month pay and salary
differential of the dismissed employees.
 

Whether De Borja is jointly and severally liable with Lynvil

 
As to the last issue, this Court has ruled that in labor cases, the corporate directors and officers are
solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with malice or in bad
faith.[46] Indeed, moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or fraud
or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public
policy. 

It has also been discussed in MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC[47] that:

 
x x x A corporation being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the
direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be
 incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following
cases:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation:

xxx

(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;

x x x [48]

The term "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."[49]

We agree with the ruling of both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals when they pronounced that there was no
evidence on record that indicates commission of bad faith on the part of De Borja.  He is the general manager of
Lynvil, the one tasked with the supervision by the employees and the operation of the business. However, there is no
proof that he imposed on the respondents the por viaje provision for purpose of effecting their summary dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The 10 September 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 reversing the Resolution dated 31 March 2004 of the National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED. The Court hereby rules that the employees were dismissed for just cause by
Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and Rosendo S. De Borja, hence, the reversal of the award for backwages and
separation pay. However, we affirm the award for 13 th month pay, salary differential and grant an
additional P50,000.00 in favor of the employees representing nominal damages for petitioners non-compliance with
statutory due process. No cost.
 

WALDO FLORES VS MONTEMAYOR

Before us is a Rule 45 petition assailing the October 19, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84254. The appellate court, in the said decision, had reversed and set aside the March 23, 2004 Decision [2] and May
13, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581 finding respondent Atty. Antonio F.
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and dismissing him from government service.

The facts follow.

Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned citizen dated  January 20,
2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently disproportionate to his income as a public
official. The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama, Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for
appropriate action.[4] The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the
matter and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land Transportation
Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC
a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year 2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O.
Petilla, furnished the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a
1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.[5]

During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, a media organization
which had previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted to the
PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. [6] In Montemayors 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the
PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same in his
2001 SSAL.[7]

On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge [8] against Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019[9] in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713[10] due to his failure to
declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land
Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001[11] and 2002[12] SSAL. The charge was
docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order [13] directing Montemayor to file his
counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order.
Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge lodged against him.

On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the deferment of the
administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the CA[14] questioning the
PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayors
motion for lack of merit, and instead gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer.
[15]
 Still, no answer was filed.

On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 enjoining the
PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60) days. [16] On September 12, 2003, shortly after the
expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution [17] finding Montemayor administratively liable
as charged and recommending to the Office of the President Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a
Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC. The pertinent portion of the Decision
reads:
After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of PAGC
and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to
disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of the
relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded
ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass by.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby found

administratively liable as charged and, as recommended by PAGC, meted the penalty of dismissal
from the service, with all accessory penalties.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision.[19] This time, he argued that he was denied his right to due
process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his petition
for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court. [20] The motion was eventually
denied.[21]

Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for review[22] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. He made the following assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its authority when
it recommended that he be dismissed from government service since the power to investigate does not necessarily
carry with it the power to impose penalty unless the same was expressly granted; second, that the PAGC grossly
violated his right to due process of law when it did not give him the opportunity to present his countervailing
evidence to the charges against him; third, that the PAGC cannot validly proceed with the investigation of the
charges against him on the basis of an unverified anonymous letter-complaint without any supporting documents
attached thereto, contrary to the requirement of Section 4 (c) of Executive Order (EO) No. 12; [23] fourth, that it was
an error for the Office of the President to hold him liable for violation of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and Section 8
(A) of RA No. 6713 since the SSAL should reflect assets and liabilities acquired in the preceding year; and fifth, that
the assailed PAGC Resolution was not supported by substantial evidence.

As aforesaid, the CA in its assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005, ruled in favor of Montemayor. The CA
concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity to present controverting evidence amounting to a brazen
denial of his right to due process.

Hence, petitioners now appeal the matter before us raising the following issues:

I.                   WHETHER PETITIONER PAGC HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO

ACCORD RESPONDENT A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
 IN PAGC-ADM-0149-03 AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE TRO ISSUED IN CA-
G.R. SP NO. 77285.

II.                WHETHER THE MERE PENDENCY OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 77285 WAS A LEGAL

GROUND FOR RESPONDENTS REFUSAL TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN [PAGC]-
ADM-0149-03.

III.             WHETHER THE ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE AND APPARENT PRECIPITATION

OF PROCEEDINGS IN [PAGC]-ADM-0149-03 HAD RENDERED THE SAME
INFIRM.

IV.             WHETHER RESPONDENT HAD COMMITTED A MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE

INFRACTION WARRANTING DISMISSAL FROM [GOVERNMENT] SERVICE.

V.                WHETHER THE [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTS] DETERMINATION THAT

RESPONDENT COMMITTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE CHARGED IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

VI.             WHETHER THE PAGC HAD AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND TO THE

PRESIDENT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL, FOLLOWING ITS INVESTIGATION
INITIATED BY AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND DESPITE THE PENDENCY
OF ANOTHER INVESTIGATION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE BEFORE THE
[OFFICE OF THE] OMBUDSMAN.[24]

The issues may be summarized as follows:

I.                   WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO INVESTIGATE HIM ON THE BASIS OF AN
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE;

II.                WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND

RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE;

III.             WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF

ITS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH
ITS INVESTIGATION; AND

IV.             WHETHER THE PAGCS RECOMMENDATION WAS SUPPORTED BY

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

We discuss the first three (3) issues jointly as these involve procedural aspects.

The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the problem on
corruption and abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under
Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1)
that the official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an
equivalent rank, or higher.[25]

Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate him
on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainants assertions.

Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, however, states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints
against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached
to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. [26] The use of the
conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving
due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course
even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is
probable cause. The clear implication of the said provision is intent to empower the PAGC in line with the Presidents
objective of eradicating corruption among a particular line of government officials, i.e., those directly appointed by her.
Absent the conjunctive word or, the PAGCs authority to conduct investigations based on anonymous complaints will be
very limited. It will decimate the said administrative body into a toothless anti-corruption agency and will inevitably
undermine the Chief Executives disciplinary power.

Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision to proceed with the investigation process without giving him the
opportunity to present controverting evidence.

The argument is without merit.

We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the pendency of
Montemayors petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest
the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency
of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an
administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction
restraining it.[27] For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action
for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding
with the case pending before its office. [28] And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to
retain jurisdiction over the principal action[29] until the question on jurisdiction is finally determined.

In the case at bar, a sixty (60)-day TRO was issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. However, barely a week
after the lapse of the TRO, the PAGC issued its resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable and
recommending to the Office of the President his dismissal from government service. The CA believes that there has
been undue haste and apparent precipitation in the PAGCs investigation proceedings. [30] It notes with disapproval the
fact that it was barely eight (8) days after the TRO had lapsed that the PAGC issued the said resolution and explains
that respondent should have been given a second chance to present evidence prior to proceeding with the issuance of
the said resolution.[31]

We beg to disagree with the appellate courts observation.

First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of
regularity particularly since it was done in the performance of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures,
absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the
official acts of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the issuance of the assailed
PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular
performance of the PAGCs duties.

Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was not afforded a second
opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold water. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[32] So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due process
are satisfactorily complied with.[33]

Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of the formal charge filed
against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counter-affidavit or verified answer. [34] When the
said period lapsed without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day
period to file his answer, [35] but the latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his petition for  certiorari.
[36]
 During the preliminary conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period,
or until June 19, 2003 within which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a
warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of available
documentary evidence on record.[37] Again, the deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by
Montemayor in his defense.

We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as recommendations until finally acted upon by the
Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to
move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another opportunity before the Office of the President to present his
side particularly since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of
these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the consequences
of his own shortcomings.
Desperately, Montemayor contends that the authority of the PAGC to investigate him administratively, as well as the
power of the Office of the President to act on the PAGCs recommendation, had already ceased following the initiation
and filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). [38] He
points out that the Ombudsman is mandated by Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA No. 6770[39] to take over the
investigation and prosecution of the charges filed

against him.[40]

We are still not persuaded.

The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the Office of the President decided to
dismiss Montemayor.[41] More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the
initiation and filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the Presidents decision to dismiss Montemayor from
government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of its concurrent investigatory and
prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been terminated even before the Ombudsman could take
cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is already a fait accompli.

As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss Montemayor from government service
is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of petitioners.

Montemayors argument that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2001 SSAL and the
1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was acquired through
chattel mortgage, it is a government employees ethical and legal obligation to declare and include the same in his SSAL.
Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess he has himself created since he knows for a fact that every asset
acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the SSAL. The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and
in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore, cannot escape liability by
arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has not yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the
said vehicle was acquired only on installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001.[42]

Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the said vehicle had been transferred to him upon acquisition, the
vehicle was sold to another person on December 15, 2002;[43]hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001
SSAL. Respondents reasoning is anemic and convoluted. It is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not reported in
his 2001 SSAL.Notably, the acquisition value of the 2001 Ford Expedition was P1,599,000.00[44] is significantly greater
than the amount declared by Montemayor under machinery/equipment, worth P1,321,212.50, acquired by him as of
December 31, 2001,[45] and to the P1,251,675.00 worth of machinery/ equipment acquired by him as of December 31,
2002.[46] This belies Montemayors claim that the said vehicle has been included among the machinery/equipment assets he
declared in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL.[47] Neither did Montemayor satisfactorily reflect the P1,000,000.00 that has come to
his hands as payment for the alleged sale of his 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2002 SSAL.[48]

Respondent apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not a mere scrap of paper.  The law requires that the
SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later than
the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of
the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government
in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, [49] promote transparency in government,[50] and
ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. [51] It is for this reason that the SSAL
must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations.

Montemayors repeated and consistent failure to reflect truthfully and adequately all his assets and liabilities in his
SSAL betrays his claim of innocence and good faith. Accordingly, we find that the penalty of dismissal from
government service, as sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b) of RA No. 6713,[52] meted by the Office of the President
against him, is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 23, 2004 Decision and
the May 13, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581 are REINSTATED and
UPHELD.

Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby DISMISSED from government service.

SO ORDERED.

MONICO IMPERIAL VS GSIS

DECISION
 

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioner Monico K. Imperial, Jr., from

the December 10, 2009 decision[2] and the February 5, 2010resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101297.
  

The Factual Antecedents

On October 19, 2005, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) administratively charged the petitioner,
then Branch Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service [4] for approving the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office
employees who lacked the contribution requirements under GSIS Policy and Procedural Guidelines (PPG) No. 153-
99,[5] giving them unwarranted benefits through his evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross negligence, and
causing injury to the pension fund.[6] He was required to answer and was preventively suspended for ninety (90)
days.

On July 21, 2006, Atty. Manuel T. Molina, the petitioners purported counsel, filed an unverified answer in
behalf of the petitioner, who was then in the United States of America. Atty. Molina explained that the petitioner
granted the loan applications under an existing board resolution, with the approval of then GSIS Vice President
Romeo Quilatan; the loans were fully paid, without causing any prejudice to the service.

In a July 26, 2006 order,[7] Hearing Officer Violeta C.F. Quintos set the pre-hearing conference on August 17,
2006 at the GSIS Legazpi Field Office. A week later, in an August 2, 2006 order,[8] the Hearing Officer modified her
previous order and set the venue at the GSIS Naga Field Office.

Atty. Molina filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the GSIS Rules of Procedure set the
venue of pre-hearing conferences at the GSIS Main Office in PasayCity. The Hearing Officer denied the motion for
reconsideration in her August 11, 2006 order,[9] stating that the prosecution requested the change of venue. Copies of
the order were duly sent via fax and regular mail. Atty. Molina received the faxed copy on August 14, 2006, while he
received the registered mail on August 18, 2006.

At the scheduled August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference, the petitioner and Atty. Molina failed to appear. Atty.
Molina likewise failed to submit the petitioners verification of the answer and to submit a letter of authority to
represent the petitioner in the case. On the prosecutions motion, the Hearing Officer declared the petitioner to have
waived his right to file his answer and to have a formal investigation of his case, and expunged the unverified
answer and other pleadings filed by Atty. Molina from the records. The case was then submitted for resolution based
on the prosecutions submitted documents.[10]

GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. [11] He noted that the evidence presented by the prosecution
clearly showed that the petitioners approval of the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office
employees was improper because they lacked the contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-99. He also noted
that the pleadings filed by Atty. Molina, as the petitioners purported counsel, were expunged from the records, but
he, nonetheless, discussed the defenses raised in these pleadings and found them unmeritorious.

Noting that this was the petitioners second administrative offense (he had previously been suspended for
one [1] year for gross neglect of duty for failing to implement the recommendations of the Internal Audit Services
Group pertaining to the handling of returned-to-sender checks, resulting in a GSIS Naga Field Office Cashier
defrauding the GSIS of checks), Garcia imposed the penalty of dismissal with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government.
On the same date, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the decision.[12]

In a June 6, 2007 resolution, [13] Garcia denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration, noting that Atty.
Molina had no authority to appear for and in behalf of the petitioner, having failed to submit any formal written
authority; that the petitioners answer was unverified; and that, in any event, the petitioner had no evidence sufficient
to overturn the evidence presented by the prosecution.

The petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), reiterating his arguments of denial of due
process and the lack of evidence against him.

The CSC rejected the petitioners claim of due process violation, finding that the petitioners filing of a motion for
reconsideration cured whatever procedural due process defect there might have been. [14] It noted that the records of
the case showed that the petitioner approved the loan applications despite the patent ineligibility of the loan
applicants. The CSC thus affirmed the petitioners dismissal for grave misconduct, but added as an accessory penalty
the prohibition from taking any civil service examination.

 
 The petitioner elevated his case to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

In its December 10, 2009 decision,[15] the CA dismissed the petition, and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration,[16] finding no reversible error in the challenged CSC Resolution.

The Petition

In the petition before us, the petitioner argues that he was denied due process when the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing
conference was conducted in his absence without prior notice of the August 11, 2006 order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of change of venue, since Atty. Molina received by registered mail a copy of the August
11, 2006 order only on August 18, 2006, or a day after the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference. The petitioner
pleads good faith in approving the loans based on an existing GSIS Board Resolution which authorizes branch
managers to approve loans for meritorious and special reasons; the loans were cleared by the Commission on Audit
and settled by the borrowers. He contends that the penalty of dismissal is too severe in the absence of any wrongful
intent and given his 40 years of government service.

The Case for Respondent GSIS

The GSIS submits that the petitioner was not denied due process because Atty. Molina received on August 14,
2006 a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order. On the merits of the case, the GSIS maintains that the evidence on
record duly established the petitioners administrative culpability for acts inimical to the interest of the public,
warranting his dismissal from the service; the penalty of dismissal was warranted since this was the petitioners
second administrative offense.

The Issues

The issues are: (1) whether the petitioner was denied due process, and (2) whether there was substantial
evidence to support petitioners dismissal from the service.
 

The Courts Ruling

 

We PARTIALLY GRANT the petition and modify the findings of the CA pertaining to the
petitioners administrative liability.

The Procedural Due Process Issue

Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard
be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard. [17] A
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary.
 

In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt
on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order), Garcias decision of February 21, 2007 duly
considered and discussed the defenses raised in Atty. Molinas pleadings, although the answer was ordered expunged
from the records because it was unverified and because Atty. Molina failed to submit a letter of authority to
represent the petitioner.

What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration which
cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case.
[18]
 Again, Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he
rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution.[19] Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.

 
Findings of facts of administrative bodies accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence

Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing
or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. [20] A
misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule are present.[21] Otherwise, a misconduct is only simple.

No doubt exists in our mind that the petitioner committed misconduct in this case. The records clearly show
that the petitioner committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS
Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-99. After a
careful review of the records, however, we disagree with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the
petitioners acts constituted grave misconduct. While we accord great respect to the factual findings of administrative
agencies that misconduct was committed, we cannot characterize the offense committed as grave. No substantial
evidence was adduced to support the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave.

We are aware that to the CSC, the mere act of approving the loan applications on several occasions proves
the element of flagrant disregard of established rules to constitute grave misconduct. Thus, it said:
The act of the appellant in approving salary loan applications of his subordinates over and
above the prescribed rates under the GSIS policy, not only once but several times, indicates
his flagrant and wanton transgression of the said policy. He, in fact, abused his authority in
doing so.[22]

Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been
demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule; [23] in the
repeated voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies; [24] in the practice of illegally
collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; [25] when several violations or
disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds were committed; [26] and when the employee
arrogated unto herself responsibilities that were clearly beyond her given duties. [27] The common denominator in
these cases was the employees propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we do not see the type of open defiance and disregard of GSIS
rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSCs findings on the petitioners actions prior to the approval of the loans
negate the presence of any intent on the petitioners part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS
branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan applications beyond the prescribed
requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient practice in the approval of loans exercised by some
branch managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his
immediate supervisor before acting on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic
flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires.

Thus, the petitioners liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As Branch Manager
of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies, guidelines and procedures in carrying
out the agencys mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees
who did not fully meet the required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of judgment sufficient to hold him
liable for simple misconduct.

The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) classifies simple misconduct as a less
grave offense. Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, the commission of simple misconduct is
penalized by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from
the service for the second offense. While records show that this is not the petitioners first offense as he was
previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect of duty, we believe that his dismissal would be disproportionate to
the nature and effect of the transgression he committed as the GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through the loans he
extended; these loans were for GSIS employees and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple misconduct, we
impose on the petitioner the penalty of suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by GSIS up to the
finality of this Decision.[28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition for review on

certiorari and MODIFY the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Monico K.
Imperial, Jr. is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the time the
preventive suspension that GSIS imposed lapsed, up to the finality of this Decision.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS EXEC SEC

DECISION
 

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that takes property from a state
university, over its objections, for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.
 

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the

[1]
State.  In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public
domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080
hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162.  Meanwhile, the
government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the
areas cultural communities.

Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.

On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission
(collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC
over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive
Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion,
however, and proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et
al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion to dismiss.

On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution
granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. Still,
the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the
ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.  CMU filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004.This prompted CMU to appeal the
RTCs dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.[2]

CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when
it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. [3]

In a March 14, 2008 decision, [4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs
recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorarifiled directly with this Court, because it raised pure
questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA added that whether
the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the
application for injunction is also a pure question of law.

CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it denied the same, [5] prompting
CMU to file the present petition for review.
 

The Issues Presented

 

The case presents the following issues:

 
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for prohibition
against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid
and constitutional;

2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of
law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this Court; and

3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.

The Courts Rulings

 
 One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action. The first is that jurisdiction over the
action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay City, given
that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done in Manila. The second reason, presumably made on the
assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and
constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some
purpose other than CMUs use.

There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no jurisdiction over a
case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the
same results, which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two
incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the present petition was brought
dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.

Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[6] vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over
the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises
purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The
question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely questions of
law.

As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due process
when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise
factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?

Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued this
proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts
that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure
question of law, indeed lies with this Court.

 
 As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process
when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was
constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly
raised and heard.NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score. What NCIP, et
al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the
injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in
the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to
hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised
pure questions of law.

Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been raised and
amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA Mindanao
Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of constitutionality of the
Proclamation in question will come to this Court however the courts below decide it. Consequently, the Court
should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now resolve the same.

The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU v. Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[7] the DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking both
privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the
segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court nullified the DARAB action considering the
inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational
institution. Said the Court:

 
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the
CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student
population and academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to
promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future
programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner
as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which blazed the trail for
the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-
West. What we now know
as Michigan State University, Penn State University and IllinoisState University, started as
small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational
programs. They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed
to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and
scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges
 came from government appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments
and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit that President
Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College(forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080
hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in
order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural
educational institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract
settlers to that part of the country.

xxxx

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest
priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to
the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside
the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the
claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking
of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet
uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted
by law to the DARAB.

The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state

colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by
misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the
main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so
vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.[8]

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate
the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their
character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and
technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 [9] in
1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
its effectivity shall be recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in
CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not
in accord with the IPRA.

 
 Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the areas
cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs name.  Indeed, eventually,
only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than 300 hectares were
acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March 14, 2008 decision and
September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential
Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.

ATTY ROMEO ERECE VS MACALINGAY

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated
on January 7, 2005 affirming the Decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found petitioner Atty.
Romeo L. Erece guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 
The facts are as follows:
 
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I, whose office is
located in San Fernando City, La Union. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint
dated October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to
petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle, and that he
certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact he did, in order to collect transportation
allowance.
 
 
The Affidavit-Complaint reads:
 
xxx
 
4. That on September 10, 1998, we, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Mr. Lyman Salvador
were denied the use of the office vehicle as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of our denied
Itinerary of Travel marked as Annex B;
 
5.                  That on August 5, 1998, I, Brigida Abratique requested for the use of the
government vehicle but the same was denied by Atty. Erece for the reason that we would be using
the same to Teachers Camp as evidenced by a copy of the denied trip ticket with the marginal
notes of Atty. Erece hereto attached as Annex C;
 
6.                  That on May 29, 1998, the request of Brigida Cecilia Abratique and
Francisco Bilog to use the vehicle within the City for field work purposes was again denied by
Atty. Erece as he will accordingly use the same;
  
7.                  That on April 20, 1998, a proposed trip was likewise postponed by Atty.
Erece on the ground that he will be using the vehicle as evidenced by a copy of the proposed
Itinerary of Travel with marginal note of Atty. Erece xxx;
 
8.                  That on April, 1997, I, Atty. Jocelyn Bastian requested for the use of the
vehicle as I need[ed] to go to the Benguet Provincial Jail but I was instructed to commute because
he will use the vehicle. To my dismay, I found him still in the office when I returned from the
Provincial Jail;
 
9.                  That such denials of the use of the vehicle are not isolated cases but were
just a few of the numerous instances of conflicts of schedules regarding the use of the government
vehicle and where we found ourselves always at the losing end because we are the subordinate
employees;
 
xxx
 
13. That Atty. Erece regularly receives and liquidates his Representation and
Transportation Allowances (RATA) which at present is in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND
PESOS (P4,000.00), the payroll of such and its liquidation could be made available upon request
by an authority to the Resident Auditor but his liquidations for the month of April 1998 and
September 1998 [are] hereto attached xxx;
 
14. That despite regular receipt of his RATA, Atty. Erece still prioritizes himself in the
use of the office vehicle to the detriment of the public service;
 
15. That to compound things, he certifies in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that HE
DID NOT USE ANY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE FOR THE SAID MONTH xxx which is a big
lie because as already stated, he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR,
Region I;
 
16. That I, Rolando C. Ebreo, the disbursing officer of the Regional Field Office hereby
attest to the fact that no deductions in the RATA of Atty. Romeo L. Erece was ever done in
connection with his regular use of the government vehicle x x x.[2]
 
 
The CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region issued an Order dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to
comment on the complaint.
 
In compliance, petitioner countered, thus:
 
xxx
 
4. In relation to paragraphs 2-D, 2-E and 2-G above cited, it is among the duties as per
management supervisory function of the Regional HR Director to approve use or non-use of the
official vehicle of the Region as it was memorandum receipted to him and the non-approval of the
use of the same if it is not arbitrary and for justifiable reasons; said function of approval and
disapproval rests on the Regional Human Rights Director and that function is not merely
ministerial;
 
5. That I have issued a guideline that the official vehicle will not be used for the
Mountain Provinces and Halsema Highway/Mountain Trail because of the poor road condition
and to prevent breakdown and early deterioration of same xxx;
 
 6. That Atty. Lynn B. Macalingay, one of the complainants had gone to Mt. Province to
attend the Provincial Peace and Order Council meetings, conduct jail visitations and follow-up
cases on many occasions using the regular bus trips in the spirit of the policy as mentioned in
paragraph 4 xxx;
 
7. That all employees had used the vehicle on official business without exception, all
complainants included xxx;
 
8. On September 10, 1998, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Lyman Salvador had the use of
the vehicle disapproved for the reasons conforming to paragraph 4 xxx;
 
9. On August 5, 1998, Atty. Erece disapproved the use of vehicle for use of Brigida
Abratique because:
 
a) The vehicle was available since July 30, 1998 for use in Happy
Hallow but not utilized earlier xxx;
b) On August 6, 1998, a DECS-CHR Seminar on Use Human Rights
Exemplar was held at the Teachers Camp Baguio City and the vehicle was used to
transport HR materials, overhead projector and for the overall use of the seminar
upon the request of the Public Information and Education Office, Central Office,
Commission on Human Rights through Susan Nuguid of CHR, Manila;
 
xxx
 
d)                  That Mrs. Abratique and Co. were asked to explain the
unreasonable delay to attend to the case of Cherry Esteban which was subject of the
disapproved travel;
 
10. On April 20, 1998, the itinerary of travel of Lyman Salvador was
RESCHEDULED from April 22 & 23, 1998 to April 23 & 24, 1998 as the vehicle was used by
Atty. Erece on an important travel to Manila upon order of no less than the Honorable
Chairperson, Aurora Navarette-Recia of Commission on Human Rights xxx;
 
xxx
 
12.              As to the use of the vehicle by the Regional HR Director, same shall be
subject to the allowance/disallowance of the COA Resident Auditor, likewise the Regional HR
Director in all his travels outside Baguio City, he does not claim bus and taxi fares per
certification of Danilo Balino, the Administrative Officer Designate and Mr. Rolando Ebreo, the
Cash Disbursing Officer, Annex Z;
 
13.              In many cases, Atty. Romeo L. Erece has to maintain the vehicle including
car washing thereof, garage parking at his residence to maintain and upkeep the vehicle and same
is still in premium condition to the satisfaction of the office at no extra cost to the Commission;
 
xxx
 
15.              In support thereof, we move to dismiss this case as pure question on
supervisory and management prerogative, which is reserved for the Office Head and a harassment
move by disgruntled employees who are counter-charged hereof;
 
16.              Annexes E and F of the complaint [are] misplaced and misleading because a
clear and cognate reading of same does not reflect that I checked/marked the use of government
vehicle in the certification and as such no dishonesty is involved; the documents speak for
themselves. x x x Annex E is for the month of April, 1998 where the check marks are clear. On
 Annex F of the complaint, no reference is made as to the fact that I did not use the government
vehicle, if so, no allegation as to when I did use same for my personal use.[3]
 
 
After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999
charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of
the monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact, he
did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.
 
Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:
 
1. That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself in the
use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office that he
cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation
allowance;
 
2. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all
Regional Human Rights Directors, as follows: to regularize your receipt of the transportation
allowance component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly, you are hereby directed to
immediately transfer to any of your staff, preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum receipt
of the vehicle(s) now still in your name;
 
3. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any
government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true because he is the regular user
of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
 
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been
prejudiced by the acts of Erece.
 
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer
under oath and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his Answer, he should indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation or waives his right thereto. Any Motion to Dismiss, request for clarification or Bills
of Particulars shall not be entertained by the Commission. Any of these pleadings interposed by
the respondent shall be considered as an Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he is
advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his choice. [4]
 
 
After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24. 2002,
finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him
with dismissal from the service.
 
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.
 
 In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA upheld the CSC Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.[5]
 
 
Hence, this petition.
 
 
Petitioner raises these issues:
 
 
1.                 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due process
despite the admitted facts that respondents failed to identify and testify on their Affidavit-
Complaint and that petitioner was denied of his right to cross-examine respondents on their
Affidavit-Complaint.
 
2.                 Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in adopting in toto the conclusions of the
CSC although they were based on mere assumptions.
 
 
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case, he
was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit.  After he rested his case,
respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence,
which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioners) objection. Respondents then submitted their Position
Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.
 
Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a
waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was not in
conformity with the procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.
 
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine
the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. [6]
 
Velez v. De Vera[7] held:
 
 Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial
in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different
principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements
are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or
hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is
met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not
essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available
trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
 
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an
actual hearing always essential. . . . [8]
 
Next, petitioner contends that the CA erred in adopting in toto the conclusions of the CSC.
 
Petitioner contends that the conclusion of the CSC proceeded from the premise that the petitioner was using
the subject vehicle as his service vehicle, which he disputes, because he did not use the vehicle regularly.  The
evidence showed that the service vehicle was being used by the employees of the regional office for official
purposes. He argues that although the service vehicle is still in his name, it should not be concluded that it is
assigned to him as his service vehicle, thus disqualifying him from receiving transportation allowance.
 
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent conclusion of the CSC referred to by petitioner reads:
 
At the outset, it must be stated that the entitlement to transportation allowance by certain
officials and employees pursuant to RA 6688 presupposes that they are not assigned government
vehicles. This was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Aida Domingo vs. COA, G.R.
No. 112371, October 7, 1998, where it ruled, as follows:
 
The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of Republic Act
6688, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
 
Sec. 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ... The
transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who
are assigned a government vehicle or use government motor transportation,
except as may be approved by the President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise
provided by law, no amount appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for
representation and/or transportation allowances, whether commutable or
reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under this Section. Previous
administrative authorization not consistent with the rates and conditions herein
specified shall no longer be valid and payment shall not be allowed.
 
xxx
 
In the case of Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,
decided by this Court on November 27, 1992, COA also disallowed the claim
for transportation allowance of the legal counsel of National Power Corporation
because he was already issued a government vehicle. Involving the circular
aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was therein held
that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use of government
 vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in stressing that the
use of government motor vehicle and claim for transportation allowance are
mutually exclusive and incompatible.
 
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled
in the aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has
been assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim transportation allowance.
(Underscoring supplied)
 
It is clear from the records that Director Edmundo S. Ancog, CHR-Central office (Field
Operations office), issued a Memorandum dated February 27, 1998, addressed to all CHR
Regional Directors in respect to Transportation Allowance. The Memorandum states that
transportation allowance shall not be granted to Regional Directors whenever a government
vehicle or use of government motor transportation is already assigned to them. It further
emphasized that should they want to avail regularization of their RATA, the Regional Directors
must immediately transfer the vehicle to any of their staff/lawyer.
 
 
Records show that Erece was issued a government vehicle since August 10, 1997 and he
did not transfer the vehicle to any of his staff. Notwithstanding this fact and the said
memorandum, he received transportation allowance particularly for the months of April and
September 1998, as reflected in the Certification/s signed by him. This clearly resulted in undue
prejudice to the best interest of the service.
 
The foregoing facts logically lead to the conclusion that the act of Erece in certifying that
he has not used any government vehicle and consequently collecting Transportation Allowance
despite the fact that a government vehicle was assigned to him constitutes the offenses of
Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. [9]
 
 
The above conclusion,as well as the Memorandum dated February 27, 1998 issued by Director Ancog to
the CHR Regional Directors, are both very clear. Once a vehicle is assigned to a regional director, like petitioner, he
is no longer entitled to transportation allowance unless he assigns the vehicle to another staff/lawyer. Since
petitioner did not assign the subject vehicle assigned to him to someone else, he is not entitled to transportation
allowance.
 
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, there is no qualification that the assigned vehicle should be for the
exclusive use of the service vehicle of the regional director alone to disqualify him from receiving transportation
allowance.
 
Since the records show that petitioner collected transportation allowance even if a government vehicle had
been assigned to him, the CA did not err in sustaining the decision of the CSC finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 7,
2005 is AFFIRMED.
 
DATUFAX MANGUDADATU VS HRET

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction[1] assailing Resolution Nos. 07-179[2] dated August 16, 2007 and 07-300[3] dated September
19, 2007, of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 07-021, entitled Angelo O.
Montilla v. Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.

Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. Montilla (private respondent) were congressional
candidates for the First District of Sultan Kudarat during the May 14, 2007 national elections. Petitioner won by
17,451 votes and was proclaimed on May 22, 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected
Representative of the said congressional district.

On May 31, 2007, respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)[4] contesting the results of the
elections and the proclamation of petitioner.

On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons [5] upon petitioner through registered
mail at Purok Losaria,[6] Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat, requiring petitioner to file an Answer to the
protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card, [7] showing that a certain Aileen R.
Baldenas[8] (Baldenas) received the summons on June 27, 2007.

On August 16, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-179 [9] which noted the aforementioned Registry Return
Receipt Card and that despite the fact that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had passed since Baldenas received the
summons, petitioner had not filed an answer in accordance with Rule 27 [10] of the 2004 HRET Rules. In the same
Resolution, the HRET considered petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations of the protest.

In an Order dated August 17, 2007, the HRET set the preliminary conference on September 27, 2007 at 11:00 a.m.

Meanwhile, petitioner informally learned of respondents protest, prompting petitioner to request his lawyers to
verify the same from the records of the HRET. Thereafter, his lawyers entered their appearance on September 4,
2007 and requested that they be furnished with copies of the petition of protest as well as notices, orders and
resolutions pertaining to the protest.

On September 10, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider [11] Resolution No. 07-179 and Motion to Admit
Answer with Counter-Protest, alleging that he never received the summons issued by the HRET. In his
affidavit[12] attached to the motion, petitioner denied that Baldenas was a member of his household or his
employee. He further claimed that she was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to
him. And assuming that he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never brought to his attention.

On September 19, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-300 [13] denying for lack of merit, petitioners Motion to
Reconsider Resolution No. 07-179, as well as his Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest, the latter for
having been filed out of time. The HRET explained that:

In the instant case, the recipient, Ailene R. Baldenas, could not have received the summons had
she not been found in said address or had she not been present therein as to have been in a position
to have acted in behalf of the resident of the house, the protestee herein. The act of a person in
receiving a mail matter cannot be easily defied by simply denying that the receipt was
unauthorized. We doubt protestees self-serving allegation of lack of knowledge of Ailene R.
Baldenas. This denial of authority, or of knowledge of the recipients identity must be supported by
conclusive proof, the burden of which belongs to no other than the one making such assertion, the
protestee himself. The ruling cited by protestee in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Fernandez does not
apply herein as the summons was served at protestees residence and not just at any house owned
by him. In that case, service of summons was made in a house, but not the defendants residence or
dwelling place. Thus, such service was ineffective and improper which is not the case herein as
the service of the summons was made to protestees residence in the province.

The records of the case bear that protestees residence is Purok Lo[sa]ria, Tamnag (Poblacion),
Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat. Aside from the protest, a Manifestation filed by protestant to submit the
Roll of Attorneys Numbers of his counsels indicates that a copy thereof was sent to the same
address on June 5, 2007, through registered mail. The summons was sent and was received at the
same address stated in the protest. Accordingly, the registry return receipt card shows proper
receipt by Ailene R. Baldena[s] on June 27, 2007. In all instances of posting, either by protestant
or by the Tribunal, the presumption is that mailed matters were duly received by the addressee, by
himself or his representatives. The Tribunal should not be taken to task to ascertain or cause the
Postmasters personnel to first determine whether or not the person receiving was or was not
known to protestee. With the proof of service, such as the registry return receipt card, at hand, the
Tribunal is satisfied that jurisdiction was acquired over protestee.

After the preliminary conference on September 27, 2007, the HRET issued a Preliminary Conference Order, of even
date, granting respondents motion for the revision of ballots and directing the Secretary of the HRET to conduct the
same in all or 100% of the protested precincts in the instant case. The HRET also noted petitioners manifestation in
open court that his participation in the preliminary conference was without prejudice to whatever legal remedies he
may avail for the reconsideration of Resolution No. 07-300 dated September 13, 2007, denying his Motion to
Reconsider Resolution No. 07-179 with Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest.

Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the HRET for issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 and 07-300. He also prayed for a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction for this Court to enjoin the HRET from further proceeding with HRET
Case No.07-021.

Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction over his person because of the absence of a
valid service of summons. He argued that a substitute service of summons is made only when the defendant cannot
be served personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed. [14] In his case, since the process
servers return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service, then the substituted service was
improper and invalid.

In the Resolution of this Court dated October 16, 2007, we required respondent to file his comment on the
petition for certiorari within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.

In his comment, respondent countered that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution Nos. 07-179 dated August 16, 2007 and 07-300 dated September 19, 2007. He argued that Rule 22 of the
2004 HRET Rules merely states that the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the
protestee or respondent, as the case may be. He posited then that the intent of the HRET in not expressly specifying
personal service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to give it a reasonable discretion or leeway in
serving the summons by other means such as registered mail. Thus, service of summons on petitioner through
registered mail did not violate Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule 14, Sections
6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were inconsistent with Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be
given suppletory application to HRET proceedings.

Petitioner, in his reply, posited that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules was not inconsistent with Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. According to petitioner, the Secretary of the Tribunal is equivalent to the
Clerk of Court, and both the regular courts and the HRET have process servers and sheriffs who may serve notices,
orders, and summons. Petitioner further contends that there is nothing in the 2004 HRET Rules that allows service
of summons by registered mail and strongly asserts that service of summons by registered mail is susceptible to
fraud and manipulation.

We grant the petition.

Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides:

RULE 22. Summons. If the petition is not summarily dismissed in accordance with Rule 21 of
these Rules, the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the protestee
or respondent, as the case may be, together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.
 
 
The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the
protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies
by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as well as with the
orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized
modes of service of summons, resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which state:
 
 
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
 
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
 
 
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which is not among the
allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

In Federico S. Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora Rosario A.
[16]
Oreta,  this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court apply suppletorily to the rules of the HRET. To quote from that case:
The matter of serving summons is governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which applies suppletorily to
the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal through its Rule 80.23 Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide -

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein)

must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice
desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however
efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed
by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at
his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary

method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit
even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the law
could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. As safeguard measures for
this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer for a claim, it is required that statutory
restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our
jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following
circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts
exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is
also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service
or officers return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence
aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with
the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the
respondent.

We find no merit in respondent Oretas austere argument that personal service need not be
exhausted before substituted service may be used since time in election protest cases is of the
essence. Precisely, time in election protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized to
serve the summons and a copy of the election protest by the means most likely to reach the
protestee. No speedier method could achieve this purpose than by personal service thereof. As
already stated, the preferential rule regarding service of summons found in the Rules of
Court applies suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of summons, there ought to be no
rational basis for distinguishing between regular court cases and election protest cases
pending before the HRET. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 
 
Indeed the doctrine in Sandoval has been reiterated by this Court in subsequent decisions to reiterate that in
ordinary civil cases, personal service of summons is preferred and resort to substituted service not only must be fully
justified but also comply strictly with requirements of the Rules of Court for substituted service. [17] In the early case
of Olar v. Cuna,[18] we held that:

In the case at bar, the summons were served by registered mail, which is not among the
modes of service under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Besides, under Section 5 of
aforesaid rule, the summons "may be served by the sheriff or other proper officer of the province
in which the service is to be made, or for special reasons by any person especially authorized by
the judge of the court issuing the summons." The postmaster of Bato, Leyte, not being a sheriff or
court officer, or a person authorized by the court to serve the summons cannot validly serve the
summons. The petitioners, therefore, were not duly served with the summons in Civil Case No. B-
674.

Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of
summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with
more reason should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the
hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court.

We note that the HRET, in its Resolution No. 07-300, justified its resort to registered mail in this wise:
 
In cases filed before the Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces, it
has been its practice to serve the summons through registered mail, it being impracticable to send
the same by personal service to protestees or respondents who reside in said far provinces. Since
protestee resides in Sultan Kudarat, summons was served to him through registered mail.
 
 
We do not agree. The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its own process servers to
personally serve the summons, or alternatively, delegate the matter to the process server of a court with territorial
jurisdiction over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case, at the expense of the
petitioner/protestant. Considering that the proper service of summons on the respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional
requirement and goes to heart of due process, we cannot allow service of summons by a method not sanctioned by
the HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations in respondents petition of protest and in denying his
motion to reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counter-protest.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 07-179 and 07-300 of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 07-021 are SET ASIDE and the HRET
is directed to admit the Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.

No pronouncement as to costs.

DEPED VS CUANAN

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated May 16,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 which set aside Resolution No. 041147 dated October 22, 2004 of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding respondent Godofredo G. Cuanan (Cuanan) guilty of sexual harassment and dismissing
him from service, and the CA Resolution[2] dated July 18, 2005 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of
Education (DepEd).
 
The factual background of the case is as follows:
 
On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their respective minor daughters,
Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III (DECS-RO
No. III), Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints[3] for Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public
Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
 
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador constituted an Investigating Committee,
composed of three DepEd officials from the province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the investigation, the
Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report [4] dated December 14, 1999, finding Cuanan guilty of sexual
harassment and recommending his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. In a Decision[5] dated January 28, 2000,
Regional Director Labrador concurred in the findings of the Investigating Committee and meted out the penalty of forced resignation
to Cuanan without prejudice to benefits.
 
In an Order[6] dated April 13, 2000, then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the Decision of Regional Director
Labrador. On May 30, 2000, Cuanan filed a Petition for Reconsideration[7] thereof, but the same was denied for lack of merit by
Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution[8] dated June 19, 2000.
Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. On January 20, 2003, the CSC issued Resolution No. 030069,[9] which set aside the June 19,
2000 Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuananfrom the charge of sexual harassment. On January 23, 2003, copies
of the resolution were duly sent to the parties, including the DepEd.[10] Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 030069
on January 31, 2003.[11]
 
In a Letter dated February 3, 2003, Cuanan requested his reinstatement as Elementary School Principal I.[12] In a 1st Indorsement,
the District Supervisor recommended appropriate action.[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4, 2003, Schools Division
Superintendent Dioscorides D. Lusung (Superintendent) recommended that Cuanan be reinstated to duty as School Principal of
San Antonio District upon finality of the decision of the CSC.[14] In a Letter[15] dated February 10, 2003, Regional Director Ricardo
T. Sibug informed the Superintendent that Cuanan could not be immediately reinstated to the service until an order of
implementation was received from the Department Secretary.
 
Sometime in March 2003, DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC
Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003. In a Letter[16]dated March 25, 2003, the CSC informed the DepEd that a copy of
the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23, 2003. Nonetheless, the CSC sent another copy of the resolution to
the DepEd for its reference. The DepEd received said reference copy on March 28, 2003.[17]
 
On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a
Petition for Review/Reconsideration[18] with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.
 
On July 29, 2003, Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for Review/Reconsideration[19] reiterating the prayer for reversal
of the resolution. Again, no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.
 
Subsequently, pursuant to Division Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated June 18, 2003, Cuanan was reinstated to his former
position as school principal effective April 30, 2003.[20] In Division Special Order No. 285, series of 2003 dated July 8,
2003, Cuanan was directed to return to duty.[21] Based thereon, Cuanan requested payment of salaries and his inclusion in the
payroll, which the Division School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7, 2003.[22]
 
However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 041147[23] setting aside CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January
20, 2003. It found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service
eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on November 9,
2004.[24]
 
Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari[25] with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No.
041147, alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the
complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and
that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process.
 
The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper remedy, the mode of review from a decision of the CSC
being a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
 
On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision [26] granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution No. 041147
dated October 12, 2004. The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule 43 were available
remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted, since the act complained of was patently illegal; that the
CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the DepEd without regard
for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not duly notified of the petition for review/reconsideration, nor was he
required by the CSC to file a comment thereon, much less, given a copy of the said petition; that the DepEd failed to establish that
the resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition for review/reconsideration.
 
DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[27] but the CA denied the same in its Resolution[28] dated July 18, 2005.
 
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
 
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 87499, THE SAME NOT BEING
THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22,
2004.
 
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING
RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22, 2004.[29]
 
DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the
CA by petition for review under Rule 43; that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not the complainant, may question the resolution of the CSC;
that Cuanan failed to prove that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed; that even if Cuanan was not
served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd, the CSC was not bound by procedural rules.
 
Cuanan, on the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating
him, since it is not the complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by the decision therein; that
even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and
that Cuanans right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the
opportunity to comment thereon.
 
The Court finds it necessary, before delving on the grounds relied upon by the DepEd in support of the petition, to first resolve the
question of whether the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.
 
In a long line of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[30] and reiterated in Philippine National Bank
v. Garcia, Jr.,[31] the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who
can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution No. 021600[32] allows the disciplining
authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee, thus:
 
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in
an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. 030069 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by
the DepEd which, as the appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest.
 
Now, as to the merits of DepEd's arguments, the Court finds none.
 
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43[33] of the
Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the
petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null
and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. [34] As will be shown forthwith,
exception (c) applies to the present case.
 
Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari, immediate
recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted wherethe order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object.[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA.
 
At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for review, the petition having been filed on
November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the 15-
day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review.[36] Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.[37]
Furthermore, CSC Resolution No. 030069 has long become final and executory. It must be noted that the records show that copies
of CSC Resolution No. 030069 were duly sent to the parties, including DepEd, on January 23, 2003.[38] Cuanan received a copy
thereof on January 31, 2003,[39] while the DepEd requested a copy sometime in March 2003, or about two months later.Under the
Rules of Evidence, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted. [40] This presumption includes
that of regularity of service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.
 
Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -- that is, non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC
Resolution No. 030069 -- is on the part of the DepEd, which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same.[41] Thus, the
presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003 had already become final and executory when
the DepEd filed its Petition for Review/Reconsideration on April 11, 2003, more than two months later.
 
It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory, it becomes immutable and can no longer be amended or
modified. In Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo,[42] this Court held:
 
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be
no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement
of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciablecontroversies with finality.[43]
 
Moreover, while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in justiciable cases presented before them.[44] The relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be
invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:[45] that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
 
Furthermore, Section 43.A.[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:
 
Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission,
shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission.
 
Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not entirely
substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a party to the
case. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading
and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the averments therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for
review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel;
nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served
upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the CSC.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87499 are AFFIRMED.
 

ANG TIBAY VS CIR

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of
the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed
in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court
of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court
of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S.
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d
13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .
The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v.
Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op.,
p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227
U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to
the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the
facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
 (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with
the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to
the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

AMERICAN TOBACCO VS DIRECTOR

ANTONIO, J.:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the
"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule
likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by
the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or
trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and
use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name
pending at the Patent Office.

Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in said
Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282, 247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400,
324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the
above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:

168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. — the Director of Patents shall have
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be
provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over
these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the
Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be
governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved
by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.. 1

Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended
the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:

168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. — The Director of Patents shall have
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided
with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over
these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to
the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be
governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be [P25.00.]
Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before
the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but
all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing
officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other
respondents herein.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter
partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to
compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the general law2 and
Republic Acts Nos. 1653 and 166 3 * to sustain the contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director
of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of
other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations
owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter
submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also
empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory
authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.
166).

It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is
entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its
purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.4 There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165
or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor
can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of
the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws
(Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official
the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration
of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent
interference proceedings,5 decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent,6 cancellations of patents under
Republic Act No. 165,7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions,8 claims of interference, 9 cancellation cases
under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could
hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every
case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. 11 For him to do so and at
the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by
law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in
regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details
often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious
consideration of the more important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers.
This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at
the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice,
and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of
detail." 12

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this
does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative
agency will be 
made. 13

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to
him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of
fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the
case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof,
and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process
and fair trial are fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as
the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of
a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the
determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the
hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the
Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional,
petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.

Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this Court has correctly pointed out, the
repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963 to 1968 18 not
only confirms the departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the act of the Director
of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the administration of the law. 19

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners. 
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS NLRC

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the resolution of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 (p. 28, Rollo) in NLRC Case No. NCR-8-
3808-83, entitled, "Apolinario M. Signo, Complainant, versus Manila Electric Company, Respondents", affirming
the decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the reinstatement of private respondent herein, Apolinario Signo, to
his former position without backwages.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor-leadman since January 1963 up to the
time when his services were terminated on May 18, 1983.

In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company for electrical services at his
residence at Peñafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo facilitated the
processing of the said application as well as the required documentation for said application at the Municipality of
Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private respondent received from Fernando de Lara the amount of
P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.

It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not yet within the serviceable point of
Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30-meter distance from the nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order
to expedite the electrical connections at de Lara's residence, certain employees of the company, including
respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an
entrance to the subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter.

As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were installed and made possible.
However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for
more than a year.

Petitioner company conducted an investigation of the matter and found respondent Signo responsible for the said
irregularities in the installation. Thus, the services of the latter were terminated on May 18, 1983.

On August 10 1983, respondent Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and separation pay.

After the parties had submitted their position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (p. 79, Rollo) on April
29, 1985, which stated, inter alia:

Verily, complainant's act of inducing the Meralco employees to effectuate the installation on Engr.
de Lara's residence prejudiced the respondent, and therefore, complainant himself had indeed
became a participant in the transactions, although not directly, which turned out to be illegal, not
to mention that some of the materials used therein belongs to Meralco, some of which were
inferior quality. . . .

While complainant may deny the violation, he cannot do away with company's Code on Employee
Discipline, more particularly Section 7, par. 8 and Section 6, par. 24 thereof However, as admitted
by the respondent, the infraction of the above cited Code is punishable by reprimand to dismissal."

... . And in this case, while considering that complainant indeed committed the above-cited
infractions of company Code of Employee Discipline, We shall also consider his records of
uninterrupted twenty (20) years of service coupled with two (2) commendations for honesty.
Likewise, We shall take note that subject offense is his first, and therefore, to impose the extreme
penalty of dismissal is certainly too drastic. A penalty short of dismissal is more in keeping with
justice, and adherence to compassionate society.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Meralco is hereby directed to reinstate complainant Apolinario M.
Signo to his former position as Supervisor Leadman without backwages, considering that he is not
at all faultless. He is however, here warned, that commission of similar offense in the future, shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Both parties appealed from the decision to the respondent Commission. On March 12, 1987, the respondent
Commission dismissed both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On June 23, 1987, the instant petition was filed with the petitioner contending that the respondent Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on August 3, 1987, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution of
the respondent Commission.

The issue to resolve in the instant case is whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from petitioner
company on grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.

Petitioner contends that respondent Signo violated Sections 6 and 7 of the company's Code on Employee Discipline,
which provide:

Section 6, Par. 24—Encouraging, inducing or threatening another employee to perform an act

constituting a violation of this Code or of company work, rules or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to
commit such offense.

Penalty—Reprimand to dismissal, depending upon the gravity of the offense.

Section 7, Par. 8—Soliciting or receiving money, gift, share, percentage or benefits from any
person, personally or through the mediation of another, to perform an act prejudicial to the
Company.

Penalty—Dismissal. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)

Petitioner further argues that the acts of private respondent constituted breach of trust and caused the petitioner
company economic losses resulting from the unbilled electric consumption of de Lara; that in view thereof, the
dismissal of private respondent Signo is proper considering the circumstances of the case.

The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An employer, generally, can dismiss or lay-off an
employee for just and authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. However, the
right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise
of its paramount police power. This is so because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the
State, more vital than the preservation of corporate profits (Euro-Linea, Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782,
December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78).

There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and violation of company rules, the
penalty for which ranges from reprimand to dismissal depending on the gravity of the offense. However, as earlier
stated, the respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiter found that dismissal should not be meted to respondent
Signo considering his twenty (20) years of service in the employ of petitioner, without any previous derogatory
record, in addition to the fact that petitioner company had awarded him in the past, two (2) commendations for
honesty. If ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric consumption of de Lara, this was
found to be the fault of petitioner's Power Sales Division.
We find no reason to disturb these findings. Well-established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited
to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Workers Union v.
San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. L-51002-06, May 30,1983,122 SCRA 557).

This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for
dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a
penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. (Itogon-
Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. L- 54280, September 30,1982,117 SCRA 523; Meracap v. International
Ceramics Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48235-36, July 30,1979, 92 SCRA 412; Sampang v. Inciong,
G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137 SCRA 56; De Leon v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-52056, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA
691; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PALEA, G.R. No. L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489).

In a similar case, this Court ruled:

As repeatedly been held by this Court, an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with
the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of breach of trust towards his employer
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to its interest. The law in
protecting the rights of the laborers, authorized neither oppression nor self- destruction of the
employer.

However, taking into account private respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of service which
undisputedly is unblemished by any previous derogatory record' as found by the respondent
Commission itself, and since he has been under preventive suspension during the pendency of this
case, in the absence of a showing that the continued employment of private respondent would
result in petitioner's oppression or self-destruction, We are of the considered view that his
dismissal is a drastic punishment. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

The ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private respondent is
reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner's obvious good faith. (Itogon- Suyoc Mines,
Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 11 7 SCRA 528)

Further, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New
Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140).

In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of
backwages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on
August 3, 1987 is lifted.

SO ORDERED.
GUZMAN VS NU

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University,
have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to
allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:

1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective
courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile
attitude to the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded
in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter contempt
for the principle of due process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and

3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if
there be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to
defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).

In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this Court's
requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:

1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and
not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"

2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was already
closed;"

3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading boycotts
of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had
demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in
G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on
November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the
opportunity given to them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted
classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from
destruction of university properties

4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to the
spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of
the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university premises but without permit from
university officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and

5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "

Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:

1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in
respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher learning, must also be
respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and villify respondent
university and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they hate.

2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned
that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.

3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll them
after the end of the semester.

On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:

... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to
require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY
INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester
without prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected
with their right to lawful defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado
Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal charge against him for malicious
mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the
continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies
in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said
petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest or
grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner.

Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—

1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it being
alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no
avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that
Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school premises," although there were no existing
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time;

2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners' right to
exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited; and

3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the permission of the school ...
can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the
students. "

On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:

... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the
petition for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for
petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b)
consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file
their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from notice. ... .

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and
other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case
for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents
to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.

Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being
disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or
in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal
this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient
for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college." 10 The rules may include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the
maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides that-

... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly
specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.
Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they
may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless
otherwise specified. 12

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or
otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to which any or
all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.

SO ORDERED.