A. INTRODUCTION was entered into after final judgment.
The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance
3. Civil Code Provisions on Compromises or Arbitrations
 
G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005.
FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ,
ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN,
petitioners, vs. RIZALINO UY, respondent.
Civil Law; Actions; Compromise Agreements; A compromise agreement is a contract
whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus
avoid or put an end to a lawsuit; A compromise may be either extrajudicial or judicial; To have
the force of law between the parties, it must comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.—A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They
adjust their difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in
litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the danger of losing. Verily, the
compromise may be either extrajudicial (to prevent litigation) or judicial (to end a litigation). A
compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must
have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. To have the force of law
between the parties, it must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts. Upon the
parties, it has the effect and the authority of res judicata, once entered into.
Same; Same; Same; A compromise agreement is immediately executory and not
appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery.—When a compromise agreement is given
judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been
sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and
effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent
or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of
execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Same; Same; Same; A compromise agreement that covered cases pending trial, on
appeal, and with final judgment upheld in Jesalva v. Bautista; Even prior to the execution of a
final judgment as held in Gatchalian v. Arlegui.—Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise
agreement that covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final judgment. The Court noted
that Article 2040 impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these
should be entered into. Palanca v. Court of Industrial Relations sustained a compromise
agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment in which only the amount of back wages was left to
be determined. The Court found no evidence of fraud or of any showing that the agreement was
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Gatchalian v.
Arlegui upheld the right to compromise prior to the execution of a final judgment. The Court ruled
that the final judgment had been novated and superseded by a compromise agreement.
Also, Northern Lines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals recognized the right to compromise final and
executory judgments, as long as such right was exercised by the proper party litigants.
Same; Same; Same; The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into; Elements of a Valid
Compromise.—There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it
with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by
the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent of
the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise,
and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established.
Same; Same; Same; Advantages of a compromise agreement appear to be recognized
by the NLRC in its Rules of Procedure.—The advantages of a compromise agreement appear to
be recognized by the NLRC in its Rules of Procedure. As part of the proceedings in executing a
final judgment, litigants are required to attend a pre-execution conference to thresh out matters
relevant to the execution. In the conference, any agreement that would settle the final judgment
in a particular manner is necessarily a compromise.
Same; Same; Same; Novation; The principle of novation supports the validity of a
compromise after final judgment.—The principle of novation supports the validity of a
compromise after final judgment. Novation, a mode of extinguishing an obligation, is done by
changing the object or principal condition of an obligation, substituting the person of the debtor,
or surrogating a third person in the exercise of the rights of the creditor.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Rights may be waived through a compromise agreement, notwithstanding a final
judgment that has already settled the rights of the contracting parties. To be binding,
the compromise must be shown to have been voluntarily, freely and intelligently
executed by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment. Furthermore, it
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
May 31, 2000 Decision and the October 30, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53581. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, having found that public respondent NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the two assailed Resolutions
and REINSTATES the order of the Labor Arbiter dated February 27, 1998.”
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA relates the facts in this wise:
“As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court
in Rizalino P. Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (GR No. 117983,
September 6, 1996) which affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC
in NLRC Case No. V-0427-93, hearings were conducted [in the National Labor
Relations Commission Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch in Iloilo City] to
determine the amount of wage differentials due the eight (8) complainants
therein, now [petitioners]. As computed, the award amounted to P1,487,312.69 x
x x.

“On February 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution.
“On May 19, 1997, [respondent] Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that
the cases be terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as
computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of [petitioners]. Said
Manifestation was also signed by the eight (8) [petitioners]. Together with the
Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of [petitioners], attesting to
the receipt of payment from [respondent] and waiving all other benefits due them
in connection with their complaint.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“On June 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution wherein they confirmed that each of them received P40,000 from
[respondent] on May 2, 1997.
“On June 9, 1997, [respondent] opposed the motion on the ground that the
judgment award had been fully satisfied. In their Reply, [petitioners] claimed that
they received only partial payments of the judgment award.x x x      x x x      x x x
“On October 20, 1997, six (6) of the eight (8) [petitioners] filed a Manifestation
requesting that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are
already satisfied of what they have received (a total of P320,000) from
[respondent]. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit in the local
dialect, dated October 20, 1997, of the six (6) [petitioners] attesting that they
have no more collectible amount from [respondent] and if there is any, they are
abandoning and waiving the same.
“On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the motion for
issuance of writ of execution and [considered] the cases closed and terminated x
x x.
“On appeal, the [National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter ‘NLRC’)]
reversed the Labor Arbiter and directed the immediate issuance of a writ of
execution, holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered
and that quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon as contrary to public
policy.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final
judgment. Thus, petitioners validly released respondent from any claims, upon the
voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for having been
filed out of time.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
“1.Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could
be subject to compromise settlement;
“2.Whether or not the petitioners’ affidavit waiving their awards in [the] labor case
executed without the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid;
“3.Whether or not the ignorance of the jurisprudence by the Court of Appeals and
its erroneous counting of the period to file [a] motion for reconsideration
constitute a denial of the petitioners’ right to due process.”
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Validity of the Compromise Agreement
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a
lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon,
disregarding the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is
balanced by the danger of losing. Verily, the compromise may be either extrajudicial
(to prevent litigation) or judicial (to end a litigation).
A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the
parties. To have the force of law between the parties, it must comply with the
requisites and principles of contracts. Upon the parties, it has the effect and the
authority of res judicata, once entered into.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than
a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered
as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is
immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The
nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution;
in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Following these basic principles, apparently unnecessary is a compromise
agreement after final judgment has been entered. Indeed, once the case is
terminated by final judgment, the rights of the parties are settled. There are no more
disputes that can be compromised.
Compromise Agreements after Final Judgment
The Court is tasked, however, to determine the legality of a compromise agreement
after final judgment, not the prudence of entering into one. Petitioners vehemently
argue that a compromise of a final judgment is invalid under Article 2040 of the Civil
Code, which we quote:
 “Art. 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a
compromise should be agreed upon, either or both parties being unaware of the
existence of the final judgment, the compromise may be rescinded.
“Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked or set aside is not a valid
ground for attacking a compromise.” (Bold types supplied)
The first paragraph of Article 2040 refers to a scenario in which either or both of the
parties are unaware of a court’s final judgment at the time they agree on a
compromise. In this case, the law allows either of them to rescind the compromise
agreement. It is evident from the quoted paragraph that such an agreement is not
prohibited or void or voidable. Instead, a remedy to impugn the contract, which is an
action for rescission, is declared available. The law allows a party to rescind a
compromise agreement, because it could have been entered into in ignorance of the
fact that there was already a final judgment. Knowledge of a decision’s finality may
affect the resolve to enter into a compromise agreement.
The second paragraph, though irrelevant to the present case, refers to the
instance when the court’s decision is still appealable or otherwise subject to
modification. Under this paragraph, ignorance of the decision is not a ground to
rescind a compromise agreement, because the parties are still unsure of the final
outcome of the case at this time.
Petitioners’ argument, therefore, fails to convince. Article 2040 of the Civil Code does
not refer to the validity of a compromise agreement entered into after final judgment.
Moreover, an important requisite, which is lack of knowledge of the final judgment, is
wanting in the present case.
Supported by Case Law
The issue involving the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a final
judgment is not novel. Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise agreement that
covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final judgment. The Court noted that
Article 2040 impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when
these should be entered into. Palanca v. Court of Industrial Relations sustained a
compromise agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment in which only the amount of
back wages was left to be determined. The Court found no evidence of fraud or of
any showing that the agreement was contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
Gatchalian v. Arlegui upheld the right to compromise prior to the execution of a
final judgment. The Court ruled that the final judgment had been novated and
superseded by a compromise agreement. Also, Northern Lines, Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals recognized the right to compromise final and executory judgments, as long
as such right was exercised by the proper party litigants. Rovero v. Amparo, which
petitioners cited, did not set any precedent that all compromise agreements after final
judgment were invalid. In that case, the customs commissioner imposed a fine on an
importer, based on the appraised value of the goods illegally brought to the country.
The latter’s appeal, which eventually reached this Court, was denied. Despite a final
judgment, the customs commissioner still reappraised the value of the goods and
effectively reduced the amount of fine. Holding that he had no authority to
compromise a final judgment, the Court explained:
“It is argued that the parties to a case may enter into a compromise about even a
final judgment rendered by a court, and it is contended x x x that the reappraisal
ordered by the Commissioner of Customs and sanctioned by the Department of
Finance was authorized by Section 1369 of the [Revised Administrative
Code]. The contention may be correct as regards private parties who are
the owners of the property subject-matter of the litigation, and who are
therefore free to do with what they own or what is awarded to them, as they
please, even to the extent of renouncing the award, or condoning the
obligation imposed by the judgment on the adverse party. Not so, however,
in the present case. Here, the Commissioner of Customs is not a private party
and is not the owner of the money involved in the fine based on the original
appraisal. He is a mere agent of the Government and acts as a trustee of the
money or property in his hands or coming thereto by virtue of a favorable
judgment. Unless expressly authorized by his principal or by law, he is not
authorized to accept anything different from or anything less than what is
adjudicated in favor of the Government.” (Bold types supplied)
Compliance with the Rule on Contracts
There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was
entered into after final judgment.
The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and
principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the law on
contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent of
the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the
compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established.
In the present factual milieu, compliance with the elements of a valid contract is
not in issue. Petitioners do not challenge the factual finding that they entered into a
compromise agreement with respondent. There are no allegations of vitiated consent.
Neither was there any proof that the agreement was defective or could be
characterized as rescissible, voidable, unenforceable, or void. Instead, petitioners base
their argument on the sole fact that the agreement was executed despite a final
judgment, which the Court had previously ruled to be allowed by law.
Petitioners voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement, as shown by the
following facts: (1) they signed respondent’s Manifestation (filed with the labor arbiter)
that the judgment award had been satisfied; (2) they executed a Joint Affidavit dated
May 5, 1997, attesting to the receipt of payment and the waiver of all other benefits
due them; and (3) 6 of the 8 petitioners filed a Manifestation with the labor arbiter on
October 20, 1997, requesting that the cases be terminated because of their receipt of
payment in full satisfaction of their claims. These circumstances also reveal that
respondent has already complied with its obligation pursuant to the compromise
agreement. Having already benefited from the agreement, estoppel bars petitioners
from challenging it.
Advantages of Compromise
A reciprocal concession inherent in a compromise agreement assures benefits for the
contracting parties. For the defeated litigant, obvious is the advantage of a
compromise after final judgment. Liability arising from the judgment may be reduced.
As to the prevailing party, a compromise agreement assures receipt of payment.
Litigants are sometimes deprived of their winnings because of unscrupulous
mechanisms meant to delay or evade the execution of a final judgment.
The advantages of a compromise agreement appear to be recognized by the
NLRC in its Rules of Procedure. As part of the proceedings in executing a final
judgment, litigants are required to attend a pre-execution conference to thresh out
matters relevant to the execution. In the conference, any agreement that would settle
the final judgment in a particular manner is necessarily a compromise.
Novation of an Obligation
The principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise after final judgment.
Novation, a mode of extinguishing an obligation, is done by changing the object or
principal condition of an obligation, substituting the person of the debtor, or
surrogating a third person in the exercise of the rights of the creditor.
For an obligation to be extinguished by another, the law requires either of these
two conditions: (1) the substitution is unequivocally declared, or (2) the old and the
new obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment
operates as a novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either
requisite. In the present case, the incompatibility of the final judgment with the
compromise agreement is evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to
supersede the former.
Second Issue: Validity of the Waiver
Having ruled on the validity of the compromise agreement in the present suit, the
Court now turns its attention to the waiver of claims or quitclaim executed by
petitioners. The subject waiver was their concession when they entered into the
agreement. They allege, however, that the absence of their counsel and the labor
arbiter when they executed the waiver invalidates the document.
Not Determinative of the Waiver’s Validity
The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not
determine its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a
waiver. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and
whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear
proof that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law
must step in to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated.
The law is silent with regard to the procedure for approving a waiver after a case
has been terminated. Relevant, however, is this reference to the NLRC’s New Rules
of Procedure:
“Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the
dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their
respective counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor Arbiter.
“The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that
it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them
the terms and consequences thereof.
“A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of
the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him, if
after confronting the parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that
they understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it was
entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the agreement is not contrary to
law, morals, and public policy.”
This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation conference during the
initial stage of the litigation. Such provision should be made applicable to the
proceedings in the pre-execution conference, for which the procedure for approving a
waiver after final judgment is not stated. There is no reason to make a distinction
between the proceedings in mandatory/conciliation and those in pre-execution
conferences.
The labor arbiter’s absence when the waivers were executed was remedied upon
compliance with the above procedure. The Court observes that the arbiter made
searching questions during the pre-execution conference to ascertain whether
petitioners had voluntarily and freely executed the waivers. Likewise, there was
evidence that they made an intelligent choice, considering that the contents of the
written waivers had been explained to them. The labor arbiter’s absence when those
waivers were executed does not, therefore, invalidate them.
The Court declines to rule on the allegation that respondent’s counsels
encroached upon the professional employment of petitioners’ lawyer when they
facilitated the waivers. The present action is not the proper forum in which to raise any
charge of professional misconduct. More important, petitioners failed to present any
supporting evidence.
The third issue, which refers to the timely filing of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the CA, will no longer be discussed because this Court’s
decision has resolved the case on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

——o0o——
G.R. No. 171698. July 4, 2007.
MARIA SHEILA ALMIRA T. VIESCA, petitioner, vs. DAVID GILINSKY, respondent.
Courts; Judgments; Compromise Agreements; A compromise agreement that is intended
to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise—once it is
stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the
parties.—A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A
compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally
called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a
mere contract binding upon the parties. Having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such
agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity
as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is
subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has
been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata,
although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court
where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed. The
settlement of disputes brought before the courts is encouraged. In fact, in the Civil Code and in
the Revised Rules of Court, courts are directed to persuade the litigants in civil cases to agree
upon some fair compromise.
Same; Same; Same; A trial court cannot modify, by motion of one of the parties, a
Compromise Agreement—a compromise agreement has the force of res judicata between the
parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.—Clause II(b) states
that “(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the father once a week.” The sentence
seems simple enough to be understood by a layman. Petitioner claims that the parties did not
specify the day and time of the week when private respondent could enjoy the overnight
company of Louis Maxwell in order to give the parties “some flexibility” and to give them the
opportunity to arrange the schedule themselves. But the parties have overstretched the
indeterminate language of said provision. Indeed, the parties have been at odds over the
interpretation and implementation of this plain provision of the Compromise Judgment and this
could have caused much confusion in the mind of the young Louis Maxwell who had to be
brought from one place to another at such unholy hours of the night only to be awakened from
deep slumber in the early hours of the morning to be taken to another place. And yet, all of these
could have been avoided had the parties opted to be more specific in their agreement. The
question thus becomes: can the trial court modify, by motion of one of the parties, a
Compromise Judgment? We hold in the negative. To reiterate, a compromise judgment has the
force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent
or forgery which private respondent does not allege in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Custody; It is high time that the matter-of-fact
treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to approve compromises were abandoned
in favor of the more positive activist attitude the situation demands—in acting in such a situation,
the judge should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement between the parties,
not to begin a new one; If the parties and their counsel are unable to do it, the judge is expected
to assist them in attaining precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make it
certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not recur, much less give rise to a
new controversy.—We cannot totally blame the trial court for having granted respondent’s Very
Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to rest
the bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to prevent
future disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw the wisdom, as this Court does, in
providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion of the Compromise Judgment. As we
previously held in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480 (1975)—This is not the first
unfortunate instance that a compromise judgment of a trial court has given rise to subsequent
prolonged controversy, only because the trial judge failed to exercise the required degree of care
in seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details should characterize the
agreement, much less the judgment rendered on the basis thereof. The expressed desire of the
parties to end their judicial travails by submitting to a compromise deserves the utmost attention
from the court, and no effort should be spared in helping them arrive at a definite and
unequivocal termination of their problems and differences. It is high time that the matter-of-fact
treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to approve compromises were abandoned
in favor of the more positive activist attitude the situation demands. In acting in such a situation,
the judge should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement between the parties,
not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel are unable to do it, the judge
is expected to assist them in attaining precision and accuracy of language that would
more or less make it certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not
recur, much less give rise to a new controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on immutability for purposes of execution
does not attach to a judgment that is materially equivocal or which suffers from either patent or
latent ambiguity.—Resultantly, a remand of this case is necessary to allow the parties
themselves to resolve the matter regarding the implementation of Clause II(b) of the
Compromise Judgment. In this regard, the rule on immutability for purposes of execution does
not attach to a judgment that is materially equivocal or which suffers from either patent or latent
ambiguity. To obviate further discord between them and to preclude their recourse to the trial
court every time one of them perceives a violation committed by the other of Clause II(b) of the
Compromise Judgment, we direct the trial court to be on guard and ensure that the parties would
lay out in concrete, specific details the terms of their agreement as to this specific matter as well
of the appointment of Louis Maxwell’s accompanying guardian.
Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; The test that must be applied in
questions involving the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was
deprived of a fair and impartial trial.—This Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify is
a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the
judge concerned. Said discretion is granted to judges, since they are in the better position to
determine the issue of voluntary inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties
in their courtrooms. The test that must be applied in questions involving the propriety of the
denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. In
this case, we hold that petitioner was not deprived of her day in court, for she was able to file her
comments on and/or objections to the motions filed by private respondent. She, therefore, was
able to ventilate her positions on the issues brought before the trial court.
Same; Same; A single comment uttered by a judge in the course of the proceedings
should not be taken to be generally illustrative of her conduct in hearing and determining the
outcome of the entire case—such isolated remark should not be taken to mean that she has
crossed the line separating cold impartiality from unbridled bias.—As regards Judge Mariano’s
remark regarding petitioner’s obstinacy, we agree with private respondent that the same is not a
sufficient ground for public respondent to inhibit herself. Indeed, “(o)pinions formed in the course
of judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct
observed by the judge, even if found later on to be erroneous, do not prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge.” Moreover, a single comment uttered by the public respondent
in the course of the proceedings should not be taken to be generally illustrative of her conduct in
hearing and determining the outcome of the entire case. Such isolated remark should not be
taken to mean that public respondent has crossed the line separating cold impartiality from
unbridled bias.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 19 October 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90285 which affirmed, with
modification, the Order dated 16 June 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 136, Makati City, in Civil Case SP Proc. Case No. M-5785.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met sometime in January 1999 at
the Makati Shangri-La Hotel where the former worked as a hotel manager. After a few
months, a relationship blossomed between the two. On 22 October 2001, their son
Louis Maxwell was born. On 30 October 2001, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity of the child. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar
of Makati City issued a Certification granting the change of Louis Maxwell’s surname
from “Viesca” to “Gilinsky.”
Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and
they parted ways during the early part of 2003.
On 6 February 2004, respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the
company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any given day; he be entitled to enjoy the
company of Louis Maxwell during weekends and on such occasions the child shall be
allowed to spend the night with his father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-
week vacation in any destination with his child. The case was raffled off to public
respondent’s sala and was docketed as SP Proc. Case No. No 5785.
During the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise
agreement. This compromise agreement was submitted before the trial court and
became the basis of the Compromise Judgment issued on 12 May 2004. We
reproduce the Compromise Judgment below—
COMPROMISE JUDGMENT
Acting on the joint motion to render judgment based on Compromise Agreement
and finding the allegations therein to be of merit, same is hereby given due
course.
Judgment is therefore rendered based on the compromise agreement which
is quoted hereunder.
“COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement entered this 22nd day of April 2004 by and between:
DAVID GILINSKY, of legal age, single and residing at Suite 2828, Makati
Shang-rila Hotel, Ayala Avenue corner Makati Avenue, Makati City, hereinafter
referred to as the “FATHER”
—and—
SHEILA T. VIESCA, of legal age, single and a resident of Lot 2, Block 39,
Phase 5, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
“MOTHER.”
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties are the biological parents of minor LOUIS
MAXWELL (the “CHILD”) born on 22 October 2001;
WHEREAS, as a result of disputes and differences, the parties are now
living separately and apart;
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for a complete settlement of the
issues pertaining to the custody, visitorial rights, support and maintenance of the
child;
WHEREAS, each party acknowledges his or her personal obligations as
parent of the child and, by these presents, each hereby undertakes to render the
performance of these obligations to the child and comply with his or her duties as
a parent;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the promises and
dispositions made in this agreement, the parties hereto have agreed as follows:
I. CUSTODY OF THE CHILD
The mother shall continue to have custody over LOUIS MAXWELL while the
father shall exercise visitorial rights as hereunder stated.
Both parties, by these presents, undertake to take every measure
necessary, desirable and proper, to consider the best interest of the child at all
times, whether with them or away from them. Any act, word or manipulative
scheme that may cause the alienation of feelings or loss of respect or that either
one or both of them, from either one of the parties, shall never be tolerated.
II. VISITATION RIGHTS
As the child will continue to be in the custody of the mother, the father, as
the non-custodial parent shall be entitled to the following supervised visitation
rights, to wit:
a.He shall be entitled to the company of the child every Saturday and/or
Sunday afternoon;
b.The child shall be allowed to spend the night with the father once a
week;
c.Nothing herein shall prevent the father from visiting the child during
reasonable hour in the afternoon of any day of the week at the mother’s
residence in the presence of the mother or her duly designated
representative, and with prior notice to the mother.
One year after the signing of this agreement, the parties shall meet to
discuss and resolve the matter pertaining to the entitlement of the father to enjoy
a yearly, three-week vacation in any destination with the child.
In the exercise and/or enjoyment of the above rights, the mother shall have
the right to designate any person of suitable age to accompany the child.
III. SUPPORT
 a.The father shall give monthly financial support of US Dollars Five
Hundred (US$500.00) or its Peso equivalent within the first five days of
the month effective upon the signing of this agreement. The amount shall
be subject to such yearly adjustment of such rate equal to the inflation
rate determined by the appropriate government agency.
b.On top of the said monthly financial support, the Father shall provide:
i.full medical and dental expenses and/or insurance coverage for the
child;
ii.full education for the child at Colegio San Agustin, Makati or any
other suitable school;
iiicollege Education Insurance for the child;
iv.monthly car amortization of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or
One Fourth (1/4) of the current amortization whichever is lower;
v.Monthly amortization due as of the date of this Agreement for the
Rockwell-Manansala Condominium unit until its full payment and
transfer of title, including its association dues and charges. The
mother here affirms/confirms she is holding title to the condominium
in trust for the child.
The mother shall ensure that all arrears and/or outstanding obligations
prior to the execution of this agreement shall have been settled and paid.
As soon as the above have been fully complied with, the father shall pay
the ensuing monthly amortization.
IV. COURT APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT
This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines. The parties hereto shall, in good faith, strictly
abide by the terms hereof.
The parties agree to submit this written agreement for the court’s approval.
V. JUDICIAL RELIEF
Should either one of the parties fail to comply with the terms and conditions
of this Agreement, the aggrieved party may seek judicial relief against the erring
party and apply with the proper court for a writ of execution against said erring
party to enforce his or her obligations imposed in this Agreement. The offending
party shall pay for the cost of litigation, attorney’s fees, other expenses, and
interest incurred in such application for a writ of execution.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our respective
signatures on the date and place hereinabove mentioned.
(SGD.) DAVID GILINSKY (SGD.) SHEILA T. VIESCA
                  Father                     Mother
On 5 April 2005, respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution.” It was alleged in said motion that petitioner had repeatedly refused to
abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing
Louis Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the week. Respondent likewise
stated in his motion that he had already filed a Petition to cite petitioner in contempt
which was raffled off to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Makati City.
Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was scheduled to
be heard on 8 April 2005. Notice thereof was received by petitioner’s counsel on 5
April 2005. On 7 April 2005, petitioner’s counsel filed a Manifestation requesting that
the hearing on said motion be reset, as he had to be in Balanga, Bataan on the date
and time of the scheduled hearing. He also prayed that he be given a period of seven
days within which to file his Comment/Opposition to respondent’s Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution.
Despite petitioner’s Manifestation, the trial court still proceeded to hear
respondent’s urgent motion on 8 April 2005 and issued the Writ of Execution prayed
for by respondent.
On 9 April 2005, the court sheriff together with respondent tried to serve the Writ
of Execution upon petitioner at her residence in Taguig City. Petitioner’s mother
informed the sheriff and respondent that petitioner was then at her office. The sheriff
then asked petitioner’s mother to inform petitioner about the service of the Writ of
Execution. After about half an hour, petitioner, her father, and her lawyer Atty. Jorge
Manuel arrived. Atty. Manuel received the copy of the Writ of Execution but informed
the court sheriff that they would not comply with the court’s order and would challenge
the writ.
As expected, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution insisting that said
writ was issued with “indecent haste” violative of her right to due process, and that the
writ varied the terms of the Compromise Agreement since it failed to take into
consideration the parties’ understanding that in the enjoyment of respondent’s
visitorial rights, petitioner “shall have the right to designate any person of suitable age
to accompany the child.”
On 15 April 2005, petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution was heard. What
transpired during the hearing was summarized by the trial court in its Order given in
open court as follows:
“The Court heard the arguments raised by the counsel for the [herein petitioner]
and the reply/comment thereto made by the counsel for the [herein respondent].
The [herein petitioner] thru counsel imposed certain conditions if ever the
visitorial rights of the [herein respondent] would be granted. Though [herein
petitioners] wished that those conditions be contained in an affidavit, which to the
mind of the court would only delay the resolution of the motion, the court
thereupon ordered that the statement of the petitioner be made orally but under
oath, thus, [herein respondent] was placed in the witness stand.
Thereafter, the court ruled to deny the motion to quash the writ of execution
filed by [herein petitioner] thru counsel for lack of merit and grant the prayer of
the [herein respondent] that he be allowed to exercise his visitorial rights over the
minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA today under the conditions imposed by the
[herein petitioner], some of which are contained in the compromise agreement to
which [herein respondent] promised under oath to obey the same (sic).
WHEREFORE, let the [herein respondent] DAVID GILINSKY exercise his
visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA on the following
conditions, to wit:
1.[Herein respondent] shall surrender to the court his passport everytime
he is with his child; and
 2.[Herein respondent] shall not secure/apply another passport (sic) for his
son LUIS MAXWELL; and
3.[Herein petitioner] shall exercise her right to designate any person of
suitable age to accompany the child whenever [herein respondent] would
exercise his visitorial right.
[Herein Petitioner] is commanded to bring the minor child LUIS MAXWELL
VIESCA to court not later than 3:00 o’clock this afternoon, to be pick-up (sic) by
the [herein private respondent], upon the service of his order to the [herein
petitioner] by the sheriff of this court.
Failure of the [herein petitioner] to comply with this order shall be a ground
for contempt of this court AND SHALL BE DEALTH WITH SEVERELY.”
In addition, petitioner alleges that in the course of argument between the parties
during this hearing, Judge Rebecca Mariano was not able to contain her bias against
petitioner when she reproved the latter’s “stubborn refusal” to comply with the
Compromise Judgment. Believing that Judge Mariano had shown her partiality in
favor of respondent, petitioner’s counsel moved in open court for her inhibition. To
this, Judge Mariano remarked:
COURT
ALRIGHT, before I inhibit myself, the MOTION TO QUASH is DENIED and my
position granting visitorial rights of the child is GRANTED.
Subsequently, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Temporary Relief of Support dated 25 April 2005 to which petitioner filed her
Comment as ordered by the trial court. In their pleadings, the parties presented
disparate accounts of what transpired after the hearing on 15 April 2005.
According to respondent—
On the other hand, petitioner countered—
“3.At 3:00 o’clock p.m. of said afternoon, [herein respondent], together with
undersigned counsel, promptly went to the court to await the arrival of his son,
Louis Maxwell.
4.At or about 4:00 o’clock, This Court’s sheriff informed undersigned counsel that
he had just served a copy of the order upon the adverse counsel.
5.Undersigned counsel immediately conferred with Atty. E. Perez, [herein
petitioner’s] counsel, to arrange the implementation of the above-quoted Order.
Atty. Perez informed undersigned of his client’s inability to comply with the 3:00
o’clock mandate given that the Order was served to her only at 3:25 p.m., to
which the undersigned counsel responded by saying that [herein petitioner] could
still have Louis Maxwell brought to court even after the designated time.
6.Despite the clear and unequivocal tenor of This Court’s Order, Atty. Perez
informed the undersigned counsel that since [herein petitioner] was still at work,
his client could only bring the child at the lobby of Shangri-la hotel, Makati, at
around 8:00 o’clock p.m. of that day.
Undersigned counsel immediately rejected the proposed arrangement for the
same does not only run counter to the express mandate of This Court’s Order but
more importantly would deprive [respondent] of spending quality time with his
son—the raison d’etre of the stipulation in the Compromise Agreement providing
an overnight stay. Undersigned counsel, moreover, explained that 8:00 o’clock
p.m. is unreasonable and oppressive, not for [herein respondent] but more for the
child, as the proposed time is the expected bedtime of three-year olds.
The adverse counsel, however, remained insistent that the child could only
be brought by the [herein petitioner] at 8:00 o’clock p.m. and intimated that since
the court order came as a “surprise” and was served at past 3:00 p.m., [herein
respondent] should not expect [herein petitioner] to alter her schedule at such
short notice.
The undersigned counsel finally relented to the 8:00 o’clock arrangement as
it was clear that the adverse counsel and [herein petitioner] was (sic) unaffected
by [herein respondent’s] earnest desire to spend quality time with his son.
7. Albeit the representation [herein petitioner’s] counsel that his client
committed to bring the child at 8:00 o’clock at Shangri-la, Makati, [herein
petitioner] arrived at past 9:00 o’clock p.m. [Herein petitioner] not only brought
the child but likewise brought with her the child’s grandmother (herein petitioner’s
mother) and several of her friends. And instead of allowing only one person to act
as guardian over Louis Maxwell, [herein petitioner] insisted on having both
herself and her mother accompany Louis during his overnight stay with [herein
respondent]. [Herein respondent] had no choice but to accede to such demand
lest he be deprived once more of the enjoyment of his right.
xxxx
10. Furthermore, [herein petitioner] arrived at past 9 o’clock p.m. despite her
undertaking that she will bring the child to [herein respondent] at 8 o’clock p.m.;
[herein petitioner] also imposed on two guardians: herself and her mother,
instead of only one guardian, as provided in the Compromise Judgment; The
child was not allowed by [herein petitioner] to sleep in [herein respondent’s] room
and was made to sleep in her separate room with her mother; finally, on the
argument that overnight stay simply means sleeping over, [herein petitioner] left
with Louis and her mother at 6 o’clock in the morning of 16 April 2005.”
“4. It is clear therefore that there was nothing in the oral argument nor in the
Order given in open court that the child was supposed to be brought to Court at
3:00 p.m. that same day to accommodate [herein respondent’s] request for
visitorial rights. Neither is there mention of the specific time in the Compromise
Judgment. It appears that it was [herein respondent] who had prior notice or
advanced information as to the contents of the Order from his Manifestation that
—
“3. At 3:00 o’clock p.m. of said afternoon, [herein respondent], together with
undersigned counsel, promptly went to the court to await the arrival of his son,
Louis Maxwell.”
“5. Undersigned counsel received a copy of the Order dated 15 April 2005
only at 4:15 p.m. of that same day, hence, it was impossible for [herein petitioner]
to comply with Order commanding her to bring the child “to court not later than
3:00 o’clock this afternoon.” Be that as it may, counsel immediately got in touch
with [herein petitioner] to advise her to comply with the Order but [herein
petitioner] stated she could not leave her office immediately because of prior
commitment and instead suggested that she would bring the child to [herein
respondent] Shangrila Hotel resident in the evening. Hereon counsel relayed the
information/suggestion to [herein respondent’s] counsel and after a series of
calls, an arrangement was made for the evening. What actually happened that
evening, the parties had different accounts.
 6. [Herein petitioner] maintains that—
a.She arrived late at little past 9:00 o’clock because of heavy traffic. It
was a Friday, pay day and last day for income tax payment.
b.[Herein respondent] conveniently failed to mention that when [herein
petitioner] arrived with the child Louis Maxwell at the hotel lobby, they
were met by [herein respondent] together with three (3) Manulife
insurance agents and a physician. [Herein respondent] and the insurance
men tried almost to coercion to convince [herein petitioner] to agree that
the child be subjected to medical examination that night so that [herein
respondent] could secure a multimillion insurance policy for the child with
David Gilinsky as the sole beneficiary. [Herein petitioner] naturally did not
agree. [Herein petitioner] does not want to speculate but the
circumstances, time and manner of taking the policy appears to be
dubious. The fact remains that whatever desire of [herein respondent] to
spend quality time with the child was clouded when he allowed these
insurance men to get in the way when they should not be therein the first
place.”
On 26 April 2005, petitioner filed an “Ex Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit” claiming
that Judge Mariano could no longer handle the case “with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge” because of her statement pertaining to petitioner’s failure to abide by
the Compromise Judgment. Respondent filed his opposition thereto, arguing that
Judge Mariano’s remark was merely based on her observation of petitioner’s behavior
and attitude during the proceedings of this case.
On 17 May 2005, respondent once more filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution, contending that petitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with their
agreement as regards his visitorial rights over Louis Maxwell. Respondent claimed
that petitioner relied on the fact that as the Compromise Judgment did not state the
time when Louis Maxwell should be in his company, she had insisted on an 8:00
o’clock p.m. to 6:00 o’clock a.m. schedule. Respondent also lamented petitioner’s
habit of reneging, at the last minute, on their agreements over Louis Maxwell’s
weekend visits with him and petitioner’s insistence that two guardians accompany
Louis Maxwell during his overnight stays. Thus, respondent prayed for the following:
“a.To command [herein petitioner] to bring the child to either This Court or to the
[herein respondent’s] residence not later than 3:00 p.m. of 20 May 2005 and for
the child to be allowed to leave the company of the [herein respondent] at 4:00
p.m. of 21 May 2005; and
b.To direct the [herein petitioner] pay (sic) the amount of P295,000.00, as and by
way of attorney’s fees.
Other relief just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.”
In her Comment, petitioner asserted that Judge Mariano should no longer rule on
respondent’s motion, since there was a pending motion for her to inhibit. She likewise
took the opportunity to refute respondent’s allegations with regard to her purported
failure to observe the terms of the Compromise Judgment. Petitioner claimed that on
14 May 2005, Louis Maxwell fell sick and so she was unable to bring him to private
respondent. In fact, petitioner’s counsel even sent a letter dated 16 May 2005 to
respondent’s lawyer explaining her “version of the story.” She also posed objection to
respondent’s plea that Louis Maxwell be brought either to the trial court or to him
since the child was still sick, and taking him out of the house would only worsen his
condition. Moreover, petitioner argued that to grant respondent’s prayer would
contravene the provisions of the Compromise Judgment under which his entitlement
to the company of his son every weekend is a separate and distinct term from his
right to spend a night with the child. She also claimed that as agreed upon,
respondent should be the one to pick up the child and to return him to her. Finally,
petitioner assailed respondent’s prayer for attorney’s fees for lack of basis.
Meanwhile, Judge Mariano issued an Order dated 16 May 2005, directing the
parties to attend an in-chamber conference on 20 May 2005 relative to respondent’s
Motion to Withdraw Support and petitioner’s Ex Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit.
In respondent’s Comment to the present Petition, it is claimed that the following
terms were agreed upon by the parties during the in-chamber conference held on 20
May 2005:
a.The respective counsels of each party will meet on 26 May 2005 to agree on
the time frame for the sleepover provision;
b.Pending the conclusion of the agreement, the child will be fetched from the
Petitioner’s residence at 6 o’clock p.m. and will be brought back at 9 o’clock a.m.
the following day, effective May 2021 and May 27-28.
c.Private Respondent is to surrender his passport during these visits.
d.Petitioner’s mother will act as the designated guardian; and
e.The withdrawal of the parties’ respective motions, i.e., Petitioner’s Reiterative
Motion to Inhibit and Motion to Withdraw Support.”
The 20-21 May 2005 sleepover proceeded as scheduled. However, discord between
the parties resurfaced when respondent was unable to spend time with Louis Maxwell
on 27-28 May 2005. It appears that petitioner’s mother, who was the designated
accompanying guardian, got sick and because of this, respondent did not enjoy the
company of his son. Once more, respondent sought the trial court’s intervention
through his Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights dated 30 May
2005. Respondent averred therein that on 27 May 2005, he sent his driver to fetch
Louis Maxwell and his maternal grandmother pursuant to the agreement forged on 20
May 2005. When his driver reached petitioner’s residence, he was informed that
Louis Maxwell and his grandmother could not go with him, as the grandmother was
allegedly sick. Respondent claimed that Louis Maxwell’s grandmother was merely
feigning sickness since she refused his offer to get medical help. Besides, had
petitioner really intended to abide by their agreement, respondent argued that she
could have appointed one of her brothers or her sister to accompany Louis Maxwell
during his sleepover. Thus, respondent concluded that the totality of petitioner’s
conduct unmasked her lack of interest in observing the Compromise Judgment,
particularly Clause II thereof. He therefore prayed for the following reliefs:
“a)To allow (him) to have the company of his son on Wednesday, June 1, 2005,
beginning 6:00 p.m. up to 9:00 a.m. of the following day. For this purpose, for this
 Court to further allow (him) to fetch his son at [herein petitioner’s] residence and
bring him back at [herein petitioner’s] abode not later than 9:00 a.m. of the
following day.
b)To designate the hours of 6:00 p.m. of any given Friday to 9:00 a.m. of the
following day, as the regular day and hours at which the [herein respondent] can
enjoy the company of his son pursuant to Clause II of the Compromise Judgment
dated May 12, 2004.
c)To designate the Court Sheriff and/or any other court officer to act as the
accompanying guardian of Louis Maxwell Viesca Gilinsky during the
implementation of the prayed for relief under paragraph (a) hereof and of the
sleep-over provision mentioned in Clause II of the Compromise Judgment.
d)To command [herein petitioner] to pay the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), as and by way of cost of litigation, attorney’s fees and other
expenses pursuant to Clause V of the Compromise Judgment.
Just and equitable reliefs prayed for under the circumstances.”
Respondent requested that his Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial
Rights be heard on 1 June 2005 notwithstanding the three-day notice rule required
under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as he was about to go on a two-week
business trip on 3 June 2005.
Petitioner posed her objection to respondent’s motion, as it violated the three-day
notice rule. She also denied that the 27 May 2005 incident was her fault as her
mother was really not feeling well that day. She denounced respondent’s fixation over
the cancellation of Louis Maxwell’s sleepover that night, in total disregard of the fact
that the 20 May 2005 scheduled sleepover pushed through as agreed upon. She
claimed that she did not have any reason to deprive respondent of his rights under
the Compromise Judgment, and so there was no need for respondent to file his Very
Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. On 1 June 2005, Judge Mariano
rendered the following Or
der:
ORDER
Set for today’s hearing is the Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial
Rights filed by the [herein respondent] and the Comment thereto filed by the
[herein petitioner]. The Court heard the arguments between the parties accusing
each other of violation of the compromise agreement.
The [herein respondent] wanted to present testimonial evidence to prove his
allegation in the motion but which was denied by the Court for lack of material
time.
The Court likewise reminded the parties the fact that the [herein respondent]
surrenders his passport everytime he exercises his visitorial right was voluntary
on his part and not as part of the compromise agreement.
WHEREFORE, the court ruled that the [herein respondent] can exercise his
visitorial right today at 6:00 o’clock in the evening to be accompanied by the
sheriff of this court. If the [herein petitioner] is not available nor the grandmother
to accompany the minor child, the court instructed the [herein petitioner] to
appoint another person who can accompany the child so as not to avoid any
delay in fetching the minor child. Likewise the motion was reset to July 1, 2005,
at 10:30 o’clock in the morning.
Considering that the very urgent motion filed by the [herein respondent] was
commented or objected to by the [herein petitioner’s] counsel, let the [herein
respondent], thru counsel file a reply within five (5) days from receipt of this
Order and the [herein petitioner] is given the same period of time from receipt of
the reply within which to file a rejoinder, if she so desires.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 1st day of June 2005, at Makati City.
REBECCA R. MARIANO
Judge               
On 16 June 2005, Judge Mariano proceeded to resolve respondent’s very urgent
motion in the following manner:
ORDER
Before the Court is the Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights
filed by the [herein respondent] thru counsel, alleging among others, that [herein
petitioner] had once again proven herself to be unfaithful to her promises and
representations, citing the incident which happened on 27 May 2005, the
scheduled meeting of the [herein respondent] and his son. On the said date,
[herein petitioner’s] grandmother (sic) became sick, however, the latter refused
the offer of the petitioner to get medical help. Said alleged illness became more
doubtful when the grandmother insisted on being well enough to push through
with the visitation but at 9:00 o’clock in the evening instead of 6:00 o’clock in the
evening, as previously agreed upon by the parties.
On the Comment filed by the [herein petitioner], she stated that the present
motion should be denied because it violates the three-day notice rule and there is
no good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice.
We shall now rule on the motion.
Under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and following the
pronouncements by the High Court in the cases of Cledera, et al. vs. Sarmiento,
et al., 39 SCRA 552; Estipora vs. Navarro, 69 SCRA 285, the motion under
consideration should have been dismissed ourtright, however, the above-cited
provision or the socalled three-day notice rule is not absolute. Like any other rule,
it admits of exception, i.e. urgent motions (Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1,
Regalado). Moreover, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court finds it
imperative and necessary to brush-aside any technicality since the issue involved
herein is basically the natural right of a father to enjoy the company and
presence of his beloved son. To the mind of the Court, the best and most
applicable law in cases of this nature is the conscience of untroubled and
unprejudiced majesty. Finally, the right of custody accorded to parents’ springs
from the exercise of parental authority (Santos Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242
SCRA 407). Hence, the motion under consideration is hereby given due course.
Accordingly, [herein petitioner] is ordered to perform the following, to wit:
1.Allow [herein respondent] to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell on 24
June 2005 and on every Friday of each week starting from 6:00 pm to
9:00 am of the following day, pursuant to Clause II of the compromise
Judgment dated 12 May 2004;
2.The Deputy Sheriff of this court is hereby designated to act as the
accompanying guardian of Louis Maxwell Viesca Gilinsky during the
implementation of the prayed for relief under paragraph 1 hereof;
 3.Pay the [herein respondent] the amount of ThirtyThousand Pesos (Php
30,000.00), as and by way of cost of litigation, attorney’s fees and other
expenses pursuant to Clause V of the Compromise Agreement.
As regards the prayer under paragraph (a) of the motion, the same is denied
for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Chambers this 16th June 2005, Makati City.
REBECCA R. MARIANO
Judge            
During the hearing on 1 July 2005, it was clarified that the Deputy Sheriff would act as
accompanying guardian of Louis Maxwell only in case of the unavailability of
petitioner or her failure to designate the child’s overnight companion.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case via Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals seeking the reversal and setting aside of the 16 June
2005 Order of the trial court as well as its Orders dated 1 June 2005 and 8 April 2005.
In her petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the assailed
Order dated 16 June 2005 altered or amended the Compromise Judgment. She
asserted that by approving respondent’s prayer that he be given the right to enjoy
Louis Maxwell’s company “every Friday of each week starting from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00
a.m. of the following day,” Judge Mariano altered Clause II(b) of the Compromise
Judgment which states that “(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the
father once a week.” As the Compromise Judgment did not specifically provide for the
day and time of the week when Louis Maxwell should be in the company of
respondent, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it rendered its 16 June 2005
Order. In addition, she contends that by designating the Deputy Sheriff of the court to
act as the accompanying guardian of the child during the latter’s sleepovers, the trial
court again disregarded the terms of the Compromise Judgment with respect to the
appointment of Louis Maxwell’s guardian whenever he visits with respondent. These
alterations, petitioner argues, should not be permitted since a compromise
agreement, once it was approved by the court, has the force of res judicata between
the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. The
court is not allowed to impose a judgment different from the terms of the agreement.
Petitioner also insisted that Judge Mariano should desist from further hearing the
case below.
On 19 October 2005, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition by
deleting the award of P30,000.00 that the trial court awarded to private respondent in
its Order of 16 June 2005. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals states:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the Order dated
June 16, 2005 is MODIFIED. The award of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(Php30,000.00), as and by way of litigation cost, attorney’s fees and other
expenses pursuant to clause V of the Compromise Judgment in favor of private
respondent is DELETED.”
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution promulgated on
24 February 2006.
Hence, the present recourse raising the following issues for our consideration:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING
A QUESTION OF LAW, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT, AND/OR DECIDING IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT CONSIDERING THAT—
A.THE TRIAL COURT AMENDED OR ALTERED THE TERMS OF THE
COMPROMISE JUDGMENT WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF
BOTH PARTIES THERETO.
B.RESPONDENT JUDGE ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDER AMENDING
THE COMPROMISE JUDGMENT IN HASTE AND WITHOUT
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AS IT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT WAITING
FOR THE SCHEDULED HEARING OF THE MOTION FILED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND DESPITE THE PENDING MOTION TO
INHIBIT.
The petition is partly meritorious.
A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties,
by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already
under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with
judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties.
Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it
has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has the force of law
and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to
execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has
been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res
judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the
approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of
the agreement is decreed.
The settlement of disputes brought before the courts is encouraged. In fact, in the
Civil Code and in the Revised Rules of Court, courts are directed to persuade the
litigants in civil cases to agree upon some fair compromise.
Unfortunately in the case before us, the compromise agreement entered into
between the parties fell way short of its objective of finally putting an end to their
dispute. The sheer number of incidents which cropped up shortly after the trial court’s
approval of the compromise agreement reveals that the compromise judgment failed
to bring peace to the parties. Interestingly enough, the only points of disagreement
are Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight visits of
Louis Maxwell with respondent and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding
the appointment of the child’s accompanying guardian.
Clause II(b) states that “(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the
father once a week.” The sentence seems simple enough to be understood by a
layman. Petitioner claims that the parties did not specify the day and time of the week
when private respondent could enjoy the overnight company of Louis Maxwell in
order to give the parties “some flexibility” and to give them the opportunity to arrange
the schedule themselves. But the parties have overstretched the indeterminate
language of said provision. Indeed, the parties have been at odds over the
interpretation and implementation of this plain provision of the Compromise Judgment
and this could have caused much confusion in the mind of the young Louis Maxwell
who had to be brought from one place to another at such unholy hours of the night
only to be awakened from deep slumber in the early hours of the morning to be taken
to another place. And yet, all of these could have been avoided had the parties opted
to be more specific in their agreement. The question thus becomes: can the trial court
modify, by motion of one of the parties, a Compromise Judgment? We hold in the
negative.
To reiterate, a compromise judgment has the force of res judicata between the
parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery which
private respondent does not allege in this case.
More importantly and as correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is settled that
neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment
different from their compromise agreement or against the very terms and conditions of
their agreement without contravening the universally established principle that a
contract is the law between the parties. The courts can only approve the agreement of
parties. They can not make a contract for them.
Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for having granted
respondent’s Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in
its desire to finally put to rest the bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the
Compromise Judgment and to prevent future disagreements between the parties, the
trial court saw the wisdom, as this Court does, in providing the specifics in the said
indefinite portion of the Compromise Judgment. As we previously held in the case
of Hernandez v. Colayco —
“This is not the first unfortunate instance that a compromise judgment of a trial
court has given rise to subsequent prolonged controversy, only because the trial
judge failed to exercise the required degree of care in seeing to it that neither
ambiguity nor incompleteness of details should characterize the agreement,
much less the judgment rendered on the basis thereof. The expressed desire of
the parties to end their judicial travails by submitting to a compromise deserves
the utmost attention from the court, and no effort should be spared in helping
them arrive at a definite and unequivocal termination of their problems and
differences. It is high time that the matter-of-fact treatment usually accorded by
trial courts to motions to approve compromises were abandoned in favor of the
more positive activist attitude the situation demands. In acting in such a situation,
the judge should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement
between the parties, not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their
counsel are unable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them in
attaining precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make
it certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not recur,
much less give rise to a new controversy.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Resultantly, a remand of this case is necessary to allow the parties themselves to
resolve the matter regarding the implementation of Clause II(b) of the Compromise
Judgment. In this regard, the rule on immutability for purposes of execution does not
attach to a judgment that is materially equivocal or which suffers from either patent or
latent ambiguity. To obviate further discord between them and to preclude their
recourse to the trial court every time one of them perceives a violation committed by
the other of Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment, we direct the trial court to be
on guard and ensure that the parties would lay out in concrete, specific details the
terms of their agreement as to this specific matter as well of the appointment of Louis
Maxwell’s accompanying guardian.
Turning now to the question of whether Judge Mariano should inhibit herself from
the case, we rule in favor of respondent.
The pertinent provision of Rule 137, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Court
states:
“SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.” (Emphasis supplied)
This Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience
and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge
concerned. Said discretion is granted to judges, since they are in the better position to
determine the issue of voluntary inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with
the parties in their courtrooms. The test that must be applied in questions involving the
propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a
fair and impartial trial. In this case, we hold that petitioner was not deprived of her day
in court, for she was able to file her comments on and/or objections to the motions
filed by private respondent. She, therefore, was able to ventilate her positions on the
issues brought before the trial court.

As regards Judge Mariano’s remark regarding petitioner’s obstinacy, we agree

with private respondent that the same is not a sufficient ground for public respondent
to inhibit herself. Indeed, “(o)pinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, as
long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the
judge, even if found later on to be erroneous, do not prove personal bias or prejudice
on the part of the judge.” Moreover, a single comment uttered by the public
respondent in the course of the proceedings should not be taken to be generally
illustrative of her conduct in hearing and determining the outcome of the entire case.
Such isolated remark should not be taken to mean that public respondent has
crossed the line separating cold impartiality from unbridled bias.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90285 dated 19 October
2005, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it affirmed the Order dated
16 June 2005 of the RTC, Branch 136, Makati City in SP Proc. Case No. M-5785,
amending Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and the last paragraph of
Clause II. Petitioner’s prayer, however, that Judge Rebecca Mariano of the RTC,
Branch 136, Makati City, be directed to inhibit herself from hearing said case is
DENIED.

Judge Mariano is ordered to hold further proceedings to allow the parties to agree
SPECIFICALLY and DEFINITIVELY on how the overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with
respondent and the appointment of said child’s accompanying guardian would be
implemented within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—A judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or
wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA
283 [1996])

While a judge is on the right path in trying to resolve or terminate promptly the criminal
cases assigned to him, choosing and pursuing amicable settlement as the manner of furthering
the same is not generally acceptable in criminal cases. (Re: Report on Audit and Physical
Inventory of the Records of Cases in the MTC of Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, 276 SCRA
257 [1997])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 194560. June 11, 2014.
NESTOR T. GADRINAB, petitioner, vs. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO
and ELENA LOPEZ, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judgment on Compromise; A judgment
based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits of the case.—In a compromise
agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “[A] judgment based on a compromise
agreement is a judgment on the merits” of the case. It has the effect of res judicata. These
principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; Requisites of Res Judicata.—There is res
judicata when the following concur: 1. Previous final judgment; 2. By a court having jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter; 3. On the merits of the case; 4. Between identical
parties, on the same subject matter, and cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata.
The first rule refers to “bar by prior judgment,” the second rule refers to “conclusiveness of
judgment.”—There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to
“bar by prior judgment,” which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action cannot
be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides: Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity[.] The second rule refers to “conclusiveness of
judgment.” This means that facts already tried and determined in another action involving a
different claim or cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule
39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 47. Effect of
judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: . . . .
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (49a)
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments; Under the doctrine of finality
of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.—This court explained in FGU
Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, 644 SCRA 50 (2011), the doctrine of finality of
judgment: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act
which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine admits a few
exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice: 1. “The correction of clerical errors; 2.
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; 3. void judgments;
and 4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.”
Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Because a judicial compromise
agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the parties and a judgment on the
merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts.—Doctrines on bar by prior
judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown
trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.
Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement between the
parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code provisions on contracts. It
can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the
law; lack of consent by a party; and existence of fraud or duress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges “have the ministerial and mandatory duty to
implement and enforce a compromise agreement.”—Judges “have the ministerial and
mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a compromise agreement].” Absent appeal or motion
to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of a
compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in
good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion. “[They cannot] relieve parties
from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the agreements are] . . . unwise.” Further, “[t]he mere
fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party does not render it invalid.” Courts do not
have power to “alter contracts in order to save [one party] from [the effects of] adverse
stipulations. . . .”
Same; Same; Same; Same; If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or
resists the enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in
accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.—The issue in this case involves the
noncompliance of some of the parties with the terms of the compromise agreement. The law
affords complying parties with remedies in case one of the parties to an agreement fails to abide
by its terms. A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right
on final judgments. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Execution
upon judgments or final orders.—Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a) If the appeal has been duly
perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin,
on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to
the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n) If a party refuses to
comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an
action for indirect contempt may be filed in accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt; . . . . (b) Disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon
such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto[.]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a
judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used against
judgments on a compromise agreement.—Since a judgment on compromise agreement is
effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used
against judgments on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the
appropriate grounds exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b)
motion for new trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from judgment; e) petition for certiorari; and f)
petition for annulment of judgment.
LEONEN, J.:
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the
effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because
of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts
from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the
modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the Court of Appeals’ decision  dated
July 22, 2010 and its resolution dated November 19, 2010. The Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision
granting respondent Salamanca’s motion for physical partition pending the execution
of a judgment on compromise agreement between the parties.
Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings
and heirs of the late Spouses Talao, Nicolas and Aurelia.  The Spouses Talao died
intestate, leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Manila.
The five Talao children divided the property among themselves through an
extrajudicial settlement.  Subsequently, Arsenia Talao waived her share over the
property in favor of her siblings.
Respondent Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against her siblings,
Antonio, Elena (deceased, now represented by her husband, Jose Lopez), and
Adoracion (deceased, now represented by heirs, petitioner Nestor and Francisco
Gadrinab) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
All parties claimed their respective shares in the property.  They also claimed
shares in the rentals collected from one of the units of a duplex apartment on the
property.  The total amount of rental collection in the possession of Jose Lopez
was P528,623.00.  The amount, according to Jose’s counsel, was ready for
distribution.
Upon being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement and stipulated the following:
1) That the subject property (land with all the improvements) situated at
2370 Nacar Street, San Andres, Sta. Ana, Manila will be subject for sale and the
amount will be divided among the four (plaintiff and defendants);
2) That the subject property will be appraised by independent appraiser
and the appraised value will be divided into four. Mr. Antonio Talao will pay in
advance the share of Francisco Gadrinab immediately after the report of the said
appraisal;
3) That Cuervo Appraiser will be the one who appraised [sic] the property
on or before March 21, 2003 and any appraised value shall binding [sic] on all
parties;
4) That the rental collection in its total amount of Five Hundred Twenty
Eight Thousand and Six Hundred Twenty Three Pesos (P528,623.00) and the
uncollected amount up to February 2003 once collected will be divided among
the parties;
5) That the amount of P528,623.00 divided by four be distributed among
the parties will be given to all parties on or before March 12, 2003 by Mr. Antonio
Talao;
6) That upon payment of the appraised value to Francisco Gadrinab, Mr.
Nestor Gadrinab is given forty-five (45) days within which to leave the premises
in question;
7) That the parties agreed to waive all their claims and counter-claims
arising from this case; and
8) That the parties agreed to request this Honorable Court that a decision
be issued base [sic] on this Compromise Agreement or this Compromise
Agreement be submitted before this Honorable Court for approval.
On April 10, 2003, the Regional Trial Court approved the compromise agreement.
Based on the entry of judgment, the case became final and executory on April 10,
2003.
Nestor Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement.  He
demanded his one-fourth share in the accumulated rentals. During the hearing on the
motion for execution, the parties agreed that the rentals shall be divided only into
three since Nestor had already been occupying one of the duplex units.  The parties
also agreed that Antonio Talao would shoulder Nestor’s share, equivalent to one-
fourth of the rental amount.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Cuervo Appraiser appraised the
property.  Unsatisfied with the appraisal, Antonio Talao moved for the property’s
reappraisal. This was denied by the Regional Trial Court.
The portion of the duplex that Nestor refused to vacate,  remained unsold.
Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, respondent Salamanca moved for the
physical partition of the property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. She
prayed for the physical partition of the property instead of having it sold.
 Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab opposed the motion.  They contended that the
judgment on the compromise agreement had already become final and executory and
had the effect of res judicata. Antonio Talao and Jose Lopez did not object to the
motion for physical partition.
among the parties will be given to all parties on or [sic] March 12, 2003 by Mr.
Antonio Talao at Greenbelt, Mc Donald at 9:00 o’clock in the morning;
6. That upon payment of the appraised value to Mr. Francisco
Gadrinab, Mr. Nestor Gadrinab is given forty-five (45) days within which to
leave the premises in question[.] (Emphasis in the original)

On December 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the motion for
Petitioner alleged that the judgment on the compromise agreement had already
physical partition.
been partially complied with, as respondent Salamanca had already been paid her
share in the accrued rentals.  On the other hand, petitioner still had not been paid his
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. They assailed
share,  prompting him to file the motion for execution.
the grant of Salamanca’s motion for physical partition after the issuance of the
judgment on compromise agreement.
Petitioner pointed out that there was no agreement that he must vacate the
property before it could be sold.
In a decision promulgated on July 22, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the exception to the immutability of
Moreover, petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision violated his right
judgments, that is, “whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
to due process.  According to him, had there been a full-blown trial on the action for
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable,” applies in this case. The Court of
partition, he would have been able to present evidence of exclusive possession of
Appeals specifically noted that the “parties’ seemingly endless disagreements on
half of the property.
matters involving the disposition of the subject property”  were such circumstances
that rendered the compromise agreement’s execution unjust and inequitable. The
In their separate comments, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this
Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court’s ruling that “the proposed
case fell under the exception of the rule on immutability of judgments.  The
physical partition of the subject lot . . . is just another way of enforcing the [c]ourt’s
noncompliance of some of the parties with the compromise agreement constituted an
decision and will not in anyway vary the parties’ agreement nor affect their right over
event that “[makes] it difficult if not totally impossible to enforce the compromise
the property.”
agreement.”

On November 19, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
Respondents Salamanca and Talao also argued that the physical partition of the
reconsideration.
property would not prejudice the parties.  The order granting the motion for physical
partition was a mere enforcement of the compromise agreement, which entitled the
Hence, this petition was filed.
parties to their shares in the proceeds of the sale.  Respondent Salamanca pointed
out that the grant of the motion for physical partition would still be consistent with the
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial
intent of the compromise agreement since it would result in the proceeds being
Court’s order granting respondent Salamanca’s motion for physical partition.  A
divided equally among the parties.  “The Order granting the physical partition was
judgment on the compromise agreement had already been rendered and had attained
within the inherent power and authority of the court having jurisdiction to render a
finality.  Petitioner also argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
particular judgment to enforce it and to exercise equitable control over such
following terms of the compromise agreement:
enforcement.”
2. That the subject property will be appraised by independent appraiser
and the appraised value will be divided into four (4). Mr. Antonio Talao will pay in
advance the share of Francisco Gadrinab immediately after the report of the said Moreover, petitioner’s refusal to vacate the property prevented it from being sold
appraisal; so that the proceeds could already be distributed among the parties.
. . . .
4. That the rental collection in its total amount of FIVE HUNDRED On the violation of due process, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that it
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS was only before this court that this issue was raised.
(Php528,623.00) and the uncollected amount up to February 2003 once collected
[sic] will be divided among the parties;
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
5. That the amount of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS (Php528,623.00) divided by four (4)
Regional Trial Court’s decision allowing the physical partition of the property despite
finality of a previous judgment on compromise agreement involving the division of the
same property.

The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s decision
allowing the physical partition of the property
Respondent Salamanca filed two actions for physical partition. The two parties
settled the first action through a judicial compromise agreement. The same
respondent filed the second action after she had determined that her co-heirs were
not being cooperative in complying with the compromise agreement.
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “[A]
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits”  of the
case. It has the effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law
and jurisprudence.
Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
In Spouses Romero v. Tan, this court said:
It is well-settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is
immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the
compromise agreement].
There is res judicata when the following concur:
1.     Previous final judgment;
2.     By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter;
3.     On the merits of the case;
4.     Between identical parties, on the same subject matter, and
cause of action.
There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers
to “bar by prior judgment,”  which means that actions on the same claim or cause of
action cannot be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph
(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]
The second rule refers to “conclusiveness of judgment.”  This means that facts
already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim or cause of
action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
....
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final
order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (49a)
This case involves “bar by prior judgment.” Respondents cannot file another
action for partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in
a previous action for partition involving the same parties and property.
This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court  the
doctrine of finality of judgment:
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down.
This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:
1.    “The correction of clerical errors;
2.    the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party;
3.       void judgments; and
4.       whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.”
Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether
judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a
compromise agreement duly approved by the court.
Because a judicial compromise agreement is in the nature of both an agreement
between the parties and a judgment on the merits, it is covered by the Civil Code
provisions on contracts. It can be avoided on grounds that may avoid an ordinary
contract, e.g., it is not in accord with the law;  lack of consent by a party; and
existence of fraud or duress. Further, the pertinent Civil Code provisions on
compromise agreements provide:
Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions
of Article 1330 of this Code.
 Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action,
parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment
and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void,
obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial
justice.
In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into
the compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms.
Some of the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s
terms.
This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a
previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by
the parties themselves.
Likewise, respondents’ argument that a supervening event, i.e., disagreement
among the parties, was present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on
compromise fails to persuade. A supervening event may justify the disturbance of a
final judgment on compromise if it “brought about a material change in [the] situation”
between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the execution of
the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise
agreement has a “right to have the compromise agreement executed, according to its
terms.”
The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material
change in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and
relations among the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations
prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which
they desired to partition.
Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which
was already stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring
about the effects desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for
all. On the other hand, the judgment granting the second action for partition filed by
respondent Salamanca was obtained with opposition.
Judges “have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce [a
compromise agreement].”  Absent appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts
cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or
set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the
parties without gravely abusing their discretion.
“[They cannot] relieve parties from [their] obligations . . . simply because [the
agreements are] . . . unwise.”  Further,  “[t]he mere fact that the Compromise
Agreement favors one party does not render it invalid.”  Courts do not have power to
“alter contracts in order to save [one party] from [the effects of] adverse
stipulations. . . .”
Respondents have remedies if parties to the compromise agreement refuse to
abide by its terms
The issue in this case involves the noncompliance of some of the parties with the
terms of the compromise agreement. The law affords complying parties with remedies
in case one of the parties to an agreement fails to abide by its terms.
A party may file a motion for execution of judgment. Execution is a matter of right
on final judgments. Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.—Execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice
so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)
If a party refuses to comply with the terms of the judgment or resists the
enforcement of a lawful writ issued, an action for indirect contempt may be filed in
accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt;
. . . .
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a
court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for
the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto[.]
Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the
case, proper remedies against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments
on a compromise agreement. Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate
grounds exist, remedies may include the following: a) motion for reconsideration; b)
motion for new trial; c) appeal; d) petition for relief from judgment; e) petition
for certiorari; and f) petition for annulment of judgment.

Respondent Salamanca knew that the only reason for the failed compromise
agreement was the noncompliance with the agreement’s terms of some of her co-
heirs. Particularly, it was stipulated that petitioner’s removal from the property was
conditioned upon payment of an amount equivalent to his share. Respondent Talao
refused to abide by his own undertaking to shoulder respondent Salamanca’s share.
He also refused to acknowledge the appraisal of the appraiser appointed in the
compromise agreement. This refusal caused the failure of the compromise
agreement.

Instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be

enforced and the partition could be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move
again for the partition of the property and set aside a valid and final judgment on
compromise. This court cannot allow such motion to prosper without going against
law and established jurisprudence on judgments.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The judgment on the compromise agreement is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—A Compromise Agreement intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a

judicial compromise. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Orient Commercial Banking Corporation,
653 SCRA 1 [2011])

In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no longer use
the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision, which has become final
and executory; Using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become final is
improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues. (Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic,
671 SCRA 280 [2012])

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