AgraSocialLegis-Finals
7. LBP v. De Leon
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.
ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE
LEON, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the
resolution,1 dated February 15, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals2 dismissing the ordinary appeal of petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity), and
resolution3 dated May 22, 2000 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The undisputed facts as found by the appellate court
are as follows:
The petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and
Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of a
parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion,
Tarlac covered by TCT No. 163051 with a total area of
50.1171 hectares. The subject property was
voluntarily offered for sale to the government
pursuant to RA 6657 at P50,000.00 per hectare. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) made a
counter offer of P17,656.20 per hectare, or a total
amount of P884,877.54, but the same was rejected.
Another offer was made by DAR increasing the
amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-
appellees failure to respond to the new offer made by
DAR, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) took cognizance of the case pursuant
to Sec. 16 (d) of RA 6657. Subsequently, the DARAB
issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to
recompute the value of the subject property in
accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992. Applying the pertinent provisions of
the said DAR administrative order, respondent-
appellant arrived at a recomputed land value as
follows:
Land Use Area Acquired Value/hectare Total/Land
Value
Sugarland 32.4187 P61,758.85 P2,002,141.63
Riceland 16.6984 P28,449.80 P 475,066.14
Idle land 1.0000 P14,523.78 P 14,523.78
or an aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65, which was
again rejected by the petitioners-appellees.
In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac, which is the
designated Special Agrarian Court in the area,
petitioners-appellees asked the court, among others,
to fix the just compensation of the subject property.
In due time the court rendered a summary judgment
on December 19, 1997 fixing the compensation of the
subject property as follows:
a. P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland;
b. P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of
sugarland.
Within the time allowed, respondent-appellant filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently
denied by the Court.4cräläwvirtualibräry
xxx xxx xxx
On March 17, 1998, the Department of Agrarian
Reform filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
review of the decision of the Special Agrarian Court.
The said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47005,
was assigned to the Special Third (3rd) Division of the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also initiated in the
Court of Appeals an appeal of the same decision of
the Special Agrarian Court by filing a notice of appeal.
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60365, the said ordinary
appeal was assigned to the Fourth (4th) Division of the
Court of Appeals.
On November 6, 1998, the Special Third (3rd) Division
of the appellate court, through then Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes5, rendered in CA-G.R. SP No.
47005 a decision6, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The decision dated
February 9, 1998 is partially reconsidered. The trial
court is ordered to recompute the compensation
based on the selling price of palay at 213.00 per
cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at
6% of the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full
payment is made by the government.
SO ORDERED.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, on February 15, 2000, the Fourth (4th)
Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner
LBPs ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365), in a
resolution dated February 15, 2000, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.8cräläwvirtualibräry
In dismissing the ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No.
60365) instituted by petitioner LBP, the appellate
court reasoned that the mode of appeal followed by
the petitioner was erroneous considering that Section
60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that
appeals from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice
of appeal filed by LBP was ineffectual and did not stop
the running of the period of appeal. Also, the
appellate court took note of the decision rendered by
the Special Third (3rd) Division of the same court
involving the same issue and parties, to wit:
All these notwithstanding LBP does not stand to lose
anything at all. While it did suffer a setback in this
instant case LBP in one way or the other still we note
that it is likewise victorious in the appeal brought by
the DAR (CA-G.R. SP 47005). In a decision rendered
on November 6, 1998 this court ordered the trial
court to recompute the compensation based on the
selling price of palay at P213.00 per cavan. Thus to
this effect with more reason that we should deny the
appeal even granting the mode of appeal as availed of
is correct to avoid any contradiction of this divisions
with that of the other.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Page 1 of 4
AgraSocialLegis-Finals
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied in a resolution dated May 22,
2000.
Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the
Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals on the
following assignment of errors:
I
IN RULING THAT SECTION 60 OF RA 6657 PROVIDES
THE PROPER MODE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS
DESPITE SECTION 61 OF RA 6657 WHICH EXPRESSLY
MANDATES THAT THE RULES OF COURT SHALL
GOVERN THE REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS;
II
IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT SECTION 61 OF RA 6657
PREVAILS OVER SECTION 60 OF RA 6657, INASMUCH
AS THE MODE OF APPEAL OF A COURTS DECISION IS
A MATTER OF PROCEDURE WHICH IS COVERED BY
THE EXCLUSIVE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTION 5(5), ARTICLE VIII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THE SUPREME COURT MERELY
MADE AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE IN REVISING
SECTION 1, RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND
REMOVING THE DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURT FROM THE LIST OF THOSE
APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BY
PETITION FOR REVIEW; AND
IV
IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER,
DESPITE ITS RULING THAT THE SUPREME COURT
MADE A MISTAKE IN ITS ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS,
RENDERING SUCH DISMISSAL AS HIGHLY UNJUST,
OPPRESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
The case at bar requires an interpretation of Sections
60 and 61 of RA 6657. The said provisions provide
that:
Section 60. Appeals, - An appeal may be taken from
the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the
decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
Section 61.- Procedure in Review. Review by the
Court of appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals, however, may require the parties to
file simultaneous memoranda within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice, after which the case is
deemed submitted for decision.
Respondent spouses point to Section 60 of RA 6657 to
support their view that the mode of appeal initiated
by petitioner LBP was erroneous. On the other hand,
petitioner LBP believes that the mode of appeal it
used is permissible under Section 61 of the same law.
What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as
Special Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just
compensation an appeal by way of a petition for
review or an ordinary appeal?
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for three modes of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings and other cases or multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of
its appeal, contends that the proper mode of appeal
from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by
way of a notice of appeal due to the reference by
Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the
governing procedure for appeals to the Court of
Appeals. This being the case, the petitioner claims
that the procedure for ordinary appealed cases
provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed,
that is, a notice of appeal is required in order to
perfect the appeal. According to the petitioner, this is
the proper mode of appeal in the case at bar
considering that the appealed decision is that of the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure11 (pertaining to
appeals by way of petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and the
Court of Tax Appeals), does not include decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian
Courts.
We deny the petition.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the
proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian
Courts in cases involving the determination of just
compensation to the landowners concerned. Section
60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the
said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no
room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is
clear and categorical, there is no room for
construction, but only application.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Page 2 of 4
AgraSocialLegis-Finals
According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657
should be followed, not Section 60. The reference by
Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an
ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the
proper manner of appealing decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts on just compensation because
Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction
follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.
We do not agree.
First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61
of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at
all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the
proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more
than a general reference to the Rules of Court and
does not even mention the procedure for ordinary
appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of
elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts
in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a
petition for review is not permissible for decisions of
the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not
relevant to determine whether a petition for review is
the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act
as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely
mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other
different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in
its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to
justify the contention that a petition for review is
prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases
inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies
and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do
not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular
No. 1-9113 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition
for review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely
signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a
quasi-judicial agency.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly
regards a petition for review as the proper way
of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far,
there is no rule prescribed by this Court
expressly disallowing the said procedure.
Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA
6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60. The
reference to the Rules of Court means that the
specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of
Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed
before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in
appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not
provide the details on how the petition for review shall
be conducted, a suppletory application of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is
necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to
designate the mode by which the appeal is to be
effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the
Rules of Court only means that the procedure under
Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for
appeals in agrarian cases.
According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal
prescribed under the Rules of Court should prevail
over a petition for review provided under Section 60
of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary interpretation
would violate the constitutional provision granting to
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and Legal
Assistance to the underprivileged. (italics
supplied)14cräläwvirtualibräry
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of
Court that categorically prohibits the adoption of the
procedure for petitions for review of decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60 of RA 6657 and
the provisions of the Rules of Court can be
harmonized and can co-exist.
Moreover, the same Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the
1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by the petitioner
states that (r)ules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. Section 60 is
obviously a special procedure. Contrary to the
petitioners contention, it cannot be otherwise merely
because it was formulated by the legislature and not
by any special body. As long as the said section
provides for a particular process for the governance of
the special court concerned, the provision is
accurately classified as a special procedure. Subject to
constitutional limitations, the statutory enactment of a
special procedure cannot be said to encroach on the
power of this Court to formulate rules of procedure for
the reason that we have not yet provided for a
particular process specifically governing agrarian
courts. In fact, this Court exercises its constitutional
power to promulgate special rules of procedure by
adopting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 declaring a
petition for review as the proper mode of appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition
for review when appealing cases decided by the
Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is
the need for absolute dispatch in the determination of
just compensation. Just compensation means not only
paying the correct amount but also paying for the
land within a reasonable time from its acquisition.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.15 Such objective is
more in keeping with the nature of a petition for
review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review
dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any
pleading is submitted. A petition for
review hastens the award of fair recompense to
deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary
appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which
the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd)
Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way
ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth
(4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of
Appeals.
Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner
LBP did not stop the running of the reglementary
period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal
the decision of the Special Agrarian Court has lapsed,
rendering the said decision final and executory.
Page 3 of 4
AgraSocialLegis-Finals

WHEREFORE, the appealed RESOLUTIONS, dated

February 15, 2000, and May 22, 2000, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 4 of 4