A.C. No. 5303             June 15, 2006 exception of Carmen J.
exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact
of LUMOT A. JALANDONI, Complainant,  agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and
vs.
ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Humberto C. Lim Jr.1 filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor
V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.2 On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of
the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First
Division of this Court:
1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P.
Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;
2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa.
In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463
closed and terminated.3 On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative
Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:
(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack
of merit; and
(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the
resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be
reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.4
No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears
in the records. The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case
(A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
The complaint read:
AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
- II -
That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter…. That sometime on September 19, 1997, Lumot A.
Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-
9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal services of
herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the
defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles…. Respondent as a consequence of said
Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of
said case. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and
confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the
respondent. The latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property
in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving]
problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs
of the corporation/hotel….
- III -
That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil
Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally resting
his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled
hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled
hearing on April 28, 1999…. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will
conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it
bear her conformity…. No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable
damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52
proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al…. The far reaching effects of the untimely and
unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] unexpected
defeat.
- IV -
That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni,
et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga,
Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis
G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter,
Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling
of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the
PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]…. Respondent further stated
that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter
before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership
one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them…. On April 06, 1999,
twenty-one (21) days prior to respondent’s filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot
A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-
Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date he was
appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin
in the "Estafa" case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them…. Simply stated, as early as
April 6, 1999 respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis
Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil
Case No. 97-9865…. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A.
Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRC’s shares of stocks] and
the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni
was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at
the same time. The corporation’s complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the
Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin.
Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his
[lawyer’s] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our
laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J.
Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized
representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and
Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-
2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J.
Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 … under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal
cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena)….
AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
-I-
xxx xxx xxx
There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and
delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A.
Jalandoni was his client … which knowledge and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-
client relationship between respondent and his clients. Using the said classified information
which should have been closely guarded … respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in
concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as
PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172
of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps.
Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an
actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for
said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish
his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of
Alhambra Hotel.
- II -
Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including
the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his untimely
unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from [his] client. On July 26, 1999,
capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the marked
exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the
new counsel by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said
documents…. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency of the
situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was duly
received by respondent’s office on the same date…. Such dilatory tactics employed by
respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic)
an adverse decision against [her]….
Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing
conflicting interest which extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper
appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp.,
this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family circle. During
the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the
entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself
beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A.
Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said client.
Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and
including the entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The
entire incident was personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length
away from them during the hearing…. However, the particular portion showing the said
irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the
transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This
prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty.
Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings…. Said corrections were
only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said
pre-trial….5 (emphasis ours)
In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent
which allegedly violated the Rules of Court ― perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his
influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that
Lim filed against the clients of respondent.6
In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant
violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:
3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa,
read its contents, the same are all true and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and
belief.7 (emphasis ours)
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on "information and
belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis
ours)
While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,8 the court may, in
its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay.9 We find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately
filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.
In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal
of the complaint, added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but
he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni
to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This
fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr.
exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special
Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the complainants.10
To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented
the following version in his defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE
xxx xxx xxx
That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter,
Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her
daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation
(PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta
Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only
property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through
the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.
That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed
before the court against the sisters.
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena
was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against
them.
II.
That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer … and
ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of
Preliminary Injunction….
That reading the Answer … it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest
on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the series [of
changes] in ownership) and the sisters’ and their parents’ actual occupation and possession
thereof. xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Lim[’s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of
Humberto C. Lim, Jr.’s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since the defense
of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is based on PUBLIC documents, what
delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly
entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his
Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring
to? Whatever transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting
involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.
There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the
corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s]
for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that the whole world knows about them….
That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he]
represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself attested that
[he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26, 1999 … , before the trial court,
sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for
[the] entire proceedings of the case?
Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion
to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility of a conflict of
interest. xxx xxx xxx. 11
Respondent discredited Lim’s claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil
case. He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of
the case to Lim.12 While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to
withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra,
he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of
his motion to withdraw13 since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandoni’s sister and Hotel Alhambra is
owned by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that
no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty.
Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.14 In fact, respondent contended, it was he who
was not notified of the substitution of counsels.15
As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:
That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos.
Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property together with
its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum
of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so now. [He] cannot find any
law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he
rendered.16
In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so consistently
[determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to
block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new
ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the
members….17
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report
and recommendation:
xxx xxx xxx
After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that
from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on, complainant
had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the
latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent
had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer,
it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the representatives of
PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but
that of the [family’s].
From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the
respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the
latter were sued by complainant’s representative.
We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed
some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the successful
defense of their cases.
Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by
respondent’s former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting
interests … in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility.
As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the
suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from
receipt hereof.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Pasig City, June 20, 2002.18
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.19 Lumot A.
Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied
the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed
to this Court.20
Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.
Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given
by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative
complaint.21 Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot
be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly authorized
by law.
We must note, however, the following:
SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against any erring attorneys….22(emphasis ours)
Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts
constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court
or the IBP.23 Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:
SEC. 11. Defects. – No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the
Investigator’s Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors,
upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a
miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the
circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.24(emphasis ours)
Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lim’s complaint was defective in form and
substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the same
reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by
respondent instead of an answer or comment.25
The core issues before us now are:
1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and
handled by respondent, and
2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in
Civil Case No. 97-9865.
Conflict Of Interest
Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-
client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To
effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.
In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap
Gargoles. This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel
Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.
In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena,
respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim
sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the
construction of Hotel Alhambra.26 The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor,
AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC
still filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid balance.27 In her complaint-affidavit,
Cristina averred:
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in
blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee,
date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any officer of the corporation and
[herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis
Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of
the same checks… (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of
the said checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente B.
Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB….28
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one month before [he]
filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through
his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal
complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999… under
BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.29
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880,
respondent positioned himself against PRC’s interests.
And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was
alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSC’s counsel.30
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor,
fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly
provides:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may
appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.31 Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation,
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.32 (emphasis
ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.33
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in
which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally
unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom
the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or
indirectly, to the present controversy.34 (emphasis ours)
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties’ connection to PRC,
even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of
the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the
confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act
both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client
in the same general matter…. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very
slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been
honest.35 (emphasis ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of
all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct
which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.36
Even respondent’s alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family
members37 was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. 38 A
lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.39
Withdrawal As Counsel In Civil Case No. 97-9865
The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondent’s withdrawal as counsel for Lumot
A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the
spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin
(BC I.S. No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he
who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he
withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the
court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The
termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and
his lawyer.40
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation
other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission
of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.41 A lawyer who desires to retire from an action
without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.42 He must
serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the
date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of
paper."43Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April
26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The
conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance
of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ
another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free
to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him.
That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed.
Nor does it require approval of the court.44

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act
as additional counsel.45 Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s
speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no
support in the records of this case.

Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel46 would be
granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni’s counsel beginning April
28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted
his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his
motion:

When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the
defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his
appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the
conformity of the defendants.47 (emphasis ours)

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza’s professional engagement on her behalf
despite respondent’s withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed.
Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the
"possibility of a conflict of interest."48

Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly
collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to
Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs.
Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a client’s
documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his
professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-
established.49

Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lim’s apparent use of his wife’s community tax
certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.50 This is not, however,
the forum to discuss this lapse.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby

found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this
decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5804            July 1, 2003
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants,  characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary character.10 It is clearly separate
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative
complaint1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of
interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which
was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA).
Respondent’s brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved
respondent’s engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its
members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657,
and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695,
for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was
engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members
of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said
cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.062 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA
Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said
law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.4 On
the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty.
Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated,
orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its
Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that
when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his
individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the
victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the
truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not public officials, but private employees.
Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of
Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty.
Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross
misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and
Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and, instead,
complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors
thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."5 This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.6 Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.7 Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.8
In this jurisdiction, a corporation’s board of directors is understood to be that body which (1)
exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the
corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation.9 Its members have been
and distinct from the corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires
acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the
wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit
of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and
indirectly to the stockholders. 11 This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the
doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should
be included as a party in the suit.12
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits,
we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend
members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following
disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found
joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is
against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to
represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must
be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to
take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable
by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid
consent.13(underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The
interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the
individual corporate officials.14 The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After
due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation’s
board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public
School Teacher’s Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public
School Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of
Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner,
was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent
Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when
he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB
Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By
filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance therein.15 Again, this constituted
conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of
the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of
the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that
this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No.
XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish
respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6160             March 30, 2006 There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use
NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,  against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.4
vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
DECISION connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature
of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5

In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur;
that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them
Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that
respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being
detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the
prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was
representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial
confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated
in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were
being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the
Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial
confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and
robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial
confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be
utilized as a state-witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial
confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was
convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the
extrajudicial confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. 2 On August 16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted
his report with the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for
one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to
accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their
extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after
apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were
under no compulsion to give their confession.
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused
in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder
victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of
double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their
confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses
knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims.
Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his
better judgment before conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to
inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the
extrajudicial confession.
Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension from
the practice of law for three years is warranted.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for
THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.

The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of
suspension to two years. SO ORDERED.

In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating

Commissioner opined that:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to prove by substantial
evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his services as a
lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty.
de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the
victim’s family. This was declared by the victim’s daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified
before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the
services of Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers. She even
admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on
one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo
despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two accused’s victim. It may
not even be improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the accused in order to
further his other clients’ interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or offer competent
evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample opportunity given him.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof
that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict
of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.

There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.3
A.C. No. 6836             January 23, 2006
LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant,  sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567
where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND
CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein
respondent as an associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil
case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest
and P6,000.00 as attorney’s fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of
execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint
against the said sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went
to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of
desistance regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the
Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion
and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where
respondent’s law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the
Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be
disbarred from the practice of law since respondent’s acceptance of the cases of the
Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent’s law
firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
particularly Rules 10.01,1 13.01,2 15.02,3 15.03,4 21.015 and 21.02.6
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana,
Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.7
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil
Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and
represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and
his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that
the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered
his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them
defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases
filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to
get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first,
respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire
of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay
no man for money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the
spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against
respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a ‘demolition job.’ The civil case
filed by Gonzales where respondent’s brother served as counsel is different and distinct from
the criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate
any canon on legal ethics. 8
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondent’s brother is
closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the
claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he
has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is
filing the cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not
true since she filed the said cases out of her own free will.9
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory
Conference dated March 1, 2004.10 On the scheduled conference, only a representative of
complainant appeared.11 Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both
parties to file their respective verified position papers.12
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent
prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking
official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent
against the said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the
CPR; and that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite
the fact that said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City,
again in violation of the CPR.13
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.14
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both
parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding
said case.15 On the said date, only respondent appeared16 presenting a sworn affidavit
executed by Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira
nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat
na "Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr." na kasalukuyang
nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na
namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.
Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-
asawang Gatcheco, gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay
walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.
Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang
kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.
Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-
567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.
Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kaya’t aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain
ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako
interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na
dismisin na ang naturang kaso.
Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng
nakasaad dito.17
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear
before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory
questioning. 18 However, none of the parties appeared.19 On February 17, 2005, only
respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for
resolution.20
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation,
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the
acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission (sic)
believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be shown
by the move of the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she filed against Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the
acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise.
It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and
reprimanded and…advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might
result in conflict of interests.21
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs.
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo
Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and
advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of
interests.22
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes,
respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by
Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise
acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.23
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.24 Such prohibition is founded
on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 25Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.26

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.27

As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,28

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.29

The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case
handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of
opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. 30

Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case
and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent
admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the
case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:31

…[W]e… can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had
sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to
the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar.
Without condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do
believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the
profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermine the integrity of justice."32

The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not
exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.33

In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is
willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one.34 Granting also that there really was no other
lawyer who could handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have observed the
requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek
the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.35 These respondent
failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such
desistance as the present case involves public interest.36 Indeed, the Court’s exercise of its
power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of
enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an
attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. 37

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a
penalty ranging from one to three years’ suspension was imposed. 38

We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the
Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which
handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar
Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm
CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his
name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco
spouses only with his name,39without any mention of the law firm. We also note the
observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in
respondent’s acceptance of the Gatchecos’ cases as shown by the move of complainant to
withdraw the case.

Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty
of fine of P2,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7360               July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito
M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1)
Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously
appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio
(Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case
No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of
action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon
y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which
case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty.
Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve
Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel
in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that
Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa
displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the
trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000,
Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa
from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16
November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the
accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case
for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed
the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to
less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified
that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider
her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo
Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a
homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse
for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment
operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed
by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and
eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty
days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any
relationship between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-
serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not
amount to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was
convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00.
[Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that
he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself
familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case.
The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file
a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred
more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on
the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the
accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note
that the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly
cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in
said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has
been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given
the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa
from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of
law to two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the
records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01
which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse
his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered
his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently
forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can
only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to
appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail.
Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles
of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s
wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the performance of his official duties.
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with
Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa
made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14
June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio
Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to
make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied
the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this
respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do
not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender
to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that
the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him
by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the
crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We
are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a
public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.
The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this
privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his

We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
binding in a disbarment proceeding. furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no
doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of
public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from SO ORDERED.
which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-
B reads:

Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.

xxxx

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and
that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter
of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting
documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty.
Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11

we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 9058               November 14, 2012
ROBERT VICTOR G. SEARES, JR., Complainant,  Seares, Jr. insists that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s submission of a "fatally defective" petition in his
vs.
ATTY. SANIATA LIWLIWA V. GONZALES-ALZATE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate is charged with incompetence and professional
negligence, and a violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interests.
Complainant Robert Victor G. Seares, Jr. is her former client.
Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran for the
position of Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2007 elections; that after he lost by a
50-vote margin to Albert Z. Guzman, she filed in his behalf a "Petition Of Protest Ad
Cautelam"1 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bangued, Abra; that the petition was dismissed
for being "fatally defective;"2 that several months later, she insisted on filing a "Petition of
Protest" in the RTC, but the petition was also dismissed on the ground that it was already time-
barred, and on the further ground of forum shopping because the certification against forum
shopping was false; that the RTC declared her as "professionally negligent;"3 that he again ran
for Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2010 elections, and won; that he later learned
that his political opponents retained her as their counsel;4 that with him barely two months in
office, one Carlito Turqueza charged him with abuse of authority, oppression and grave
misconduct in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Abra;5 that she represented Turqueza as
counsel; 6 and that she intentionally made false and hurtful statements in the memorandum she
prepared in that administrative case in order to attack him.7
Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his election
protest, for prosecuting him, her former client, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations
against him. Hence, he prays that she should be disbarred.
In her comment,8 Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies the charges of professional negligence and
incompetence, and of representing conflicting interests. She states that Seares, Jr. solicited
her legal services in the last week of May 2007 because his counsel, Atty. Yasser Lumbos,
informed him that he could not go to Abra to handle his ad cautelam petition;9 that Seares, Jr.
and his parents were themselves the ones who decided not anymore to appeal the dismissal of
the ad cautelam petition despite her advice that an appeal would likely succeed;10 that she did
not convince Seares, Jr. to file the second petition because he and his parents were the ones
who insisted on filing the appeal in disregard of the possibly adverse consequences of doing
so;11 and that the imputation of negligence against her based on the trial judge’s declaration
that she submitted a false certification against forum shopping was unwarranted, because all
that she did was to make superimpositions in the certification against forum shopping in order
to write the correct dates as well as the notarial document number and notarial docket page
number for the certification against forum shopping.
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate refutes the charge that she represented conflicting interests by
explaining that: (a) she was engaged as an attorney in the May 2010 elections only by Dominic
Valera (a candidate for Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra) and by President Aquino, neither of
whom was Seares, Jr.’s political opponent;12 (b) Carlito Turqueza used to be a political ally of
Seares, Jr.;13 (c) she disclosed to Turqueza her having once acted as a counsel of Seares,
Jr.;14 (d) Seares, Jr. did not object to her legal representation of Turqueza;15 and (e) the 2007
election protest that she handled for Seares, Jr. was unrelated to the administrative complaint
that Turqueza brought against Seares, Jr. in 2010.16
Issues
To be determined are the following issues, namely:
(a) Was Atty. Gonzales-Alzate guilty of professional negligence and incompetence in her
handling of Seares, Jr.’s electoral protest in the RTC?
(b) Did Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violate the prohibition against representing conflicting interests
when she assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against Seares, Jr., her former client?
Ruling
The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an attorney’s
misconduct has always moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost caution and
deliberate circumspection. We have done so because we must wield the power to disbar or
suspend on the preservative rather than on the vindictive principle, 17conformably with our
thinking that disbarment or suspension will be condign and appropriate only when there is a
clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct seriously affecting the professional
standing and ethics of respondent attorney as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
Bar.18
Guided by the foregoing tenets, we dismiss the disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales-
Alzate.
I.
Charge of professional negligence and incompetence
is unfounded and devoid of substance
election protest violated Canon 1719 and Canon 1820 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
claiming that her attaching a "cut-and-paste" certificate of non-forum shopping to his election
protest, which the trial court’s decision described as "professional negligence," reflected her
lack of diligence and competence as an attorney because it was fatal to his protest.
The complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is unfounded and devoid of substance.
For administrative liability under Canon 18 to attach, the negligent act of the attorney should be
gross21 and inexcusable22 as to lead to a result that was highly prejudicial to the client’s
interest.23 Accordingly, the Court has imposed administrative sanctions on a grossly negligent
attorney for unreasonable failure to file a required pleading,24 or for unreasonable failure to file
an appeal,25 especially when the failure occurred after the attorney moved for several
extensions to file the pleading26 and offered several excuses for his nonfeasance.27 The Court
has found the attendance of inexcusable negligence when an attorney resorts to a wrong
remedy,28 or belatedly files an appeal,29 or inordinately delays the filing of a complaint,30 or fails
to attend scheduled court hearings.31 Gross misconduct on the part of an attorney is
determined from the circumstances of the case, the nature of the act done and the motive that
induced the attorney to commit the act.32
Yet, a reading of the June 8, 2007 order of the RTC (Branch I) in Bangued, Abra shows that
the true cause of the dismissal of Seares, Jr.’s "Petition For Protest Ad Cautelam" was its
prematurity in light of the pendency in the Commission on Elections of his "Petition to Suspend
Canvass and Proclamation." 33 The RTC cogently held that "(t)he primary objective of this
petition is to pray for the issuance of a Preliminary Precaution Order xxx (but) a prayer for the
issuance of the protection of ballot boxes, Books and Lists of Voters and other election
paraphernalia in the recently concluded elections is well within the power of the Commission
on Elections."34 We see no trace of professional negligence or incompetence on the part of
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in her handling of Seares, Jr.’s protest, especially because she even
filed in his behalf a "Motion for Reconsideration," 35 a "Comment on the Court’s Dismissal of the
Protest Ad Cautelam" 36 and a "Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit."37 Besides, her explanation
that it was Seares, Jr. himself who decided not to pursue the appeal and who instead
requested her to move for the withdrawal of his cash deposit was very plausible.
Also, we cannot find Atty. Gonzales-Alzate professionally negligent in respect of the filing and
eventual dismissal of the subsequent "Petition for Protest." The verification and certification
against forum shopping attached to the petition contained handwritten superimpositions by
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate, but such superimpositions were apparently made only to reflect the
corrections of the dates of subscription and the notarial document number and docket number
for the verification and certification. If that was all there was to the superimpositions, then there
was nothing to support the trial judge’s observation that the "cut and paste" method in
preparing the verification and certification for non-forum shopping constituted "professional
negligence" that proved fatal to her client’s protest.38As a matter of policy, a court-bound
document or paper prepared in a slipshod manner affects only the form but not the substance
of the submission. Such slipshod preparation, even assuming it to be true, would not deserve
administrative censure. Not letting form prevail over substance still remains to be the judicial
ideal.
The foregoing notwithstanding, we doubt the sincerity of the charge of professional negligence
and incompetence. Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s negligent and
incompetent handling of his election protest, we wonder why he would denounce her only after
nearly five years have passed. The motivation for the charge becomes suspect, and the
charge is thereby weakened all the more.
II.
Charge of representing
conflicting interests is bereft of merit
Seares, Jr. next charges Gonzales-Alzate with violating Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for supposedly representing conflicting interests when she took on the
administrative complaint that Turqueza brought against Seares, Jr.
The charge of Seares, Jr. is bereft of merit.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney from representing a
party in a controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to the subject matter of a
previous litigation involving another client. Relevantly, Rule 15.01, Rule15.02 and Rule15.03
provide:
Rule 15.01—A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest,
and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.02—A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03—A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all In Lim v. Antonio,49 we censured the complainant because revenge and bad faith had
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. motivated him into filing a baseless complaint against an attorney, stressing:

Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s legal representation of Turqueza neither resulted in her betrayal of the
fidelity and loyalty she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor invited the suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing while she was performing her duties as an
attorney.39 Representing conflicting interests would occur only where the attorney’s new
engagement would require her to use against a former client any confidential information
gained from the previous professional relation.40 The prohibition did not cover a situation where
the subject matter of the present engagement was totally unrelated to the previous
engagement of the attorney.41 To constitute the violation, the attorney should be shown to
intentionally use against the former client the confidential information acquired by her during
the previous employment.42 But a mere allegation of professional misconduct would not suffice
to establish the charge, because accusation was not synonymous with guilt.43
The dignity and honor of the profession require that acts unworthy of membership in the bar
should be visited with the appropriate penalty. The charge against respondent is of a serious
character. If in fact there was such a violation of the law as charged, he should be duly
penalized. It is quite clear, however, that the complaint is unfounded. It was the product of ill-
will, the desire of complainant to avenge himself. It certainly was not made in good faith. If it
were so, its dismissal would have sufficed. To repeat, such is not the case. As the Report
made clear, the complaint arose from a feeling of resentment, even of hate. To allow
complainant to trifle with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an instrument of
retaliation, would be a reflection on the rule of law. He should be held to strict accountability,
considering that this is his second attempt. Such stubbornness, compounds the gravity of his
offense. He appears to be incorrigible. At the very least, therefore, he should be censured.50

As it turned out, the charge of representing conflicting interests leveled against Atty. Gonzales-
Alzate was imaginary. The charge was immediately unworthy of serious consideration because
it was clear from the start that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not take advantage of her previous
engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal representation of Turqueza in the latter’s administrative
charge against Seares, Jr. There was no indication whatsoever of her having gained any
confidential information during her previous engagement by Seares, Jr. that could be used
against Seares, Jr. Her engagement by Seares, Jr. related only to the election protest in 2007,
but Turqueza’s complaint involved Seares, Jr.’s supposedly unlawful interference in ousting
Turqueza as the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Dolores, Abra in 2010. There is no
question that both charges were entirely foreign to one another.
We have often demonstrated our genuine concern for the members of the Bar, especially
those who stand before our courts as ethical advocates of their clients’ causes. We definitely
do not tolerate unwarranted and malicious assaults against their honor and reputation. The
Court issued a stern warning to the complainant attorney in Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-
on51 for filing an unfounded complaint against a clerk of court, and found the complainant
attorney in contempt of court and deserving of a P2,000.00 fine. But a stiffer penalty of
P5,000.00 was imposed on the complainant attorneys in Prieto v. Corpuz52 and Arnado v.
Suarin53 because their complaints against a judge and a court sheriff, respectively, were found
to be baseless.

Moreover, the prohibition against representing conflicting interests further necessitated identity
of the parties or interests involved in the previous and present engagements. But such identity
was not true here. The adverse party in Seares, Jr.’s election protest in 2007 was Albert Z.
Guzman, the newly-elected Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra, who was not involved in
Turqueza’s administrative complaint against Seares, Jr. In fact, Turqueza was not even a
mayoral candidate in Dolores, Abra in the elections held in 2007 and in 2010. The allegation by
Seares, Jr. that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate represented his political opponent was not even true
because Turqueza was Seares, Jr.’s political ally, as Atty. Gonzales-Alzate stated.
Considering the circumstances attendant here, the Court deems it sufficient for now to merely
admonish Seares, Jr., but sternly warns him that he shall be dealt with more severely should
he commit a similar act against a member of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Atty. Saniata
Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate for utter lack of merit; and ADMONISHES Robert Victor G. Seares,
Jr. for filing the malicious complaint, WITH STERN WARNING that a repetition shall be dealt
with more severely as indirect contempt of the Court.

It is notable, too, that Seares, Jr. expressly agreed to Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s legal SO ORDERED.
representation of Turqueza in the latter’s administrative case against Seares, Jr. This is borne
out by the affidavit of Turqueza that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate submitted,44 the relevant portion of
which follows:

xxxx

6. When Mayor Robert Victor Seares arrived, he was with a black shirt and jeans and the Vice
Governor started the conference asking us if there is a possibility of amicable settlement. Atty.
Ma. Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate first talked and she raised the fact that in 2007 Mayor
Robert Victor Seares was her client in an election protest and she even said how she
represented him, and Mayor Seares said "wen Attorney (yes Attorney) and the Atty. Gonzales-
Alzate said to all of us in the said room that she was before the lawyer of Jr. Seares (Mayor
Robert Victor Seares) and now if Jr. will not oppose it, she will be representing me in the said
administrative case and this time, she will now be a lawyer against Jr. Seares. The said lawyer
was even smiling when she said that and Jr. Seares (Mayor Robert Victor Seares) was
normally giggling and smiling and said "wen attorney, awan ti kuak dita, iyabogaduam latta a,
isuna lang a ni kapitan no nya paylang ti kayatna, nayted la ngarud sueldo nan" (Yes, attorney,
I have no concern with that, you lawyer for him if that is so, I don’t know what the (barangay)
captain would still want, his salary was already released to him.) xxx.

xxxx

The Court emphasizes that an attorney enjoys the presumption of innocence, and whoever
initiates administrative proceedings against the attorney bears the burden of proof to establish
the allegation of professional misconduct.45When the complainant fails to discharge the burden
of proof, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the charge and absolve the attorney.

We find that the administrative complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was nothing but an
attempt to vex, harass and humiliate her as well as to get even with her for representing
Turqueza against Seares, Jr. Such an ill-motivated bid to disbar Atty. Gonzales-Alzate trifles
with the Court’s esteem for the members of the Bar who form one of the solid pillars of Justice
in our land. We cannot tolerate it because attorneys are officers of the Court who are placed
under our supervision and control due to the law imposing upon them peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities.46 We exist in a symbiotic environment with them where their duty
to defend the courts is reciprocated by our shielding them from vindictive individuals who are
deterred by nothing just to strip them of their privilege to practice law.

In De Leon v. Castelo,47 we underscored the need to shield attorneys as officers of the Court
from the mindless assaults intended to vex or harass them in their performance of duty,
stating:

According to Justice Cardozo, "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at
the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender
growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."

A lawyer’s reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object.1âwphi1 The Court, whose officer every
lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the
malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against
a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of
unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to
be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice.48
A.C. No. 4354      April 22, 2002
LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the
suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of
six (6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now comes before this Court to challenge
the basis of the IBP's resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H.
Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car
owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his
brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by
complainant Lolita Artezuela.3
The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her
small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and
due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. 4
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed,
impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant.6 For his
services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00)
as attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) as filing fee.7 However, the case was
dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her
husband.8
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages
against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001.9
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer
and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil
Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked
for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He
withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent.10
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While
acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The
said document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was
respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that
the dismissal was with her consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his
part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the
complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices
to the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw
as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference,
decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the
services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of
the case.12
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled
on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the
document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested
him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office
and asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the
complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay
the amount of ₱500,000.00.13
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-
Visayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the
disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the
findings of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia
is contrary to court records and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts
doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations
considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries
in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month
suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source
of income.15
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution.1âwphi1.nêt
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or
when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies." 16 Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.17
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex
parte and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective
memorandum. Hence:
"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer tolerate any
further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at
2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia,
also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same and
understood the contents thereof."18
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-
examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial
after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the
records and the complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty.
Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the
certification from the clerk of court,19 and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:       Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan
Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when
you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?
A:       What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before
Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty.
Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allan's case.
Q:       So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?
A:       Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia."20
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-
of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting
interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof
of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original
client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the
most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances
of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." (emphasis
supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring
lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the court and his
actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice."22
latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias
or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.26 The suspension of the respondent's
privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal
profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very
same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's
cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently
disadvantageous to his client's cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests
requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:

"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

xxx

Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the
same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or
that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.23

A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with
the complainant's claims. It reads:

"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it
pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of
the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3),
FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the
Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations." 24

By way of prayer, Echavia states:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing

plaintiff's complaint."25

Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating
Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to
respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo,
introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to
return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.

The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to
present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he
offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.

Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to
the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor
of the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who
prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.

With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find
any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law.
He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.

Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see
how she could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal
maneuver as complicated as the present case.

Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an

impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us
to grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of
Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith
that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the
A.C. No. 5128             March 31, 2005
ELESIO1 C. PORMENTO, SR., Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified Complaint2 dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A.
Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct, praying that on the basis of the facts alleged
therein, respondent be disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent is his family's legal counsel
having represented him and members of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are
involved. Complainant also claims that his family's relationship with respondent extends
beyond mere lawyer-client relations as they gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and
financial support in his different endeavors.3 Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift
between complainant and respondent began when complainant's counterclaim in Civil Case
No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City was dismissed. Complainant
claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case, deliberately failed to inform him of
the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order of dismissal by the trial court, as a
result of which, complainant was deprived of his right to appeal said order. Complainant
asserts that he only came to know of the existence of the trial court's order when the adverse
party in the said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land
which is the subject matter of the suit. In order to recover his ownership over the said parcel of
land, complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute
an action for the recovery of the subject property.4 Complainant also claims that in order to
further protect his rights and interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a
criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner of the said land.
Respondent is the counsel of the accused in said case. Complainant claims that as part of his
defense in said criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he
obtained from complainant while the latter is still his client.5
In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at
Escalante, Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was
prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership
of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent's advice to build a small house
on the property and to allow his (complainant's) nephew and his family to occupy the house in
order for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently,
complainant's nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment
case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case
No. 528. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant's nephew.6
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by representing
clients with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.7
In his Comment,8 respondent contends that he was never a direct recipient of any monetary
support coming from the complainant. Respondent denies complainant's allegation that he
(respondent) did not inform complainant of the trial court's order dismissing the latter's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. Respondent claims that within two days upon his receipt
of the trial court's order of dismissal, he delivered to complainant a copy of the said order,
apprising him of its contents. As to his representation of the persons against whom
complainant filed criminal cases for theft,9respondent argues that he honestly believes that
there exists no conflict between his present and former clients' interests as the cases he
handled for these clients are separate and distinct from each other. He further contends that he
took up the cause of the accused in the criminal cases filed by complainant for humanitarian
considerations since said accused are poor and needy and because there is a dearth of
lawyers in their community. With respect to the case for ejectment filed by complainant against
his nephew, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed of sale of the parcel of
land sold to complainant. However, he contends that what is being contested in the said case
is not the ownership of the subject land but the ownership of the house built on the said land.10
On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to respondent's Comment.11
On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.12
On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply adding that the
instant complaint was orchestrated by complainant's son who wanted political vengeance
because he lost the vice-mayoralty post to respondent during the 1988 local elections.13
14
On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to respondent's Rejoinder.
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers,15 after which the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004, Investigating Commissioner
Agustinus V. Gonzaga found respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of
suspension for one month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to annul
and set aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead approved
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387
Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commission, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit of the complaint.
We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints for disbarment, a formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons.16 Formal investigations entail notice and hearing. However, the
requirements of notice and hearing in administrative cases do not necessarily connote full
adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give
vague testimonies.17Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.18
From the records extant in the present case, it appears that the Investigating Commissioner
conducted a hearing on January 16, 2002 where it was agreed that the complainant and the
respondent shall file their respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.19 No further hearings were conducted.
It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
annulling and setting aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, is bereft of
any findings of facts or explanation as to how and why it resolved to set aside the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead dismissed the complaint
against respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of
the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz vs. Cabrera,20 we reiterated the importance of the requirement that the decision of the
IBP Board of Governors must state the facts and the reasons on which such decision is based,
which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record. We held therein that:
[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the
appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides
to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this
case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.
Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the remand of the case.21
Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of Governors in simply adopting the
report of the Investigating Commissioner as substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case,
we cannot countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in merely stating that it is
annulling the Commissioner's recommendation and then dismiss the complaint without stating
the facts and the reasons for said dismissal. However, considering that the present controversy
has been pending resolution for quite some time, that no further factual determination is
required, and the issues being raised may be determined on the basis of the numerous
pleadings filed together with the annexes attached thereto, we resolve to proceed and decide
the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record, in the interest of justice and speedy
disposition of the case.22
Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is being accused of malpractice and
misconduct on three grounds: first, for representing interests which conflict with those of his
former client, herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information and
knowledge that he obtained from complainant; and, third, for not notifying complainant of the
dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as they are interrelated.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."
Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of his clients even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21
specifically requires that:
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless
the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of
his relations to the parties and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might
influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been
reposed.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance
of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.23 Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.24
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.25 Conversely, he may
properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client
in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no
conflict of interests.26 Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the
lawyer's new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former
client's action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously
opposed as counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him
as his counsel.27 As we have held in Maturan vs. Gonzales:28
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have
the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by
the loss thereof.29
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be.30 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.31
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein
complainant's nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 528, and in the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed
by herein complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had with
respect to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized
the deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent obtained any information from herein complainant that can be used to the
detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed. While complainant alleges that it was
respondent who advised him to allow his nephew to temporarily occupy the property in order to
establish complainant's possession of said property as against another claimant, no
corroborating evidence was presented to prove this allegation. Defendant, in his answer to the
complaint for ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the vendor to sell the said land in
favor of complainant.32 However, we find this immaterial because what is actually in issue in
the ejectment case is not the ownership of the subject lot but the ownership of the house built
on the said lot. Furthermore, the subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-188 filed by complainant
against his nephew and other members of his family involves several parts of trucks owned by
herein complainant.33 This case is not in any way connected with the controversy involving said
parcel of land. In fine, with respect to Civil Case No. 528 and I.S. Case No. 99-188,
complainant failed to present substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for violating the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interests. However, we find conflict of interests
in respondent's representation of herein complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his
subsequent employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at Escalante, Negros Occidental,
the same parcel of land involved in Criminal Case No. 3159 filed by herein complainant against
several persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing coconut trees within
the premises of the said lot. Complainant contends that it is in this criminal case that
respondent used confidential information which the latter obtained from the former in Civil
Case No. 1648. To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence portions of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during his cross-examination in Criminal Case No. 3159.
However, after a reading of the said transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove that
respondent took advantage of any information that he may have been acquired from
complainant and used the same in the defense of his clients in Criminal Case No. 3159. The
matter discussed by respondent when he cross-examined complainant is the ownership of Lot
609 in its entirety, only a portion of which was purportedly sold to complainant. Part of the
defense raised by his clients is that herein complainant does not have the personality to file the
criminal complaint as he is not the owner of the lot where the supposed theft occurred. It is
possible that the information as to the ownership of the disputed lot used by respondent in
bringing up this issue may have been obtained while he still acted as counsel for complainant.
It is also probable that such information may have been taken from other sources, like the
Registry of Deeds, the Land Registration Authority or the respondent's clients themselves.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of
complainant in Civil Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that
complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said
as to whether or not respondent utilized against complainant any information given to him in a
professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him
from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. As we have previously held:
The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.34
Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David35 that:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client,
inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.36
Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal Case No. 3159 so as to avoid
suspicion that he used in the criminal action any information he may have acquired in Civil
Case No. 1648.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his
new clients and secured or at least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in the subject criminal case
for humanitarian reasons and with the honest belief that there exists no conflict of interests.
However, the rule is settled that the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests
applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.37 Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not
make the prohibition inoperative.38
Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment in Criminal Case No. 3159, the
attorney-client relations between him and complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already
been terminated. This defense does not hold water because the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.39
Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to present substantial evidence to prove
that respondent did not inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
On the contrary, we find sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has been properly
notified of the trial court's order of dismissal. The only proof presented by complainant to
support his claim is the affidavit of his daughter confirming complainant's contention that
respondent indeed failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim. 40 However, in the
same affidavit, complainant's daughter admits that it was on December 4, 1989 that
respondent received the order of the trial court dismissing complainant's counterclaim.
Respondent, presented a "certification" dated December 11, 1989, or one week after his
receipt of the trial court's order, where complainant's daughter acknowledged receipt of the
entire records of Civil Case No. 1648 from complainant.41 The same "certification" relieved
respondent of his obligation as counsel of complainant. From the foregoing, it can be inferred
that respondent duly notified complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim. Otherwise,
complainant could not have ordered his daughter to withdraw the records of his case from
respondent at the same time relieving the latter of responsibility arising from his obligation as
complainant's counsel in that particular case.
As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondent's honest belief that there is no conflict
of interests in handling Civil Case No. 1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that
this is respondent's first infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of suspension to be
disproportionate to the offense committed.42 Moreover, we take into account respondent's
undisputed claim that there are only three lawyers who are actually engaged in private practice
in Escalante, Negros Occidental, where both complainant and respondent reside. One of the
lawyers is already handling complainant's case, while the other lawyer is believed by
respondent's clients to be a relative of complainant. Hence, respondent's clients believed that
they had no choice but go to him for help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for
respondent to accept employment because he could have referred his clients to the resident
lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office or to other lawyers in the neighboring towns.
Nonetheless, in view of respondent's belief that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to defend
the poor and the needy, we consider such situation as a circumstance that mitigates his
liability. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we find it proper to impose a fine
on respondent. In Sibulo vs. Cabrera,43 the respondent is fined for having been found guilty of
unethical conduct in representing two conflicting interests. Respondent is further reminded to
be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and
acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all
times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.44 WHEREFORE, respondent
Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is hereby
FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to be heedful of the requirements provided for
in Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in the text of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC               December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,  With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of
violating Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously
part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant
to Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on
October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of
Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered
by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with
the complainant’s sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The
complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales
application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the
respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as
payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed
that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales
application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum
No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of
the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales
application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious
charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial
and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the
second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of
Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land
and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the
Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other
hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified
applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent
emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of
the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this
allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the
subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel
Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an
inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit
where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the
truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his
rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of
his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them
was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay,
Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the
farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the
withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel
Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the
conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were
not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their
conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on
August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are
allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from
engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the
active practice of law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in
Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting
applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were
not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public
official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a
public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously
connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical
conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In
addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees,
a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers
in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public
accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in
favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge
of their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his
or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers
who use their public offices to promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may
be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private
interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We
also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office
and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on
Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending
before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent
(an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money
from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office.18
19
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano  we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence
showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case
before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete
proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a
sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the
complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of
the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective
public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use
his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application
was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no
sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We
note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land
was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the
records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25,
2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither
was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of
any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s
alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to
support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father
(namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped
Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another,
and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to
contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are
contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal
knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the
respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by
corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of
money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25,
200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums
of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment.
Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the
money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the
latter’s involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca
Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of
the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount
paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the
dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995,
September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over
the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were
extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are
consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the
subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his
continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his
separation from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where
the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless,
the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover,
we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on
government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x
xx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an
exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are
covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is
imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword
in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment
in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with
the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent
was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent
was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32we
specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made
before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before
it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in
this regard against the respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent
engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application
of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified
applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by
the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due
course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this
finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President, the Court of Appeals 35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated
October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. 36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally
is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of
what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing
has to be rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed
unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule
6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6788               August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,  Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
₱5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court,
respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She
was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from
the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as
counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an
indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson,
a relative who was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the
complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant.
She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty.
Ungson's acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one
of her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent
for safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated
July 15, 1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September
1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.
Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint.
However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On
November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with
the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued
one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a
friend's request.19 It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers
from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.20 The CBD
concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a
client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent
violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however,
modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the
total amount, an additional suspension of six months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For
this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to
devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter
5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant
as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail
to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public
faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice.321avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation
in favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for
filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,  office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one
hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the
other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith the then Court of First Instance praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts
of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987,
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola,
William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying
Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the
filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Bank’s officials on the procedureto bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It
further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since
he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public
official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the
public office.13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed
in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule
is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s
appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was
interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal
profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards
the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were
at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of
falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic
duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor
-- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not
differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes,
judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was
sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties
can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United
States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set
of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time,
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers
were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about
legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a
lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field
Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its
underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of
service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive
statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were
detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar
association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely
popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the
new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations
formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where
their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the
Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to
attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter
that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current
and former are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one
canon and added thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government
lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts"
and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in
a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by
the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon
36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the
ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were
thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with
the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the
applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the
conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format
was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad
canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments
after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts
of interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless
dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as
well as the norm’s indefinite nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court
for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of
the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005
and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the
issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts
of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists
that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK
by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a
conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed
with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976
and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may
be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general
public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board
where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating
to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as
amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its
attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use
in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule
6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition
of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and
the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank
or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of
the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall
be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the
petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in
the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision
of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the "matter"contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it
may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the
then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not
the same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No.
0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not
involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from
the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and
officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different
from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule
6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall,
or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same
city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests
of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first
interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene"
only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We
hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office
or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or
passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which
the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983
Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall
not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long
number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as
a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that
of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable
effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-
101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation
and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government
to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the
government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in
the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm
with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of
motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of
counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic
was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and
academic commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the
Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the case
at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after
the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to
the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must
start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or
she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who
lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any
system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit
on the ability to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of
Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly
stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive." 64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with
lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who
were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this
particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of
what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or
her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point
they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the
IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer

of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is
a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory
has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some
courts have abandoned per sedisqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger
that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the
act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still
in government service.61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might
be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
856 F. Supp. 370 (1992)
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers.
No. 3-92-00102.
United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.
December 18, 1992.
*371 *372 Hal McDonough, Wendy Goggin, Asst. U.S. Attys., Nashville, TN, for plaintiff.
Michael E. Terry, Nashville, TN, for defendant Russell Brothers.
Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, TN, J. Sedwick Sellers, III, Washington, DC, Larry D. Thompson,
Atlanta, GA, for defendant Thomas Nebel.
William H. Jeffress, Jr., Paul F. Enzinna, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, DC,
Nashville, TN, for defendant Thomas Brothers.
MEMORANDUM
HIGGINS, District Judge.
The Court has before it the government's motion (filed September 2, 1992; Docket Entry No.
30) to disqualify attorney Peter J. Strianse; the memorandum (filed September 2, 1992; Docket
Entry No. 31) in support of the motion, defendant Nebel's response (filed September 10, 1992;
Docket Entry No. 32) to the government's motion; the supplemental memorandum (filed
October 9, 1992; Docket Entry No. 87) in support of the defendant Nebel's response; the
second supplemental memorandum (filed November 16, 1992; Docket Entry No. 148) in
support of the defendant Nebel's response; and the government's response (filed November
20, 1992; Docket Entry No. 155) to the defendant Nebel's second supplemental memorandum.
For the reasons stated below, after reviewing the entire record, including the testimony given at
the evidentiary hearing, the Court grants the government's motion to disqualify Mr. Strianse
from representing Mr. Nebel in this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Peter J. Strianse was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Middle District of Tennessee
from January, 1987, to June, 1989. Since leaving the United States Attorney's office, Mr.
Strianse has been engaged in the private practice of law in Nashville, Tennessee. The
Government has moved to disqualify Mr. Strianse from representing the defendant, G. Thomas
Nebel, because of actions taken by Mr. Strianse in his capacity as an Assistant United States
Attorney. The parties do not dispute Mr. Strianse's actions so much as the consequences of
those actions.
A. The Search Warrant
In April, 1988, federal and state authorities in Florida were investigating the alleged drug-
trafficking activities of the defendant, Russell White Brothers, Jr., a Nashville resident.[1] In
connection with their investigation, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration *373 (DEA)
and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) came to Nashville to search Russell
Brothers' house. The agents met with Mr. Strianse[2] who prepared the affidavit and search
warrant from written reports, charts, and oral information given to him by the agents.[3]
At the evidentiary hearing on the government's motion to disqualify, Mr. Strianse described the
preparation as a "cut and paste" job done as a courtesy for the agents to conform their
information to federal court affidavit and search warrant forms. He testified that he received no
information other than that which was given to him to cut and paste. He never met the
confidential informants mentioned in the affidavit, nor does he recall their identities being
disclosed to him. After the search warrant was executed, he did not review the results and had
no further contact with the agents. He further stated that Mr. Nebel's name never was
mentioned.
Special Agent Cynthia Schultz of the DEA testified that before meeting with Mr. Strianse she
met with the two unidentified confidential informants mentioned in the affidavit. She discussed
the substance of her conversations with the informants with Mr. Strianse and thinks that she
told him their names. In addition, she testified that when meeting with Mr. Strianse to prepare
the affidavit and search warrant, she discussed what she knew about Russell Brothers'
activities, that Mr. Strianse determined whether there was probable cause for a search warrant
and what information to include in the search warrant.[4] After Russell Brothers' house was
searched, Ms. Schultz spoke with Mr. Strianse about the documents which had been
discovered; however, she did not go over the inventory item by item with him.[5] Ms. Schultz is
not sure whether she mentioned Mr. Nebel's name to Mr. Strianse.
Special Agent William G. Wolfe of the FDLE testified that the written reports and charts given
to Mr. Strianse contained information regarding smuggling and individuals which was not
incorporated into the affidavit and search warrant. Mr. Wolfe also testified that the identity of
the second confidential informant was made known to Mr. Strianse. Mr. Nebel's name was not
mentioned and Mr. Wolfe did not give Mr. Strianse any information regarding Mr. Nebel.
 
B. The Seizure Warrant
In June, 1988, Mr. Strianse was approached by Nashville DEA Special Agent Mark Keller
about preparing a seizure warrant and affidavit for a Piper Navajo aircraft allegedly used by
Russell Brothers in his drug smuggling activities. Mr. Strianse testified that this, too, was a cut
and paste job in which he took the affidavit from the April search warrant, added information
regarding the pedigree of the airplane, and substituted Mr. Keller for Ms. Schultz as the affiant.
[6]
 However, he also evaluated the evidence connecting the airplane to the reports given to him
by Mr. Wolfe.
When the agents went to seize the airplane, its engines, avionics, and log book were missing.
The agents suspected the owner of the hangar, Robert Hancock, of secreting the missing
engines, and Mr. Keller asked Mr. Strianse if Mr. Hancock could be charged with obstruction of
justice. Mr. Strianse testified that he was going to charge Mr. Hancock with obstruction, but
that Joe Brown, the United States Attorney, told him *374 not to. Mr. Brown had spoken with
Charles Ray, Mr. Hancock's attorney, and had decided not to issue a complaint and warrant in
return for Mr. Hancock turning over the missing items. Mr. Strianse passed this information on
to Mr. Keller.
According to Mr. Strianse, that was the extent of his involvement. No long-term strategy was
discussed, and he did not learn any confidential information regarding Russell Brothers. He
does not recall a letter between Mr. Ray and himself memorializing the agreement not to
prosecute Mr. Hancock; however, he does recall telling Mr. Ray by telephone that, although
there was no current intent to prosecute Mr. Hancock, there was nothing to stop the DEA from
going to the grand jury.
Mr. Keller testified that Mr. Strianse's preparation of the seizure warrant and affidavit was a cut
and paste job, and that he did not give Mr. Strianse any confidential information which went
into the seizure warrant. However, in the days following the attempted seizure of the airplane,
Mr. Keller spoke almost daily with Mr. Strianse. DEA internal memoranda (DEA 6's) regarding
the seizure of the airplane and related events were given to the United States Attorney's office.
[7]
 These memoranda would reflect the information Mr. Keller would have given verbally to Mr.
Strianse,[8] much of which is material, confidential information regarding the investigation of
Russell Brothers and Mr. Hancock.
Mr. Wolfe also testified that Mr. Strianse's preparation of the seizure warrant and affidavit was
mostly a cut and paste job based on the April search warrant and affidavit. However, like the
earlier search warrant and affidavit, they also were based partly on information from a
confidential source named in the affidavit. The investigation into Russell Brothers was still a
Florida matter in June, 1988.
It is based on these acts by Mr. Strianse in relation to the investigation of Russell Brothers that
the government seeks to have him disqualified as Mr. Nebel's attorney in this matter. Briefly
stated, the three defendants in this case are being prosecuted for allegedly laundering money
received as a result of the defendant, Russell Brothers', drug trafficking activities.
II. DISCUSSION
The government bases its motion to disqualify on Canon 9 and Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) of
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,[9] and the Ethics in Government Act, 18
U.S.C.App. § 207(a) (1). The Court will address the government's arguments under the ABA
Code before turning its attention to the government's statutory argument.
A. Code of Professional Responsibility
(1) Canon 9
Canon 9 states that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety."[10] Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) requires that "[a] lawyer shall not accept private
employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee."[11] The government argues that Mr. Strianse's actions meet these standards, and
therefore, he must be disqualified. The defendant, Mr. Nebel, naturally disagrees.
*375 "The district court's power to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent authority to
supervise the professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it." United States v.
Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263
(S.D.N.Y.1973). "[W]hen dealing with ethical principles" such as attorney conduct, a court
"cannot paint with broad strokes." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367
(S.D.N.Y.1955). Rather, it should look at the specific conduct of the attorney before it, since
"the conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after painstaking analysis of the facts
and precise application of precedent." Id.
While paying close attention to detail, however, a court should not lose sight of the need to
balance the broad and sometimes contrasting policies involved in a motion to disqualify.
"Motions to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored. Disqualification has a serious and
immediate adverse effect by denying the client his choice of counsel." Society for Good Will to
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); cf. United States v.
Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-03 (6th Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.1984).
Special considerations, both for and against disqualification, arise when a motion is interposed
to disqualify a former government attorney.
 
If service with the government will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for
too long a time, or will prevent him from engaging in practice of the very specialty for which the
government sought his service and if that sterilization will spread to the firm with which he
becomes associated the sacrifices of entering government service will be too great for most
men to make. As for those men willing to make these sacrifices, not only will they and their
firms suffer a restricted practice thereafter, but clients will find it difficult to obtain counsel,
particularly in those specialties and suits dealing with the government.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. at 363. On the other hand, policy considerations underlying DR
9-101(B) which militate toward disqualification include
 
[t]he treachery of switching sides; the safeguarding of confidential governmental information
from future use against the government; the need to discourage government lawyers from
handling particular assignments in such a way as to encourage their own future employment in
regard to those particular matters after leaving government service; and the professional
benefit derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975), quoted in In re
Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 920 (E.D.Va.1981).
With these competing policies in mind, the Court turns to the requirements of Canon 9 which
prohibit a former government attorney from accepting private employment in a matter in which
he had "substantial responsibility" while working for the government. According to the
American Bar Association, a "substantial responsibility" is "a responsibility requiring the official
to become personally involved to an important, material degree, in the investigative or
deliberative processes regarding the transactions or facts in question." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975), quoted in Kadish v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (N.D.Ill.1982).
However, the Court is conscious that "[t]he A.B.A. itself has recognized that the limitation on
former government attorneys which is now codified in ... DR 9-101(B) `was not intended to
have the effect that its words too literally construed imply.'" ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 26 (1930), quoted in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804, 812 (5th Cir. 1976). Instead, an attorney should not be disqualified unless his participation
would tend to "taint the underlying trial." W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678 (2d
Cir.1976). In other words, "while Canon 9 does imply that there be no proof of actual
wrongdoing, ... there must be at least a reasonable possibility that some
specifically *376identifiable impropriety did in fact occur." Woods, 537 F.2d at 813. A mere
"appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order
except in the rarest cases." Board of Educ. of New York v. Nyquist,590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d
Cir.1979); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.1986). [12]
The fatal taint which would require disqualification arises in two types of cases:
(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests in violation of Canons 5[13] and 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility undermines the court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's
representation of his client, or more commonly (2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a
position to use privileged information concerning the other side through prior representation,
for example, in violation of Canons 4[14] and 9, thus giving his present client an unfair
advantage.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246 (citations omitted) (footnotes added). The second type of potential
taint is claimed in this case. The government fears that Mr. Strianse obtained confidential,
privileged information while acting in his capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney which
will give him an unfair advantage in defending Mr. Nebel.
In a case factually similar to the present case, another district court found a former CFTC
attorney had been "personally involved" within the meaning of ABA Formal Opinion 342 to the
extent that he had to be disqualified from the present litigation even though his prior
involvement in the matter had been quite limited. Kadish v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D.Ill.1982). The attorney, John Dolkart, had: (1) "prepared a
`boilerplate' complaint by `cutting and pasting' portions of pleadings in prior CFTC cases;" (2)
helped pull files (but did not read them); (3) briefly discussed in general terms "the federally
recognized accountant-client privilege;" and (4) accompanied a junior staff attorney to court
when she argued a motion to "hold her hand" since she was new and inexperienced. Id. at
1032. Although that was the extent of his involvement, the district court disqualified Mr. Dolkart
because his activities "call[ed] for the kinds of judgments inherent in lawyering." Id. at 1033.
However, in Woods v. Covington County Bank, supra, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
disqualify a Navy reserve attorney who, while on active duty, had conducted a five-day
investigation into an alleged securities fraud scheme aimed at returning prisoners of war. His
investigation "included a day-long meeting in Miami with S.E.C. officials familiar with the ...
proceeding, an examination of the files of the Deputy Attorney General of Alabama, and
interviews with the president and trust officer of the defendant Covington County
Bank." Woods, 537 F.2d at 808-09.
The district court had disqualified the attorney in Woods because of the resulting "appearance
of professional impropriety" in violation of Ethical Consideration 9-3 of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility.[15]*377 Id. at 809. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that
an appearance of impropriety was insufficient to justify disqualification. Rather, "there must be
at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety did in fact
occur" and "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interests which
will be served by a lawyer's continued participation in a particular case." Id. at 813, 813 n. 12.
Similarly, in United States v. Washington, supra, the principal case relied on by both parties to
this action, the district court had disqualified two former Justice Department attorneys, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that the resulting appearance of impropriety outweighed
their client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. Washington,797 F.2d at 1464-65.
One of the attorneys, Gerard J. Hinckley, allegedly had received confidential information about
the defendant while working for the government. Id. at 1464. The other attorney, Thomas E.
Kotoske, had supervised the Strike Force on which Mr. Hinckley had worked. Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court, applying the same rationale
announced by the Fifth Circuit in Woods. The Court had "grave doubts whether an appearance
of impropriety would ever create a sufficiently serious threat to public confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process to justify overriding Sixth Amendment rights." Id.at 1466. However, if Mr.
"Hinckley did in fact receive in confidence information that is material to the government's case
that would give him an advantage in representing Washington, concerns about the integrity of
the judicial process and our adversarial system of justice could possibly outweigh
Washington's Sixth Amendment interests." Id.[16]
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with this rationale. In United States v. Ostrer, 597
F.2d 337 (2d Cir.1979), the Court upheld the disqualification of a former government attorney
who, while assigned to the Justice Department's Brooklyn Strike Force, personally prosecuted
two men, and called another as a witness at one of their trials, who the government planned to
call as witnesses at the appellant's trial. The former government attorney, Michael B. Pollack,
now represents the appellant. The Court relied on both Canon 4[17] and DR 9-101(B) in
affirming the disqualification. The "matter" was not exactly the same as the prior prosecutions
in that the appellant had not been on trial before. However, the policy "considerations are
pertinent not only where the issues involved in the lawyer's former and present representation
are the same, but also where, as here, the privileged information obtained in the course of the
former representation may be used to impeach or discredit important Government witnesses in
a closely related matter." Id. at 340.
With these policy considerations under DR 9-101(B) in mind, the Court now turns to the
specific facts of this case. There is no reason to believe that Mr. Nebel's name ever was
brought to the attention of Mr. Strianse while he was an Assistant United States Attorney.
Nevertheless, there is sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence linking Mr. Strianse to
the investigation of Russell Brothers and Robert Hancock to justify disqualifying him from
representing Mr. Nebel in this related matter. That Mr. Nebel's name never was mentioned to
Mr. Strianse is not critical. What is critical is the types and amount of confidential information
Mr. Strianse was exposed to,[18] the decisions he made, the likelihood that his knowledge would
taint this trial, and the accompanying public suspicion of the fairness of the judicial process.
*378 At the evidentiary hearing, DEA Special Agents Schultz and Keller testified that they met
with Mr. Strianse for assistance in preparing, respectively, the affidavit and search warrant for
Russell Brothers' house and the affidavit and seizure warrant for the Piper Navajo aircraft.
Although both agents' memories of their specific discussions with Mr. Strianse understandably
were dulled by time, they both testified that the substance of their conversations with Mr.
Strianse were memorialized in internal DEA memoranda.[19] Also submitted under seal is the
affidavit, with attachments, of Joe Brown,[20] the United States Attorney for this district during
the relevant time period, and a July 30, 1991, letter from Robert R. Hancock to Charles R. Ray.
[21]
From the testimony of agents Wolfe, Schultz and Keller,[22] and the government's exhibits, it is
evident that Mr. Strianse has received confidential information which could possibly assist him
in impeaching or discrediting government witnesses on cross-examination. Mr. Strianse knows
the substance of the conversations between the confidential informants and Ms. Schultz, and
the identity of at least one of the informants. He has insights into the investigations of Russell
Brothers and Mr. Hancock. Copies of letters and internal memoranda, including the DEA 6's,
were either sent to his attention or available to him. He had telephone conversations with Mr.
Hancock's attorney, and discussions with Mr. Brown and DEA agents regarding whether to
bring charges against Mr. Hancock. In addition, it was Mr. Strianse who decided what
information to include in the affidavits and warrants, and who made the lawyer-like decision
whether probable cause existed for the warrants to be presented to the Magistrate Judge.
In light of the foregoing, the Court further finds that Mr. Nebel's qualified Sixth Amendment
right to counsel also "must give way [since] its vindication would create a serious risk of
undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system." United States v.
Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S. Ct. 208, 74 L. Ed. 2d
166 (1982). Because of the confidential information shared with Mr. Strianse, there is a great
chance that his continued representation of Mr. Nebel would be perceived by the public as
tainting the fairness of the judicial process.
Therefore, since there is both "a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable
impropriety did in fact occur" and "the likelihood of public suspicion ... outweighs the social
interests which will be served by [Mr. Strianse's] continued participation," Mr. Strianse must be
disqualified. See Woods, 537 F.2d at 813, 813 n. 12.
(2) Canon 4
Canon 4 states that "[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." This
Canon applies to all attorneys, including former government attorneys. Although the
government did not argue in its motion that Mr. Strianse should be disqualified for violating
Canon 4, the Court has a duty, sua sponte, to examine Mr. Strianse's conduct in light of Canon
4.
The relevant test is clear. "[W]here an attorney represents a party in a matter in which the
adverse party is that attorney's former client, the attorney will be disqualified if the subject
matter[s] of the two representations are `substantially related.'" Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 (7th Cir.1978); see also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir.1977); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.1953).
 
[T]he determination of whether there is a substantial relationship turns on the possibility, or
appearance thereof, that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in
relation to the subsequent matter in which disqualification is *379 sought. The rule thus does
not necessarily involve any inquiry into the imponderables involved in the degree of
relationship between the two matters but instead involves a realistic appraisal of the possibility
that confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be harmful to the client in the
other.
... The evidence need only establish the scope of the legal representation and not the actual
receipt of the allegedly relevant confidential information.
Westinghouse, 588 F.2d at 224.
In order to determine whether to disqualify an attorney under Canon 4, therefore, the Court
must make three inquiries:
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of the prior legal
representation. Second, it must be determined whether it is reasonable to infer that the
confidential information allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer representing a
client in those matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that information is relevant to the
issues raised in the [current] litigation....
Id. at 225.
The scope of Mr. Strianse's involvement while he was an Assistant United States Attorney has
been reconstructed in detail in previous sections of this memorandum. The government alleges
that, "[a]s the government attorney in the search warrant process, Mr. Strianse would have had
communications with government agents concerning the evidence justifying the search,
including reference to confidential informants, the search itself, and the items taken pursuant to
the search." Memorandum in support at 5. In addition, the government alleges that Mr.
Strianse was privy to "information obtained from confidential informants about Mr. Hancock
and his relationship with Mr. [Russell] Brothers which was provided to Mr. Strianse by the
[DEA]." Government's response at 3. The Court finds that it is reasonable to presume that this
information was given to Mr. Strianse. Indeed, based on the evidentiary hearing testimony of
agents Wolfe, Schultz and Keller, it is highly unlikely that this information was not given to Mr.
Strianse.
The presumption that the information was given to Mr. Strianse having been established, the
Court now must determine whether the information is relevant to the issues in the present
action. If so, Mr. Strianse must be disqualified. "Relevance must be gauged by the violations
alleged in the [Superseding Indictment] and assessment of the evidence useful in establishing
those allegations." Westinghouse, 588 F.2d at 226. The heart of the Superseding Indictment is
the laundering, through numerous corporations incorporated by Mr. Nebel and Thomas
Brothers, of the proceeds of Russell Brothers' drug trafficking activities.[23] "Relevance ... must
be measured against the potential avenues of proof and not against the expected." Id. The
Court finds that a sufficient nexus exists between the confidential information regarding Russell
Brothers' activities, relationships and items seized from his home and the allegations in the
Superseding Indictment for the confidential information to be relevant. Mr. Strianse, therefore,
must be disqualified.
B. Ethics in Government Act
The government also has moved to disqualify Mr. Strianse pursuant to the Ethics in
Government Act, 18 U.S.C.App. § 207(a) (1). However, the Court does not need to reach the
question of Mr. Strianse's disqualification under the Act because the issue has been resolved
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the government's motion to disqualify Mr. Strianse from
representing Mr. Nebel in this matter shall be granted.
The Court notes, however, that Mr. Strianse's disqualification from this matter does not reflect
on his integrity or competence as *380 a lawyer. Honest and competent lawyers can and do
disagree on close questions regarding the interpretation of the Canons of legal ethics which
are "not drawn for Holmes' `bad man' who wants to know just how many corners he may cut
without running into trouble with the law. They are drawn rather for the `good man,' or the
ethical man, as buoys to assist him in charting his professional conduct." Irving K. Kaufman,
Comment, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70
Harv.L.Rev. 657, 657 (1957).
An appropriate order shall be entered.
ORDER
In accordance with the memorandum contemporaneously entered, the government's motion
(filed September 2, 1992; Docket Entry No. 30) to disqualify attorney Peter J. Strianse is
granted. Mr. Strianse is disqualified from further representing the defendant, G. Thomas Nebel,
in this matter.
It is so ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi
City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed
by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan
Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, 2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali
Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer,
Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that
he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered,
it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of
merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08
September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the
charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found
respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and
manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon
recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's
dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative
order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming
that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from
office. He also insisted that respondents 6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure
and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach
of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint
against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned order."7Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking
the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent
had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he
poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of
Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents
presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they
presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-
2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the
latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of
the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to
produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of
said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by
the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is
totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution,
the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue
of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the
local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the
Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner
Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed
the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation. 13The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the
Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region
Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a
letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP
Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his
recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors.14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter15 informed the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said
notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of
the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to
Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February
1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter
to comment on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no
opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi
City.18 On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to
IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's evidence.19 This order of referral, however,
was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4
December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of
the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate
the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of
Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a
motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the
records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did
not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153
and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City
with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any
hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to
due process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to
complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly
states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel
yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent
did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as
respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence
of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter
to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been
completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato
Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as
well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21
February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel,
furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August
1997.24Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office.
On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation
submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the
Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an
investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice.25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali,
complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that
in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the
chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the
IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.27 This motion
was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.28 According to
Atty. Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report
of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the
undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and
recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte
is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion
of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President
in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found
guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the
Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal
complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against
respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative
Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully
explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave
Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by
evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct
of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo.
The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which
should be imposed on respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier
recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of
Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the
latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for
grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this
question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because
he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the
rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is
of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that
a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer
if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. 32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, 33 we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave
misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him
his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a
lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking,
a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as
moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, 35 this Court found sufficient basis
to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that
case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith
and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By
taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he
used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of
his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his
privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this
nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."37 As
we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of

the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised
on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459             October 14, 2003
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, 
vs.
Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign
from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own
behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto
H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo.
In the Complaint, the judge was charged with "gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave
misconduct" for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure" in Civil
Case No. 252.2
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages 3 covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala,
Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated
respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case to
show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge
scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation 5 on
September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an
answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September 28,
2001.6Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition7 to complainant’s prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants’
lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her
co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave the defendants ten days9 to file a motion to disqualify
complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition
thereto.
In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants’ Motion11 to disqualify
complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil
case. In an Order13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainant’s Motions
because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He
likewise denied the defendants’ Motion for extension of time to file an answer.14 Complainant
did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
15 
In his Comment on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for
his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of
administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing
cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves.
It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was
then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him,
considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every
motion presented before him.16 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction.17 Moreover, she
supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the validity of his
Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case.18
Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own
behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without
basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to
pay for the services of counsel.19 He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this
Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she
appeared in court.20
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in
the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal
action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided
within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction
and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had
already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.1a\^/phi1.net
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of ₱1,000
with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.21
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round
of investigation, the subject of which was complainant’s appearance in court as counsel for
herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to
government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they
are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so
only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that "[e]ngaging in any private business,
vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which
amounts to malfeasance in office."22
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of ₱1,000 for
appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that
she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in
court to litigate her case.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to
conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.23 These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly
as possible.24 Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided. 26 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to bring immediate
relief.27
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled
to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain
from doing a particular act or acts.28 It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.29Since this remedy is
granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that
the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of forcible
entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30
days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
"A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within
five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof."
(Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word "shall" to evince
its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was
a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would
have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If
that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of
the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary
injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary
injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication
of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage during the
pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and
judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.30 To a large extent, the
public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt
disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof.31 Judges are thus enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges
judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. 32 To avoid sanction, they should ask this
Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he
cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided
within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and
pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for
forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court.
The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her
being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot
make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Court’s ruling in
Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-
plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.

Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges
should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.33 They should not be at
the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latter’s convenience that should
be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice.34 1awphi1.nét
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases
within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in
the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting
Judge Doronila:35
"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging
of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-
out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the
disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties."36
The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a
person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that
complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give
complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-
plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service
once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that
she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we
should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the
dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility.50 Given these circumstances,
the penalty of reprimand51 is sufficient.

The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court
is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently
put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:37
"x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more
than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is
carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no
greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before
the courts."38
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions
against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of ₱10,000 is appropriate pursuant to
current jurisprudence39 and Rule 140.40
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls
short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the people’s faith in our justice system.
But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee
from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes,52 and that serves only to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.53
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in
the amount of ₱10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby
REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and
is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.1awphi1.nét
SO ORDERED.

As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of
₱1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of
the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for
herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of
malfeasance in office.

Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she
appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law.
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar."

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination.41 When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. 42 Individuals have long
been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they
are not considered to be in the practice of law.43 "One does not practice law by acting for
himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."44

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession
or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as
counsel by rendering legal advise to others.45Private practice has been defined by this Court as
follows:

"x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x."46 (Citations
omitted)

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence,
she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to "the members
of such a vocation." 47In turn, vocation is defined as "a person’s regular calling or business;
one’s occupation or profession." 48