Custodial rights

7. People v. Lucero

No, Atty. Peralta was not an effective and vigilant counsel.

The Constitution provides that the right to counsel must be competent and independent; it
does not require just any kind of counsel but an effective and vigilant one. The case of People vs.
De Guzman stated that in a custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the time the
investigation starts – when the investigator starts to ask question in order to get information,
confession and admission from the accused.

In this case, the counsel was there at the start of the custodial investigation, but at the
crucial point when the investigator was just starting to ask the questions, Atty. Peralta left to
attend the wake of a friend. Because of this, the accused gave a confession which was
uncounseled depriving him of any protection from any words he might say which may, then, put
him in danger.

Therefore, Atty. Peralta was not an effective and vigilant counsel.

8. People v. Tomaquin

a. Yes, appellant may validly challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a competent and
independent counsel.

Section 12 of the Constitution provides the phrase “preferably his own choice” regarding
an accused right to counsel. However, the term “preferably” is not so exclusive that if the lawyer
is the accused’s own choice, the latter is precluded from other equally or more competent and
independent counsel.

In this case, the fact that Atty. Parawan was chosen by the appellant does not estop the
latter from complaining about the lawyer’s failure to safeguard his rights. What is important in
this constitutional right is not whether or not the counsel is the accused’s choice but that the
lawyer should be competent and independent.

Therefore, the appellant may validly challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a

competent and independent counsel.

b. No, Atty. Parawan was not an independent counsel.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and
ensure peach and order at all times. As a peacekeeping officer of the barangay, it puts him in
direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was
accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction.
 In this case, since Atty. Parawan is the Brgy. Captain of the jurisdiction in which the
accused is alleged to have committed the crime, the conflict of interest brought by his position
makes him not an independent counsel.

Therefore, Atty. Parawan was not an independent counsel.

9. People v. Cabrera

Yes, the alleged maltreatment of the accused in the hands of the police rendered his extra-
judicial confession inadmissible.

The confession of the accused must be voluntary and of his free will and therefore must
be free from any violence, coercion or intimidation.

In this case, the accused brought Dr. Pingoy to prove the maltreatment that he alleged
happened in order to exact the confession from him, but this was questioned because it cannot be
clearly proven if the injuries were made before or after the confession. There was, however, a
testimony describing how the victim was attacked. So, the court stated that Judges and Fiscals
must adopt a practice of having the confessants be physically and thoroughly examined before
administering oath.

Therefore, the alleged maltreatment of the accused in the hands of the police rendered his
extra-judicial confession inadmissible.

10. Malacat v. CA

a. If the petitioner admitted to possessing the grenade during his custodial investigation, the
admission is not admissible in evidence against him.

Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights states that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Section 17
states that no person shall be compelled to be witness against himself.

In this case, even if granting that the petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest
and search of the petitioner was invalid because of the Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures especially for those effected without a validly issued
warrant. There are exceptions cited in Rules of Court; however, this case is not one of them since
when the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they not yet aware that a hand
grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object.

Therefore, granting that the petitioner admitted to possessing the grenade during his
custodial investigation, the admission is not admissible in evidence against him.

b. No, the petitioner’s consent to the investigation and the waiver of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel is invalid.
 Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights states that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably oh his own choice. … These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

In this case, the custodial investigation on the petitioner was conducted the day following
his arrest. Since there was no PAO lawyer available, Serapio could not could not have requested
a lawyer to assist the petitioner. So even if the petitioner consented to the investigation and
waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver is invalid as it was not in writing
and it was not executed in the presence of counsel.

Therefore, the petitioner’s consent to the investigation and the waiver of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel is invalid.

11. People v. Barros

No, the Supreme Court shall not affirm conviction of the accused.

The Constitution provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this –
means that vitiate a person’s free will - or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him. However, this is not absolute because the Court may still convict accused despite
the exclusionary rule for as long as there are other pieces of evidence to prove guilt.

In this case however, the contentions of the accused: that he was interrogated under
intimidating circumstances, that he was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
that he has not waived his rights as an accused and that he signed his contention involuntarily
and without the assistance of counsel is no longer considered in the decision since the trial court
did not use such confession and interrogation in the arrival of their judgment. The trial court has
disregarded the alleged uncounseled confessions. Therefore, if the court wishes to convict the
accused despite the exclusionary rule, there must be pieces of evidence to prove the guilt which
in this case is not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the Supreme Court shall not affirm the conviction of the accused.

12. People v. Macam & Dela Torre v. CA

a. A police lineup usually consist of placing a criminal suspect among a group of people
who have nothing to do with the crime where the eyewitness would identify the suspect. It could
be identifying through a live lineup where the suspect and four or five other people are lined up
against a wall or through a series of pictures.

Custodial investigation and the rights afforded to the accused during which such as the
right to counsel begins at the start of the investigation - when the police officers ask for
information, admission or confession. A police lineup is not a part of custodial investigation. In a
police lineup, the accused is not yet being held to answer for the criminal offense for which they
are being charged or convicted.
 But because of the changes in the patterns of police investigations, the accused confronts
the judicial system and expert adversaries even before trial. The right to counsel must therefore
be extended to the critical stages of prosecution even before trial and that the police lineup is
considered to be a critical stage of the proceedings. Therefore, after the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification of the accused is considered to be part of such custodial
investigation which attaches to the accused the right to counsel.

b. Yes, the uncounseled identification of the accused during the police lineup at the hospital
violated their custodial rights.

Jurisprudence dictates that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation.
However, patterns of police investigations involve critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings where the result might settle the accused’s fate and reduce
the trial to mere formality thereby making it essential to extend the right to counsel to critical
stages of prosecution before trial and that police lineup is considered to be a critical stage.

Police lineup is considered to be part of the custodial investigation if the identification of

the accused occurs after the start of such investigation and that if it is conduction with the
accused being uncounseled, the identification is considered to be inadmissible as in this case
where the police officers has first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The
conversation with the victims may give improper suggestion which may then lead to mistaken
identification.

Therefore, the uncounseled identification of the accused during the police lineup at the
hospital violated their custodial rights.

c. No, the police line-up did not violate the petitioner’s custodial rights.

Cited in this case is the ruling in Gamboa v. Cruz that no custodial investigation is
conducted without a counsel and since a police line-up occurs before the investigation stage, it
does not attach to it the right to counsel since it is not considered to be part of the custodial
investigation. That such constitutional right shall begin at the start of the investigation – when
the actual questioning in order to get information, admission or confession happens.

In this case, the petitioner together with the other crewmembers was merely included in a
lineup of eight where he was picked up as the leader of the group. Here, the investigation did not
focus on the petitioner and there were no questions that were hurled out towards him but only
toward the witnesses of the complainant.

Therefore, the police line-up did not violate the petitioner’s custodial rights.

Part III: Citizens of the Philippines

1. Re: Application for Admission to the Phil. Bar of Vicente Ching
a. Under the 1935 Constitution, those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon attaining the majority age, elected Philippine citizenship are considered to be citizens of the
Philippines.
The procedure as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 625 “An Act Providing the
Manner in Which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship Shall Be Declared by a Person
Whose Mother Is a Filipino Citizen” is as follows:

i. The option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be expressed in a statement to be

signed and sworn to by the party concern before any officer authorized to
administer oaths;
ii. The statement shall be filed with the nearest civil registry;
iii. The statement shall be accompanied with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines; and
iv. The Civil Registrar shall collect as filing fees of the statement in the amount of
ten pesos.

If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement before
any officer of the Government of the United States authorized to administer oaths and shall
forward the same together with his oath of allegiance to the Civil Registry of Manila.

b. No, Vicente Ching did not validly and timely elect Filipino Citizenship.

The 1935 Constitution does not provide a time period within which the election of the
Philippine citizenship be made; it only provided that it should be made upon reaching the age of
majority – 21 years. Jurisprudence, however, dictates that the election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of majority and the term “reasonable time” has been
interpreted to mean within three (3) years but this is not an inflexible rule.

In this case, Vicente Ching elected for Philippine citizenship when he was already 35
years old and only because it is a requirement in order to take the Bar examinations; it is already
14 years from the time he has reached the age of majority. The court ruled that the span of 14
years is clearly beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age
of majority”.

Therefore, Ching did not validly and timely elect Filipino Citizenship.

c. No, the Supreme Court should not approve Vicente Ching’s application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.

The court stated that Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that
can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient; and that a person should avail of
the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.

Even if the court sympathizes with Ching’s circumstance that he has lived in the
Philippines all his life and that he has a constant belief that he is a Filipino, the court cannot
accommodate Ching’s application because of the controlling statutes and jurisprudence. Being
35 years old, for 14 years, Ching has slept on the opportunity and this is opposite to the above-
mention that the right must be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Such attitude
was not shown since he only elected for citizenship just because it was a requirement in order to
take the Bar examinations. In addition, Ching also failed to give any reason on why he delayed
his election; the procedure is not an intricate process but merely just an execution of an affidavit.

Therefore, the Supreme Court should not approve Vicente Ching’s application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.

2. Republic v. Sagun

No, the petitioner’s petition for the judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship was not a correct alternative to electing Filipino citizenship.

The courts have consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the
Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is
part of our citizenry. As held in Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, under the Philippine law,
there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice have for their duties the settlement of justiciable controversies. As
an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may
pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status; otherwise, such a pronouncement
is beyond judicial power.

In this case, the trial court was in error when it made a specific declaration of
respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement is not within the court’s competence.

Therefore, the petitioner’s petition for the judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship was not a correct alternative to electing Filipino citizenship.