SECTION 9.

PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION.

Facts related to right to repurchase property which was already expropriated by the State

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, namely, ESPERANZA R. EDJEC, BERNARDA R.
SUELA, RUBY C. ROTEA, BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE LIMBAGA, VIRGINIA R. ARBON,
ROSALINDA R. ARQUISOLA, CORAZON ROTEA, FE R. EBORA, CARIDAD ROTEA, ANGELES VDA.
DE RENACIA, JORGE ROTEA, MARIA LUISA ROTEA-VILLEGAS, ALFREDO R. ROTEA, represented
by his heirs, namely, LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH ROTEA; LUIS ROTEA, represented by his heir
JENNIFER ROTEA; and ROLANDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heir ROLANDO R. ROTEA,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156273, October 15, 2003
BELLOSILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:
The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for public purpose,
the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of the land if the condemning party continues
to use the property for public purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a
public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee simple.

FACTS:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of herein respondent MCIAA,
sought to acquire Lot No. 916, and Lot No. 920 for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. The two
parcels of land located in Lahug, Cebu City were owned by the spouses Timoteo Moreno and Maria
Rotea. The spouses refused to sell their properties because the proposed price was unacceptably way below
the market value of the lands at that time. As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining the
then existing Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the right to repurchase their
properties for the same price paid by the government in the event that these properties were no longer used
for purposes of the airport.

Subsequently, the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its functions and operations were transferred
to the Mactan Airport. In two various letters sent on different dates, the heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria
Rotea, the petitioners herein, wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the MCIAA General
Manager,14 requesting for the exercise of their supposed right to repurchase Lot Nos. 916 and 920
considering that the said lots intended for the expansion of the Lahug Airport were not utilized. Their written
and verbal demands were ignored by the respondent.

Consequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City against the respondent asserting their right to reacquire the subject properties. In the
complaint, the petitioners claimed that assurances were given by the NAC officials regarding the entitlement
of the landowners to repurchase their properties for the same price paid by NAC in the event that the lots
were no longer used for airport purposes. The petitioners further added that the guaranty of right to
repurchase was the propelling factor that persuaded the registered owners to continue with the expropriation
proceedings. The same reason was given by the petitioners for not opposing and appealing the case later
on.16

On April 12, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, granting them the right
to repurchase the properties at the amount originally paid by the respondent in Civil Case No. R-1881,
including consequential damages. The trial court ruled that the public purpose for which the lands were
expropriated had ceased to exist, therefore, it is but logical and in the higher interest of substantial justice to
give back the right of ownership of the subject lots to the former owners.
 Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On December 20,
2001, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision on the premise that the judgment affirming the state’s right to
exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional. In maintaining a contrary view, the CA cited Fery v.
Municipality of Cabanatuan, which held that when a land has been acquired for public use unconditionally
and in fee simple, the previous owner retains no right in the land and the title obtained will not, in any way, be
impaired. Another case relied upon by the appellate court was Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals which is allegedly stare decisis to the case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase
as the former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881; hence, the same
questions relating to the same event have already been previously litigated and decided by a competent court.

Respondent MCIAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Court’s decision be
reconsidered and set aside. Additionally, MCIAA filed a Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration by
the Honorable Court En Banc dated November 11, 2003, alleging that the present case involves novel
questions of law.

The petitioners filed an Opposition to the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration stating that no new
arguments have been proffered by the respondent to warrant the reversal of the Court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Petitioners have the right to repurchase the assailed property which was already
expropriated by the respondent.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the petitioners had the right to repurchase the assailed
property. The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust
referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure
the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the
fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance
of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lot Nos. 916 and 920 to the government with
the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the
government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners
would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated
when the expropriation was authorized.

According to SC ruling the predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property
condemned for public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of the land
if the condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose; however, if the condemning authority
ceases to use the property for a public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee simple.35 The
government’s taking of private property, and then transferring it to private persons under the guise of public
use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense power of eminent domain.36 Moreover, the direct and
unconstitutional state’s power to oblige a landowner to renounce his productive and invaluable possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for his own private gain, is offensive to our laws

SC stand that when the State reconveys land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations in land
values. Any increase or decrease in market value due to the proposed improvement may not be considered
in determining the market value. Thus, reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he
was paid by the government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the land’s
highest and best use when the sale to the State occurred.
Facts related to right to repurchase property which was already expropriated by the State

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS OF ROSARIO MERCADO, namely, VICENTE LOZADA,
MARIO M. LOZADA, MARCIA L. GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES, BERNARDO LOZADA, JR.,
DOLORES GACASAN, SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA, represented by MARCIA
LOZADA GODINEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010
NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:
In taking of private property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain,
is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. If this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned,
then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received.

FACTS:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters,
more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was
subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) represented by the
then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The
case was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozada's name.

On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the
latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with
consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947--the time when the lot
was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received the amount of P3,018.00 by way of payment. The projected
improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. Lozada, with the other
landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per
previous agreement. The CAA replied that there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an
emergency DC-3 airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that "should this Office dispose and resell the
properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to give
priority to the former owners subject to the approval of the President."

On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department
of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan
International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport. From
the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said
expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old
airport was converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay
Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters.The old airport was converted into
what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.

Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M. Lozada, Marcia L.
Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M.
Lozada, represented by their attorney-in-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez, and against defendants Cebu-Mactan
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO).

Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate
briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners' appeal and
affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the effect of abandonment of intended use of the petitioner gives the respondent
the right to repurchase.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court declared that in taking of private property, consequent to the
Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. If this particular purpose or intent is not initiated
or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case,
the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
The expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element
for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owners’ right to justice, fairness, and equity.

Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the question of whether respondents
were able to establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase Lot
No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned, The SC rule in the affirmative. It bears
stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and have
declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into between the
Government and respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the improvement
and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued. In affirming the factual finding of the RTC to this
effect, the CA declared—

Lozada’s testimony is cogent. An octogenarian widower-retiree and a resident of Moon Park,

California since 1974, he testified that government representatives verbally promised him and his late wife
while the expropriation proceedings were on-going that the government shall return the property if the purpose
for the expropriation no longer exists. This promise was made at the premises of the airport. As far as he could
remember, there were no expropriation proceedings against his property in 1952 because the first notice of
expropriation he received was in 1962. Based on the promise, he did not hire a lawyer. Lozada was firm that
he was promised that the lot would be reverted to him once the public use of the lot ceases. He made it clear
that the verbal promise was made in Lahug with other lot owners before the 1961 decision was handed down,
though he could not name the government representatives who made the promise. It was just a verbal
promise; nevertheless, it is binding. The fact that he could not supply the necessary details for the
establishment of his assertions during cross-examination, but that "When it will not be used as intended, it will
be returned back, we just believed in the government," does not dismantle the credibility and truthfulness of
his allegation. This Court notes that he was 89 years old when he testified in November 1997 for an incident
which happened decades ago. Still, he is a competent witness capable of perceiving and making his
perception known. The minor lapses are immaterial. The decision of the competency of a witness rests
primarily with the trial judge and must not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that it was erroneous. The
objection to his competency must be made before he has given any testimony or as soon as the incompetency
becomes apparent. Though Lozada is not part of the compromise agreement, 18 he nevertheless adduced
sufficient evidence to support his claim.
Facts related to the payment of just compensation

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974
ZALDIVAR, J.

DOCTRINE:
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on
June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.

Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease
on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and
conditions therein stated. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought
to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the
termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that
the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided
to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days
from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before
occupancy. On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of
Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations
and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and
that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings
would be recommended to the President.

Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in Civil Case No.
1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic
instituted these expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.

On March 15, 1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after
having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended
unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of
Castellvi. The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case — by defendants Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square
meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per
square meter

On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds
of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was
against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective
oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called
for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly-
discovered evidence.

Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred: 1. In finding the price of P10 per
square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings as just compensation; 2. In holding that the
"taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action; 3. In ordering plaintiff-
appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956.

In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties
under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the
"taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the
Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should
the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market
value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that
half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were
indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the
interest of national Security.

Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the
private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in
the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from
year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a
monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege"
to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “taking” of the properties under expropriation commenced on 1947.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year. It must be reckoned
as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property
for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite or
permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry
on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through
AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant
was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the
land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises
in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that
the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract.
 The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and
its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown
by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had
been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain
on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
“taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
Facts related to the computation of just compensation and court jurisdiction

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EUGENIO DALAUTA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 190004, August 08, 2017
MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:
The courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

FACTS:
Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida,
Butuan City, with an area of 25.2160 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1624.
The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as reflected in the Notice of Coverage dated January 17,
1994, which Dalauta received on February 7, 1994. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered
P192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low. The case
was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate
just compensation for the subject property. In its Resolution, dated December 4, 1995, the PARAD affirmed
the valuation made by LBP in the amount of P192,782.59.

On February 28, 2000, Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC,
sitting as SAC. He alleged that LBP's valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations
prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation
of lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme. During the trial, the SAC constituted the Board
of Commissioners (Commissioners) tasked to inspect the land and to make a report thereon. The Report of
the Commissioners, dated July 10, 2002, recommended that the value of the land be pegged at 100,000.00
per hectare. With both Dalauta and the DAR objecting to the recommended valuation, the SAC allowed the
parties to adduce evidence to support their respective claims.

Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No.
6, series of 1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income (CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per
tax declaration x 0.1, as he had a net income of 350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of the trees that were grown
on the said land. Norberto C. Fonacier (Fonacier), the purchaser of the trees, testified that he and Dalauta
executed their Agreement. Dalauta added that he had no tenants on the land. He prayed that the
compensation for his land be pegged at P2,639,566.90. LBP argued that the valuation of Dalauta's land should
be determined using the formula LV= MV x 2, which yielded a total value of P192,782.59 for the 25.2160
hectares of Dalauta's land. LBP claimed that during the ocular inspection/investigation, only 36 coconut trees
existed on the subject land; that 3 hectares of it were planted with com; and the rest was idle with few second-
growth trees. The SAC rendered judgement in favor of Daluata ordering DAR and LBP to pay him
P2,639,566.90

The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It reiterated that the SAC had original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The appellate court
stated that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate court
for the review of administrative decisions. With regard to just compensation, the CA sustained the valuation
by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules and regulations, and in accordance with
settled jurisprudence.

The case was first referred to DARAB through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
for the determination of appropriate compensation of the subject property. PARAD affirmed the computation
made by LBP. Daluata filed a petition to RTC sitting as SAC, alledging that the computation of LBP was
inconsistent with the provision of DAR. SAC recommended that the value of the land be pegged at 100,000
per hectare. Unconvinced, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled that the computation
of SAC is correct. Aggrieved, petitioner raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the
PARAD Resolution.

2. Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject property.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite
the finality of the PARAD Resolution.

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells the SC that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Although Section 5,
Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the
adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA
No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus,
Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just
compensation.

In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence,
the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute
can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot. In agrarian
reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB. Final determination
of just compensation is a judicial function; that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special
Agrarian Court, is original and exclusive, not appellate; that the action to file judicial determination of just
compensation shall be ten (10) years from the time of the taking; and that at the time of the filing of judicial
determination, there should be no pending administrative action for the determination of just compensation.

The SC agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that just compensation for respondent
Dalauta's land should be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003). The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) approach to land
valuation assumes that there would be uniform streams of future income that would be realized in perpetuity
from the seasonal/permanent crops planted to the land. In the case of commercial trees (hardwood and soft
wood species), however, only a one-time income is realized when the trees are due for harvest. The regular
CNI approach in the valuation of lands planted to commercial trees would therefore not apply.

During the proceedings before the SAC, Dalauta testified that he derived a net income of ₱350,000.00
in 1993 from the sale to Fonacier of falcata trees grown in the property. He presented the following evidence
to bolster his claim of income: (1) Agreement between Dalauta and Fonacier over the sale of falcata trees; (2)
copy of deposit slip of amount of ₱350,000.00; and Certification from Allied Bank as to fact of deposit of the
amount of ₱350,000.00 on November 15, 1993. Dalauta's sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-
time transaction. He did not claim to have derived any other income from the property prior to receiving the
Notice of Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason, his property would be more appropriately
covered by the formula provided under JMC No. 11 (2003). JMC No. 11 (2003) provides for several valuation
procedures and formulas, depending on whether the commercial trees found in the land in question are
harvestable or not, naturally grown, planted by the farmer-beneficiary or lessee or at random. It also provides
for the valuation procedure depending on when the commercial trees are cut (i.e., while the land transfer claim
is pending or when the landholding is already awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries)

Dalauta alleges to have sold all the falcata trees in the property to Fonacier in 1993. After Fonacier
finished harvesting in January 1994, he claims that, per advice of his lawyer, he immediately caused the date
of effectivity of this Joint Memorandum Circular x x x." It is submitted, however, that applying the above formula
to compute just compensation for respondent's land would be the most equitable course of action under the
circumstances. Without JMC No. 11 (2003), Dalauta's property would have to be valued using the formula for
idle lands, the CNI and CS factors not being applicable. Following this formula, just compensation for Dalauta's
property would only amount to ₱225,300.00.
Facts related to the determination of just compensation

RAMON M. ALFONSO, Petitioner

vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent
G.R. Nos. 181912, November 29, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.

DOCTRINE:
First, in determining just compensation, courts are obligated to apply both the compensation valuation
factors enumerated by the Congress under Section 17 of RA 6657, and the basic formula laid down by the
DAR.
Second, the formula, being an administrative regulation issued by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making
and subordinate legislation power under RA 6657, has the force and effect of law. Unless declared invalid in
a case where its validity is directly put in issue, courts must consider their use and application’.
Third, courts, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, may relax the application of the formula to fit
the peculiar circumstances of a case. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation;
otherwise, they will be considered in grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2007 and March
4, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90615 and CA-G.R. SP No. 90643. The
Court of Appeals granted the individual petitions filed by the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
and set aside the Decision dated May 13, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court fixing the total amount of
₱6,090,000.00 as just compensation.

Cynthia Palomar was the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land. One is located in San Juan,
Sorsogon City, with an area of 1.6530 hectares and the other in Bibincahan, Sorsogon City, with an area of
26.2284 hectares. Upon the effectivity of RA 6657, the DAR sought to acquire Palomar's San Juan and
Bibincahan properties at a valuation of ₱36,066.27 and ₱792,869.06,8 respectively. Palomar, however,
rejected the valuations.

After the effectivity of RA 6657, the DAR sought to acquire the subject lands. The owner prior to
petitioner rejected the valuation of DAR, resulting to land valuation cases subsequently being filed before the
DAR Provincial Adjudication Board. Subsequently, the Land Bank filed a motion seeking reconsideration of
the DAR PAB’s valuations. Both petitioner and respondent filed separate actions for the judicial determination
of just compensation of the subject properties. The RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, found the valuations
of both the LBP and the Provincial Adjudicator to be unrealistically low.

During the proceedings, the RTC adopted Commissioner Chua’s valuation which utilized the Market
Data Approach and the Capitalized Income Approach, due to their “different actual land use”. He opined that
“the average of the two indicators reasonably represented the just compensation (FMV) of the land with
productive coconut trees”. LBP argued before the CA that there is nothing in Section 17 of RA 6657 which
provides that capitalized income of a property can be used as a basis in determining just compensation. Thus,
when the RTC used that capitalized income of the properties as a basis for valuation, “it actually modified the
valuation factors set forth by RA 6657”. The CA reversed the findings off the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not courts obliged to apply the DAR formula in cases where they are asked to determine
just compensation for property covered by RA 66571.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the courts are obliged to apply the DAR formula in cases where they
are asked to determine just compensation for property covered by RA 6657.
 The factors listed under Section 17 of RA 6657 and its resulting formulas provide a uniform framework
or structure for the computation of just compensation which ensures that the amounts to be paid to affected
landowners are not arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives of agrarian reform. Until and unless
declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas partake of the nature of statutes, which under the 2009
amendment became law itself, and thus have in their favor the presumption of legality, such that courts shall
consider, and not disregard, these formulas in the determination of just compensation for properties covered
by the CARP. When faced with situations which do not warrant the formula's strict application, courts may, in
the exercise of their judicial discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the reasons (as borne by the
evidence on record) for the deviation undertaken. It is thus entirely allowable for a court to allow a landowner's
claim for an amount higher than what would otherwise have been offered (based on an application of the
formula) for as long as there is evidence on record sufficient to support the award.

First, in determining just compensation, courts are obligated to apply both the compensation valuation
factors enumerated by the Congress under Section 17 of RA 6657, and the basic formula laid down by the
DAR.

Second, the formula, being an administrative regulation issued by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making
and subordinate legislation power under RA 6657, has the force and effect of law. Unless declared invalid in
a case where its validity is directly put in issue, courts must consider their use and application’.

Third, courts, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, may relax the application of the formula to fit the
peculiar circumstances of a case. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation; otherwise,
they will be considered in grave abuse of discretion.

In other words, in the exercise of the Court's essentially judicial function of determining just
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No.
6657 - enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide
the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property subject to
agrarian reform. This uniform system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd,
baseless and even contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation. This
system will likewise ensure that the just compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close
approximation of the full and real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-
beneficiaries and the landowner.

When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound
to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formula's strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the
factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the
factors and formula that the law and the rules have provided.

The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial discretion should at all times be
distinguished from a situation where there is utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law and
by the implementing rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC's action already amounts to grave abuse of
discretion for having been taken outside of the contemplation of the law
Facts related to the payment of just compensation

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA,
EDGAR, PUTRI , MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:
The taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking
or appropriation

FACTS:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National
Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that one of the underground tunnels of
NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V,
Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land, and that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their
knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land.

NPC said that Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should
they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and
that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such
easement prescribed in five year. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that an underground tunnel was
constructed therein.

The Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The RTC
granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. NPC assailed such decision by filing a writ by petition for
certiorari in the CA. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Thus, the National Power Corporation seeks the
review on certiorari of the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC is liable for payment of just compensation.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that NPC was liable for payment of just compensation. The
construction constitutes taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation.

There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and
actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need
not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition
of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. As a result, NPC should pay just
compensation for the entire land. Just compensation was based on the valuation of the OIC of the City
Assessors Office who testified that, within that area, that area is classified as industrial and residential. That
plaintiffs land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is within the industrial classification. He also issued a
certificate stating that the appraised value of plaintiffs land ranges fromP400.00 to P500.00 per square meter.
The fixing of just compensation must be based on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395.
Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when
it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already
caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without
the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of
law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings.
Facts related to the payment of just compensation based on the time of taking

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015
PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell,
it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

FACTS:
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject
property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.

Respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land
but the rate of (P0.70) per square meter was offered by Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value. Hence, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with damages. Respondents-movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum.

Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the Court. It did not agree with both courts and ruled instead that
just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940, which is Seventy
Centavos (P0.70) per square meter. In addition, and by way of compensation, awarded an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment. Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby move for the
reconsideration of said decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking or at
the time of the filing of the action.

HELD:
The Supreme Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking
is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.

Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time
of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not
One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.

While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-movants
as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be noted that the purpose
of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss
thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at
the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
 Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell,
it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's
property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of the
circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately
bears the cost of expropriation.
Facts related to the rules governing the expropriation proceedings

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005
TINGA, J

FACTS:
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO,
promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered
into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to
build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said
terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the agreement was
contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already
been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status
of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities.

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation.
The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.

In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government
sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate
possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3, 002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA
3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand,
PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings in this case

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that RA 8974 governs. Application of Rule 67 violates the 2004 Agan
Resolution. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may
expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then
there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner
than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for
national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government
for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
 Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings
through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which necessitate an authorizing
ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974
for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain.
The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the
Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession. Rule 67 merely requires the Government
to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for
it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government
make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on
the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the
replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered
value of the property to be seized.

Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67
should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s
requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before
the Government may take over the property.
Facts related to the exercise of municipal corporation of Power of Eminent Domain by way of a City Resolution

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.

DOCTRINE:
The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance,
not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing then Mayor
Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at
Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City as an expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center. Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter offering to buy his property, but Suguitan
refused to sell. Consequently, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation. Suguitan filed a
motion to dismiss6 the complaint based on the ground that the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the
said property without payment of just compensation, among others.

Acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the City of
Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing
15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property.
The court granted the expropriation proceeding.

Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,9 and not by
means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of
eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong validly exercise its power of eminent domain.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section
19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
SC cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the
court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an
ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point,
the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable
to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings,
which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of
condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter
upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated.
28 Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to
exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the
proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the
defendant is entitled.
Facts related to the inflation rate that can be included in computing the payment of just compensation

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ELIZABETH MANALASTAS and BEA CASTILLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196140, January 27, 2016
PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a government-owned and controlled corporation involved in the development of hydro-
electric generation of power, among others, constructed a transmission on respondents' parcel of land.

Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge or consent of respondents, without properly
initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any compensation to respondents-landowners. Because of
said transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no longer use their land as part of a subdivision
project as originally intended, which ultimately caused financial loss to their family.

Thus respondents, filed a complaint against petitioner demanding the removal of the power lines and
its accessories and payment of damages, or in the alternative, payment of the fair market value of the affected
areas totaling 26,000 square meters of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter. It was granted by the
lower court upon the payment of more than P92Million persos. On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued
that the RTC erred in factoring the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
respondents' land. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification, reducing the award to P1.6Million.

The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer assail the valuation that petitioner itself recommended,
the same being a judicial admission. Moreover, the CA pointed out that taking an inconsistent position on
appeal cannot be allowed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inflation rate of the Philippine Peso be included in determining the just compensation
due to respondents

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso should not be included in
determining the just compensation due to respondents.

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In
fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

In other words, the just compensation due to the land owners amounts to an effective forbearance on
the part of the State—a proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was taken until the full
amount of just compensation is paid—in order to eradicate the issue of the constant variability of the value of
the currency over time.

The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation
should not include the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of
expropriated land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of the land as
of the time of taking from the landowner.

Moreover, the fact that it was petitioner's own counsel below that recommended the inclusion of the
inflation rate in the determination of just compensation should not be taken against petitioner. After all, it is
ultimately the courts' mandated duty to adjudge whether the parties' submissions are correct. It is the courts,
not the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or application of the law and, thus, only the courts
may determine the rightful compensation in accordance with the law and evidence presented by the parties.
It is incongruous for the court below to uphold a proposition merely because it was recommended by a party,
despite the same being erroneous.
Facts related to the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

FACTS:
For the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA), it offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set
forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement
regarding the sale of the property.

The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which
empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export
processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export
Processing Zone. It was granted by the lower court imposing P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533; the basis of just compensation
shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to
appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners
to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The trial court denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 is
valid and constitutional?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court (SC) hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would
be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
SECTION 10. NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS SHALL BE PASSED.

Facts related to right to Contract of loan/mortgage

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ASB HOLDINGS, INC., ASB REALTY CORP., ASB DEVELOPMENT CORP. (formerly TIFFANY TOWER
REALTY CORP.), ASB LAND, INC., ASB FINANCE, INC., MAKATI HOPE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, INC.,
BEL-AIR HOLDINGS CORP., WINCHESTER TRADING, INC., VYL DEVELOPMENT CORP., GERICK
HOLDINGS CORP., and NEIGHBORHOOD HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 172192, December 23, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.

DOCTRINE:
In intruding into corporate affairs, the State must, at all times, promote a wider and more meaningful
equitable distribution of wealth and protect investments and the public.

FACTS:
ASB Development Corporation and its other affiliates (ASB Group of Companies) are debtors of
petitioner China Banking Corporation. Their loans were secured by a real estate mortgage. Respondents filed
before the SEC a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of actions and proceedings against their
creditors. In filing the petition for rehabilitation, respondents contended that while they have sufficient
capitalization, the company will be hard-pressed to service its obligations in favor of petitioner bank and its
other creditors due to a glut in the real estate market, the depreciation of the currency and decreased investor
confidence in the Philippine economy.

Based on the program, secured creditors have been asked to waive all penalties and other charges.
Dacion en pago program is introduced to creditors or they encouraged their creditors to buy their real estate
property in offset of their debt. If the dacion en pago does not materialize for failure of the secured creditors
to agree thereto, this rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle the obligations (without interest, penalties, and
other related charges accruing after the date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors with
mortgaged properties at ASB selling prices for the general interest of the employees, creditors, unit buyers,
government, general public, and the economy. It was approved by the SEC.

Aggrieved, petitioner bank appealed the plan’s approval to the SEC En Banc. According to petitioner,
the SEC order compelling the bank to surrender its present collateral and accept certain properties in other
locations as payment of the obligations due, it violates the constitutional proscription against impairment of
contracts. It was likewise argued that the value of the properties being offered by ASB via dacion en pago is
insufficient to cover the amount of its outstanding loans; and that the preference conferred by law to the bank
as a secured creditor has been rendered illusory. The appeal of the petitioner was denied by SEC as well as
Court of Appeals. Hence, they appealed to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ASB’s rehabilitation plan violates the contract clause.

HELD:
No, ASB’s rehabilitation plan does not violate the contract clause. The Supreme Court held that in
intruding into corporate affairs, the State must, at all times, promote a wider and more meaningful equitable
distribution of wealth and protect investments and the public.

In this case, the approval by the SEC of the rehabilitation plan of respondent corporations is a step
towards that direction. The terms of the rehabilitation plan unveil that secured creditors like petitioner bank
may refuse or reject the dacion en pago arrangements stated in it. It cannot be implemented without
petitioner’s consent. Further, the approval of the plan and the appointment of a receiver merely suspend
actions and claims that may be raised against respondent bank. They do not, in any manner, obliterate
petitioner’s status as a preferred secured creditor.
 Questions on the viability of the plan should likewise be laid to rest. As the CA aptly observed, majority
of respondents’ obligations to creditor banks had already been paid as early as two years upon the approval
of the plan. Wherefore, the petition is denied and the appealed Court of Appeals Decision affirmed.
Facts related to Contract of Sale

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
SANTOS, J.

DOCTRINE:
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has
to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the
Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal. The plaintiff then sold two parcels of land, known
as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles with stipulation that the parcels of land shall be used by the buyer exclusively for residential purposes.
The said vendees sold the lands to Emma Chavez, still with the same stipulation. Later on, Lot 5 was bought
by the respondent from Chavez and Lot 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills. Then FEATI started the
construction of a building for banking purposes.

The petitioner filed a petition in the lower court to enjoin the respondents from completing the
construction and comply with building restrictions. Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on
the titles should be followed because it was imposed in accordance with their general plan in the subdivision
which is merely residential. Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the
western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial
zone, per Resolution No. 27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant
'completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it after more than two years the place had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone.

The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution declaring the area commercial area. It appealed to the
decision of lower court claiming that the Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant corporation. The appeal was given due course and the records of the case were
elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed
by defendant-appellee.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. The SC held that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people.

Resolution No. 27, declaring the western part of highway, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for
short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed
in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality.

The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "
legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause
of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. It is, therefore, clear that even
if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the
contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions,
which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
Facts related to Contracts

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
COURTS, J.

DOCTRINE:
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

FACTS:
In 1965, the petitioner entered into a timber license agreement and was issued an exclusive
license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest
land in Nueva Vizcaya which will expire in 1990.

In 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development pursuant to the orders of then Pres. Marcos,
issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires for the conservation of
the remaining forest. The petitioners pleaded to the Office of the President, for reinstatement of their license
citing that they were not given opportunity to be heard but it was denied. After a year, half of the land area
formerly covered by their license were awarded to other corporations allegedly controlled by cronies of Marcos.

Soon after the ouster of Marcos, petitioner sent a letter to the Office of the President and to the Ministry
of National Resources (now DENR) seeking to stop the logging of the aforementioned corporations and
reinstatement of its cancelled TLA. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR denied petitioner's request. The
Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but
only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner
was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were
revoked in 1983. Moreover, the MNR contended that it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not
only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.

After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but the petition was
denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the
MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of petitioner’s timber license agreement valid and constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, the revocation of petitioner’s timber license agreement was valid and constitutional. The Supreme
Court stated that timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause.
 In short, the TLA granted to the petitioner was a privilege only and can be revoked by the state. Given
that there is a reasonable cause of such revocation, it cannot be said that the contract they entered into was
impaired.
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative
reliefs sought. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
Facts related to Contract of Lease

FELIPE V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
Hon. ISAAC S. PUNO, JR., as Judge, CFI of Manila, Branch XXXV, et al, respondents.
G.R. No. L-50998 January 31, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:
The decree, therefore, in order that it would not be tainted with constitutional repugnancy, must be
construed as only restricting the freedom of the parties to contract, but only in a prospective manner. Thus, to
raise the rent in specified specie of leases after the decree has been promulgated would constitutionally come
within the regulatory provision of the decree.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Felipe V. Cruz filed a complaint asserting that he is the lessor of a one-door apartment at
Sampaloc, Manila, which is being leased and occupied by defendants Rogelio Gundayao and Erlinda T.
Gundayao. The lease is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated by either party by means of a
written notice served upon the other at least thirty days prior to the date of the termination.

Thereafter, the plaintiff made a formal demand upon the defendants to vacate and surrender the
peaceful possession of the premises to the plaintiff within thirty days from receipt thereof. The defendants
have failed and refuse to vacate the premises to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff who was thus forced
to avail himself of the services of counsel. The defendants averred that the termination by the plaintiff of their
lease contract was due to their refusal to increase their rents which is in provisions of Presidential Decree No.
20. They alleged that their lease contract is without a definite period which should be barred by the decree. It
was approved by the lower court but was denied by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the lease may be
considered one for an indefinite period for the purpose of applying Presidential Decree No. 20. Hence, the
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of lease of the parties was violated.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that the contract of lease of the parties was not violated. To exempt the
lease from the application of PD No. 20, it must, therefore, be one with a definite period. In the instant case, it
is not disputed that the lease is on a month-to-month basis because the rental agreed upon is monthly. At all
events, the fact remains that the parties agreed, under the stipulation of the lease contract as quoted above,
that either one of them may, on a thirty-day notice, terminate the lease. This agreement is, at the tune it was
entered into, a perfectly valid undertaking. Not being against the law, public policy or custom, it is the law
between the parties, as all valid contracts are, and the obligations thereof may not be impaired by law, as so
ordained by the constitution.

It seems all too clear that to hold, under the authority of Presidential Decree No. 20, that the lessor may
not anymore exercise this right under the agreement and subject the lessee to the corresponding obligation,
or the other way around, as the right to terminate may be exercised also by the lessee, would be to lend to
the decree a legal infirmity arising from the provision of the Constitution that no law impairing the obligations
of contract shall be passed. The decree, with all its manifest social justice intent, could not have meant to
ignore any constitutional injunction. It means only to regulate, or perhaps even restrict, the exercise of
proprietary right for a higher purpose than just protecting private interest, which is that of advancing general
welfare by giving direly needed benefits to the poor and the underprivileged under conditions of economic
crisis, but not at the cost of the sanctity of contracts, the obligations arising from which being shielded by the
constitution from impairment.

The decree, therefore, in order that it would not be tainted with constitutional repugnancy, must be
construed as only restricting the freedom of the parties to contract, but only in a prospective manner. Thus, to
raise the rent in specified specie of leases after the decree has been promulgated would constitutionally come
within the regulatory provision of the decree. In the instant case, this is not what is sought to be done by the
petitioner. He seeks to enforce an obligation validly imposed on, and voluntarily assumed by, the private
respondent, already existing with complete validity and full enforceability at the time Presidential Decree
No. 20 took effect. The contract could not be made to lose these qualities or attributes by a law or
decree without doing violence to the Constitution.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted and the appealed decision reversed. The decision of the City
Court in favor of petitioner is hereby reinstated, particularly the dispositive portion thereof.
SECTION 11. FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES AND
ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE SHALL NOT BE DENIED TO ANY PERSON BY REASON OF
POVERTY.

Facts regarding the Rules of Indigent litigant

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners,

vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON
PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR., respondents.
G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:
The rules on indigent litigant states that if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand,
when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

FACTS:
Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a complaint for damages against the Naga
City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding
house. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants. The motion was
granted and they were exempted from filing fees. However, the respondent filed a Motion to Disqualify
Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. They asserted that the petitioners cannot be considered indigent litigant
because their gross income exceeds the income stipulated by law to be exempted (Background: the husband
was policeman then they had boarding house, sari-sari store and computer shop; they are outside metro
manila—they have gross income of I think 10k but net of 3k).

Then, the Naga City RTC issued an order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground
that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the
third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite
filing fees.

Petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly
income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on
her husband's salary as a policeman which provided them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less.
Also, they did not own any real property as certified by the assessor's office of Naga City. Petitioners however
argue that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure
which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is "one who
has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family." Judge of the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras
instituted the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying
filing fees.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify
for exemption from paying filing fees.

Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the
unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized. The rules
on indigent litigant states that if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under
Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application
does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the
court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining
the merits of the prayer for exemption.

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their
affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross
monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent
litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners
to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter,
and basic necessities for them and their family. In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to
also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to
litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial
court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule
3, Section 21.

Wherefore, the petition is granted and the Order granting the disqualification of petitioners, the Order
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, and the Order dismissing the case are annulled and set aside.
Facts related to paying sheriffs expenses

RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDA-ACOSTA
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFF’S EXPENSES
A.M. No. 11-10-03-0, July 30, 2013
REYES, J.

DOCTRINE:
The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services.
Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action” refers to the
totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing or docket
fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s
fees and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in
connection with the action instituted before it. Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a “fee”
within the purview of the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. Sheriff’s
expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), sent
a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). She sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO's
clients from the payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in its Regional Office in Region VII
are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses in the amount of ₱1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil
action in court. She claimed that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Section 6
of Republic Act No. 94062 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and other
fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies.

The OCA clarified that PAO’s clients, notwithstanding their exemption under Section 6 of R.A. No.
9406 from payment of "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court," are not exempted
from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are not
considered as "legal fees" under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they are not payable to the government;
they are payable to the sheriff/process server to defray his travel expenses in serving court processes in
relation to the litigant’s case.

Atty. Acosta maintained that, while sheriff’s expenses may not be strictly considered as a legal fee, they
are nevertheless considered as a fee which is incidental to the filing of an action in court and, hence, should
not be exacted from PAO’s clients. She pointed out that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on PAO’s clients
would render the latter’s exemption from payment of docket and other fees under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
nugatory. Considering that the matter involves an interpretation of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested that
the same be referred to the Court en banc for resolution.

In its report and recommendation5 dated September 14, 2011, the OCA maintained its position that
PAO’s clients are not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. Accordingly, the OCA recommended
that Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of sheriff’s expenses be denied. It
was denied by the Court. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this second motion for
reconsideration. She claimed that the said imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts
contrary to the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PAO litigants should be exempted from paying sheriffs expenses.

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court held that the PAO litigants should not be exempted from paying sheriffs
expenses. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers–who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers–to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
 That Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of “docket and other fees
incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies” is beyond cavil. However, contrary
to Atty. Acosta’s claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption granted to PAO’s
clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s expenses; the exemption is specifically limited to the
payment of fees, i.e., docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action.

The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services.
Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action” refers to the
totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing or docket
fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s
fees and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in
connection with the action instituted before it. Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a “fee”
within the purview of the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. Sheriff’s
expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting PAO’s clients
from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less
privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason
of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption from the payment
of docket and other legal fees, would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable
intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.

Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the fundamental rights which the
Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
“[f]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.” The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts;
moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts.
Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit
of this constitutional provision.20

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is
essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be
shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and
the marginalized.

Wherefore, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta is denied. The Court’s Resolutions are hereby affirmed. The request of Atty.
Persida V. Rueda-Acosta for the exemption of the clients of the Public Attorney’s Office from the payment of
sheriff’s expenses is denied.
SECTION 12. (1) ANY PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN
OFFENSE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN
CHOICE. IF THE PERSON CANNOT AFFORD THE SERVICES OF COUNSEL, HE MUST BE
PROVIDED WITH ONE. THESE RIGHTS CANNOT BE WAIVED EXCEPT IN WRITING AND IN
THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.

(2) NO TORTURE, FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION, OR ANY OTHER MEANS

WHICH VITIATE THE FREE WILL SHALL BE USED AGAINST HIM. SECRET DETENTION
PLACES, SOLITARY, INCOMMUNICADO, OR OTHER SIMILAR FORMS OF DETENTION ARE
PROHIBITED.

(3) ANY CONFESSION OR ADMISSION OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS OR SECTION 17

HEREOF SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.

(4) THE LAW SHALL PROVIDE FOR PENAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THIS
SECTION AS WELL AS COMPENSATION TO AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF
TORTURE OR SIMILAR PRACTICES, AND THEIR FAMILIES.

Facts related to the rights of the accused

DANNY ESCOBEDO VS. ILLINOIS

378 U.S. 478, Jun 22, 1964
JUSTICE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

DOCTRINE:
As soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to
speak to an attorney.

FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested with his sister and taken to police headquarters for interrogation in connection
with the fatal shooting, about 11 days before, of his brother-in-law. He was implicated by Benedict DiGerlando,
who was then in police custody and who was later indicted for the murder along with petitioner, told the police
that petitioner had fired the fatal shots. En route to the police station, the police "had handcuffed the defendant
behind his back," and "one of the arresting officers told defendant that DiGerlando had named him as the one
who shot" the deceased. At the station, petitioner made several requests to see his lawyer, who, though
present in the building, and despite persistent efforts, was refused access to his client.

Petitioner was not advised by the police of his right to remain silent. Notwithstanding repeated requests
by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the
entire interrogation. After persistent questioning by the police, petitioner made a damaging statement to an
Assistant State's Attorney which was admitted at the trial. Convicted of murder, he appealed to the State
Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction. Thus, Escobedo appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Escobedo was denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

HELD:
As soon as someone is in the custody of law enforcement, he or she has a Sixth Amendment right to
speak to an attorney.

In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Goldberg, the Court ruled that Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment rights
had been violated. The Court reasoned that the period between arrest and indictment was a critical stage at
which an accused needed the advice of counsel perhaps more than at any other. A suspect who was being
interrogated by police while in custody, who had not been warned of his right to remain silent, and who had
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, had been denied the assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Any statement elicited under such circumstances could not be
used against him at a criminal trial. The Court therefore reversed Escobedo’s judgment and remanded for
further proceedings.
Facts related to the rights of the accused

ERNESTO MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA

384 US 436, Jun 13, 1966
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN

DOCTRINE:
The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain
silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.

FACTS:
This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt
after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment
rights during an interrogation.

On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station
where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of
interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into
evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that
they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found
Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights
were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel. Hence, this appeal in United States
Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law enforcement officials violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused

HELD:
The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain
silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant’s
interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural
safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to
remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required
to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated
the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.
Facts related to Rape with homicide of 12 years old girl

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, Accused-

Appellant.
G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999
PER CURIAM

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide against Maria Victoria Chan, 12
years of age. He disappeared on the day that the body of Maria was discovered in a septic tank. After a series
of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police
Station. With the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein
he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the
victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim.

Upon the automatic review of the Court en banc, he pleaded not guilty, he alleged that the police
officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer's
plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he
executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when
he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused was against his constitutional right.

HELD:
No, the extra-judicial confession of the accused was not against his constitutional right. There being
no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture,
maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have
been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true,
correct and freely or voluntarily given.

Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily
gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given
with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That
accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even inform
the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed
or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abounds with details know only to him. The Court
noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys’ Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty.
Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the
giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys’
Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and
the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death Asphyxia by
manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the
accused that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.

There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There were no medical
certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers. Another
thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he, however, claims was executed
in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the
testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-
interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer.
Facts related to Simple rape against the daughter of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. DELFIN DELA CRUZ, Appellant.

G.R. No. 137405, September 27, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must at all times be pleaded in the
information, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him.
It is a matter of settled jurisprudence that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment.

FACTS:
Marikit, 16 years old, had a reunion with her family at their farm in Mindoro, because of her father’s
birthday, herein appellant Delfin dela Cruz. One night, after the celebration, she was then ordered to go with
him to the hut of their farm. Upon arriving at the hut which was one kilometer from their house, her father
succeeded in raping her.

Three (3) days thereafter, Marikit decided to file a complaint against her father. On the same date,
she submitted herself to medical examination. The lower court found him guilty, thus this appeal. Appellant
does not challenge the finding of guilt arrived upon by the RTC, but questions its imposition of the death
penalty. He alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death for the crime charged despite
that accused was not properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him which is in violation
of his constitutional right.

Appellant argues that the Information under which he was arraigned charged him only with simple
rape as defined by Article 355 (paragraph 1) of the Revised Penal Code. Such offense, he contends, is not
punishable with the death penalty; besides, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not
alleged in the Information.

The OSG, on the other hand, counters that appellant was reasonably apprised of the nature of the
accusation against him, inasmuch as the Information made reference to the sworn Complaint with appendices
(Sworn Statement, Birth Certificate and Medico-legal Certificate) that unmistakably establish the minority of
the victim and her relationship to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was apprised of the nature of the accusation against him.

HELD:
No, the accused was not apprised of the nature of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that the various circumstances enumerated under RA 7659 are in the nature of qualifying
elements, which should be alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. Thus,
in order that the circumstances of minority and relationship may be appreciated, both must be specifically alleged
in the information and duly proven during trial, with equal certainty as the crime itself.

Indeed, in the present case, the Information did not allege the qualifying circumstances that the victim was
below eighteen (18) years old when the offense was committed, and that the offender was her father. Hence, in no
way can appellant be convicted of qualified rape, because the Information clearly makes out a case for simple rape
only. The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must at all times be pleaded in the information,
consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. It is a matter of
settled jurisprudence that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. It would certainly
be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process if he is charged with simple rape, but is later convicted of qualified rape punishable with death. Where the
prosecution fails to conjointly allege and prove the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, the
accused should be held liable for simple rape only. To effectively prosecute him for the crime of qualified rape,
these two circumstances must concur, and failure to allege them in the Information — despite proving them during
trial — effectively rules out the imposition of the death penalty.
Facts which are not covered by right of the accused

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS

G.R. No. 79138 July 2, 1990
CORTES, J.

DOCTRINE:
Miranda rights contained in constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under
custodial investigation which has been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"

FACTS:
The appellant was charged with Robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. The appellant
allegedly hold-up a passenger jeepney in Marikina City wherein Manzanero, the driver and other person was
stabbed. Manzanero was confined in a hospital, few days later, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-
up men were being detained at the 225th PC Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another
robbery, went there to check. Having identified the appellant among the detainees, he reported the matter to
the Marikina police. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in
Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident.
Pat. Ayun then took the sworn statement of Manzanero

Upon being arraigned, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. He was convicted in the lower court.
From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal. The appellant assails the manner in
which he was identified by Manzanero, at the headquarters of the police, claiming violation of his constitutional
right to counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused to counsel has been violated.

HELD:
No, the right of the accused to counsel has not been violated. The court must emphasize that the so-called
Miranda rights contained in constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial
investigation which has been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way". Hence, for instance,
these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court
because he is no longer under custodial investigation.

Here, the Court concluded that the accused could not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel because
he was not under custodial interrogation. He identified the accused upon learning that certain hold-up men were
being detained and reported the matter to the police officers.
Facts related to extrajudicial confession

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA

G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing
the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling
chickens to customers. He was charged of the killing of the two maids of one the customer as well as robbery.
The police officer testified that they found the accused in Pangasinan and were able to apprehend him whom
they brought to Manila. He was positively identified by one witness. Pat. Ines testified that on that same day,
accused-appellant gave a confession in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes,
in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta.

The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD
Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at Station 7 of the
WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked to assist accused-executing an
extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional
rights, explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used against him in court, but accused-
appellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime
of robbery with homicide.

The accused on the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that
he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges against
him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied
having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the
extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read.

He was then convicted in the lower court. Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the
validity of this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not the counsel
of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He
said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused is inadmissible as evidence to the Court.

HELD:
Yes, the extrajudicial confession of the accused is inadmissible as evidence to the Court. There are
two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the
product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are
the subject of paragraph 1 of the same Section 12.

Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside from this bare
assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical treatment
nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times
is proof that he refused to sign it.

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence
showing the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not
given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called
in the United States from which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept
into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police
interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation
must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be
warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to
counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
Facts related to right to counsel are not applicable during line-up which is not part of custodial investigation.

CRISTOPHER GAMBOA vs HON. ALFREDO CRUZ

G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988
PADILLA, J.

DOCTRINE:
It was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when
police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

FACTS:
The petitioner was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, petitioner was
brought to precinct in Manila where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with
several others.

The following day, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B.
Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees
were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being
interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. sit down in front of her.
An information for robbery was then filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing
a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence alleging that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in
the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The Solicitor-
General counters that when petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he
was not yet entitled to counsel. It was denied by the respondent court. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to counsel was violated during the conduct of the line-up.

HELD:
No, the petitioner’s right to counsel was not violated during the conduct of the line-up. The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission
of an offense.

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When petitioner
was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal
offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel.
Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when
police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer
for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due
process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated
at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage,
exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated
at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated.
Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued.
Facts related to admission to private person

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and NELSON GARCIA y
TEMPORAS, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 112177 January 28, 2000
PARDO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him."

FACTS:
The three accused in the case were convicted of robbery with homicide. The appellants were helpers
of the victim Maria and her sister. The incident happened during the delivery of the victims of palay. Though
there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was committed with the testimony of
Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by Maximo Velarde to
Romualda when she visited the latter at the jail.

The police officers arrested Maximo and was investigated and asked to give a written statement in the
presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City. Tito and Nelson
were taken into police custody without a warrant. They underwent custodial investigation without the
assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be found in Cabusao, Camarines Sur.

Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before the judge of the lower court on
three (3) different dates. She followed the same procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect, in
ascertaining the voluntariness of the three (3) accused's confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his
companions to leave her and the accused inside the chamber. Satisfied that they were properly apprised of
their rights and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she had them sign their individual extrajudicial
statements.

Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and (2) that they were tortured and
forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they were not assisted by counsel when
their confessions were taken, while Maximo alleged the defense of alibi saying that he did not leave
Magallanes, Sorsogon anytime in 1985. They were then convicted of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions of the accused were executed in accordance with the
Constitution.

HELD:
As to the extra-judicial confession to the police officers, it was inadmissible for violation to constitution
but as to admission to Rumualda, it was admissible since she is a private person. The right to counsel attaches
the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected
offender. It is at this point that the law requires the assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other
words, "the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then
and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel."

Lt. Idian's team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes Sorsogon when no warrant had been
issued for his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the arresting peace officers investigated appellant Maximo. His
statement was reduced in writing when they were in Camaligan, Camarines Sur. It was in Camaligan that
CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to assist appellant Maximo in the execution of his written confession.
Atty. Ocampo was not present during the entire duration that accused Maximo was subjected to custodial
investigation as could be inferred from the testimony of Pat. Rodolfo Cariño.

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts,
we are constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. "An
uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in
the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants'
sworn statements did not leave a void in the prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the
contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to
a private person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section
26 of the Rules of Court stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualda's
testimony. Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's fate
but also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the latter has no opportunity to cross-
examine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay, is not applicable here. What
is involved here is an admission, not a confession
Facts related to investigation of private person

ERNESTO NAVALLO vs HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994
VITUG, J.

DOCTRINE:
Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial
investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Navallo, as the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational
School was charged of malversation. A warrant of arrest was issued, but he was not immediately found. When
he was finally arrested, he posted bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court, he pleaded not
guilty. He asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution. The safe used by him and by Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the cash which
was taken out from the safe was placed on top of a table. He did not see the actual counting of the money and
no actual audit of his accountability was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash count only because he was
pressured by Macasemo, his superior, who assured him that he (Macasemo) would settle everything. The
collections in 1976, reflected in the Statement of Accountability, were not his, he declared, but those of
Macasemo who had unliquidated cash advances.

Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not reply because he was already in
Manila looking for another employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not
exert any effort to have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying instead on Macasemo's
assurance that he would settle the matter. He, however, verbally informed the investigating fiscal that the
shortage represented the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo. He was convicted by Sandiganbayan.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared
by State Auditing Examiner.

HELD:
No, the petitioner was not under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared by
State Auditing Examiner. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way."

A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner
himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case,
the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears
to be belied by his own testimony. Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to sign the
auditor's report.
Facts related to custodial investigation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDUARDO MACAM y LONTOC

G.R. Nos. L-91011-12 November 24, 1994
QUIASON, J.

DOCTRINE:
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up is inadmissible.

FACTS:
The accused were charged of robbery with homicide. They robbed the house of the uncle of one of the
accused and killed his wife. Other accused pleaded not guilty at first but later on changed their plea to guilty.
They were convicted with the crime charged. Only two accused who pleaded not guilty appealed in this Court.
According to the statement of accused Danilo Roque, a driver of tricycle who brought the accused to the place
of the robbery, he was just force to take part in the said robbery. Also, his brother Eduardo Roque is not
involved in the crime since he was not present at the place the crime was committed.

In the statement of Danilo, he said that they went to the factory of the father of one of the accused
Eduardo Macam to collect the supposed fare from him. However, Danilo alleged that the security guard of the
saif factory detained them. They were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters for investigation.
Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime, appellants were then brought to
the Quezon City General Hospital and were made to line-up together with several policemen in civilian clothes.
Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained
during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore
contusions on their faces caused by the blows inflicted on them by the police investigators

Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled identification by the
prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of their constitutional rights under
Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution

ISSUE:
Whether or not their identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital
are violative of their constitutional rights to counsel.

HELD:
No, their identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are not
violative of their constitutional rights to counsel. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification
of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at
bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances
were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken
identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police
line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an
uncounseled accused cannot be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of
appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not
object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the
prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin
Facts related to not admitted extra-judicial confession

HO WAI PANG vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176229 October 19, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself.

FACTS:
Thirteen Hongkong nationals arrived at NAIA from Hongkong. Six of them were recovered with a total
of 18 chocolate boxes containing white crystalline substance inside contained in a white transparent plastic by
Gilda Cinco, custom examiner. She reported it to her immediate superior and called the NARCOM and the
police. The following day, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
questioning. The NBI found that it was more or less 31 kilos of shabu. They were convicted in the lower court
of violation against the Dangerous Drug Act.

Later, five of the accused withdraw their notice appeal. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left
to pursue his appeal. The CA denied the appeal. While conceding that petitioner’s constitutional right to
counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were
other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the CA denied also. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence taken during the custodial investigation be excluded.

HELD:
No, the evidence taken during the custodial investigation should not be excluded. Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus in Aquino v. Paiste,
the Court categorically ruled that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation."

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of
his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in
evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based
its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu.
As the Court held in People v. Buluran, "[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction." Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not
excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.

On the other hand, petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or
admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court,
hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime.
Facts related to Counter-Affidavit executed as admissible proof

JOSUE R. LADIANA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 144293 December 4, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply
only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of
accused persons. Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ladiana, a police officer, was charged with homicide for allegedly killing Francisco San Juan,
barangay captain after he confronted the latter because he was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along the street and the accused told
the latter that he has no business in stopping him. He was shoot by the accused using his firearm. After the
shooting he voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities and voluntarily execute a counter-affidavit
admitting the incident but alleged that it was a self-defense. He was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. Hence,
the petition.

The petitioner assails the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit submitted by him during the preliminary
investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed which is a violation of
the Constitution. Petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and
independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is
admissible proof showing the complicity in the crime of the accused.

HELD:
Yes, the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible
proof showing the complicity in the crime of the accused. It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities
required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained
during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in
custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons. Custodial interrogation is the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground

to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his
Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was
not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a
person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at
issue in this case. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the
commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission,
not a confession.The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim
when the latter was attacking him.

Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to
the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court
how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his
defense. In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made
by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular,
not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts.29 Yet, petitioner
never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In
addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the
declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the
victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal
liability therefor.35 Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing.
SECTION 13. ALL PERSONS, EXCEPT THOSE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY
RECLUSION PERPETUA WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG, SHALL, BEFORE
CONVICTION, BE BAILABLE BY SUFFICIENT SURETIES, OR BE RELEASED ON
RECOGNIZANCE AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE
IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED.
EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED.

Facts related to right to bail of an accused who charged of Child Abuse

MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:
"The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

FACTS:
Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse. His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. Then, nine more information for child
abuse were filed against petitioner. n all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the
informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and
money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended.
Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.

The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post
bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following
conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He
shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to
do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately
issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April
10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused. He filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment. It was denied by the CA. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditions attached to the bail is valid.

HELD:
No, the conditions attached to bail is invalid. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure
the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage
of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court
or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on
bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
 It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition
imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial
but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another
condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May
23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid
condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a
condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of
bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Facts related to Excessive Bail

MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to
P5,500,000.00. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond
he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court. After the records of the case
were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the
Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal. The Court of Appeals allowed the petitioner to post
bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and other conditions in relation to his abode and travel. Petitioner filed a
Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent
court, but was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court
for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability. He prays that bail be
reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa
under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of
the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive
bail

HELD:
Yes, the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail. The
prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared
in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, the SC made the pronouncement that it will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused
entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions
There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing
bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and
despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the country several times
during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at
P5,500,000.00. Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may
include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the
court and to make an accounting of his movements.

In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case
was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-
departure order against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have
been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-
departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, SC
find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioner's right to bail.
 The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount
paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this cannot be allow because bail is
not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment
of the appellate court.

On the other hand, the petitioners submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based
on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide cannot also be approved. Yes the courts are advised that they must not only be
aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal
justice. However, the court is not precluded from imposing in petitioners case an amount higher than
P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the
circumstances. Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the
following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

In this case, the SC believes that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable considering the
penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner.
Facts related to granted bail due to health condition

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:
The principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. He then filed a petition to
be allowed to post bail which the Sandiganbayan denied for the reason that he had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest
of Enrile. However, he voluntarily surrendered.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition.
Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. CA
stated that it is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter
of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail. Hence, he filed the
present petition.

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at
it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish
that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two
mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward
with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight
risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

The Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be granted bail.

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the SC is guided by principal purpose of
bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.

In SC’s view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake,
he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration
of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts
can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Respondent (possible extradite) petition for bail and was granted by respondent Judge. Petitioner claim
that it could only be granted in criminal proceedings and not in extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court
reversed their previous ruling and granted the bail due to consideration of international law on human rights.
Facts related to bail on prospective extraditee

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice vs HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Respondent Juan Antonio Munoz was charged with criminal offenses before the Hongkong Court
and a warrant of arrest was issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice
a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. He was then arrested and detained and filed a petition for bail. It was
denied by the RTC. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge.

The petitioner opposed the decision but was denied. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner alleged
that private respondents should not be granted bail because there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

HELD:
At first glance, the above ruling (previous ruling that post to bail applies only to criminal proceedings-
Purganan Case) applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right
to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that
under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,
have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained
for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation
of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The
applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a
party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Facts related to excessive amount of bail

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA vs HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE

G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental , was arrested
and detained in Agusan for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur. He then filed an application for bail
with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident.
It was granted by the judge at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.

The Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either
in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the
amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.

The answer filed by respondent Judge set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the above
order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any charge that he was guilty of
grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find support in circulars of
the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. Later, the Court was informed that petitioner escaped
from the provincial jail. However, the Court still decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fixed amount of bail imposed to the petitioner is excessive.

HELD:
Yes, the fixed amount of bail imposed to the petitioner is excessive. Nothing can be clearer, therefore,
than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should
be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being
fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve
victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses
charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.

There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there
summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of
the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the
accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this
decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called
upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."

No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such
an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the
command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the
Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner
would under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he
must have been to a stateof desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have
been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would
have beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a
promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."12
It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake. Petitioner's subsequent
escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge
did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.