After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in The Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?

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After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance Between Security and
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.823754
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After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the

Balance Between Security and Liberty in
Norway?
a a a a
Anne Lise Fimreite , Peter Lango , Per Lægreid & Lise H. Rykkja
a
Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University
of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Accepted author version posted online: 26 Aug 2013.Published
online: 17 Sep 2013.
To cite this article: Anne Lise Fimreite, Peter Lango, Per Lægreid & Lise H. Rykkja (2013) After Oslo
and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 36:10, 839-856, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.823754
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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:839–856, 2013
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ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.823754
After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance

Between Security and Liberty in Norway?
ANNE LISE FIMREITE

PETER LANGO
PER LÆGREID
Downloaded by [Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen] at 05:00 03 October 2014
LISE H. RYKKJA
Department of Administration and Organization Theory
University of Bergen
Bergen, Norway
The article addresses the challenges a society faces to when trying to balance security
and liberty after a terrorist attack. A main question is to what extent attitudes toward
counterterror measures changed in Norway after the massive terror attacks in July
2011. A hypothesis that people will be more in favor of such measures after a terror
attack is examined using data from two surveys—one conducted in 2006 and one in
August 2011, with additional results from a survey in 2012. The Norwegian response
after the 2011 attacks is compared to the response to the same questions in the United
States shortly after 11 September 2001. A main finding is that in Norway, in contrast
to the United States, levels of support for counterterror measures declined immediately
after the attacks. The authors argue that this can be explained partly by the different
levels of trust in the two countries, and partly by differences in the political executive’s
framing of the crisis. In 2012, support of counterterror measures in Norway has risen
to pre-2011 levels. This is related to the changed discourse after the publication of the
report from the 22 July Commission.
Balancing security and liberty is an important challenge in a liberal democracy. After the
terror attacks in July 2011 where 77 people—most of them very young—were killed,
Norway has been encouraged to act and face this challenge, perhaps in a different way
than before. Ensuring both security and liberty is a core function of a democratic state.
Individual rights or important liberties, such as freedom of expression, religion, mobility,
assembly, privacy, and the right to due process, are among the most important political
values in a democratic society.1 However, these rights may in some instances be in conflict
with a situational imperative of security, especially during times of national threat and
crisis.2 Owens and Pelizzo argue that critical events, be it war, civil unrest, or economic
and political crises or terrorist attacks, tend to strengthen the power of the executive and
damage democratic institutions.3 Although this likely depends on political processes and
may vary across political systems, both external and internal events may incite restrictions
Received 19 January 2013; accepted 19 May 2013.

Address correspondence to Dr. Lise H. Rykkja, Department of Administration and Organization
Theory, University of Bergen, P.O. Box 7802, N-5020 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: lise.rykkja@aorg.
uib.no
839
840 A. L. Fimreite et al.
on recognized liberties to achieve more security, and thus alter the balance between the
executive and the legislature. Such shifts challenge established and valued democratic
principles, and should therefore be thoroughly scrutinized and discussed.
A terror attack is perhaps one of the most devastating events that can befall a modern
society. It has an important psychological dimension, since in addition to causing material
damage it particularly aims to create fear and anxiety.4 It is a common, but also contested
understanding that liberties tend to be constrained in the process of re-establishing safety
after terror. A range of scholars have identified what they see as a general trend: When
the perceptions of threat or danger increase, in particular in the aftermath of major terror
attacks, liberties tend to shrink.5 According to these studies, security and civil liberties
such as privacy, due processes, free speech and non-discrimination are typically traded off
against each other.6 Several scholars discuss this tradeoff.7 The tradeoff thesis is contested,
however. Security and liberty may be traded off in some, but not all domains. Liberty
does not necessarily shrink in all respects when security increases; neither does liberty
necessarily increase if security decreases.8 Nevertheless, the issue is an important one since
both security and liberty are crucial values in a democratic society. This article aims to
explore and discuss these relations further by introducing a comparison of reactions to
recent terror attacks in Norway (2011) and the United States (2001). The comparison is
interesting, first, because of the great shock the terrorist attacks each in their own ways
represented for the society in both countries, and second, because the countries differ
regarding public perceptions to terrorist attacks and in how the threats are constructed
politically.
Since 11 September 2001 and the subsequent “War on Terror,” many scholars argue
that the threat from terrorism has lowered Western governments’ threshold for introducing
strong counterterror measures, and heightened people’s tolerance toward such measures.
The trend has been most evident in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Australia, where far-reaching counterterror legislation has been passed—albeit not
unopposed.9 Owens and Crotty, for instance, argue that the Bush administration’s “War on
Terror” strengthened the power of the executive in the United States.10 Shepard shows how
new executive powers enhanced the power of the British executive in response to the London
bombings in July 2005.11 Several other European countries, including Norway, passed
new counterterror laws and introduced further measures in the wake of 9/11. Although
such regulations can be implemented differently, they provide the police and intelligence
services with considerable new powers in the area of arrest, detention, and surveillance.12
While awareness of issues concerning personal freedom, human rights, and abuse of power
related to counterterror measures is fundamental to democracy, security and protection
is also necessary. One possible way to handle potential negative side effects of stricter
security measures is to establish reliable control with the security and surveillance methods
and public bodies performing them.
Literature on counterterrorism has revealed that the robustness of the regime’s demo-
cratic foundations, as well as symbolic effects of terrorism, affects the democratic response
to it.13 A constructivist framework underlines the importance of the public’s perceptions
regarding the use of violence, the national collective, and how the threat is constructed
politically.14 The level of institutionalization of democratic foundations is crucial and a
general assumption is that there is a positive association between the strength of the demo-
cratic foundation of a regime and its tendency to avoid hard-line measures against terrorist
elements.15 What seems to matter most are processes that shape how citizens and govern-
ments conceive the use of violence, how the public perceive and interpret insecurity, and
how threats are constructed politically.16
After Oslo and Utøya 841
In Norway, the public debate and general attention to these questions have, until re-
cently, been moderate. A survey conducted in 2006 revealed that the Norwegian population
was rather supportive of stronger counterterror measures.17 Some suggest that this might
be explained by the absence of earlier terrorist attacks, and a lack of earlier formative
experiences of authoritarian or intrusive government.18 A main question in this article is to
what extent attitudes toward counterterror measures have changed in Norway after the mas-
sive terror attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011. A reasonable hypothesis is that the
population will be more in favor of such measures after an attack because of a heightened
awareness of threat and increasing security concerns, but constrained by the democratic
foundation of the regime. Whether or not such attitudes are taken into account by central
decision makers is also relevant. In most democratic countries, public support or opposition
to government policies feeds into and is mediated by the system’s rules, procedures, and
institutional arrangements. These arrangements influence how politics and government are
conducted.19
This article first and foremost explores the public opinions and discusses to what
extent such general opinions can have implications for policymaking and the establishment
of counterterror measures. Whether and how such attitudes influence actual decision making
needs further elaboration and analysis, a topic somewhat beyond the scope of this article. The
article highlights reactions to terrorist attacks in Norway after 22 July 2011. It proceeds with
a short introduction to terror and terrorism in Norway before the attacks. The hypothesis,
that people will be more in favor of counterterror measures after a terror attack, is examined
using empirical data from two surveys in Norway. The first was issued in 2006, the second
in August 2011, directly after the terror attacks.20 Results from the Norwegian survey in
2011 are then compared to the same questions in a survey conducted in the United States
shortly after 9/11 (data collected in late 2001/early 2002). The results of these surveys
will be linked to reported levels of fear or anxiety after the attacks in both countries. In
a concluding section we discuss what these attitudes could imply for central political and
administrative executives in Norway.
Terrorism in Norway—Pre 22 July

Terrorism and terror are controversial concepts, both in politics and in academic research.
They are not readily defined, and are open to differing interpretations. Definitions are often
broad, and may be normative and condemning. Mostly, linguistic shifts in favor of either
concept are not very conscious. Experts, for instance Nathanson, warn that a lack of clarity
means these concepts can be used in inflammatory and even self-serving ways.21 The
political connotations of both can be problematic, and current research can be harnessed
to support particular policy strategies. Appropriate definitions are therefore important.
Nordenhaug and Engene avoid the value-normative trap and define terrorism as the use
of violence that deliberately targets civilians in order to create an effect on others.22 The
intention is to create fear in order to achieve certain political goals. In this definition, the
specific political or ideological motivation behind the violence is not important. People or
groups with different convictions can exercise terrorism. By focusing on attacks on civilians,
other types of action where the intention is to hit military forces or certain individuals are
excluded.
Different states fight terrorism in different ways.23 Until 9/11, counterterrorism was
rather marginalized within Norwegian security policy.24 Norway is a small multiparty
parliamentary state with a strong democratic tradition. The country scores high on per
capita income and abundance of natural recourses, has relatively strong collectivistic and
egalitarian values, is consensus-orientated, and has a low level of internal conflict. The
public sector is large, owing to a large and universal welfare state. Norwegian society is
marked by a high level of trust,25 and surveys of public support for political institutions
very often accord Norway a leading position.26
Norway has, until 22 July 2011, been seen as a country with limited experience with
terrorism and political violence. Although we can easily identify examples of smaller
incidents, a general problem is that documentation on political violence and terrorism in
Norway is rather fragmented and out-dated. Engene mentions a few small-scale attacks
by extreme rights activists and a few internal terror-like attacks (although not politically
motivated).27 A few more significant events are also worth mentioning. In 1973, Israeli
agents who wrongly assumed he was connected to the massacre at the Munich Olympics
in 1972 murdered a Moroccan on the street. Until July 2011 this was regarded as the most
serious act of terror on Norwegian soil. In 1993 the head of the publishing company that
printed Salman Rushdie’s controversial novel The Satanic Verses survived an attempt on
his life. In 2006 a Kurd living as a refugee in Norway who headed the Islamic organization
Ansar al-Islam was put on the UN’s so-called “terror list” of people associated with the
Taliban, Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda. He was charged with financing and organizing
terror acts from Norway, and was in 2012 found guilty. However, according to Norwegian
legislation he could not be expelled because he risks torture or execution in his homeland
Iraq. In 2008, another radical Muslim was charged with threatening and planning terrorist
acts after firing gunshots at the Jewish synagogue in Oslo. He was later acquitted, however.
In 2010, three Norwegian immigrants were arrested on suspicion of planning terrorist
acts targeting a Danish newspaper (Jyllandsposten) that had published a cartoon of the
Prophet Mohammed in 2005. They were alleged to be part of the Al Qaeda network. A
public debate followed on whether the Norwegian government and Police Security Service
(PSS) had been using sufficient measures to expose terrorist cells operating in Norway.
In 2012, two of the three were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. This was
the first time in Norwegian history that someone was sentenced for planning a terrorist
act.
Despite the lack of major acts of terror in Norway until July 2011, the events of the
last decade, such as several disrupted or failed terrorist plots in Denmark and Sweden,
the terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom, and certainly 9/11 and the ensuing
“War on Terror,” were regarded as highly relevant in the Norwegian context too.28 Only a
few weeks after 9/11, a temporary ordinance that prohibited financing of terror was issued
by a royal decree. Later that year the Norwegian government proposed new counterterror
regulations.29 Although these measures were not as far-reaching as those adopted by some
other countries they did represent something new in the Norwegian context. Until then, the
concept of terror was not even mentioned in the Norwegian penal code.
The proposed counterterror legislation gave the police new and wide-ranging powers
in the area of technical monitoring (like wiring and phone-tapping), and included a general
ban on planning or preparation of terrorist acts. The proposals were heavily criticized by
the director of Public Prosecutions and by human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International. They argued that the new measures would criminalize acts that up until then
had been considered legal political instruments, and that the proposals would cast doubt
on the legislative status of human rights. With the new initiative laws banning terrorist
acts and the financing of such acts were included in the Penal Code. Extensions of police
powers of surveillance to prevent terrorist acts and fight organized crime were adopted in
2004. However, the final legislation represented a considerable modification of the original
proposals, which were more radical.
Consequently, the present Norwegian counterterror laws can be characterized as rel-

atively moderate compared to those of other Western countries. The public debate over
the introduction of the post 9/11 counterterror measures was limited.30 This indicates that
there is a broad support for and trust in the ways the government handles these issues. The
picture of Norwegians as quite tolerant is confirmed by a survey from 2007 that showed that
three out of four Norwegians would accept more surveillance if it made everyday life safer.31
At a more general level, Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid found that Norwegian citizens
have a rather high level of trust in the government’s ability to handle and prevent crisis.32 It
seems that Norwegians generally regard the use of surveillance technology positively and
expect the government to use appropriate means to protect them against crime and terror.
Attitudes Toward Counterterror Measures—2006

In the survey from 2006, three variables tap attitudes toward different counterterror mea-
sures. The question posed was:
Imagine that the government suspects that a terror attack is imminent. Do you
think that the government should have the right to:
• Hold people in custody as long as they wish without putting them on
trial
• Tap people’s telephone calls
• Randomly stop and search people on the street
It is difficult to know precisely how the respondents interpreted the term “terrorist attack”
in this survey, since they were not presented with any clear definition. Given the context in
2006, many Norwegians probably saw terrorism as a remote threat, as something largely
happening abroad. The dramatic events of 9/11, other incidents like the Madrid and London
bombings, and a subsequent heightened media attention towards such issues, would on the
other hand have brought the threat of terrorism closer. Although we cannot confirm this,
we find it quite likely that respondents were sensitive to this particular kind of external and
organized terrorism, when posed the question in 2006.
The three policy measures in question can be categorized as essentially preventive.
They are proactive; intended to be taken in anticipation of future problems or needs. The
attitudes toward them can be expected to vary, given that they differ considerably in terms
of how far-reaching they are. A general expectation is that there will be more scepticism
toward holding people in custody without trial, and less concern about phone-tapping and
randomly stopping and searching people.
Although a majority in 2006 supported the use of strong measures in the fight against
terror, Table 1 shows a considerable variation in attitudes. Phone tapping stands out—
whereas more than 80 percent said the government definitely or probably should have the
right to use this measure. Only 14 percent were sceptical.33 Fifty-five percent supported
the right to randomly stop and search people on the street, while 51 percent said that the
authorities should definitely or probably have the right to hold people in custody without
trial. The general pattern turns out as expected: Norwegians are more willing to accept public
authorities having the right to tap people’s phone calls, than to randomly stop and search
people on the street if a terror attack is suspected, and they are even more sceptical about
the authorities holding people in custody without trial. Attitudes toward these measures are
supplementary rather than alternative.34 This means that a respondent with a more positive
attitude towards one measure is likely to be supportive toward the other two, while someone
more sceptical toward one measure will be more sceptical toward the others.
Table 1
Citizens’ attitudes toward three different prevention measures in the fight against terror
(2006)
Randomly stop Custody

Phone-tapping and search without trial
Should definitely have the right to 48% 23% 22%
Should probably have the right to 35% 32% 29%
Should probably not have the right to 10% 23% 26%
Should definitely not have the right to 4% 18% 20%
Do not know 3% 4% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 1,318 N = 1,312 N = 1,318
Compared to other countries in 2006, Norway scores relatively high on the question of
permitting phone-tapping and randomly stopping and searching people.35 Only Denmark
has a higher score on the first question. On the second question, Norway ranks fourth after
Denmark, Great Britain, and Sweden. When asked about attitudes towards the most contro-
versial measure, keeping people in custody without trial, Norway scores above average, but
only barely. Five out of the 33 countries included in the survey score higher than Norway
(the five were Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Israel, and the United States).
Although Danes and Swedes are slightly more sceptical about holding people in custody
without trial than Norwegians, this confirms an assumption that Scandinavians generally
are more supportive of strong measures in the fight against terror than people from other
countries.
Overall, there is little variation in the material.36 Men tend to be slightly less supportive
of strong counterterror measures than women, while the youngest (between 18 and 22 years
old) and the oldest (between 50 and 80 years old) tend to be more supportive. There is some
variation related to education, whereas those with higher education tend to be less supportive
compared to those with only basic education. The material also shows that residents of the
capital of Oslo are less supportive of strong counterterror measures compared to people
from the rest of the country.37 People voting for left-wing parties tend to be less supportive,
while those who state a preference for right-wing parties tend to be more supportive.
Those who indicate a preference for the dominant political party in Norway—the Labour
party—do not stand out from the rest of the population.
Being a country that, until July 2011, had not experienced any major terrorist attacks,
Norway may seem rather tolerant of strong counterterror measures. On the one hand, this
might be explained by general societal developments. In a globalized world, even terror
attacks occurring elsewhere may seem close, causing a sense of insecurity to increase.
Even if Norwegians are not involved and the attacks take place somewhere else, people
may feel that these incidents affect them. On the other hand, if the threat feels remote,
people might accept such measures because they believe that they are unlikely to be used
extensively.38 Survey results and people’s attitudes may also be influenced by current
events and public discourse. The data from 2011 reveal some of these tendencies. Results
from a similar survey conducted in 2012 largely confirm this impression, as we will show
below.
Attitudes Toward Counterterror Measures—2011

The events of 22 July altered the picture of Norway as a peaceful and sheltered corner of
the world. Suddenly terror was not a remote threat any longer. On a Friday afternoon at
the height of the Norwegian summer holiday season, a massive bomb detonated in central
Oslo destroying several main government buildings. Eight people were killed. Two hours
later, sixty-nine people were massacred and thirty-three wounded by gun-shots at the social
democratic Labour Party’s youth camp on Utøya—a small island in a lake a few miles
northwest of Oslo. Most of them were between fifteen and eighteen years old. The same
evening, a thirty-three-year-old ethnic Norwegian citizen living in one of the more affluent
areas of Oslo was arrested on Utøya and charged with the attacks. He quickly admitted
responsibility. His motivation for committing the attacks was a strong resentment against
the development of Norway into what he saw as a “multicultural society.” Given the Labour
Party’s many years in power, he held it responsible for this development. The trial concluded
in 2012 and revealed that he acted without the support of any terrorist organization.
In August, a month after these devastating attacks, a telephone survey asked a repre-
sentative sample of Norwegians the same questions about attitudes towards counterterror
measures as in 2006. At this point, terrorism probably was not seen as a remote threat,
given the recent attacks. The results of the 2011 survey are shown in Table 2.
As in 2006, a majority of Norwegians supported the use of strong counterterror mea-
sures in 2011. Again, phone tapping stands out. Sixty-five percent said they thought the
government definitely or probably should have the right to use this measure. Compared
to 2006, this was a decline of 18 percentage points.39 One third of the respondents were
sceptical towards this measure. Forty-three percent supported the right to randomly stop
and search people on the street, while 48 percent said that the authorities definitely or
probably should have the right to hold people in custody without trial. The general pattern
shows a slight change compared to 2006, when more respondents were sceptical towards
keeping people in custody than towards the other two measures. In 2011, more respondents
were sceptical to randomly stopping and searching people on the street.
The most interesting finding when comparing the two surveys is that the general
acceptance of counterterror measures overall seems to have declined directly after the two
Table 2
Citizens’ attitudes toward three different prevention measures in the fight against terror
(2011)
Randomly stop Custody

Phone-tapping and search without trial
Should definitely have the right to 34% 22% 27%
Should probably have the right to 31% 21% 21%
Should probably not have the right to 13% 18% 17%
Should definitely not have the right to 18% 36% 29%
Do not know 4% 3% 6%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N = 1,000 N = 1,000 N = 1,000
Figure 1. Supportive attitudes toward counterterror measures (2006 and 2011). (Color figure avail-
able online).
attacks in Oslo and on Utøya. The differences between the levels of acceptance for each
measure are displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates that Norwegians apparently were more sceptical toward coun-
terterror measures after the attacks than before the attacks, quite the opposite of the ex-
pectations following from the initial hypothesis. The variation according to gender, age,
political affiliation, and place of residence follows roughly the same trends as in 2006.40 The
youngest were less supportive compared to 2006, while the eldest were more supportive.
Residents of Oslo were more supportive of the counterterror measures in 2011 compared
to 2006, although they were still less supportive than residents from the rest of the coun-
try. People who indicated support for the Labour Party did not stand out from the rest of
the population in 2011, although there was a stronger support for the strongest measure
(custody without trial) compared to 2006.
The findings from 2011 are supported by the results of yet another survey conducted
by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services in September 2011.41 How unique is
this reaction? In an attempt to answer this question we compared the response of people
in Norway with that of another Western democracy with experience of massive terror
attacks—the United States. Approximately the same questions were posed in a survey in
the United States just after the 9/11 attacks.
Comparing the Responses to Counterterror Measures After the Terrorist

Attacks in the United States and Norway
In an article about the American population’s response to counterterrorism from 2005, Carol
Lewis wrote: “It was only in the immediate aftermath of September 11 that a majority saw
some sacrifice of civil liberties as necessary in the fight against terrorism.”42 To the question
“In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average
person to give up some civil liberties, or not?” around 30 percent of Americans answered
in the affirmative in 1996/97. Sixty-three percent said the same in September 2001 and in
June 2002 46 percent agreed.43 Lewis claims that these results contradict interpretations
of survey research after 9/11 that allege that the public was willing to constrict civil
liberties in the face of a perceived threat. In the United States a heightened security
concern seems to have dropped shortly after the attacks, but proceeding to stabilize at a
Table 3
Supportive attitudes toward individual counterterrorism measures in the United States and
in Norway shortly after terrorist attacks on own soil
United States (2002) Norway (2011)

Telephone 40% 65%
tapping/monitoring (United
States also e-mail)
Random check on street and 56% 43%
highways
Custody without judge 44% 48%
(Norway trial)
higher level compared to the situation before the attacks. The same tendencies are reported
by Davis and Silver, and confirmed by Kuzma.44 Even though the data is not directly
comparable to Norway, the pre-9/11 scores indicate that the concern for civil liberties
was stronger in the United States before 9/11 than it was in Norway before the attacks in
Oslo and on Utøya. Methodologically, one should be cautious when analyzing different
questionnaires and surveys conducted in different time frames and in different political
and social contexts. There are certain limitations in terms of comparability. However, we
argue that the surveys used here are sufficiently similar and therefore provide interesting
and comparable information.
Another survey in 2002 asked U.S. citizens about their attitudes toward different
individual counterterror measures.45 Three of the questions asked in this survey are directly
comparable to those included in the two Norwegian surveys; telephone monitoring, random
checks, and detention without a trial. Even though the questions were posed somewhat
differently46 the results, presented in Table 3, give us an idea of the attitudes toward such
measures in the two countries after the terror attacks.
With the exception of random checks, Norwegians are more supportive of counterterror
measures than Americans were shortly after the attacks. The majority of Norwegians
supported custody without trial and telephone-tapping, while a majority of Americans
approved of random checks. To conclude that either Norway or the United States is a
unique case is difficult given that only these two nations are included in our comparison.
The comparison does challenge an argument asserting that what we see in the Norwegian
survey is a remarkable “awakening of liberty,” however. Compared to the situation in the
United States after 9/11, this is not so.
So, what lies behind these differing attitudes in the two countries? To scrutinize this
further, it makes sense to take a closer look at the context in which the surveys were
conducted. Fear is one obvious reason why citizens would want to support counterterror
politics. If someone fears or expects a new attack, they will most likely want the authorities
to prevent it. Perceived threat is said to increase the support for domestic counterterror
politics.47 The psychological dimension of terrorism is decisive here. The 9/11 attacks and
the terror attacks in Norway in 2011 are of a different character—the first one was an attack
from the outside that was quickly linked to a known international terrorist organization (Al
Qaeda), while the attacks in Norway were performed by a person apparently acting alone
and independently of any (international) terrorist organization. This might, at least partly,
explain why the threat is interpreted differently in the two countries.
At the same time, fear of terrorism might generally be higher in the United States,
independent of the character of the attack. Several studies show that people in the United
States also became very concerned about terrorism immediately after the bombing in
Oklahoma in 1995. This attack was quite similar to the attack in Norway in 2011. Shortly
after the Oklahoma bombing and after 9/11, about nine out of ten Americans were very, a
great deal or somewhat concerned about (future) terrorism.48 In August 2011, only two out
of ten Norwegians reported this kind of anxiety.49 This reveals more or less the opposite
pattern of fear or perceived threat immediately after the attacks. The differences remain
when the questions are phrased more directly. Thus to the question How concerned are you
that you yourself, family or friends will be victim of terrorism (the United States)? And To
what extent are you concerned that future terrorist attacks will harm you, your family or
your friends (Norway)? Sixty-eight percent of the Americans answered very concerned or
somewhat concerned in 2001/02.50 In August 2011, 19 percent said the same in Norway.51
Summing up, Americans are comparatively less supportive of counterterror measures,
even though they are more afraid of future terrorism. Norwegians, however, stand out as
quite supportive towards counterterror measures and do not fear future terrorism or perceive
it as a threat. In the next section we try to explain this and also discuss how this might affect
ongoing law-making processes in Norway after 22 July.
Trust, State-Friendliness, and Symbols

In their Handbook of Emergency Management, Waugh and Hy claim that the fundamental
values of a society can be found in how the society responds to risk, especially risk that
may result in major losses of human life and/or property.52 The terrorist attacks in Oslo
and on Utøya caused major loss of life and suffering. Given Waugh and Hy’s statement,
fundamental values in the Norwegian society should be visible in the response to the attacks.
As emphasized above, Norway is a high-trust society. This goes for both interpersonal
and institutional trust.53 Trust is frequently regarded as a fundamental and characteristic
value of Norwegian society.54 In the weeks after the terror attacks in 2011, both interpersonal
and institutional trust was found to increase.55 Interestingly, trust toward the government,
the parliament and the public administration increased quite significantly. Results from a
similar survey in 2012, however, show a return to the situation before the terrorist attacks
in 2011.56 Interpersonal trust and trust in central institutions is roughly on the same level
as before, and although there is a small increase in the level of fear and insecurity, it has
by no means risen to the level of fear seen in the United States. The authors conclude that
the terror attacks neither led to social collapse nor a permanent sense of togetherness and
unity. Neither does it seem to have swayed the overall sense of security in a major fashion.
Results from the survey conducted one year after the terrorist attacks in Norway reveal
another interesting change. When asked about attitudes toward phone-tapping, random
checks, and custody without trial in August 2012, it seems that the situation has returned
to “normal.” Support for telephone surveillance and random checks have increased, but
remain unchanged when asked about willingness to accept custody without trial. In 2012,
50 percent support custody without trial, 78 percent support phone tapping, and 50 percent
support random checks.
Norway is normally characterized as a state-friendly society.57 Most Norwegians
see the state as an extension of society rather than as an adversary or threat.58 This is
another important feature of Norwegian society that distinguishes it from many other
Western democracies. Can the combination of these two fundamental features—trust

and state-friendliness—help us understand the comparatively high level of acceptance of
counterterror measures and the simultaneous low level of fear of another terrorist attack
directly after 22 July?
High levels of trust combined with tolerance for strong prevention measures seem
to reflect a general confidence in government or the state and a corresponding trust in
the “virtuousness of the state” in contrast to the more fundamental scepticism toward
central government apparent in the United States and other Anglophone countries.59 For
Norwegians, maybe the assessment of the state as an extension of society means that the
authorities that carry out counterterror measures are not perceived as adversaries capable
of abusing these measures randomly. Norwegians seem to have a strong confidence in their
authorities. This might mean that they also trust them to use counterterror measures to
protect citizens and society, not to abuse them.

Attention to democratic values was high in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
Our data also reveals this, when we see that people are less willing to accept strong
counterterror measures directly after the attacks, compared to before (2006) and a year
after (2012). It seems that far-reaching counterterror measures therefore are not seen as
representing a serious democratic problem in the long run. These findings may also be
related to the severe criticism of the preparedness and response of crucial institutions,
both of the government itself and more particularly the police, that has emerged after
the publication of the report from an independent commission appointed to examine the
government’s response to the attacks.60 The 22 July Commission published its report in
August 2012. It revealed severe system failures, and argued that the attacks could have been
prevented if the responsible units had acted differently: “The attacks on the government
buildings could have been prevented through effective implementation of security measures
already decided upon. The governments’ ability to secure people at Utøya failed.”61 The
report from the Commission claimed that there was enough police resources available in
Oslo and in the Utøya-area, but the resources were not able “to find each other.”62 Lack
of command and coordination are given as the main reasons for this. The report launched
intense debates on government responsibility, the use of new investigation and surveillance
methods, as well as leadership, culture and commitment within the government as a whole.
The continuous high—and immediately after the terror attacks of 22 July— increasing
level of interpersonal trust, might explain why Norwegians do not fear another terrorist
attack. In a country where trust in your neighbors, family, relatives, friends, colleagues,
and people more generally is high, you do not expect them to be terrorists. As Wollebæk
et al. state: “. . . there are weak indications that the Utøya attacks were a harbinger of a new
culture of fear. . . .”63 Another terrorist attack seems unlikely, even though only a month
earlier one of these “neighbors” turned out to be one of the most ruthless solo terrorists the
world has seen. On the other hand, this could also reflect the nature of the attack. Norwegian
reactions could have been tempered compared to those of the United States after 9/11 with
the realization that the attacks in Oslo and at Utøya were ostensibly the work of a loner
rather than that of a coordinated and transnational network.
The way the situation in Norway was handled in the days and weeks after 22 July
can be seen as an extreme form of crisis management. The terror attacks in Oslo and on
Utøya represent one of the most dramatic crises ever experienced by Norwegian society.
Fimreite et al. point out that how the authorities and particularly political leaders handle a
crisis, is essential for successful crisis management.64 Crisis communication and meaning
making is vital.65 Referring to Schneider, Lewis claims that success or failure in disaster
recovery is almost entirely a matter of public perception rather than objective reality.66
Symbolic communication is very much to the point in a government’s response to disaster,

she says. This is even truer when the crisis or disaster is caused by terror. This is related
to the psychological dimension. Spinzak is cited in Lewis’s article from 2005 as saying:
“(while) terrorism is largely a psychological weapon, psychology is very important in the
fight against terror.”67 National leaders in Norway, in particular the prime minister but also
the king, stated very early after the attacks that terror ought to be met by “more democracy,
more openness and more humanity, but never naivety. We owe that to the victims and their
families,” voicing a continuing strong adherence to central democratic values but at the
same time underlining security.68 This reaction contrasts with President Bush’s response
after 9/11. In his speech to the Congress in September 2001, the message was: “Our war
on terror begins with al-Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”69 The symbolic effect of these
speeches was significant. Three days after the attacks in Norway, hundreds of thousands
Norwegians joined in what have been called ‘the Rose Marches.’ All over the country,
candles were lit and flowers laid down in a silent protest against the extreme views of the
terrorist and as a token of respect for the victims. Norwegians and other residents of all
origins and ages participated in these demonstrations.
The statements and speeches of the nation’s leaders directly after the attacks and
the following demonstrations helped to raise awareness in Norway that terror seeks to
destroy trust.70 The symbolic communication from the country’s leaders to the people,
but also among people themselves, apparently resulted in a mobilization of Norwegian
core values. This is probably an important explanation for the increase in institutional as
well as interpersonal trust in the immediate aftermath of 22 July. Fighting terrorism with
immaterial weapons and through such symbolic communication may also be an important
aspect in explaining the substantial decrease in support for counterterror measures between
2006 and 2011. The fact remains that Norwegians still are, comparatively speaking, quite
supportive of counterterror measures. How will this challenge the legislative process and
future safety regulation in Norway? This is discussed in the last and concluding section.
A Question of Trust?
Evidence from Norway immediately after the terrorist attacks in 2011 counters the initial
hypothesis that people will be more supportive of counterterror measures immediately
after an attack. In an open society, one would assume that citizens’ attitudes and attention
affect discussions on liberty versus security.71 Norwegians’ support for strong counterterror
measures was actually lower in August 2011 than in 2006. However, in September 2012,
it seems that things have returned to normal. Attitudes towards counterterror measures
therefore, all in all, seem stable and robust. Compared to the United States, Norwegians are
more supportive of counterterror measures. That the support is not based on fear of (future)
terror is a puzzle. Institutional as well as interpersonal trust are probably important clues
to an explanation. Trust in the political and administrative authorities seems particularly
important and deeply rooted in Norway.72
In Norway, the terror attacks targeted an essential source of trust: civil servants in
the government apparatus and the recruits of a dominant political party. Both are central
institutions situated at the core of Norwegian democracy. The buildings destroyed in Oslo
are important symbols of government power and represent a particular period in Norwegian
history when the country moved from being a poor country on the edge of Europe to
becoming a rich, oil-producing nation.
A debate on the need to strengthen counterterror legislation is currently emerging
in Norway. In November 2011, the Police Security Service (PSS) proposed to broaden
the existing counterterror laws, including proposals to further criminalize the planning of
terror. The present terrorism legislation (from 2004) criminalized only preparations by a
“terrorist association.” According to existing legislation, one has to be part of a group or
association planning terror in order to be sentenced.73 Directly related to the events in 2011,
the new proposals include criminalization of so-called “solo terrorism.” Furthermore, new
investigation methods are proposed, including monitoring data-traffic, the surveillance of
certain buildings, and television monitoring of private premises. A third proposal is to
give police officers the right to give anonymous testimony in trials covering terror. In the
transmittal letter to the Ministry of Justice the (then) head of the PSS stated that: “It is
important to emphasize that these legal changes will enable the PSS to secure democracy
and critical interests of the society in a better way.”74
To criminalize preparations and prevent terrorist attacks is a difficult endeavor. To
draw the line between just thinking about an attack, and actually planning and preparing
for it, can be problematic. The 22 July Commission recommended stricter control of arms
and chemicals, and the criminalization of receiving terrorist training, but was more critical
about criminalization of all actions that might be seen as preparatory.75 Expanding the
mandate of the PSS to conduct surveillance of individual citizens might weaken privacy
and individual freedoms. It could also produce unrealistic expectations about what can be
prevented and create a false sense of security.
In May 2013 the Norwegian government presented a proposal for legislative changes
to handle “solo-terrorism.”76 The proposition proposes to criminalize planning of terrorist
activities, participation in terror training and active engagement in terror organizations.
The maximum sentence for terrorism was proposed to increase from 21 to 30 years.
Significant steps to ensure domestic safety were initiated and implemented by the U.S.
public administration after 9/11—some modest, others momentous.77 Lewis argues that too
many rule makers advocate policies that directly affect their own power and authority. To
emphasize this, she cites a dissenting judge in the American Supreme Court in 1928: “The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.”78 Lewis claims that public opinion can act as a critical boundary and
hence a useful orientation for administrators in such situations. In Norway public servants
have, as discussed above, proposed new measures to ensure public safety and launched
discussions related to these initiatives. These initiatives also affect those proposing them.
As shown in the previous quote from the head of the PSS, to give the Service more
authority is part of the reasoning behind the proposals. Increasing executive powers on the
expense of legislatures and parliaments has a cost on democracy. The democratic forces
that serve to mitigate changes to the balance between security and liberty vary in different
political systems.79 These are important insights when one discusses the introduction of
new counterterror measures.
In Norway, progressive legislators might lack the corrective force of sceptical public
opinion, given that the majority is in favor of counterterror measures. As our data show,
a majority support the detention of suspects without trial to prevent terror. We argue that
this gives Norwegian politicians and public administrators different challenges from those
in the United States. Politicians and administrators have to balance security and liberties in
such a situation.
Conclusion
Norway can be categorized as belonging to a reconciliatory model of counterterrorism, in
contrast to the more hard-line models focusing on criminal justice and warfare.80 Norway
has been hit by terrorism only on an infrequent basis. In such situations countermeasures
are usually carried out by standard law enforcement and counterterror legislation has been
limited.
The terrorist attack in July 2011 represents an attack against major interests of the
political regime. It was an attack against symbolic targets, there was a high level of exposure,
and it was operationally exceptional. One would expect that such characteristics would
escalate the state’s response.81 That the state’s response did not escalate, in spite of these
features, is a puzzle. This could indicate that the strength and robustness of the democratic
regime and its tendency to avoid the use of hard-line counterterror measures overrules the
symbolic power of the terrorist attack. This leads us to conclude that stronger democracies
are more likely to use reconciliatory measures, even in cases with terrorist attack with
strong symbolic power. Historical context, cultural perceptions, and the level of trust in
government and among citizens seem to be important factors. However, the nature of the
terrorist attack and the appropriateness and legitimacy of the use of hard-line counterterrorist
measures makes a difference. This can explain the different reactions in Norway and the
United States compared. Thus different self-conceptions, views, identities, and institutional
practices appear to have a great impact on the balance between security and liberty in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack. These differences in interpretations reflect past institutional
practices and contribute to the different responses on terrorist attacks in different countries.
Even though the immediate reaction to the terrorist attacks in Oslo and at Utøya in
2001 was “more openness, more democracy and humanity,” recent developments have seen
a normalization of attitudes toward counterterror measures and the introduction of new
arrangements in Norway. Still, they cannot be characterized as as hard-line as in the United
States. The 22 July Commission concluded their report by saying that the Norwegian
legislation in the security field succeeds to balance the relationship between security and
liberty, and reflects reasonable ambitions for the level of security in the Norwegian society.
The Commission adds that the main challenge is consistence between words and action,
however. To secure this the Commission suggested 31 different measures, including reforms
within the government system, the police, on legislation, and within the army, the emergency
sector and the police security service.82 These recommendations do not represent radical
changes from previous arrangements, however.
In Norway, as in other countries facing terrorist attacks, the government will probably
want to act preventively when the issue of security is current in order to be seen as
proactive and up to date with ongoing events. By introducing and supporting counterterror
measures, politicians and government officials try to tackle criticism and avoid blame-
games. Worldwide there has been a response to a new managerial and political climate
of “security precautions” in the wake of 9/11 and other international terror attacks.83 The
experiences of Oslo and Utøya and the reforms in their wake add to this. However, perceived
threat does not exist independently of management or political processes. Representations
of risk, how it is dealt with, and the organizations set to handle the threats are co-produced
in specific political and organizational contexts. Even in a situation like that in Norway
post–22 July, with very little expressed fear or anxiety, the policies pursued might create
opportunities for a change of policy in the long run and result in the introduction of
prevention measures that may be remotely related to specific experiences, lessons learned,
or expressed attitudes.84
On the other hand, we might have to accept that we cannot avert all threats, and that
security and safety cannot always be restored by use of stronger security measures. In the
fight against terror and terrorism, societies are faced with a difficult dilemma. The tradeoff
between democratic principles and security could at worst result in what Papastamou,
Prodromitis and Iatridis caution against in their study of attitudes toward counterterror
politics in Greece after 9/11: . . .society’s bid to shield itself from terrorism may lead to
society terrorizing itself. . ..85 Continuous debate and awareness toward this dilemma is
important. In the end, we would argue that the idea that terror attacks can be avoided by
the use of all available means of power seems illusory.
Notes
1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1963); Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).
2. Lynn M. Kuzma, “Security versus Liberty,” in William Crotty, ed., The Politics of Terror.
The U.S. response to 9/11 (Boston: North Eastern University Press, 2004).
3. John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo, eds., The “War on Terror” and the Growth of Executive
Power? A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2010).
4. Iselin Nordenhaug and Jan O. Engene, Norge i kamp mot terrorisme (Oslo: Universitets-
forlaget, 2008); Carol W. Lewis, “The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to
Terror,” Public Administration Review 65(1) (2005), pp. 18–30.
5. Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist
Attacks on America,” American Journal of Political Science 48(1) (2004), pp. 28–46; Lewis, “The
Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror”; Mark Sidel, More Secure—Less
Free? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser,
“Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26 (2–3)
(2003), pp. 99–120.
6. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermcule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts
(Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 2007).
7. Carlos Bozolli and Cathérine Müller, “Perceptions and Attitudes Following a Terrorist
Shock: Evidence from the UK,” European Journal of Political Economy 27(s1) (2011), pp. 89–106;
Crotty, ed., The Politics of Terror; Kristopher K. Robison, “Terror’s True Nightmare? Reevaluating
the Consequences of Terrorism on Democratic Governance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22(1)
(2010), pp. 62–86.
8. Jeremy Waldron, “Security and Liberty. The Image of Balance,” Journal of Political Phi-
losophy 11 (2) (2003), pp. 191–210.
9. Lewis, “The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror”; Jonathan
Malloy “Canada’s War on Terror, Parliamentary Assertiveness and Minority Government,” in Owens
and Pelizzo, The “War on Terror” and the Growth of Executive Power?
10. John E. Owens, “Congressional Acquiescence to Presidentialism in the US War on Terror:
From Bush to Obama,” in Owens and Pelizzo, eds., The “War on Terror” and the Growth og Executive
Power?; Crotty, ed., The Politics of Terror.
11. Mark Shepard, “Parliamentary Scrutiny and Oversight of the British ‘War on Terror’:
Surrendering Power to Parliament of plus ça change?,” Owens and Pelizzo, eds., The “War on
Terror” and the Growth of Executive Power?
12. Mark Rix, “Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The National Security State and the
Community Legal Sector,” Prometheus 24 (3) (2006), pp. 429–439.
13. Arie Perlinger, “How Democracies Respond to Terrorism: Regime Characteristics, Sym-
bolic Power and Conterterrorism,” Security Studies 21 (2012), pp. 490–528.
14. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in
State’s Response to Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (3) (2007), pp. 369–393; Peter J.
Katzenstein, “Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Conterterrorism,” International
Organization 57 (4) (2003), pp. 731–760.
15. Perlinger, “How Democracies Respond to Terrorism.”
16. Katzenstein, “Same War.”
17. Lise H. Rykkja, Anne L. Fimreite, and Per Lægreid, “Attitudes towards Anti-Terror Mea-
sures: The Role of Trust, Political Affiliation and Civil Liberties Support,” Critical Studies of Terro-
rism 4 (2) (2011), pp. 219–237.
18. Owens and Pelizzo, The “War on Terror” and the Growth of Executive Power?, p. 16.
19. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis
of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).
20. The analysis is based on data from a telephone survey conducted in August 2011 and a
broad mass survey on “Citizen’s attitudes towards public authorities and public activities” conducted
in September–November 2006, where the same questions featured. The survey from 2006 is part of
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). It was conducted by the Norwegian Social Science
Data Services (NSD) and funded by the Norwegian Research Council. An extensive questionnaire
was sent to a representative sample of Norwegian citizens between 18 and 79 years of age, focussing
on attitudes toward government and public authorities. Two thousand and seven hundred Norwegian
citizens were randomly drawn from the Central Register of Persons to participate. The response
rate was 49 percent (1,331 responded) and the respondents were representative for the population.
The telephone survey was carried out on 23–26 August 2011. The survey in 2011 was part of an
omnibus focusing on the Norwegian local government election, conducted by Norstat. The sample is
representative of Norwegian citizens over 15 years of age. 1,000 responded.
21. Stephen Nathanson, “Prerequisites for Morally Credible Condemnation of Terrorism,” in
Crotty, ed., The Politics of Terror.
22. Nordenhaug and Engene, Norge i kamp mot terrorisme, p. 14.
23. Jan O. Engene, “Kampen mot terrorisme,” Internasjonal politikk 60 (1) (2002), pp. 3–26;
Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, eds., How States Fight Terrorism. Policy Dynamics in the
West (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).
24. Tore Nyhamar, “Norway’s Counterterrorism Policy,” in Doron Zimmermann and Andreas
Wenger, eds., How States Fight Terrorism. Policy Dynamics in the West (Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 79–89.
25. Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, “Introduction: Social Capital in Scandinavia,” Scandina-
vian Political Studies 26 (1) (2003), pp. 1–26.
26. Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends
in New and Established Democracies,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18 (1)
(2005), pp. 31–48; Myunghee Kim, “Citizens’ Confidence in Government, Parliament and Political
Parties,” Politics and Policy 23(3) (2007), pp. 496–521.
27. Jan O. Engene, Storskalaangrep, myndighetsmål og høyreekstremismens plass i Europeisk
terrorisme. Working Paper 3/12 to the 22 July Commission. Available at http://22julikommisjonen.
no/Bakgrunnsnotater/Materiale-frakommisjonens-moeter (accessed 19 September 2012).
28. Nordenhaug and Engene, Norge i kamp mot terrorisme.
29. Rykkja et al., “Attitudes towards Anti-Terror Measures.”
30. Ibid.
31. Teknologirådet, Nordmenn positive til å bli overvåket. 7 June 2007. Available at
http://www.teknologiradet.no/FullStory.aspx?m=28&amid=3673 (accessed 12 August 2009).
32. Tom Christensen, Anne L. Fimreite, and Per Lægreid “Crisis Management—The Per-
ceptions of Citizens and Civil Servants in Norway,” Administration & Society 43 (5) (2011),
pp. 561–594.
33. The phone tap question was rather vague. This might have made it difficult for the respon-
dents to know what to answer, and could also explain the response.
35. Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste, Ja til strengere tiltak mot terror, NSD-Nytt
4/08. Available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/nsdnytt/084/1 terror tiltak.html (accessed 12 February
2012).
36. Lise H. Rykkja, Anne L. Fimreite, Peter Lango, and Per Lægreid, Anti-terrortiltak mellom
personvern og samfunnsvern. Working Paper no. 9/2011 (Bergen: Stein Rokkan Centre for Social
Studies, 2011).
37. There are several plausible explanations for the variation according to gender, age, education,
and residence. Women and older citizens may be more anxious and therefore prone to prefer stronger
counterterror measures. People living in larger cities like Oslo may have a different threat perception
than citizens living in other parts of the country. There could also be an interaction between residence
and levels of education. It is difficult to conclude without performing more sophisticated statistical
analysis.
39. The decline in support for phone-tapping seems to be related to an intense public debate
and opposition to the inclusion of the so-called Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC),
regulating the storage of Internet and telecommunications traffic. There is also variation in the data
showing that scepticism remains the highest among the youngest respondents (i.e., those who use
electronic communications media the most). See Rykkja et al., Anti-terrortiltak mellom personvern
og samfunnsvern.
40. Rykkja et al., Anti-terrortiltak mellom personvern og samfunnsvern.
41. Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste, Holdning til antiterrortiltak. NSD-Nytt 3/11.
Available at http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/nsdnytt/11-3/holdning-til-antiterrortiltak.html (accessed 10
March 2012).
42. Lewis, “The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror,” p. 23.
43. Ibid.
44. Davis and Silver, “Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America,”
p. 33; Lynn M. Kuzma, “Security versus Liberty,” in Crotty, ed., The Politics of Terror.
45. Lewis, “The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror.”
46. The wording in the Norwegian surveys was: Imagine that the government suspects that a
terror attack is imminent. Do you think that the government should have the right to: a) Hold people
in custody as long as they wish without putting them on trial, b) Tap people’s telephone calls, c)
Randomly stop and search people on the street? The respondents were asked to rank their responses
from 1 (should definitely have the right to) to 4 (should definitely not have the right to), and a category
5 (do not know). The wording in the American survey was: We would like your opinion of some
things that have been done—or might be done—to improve security and protect against terrorism in
the United States. For each one tell me if you strongly favor it, are willing to accept it if necessary
or think it goes too far. What about: a) Making it easier for intelligence and law enforcement agents
to monitor people‘s telephone conversations and e-mails, b) Giving government the power to detain
American citizens suspected of crimes indefinitely, without review by a judge, c) Random ID checks
on the streets and highways. The respondents regarded as supportive were in Norway those who
answered “should definitely have the right to/should probably have the right to” and in the US those
who answered “strongly in favour” or “willing to accept.”
47. Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, “Threat, Anxiety, and
Support of Anti- Terrorism Policies,” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3) (2005), pp.
593–608; Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman, “Americans Respond Politically to 9/11. Understand-
ing the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath,” American Psychologist 66 (6) (2011),
pp. 455–467.
48. Huddy et al., “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Anti-Terrorism Policies”; Lewis, “The Clash
between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror,” p. 204.
49. Dag Wollebæk, Bernard Enjolras, Kari Steen-Johnsen, and Guro Ødegaard, “After Utøya:
How a High-Trust Society Reacts to Terror—Trust and Civic Engagement in the Aftermath of July
22,” Political Science & Politics 45(1) (2012), p. 36.
50. Huddy et al., “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Anti-Terrorism Policies,” p. 597.
51. Wollebæk et al., “After Utøya,” p. 36.
52. William L. Waugh and Richard J. Hy, eds., Handbook of Emergency Management. Programs
and Policies Dealing with Major Hazards and Disasters (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).
53. Wollebæk et al., “After Utøya.”
54. Dag Wollebæk and Signe Bock Segaard, eds., Sosial kapital i Norge (Oslo: Cappelen Damm
Akademisk, 2011).
55. Wollebæk et al., “After Utøya,” pp. 34–35.
56. Dag Wollebæk, Bernard Enjolras, Kari Steen-Johnsen, and Guro Ødegaard, Ett år etter
22. juli. Har rosetoget gått? Report 2012-5 (Oslo/Bergen: Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og
frivilling sector, 2012). The survey was conducted by TNS Gallup for the Centre for Research on
Civil Society & Voluntary Sector in August 2012. It includes a survey sent to a representative sample
Internet users (N = 1,000) and data from a panel of social media users (N = 1,655).
57. Wollebæk and Segaard, Sosial kapital i Norge.
59. Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, Why People Don’t Trust Government
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Pippa Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of
Critical Citizens?,” in Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1–30.
60. NOU 14, Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen (Oslo: Departementenes Servicesenter, 2012).
61. Ibid., p. 15.
62. Ibid., p. 134.
64. Anne L. Fimreite, Peter Lango, Per Lægreid, and Lise H. Rykkja, eds., Organisering,
samfunnssikkerhet og krisehåndtering (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2011).
65. Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management.
Public Leadership under Pressure (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid, and Lise H. Rykkja, “After a Terrorist Attack: Challenges for Political
and Administrative Leadership in Norway,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 21
(2013), pp. 167–177.
67. Ibid.
68. Jens Stoltenberg, Tale ved Statsminister Jens Stoltenberg i Oslo Domkirke. 24.7.2011. Avail-
able at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler og artikler/statsministeren/statsminister
jens stoltenberg/2011/tale-ved-statsminister-jens-stoltenberg-.html?id=651789 (accessed 12 August
2011).
69. Terry H. Andersson, Bush’s Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
71. Jon Wessel-Aas, “Krigen mot terror og den norske rettstaten,” Internasjonal Politikk 70 (1)
(2012), pp. 114–121.
73. Lov 1902-05-22 nr. 10: Alminnelig borgerlig Straffelov (Straffeloven). Available at http://
www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19020522-010.html (accessed 3 March 2012).
74. Letter from PSS to Ministry of Justice 1/11 2011, our translation.
75. NOU 14, Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen, p. 392.
76. Prop. 131 L (2012–2013) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Endringer i
straffeloven 1902 og straffeloven 2005 mv. (forberedelse av terror m.m.).
78. Ibid.
79. Owens and Pelizzo, The “War on Terror” and the Growth og Executive Power?
80. Perlinger, “How Democracies Respond to Terrorism.”
81. Ibid.
82. NOU 14, Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen (Oslo: Departementenes Servicesenter, 2012),
pp. 458–460.
83. Bridget M. Hutter and Michael Power, eds., Organizational Encounters with Risk (Cam-
bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
84. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management.
85. Stamos Papastamou, Gerasimos Prodromitis, and Tilemachos Iatridis, “Perceived Threats
to Democracy: An Examination of Political Affiliation and Beliefs about Terrorism, State Control
and Human Rights,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 5 (1) (2005), pp. 249–262.
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After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in The Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?

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Article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism · October 2013

Anne Lise Fimreite Peter Lango

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Per Lægreid Lise H. Rykkja

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the

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After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance

ANNE LISE FIMREITE

Received 19 January 2013; accepted 19 May 2013.

Terrorism in Norway—Pre 22 July

Consequently, the present Norwegian counterterror laws can be characterized as rel-

Attitudes Toward Counterterror Measures—2006

Randomly stop Custody

N = 1,318 N = 1,312 N = 1,318

Attitudes Toward Counterterror Measures—2011

Randomly stop Custody

Comparing the Responses to Counterterror Measures After the Terrorist

United States (2002) Norway (2011)

Trust, State-Friendliness, and Symbols

Western democracies. Can the combination of these two fundamental features—trust

protect citizens and society, not to abuse them.

Symbolic communication is very much to the point in a government’s response to disaster,

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