Harrassowitz Verlag

THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF LIU BIAO: GOVERNOR, WARLORD, AND IMPERIAL PRETENDER IN
LATE HAN CHINA

Author(s): ANDREW CHITTICK
Source: Journal of Asian History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2003), pp. 155-186
Published by: Harrassowitz Verlag
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ANDREW CHITTICK
(EckerdCollege, St. Petersburg,
Florida)
THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF LIU BIAO:

GOVERNOR, WARLORD, AND IMPERIAL PRETENDER
IN LATE HAN CHINA
In theeffortto understandthedevelopmentof thedynasticideal in im-

perial China, attentionhas rightlybeen paid to the late Han and Three
Kingdoms period,when the collapse of the Han dynastyfirstthrewthe
problemof dynasticlegitimacyintosharprelief.The richbody of materi-
als on theCao-Wei transition and therivalclaims of Liu Bei and the Sun
clan have naturallyreceived the most attention.1 All of these would-be
dynastsachieved lastingfame by carvingout and defendingsubstantial
empires,and by passing on theirsemi-imperialmantlesto youngergen-
erations.By comparison,the dynasticclaims of Liu Biao (142-208) have
received littleattention.His regional state was at the wrong time (too
early),the wrongplace (the Xiangyangarea, which would never see an-
other"imperial"capital), and was too short-lived(only one generation,
less thantwo decades) to gain much notoriety.His imperialpretensions,
whenremarkedupon at all in traditionalhistories,are passed offas delu-
sions of grandeur,theoverweeningpretensionsof a would-beKing Wen.
Abbreviations
forthestandarddynastic usingeditions
histories, from Zhonghua shuju,
Beijing,
published areas follows:
1959-1974,
HHS:HouHanshu,byFanYe,with treatises
bySimaBiao.
SGZ:Sanguo zhi,byChenShou,with annotationsbyPeiSongzhi.
JS:Jinshu,byFangXuanlingetal.
1 For seeCarlLeban, heaven's
mandate:Codedcommunication in
examples, "Managing
ofTs'aoP'ei,A.D. 220,"inDavidT. RoyandTsuen-hsuin
theaccession Tsien(eds),
AncientChina:StudiesinEarlyCivilization(HongKong:Chinese UniversityPress,
1978);Howard L. Goodman,Ts'aoP' i Transcendent:
ThePolitical
CultureofDynasty-
FoundinginChinaattheEndoftheHan(Seattle: Serica,1998);RafedeCre-
Scripta
spigny,GeneralsoftheSouth:TheFoundation andEarlyHistory oftheThree King-
domsStateofWu(Canberra:ANUPress, 1990).
JAH37/2
(2003)

156 ANDREWCHITTICK
Carefulstudyof Liu Biao's rule in Jingprovinceturnsout to be re-

warding,however,in at least threeinterconnected ways. First,an analysis
of the patternof his staffingand his strategysuggests a strongcausal
linkagebetweenthetwo,therebyilluminating a good deal about thechar-
acter of his decision-makingthat traditionalhistoriography ignores. In
particular,Biao can be seen as a decisive leader who rejectedthe argu-
mentsof the more prestigiousmembersof his staffin orderto pursuean
unconventional"southernstrategy"thatplayed to thewishes of his local
supporters.His successes and difficulties have notableparallelswiththe
earlyhistory of both Wu and Shu-Han, and highlightsome of the impor-
tantstructural limitationsthatthe late Han politicalenvironment imposed
on effortsto develop a regionalpowerbase.
Second, armedwiththisenrichedunderstanding of the challengesbe-
foreBiao, his imperialpretensionscan be seen in a new light.They are
more substantiveand interesting than traditionalhistoriography usually
admits, and are also noteworthy a strategybothto appeal to theuniver-
as
salistambitionsof his followers,and to win theirforgivenessforthecon-
straintsof his limitedand provincialpowerbase. On thisissue, thepropa-
ganda itemswhich Wang Can wroteforBiao are excellentevidence for
thetermsupon whichBiao claimed theimperialmandate;theyhave been
largelydismissedby earlierscholarship,but by reassessingWang Can's
careertheycan be seen afresh.Biao's claim to have receivedtheMandate
of Heaven would go on to have a directformativeimpacton themoreen-
duringclaims of Cao Pi and Liu Bei, bothas an immediateprecedentand
as a directcontributor of texts,techniques,and personnel.
Finally,we can begin to understandwhy the officialhistoriography on
Biao served him so poorly,and to see thatalternativeinterpretations of
his rule existed fromearly on. Biao's legacy turnsout to be a veryfine
example of thecontrastbetweenimperial-levelhistory,whereBiao had a
very negative reputation,and local sources, where his reputationwas
quite laudatory,and even gained in mystiqueover time. Understanding
this process can help to strengthenour appreciationof the sharp geo-
graphicdifferences of interpretation and ideologythatare oftenlost in the
homogenizing efforts of laterimperialhistory.
JAH
37/2
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THELIFEANDLEGACYOF LIUBIAO 157
I. Staffing
One of themostimportant thingswe can determineabout a ruleris the

and
identity background of his supporters.In Chinese history,thiscan be
at least partiallydeterminedby figuringout to whom he gave officialpo-
sitions,withall theprivilegesand perksthattheyentailed.Knowingwho
refusedto servecan be as important as knowingwho accepted,too, forit
helps to definethe limitsof a ruler's influence.Even thoughfull bio-
graphicalinformation for lesser historicalfiguresis oftenlacking,even
knowing each supporter'splace of origin allows the constructionof a
tentativegeographicalportrait of a ruler'sactual or hoped-forinfluence.
In Liu Biao's case, we can identify close to two dozen menwho served
Biao in an officialcapacityduringhis tenure.Several trendsare apparent.
Biao preferentially hiredmen fromJingprovince,and virtuallyexcluded
men who had emigratedfromfurther north.Of theJingprovincenatives,
he was heavily relianton a few men fromhis capital region around
Xiangyangthroughout his reign.He also at firstemployedmanyprestig-
ious gentrymembers from Nanyang commandery,the richest,best-
connected,and most contestedpartof the province,which was immedi-
atelyto thenorthof Xiangyang.However,mostof thesemen left,or were
purged,about halfwaythroughhis reign. We know of only a few men
fromthe southernpartof the provincein his employ; his ultimatedeci-
sion to secure the southernpart of the province and forfeitthe north,
however,suggeststhathe soughtand won a good deal of supportfrom
such men.Theirabsence fromrecordedhistoryshouldbe ascribedto their
lack of priorimperialserviceand old-linepedigrees.
Liu Biao, a distantrelativeof the Han imperialhouse, was himselfa
native of Shanyang commanderyin contemporaryShandong province.
He gained notorietyas a prominentfigurein the factionincidentsof the
160s to 180s, and as an associate of He Jinthereafter. FollowingHe Jin's
assassinationand thesubsequentexecutionof theeunuchs,theHan impe-
rial courtwas in a severe crisis fromwhich it would essentiallynot re-
cover. In 190, Biao accepted the officeof Inspector(cishi) of Jingprov-
ince fromthecourt,at thattimedominatedby therenegadegeneralDong
Zhuo. At the time, Jing province consisted of seven commanderies,
stretching fromthe prosperousand very well-connected"southerncapi-
tal" of Nanyang at the northend of the province,throughthe middle
reachesof theHan and Yangzi rivers,down intoChangsha and the south-
ernrivervalleysand mountainsof whatis now Hunan.
JAH37/2
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158 ANDREWCHITTICK
Biao was a compromiseappointment:it was hoped thathis good pedi-

gree and lack of militaryreputationwould make him acceptable to Yuan
Shu, whose forcescontrolledNanyangand areas northand east of it,and
implicitlydominatedtherestof Jingprovincethroughtheinfluenceof his
new ally,Sun Jian,who had just foughthis way up fromChangsha,kill-
ingthepreviousprovincialInspectorin theprocess.In theshortrun,Yuan
Shu wentalong withBiao's appointment, and acceptedappointment from
Biao in turnas Governorof Nanyang. It did not take long,however,for
Yuan Shu to decide to eliminatehis rival,and he sentSun Jianto lead his
armyagainst Xiangyang,Biao's capitaljust across the Han River from
Nanyangcommandery.Only thetimelydeathof Sun Jianin battlesaved
Biao's capital and his position,and lefthim in weak controlof the re-
mainingsix commanderiesof theprovince.
Biao was an outsiderto the province,and, since he had no private
militarypower of his own to startwith,it would have been immediately
essential for him to win the favor and militarybacking of local great
families.In theonlysurvivingaccountof Biao's takeoverof theprovince,
theauthor,Sima Biao, is verymuchaware of thisprocess:
WhenBiao first
tookoverJing province, oftheareasouthofthe
theclan-bandits
YangziRiverwerenumerous, andYuanShuwasencamped atLuyang witha firmhold
overtheforcesatNanyang.Su Dai,a manofWu,hadcontrol oftheGovernorshipof
Changsha[commandery],andBeiYuwasprefect ofHuarong bothwererely-
[county];
ingontroopstomaketrouble. WhenBiaofirstcameherodea lonehorseintoYicheng
andengagedKuaiLiangand[Kuai]YueofZhonglue andCaiMeiofXiangyang toplan
withhim.Biaosaid,"Theclan-bandits andthepeoplewillnotyield
arequitenumerous,
[tomyrule];because YuanShuisabouttobring
ofthis, ustoruin.I wanttolevytroops
fear willnotassemble.Howwould have
us "
yet they yourplans proceed?
Aftersuggestingtwo contrastingadvisory speeches the local gentry

mighthave made, Sima Biao continues,"Thus he had [Kuai] Yue send a
man to enticethe clan-bandits;fifty-five of themcame, and all were be-
headed. He seized theirfollowersand inheritedtheirmilitaryretainers."2
Though writtenlater,this account describes a process akin to what
musthave occurred:Biao mustsomehowhave allied himselfwithpower-
ful local clans, relied on theirmilitarysupport,and thenwiped out their
rivals forpower in the province.The scions of the Kuai and Cai clans
mentionedin this anecdote were not randomchoices forallies; theyare
2 Sima 6:
, as quotedbyPei Songzhiin hisannotations
Biao,Zhanlue to SGZ/Wei
211-212.
JAH37/2
(2003)

noteworthy forbeing the only two nativesof the Xiangyangarea known

to have recentlyserved the Han imperial court. Biao may well have
knownKuai Yue personally,forbothmen had servedas close advisorsto
He Jin.By allyingwiththese men and theirlocal power networks,Biao
securedhis positionas provincialInspector,buthe also securedthepoliti-
cal hegemonyof thesepowerfullocal clans in his administration. Cai Mei
would become Biao's closest advisor,servingas Governorof threecen-
tral commanderiesand general commanderof militaryforces,and ulti-
mately providinghis sister and niece as wives for Biao and Biao's
youngerson Liu Zong.3 Kuai Yue remainedBiao's top militarystrategist
and Governorof Zhanglingcommandery, whichwas newlycreatedout of
themountainoussouth-eastern partofNanyang.4
Biao's reliance on powerfullocals did not stop withthese two clans,
however.He also courtedup-and-comingmen fromotherimportant local
families, men such as Pang Tong and Xiang Lang. Their clans are not
knownto have ever sentmembersto theHan court,so Biao is unlikelyto
have had priorcontactwith them; more probably,once he had aligned
himselfwiththeKuai and Cai clans,theywere able to recommendforser-
vice otherlocal men who were allied withtheirinterests.Indeed,the dif-
ferencebetweenthe Pang and Xiang clans and the "clan-bandits"killed
underBiao's auspices almost certainlyhad a good deal more to do with
who was on which side in local factionalpolitics thanabout any actual
banditry. This second tierof Xiangyangmen receivedlesserpoststhanthe
firsttier,buttogethercan be thoughtof as theinnercore of Biao's admini-
stration.5
3 Xi
Zuochi,Xiangyang qijiuji, in HuangHuixian(ed),JiaobuXiangyang qijiuji
(Henan:Zhongzhou gujichubanshe): 12-15,
partially
quotingCaoPi,Dianlun.Seealso
Andrew Chittick,PrideofPlace:TheAdvent ofLocalHistoryinEarlyMedieval China
(U.MichiganPh.D.,1997):176-77fora translation.
FuXuan, Fuzi, as quoted byPeiSongzhi inSGZ/Wei 6: 215.Anothermanwhomight be
inthisgroup
considered isHuang Zu, whose isunknown.
origin Giventhat
hewasoneof
Biao'stopgenerals almost immediately,hemayhavehailedfrom a Jing
province clan
which hada prior historyofimperial service.
Thetwomostlikely arethe
possibilities
Huangs ofJiangxia andthose ofNancommandery; both groupshadmeninprominent po-
sitions
atcourtatleastsincethereign ofEmperor Shun(r.126-144),andthemost recent
scionoftheJiangxia Huangs, Huang Yuan,hadbeena keyfigureintheProscribed
Faction
affair
andserved inDongZhuo'sadministration. SeeHHS61: 2032-2041 and61: 2027.
OnPangTong, seeSGZ37/Shu 7: 953-56;OnXiangLang,seeSGZ41/Shu 11:1010.
SeealsoChittick, PrideofPlace:174-75, 185-86.
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160 ANDREWCHITTICK
The second major group in Biao's top staffwere men fromthe all-
importantNanyang commandery,all of whom came fromfamiliesthat
had relativelyclose tiesto theimperialcourt,and aboutwhomBiao there-
foremay have had some priorknowledge.At this time,however,Nan-
yang had become a battlegroundarea, and Biao was only one of several
men courtingsupportersand influencethere,so theirallegiance to Biao
was potentiallymore suspect. These Nanyang men formedthe bulk of
Biao's initialadministration on thecivilianside. Deng Xi, probablyof the
eminentXinye Dengs thatdescended fromHan Guangwu's top general
Deng Yu, served Biao as MetropolitanAdministrator.6 Han Song served
firstas LieutenantGovernor and lateras Court Gentleman-Retainer and
emissaryto the imperialcourt.7Han Ji and Han Xi, both fromNanyang
commanderyand possiblyrelatedto Han Song, also took lesser appoint-
ments from Biao. Liu Wangzhi served at Biao's court until he was
purged,and his youngerbrotherYi was also at Xiangyangand may have
had some officialpositionas well.8Finally,Song Zhong,a renownedOld
Text scholar,was appointedRetainerforthe Five Disciplines and gener-
ously patronized;he attracteda wide circle of scholarsfromall over the
empire,who began an ambitiousprojectto produce new versionsof the
fiveclassics and othertexts.9Only one man fromNanyang,Zhang Xian,
6 Pei notes(SGZ/Wei 6: 216)thathewasfrom for-

Songzhi Zhangling commandery,
the
merly less-populous southern reachesofNanyang commandery, which included
Xinye county.Forhisofficialpositions,seeSGZ/Wei 6: 211.
Xiartxianxingzhuang, as quoted byPei Songzhi inSGZ/Wei 6: 215;alsoChenShou,
SGZ/Wei 6: 212,andFuXuan, asquoted
Ftizi, byPeiSongzhi inSGZ/Wei 6: 213.
ForHanJi,seeChenShou,SGZ/Wei 24:677;forHanXi,seeSimaGuang, Zizhitong-
jian (Beijing:Zhonghua shuju,1956)63: 2021;fortheLiubrothers, seeSGZ/Wei 21:
613.
WangCan,Jingzhou wervcue ji guanzhi Account
[Official oftheRecordofLiterary
StudiesinJingProvince], as quoted inOuyang Xun(ed),Yìwen leiju(Shanghai: Guji
chubanshe, 1965)38:693;alsomentioned inhisYingxiongji, as quoted byPeiSongzhi
inSGZ/Wei 6: 212.Fora fuller accountoftheinfluence ofSongZhongandtheJing
ProvinceschoolofOldTextscholarship, seeT'angYung-t'ung, "Wang Pi'sNewInter-
of
pretation the I ChingandLun-yu," translated
by WalterLieberthal, inHarvard Jour-
nalofAsiatic Studies10.1(1947):126-135; Yoshikawa Tadao,"Scholarship inChing-
chouat theEndoftheLaterHanDynasty," ActaAsiatica60 (1991):1-24;Rudolf
The
Wagner, Craft ofa Chinese Commentator: Wang Bi ontheLaozi(SUNYPress,
2000):45-48.
JAH 37/2
(2003)

THELIFEANDLEGACYOF LIUBIAO 16 1
is knownto have receiveda militarilystrategicpost,as governorover the

threesoutherncommanderiesof Changsha,Guiyang,and Lingling.10
By comparisonwith these two groups, men fromfurthersouth are
hardlymentionedin survivingtexts.This is notsurprising, giventhatthey
would have been much less well knownthanthe high-ranking gentryof
Nanyang,and unlikelyto have developed muchimperial-levelreputation.
One top advisor,Liu Xian, who servedas LieutenantGovernorand emis-
saryto the imperialcourt,was fromLingling"; one minoraide, Pan Jun,
was fromWuling.Following the failureof Zhang Xian's southernrebel-
lion in 200, Biao also offereda post,and even a maritalalliance,to Huan
Jie,who hailed fromChangsha and had been one of Zhang Xian's top
supporters.In fact,Biao's strategicdecisionsafter200 suggestthathe be-
came more relianton southerners thanbefore,an issue thatwill be dealt
withbelow.
Strikingly,not one émigréfromoutside of the provincewas given a
substantivedecision-makingposition,not even as a CountyPrefector a
Retainer.This was not forlack of such men, who were attractedby the
peacefulnessof Biao's territory and the largesse of his scholarlypatron-
age; one source says therewere several hundred,and I have identified
twenty of the most eminent by name.12Yet besides threemercenarygen-
erals (Zhang Xiu, Gan Ning, and Liu Bei) who commandedpersonalar-
mies on thenorthern theonlyémigrésknownto have workeddi-
frontier,
rectly for Biao were two men in ceremonialpositions:Du Kui, a music
masterfromthe Han court,and Wang Can, who was fromBiao's home
provinceand the grandsonof his formermentor.Otherwise,Biao kept
positionswith real decision-makingauthorityfor the local gentry,who
presumablyhad the political connectionsand armed retainersthatBiao
neededto relyon to stayin power.13
10 For
ZhangXian,seeSGZ/Wei 6: 211,andWangCan,Yingxiong ji, as quotedbyPei
SongzhiinSGZ/Wei 6: 212.
xianxian
Lingling zhuan, asquotedbyPSZ inSGZ/Wei 6:216.Ascribed toSimaBiao.
They are:CaiZīdu,Cui Zhouping,Du Kui,Du Xi, Fan Qin,Gan Ning, He Xia,Li Ren,
Liu Bei, Pei Qian,ShisunWenshi, SimaHui (Decao),SimaZhi,WangCan,Xu
Yuanzhen (Shu),YinXian,ZhangXiu,ZhaoJin, ZhaoYan,andZhugeLiang.
Thisinterpretation
ofBiao'sstaffingstrategy putforward
is also byUedaSanae,"Go-
Kanmakki noJoyo nogozoku," Toyoshikenkyu 28.4(1970):31-36.Itflatlycontradicts
RichardMiao'sposition,whichisthatLiuBiao'sadvisers"belongedtothat typeofpro-
career
fessional whoseskillswereoffered
official tothehighest
bidder;" EarlyMedie-
val Chinese The
Poetry: Life and Verseof Wang Ts'an(A.D.177-217)(Wiesbaden,
JAH37/2
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162 ANDREWCHITTICK
This patterncontrastswith Rafe de Crespigny's descriptionof the

foundingof theWu kingdom,in whichthefirstgenerationof officialswas
dominatedby a collectionof northern émigréschosen fortheirabilityand
loyaltyto the Sun clan, themselvesa local clan withsubstantialresources.
Liu Biao, being alone and an outsiderto theprovincehe ruled,was forced
to relyon local familiesfromthestart.His foundinggenerationof support-
ers thereforemoreresembleswhatde Crespignycalls the"second genera-
tion" of Wu officials,men drawn fromprosperousfamiliessouthof the
Yangzi.14Justas thisgroupof magnatesrestrainedand redirectedthe ini-
tiallyexpansionistenergiesof Wu, thestaffing decisionsmade by Liu Biao
also had decisivelyrestrictive
implicationsfor his strategicpolicy-making.
II Strategy
As we have seen, Biao's immediatestrategywas to win the allegiance

of the leading gentryof Xiangyangand quell any major armed opposi-
tion; he was successfulenough to have kept his alliance togetherin the
face of Sun Jian'sassault in 191. Thereafter,
Biao's strategywas designed
to appeal to various geographically-basedinterestgroups:firstthegentry
of Nanyang,thento thegentryof Xiangyangand the southernpartof the
province.
Nanyangcommandery, the mostpopulous and prosperouspartof Jing
province, was still in the hands of Yuan Shu, and Biao's actions from
191-196 were primarilyaimed at winningit back by pleasing whoever
held power over the imperialcourt.During thistime,Biao's use of men
from Nanyang in top advisory positions was certainlydesigned to
strengthen his positionthere,while theirchoice to serve him insteadof
Yuan Shu suggeststhattheyhoped he would be able to move in and set
up a more peaceful administration. Biao developed an informalalliance
with Yuan Shao, whose base of power was northof the Yellow river,
well-placedto put pressureon Yuan Shu withoutthreatening Biao. Biao
also assiduouslycurriedfavorwith the imperialcourtby continuingto
send tribute(in winter 192-193), helping to keep militarypressureon
Yuan Shu (in spring193), and aiding in thereconstruction of Luoyang in
1982):72.There
isnoevidencethat
Biao'smenwereanymore than
unscrupulous other
advisors
political oftime,
including Miao's favorite,
(especially) WangCan,whom we
willaddress
presently.
De Crespigny,
Generals
oftheSouth
: 505-512.
JAH
37/2
(2003)

preparationforthe Emperor'sreturn(in 196).15As a reward,he was en-

feoffedas a marquis and granted the title of Provincial Governor
(.zhoumu), which gave him titularmilitaryauthorityover every com-
manderyof Jingprovince,includingNanyang. Once Yuan Shu had been
drivenfromNanyang (in 193), Biao had a strongclaim to be allowed to
re-administer theentireterritory. Unfortunately forBiao, Nanyanginstead
came underthefirmgripof Cao Cao, who was in no hurryto hand itover
to Biao so long as Biao was stillallied withYuan Shao, who had emerged
as Cao's chiefrival.
The year 196 therefore marksa criticalturningpointin Biao's strategy.
Given his continuedsupportof theHan imperialhouse,and his lack of di-
rectconflictwithCao Cao, Biao would have been expected to throwin
his lot withCao Cao and thenew puppetimperialcourt.By doing so he
could have anticipatedbeing grantedfull authorityover Nanyang,or if
notthat,at least to be transferredto some otherdesirablepost as a reward.
This is, in fact,what most of his advisersare recordedas havingrecom-
mended.Instead,Biao made whatcan onlybe seen as a strikingly daring
choice: he reaffirmed his alliance withYuan Shao, and wentintoopposi-
tionto Cao Cao and thepuppetcourt.This decision had an enormousim-
pact on thecourseof Biao's administration, as we shall see.
Biao began by takingadvantageof the timelyarrivalof a rogue impe-
rial army in westernNanyang in late 196; afterhis men firstengaged
themin battleand killed theircommander,Biao hiredthemon as merce-
nariesand appointedthe commander'snephew,Zhang Xiu, as theirnew
commander.Cao Cao understandably viewed thisaction as hostileto his
own forcesin theregionimmediatelysouthof theYellow river,and in the
springof 197 he advanced on Wan City,the capital of Nanyang, and
forcedZhang Xiu to surrender.Sources claim that Cao Cao remained
suspicious of Xiu and plannedto eliminatehim; in any event,Xiu soon
rebelled,foughtCao's forcesback as faras Wuyin,and re-securedhis al-
liance with Liu Biao. Several counties in Nanyang rebelled in favorof
Zhang Xiu, and Cao's forces,despite repeatedattempts,failed to retake
any of thecommanderythroughout the summerand fall of 197. Cao Cao
finallyled a moderately successful raid in the winter,pushingas faras
Wan City and capturingBiao's general,Deng Ji. By springof 198 Cao
Cao was besiegingZhang Xiu at Rang but,harassedby Liu Biao's forces
15 Sima 60:1940and1942,62: 1979,as translated

Zizhitongjian indeCrespigny,
Guang,
ANUPress,
LastoftheHan(Canberra: 1969):99,101,144.
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164 ANDREWCHITTICK
at his rear and concernedabout threatening moves fromYuan Shao, he

retreatedin mid-summer and hastenedback to Xu. At thispointLiu Biao,
throughhis surrogateZhang Xiu, had expelled Cao Cao frommost of
Nanyangcommandery, achievinghis mostlong-standing objective.16
It proved to be a short-livedvictory,however.Biao's decision to con-
frontCao Cao, ratherthanaccede to his versionof imperialrule,had al-
ready alienated many of the Nanyang natives on his staff.As early as
196, Deng Xi opposed Biao when he failedto breakoffthe alliance with
Yuan Shao; Deng was subsequentlyforcedto retire.Han Song was sentto
observeCao Cao 's court,and returnedadvocatingthatBiao yield to Cao
Cao; forthishe was suspectedof treasonand imprisoned.Several other
Nanyang natives are recordedas having been purgedand killed during
thistime,includingLiu Wangzhi,whose brotherwas thenforcedto flee
theprovince.Fu Xuan, writinga few decades later,arguedthatthispurge
in particularwas the turningpoint in Biao's career: "AfterBiao killed
[Liu] Wangzhi,the literatiand people of Jingprovinceall feltthemselves
in peril. For Biao in his heartdid not regardWangzhi lightly;yet when
theywere directlyopposed, and slanderouswords surfaced,he would not
allow an honestappraisal of them.That he possessed all the land of Chu
yetwas unable to achieve anythingwas probablydue to this.. ."17
Zhang Xian, theNanyangnativewho held commandof
Most critically,
Jingprovince'sthreesoutherncommanderies,began a rebellionin sym-
pathywithCao Cao in 198, about the timeBiao and Zhang Xiu consoli-
dated controlover Nanyang. Withinthe year,Zhang Xiu switchedsides
again and surrendered to Cao Cao, takinghis armyand his Nanyangallies
withhimjust in time to aid Cao Cao in his face-offwithYuan Shao at
Guandu. Biao, undeterred by thesestrikingreversalsand unmovedby the
of
urgings many of his advisors,still refusedto give in to Cao Cao; he
remainedneutralas thetwo warlordsfoughtitout forcontrolof thenorth,
and instead devoted his forces to crushingthe rebellion in the south,
whichwas achieved onlyafterthedeathof Zhang Xian in 200.
Given the cost in personneland support,one mustwonderwhy Biao
made thecriticalchoices he did. Traditionalhistoricalcommentators have
accused Biao of indecisivenessand militaryweakness, but this is not a
persuasiveexplanation;Biao's stancewas fiercelyindependent, not inde-
cisive, and he was not afraidto exertmilitaryforcein his suppressionof
16 Thisnarrative follows that

ofSimaGuang,
Zizhitongjian
62: 1992-200
1.
largely
FuXuan,Fuzi,asquoted Pei
by Songzhi inSGZ/Wei
21:615.
JAH
37/2
(2003)

Zhang Xian's rebellion,nor in his defenseof theJiangxiaarea againstin-

cursionsby Sun Ce aroundthesame time.The evidence of thosemilitary
effortssuggests instead that Biao was pursuinga "southernstrategy,"
purposefullystayingout of thecivil war in thenorthand using his forces
to consolidatehis hold overthecentralYangzi area. When itbecame clear
thatthe further defenseof Nanyang commanderywould necessitatein-
volvementin thenorthern quagmire,Biao decided to let itgo.
This theoryis backed up by anecdoteswhich suggestthatBiao subse-
quentlyheld a stronggrip on his territory, and therebyruled one of the
mostformidablestatesof theperiod.Chen Shou, whose biographyof Liu
Biao is quite hostile,admittedthisopenly,writing:"[Afterdefeatingthe
southernrebellion,Biao] held Ling and Gui, northto the Han River,an
area several thousand li square, containing over 100,000 tithings."18
Biao's formidability in 203, one
helped to deterinvasionsof his territory;
of Cao Cao 's advisorscautionedhimnotto attackBiao, writing:"Heaven
has given [Yuan] Shang rightto you, lord,yet you would refuseit and
attack Jingprovince! Jingprovince is flourishingand contentand the
statehas no internalquarrels."19
The internalsolidarityof Biao's domain implies that a substantial
numberof the gentryfromXiangyangand further southmusthave sup-
ported Biao's southern strategy,even though Chen Shou does notdirectly
referto theirexistenceor explaintheirperspective.It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that Biao's two pro-Cao Cao advisers who were from the south
chose to remainwithhim to the end of his reign,unlike theirNanyang
colleagues.20Anothersoutherner, Huan Jie, served as a key advisor to
Zhang Xian in his rebellion,but instead of defectingto Cao Cao after
Xian's defeat,he accepteda post withLiu Biao, and was even considered
fora maritalalliance.21Cai Mei, one of Biao's most importantallies in
theXiangyangarea, is notrecordedas havingsupportedan alliance with
Cao Cao; he may have been the key opponentof any militaryinvolve-
ment in northernwarlord politics. Biao's subsequent strengthin the
provinceproves therewere manyotherswiththe same opinion;by satis-
fyingthisconstituency, Biao gained breathingroom and was able to rule
peaceably foranotherdecade untilhis deathin 208.
18 SGZ/Wei 6: 211.
" SGZ/Wei 25:696.
Namely KuaiYueandLiuXian;seeSGZ/Wei
6:212.
21 Seehis 22:631.
inSGZ/Wei
biography
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166 ANDREWCHITTICK
III. ImperialPretensions
Biao's "southernstrategy"in itselfwas not so different fromwhatthe

Sun clan was attempting in theYangzi delta,or whatLiu Bei would soon
do in Sichuan. Biao was two decades ahead of his better-known succes-
in
sors, however, setting himself up as a rival for the imperialthrone.
Biao claimed to be the recipientof Heaven's mandateto renew the em-
pire,and patronizedscholarshipon the classics, ritual,music,and prog-
nosticationin orderto build an ideological resourcebase on which he
could drawto legitimatehis assertions.Biao's efforts constitutedthemost
significantideological challenge to the throne in the early years of Em-
perorXian's reign.Moreover,his imperialpretensionshad substantialin-
fluenceon the eventualstrategiesof both Liu Bei, who followedBiao's
lead to become an imperialpretenderin his own right,and Cao Cao, who
inheritedBiao's scholarlyclique after208 and employed them for the
creationof his own campaignto succeed theHan.
Studies of the much betterdocumentedCao- Wei succession,less than
two decades later,illustratesome of the key issues thatfaced would-be
successorsto Han rule. Two of themostimportant were attracting skilled
and powerful supporters,and establishingritual legitimacy.Powerful
supportersnot only broughtlegitimacyby the mere factof theiragree-
mentto servetheadministration, butalso servedas a public forum,a kind
of electoratewhose affirmation or remonstrance were an essentialpartof
theongoingprocess by which thenatureof thepotentialsovereign'srule
and thebasis of his claim to themandatewere formulated.22 Throughthis
process,the would-be emperorevolved the stancethatwould justifyand
smoothhis eventualseizureof power.
The evidence suggeststhatLiu Biao's decision to become an imperial
pretendershared many of these characteristics. In the firstplace, it was
obviously quite controversial, and led to substantial discussionamongst
theelite of his day. It was notedat Cao Cao 's puppetimperialcourtat Xu
by 200, when a powerfulministerat the ImperialTreasury,Kong Rong,
sentin thefollowingmemorial:
I'veheard
theGovernorofJing LiuBiao,is indulging
province, invindictive
oppo-
hisrebellious
sition; activities
include toHeavenandEarth
sacrificing andimitation
of
theceremoniesoftheSoilandGrain.Though hisfoolish are ab-
pretensions greatly
22 heaven's
mandate": Ts'aoP 7 Transcendent:
Leban,
"Managing 338;Goodman, 4-6,11.
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37/2
(2003)

thecrimeis noteasytopunish;
horred, atthefoundations
itstrikes and
ofthestate,
moreover allthatisproper.23
goesagainst
Some of Biao's own staffalso rejectedhis claims, and many of them
"voted" withtheirfeetby simplyleavinghis service,or refiisingto serve
in thefirstplace. Some theémigréswho refusedto serve Biao or even to
stayin Xiangyangare explicitlynotedas havingdistrustedBiao, perhaps
at least in partdue to his ambitiousclaim to the mandate.24Most of the
Nanyang men who leftor were purgedfromBiao's service in the years
196-200 are clearly recordedas having done so in oppositionto Biao's
anti-Cao strategy,which was tightlylinked to his imperialpretensions.
For example, Han Song, who was ultimatelyimprisonedby Biao for
sympathizingwith Cao Cao, is noted as having objected to Biao's per-
formanceof imperialsacrificesto Heaven and Earth.25Anotherclear ex-
ample is Du Kui, an émigré music master fromthe Han court,who
worked under Biao to preparethe imperialcourt music, supposedly to
presentit as a giftto therightful emperor.When Biao thenasked to have
itplayedat his own court,Du Kui protested,saying,"You do nothave the
titleof Son of Heaven. To assemble the music and play it in the court-
isn'tthatimproper?"26 In thiscase, Biao desisted.
Biao's difficulty in holdingmen in his employ followinghis imperial
claim was paralleledby the experienceof Yuan Shu, who made a better-
known assertionto the mandatearoundthe same time,in 197, fromhis
weak regionalbase in theHuai and lower Yangzi riverbasins. Like Biao,
Yuan Shu had manyof his supporterscounsel him againstthemove, and
also like Biao, he lost manymen to rivals,some to Cao Cao, but moreto
Sun Ce. Yuan Shu's effortsare so roundlycondemnedby the historical
sourcesthatone mustwonderwhy he ever chose to make such a claim in
27
thefirstplace; he comes offas being merelydeluded.
Liu Biao's regimefaredmuchbetterand lasteda good deal longerthan
Yuan Shu's, suggestingthathis claim to themandatewas not so deluded,
23 InFan HHS70:2269.
Ye,
" Seefor SGZ23:665(BioofDu Xi);SGZ/Wei 23:671(BiootPeiQian).
example
Xiawcian
xingzhuang, as quoted inSGZ/Wei
byPeiSongzhi 6: 215.
SGZ/Wei 29:806(Biography ofDu Kui).
SeedeCrespigny,Generals oj theSouth'. loranaccount
192-197, ol Yuan¡Shus claim.
isincorrect,
De Crespigny however, onp. 174that
whenhestates "itwasnotfortwenty
moreyearsthatanother suchclaimwas made."Liu Biao was contemporaneously
makinga similar
claim.
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168 ANDREWCHITTICK
and in fact had a reasonable basis of support.Certainlythe men who

stayedwithBiao over the subsequentdecade of his tenurein Jingprov-
ince must have at least tacitly supportedthe imperial strategy,even
thoughtheirvoices have gone largelyunrecordedin officialhistories.
Sima Biao does offersan account of one emissarydefendingBiao's ac-
tions to Cao Cao; thoughit is perhapsan inventeddialogue, it is none-
theless suggestiveof how men fromsouthernJingprovincemay have
viewed Biao's imperialpretensions:
CaoCao asked[Liu]Xian,"WhydoesGovernor Liusacrifice

toHeaven?" Xianre-
sponded, "GovernorLiuisentrusted oftheHouseofHan,withthe
withtheconfidence
positionofa seniorGovernor.Yetnowthekingly is notatpeace,andevil
leadership
hordes blocktheroad.Onestores isnoonetooffer
upjadeandsilkbutthere ittointrib-
ute;preparesessaysandmemorialsbutthereisnoonetoreceive orimplement them.In
thissituation,
tooffersacrifices
toHeaven andEarthistoproclaim 28
one'sfidelity."
Though Biao's imperialstrategymay have helped to impressprovin-

cial men such as Liu Xian as a preservationand possible redemptionof
theHan patrimony, itwas equally important forhimto impressand attract
learned supportersfromall over the empire,so as to demonstratethe
broad,universalnatureof his claim. Such men could offerhim not only
enormousprestige,but also a base of expertpersonnelwho could advise
himon mattersof imperialritualformand help himto refinehis imperial
stance.In thisway Biao could set up a virtuouscircle,in whichthe sup-
portof well-educatedmen would allow him to enrichhis effortsat impe-
rialritualdisplay,raise his prestigeand therebyattractfurther
supporters.
Surprisingly,Biao's regime was rathersuccessfulat this,too. In the
early years of the Jian'an era (196-220) Biao's courtat Xiangyangwas
considereda haven forrefugeesfromthe north,and the single most im-
portantcenterforOld Text scholarship;it contrastedsharplywith Cao
Cao 's courtsat Xu and Ye, which initiallyhad littlescholarlyreputation.
Biao attractedscholarsfromas faraway as Sichuan and Shandong,and
his manyprotegesworkedon rituals,music,calendricalscience, and pe-
nal law. They produceda definitiveversionof the Five Classics, drafted
studiesof the Taixuanjing, and produceda major work on prognostica-
tion which remainedimportantfor over fourhundredyears.29Though
28 xianxian
Lingling zhuan, byPeiSongzhi
as quoted inSGZ/Wei6: 216.Fora gooddis-
oftheroleofsuchemissaries
cussion intheThree
Kingdoms seedeCrespigny,
period,
Generals
oftheSouth,p.469-473.
Ontheliterary seeWangCan,Jingzhou
studies, wenxue as quoted
ji guanzhi, inYiwen
JAH37/2
(2003)

muchof theworkof thisgrouphas been lost,thereare several surviving

pieces of propagandafromthepen of Wang Can, one of theliterarygiants
of the late Han period, who ultimatelythrewhis lot in with Cao Cao.
These pieces offerus a glimpseof thetermsupon which Biao's claims to
the mandatewere celebrated,and ultimatelyrejected,and are therefore
worthcarefulstudy.
of WangCan
IV. The Writings
Wang Can had fled the troublesin northChina and came to settlein
Jingprovincein 193, when he was about sixteenyears old. He no doubt
expectedto be treatedwell by Biao, fortheyhad tightfamilialconnec-
tions;theywere both fromShanyangcommandery,and Wang's grandfa-
therhad been Biao's tutor.Ultimately,Wang spentmostof his shortadult
life in Jingprovince,draftinglettersand propagandapieces forBiao, and
only returnednorthwhen the provincewas forciblytaken over by Cao
Cao in 208. Wang was thenthirty-one; he would serve Cao Cao untilhis
untimely deathjust nine years later.
Traditionalhistoriography has assertedthatWang Can faredpoorlyin
Jingprovinceand was unhappythere.In his officialbiographyof Wang
Can, Chen Shou claims that Wang was ignored by Biao, and Wang's
modernbiographer,Ronald Miao, findslittlereason to dispute this as-
sessment. Miao observes that many of Wang's poems from his Jing
provinceperiodspeak of his dissatisfaction at nothavinga powerfulpost,
his sense of failure,and his longingto returnto his home area. Miao con-
cludes thatWangprobablyhad littleallegiance to Biao, and goes so faras
to assertthatWang was virtuallya "prisoner"in Jingprovinceuntilhe
was liberatedby Cao Cao.30 There are good reasons to disputethis as-
sessment,however; thereis plentyof evidence to counterChen Shou's
interpretation,based bothon the immediateevidence of Wang Can's ca-
reer, the broader contextof the political and intellectualclimate of Jing
province at the time,and the prejudicialdriftof imperialhistoriography
fromthenuntilChen Shou's era.
leiju38: 693;LiuZhennan bei(Biao'smemorial inYanKejun(ed),Quart

epitaph),
wen
Sanguo (Beijing: Zhonghua 56:
shuju,1959) 3b-5a.
The workonprognostication,
Jingzhou atlength
zhan,isquoted inJS12:322-324. SeealsoT'ang,"NewInterpreta-
tion,"p. 128-132.
Miao,EarlyMedieval Chinese
Poetry.277.
JAH37/2(2003)

170 ANDREWCHITTICK
First,we have no reason to thinkthatWang was a "prisoner"in Jing

province.We have numerousexamples of northern émigrésto Jingprov-
ince who decided notto staythere,and leftto serve Cao Cao well before
the takeoverin 208.31Nor do we have any reason to presumethatWang
Can was compelled to work for Biao; Wang had good friendswho re-
fusedto work forBiao, and insteadsettledin the farsouthof the prov-
ince,away fromthepoliticsof Biao 's court.32Wang even wrotepaeans to
threefriendswho leftJingprovinceforvarious reasons,withno indica-
tion that he was not free to do likewise if he chose.33Other émigrés
stayedin theXiangyangarea, butunlikeWang are notrecordedas having
taken any officialadministrative position with Biao; theywere merely
"treatedas guests."We have no indicationthatWang was especially im-
poverishedand in need of salarycomparedto otherémigrés,nor thathe
had a special patronalobligationto Biao; in fact,since Wang's grandfa-
therhad been Liu Biao's patron,the obligationwent the otherway, as
Miao rightlyobserves.34Therefore,we are on the strongestgroundif we
presume that Wang chose to stay at Biao's court and work for him
throughout his tenurein Jingprovincebecause he wantedto, out of either
sympathy with Biao's objectives,or out of pureambition,or both.
Second, Wang's intellectualproclivitiesstronglyimplythathe would
have been sympathetic to Biao's objectives.Wang was firstand foremost
a classical scholar,and of thepoets of his day he was unusuallyenamored
of thetetrasyllabic mode of verse based on the Classic ofPoetry.Most of
the poetryhe wroteduringhis tenurein Jingprovinceadopts thismode,
as does a propagandapoem he wroteforBiao.35Biao's patronageof clas-
sical scholarsand his efforts to producefreshlyannotatedversionsof Old
Text editions of the classics would certainlyhave appealed to Wang.
While Cao Cao and otherwarlordswere decidedlyhostileto scholarship
at thistime,Biao's courtat Xiangyangwas a thrivingcenterof learning,
seeminglyfreefromthedictatesof militarystrongmen.36 It is whollycon-
sistentwithwhat we know of Wang, therefore, to conceive of him as a
31 For the"Yingchuan ofDu Xi,FanQin,andZhaoYan;see

example, group"consisting
ChenShou,SGZ/Wei 23:665.
PeiQianandSimaZhi;seeChenShou,SGZ/Wei 23:671.
Miao,EarlyMedievalChinese 76.
Poetry:
34 Ibid.:65-66.
35 Ibid.: 203-6.
60,63-64,
36 Ibid:71-72.
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THELIFEANDLEGACYOF LIU BIAO 171
bright,well-educatedadolescent,thrivingin Biao's literarysalon under

the tutelageof such scholars as Song Zhong and Sima Decao, and har-
boringidealisticdreamsof an imperialrevival.
Third,Biao's court initiallywould have offeredWang a tremendous
outletforhis political ambitions,as well as his intellectualones. For if
Biao had been successfulin his bid fortheimperialthrone,Wang's politi-
cal fortuneswould have been assured. The overall trajectoryof Wang's
careershows thathe was highlyambitious,even opportunistic about ad-
vancing his officialstatus.
When Jingprovincewas faced with a takeover
by Cao Cao in in
208, Wang quicklymade a rapid turnabout allegiance,
advisingBiao's son Zong to surrender, and thenusing his talentsto criti-
cize Biao and praise Cao Cao forhis militarymightand his abilityto
choose "talentedmen" like himself.Wang could readilyhave chosen to
avoid servingCao, as did many educated literatiin northChina, and a
good deal of Biao's entourage;his willingnessto spend the remainderof
his careerwritingfawningpaeans to Cao Cao 's militarygloryshows that
he valued officialstatusand courtpatronagevery highlyindeed.37It is
suggestivethatWang's poetryso routinelyuses thecommonChinese po-
etic themeof "longingto achieve greatness,"yet rarelyengages another,
equally commontheme:thedesireto become a recluse.
None of thisis to denythatWang may verywell have become disillu-
sioned withBiao aftera while. As it became apparentthatBiao was not
going to succeed in engineeringa dynasticrevival, therebyliftinghis
supporters'careers into the imperialstratosphere, Wang naturallymight
have become restless.But anecdotes about Wang's restlessnessand dis-
satisfactioncannot count as conclusive proofthathe was activelymis-
treatedby Biao. The evidence for that relies on the testimonyof the
northernémigréswho went over to Cao Cao's regime,or even on Cao
clan membersthemselves38, all of whomhad verygood reasonto paintan
unflatteringportraitof Biao and the way he had appreciatedtheirtalents.
37 His
paeantoCao Cao isrecorded byChenShou,SGZ/Wei 21:598,andquotedbelow.
Miaosuggeststhatthistextis anhonest ofWang's
representation political
preferences
inEarlyMedieval ChinesePoetry.79.Miaooffers nobasisforhispresumption
thatthis
pieceofflattery
is somehow closer
toWang's "true thanwerehisearlier
feelings" pae-
anstoLiuBiao.Thereis somereason tothink itlessso,sinceWangwasnowmuch
morea captiveunder Cao Cao thanhehadeverbeenunder Biao,andtherefore
much
moreconstrainedinwhathemight chosetosay.
38 For Cao Zhi'selegytoWang, anunbiased source LiuBiao's
example, hardly regarding
administration,
though Miaoacceptsitatfacevalue;EarlyMedievalChinese : 68.
Poetry
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172 ANDREWCHITTICK
Laterhistorianslike Chen Shou reliedon theseaccounts,creatinga trend

in officialhistoriographywhichwill be analyzedfurther on.
Armed with this more judicious perspectiveon Wang's career,his
work while servingLiu Biao takes on new significance.The body of
work is not large: two propagandapieces, a half-dozenpoems and two
formalletters.The poems and lettershave been well analyzed by Miao,
buthe dismissesthepropagandapieces as insincereand thusunimportant.
This is misguided;theywould betterbe interpreted as representing the
genuinehope of a young scholar forpoliticaland scholarlyrenewal, and
as evidence of the elementsof Biao's imperialclaim that appealed to
39
young,well-bornnortherners such as Wang. One is a shortexcerptfrom
a worktitled,"Essay on the Three Assistants(Sanfu luny-,the otherap-
pears to be a completeprefaceto "The OfficialAccountof theRecord of
LiteraryStudies in JingProvince (Jingzhouwervcue ji guanzhí)." Both
textssurvivein the Yiwenleiju, a seventh-centuryencyclopedia.40
The fragmentfromthe "Essay on the Three Assistants"(which refers
to thearea aroundthe imperialcapital) is intriguing forbeing attributable
to a particularpropagandacampaign:theeffortto justifythe suppression
of theChangsharebellionof 198-200. In theopeningsectionof thetext,a
"Xiang qian xiansheng"(a retiredelderfromChangsha,hererepresenting
the defeatedsouthernpartof Jingprovince) engages in a debate with a
"Jiangbin yilao" (a recluse fromthe Yangzi River area, representing the
victoriousnorth),while a "Yunmengxuangong"(a mysteriouslord from
Yunmengmarsh,in between the two) adjudicates.41The southernelder
39 Miaodismisses forBiao inEarlyMedieval Chinese 78.

Wang'spropaganda Poetry.
Miaoaccepts
Surprisingly, thepropaganda itemsWangwrote forCao Cao as genuine
evidence,claiming thattheyoffer
scholars "anappreciationofwhatTs'aoTs'aomust
havemeant tohiscontemporaries"as "their
besthope"and"thesingle forcecapable of
ending civilstrife
and restoring
imperial unity";
Early Medieval ChinesePoetry: 86.
Miaodoesnotexplain whyhetreats thetwoitems so differently,
norwhyhepresumes
CaoCao,butnotLiuBiao,tohavesoinspired WangCan.
40 An"Account ofLiteraryStudies"
inthisperiod wouldmostlikely consist
ofa collec-
tionofbiographical anecdotesaboutvarious scholarlyfigures,alongthelinesofthe
"Wenyuan zhuan" chaptersinlaterimperialhistory
(beginning withHHS 80).Seethe
listofothersimilarlateHanworks inYaoZhenzhong, "HouHanyiwen zhi,"Ershtwu
shibubian(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,1956)II: 2367-75.Thepassagepreserved here,
withitsopening quotefrom LiuBiaoontheimportance ofliterary anditsclos-
studies,
ingpaean,isofabouttheright length, andtonetoserveas a preface
structure, tosucha
collection.
Mythanks toPaulKrollforhisinsight inhelping
tointerpretthisopening
passage.
JAH 37/2
(2003)

begins by asserting,"I've heardthatthemilitaryshould not be deployed,

and troops should not be marshaled. ... How then can [GovernorLiu]
summontroopsup fromthe masses and do violence to my freespirit?"42
The otherman thenrepliesat lengthin defenseof Liu Biao. In his argu-
ment,Changsha's rebellionis portrayedas a revoltagainstthenaturalor-
der,and Biao's carefullydeliberatedresponseis therefore a case of fight-
ing to "eliminateviolence and establishconcord." Wang Can thentakes
the opportunity to indulgein an extendedglorificationof Biao's military
prowess and righteousness:
TheGovernor's armies thebanner
established ofassisting
Heaven,andsounded
the
drumofrescuing Earth;their
blackhelmets dazzledwiththesun,their
sharp-edged
armorwaslikea greatwall.Whocouldopposesucha populist Haveyounotyet
battle!
heard
ofGovernor Liu'svirtue?
He treadstheWay(ofright andembraces
leadership)
wisdom; signsaremadeclearandbright.
auspicious He hassweptawaythethieving
hordesandclearedawaythecorrupt He haschasedYuanShutothe
anduncultivated.
western beheaded
border, SheGongatWudang, SunJianatHan'nan,
eliminated and
chasedYangDingtoXiandShang.43
Though Wang alludes to Biao's good characterand wisdom, in this

fragmenthe is principallyconcernedwith Biao's militaryprowess. By
comparison,the"Record of LiteraryStudies" offersa muchbroaderjusti-
ficationof Biao's imperialclaim. It can be neatlydivided intothreesec-
tions,the firsttwo being prose,the thirda poem in the classical tetrasyl-
labic meterof the Classic of Poetry.In the openingprose section,Wang
presumesto quote Liu Biao himself,extollingthe achievementsof the
past: "Ah, whatthekingsof old did fortheirgeneration:thediagramsof
Heaven and Earth;thehigheststandardof rules,regulations,and rites;the
introduction of educationand of 'transformative leadership';the labor of
organizing the classics." From this,Biao continues,floweda stable hier-
archical systemof governance,and a benevolent,respectfulrelationship
betweenit and the people. Thus, he concludes, "literarylearninglies at
thehead of humanrelationships, at therootof greateducation."44
Wang begins the second section by enumeratingthe activitiesof Liu
Biao and his entourage,demonstrating how theyfulfilledthe legacy of
42 lun, inYiwen
WangCan,Sanfit leiju59: 1076.
Ibid.Iftheoriginal
piece followed theusualformat
forthistypeoflop-sided
argument,
onewouldexpect the"Mysterious Lord"tohavehissayattheend,buttheremainder
of
thetextisnotextant.
Wang Can,Jingzhouwenxueji guanzhi, inYiwen
leiju38:693.
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174 ANDREWCHITTICK
the kings of old throughclassical scholarship.He thengoes on to write:

"Because of this,young men made fierceprogress,and militarymen re-
formed;tow-headed,bodkin-wearingyouthsabandoned theirarmorand
took offtheirhelmets,coming shoulderto shoulderin lock step like a
river flowing,a spring gushing,resolute and conscientiouslike this."
Here Wang assertsthatBiao's supremevirtuehas the potentialto quell
men's tendenciestowardsmilitarismand violence, and obviate the need
foractual armedconquestof the empire.In otherwords,Wang is assert-
ing thatBiao's patronageof classical scholarshipis ultimatelymore im-
portantthanhis militaryachievements.
The third,poetic section,is where Wang reallymakes use of his tal-
ents. In his openinglines,he draws heavilyon the "Great Odes (Daya)"
sectionof theClassic ofPoetry,all of themtightlyconnectedto theZhou
accession to the mandateof Heaven, in orderto make the parallel with
Biao's regimeclear.He opens withone of his favoriteclassical allusions,
theopeningline of the"Yun Han" ode (Mao 258) on thefallof theShang
dynasty:"Heaven sends down death and disorder;faminecomes repeat-
edly."45Wang turnsthis around, however, by offeringthe following:
"Heaven sends down greatprosperity, and thereis a reasonwhy it is con-
ferred."The "great prosperity"( chunjia) here is used in several poems
fromthe Classic of Poetryto describethe peace and plentythatHeaven
rewardsto good rulers;forexample,in the"Bie Gong" ode (Mao 300).46
Wang goes on to assert the "reason" for Heaven's favor in the second
couplet,wherehe boldlystates:"What has come to our Lord is theabun-
dance of havingreceivedthemandate."Here he drawson the"Huang yi"
ode (Mao 241), which describes the Zhou receptionof the Mandate of
Heaven: "Heaven has set up a counterpart on Earth,made firmforhaving
45 SeeJames Classicsvol.4: TheSheKing(HongKongUniversity

Legge,Chinese Press,
1960):528.Wangalsoalludestothislineintheopening ofhisPresentation
Poemto
ShisunWenshi ("Heavensentdowndeathanddisorder, andthecapital
citieswereno
more")andhisPoemontheDucalFeast("Heaven sendsdownabundant favors, and
thehundredplantsshowluxuriantgrowth), as wellas theopening
ofa lettertoYuan
TanhedraftedforLiuBiao("Heaven hassentdownnatural andharm;
calamity mis-
fortune
anddifficulties
streamoncontinuously"). See Miao,EarlyMedieval Chinese
Poetry.179-80, and67 (forMiao'stranslations),
194-95, and294-95and300(forthe
Chinesetext).
Legge,SheKing;. 628;ArthurWaley, TheBookofSongs(NewYork:GrovePress,
#251:
1960) 273.
JAH37/2(2003)

received the mandate."47In the opening fourlines, therefore, Wang has

set up a powerfulparallel betweenthe foundingof theZhou dynastyun-
derKing Wen and Biao's own claim to thethrone.
Wanggoes on to highlight Biao's militarysuccess withinJingprovince:
Hehasestablished
theGovernorshipoftheSouth,
andprotected
theregionofJingandHeng.
Hisseasonal
tours
ofinspectionshowmunificence
andvirtue,
hisgrand
proclaiming plan.
Whatishisplan?
Thefourstates
contendwitheachother,
Andso,withmajestyandwithglory
hehasgatheredandorganizedhisforces.
HehascowedtheYi peoplewithoutequal,
andsuccessively andshamed
fought thebandits."
Again, Wang drawsheavilyon classical allusionsto emphasizetheim-

perial claims of his lord. The "seasonal toursof inspection"(shimai) in
couplet#3referto theode of thesame name (Mao 273), describingKing
Wu's tourof the newly-founded Zhou empire.The "grandplan" in cou-
plets #3 and #4 is taken from a line in the "Qiao yan" ode (Mao 198).
Furthermore, by contrasting the mutualcontentionof the "fourstates,"a
euphemismforneighboringwarlordregimes,with the triumphalpacifi-
cation of Jingprovince,Wang suggeststhatBiao is the most capable of
usingforceto bringpeace, and therefore themostdeservingof thethrone.
The nextsix coupletscan be neatlydivided intothreepairs,each em-
phasizinga morecivilianbasis forWang's claim to themandate.Couplets
#8-9describeBiao's promotionof laws, sagely learning,classical texts,
rites,and music. Couplets #10-11 cite Biao's countless officials,"so
abundanttheyascend to theskies,"and theeminentand refinedmen who
have moved to his region.Finally,Couplets #12-13emphasize the bene-
fitswhich Heaven has raineddown on Biao and his provincein reward
forhis virtue:
Theharmonioustransformation
isadvancing;
signsarearranged
auspicious intheir seasons.
proper
Material
goodsareabundant;
thehundred
grainsareoverflowing.
47 SheKing
: 448;Waley,
Legge, Songs#243
: 256.
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176 ANDREWCHĪTTICK
The "auspicious signs" (xiuzheng) referto the list of five "verifica-

tions" in the "Hongfan" sectionof the Classic of History.These are fa-
vorable rain, sun, heat, cold, and wind; "favorable" should be taken to
mean the properweatherin the properseason. Wang emphasizesthisby
addingthatthesignsare "arrangedin theirproperseasons" in a line taken
fromthe "Shun dian" chapterof the same work.48Since Wang follows
this up with a referenceto materialprosperityand good harvests,he
would not appear to be claimingany of the mysticalomens and portents
associated withNew Text formulations of dynasticsuccession; rather,he
is merelypointingout the good weatherand abundantcrops of the pre-
cedingyearsas proofof Heaven's favor.Finally,in thefourteenth and last
couplet of the poem, Wang reassertsBiao's great reputationfor merit
throughout theempire.
The "Record of LiteraryStudies" offersa broad justificationfor dy-
nasticlegitimacywithseveral important features.It is modeled explicitly
on the Zhou conquest,using the poetic mode and even the specificlan-
guage of relevantpartsof theclassics to echo thathallowed event.In do-
ing so, it chooses specificattributes
of the Zhou conquest,and of Biao's
own contemporary reign, for emphasis: patronageof literaryendeavors,
success in attractingeminentmen,and thefavorof Heaven demonstrated
by good weatherforagriculture.Militarysuccess is also given a promi-
nentposition,in contrastto Biao's laterreputationas ineptin thisregard.
The stressis on internalpacificationand awing others,however,and not
on conquestsoutsidethe province;Biao's greatersuccess is attributed to
his abilityto persuademen to lay down theirarms.It is also noteworthy
that thereis no appeal to supernaturalportentsor omens, unlike New
Text-inspiredapproaches to imperial succession. Biao's approach,
throughthe voice of Wang Can, is deliberatelyrestrainedand scholarly,
even archaic. This is verymuch in line with what else we know of the
Jingprovinceschool of classical studies,whichhad become thepremiere
centerof Old Textlearningin itsday.49
A further elementin Biao's effortat imperialrestorationis his likely
choice of King Wen as an exemplar.This is impliedby Wang Can's use
of the Zhou Mandate as his principalexample in the propagandaitems,
and statedmore explicitlyby Wang in his firstpaean to Cao Cao, where
48 Refer
toLegge,TheChinese Classicsvol.3: TheShooKing(HongKongUniversity
1960):340,31.
Press,
Refer
tothethree studies
significant oftheinfluence ofthisschoollisted
above,infh.9.
37/2
JAH (2003)

he assertsthatBiao "thoughthe could model himselfon the Lord of the

West(King Wen)." Though Wang is here using thisparallel fora pejora-
tivepurpose(an issue whichwill be takenup presently),it was likelythat
he chose itpreciselybecause itwould play so ironicallyon theself-image
thatBiao had chosen to promote.50
In his studyof the succession of Cao Pi, Howard Goodman pointsout
thatthe selectionof a particularsage-kingas an exemplarforone's own
reignwas an importantstrategyfor legitimation.Emulationof a legen-
darysage-king"not only establisheda style,but advertisedin simple,of-
ten in visual and declamatorystyles,how a rulermightresolve the built-
in tensionssurrounding thechange in dynasty."51 King Wen,in particular,
was characterizedby "loyaltyto his dynasty,saintlyrefusalof power,fil-
ial piety,militancewithoutcoercion,and sharingof power,"traitswhich
contrastedsharplywith the "violent coercion" of Tang, founderof the
Shang dynasty,or of King Wu.52
In fact,the exemplarof King Wen is unusual in Chinese myth-history
forbeing a distillationof civil virtue,untaintedby thebloody business of
regicide. As Sarah Allen has pointed out, the mythicaltopoi of other,
priordynasticsuccessions had only a single successor who represented
bothcivil and militaryvirtues.King Wen,by contrast,is notedfornotat-
tackinghis ruler,Zhou Xin, despiterecognizinghis cruelty.Instead,King
Wen demonstratedrestraint,loyalty,benevolence, and lack of greed,
therebyattractingmeritoriousmen fromthroughoutthe empire to his
court.In thisway,King Wen establishedthevirtueof his familialline and
theirrightto rule,therebyallowinghis son King Wu to attackand depose
Zhou Xin as an act of filialpiety,and also leaving a talentedand well-
connectedcoterieof supportersforhis son to drawupon.53
King Wen's legacy was one of the most celebratedin traditionalCon-
fucianthought- indeed, its very creationcan be attributedto the early
Confucianschool. Mencius, in particular, was a tremendousproponentof
50 Chen is alsonotedin
Shou,SGZ/Wei 21: 598.A similar KingWenanalogy
pejorative
SGZAVei 23:671,butsinceitisnotedas a private itisnothistorically
communication,
andcouldverywellbe basedonWangCan'sprior
reliable, Biao is
characterization.
alsocompared toKingWeninananecdote another
regarding ofhis"guests," MiHeng,
inSGZAVei 10:312.
Goodman,'aoP 'i Transcendent
Ts 32-33.
52 Ibid.:34.
SarahAllen,TheHeirandtheSage:Dynastic LegendinEarlyChina(SanFrancisco:
Chinese Materials
Center,1981):103-108.
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178 ANDREWCHITTICK
King Wen's styleof rulership,extollinghis benevolentgovernment, in-

tensivecare forthe people "as if theywere invalids,"and his abilityto
win over even themostrecalcitrant of supporters, such as Bo Yi. Signifi-
cantly, Mencius also made it clear thatKing Wen, thoughbenevolentand
restrained, was fully able to exert himself in a defensive war to bring
peace to the people. The only reason his efforts to win the empirewere
not successfulin his own generationwas thatthe Shang dynastystillhad
a strongpositivelegacy,whichtooktimeto erode.54
It is immediatelyapparentthatthe example of King Wen was an ex-
cellent fitforLiu Biao, complementinghis self-consciousappropriation
of the archaicstyleof the earlyZhou period,and accordingwell withhis
preferredstyleof rulership.Like King Wen, Biao practicedmilitaryre-
straint,professedloyaltyto the rulingimperiallineage (of which he was
afterall a part),and succeeded in attracting the best and brightestof his
generation to his courtin the creation of a reinvigorated imperialculture.
In particular,King Wen's eschewal of violent coercion and aggressive
militaryactionwas well suitedto Biao's situation,whichwas constrained
by his lack of an independentcoterieof militaryretainers, his heavy reli-
ance on thesupportof provincialfamilieswithmore interestin peace and
stabilitythanexpansion,and his sprawling,poorlycentralizeddomain.In
otherwords,the selectionof King Wen as an exemplartook a necessity
and made it intoa virtue.The availabilityof theKing Wen paradigmmay
even have made the otherwiseunprecedented"southernstrategy"seem
more viable to Biao as an imperialsuccession strategy, enticinghim to
adopt it over theadvice of so manyof his aides. any event,whetheran
In
initialspur or an expedientafterthought, the choice of King Wen as ex-
emplar served to shape the "style" with which Liu Biao advertisedhim-
self, his claims to his own province, and to therest of theempire.
What is especiallynoteworthy about Biao's experiment is notthatit ul-
timatelyfailed,butthatitsucceededas well as itdid. Biao maintainedboth
a cohesivepoliticalregimeand a vibrantscholarlycommunity fortwo dec-
ades, whichstronglysuggeststhatBiao's local supportersand a fairnum-
ber of émigrés,includingWang Can, were at least initiallypersuadedby
his idealisticappeal fora "civilized" successionto theimperialthrone.By
the time Cao Cao took over Jingprovincein 208, however,Wang and
many otherswere evidentlypreparedto be a good deal more cynical.
54 Mencius 7A/22,
4A/13, IB/3,2A/1, byD.C. Lau(Penguin,
translated 1970):123,186,
74-75.
62-63,
JAH37/2
(2003)

in generating
Biao's imperialpretensionshad notovercomehis difficulties
militarysuccess, nor kept him fromhaving the same sortsof difficulties
withmaritaland succession politicsthat"real" emperorshad long strug-
gled with.Like so manyothersin his day, Wang Can's desirefora more
moremilitantpatronwould findat least some sortof fulfillment
effective,
in Cao Cao.
V.Liu Biao s HistoricalLegacy
The opinions of northern émigréssuch as Wang Can served to legiti-

matetheCao takeoverof Jingprovince,and lefta negativereputationfor
Biao thatcame to dominateimperialhistory.Meanwhile, however,there
floweda local undercurrent thatcontinuedto celebrateBiao's rule,extol-
ling him withthe same metaphorsand justificationsthatWang Can had
once used, and directlyrefutingthe negative reputationhe had gained
elsewhere.Ultimately, thisalternativelocal traditioneven appearsto have
had a marginalimpacton officialhistory.
Wang Can is one of a groupof a half-dozennorthern émigréswho fled
to Jingprovinceforwhom Chen Shou wrotebiographies.All the biogra-
phies follow a similarpattern:disappointedby theirfailureto achieve
theyanticipated,and received,much
success in Liu Biao's administration,
more substantialposts under Cao Cao. Chen Shou recordednumerous
anecdotesin which thesemen sharplycriticizeBiao, suggestingthatthis
group's negativeopinionsformedthe basis forBiao's poor reputationin
the Wei kingdom followinghis death.55Wang Can himselfoffersthe
cleareststatementof how he came to reject Biao's claims and extol the
virtuesof Cao Cao in his famous firstpaean to his new patron,written
upon thelatter's takeoverof Jingprovincein 208:
Liu Biao brought
peaceandease to JingandChuandsatwatching thetimes
change, hecouldmodelhimself
thinking ontheLordoftheWest(KingWen).Those
gentlemenwhofledtroubles toJing andbravemenofthe
wereall worthy
province
empire,yetBiaodidnotknowwhattaskstogivethem; thuswhenhisstate
wasimper-
wasnosaving
iledthere it....
WhenyoupacifiedtheJiang thewiseandworthy
andHan,youselected andgave
them causing
highpositions, theempiretoturn
their
hearts
toyou,takeona hopeful
air
55 include 23:671(PeiQian);SGZ23:665(Du Xi);SGZ55/Wu

SGZ/Wei 10:
Examples
1292-3
(GanNing).
JAH37/2
(2003)

180 ANDREWCHITTICK
order.
andanticipate Thecivilian bothfound
andmilitary use;thebraveandheroic
ex-
their
hausted energies. oftheThreeKings.56
Thisisa deedlikethat
This statementcontrastingthe two rulers already lays the essential

groundworkforBiao's officiallegacy. Wang contraststhemon two prin-
cipal points:the abilityto use men of talent,and successfulmilitaryef-
fort.The formerpointwas intendedto complementCao Cao forselecting
the poet himself,surelya "man of talent."But it also had a basis in fact,
foras we discoveredby analyzingBiao's staffingdecisions,Biao did in-
deed rejectmostémigrésfromthehigherlevels of his administration, re-
servingthe most importantpositions for the powerfullocal men upon
whose supporthe was dependent.Cao Cao, who developed a substantial
militaryclientbase in his earlyyears,was less whollydependenton pow-
erfullocal supporters,and his larger,more populous, and more central
initial base region allowed him to draw on more lineages of national
prominence,and thereforeto appear less provincialin his staffingdeci-
sions. From the perspectiveof little-knownmen from southernJing
province,however,Liu Biao had surelybeen the morepromisingpatron.
It is noteworthythat,while Biao's few remainingprominentand well-
connectedsupporters(notablyCai Mei and Kuai Yue) were picked up by
Cao Cao after208, his talentedsecond-tierstaffof local men wentwith
Liu Bei to Shu, rightlyunderstanding thatCao Cao 's imperialcourthad
no room forsmall fishsuch as they.57
The latterpoint,Biao's lack of militaryprowess,contrastswithWang
Can's previouspropagandapieces forBiao, which did extol his military
virtueat some length.Yet as we know fromthe historicalrecord,Biao's
militaryeffortswere largelydirectedto areas withinthe boundariesof
Jingprovince,and his forcesmade few foraysbeyondthem.58As previ-
ously noted,thiselementof his rule can probablybe attributed to a sys-
temic problem:Biao was dependenton local supporterswho were con-
56 Recorded ChenShou,SGZ/Wei 21:598.

by
Fora studyofthisphenomenon, seeYangDebing, "DongHanzhiNanbeichao shiqi
Jingzhoudiqudaxinghaoqiangdiweidebianhua,"inTanigawaMichio(ed),Ri-Zhong
guojigongtong yanjiu:Diyushehui wenhua
zai Liuchaozhengzhi shangsuo qi de
zuoyong Xuanwen
(Beijing: she,1989):173-186.
Thisconservatism a source
wasnaturally andthebasisfor
ofscornforhisdetractors,
minatory Forexample,
anecdotes. XiZuochi, Han-Jin
chunqiu byPeiSong-
, as quoted
zhiinSGZ/Wei Biao'stimidstancewithLiuBei'sastutemilitary
6: 213,contrasts
opportunism, tothecreditofthelatter.
JAH37/2
(2003)

THELIFEANDLEGACYOF LIUBIAO 18 1
servativeregardingmilitaryexpansionism,and who constrainedhis abil-

ity to project forcebeyond the provincialboundaries.The state of Wu
also became militarilyconservativeas it came increasinglyto relyon lo-
cal magnates,and the Shu-Han statesaw a similartrendin its lateryears.
Liu Biao's regimefaced thisconservativeimpasse at theoutset,since un-
like Sun Quan and Liu Bei, Biao broughtin no militaryforcesof his own,
and was immediatelybeholdento local interests.
We can see, therefore, thatwhile Wang Can's assessmentof Biao had
some basis in fact,itrecastwhatwere essentiallystructural problemsinto
anecdotal,personal explanationsrootedin the weakness of Biao's char-
acter.Chen Shou's biographyof Biao takes the lead fromthe prejudices
of Wang and otherémigrésand entrenchestheirassessment.Chen juxta-
poses long passages of advice fromBiao's subordinates,all seeking to
persuadehim to submitto Cao Cao, withBiao's refusalto heed them,his
persecutionof the unloyal,and his militaryindecision.Biao is also por-
trayedas havingbeen swayed by his schemingwife and brother-in-law, a
top advisor, to his
promote younger son over his elder; he dies just in time
to avoid watchingthisnew youngheirhand theprovinceover to Cao Cao
withouta fight.There is littleto recommendBiao fromthisportrait;gen-
eratedfromnorthern émigréswho wentto workfortheCao clan, some of
it even writtenby Cao Pi himself,theaccountservesthepurposeof dem-
onstrating Biao's incompetence,in orderto make Cao Cao look capable
and magnanimousby comparison,and therebylegitimatethe Cao take-
over of Jingprovince. We cannot prove thatBiao did not in fact have
thesecharacterflaws,buttheyare not necessaryto explain why he made
the choices he did, and thereis every reason to believe thattheyhave
been magnifiedin the officialhistoricalrecordforpolitical and didactic
purposes,as well as forsheerentertainment value.
It is important to note,as a furthercorrective,thatthereare glimpsesof
a strongcontrasting local currentof writingthatpreserveda positive,even
glowing assessmentof Biao and his reign. Some writings,such as the
originalpropagandapieces fromWang Can, survivefromBiao's reignit-
self.AfterBiao's death,he was buriedin a tombjust east of Xiangyang
town,and a lengthymemorialinscription was added throughtheefforts of
local people. The inscription, whose textsurvivesto thepresent,celebrates
Biao in termsvery much akin to Wang Can's propaganda.It begins by
notingBiao's talent,majesty,benevolence,and transformative virtue,then
goes on to credithis administration with forceful military action to secure
JAH37/2
(2003)

182 ANDREWCHITTICK
the bordersof Jingprovince,attracting and using talentedand powerful

men,aiding agriculture, and supportingclassical scholarship.Though the
epitaphsays nothingof Biao's imperialclaims,it otherwisecelebrateshis
reignin exceedinglylaudatorylanguage;notunusual,forthissortof work,
but a starkcontrastto the officialportraitof Biao as weak, indecisive,in-
termittentlyvicious,and besottedwithdelusionsof imperialgrandeur.59
Biao's local reputationseems to have reached greater,even mystical
heightsin the period of unifiedJinrule. In the Taikang era (280-289)
Biao's tombis recordedas havingbeen re-opened;thebodies of Biao and
his wife are said to have remainedperfectlypreserved,and exuded a
beautifulfragrancethatcould be smelled formiles. So awed were the lo-
cal people thattheyrehabilitated his tomband ancestralhall.60Liu Hong,
who governedthe Xiangyangregionsemi-autonomously in the firstdec-
ade of the fourthcentury,was said to have consideredLiu Biao as an ex-
emplar,and several anecdotes draw a varietyof links between the two
men. The language used to laud Hong is very similarto thatwhich was
used forBiao, includinghis good administration in Xiangyangand the
extentto which he was beloved by the local people and deeply mourned
followinghis earlydeath.61
It was also aroundthistimethatSima Biao, reputedlya nativeof the
southernpartof Jingprovince,gatheredtogetherthe historicalmaterials
forseveralimportant works,includinga historyof the Later Han thanre-
maineddefinitiveforover a century.62 He is creditedwiththe authorship
of severalanecdotesthatwere moreflattering of Biao's rulershipthanhad
previouslybeen noted in imperialhistory.The anecdoterecordingBiao's
use of good advice and his decisive and righteousmilitaryactionin paci-
fyingJingprovincehas already been noted, as has the account of Liu
Xian's verbal defenseof Biao in frontof Cao Cao. This latteraccount is
noteworthy forincludinga directcriticismof Cao Cao, and a contrastbe-
tweenhis militaristicsuccessionstrategy and Biao's morecivilianone:
59 Yan wen56:3b-5a.
Kejun(ed),QuemSanguo
GuoSong,Shiyu, as quotedbyPei Songzhi in SGZ/Wei 6: 216;Li Daoyuan,Yang
Shoujung zhushu(Jiangsu
(ed)Shuijing gujichubanshe,1989)28: 548.Accordingto
Li,thetomb andancestral
hallwerestill
well maintainedinhis over
day, three
centuries
after
Biao'sdeath.
61 JS66: 1766-67.
See Mansvelt ofLaterHan: Their
Beck,TheTreatises Author, Sources, and
Contents,
PlaceinChinese (Leiden:
Historiography E. J.Brill,
1990).
JAH
37/2
(2003)

Cao Cao said,"NowI havegentlemen withthemartial prowessofbears,footsol-

diersandcavalrynumberinga hundredthousand,andhaveoffered mercytotheguilty
- whodaresnotfollow me?"Xiansaid,"TheleadershipoftheHanhaseroded, thelife
ofthemassesis grievousandanxious, andthere areno loyalandjustgentlemento
supporttheSonofHeavenontheir wings, sootheandcomfort theworld,
andcauseall
thestatestoflock Ifyourelyontroops,
tovirtue. find inhard-heartedness,
security and
sayyou cando no then
better, ChiYou and ZhiBo havecome backintothe
world."
CaoCaowasimpassive.63
Sima Biao's anecdotesare consistentwiththeotherelementsof Biao's

local reputation,notablythe appreciationof decisive militaryeffortstar-
geted at internalpacification,coupled with a denunciationof excessive
"reliance on troops"and a celebrationof more civilian virtues.One can
see, in thisassemblage,how a local ideal of benevolentgovernancegot
wrappedaroundBiao's legacy and was sustained,throughconcretecom-
memoration(such as Biao's epitaph,tomb,and ancestralhall) and local
legend (such as themagical efficacyof Biao's corpse),untilit was even-
tually parleyed into historicalwritingwith imperial-levelsignificance
throughtheliterarysuccess of a man withJingprovincialroots.
The contrastbetween this cherishedlocal ideal and the more harsh
world of imperialpolitics is nicely illustratedby a revealing anecdote
fromthe Shishuo xinyuregardingHuan Wen, who governedJingprov-
ince independently fortwentyyears (345-365) underEasternJinemper-
ors. Huan Wen had staffedhis provincial and militaryadministrations
withbrightyoungmen fromthe province,men who had been largelyig-
noredby theimperialadministration downriverin Jiankang.In thisanec-
dote,Huan Wen refersto the legacy of Liu Biao in orderto drivehome a
message abouthis own, decidedlydifferent approachto rulership:
WhenHuanWeninvaded Luoyang (in356),hecrossedtothenorth bywayofthe
HuaiandSi rivers.Climbingtotheturretofhisshipwithhissubordinate he
officers,
lookedoutovertheCentral Plain,andwithdeepfeelingsaid,"Forcausing
theSacred
Landtobe engulfed andtoliewastefora hundred
(bybarbarians) WangYan
years,
andthoseabouthimcan'tescapebearing theblame!"
His aide-de-camp, YuanHong,answered himforthrightly,
"Fatenaturally
brings
aboutitsfallsandrises;whywasitnecessarily
thefaultofWangYanandthoseabout
him?"
Coloringangrily,HuanWenturned aboutandsaidtoallwhowerepresent, "Have
yougentlemen everheardofLiuJingsheng (Biao)?He owneda largeox weighinga
thousandcatties.
Itatetentimesas muchfodderandbeansas ordinaryoxen,butwhen
63 xianxian
zhuan
Lingling , as quoted
byPeiSongzhi
inSGZ/Wei
6: 216.
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184 ANDREWCHITTICK
itcametobearingheavyburdens ortraveling itwasn'teventheequal

longdistances,
ofa sickcalf.WhenCao Cao invaded
Jing
provincehecookedtheoxtofeasthisoffi-
cersandmen.Atthetimeeveryone expressed Huan'sintention
delight." wastomake
ananalogy withYuanHong.Everyone wasfrightened,
present andevenYuanhimself
turnedpale."64
The force of this particularanecdote revolves precisely around the

disjuncturebetweenorthodoxand local interpretations of Liu Biao's leg-
acy. Huan Wen's opening question is rhetoricaland sarcastic;of course
his men had heard of Liu Biao! He was a reveredlocal exemplarof be-
nevolentrule and scholarlysponsorship.Yet Huan Wen would have none
of his supporter'ssoft-focusideals of Liu Biao, or of King Wen either;
Huan was cut more in Cao Cao 's mold, a man of action,not theory.The
anecdote serves not only to contrastHuan Wen's rulingstylewith Liu
Biao's, but also to emphasize Huan Wen's brusque treatment of his pro-
vincial subordinates, and his impatient,
even threatening dismissalof their
particularideals and exemplars.65
Ultimately, of Liu Biao's ruledid finda place in
thelocal interpretation
the officialhistoricalrecord.When Pei Songzhi annotatedtheSanguo zhi
in theearlyfifthcentury, he recordedexcerptsfroma verydiversecollec-
tionof local materials,includingsome thatreflectedJingprovincialtradi-
tionsregardingBiao. Aroundthe same time,and using muchof the same
material,Fan Ye composeda new biographyof Liu Biao fortheHou Han
shu, whichwould become the orthodoxaccountof the laterHan. His in-
corporationof some Jingprovincialtraditions generateda somewhatmore
sympatheticportrait of Biao. For example, his inclusionof Sima Biao's
anecdoteabout Biao's takeoverof the provinceshowed Biao as decisive
and capable, in contrastto his dominantreputation. Fan Ye also includeda
lengthydescription of Biao's good rulershipof the province,a small part
of which can clearlybe creditedto Wang Can, and all of which closely
follows the language of Wang Can's originalpropagandaand of Biao's
64 Liu
Yiqing,Yu Jiaxi(ed),Shishuoxinyu
jianshu(Shanghai: Gujichubanshe, 1993)
26/11: 834;translation
inRichard Shih-shuo
Mather, Hsin-yu:A NewAccount ofTales
oftheWorld (Minnesota Press,
University 1976):433.
YuanHonghimself wasnotfrom Jing hisancestors
province; hailedfrom
Henan, andhe
hadbeenraised atcourt
orinvarious positions provinces ac-
court-appointed inthe before
ceptingthepostwithHuanWen.However, muchoftherestofHuanWen'sstaff wereJing
anditwastothem
provincials, thatHuanWen'scomment wasdirected,
as muchas to
Yuan;seeAndrew Chittick,
"Dynastic intheEastern
Legitimacy Ch'in:HsiTo-ch'ihand
theProblem ofHuanWen," AsiaMajor,Third
Seriesvol.XI(1998):30-33.
JAH37/2
(2003)

memorialepitaph.66By includingsignificantmaterialthatcast Biao in a

positivelight,Fan Ye's biographyoffereda more complex and nuanced
portraitof Biao 's rulethatcontrastedclearlywithChen Shou's.
Fan Ye was no partisanof Liu Biao, however;his biographywas still
primarilybased on Chen Shou's quite hostileone, and he even included
the full text of an especially harsh anecdote regardingBiao's vicious
treatment of a subordinate,whichChen Shou had severelyedited.67In his
summarycomments,Fan Ye also repeatedwhat had by thattimebecome
thestandardverdicton Biao's rule:he had merelywishedto "lie back and
receive the blessingsof Heaven."68Clearly,Liu Biao's strategyof culti-
vatinga benevolent,scholarlyreputationwhile "sittingback and watch-
ingthetimes"had servedonlyto generatea minatorydidacticlesson,one
which openlycelebratedthe centralrole of militaryconquest in imperial
succession. Despite King Wen's importanceas an exemplar,both for
early Confuciansand forlate Han idealists,Wang Can's scornhad long
since settledintoorthodoxy.
66 SeeFan HHS 74B:2419-25. Thenext-to-last sentence

ofthelongparagraphonp.
Ye,
2421isfrom WangCan'sYingxiongji, as quoted byPeiSongzhi inSGZ/Wei6: 212.It
seemslikelythattheremainderoftheparagraph is fromthesamesource,
whichPei
Songzhiapparently
quoted onlya smallpartof,butFanYe drewonmoreheavily. In
anyevent,thecontent,
though nottheexplicit wording,oftherestoftheparagraphis
veryclosetoWang Can'sJingzhouwenxue ji guanzhi.
Seetheanecdote HanSong,inHHS74B:2422.Thesource
regarding isknown,viaPei
Songzhi's tohavebeenthethird-century
quotation, Fuzi,butChenShoualludestoit
SeeSGZAVei
onlybriefly. 6: 212-13.
68 HHS74B:2425.
JAH37/2
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186 ANDREWCHITTICK
Glossary
biejia glJH LiuXian

CaiMei LiuVi fij^
CaoCao ff# LiuZong fijïf
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THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF LIU BIAO: GOVERNOR, WARLORD, AND IMPERIAL PRETENDER IN

LATE HAN CHINA

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THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF LIU BIAO:

In theeffortto understandthedevelopmentof thedynasticideal in im-

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Carefulstudyof Liu Biao's rule in Jingprovinceturnsout to be re-

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.54 on Fri, 20 Jun 2014 12:03:20 PM

One of themostimportant thingswe can determineabout a ruleris the

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.54 on Fri, 20 Jun 2014 12:03:20 PM

Biao was a compromiseappointment:it was hoped thathis good pedi-

Aftersuggestingtwo contrastingadvisory speeches the local gentry

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noteworthy forbeing the only two nativesof the Xiangyangarea known

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6 Pei notes(SGZ/Wei 6: 216)thathewasfrom for-

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is knownto have receiveda militarilystrategicpost,as governorover the

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.54 on Fri, 20 Jun 2014 12:03:20 PM

This patterncontrastswith Rafe de Crespigny's descriptionof the

As we have seen, Biao's immediatestrategywas to win the allegiance

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preparationforthe Emperor'sreturn(in 196).15As a reward,he was en-

15 Sima 60:1940and1942,62: 1979,as translated

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at his rear and concernedabout threatening moves fromYuan Shao, he

16 Thisnarrative follows that

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Zhang Xian's rebellion,nor in his defenseof theJiangxiaarea againstin-

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Biao's "southernstrategy"in itselfwas not so different fromwhatthe

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This content downloaded from 62.122.76.54 on Fri, 20 Jun 2014 12:03:20 PM

and in fact had a reasonable basis of support.Certainlythe men who

CaoCao asked[Liu]Xian,"WhydoesGovernor Liusacrifice

Though Biao's imperialstrategymay have helped to impressprovin-

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muchof theworkof thisgrouphas been lost,thereare several surviving

leiju38: 693;LiuZhennan bei(Biao'smemorial inYanKejun(ed),Quart

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First,we have no reason to thinkthatWang was a "prisoner"in Jing

31 For the"Yingchuan ofDu Xi,FanQin,andZhaoYan;see

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bright,well-educatedadolescent,thrivingin Biao's literarysalon under

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Laterhistorianslike Chen Shou reliedon theseaccounts,creatinga trend

39 Miaodismisses forBiao inEarlyMedieval Chinese 78.

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begins by asserting,"I've heardthatthemilitaryshould not be deployed,

Though Wang alludes to Biao's good characterand wisdom, in this

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the kings of old throughclassical scholarship.He thengoes on to write:

45 SeeJames Classicsvol.4: TheSheKing(HongKongUniversity

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received the mandate."47In the opening fourlines, therefore, Wang has

Again, Wang drawsheavilyon classical allusionsto emphasizetheim-

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The "auspicious signs" (xiuzheng) referto the list of five "verifica-

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he assertsthatBiao "thoughthe could model himselfon the Lord of the

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King Wen's styleof rulership,extollinghis benevolentgovernment, in-

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.54 on Fri, 20 Jun 2014 12:03:20 PM