LARIN VS.

EXECUTVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused in
two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was
convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the president issued Memo
order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his
statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that
the committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights
against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending,
the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being
abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in which it
stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c.
What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the
reorganization done in bad faith.

HELD:

The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and
being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the
constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the
Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being
willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the
procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed and complied with the
petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of
the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal
cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative
cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of the
alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the
removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble
of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court
stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the
reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and
investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office. Most
importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or
preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he
was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner
and is entitled to back wages.

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v ZAMORA

FACTS:

On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of  Finance.
Aquino issued another memo providing that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all land areas
and inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On January 2000 Pres.  Estrada issued EO 191
entitled “Deactivation of the EIIB.” The order of deactivation was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223 providing for the separation from the service
of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of
positions.
 

ISSUES:

Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department?How shall the reorganization be carried out?

RULING:

YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department are
under the President’s power of control. Hence he is justified in deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out
reorganizations when a certain law grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in order to achieve economy and efficiency. b. The
reorganization should be carried out in good faith. The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being
performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to lessen the expenses of the government.

Bagaoisan v. NTA

Facts: President Estrada issued EO 29 which provided for the streamlining of the NTA. In compliance therewith, NTA prepared and adopted a
new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) which was submitted to the Office of the Pres. On June 10, 1999, petitioners, all
occupying different position of NTA Office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their employment effective 30
days from receipt thereof.

Issue: Is the president empowered to reorganize the NTA?

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may
justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
law. In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the
authority of President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this
Court could only but accept.

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. SEC G.R. No. L-23004 June 30, 1965 FACTS:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) denied the registration of Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MSE) to operate as a stock exchange
company on the ground of the rule against double listing wherein a new stock exchange company is not permitted to list for trading on its
board, securities already listed in another Stock Exchange such as the Manila Stock Exchange in the instant case. Objecting to the requirement,
MSE contends that SEC has no power to impose such requirement. Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless
it is previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in Sec. 17 of the Securities Act
(Commonwealth Act 83, as amended). But the SEC contends that it merely acted "in the public interest" because operation of two or more
exchanges adversely affect the public interest. It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with; if not,
it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been complied with, or would be complied with, except that the Makati Stock
Exchange, upon challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule against double listing) may be deemed to have shown inability
or refusal to abide by its rules, and thereby to have given ground for denying registration. ISSUE: WON the SEC has the power to promulgate
rules HELD: The SEC has no power to promulgate rules. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him by the statute, and these necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. The Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its
rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is “necessaryfor the execution of the functions vested in it”;but it makes no explanation,
perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock exchanges, fails to
give protection to the investors besides contravening public interest. The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange
may legally obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two competing exchanges
jeopardizes public interest —which is doubtful —let the Congress speak. Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendations of the Commission
will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprises and business opportunities. But until
otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the
establishment of other stock exchanges, and thereby contravening.

TAULE vs. SANTOS

August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
x----------------------x

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for
being null and void.

Facts:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other
members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.

Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted.

Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-
partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
President of the FABC in Catanduanes.

Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to
be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.

Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.

2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.

Decision:

Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the
governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only
vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the
Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the
sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected
president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be
vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections
of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.

DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting,
there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and
elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the
said mandatory provision.

• Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his
 memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government
has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

TAULE vs. SANTOS200 SCRA 512, 1991

 
Facts:
On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members,
including Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. The group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members. The Governor
of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification due to flagrant irregularities in
the manner it was conducted. The Secretary nullifed the election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V
of the Department of Local Government. Taule, contested the decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over
election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC and that the Constitution provides that it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay
officials.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;

Held:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition
contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng
mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their
own respective organization.