Who are Filipino citizens
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954,
Tecson v COMELEC
Facts:
 Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President and
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines
 Petitioner initiated to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national
 Petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother
 The date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution.
 With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth
 Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, the father of
Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou had not been presented in evidence, his
death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954
 The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan
F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and
Español mother
 Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940
Issue:
W/n FPJ is a natural born citizen
Ruling:
Yes, Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
Note:
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for
the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly
referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States on the Philippines
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands
The term “inhabitant” was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and
3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before
11 April 1899
“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines—
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
 misconstrued and misapplied by the court in that
case
Who are Filipino Citizen

Torres v Tan
Issue:
Facts:
W/n Tan Chim is a Filipino citizen
 Tan Chim arrived at the port of Cebu on January
18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son Ruling:
of Alejandro Tan Bangco.
 Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him When in Roa vs.Collector of Customs we declared the
applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines,
entry on the ground that the status of his father
had not been passed upon by the Secretary of VOLUME 69.523 that declaration was a statement of a
general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa
Labor
individually but to all those who were in the same
 A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the
situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the
Court, which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco
Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace
was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born in
between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father
Manila on February27, 1893. On appeal, the
and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the
Court of Appeals, upheld the conclusion of the
time mentioned in the treaty of peace, although in their
lower court and declined to overrule the
minority; thereafter, going to China for the purpose of
doctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Customs
studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here. This
 The appellant impugns the soundness of the
was the rule at the time of the adoption of our
doctrine laid down in the foregoing decisions
Constitution
and urges us to overrule them.
 A comparison between this case and that of Roa In paragraph 7, Article I, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, to
v. Collector of Customs, supra, will show the the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her
following similarities and dissimilarities: citizenship by marrying a foreigner belonging to a nation
 Similar in that Roa was born in the Philippines in the laws of which do not allow her to acquire the
1889, whereas Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of husband's nationality.
the petitioner)was born here in 1893, both
before the advent of American soverignty; Considering the fact that the mother of Alejandro Tan
(2)the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were Bangco, who is the father of the herein applicant, is a
of Chinese nationality and their mothers, Filipina, and, under our Constitution, Alejandro Tan
Filipino; Bangco would have the option, upon reaching majority, to
(3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of adopt Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV,
peace between the United States and Spain,both Constitution) ;considering the benign policy of giving
were minor residents of the Philippines; and greater political recognition to women, to the extent that
(4)both, in their boyhood, went to Chinaf or the in the United States marriage of an American woman to a
purpose of studying there, returning thereafter foreigner does not operate loss of her citizenship; and in
to the Philippines. view of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which is indicative of
 The dissimilarities are: this political recognition. , being a minor child of
(1)Roa returned to the Islands after attaining the AlejandroTan Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the time
age of maturity, whereas Tan Bangco returned to of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen .
this country when still a minor; and
(2) the father of Roa was domiciled inthe
Philippines until the year 1895 when hewent
toChina and never returned, dying therein 1900,
whereas, in the present case the record is silent
on this point.
 Itis urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that
we reexamine and reverse the doctrine laid
down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra,
because the law,we are now informed, had been

Who are Filipino Citizens
Poe-Llamanzares v COMELEC
Facts:
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo and was
later one registered as a foundling
 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption which
was granted
 Petitioner opted to continue her studies abroad
and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S
 On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport
 On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections and returned to US after
 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February
2005
 Petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime
in the first quarter of 2005
 Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there
 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick
trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006
 On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship
 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship
 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States" effective 21 October
2010.52On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed
with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein
she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed
Senator on 16 May 2013
 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections,
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from
24 May 2005
 On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-
born Filipino on account of the fact that she was
a foundling. Elamparo claimed that international
law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to
apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.
 Petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth
 Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo  that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July
2006. Also on the assumption that petitioner is
qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship,
 Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines
 Petitioner argued the following
) she did not make any material
misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international
law to have been born of citizens of the place
where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of her
COC for
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before
she reacquired natural-born citizenship under
 COMELEC granted the petition to pf the
petitioner
 Tatad theorized that since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,  persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings,
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule
of statutory construction that what is not
included is excluded. He averred that the fact
that foundlings were not expressly included in
the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent
to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen. According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory
and that local legislations are necessary in order
to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.
Issue:
w/n foundlings are considered as natural-born citizens
Ruling:
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. As pointed out by petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the
mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class,
as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935
Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the
1973 and 1987 Constitution
In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there
are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no
third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino.

Who are Filipino citizen
David v. SET
Facts:
 Petition for Certiorari [1] filed by petitioner
Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the
nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of
SET
 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision[3] dismissed the Petition for Quo
Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat
private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares
as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore,
not being qualified to hold such office under
Article VI, Section 3[4] of the 1987 Constitution.
The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution[5] denied David's Motion for
Reconsideration.
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo and was
later one registered as a foundling
 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption which
was granted
 Petitioner opted to continue her studies abroad
and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S
 On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a
naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport
 On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections and returned to US after
 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February
2005
 Petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime
in the first quarter of 2005
 Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their
family home there
 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick
trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006
 On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship
 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship
 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States" effective 21 October
2010.52On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed
with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein
she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed
Senator on 16 May 2013
 David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August
6, 2015.[76] He contested the election of Senator
Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship
and residency requirements mandated by the
1987 Constitution
 David moved for reconsideration.
 Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not
a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly
on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a
 foundling whose parents are unknown, private
respondent fails to satisfy the jus
sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to
establish her Filipino "blood line," which is
supposedly the essence of the Constitution's
determination of who are natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first
assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she
could never leave reverted to natural-born
status despite the performance of acts that
ostensibly comply with Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
 Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places
over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and its enumeration of who are
Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section
1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as
private respondent's foundling status is settled,
the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon
her
Issue:
W/n respondent is a natural-born citizen
Ruling:
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional
interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed
intent of the framers or fathoming the original
understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic
document is the weakest approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest
errors. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framer's understanding
thereof.
It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to
parentage vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.
[169]
 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this
jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating
the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935
Constitution did not define the term
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a
"foreign" concept that was transplanted into this
jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility
requirements for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept
originated, the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only
a single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the
presidency
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus
soli, not jus sanguinis.
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:
natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as
one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen
is one who is not natural-born
Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal[178] articulates this definition by dichotomy:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is a natural-born Filipino.
Naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or
foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which
they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and
the need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is
inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's
mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the
succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps

on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To
determine whether private respondent is a natural-born
citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything
to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for
an inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization
process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private

respondent went through the actual naturalization
process. There is no more straightforward and more
effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization
of total and utter lack of proof.

Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of

foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their birth.
They benefit from this without having to do any act to
perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are
natural-born citizens.

3 Reqs to run for public office:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This

effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a
natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of
full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided
the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9225 are satisfied.

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other
existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any

and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath." This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under
relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.

Naturalization and denaturalization
Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Comm if Immigration
Facts:
 Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, she
stated that she was a Chinese
 That she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle for a
period of one month. She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961,
and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961
 On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before
the expiration of her authorized period of stay
 After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen
 Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought
this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction
 At the hearing it was admitted that petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not
speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of
her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
 the Court holds, that the instant petition for
injunction cannot be sustained
 Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.
— Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
 The clause "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien
woman may be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications specified in the
law, because these are the explicit requisites
provided by law for an alien to be naturalized
 petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to
be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that
she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been
admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at
least, the requisite length of residence in the
Philippines
 Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese
woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof,
was to expire last February 28, 1962, having
married her co-plaintiff only on January 25,
1962, or just a little over one month before the
expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said
marriage was effected merely for convenience to
defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory
departure, not to say deportation.
Solicitor General has well stated:
 That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been
admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only
for a period of one month and thereby secured a
visa, cannot go back on her representation to
stay permanently without first departing from
the Philippines as she had promised
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Decision:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section
4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section
4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant
for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indespensible in a
judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edhilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of January 25, 1962

Naturalization and Denaturalization
Edison So v Republic
Facts:
 Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a
Petition for Naturalization3 under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law
 Petitioner stated that he has all the qualifications
provided under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473
 RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for
hearing. The entire petition and its annexes,
including the order, were ordered published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC
likewise ordered that copies of the petition and
notice be posted in public and conspicuous
places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
 Petitioner thus caused the publication of the
above order and no one opposed the petition
 Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to
know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant
and adviser of the So family’s business. He would
usually attend parties and other social functions
hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner
to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of
good moral character, petitioner had been
practicing Philippine tradition and those
embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had
been socially active, mingled with some of his
neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his entire stay
in the Philippines. According to the witness,
petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No.
473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not
opposed to organized government or believes in
the use of force; he is not a polygamist and has
not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; neither is he suffering from any
mental alienation or any incurable disease
 Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo,
testified that he has known petitioner for ten
(10) years; they first met at a birthday party in
1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took
up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some
school organizations and mingled well with
friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw
petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and
special occasions when he would go to
petitioner’s house.
 RTC rendered GRANTING the petition and
declaring that petitioner EDISON SO has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby
admitted as citizen of the Philippines
 Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the decision to the CA, contended that
based on the evidence on record, appellee failed
to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that
his two (2) character witnesses did not know him
well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a
Filipino citizen; they merely made general
statements without giving specific details about
his character and moral conduct
 Petitioner insisted that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become Filipino. This was clearly established by
his witnesses.
 Respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to
administrative naturalization filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted
that even in the absence of any opposition, a
petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
 CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed
the petition for naturalization without
prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioner’s two
(2) witnesses were not credible because they
failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s
life or character to show how well they knew
him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of
the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining
their applicability to petitioner’s case. 35 The
appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner
failed to comply with the requirement of the law
that the applicant must not be less than 21 years
of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9)
 months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling qualifications set forth in said law apply even to
short of the requirement applications for naturalization by judicial act.

 Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an
applicant for naturalization should possess are
those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not
those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit
 Respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which
took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the
applicant’s age requirement was lowered to
eighteen (18) years old), refers only to
administrative naturalization filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not
apply to judicial naturalization before the court,
as in the present case
C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct
laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while
the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country
and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to the customs and traditions
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by
judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition,
administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was
already available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses

issues:
(1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for
naturalization by judicial act; and
(2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner
are "credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and
the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
Ruling:
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by
which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
(a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139;
he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral
character, and are themselves possessed of good moral
character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the
applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to
testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference
that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided by law.53
Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not
testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his
traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that
they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a
position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found
by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of
general statements in answer to the leading questions
propounded by his counsel.

(b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as

amended; and

(c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted

by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien

The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for

naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections
246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections
348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications
and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization
by administrative act.

R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure

intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging.50 It likewise addresses the concerns of
degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship
requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus
promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These
however, do not justify petitioner’s contention that the

Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Mercado v. Manzano
Facts:
 Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makat
and the respondent is the one who garnered the
most number of votes
 The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification was filed as it was alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States
 COMELEC granted the and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
private respondent on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective
position
 Respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he
was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United
States, San Francisco, California , and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws.
But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
 COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its
Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections for the
reason that it is an undisputed fact that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under
American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had U.S. citizenship.
Issue:
whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being
a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Ruling:
Dual citizenship
- arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states
- such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of  jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states
- classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:
- (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers
in foreign countries which follow the principle
of  jus soli;
- (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
father's' country such children are citizens of
that country;
- (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter's country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance
- refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
 citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individual's volition.
- is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law
- citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by
their acts, may be said to be bound by a second
allegiance

Including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens  per
se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy

that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far
as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen

Renunciation of Foreign citizenship, is it required if dual
citizen from birth?
Valles v. COMELEC
Facts:
 Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian and ,
at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came
to settle in the Philippines
 She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Davao Oriental
 She ran for and was elected governor of Davao
Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, in a petition for quo warranto,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced
her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on
Elections en banc dismissed the petition
 For the 3rd time The citizenship of private
respondent was once again raised as an issue
when she ran for re-election as governor of
Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner but the COMELEC dismissed petition
against her
 The Commission on Elections ruled that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo
Ybasco, is a Filipino citize n, and by virtue of the
principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution;
(2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making
her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section
4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified
to by the Australian Embassy, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
 Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated
facts and circumstances, the private respondent
had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He
contends that in her application for alien
certificate of registration and immigrant
certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship,
and operated to disqualify her to run for elective
office.
 According to petitioner, for the private
respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship
she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act
8171; and the election of private respondent to
public office did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent
was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship,
private respondent has effectively become a
stateless person and as such, is disqualified to
run for a public office in the Philippines;
petitioner concluded.
Issue:
w/n the respondent is disqualified to run for office
because of her being a dual citizen
Ruling:
The Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that
for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that
they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of
candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.
Renunciation of foreign citizenship, is it required if dual
citizenship thru naturalization
Sobjena-Condon v COMELEC
Facts:
 Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having
been born of Filipino parents, she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon
 She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The
application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005
 The petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.
 Petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during
the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office
 Private respondents, filed separate petitions for
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s
eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she
is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
 Petitioner denied being a dual citizen and
averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia
sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for public office
is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
 The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure
to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public
office and COMELEC en banc concurred with the
findings and conclusions of the RTC
 The petitioner contends that since she ceased to
be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006,
she no longer held dual citizenship and was only
a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence,
the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.
 She further argues that a sworn renunciation is
a mere formal and not a mandatory
requirement
Issue:
w/n the petitioner is disqualified in holding public office
upon failure to renounce under oath her Australian
citizenship
Ruling:
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not
suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her
Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of
a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, 33 such ruling was
already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No.
9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional
condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.34
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born
Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective
office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public
officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who
have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or
not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for
elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-
acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to run for
public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith
in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered
ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such,
she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold
any elective office in the Philippines
Recantation of Oath of Renunciation
Maquiling v. COMELEC
Facts:
 Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. On the same day
an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
 Respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May
2010 local and national elections
 Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not
a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American." Balua presented in
his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record indicating that Arnado has been using his
US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines
 COMELEC 1ST DIVISION find that although Arnado
appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation
 Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc stating that the
use of his US passport subsequent to his
renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines. He used his US passport only
because he was not informed of the issuance of
his Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained
 Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),
another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan
argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado.
 However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and
set aside the ruling of the First Division and
granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration,
that the use of a US passport … does not operate
to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to
his renunciation as there is no law saying such.
More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to "un-renounce" what he has
earlier on renounced
Issue:
w/n the Arnado recanted his Oath of Renunciation upon
using his American passport.
Ruling:
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or
just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
Arnado v COMELEC
Facts:
 Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as citizen of the United States of
America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation
for his plans to run for public office in the
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225 [5] (RA 9225) before
the Consul General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008
and, on even date, an Order of Approval of
Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was
issued in his favor.
 On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national
and local elections
 Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among
others, that Arnado remained a US citizen
because he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after
executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation
 Arnado garnered the highest number of votes
for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was
proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division
issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's
continued use of his US passport effectively
negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run
for public office for failure to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225
 Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution
reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division.
It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did
not operate to revert his status to dual
citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in
Arnado's explanation that he continued to use
his US passport because he did not yet know
that he had been issued a Philippine passport at
the time of the relevant foreign trips. The
Comelec En Banc further noted that, after
receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used
the same for his subsequent trips.
 On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its
Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled
and set aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2,
2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from
running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010
elections thus;
 We agree with the pronouncement of the
COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of
consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does
not mean that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did. It was after complying with the
requirements that he perfonned positive acts
which effectively disqualified him from running
for an elective public office pursuant to Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
 May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its
Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an
Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit
of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009.
  The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado
Petition[9] seeking to disqualify him from running submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his
for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would
cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court not suffice for having been belatedly executed
in Maquiling
 Comelec Second Division disqualify Arnado
from running in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado
still failed to comply with the requirement of
RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same was deemed
withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently
traveled abroad using his US passport, as held
in Maquiling.
 Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the
Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled
the proclamation of Arnado and declared
Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan
 Petitioner argued that THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA
9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON
OCTOBER 1, 2012

Issue:

w/n petitioner complied with the requirements of RA 9225

Ruling:

Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens

of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political
rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
They may now run for public office in the Philippines
provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior
to or at the time of filing of their CoC

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as

affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed
to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA
9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections,[47] his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was
deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13,
  Petitioner, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET
 Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a
Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she
was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that
she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a
mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of
Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the
latter
 Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. She averred that the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her
father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship
could not be assailed through a collateral
attack.
 HRET dismissed both petitions and declared
Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives
 Petitioner asserted that HRET failed to disqualify
Limkaichong despite the evidence that she is not
a natural-born citizen and does not agree upon
the motion that THE PETITION FOR QUO
WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF
LIMKAICHONG’S FATHER FOR THE REASON THAT
HER FATHER’S CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION
IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM THE VERY
BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY
NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE
SAME.

Issue:
Attack on Someone Else’s citizenship w/n the attack on someone else’s citizenship could be
attacked collaterally.
Vilando v HRET

Facts: Ruling:

Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that

 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate
she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes
of candidacy for the position of Representative
reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of
of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won
naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is
over the other contender
not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on
 she was proclaimed as Representative by the
the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack
Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of
on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
Comelec Resolution and later on assumed office
direct action for its nullity
as Member of HOR
 The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of
were filed against Limkaichong, dismissed the Limkaichong’s father should be in accordance with Section
three (3) other petitions, and directed the 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473:
petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by
way of a petition for Quo Warranto. "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come
from these officers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case”

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State,

through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate
of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised
by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.