India and Bangladesh: Major Issues

Submitted by
Jyoti Sharma
UID- SF0116020

Faculty in Charge
Dr.Mayengbam Nandakishwor Singh

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERISTY AND JUDICIAL ACADEMY, ASSAM

GUWAHATI

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
1.1 Literature Review
1.2 Scope and Objectives
1.3 Research Questions
1.4 Research Methodology
2. The Historical Origin of Bangladesh
3. Border Issues between India and Bangladesh
4. Political Issues between India and Bangladesh
4.1 Bangladesh North East Insurgencies
4.2 Water Dispute
4.3 Trade Dispute
4.4 Security Concern
4.5 Transit Issue
5. Problem of Illegal Migration
6. Nexus Between China and Bangladesh
7. Conclusion
8. Bibliography

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 Chapter- 1

INTRODUCTION
India had played a pivotal role in the emergence of the current state of Bangladesh on 26 March
1971. India had given full-fledged support to the Bangladesh’s ‘Mukti bahini’ in its fight for the
liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. India and Bangladesh share a common border of
approximately 4096 km bordering 4 Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura
and Mizoram. Both countries share cultural affinities, especially the state of West Bengal and
also ethnic linkages with the North Eastern states. India and Bangladesh two sub continental
neighbors have always shared strong cultural, linguistic and geographical ties. This commonality
is reflected in our multi-dimensional and expanding relations. India and Bangladesh’s
geographical locations complement each other and present an opportunity for both to further
develop their connectivity links and economies. In the last more than four decades, the two
countries have continued to consolidate their political, economic, trade and cultural relations and
have built a comprehensive institutional framework to promote bilateral cooperation.

However, tensions between Indo-Bangladesh relations crop from various issues like Illegal
Migration, border dispute, water dispute, trade, and transit issue etc. Moreover, as the recent
improvements in relations suggests, there is a growing realisation that increased cooperation will
bring substantial socio-economic benefits that can no longer be overlooked. This project is an
attempt to do an in depth study on the Major issues in Bangladesh-India relations. It is found that
among other issues, Illegal Migration, Bangladesh North East Insurgencies, water and border
dispute etc. has been major issues in determining Bangladesh-India relations. Among them, land
boundary dispute and has been resolved peacefully. But there are a number of recent issues,
which is determining Bangladesh-India relations to many extents. Further, this project will go on
to assess the political issues and the nexus between China-Bangladesh relations.

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1.1 Literature Review

1. International Relations, Peu Ghosh, PHI Learning Private Limited, 2013

This book examines on India’s relationship with its neighbouring countries. It
focuses on India’s immediate strategic neighbourhood. It deals with various major
political issues between India and Bangladesh. It also looks at important issues like
energy security, economic diplomacy, and the interaction between defence and
diplomacy, and foreign policy institutions.

2. Indian Foreign Policy: New Dimensions and Directions, S.K Purohit, Swastik
Publications, 2011
This book focuses on India’s current and looming foreign policy challenges from a
strategic and policy-oriented perspective. It analyzes the long term factors and trends
that should determine the country’s foreign policy formulation.
3. The Emergence of Bangladesh, Badruddin Umar, Foundation Books, 2017
This book deals with the historical origin of Bangladesh. This book presents the
people’s perspective of the political struggles in East Pakistan which culminated in
the emergence of an independent nation-Bangladesh. The study draws upon original
documents as well as the personal experience of the author who was directly
involved in these struggles.
4. North East India: Politics and Insurgency, Dr. Chandrika Singh, Manas
Publications, 2003
This book presents politico-historical account of the North-East India. It also presents
administrative provisions in the area during the British rule and their impact on the
Present politics of the North Eastern States. Moreover, the international boundary
lines
touching the region has always remained controversial. As North East is prone to
insurgency this book also discuses about the militant and anti-national organizations
which caused threat to national integrity.

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1.2Scope and Objectives
The Main Scope and Objective are:
 To have an in-depth analysis of the relationship between India and Bangladesh
 To study about the historical origin of Bangladesh
 To know in detail the border issues between India and Bangladesh
 To have an in-depth analysis of the various political issues between India and
Bangladesh
 To study about the nexus between China and Bangladesh
1.3Research Question
 What are the major issues between India and Bangladesh?
 What is the historical origin of Bangladesh?
 What are the border issues between India and Bangladesh?
 What are the various political issues between India and Bangladesh?
1.4Research Methodology
1. Approach to Research
In this project doctrinal research was involved. Doctrinal Research is a research in
which secondary sources are used and materials are collected from libraries,
archives, etc. Books, journals, articles were used while making this project.
2. Type of Research
Explanatory type of research was used in this project because the project topic was
not relatively new and unheard of and also because various concepts were needed to
be explained.
3. Sources of Data Collection
Secondary source of data collection was used which involves collection of data from
books, articles, websites, etc. No surveys or case studies were conducted.

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 Chapter-2

The Historical Origin of Bangladesh

Bangladesh was created out of two violent partitions. The first in 1947 partitioned Bengal into a
largely Muslim east, which became East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), and a largely Hindu west,
which became the state of West Bengal in India. When the Pakistan state failed to meet the
aspirations of East Pakistani elites, a second violent partition in 1971 led to the secession of East
Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. The outcome was a country with significantly greater
linguistic and religious homogeneity compared to the other major sub continental countries. Yet
far from creating a stable state and a society with a clear sense of national identity, Bangladesh
continues to be riven by conflict and dissent over what constitutes the fundamentals of its
nationhood. While these sequential partitions created a Muslim Bengali state, there had been no
significant history of political movements that had imagined such a nation before 1947. Rather,
both partitions were driven by conflicts between established and upwardly mobile elites
attempting to solve distributive conflicts through patron-client mobilizations. In 1947, the
conflict was primarily between an upwardly mobile Muslim Bengali elite based on the rich and
middle peasantry and more established Hindu Bengali elites consisting of landlords, bureaucrats
and professionals. Demography favoured the Muslims who constituted the majority in Bengal
but they were economically less prosperous. They had no intention of partitioning their province
and the mobilizations led by Bengali Muslim faction leaders from the rich peasant classes in the
1930s were entirely about achieving a bigger share of power and resources through the electoral
process. 1The failure of these two competing sets of elites to agree on a distribution of power and
privilege that was satisfactory to both sides was not foreordained. But failure led to the violent
partition of Bengal in 1947.

The conflict of 1971 was also about the distribution of power and privilege, this time between
the elites of East and West Pakistan. The fact that the partition of Bengal in 1947 was not the
result of a long political mobilization which had struggled for the creation of Pakistan meant that

1
Badruddin Umar, “The Emergence of Bangladesh”, Foundation Books, 2017, pp-43-51

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the Muslims of Bengal, Punjab, and the other areas constituting Pakistan had not created a
consistent or shared national ideology that pre-dated the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim
homeland. Yet when Pakistan was born, many Bengali Muslim elites tried for a long time to
make Pakistan work in their interest. But with economic, military and political power firmly
based in the West, upwardly mobile Bengali Muslims again felt hemmed in even within East
Pakistan. They now faced a new dominant group: the West Pakistani military and bureaucratic
elite based in Karachi a thousand miles away. The new state nurtured an emerging capitalist class
based almost entirely in the West. But once again demography favoured the Bengalis in East
Pakistan who were more numerous than all of West Pakistan’s population put together. This
resulted in constitutional crises from the outset as democracy threatened to reflect a distribution
of political power that was out of line with the distribution of economic and military power.
After twenty three years of failed constitutional experiments to marry democracy with the
protection of the economic and political privileges of elites based in the West, the crisis came to
a head with the elections of 1970. The Western elites refused to accept the results of an election
that put East Pakistanis in charge of all of Pakistan. 2 In the violent crisis that ensued, East
Pakistan split off in 1971 in a second and even bloodier partition to become Bangladesh. The
emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 did not achieve internal peace. Instead, there was more
violence, an attempted imposition of a one-party state, the assassinations of two heads of state,
long periods of military rule and finally in 2000, the emergence of a vulnerable democracy.

2
Badruddin Umar, “The Emergence of Bangladesh”, Foundation Books, 2017, pp-90-97

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 Chapter-3

Border Issues between India and Bangladesh

The India-Bangladesh border that stretches for over 4094 km and is extremely porous facilitates
the illicit flow of goods across the border and illegal migration from Bangladesh into India. In
fact, illegal trade and smuggling has led to violent incidents in the past with Bangladesh accusing
India’s Border Security Force (BSF) of shooting innocents. India, which has always maintained
that the supposed innocents were in fact gangs of cattle smugglers, has now issued strict
guidelines for the use of non-lethal weapons against illegal trespassers. With the majority of the
trespassers evading security forces, it is evident that not enough resources are being allocated to
the border.

Related to the border issue is the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh into India.
Historically, migration has been a recurring cause of concern in India-Bangladesh relations; and
Bangladesh’s role in facilitating the movement of its population beyond its borders has always
been a question mark. Today, with population pressures beginning to tell in several Indian states
and influx from Bangladesh rising at an alarming rate, the issue has taken on great significance.
Over and above the economic and demographic risk that migration poses to India through drain
of resources and employment strains, migration has also led to a rise in crime and other
subversive activities that pose a considerable challenge for India’s security apparatus.3

The Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was signed between both the countries in 1974. This
provided for India’s control over 112 enclaves and Bangladesh’s control over 32 enclaves based
on the religious identities of the inhabitants of those areas but since it was not ratified by India it
could not be put into effect. On the other hand Bangladesh’s immediate ratification of the treaty
and the fulfillment of its obligation gave way to the return of Berubari to India by Bangladesh,
while India gave permission to Bangladesh to use the Tin Bigha corridor in 1992 which would
work as an entrance to Bangladesh’s enclaves inside India.

3
S.k Purohit, “Indian Foreign Policy”, Swastik Publications, 2 nd edn, 2011

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In a historic move, India and Bangladesh on 6 June 2015 signed the Land Boundary Agreement
to finally put an end to the 41-year-old boundary dispute. Prime Minister Narendra Modi
announced a fresh $2 billion line of credit for Bangladesh and promised quick implementation of
the earlier line of credit of $800 million and the full disbursement of $200 million on the first day
of his tour to the eastern neighbor. With the border agreement in place, India has now control of
510 acres of land while Bangladesh will have control of 10,000 acres of land. PM Narendra
Modi, on his maiden visit to Bangladesh, also expressed confidence to have a fair solution to the
Teesta and Feni river water sharing issues with Bangladesh with the support of state
governments in India. The formal Land Boundary Agreement ratification ceremony was
witnessed by PM Narendra Modi, Sheikh Hasina and West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata
Banerjee. The exchange of documents paves way for the operationalization of the 1974 India-
Bangladesh LBA that provides for exchange of 161 enclaves between the two countries. A total
111 border enclaves will be transferred to Bangladesh in exchange for 51 that will become part
of India. In the recently concluded Budget Session, Parliament had passed a historic Constitution
Amendment Bill seeking to settle India's 41-year-old border issue with Bangladesh. The bill will
operationalize the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary agreement that provides for exchange of
161 enclaves between the two countries. So, India and Bangladesh are not just neighbours but
nations bound by the threads of history, religion, culture, language.

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 Chapter-4
Political Issues Between India and Bangladesh
India and Bangladesh share a unique bond and a special relationship rooted in a common cultural
heritage, shared principles and values and forged by common aspirations and sacrifices of its
peoples. There are many political and social issues which affect the relationship between India
and Bangladesh. Various issues need to be resolved if the relationship between the two are to be
improved, from sharing the water of 54 international rivers that flow from India to Bangladesh to
controlling terrorism and promoting economic development. The major political issues include:
4.1 Bangladesh Northeast Insurgencies
Northeast (NE) India has faced insurgency for almost 60 years. The region’s proximity to
Bangladesh, Myanmar and China has encouraged insurgents from Nagaland, Manipur, Assam,
Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya to use these countries. In any insurgency there are always at
least four participants: the government in power, the local population, the insurgents and external
powers, specially the immediate neighbouring countries. Apart from these four factors,
favourable terrain, secure bases (within the area of insurgency and outside), intelligence,
mobility and propaganda are essential. The key factor for the growth of insurgency in NE India
has been the support from neighbouring countries – China, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and
Pakistan. Their support is linked to larger geo-political rivalries and geo-strategic interests as
insurgency in NE India provided, and continues to provide, a favourable environment and fertile
territory to weaken and destabilize India. Even after the emergence of Bangladesh as an
independent nation, successive governments except the Awami League government in
Bangladesh continued to offer support to the insurgents in NE India as a response to “perceived”
and “alleged” attempts to cause trouble in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 4
The North-eastern region of India covering a total area of about 2, 55,000 sq. km is surrounded
by Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. Less than one percent of the external boundaries of
the region are contiguous with rest of India while remaining 99 percent form international
borders. There is not only geographical isolation of this region but also absence of cultural and

4
Dr. Chandrika Singh, “North East India: Politics and Insurgency”, Manas Publications, 2003. pp. 36

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psychological integration with the mainstream. Many ethnic groups in the region especially in
the areas bordering the international boundaries have more in common with the population living
across the boundary than with the rest of India. Bangladesh has been active in exploiting the
situation in the North-eastern region and this has had impact on the overall security in the region.
East Pakistan had aided many insurgent activities in the India's northeast. After birth of
Bangladesh till Mujibur Rehman was in power the relations were cordial. But, soon after his
assassination, the forces used to the Pakistan way of thinking took over and earlier policy of
hoisting anti-India insurgents on Bangladesh soil was revived. Influx from Bangladesh is a major
problem for the Northeast. There are estimated to be 15 to 18 million illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants in India who have spread all over in the Northeast with the bulk in Assam. Three to
five million have spread over to Bihar, Bengal and to other parts of India. 'Operation Pin Code'
was yet another motive of Pakistan ISI to pan-Islamise the Northeast. The aim is to first raise a
Jihadi group to carve out the Bangladeshi dominated border areas of Assam as new districts of
Bangladesh. Bangladesh has become very important to forces linked to al Qaeda. They have also
managed to pool in ULFA leaders into this. Bangla Bhai, alias Siddiqul Islam, was leading
violent campaign preaching militant Islam in different border districts of Bangladesh. The impact
of fundamentalism can be felt in some parts of the Northeast. Inside Bangladesh there were a
number of training, liaison camps and safe houses for the underground insurgents of the
Northeast India like ULFA, Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, NDFB, NSCN (IM),
PLA, and KYKL etc. ULFA leaders permanently reside in Dhaka and Chittagong. They are
running lucrative business in Bangladesh and are living a luxurious life. Indian intelligence
reports had indicated that there were at least 190 militant camps inside Bangladesh which train
and house Northeast militants with the help of ISI and al Qaeda. From Bangladesh, the ULFA
has made contacts with arms dealers in Cambodia and Thailand. Cox's Bazaar became a transit
route of weapons. Bangladesh also served as a place for currency conversion and flowing
finances out of country. The presence of number of terrorists like Harkat-ul-Jihad, Al-Islami,
Islami Liberation Tiger of Bangladesh, Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chatra Shibir, Arakan Rohingya
National Organization etc in Bangladesh have made their impact in North-East insurgency.

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4.2 Water Dispute
Water is a key resource to socio economic development and for survival of life. It has been
utilized since ages for various purposes like drinking, household uses, irrigating fields,
navigation, etc. Water is an important multi-use resource to the countries sharing the rivers. The
demand for water as well as water scarcity is increasing every day. In case of India and
Bangladesh; the issues of Ganga- Brahmaputra Rivers water sharing have been at the centre
stage of India and Bangladesh’s relationship for the past four decades. The Ganges is trans
boundary River it is known about popular history of the disputes. There are disputes for water
sharing since more than 50 years. Before partition the Ganges water distribution was domestic
problem. Later on India and East Pakistan were major parties and from the 1971 conflict was
between Bangladesh and India. It remained until now, the Ganges water was used in both the
countries because they were economically depended on the water for several uses such as
fishing, agriculture and small business therefore both the countries want to have more shares of
water. But the important source of conflict between the two countries is the dispute over water
sharing from Ganga river system. This issue of water sharing has been going on even today 5. In
case of Ganga River, geographically India lies at the upper stream of the Ganga riparian while
Bangladesh is at downstream. The Ganges river water issue is largely related with the quantity of
water availability and sharing between southeastern Bangladesh and west Bengal state of India.
India’s prime concern of water necessity is Kolkata, a capital city of West Bengal. Kolkata needs
water for all time in general and
dry season in particular. The limited quantity of Ganges water is the cause of this dispute. This
situation led to economic and political tension between India and Bangladesh.

The Farakka Barrage

The origin of the dispute can be traced back to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace
signed by then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh’s founding leader and Prime
Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman on 19 March, 1972. According to the treaty, the two nations
established a Joint River Commission to work towards the common interests and sharing of
5
Peu Ghosh, “International Relations”, PH Learning Private Limited, 3 rd edn, 2013

12
water resources, irrigation, floods and cyclone control. As per the treaty, the Farakka Barrage
was built in 1974, about 10 kilometers from the border of Bangladesh, controlling the flow of the
Ganges, possessing strong economic and religious importance, diverting some of the water into a
feeder canal linking the Hooghly River, keeping it silt free. With increasing demands for water in
Kolkata for industrial and domestic use, and for irrigational purposes in other parts of West
Bengal, dispute over the sharing of water is intensifying. The objective behind the construction
of the Farakka Barrage was to increase the lean period flow of the Bhagirathi‐Hooghly river
branch of the Ganges to increase the water depth at the Kolkata port which was threatened by
siltation. In November 1977 the two countries proposed a five year agreement on water sharing.
However, the basic issue remained unaddressed, leading to its lapse in 1982.6
Further, the construction Farakka Barrage (1974) became the major cause of this dispute for both
the countries. The sharing of water of trans-boundary River becomes political and social issue
since the birth of Bangladesh.
Finally a comprehensive bilateral treaty was signed by the Indian Prime minister H. D. Deve
Gowda and his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheik Hasina Wajed on 12 December, 1996. This treaty
established a thirty year water sharing arrangement with guaranteed minimum quantities of water
supply for Bangladesh, whose rights as a lower riparian country was recognized.

Teesta River
Water sharing remains the critical element in shaping of India-Bangladesh ties, with the Teesta
River dispute and the proposed construction of the Tipaimukh dam at the centre of the
controversy. The 1983 Teesta River Agreement allows India and Bangladesh to share 75 percent
of the river water on a 39 and 36 percent basis. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit
to Bangladesh in 2011, it was announced that India would share the remaining 25 percent of the
river water on a 50:50 basis. However, the announcement was met by stiff opposition from
Mamata Banerjee and therefore India refrained from signing the agreement. 7The West Bengal
government has argued that such an agreement would adversely affect irrigation projects and
formed an “expert” committee to review the ground realities of water sharing, with progress on
the issue directly linked to the committee report. Although resistance from one of the

6
Piyali Dutta, “India Bangladesh Relations”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, September 2010
7
S.K Purohit, “Indian Foreign Policy” Swastik Publications, 2 nd edn, 2013

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participating states could not have been anticipated, the last minute cancellation was an
“avoidable mess” that did some damage to India’s image as a reliable partner.

Recently the Teesta water sharing issue has occupied an important dimension in determining
Bangladesh-India relations. It is argued that due to internal political calculations, Teesta has
remained an unresolved issue. For long term interests and consolidated Bangladesh-India
relations, Teesta issue needs to be resolved at the earliest.

4.3 Trade Dispute

Trade has been an important dimension in Indo-Bangla relations since the independence of
Bangladesh. It is pertinent to note that since 1971 until 2004, India was the largest trading
partner of Bangladesh. However, China’s trade with Bangladesh has manifold in recent years
and even surpassing India from 2004 onward. Notably, China is providing duty free access to
more than 4,700 Bangladeshi products. Hence, India also needs to open its market for
Bangladeshi products and provide duty free access. In Bangladesh-India bilateral trade, the major
problem lies in the huge trade imbalance. This huge trade imbalance needs to be addressed
through exploring new avenues of bilateral trade. In that case, tariff and non-tariff barriers
imposed by India for the Bangladeshi businesspersons need to be removed. In fact, during his
visit to Bangladesh in June
2015, Mr. Narendra Modi emphasized on increasing bilateral trade that needs to be implemented
through effective actions. Political will is important in this context.

4.4 Security Concern

Insurgency has been playing the role in straining relations of India with Bangladesh. Northeast
India has been facing insurgency since 1956 due to feelings of ethnic separatism among its
inhabitants. ISI is operating from Bangladesh, supporting the insurgents in the North east India.
National Liberation of Tripura (NLFT), Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFM) are major insurgent groups in Northeast India. There are
some rumours that ULFA has several lucrative income generating Projects in Bangladesh to
sustain its insurgency activities in India.
Bangladesh is increasingly being used as a transit point by drug dealers and the drug mafia,
which dispatches heroin and opium from Burma and other countries of the golden triangle, to

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different destinations. As a result Bangladesh’s department of Narcotics control has come under
the scanner several times and invited criticism. Bangladesh has become the prime transit route
for trafficking heroin to Europe from Southeast Asia, according to a report from the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB). INCB notes that the most common methods and routes for
smuggling heroin into Bangladesh are by courier from Pakistan, commercial vehicles and trains
from India and via sea through the Bay of Bengal or overland by truck or public transport from
Burma.

4.5 Transit Issue

Transit refers to the passage of Indian good across Bangladeshi borders to and from the North
Eastern states of Indian owned surface transport.
India has been urging Bangladesh to provide rail and road transit to connect with its north-
eastern states. The issue of transit was resolved in 1972 when both sides agreed on a mutually
beneficial arrangement for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce
between two countries and for passage of goods to places in one country through the territory of
the other. Inland water transit has been functional, but the rail and road transit is still waiting to
be operational.
Bangladesh's initial reluctance to granting India rail and road transit was on the grounds that
transit facility once given was difficult to take back and such a facility may encourage terrorism
and
insurgency. Other concerns included damage to the roads and bridges in Bangladesh by the
increased traffic flow from the Indian side.
The issue of granting transit rights to India has been a controversial affair in Bangladesh, with
many in the country arguing that India will take advantage of the transit access to more easily
transport its military personnel to its far flung borders across Arunachal Pradesh. They also
assume that India will exploit the transit access to put down the insurgency in the Northeast.
Military affairs aside, transit rights would also harm Bangladeshi exports to India’s northeast
which is presently dependent on Bangladeshi manufactured products due its isolated geographic
position. For this reason the relationship between India and Bangladesh remain in a deadlock.

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Transit access through Bangladesh would be hugely beneficial for India and would significantly
reduce transport time and costs between India and its North-eastern states, with Bangladesh
profiting in millions of dollars through transit fees.

Finally the India-Bangladesh waterways transit, carrying goods from Kolkata, was inaugurated
recently in Dhaka. In a first for New Delhi-Dhaka relations, the vessel carrying Indian goods

consigned for Tripura marked the official transit to India’s north-east via the inland waterways of
Bangladesh. The vessel from Kolkata, carrying a thousand tonnes of iron rods, was received at
Ashuganj port in Bangladesh by Shahjahan Khan, the Bangladeshi Shipping Minister, and Dr.
Mashiur Rahman, Adviser to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. This event marked the first
official transit (to India's) North East via Bangladesh.

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 Chapter-5

Problem of Illegal Migration

Illegal migration into Assam from Bangladesh has posed a serious security threat to the identity
of Assamese people. It adversely affects the social, economic and political environment of
Assam, creating law and order problems where immigrants are present in large number. The
deportation of illegal migrants become difficult due to the lack of strong law and political will, as
illegal migrants were used as a vote bank by different political parties. The ‘Bangladesh factor’ is
an important issue in north-east India due to illegal migration from Bangladesh. When the British
occupied the north-east, it was largely uninhabited due to rivalries amongst the local tribes and
massacres. Initially, under the British, the immigrant population from neighbouring regions like
Bengal, Bihar and Nepal were welcomed and were considered useful for the development of the
region. But soon immigrants were seen as encroachers on their lands and reserve forest that
affected demography and ecology of the area. Subsequently, in 1920 the British introduced Inner
Line System to restrict immigrants, mostly Bengali Muslims. However, it remained ineffective.
When the British left India, north-east was not affected by the riots. However, there was
uncertainty due to influx of refugees who found themselves on the other side of the border. 
Consequently, large scale migration had a social, economic, political and environmental effect
leading to people of the north-east voicing their concerns that took explosive dimension soon
after independence. Subsequently, the Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act 1950 was passed
in Parliament which mentioned that only those people who were displaced because of civil
disturbances in East Pakistan could migrate to India. The deportation of people caused much
antipathy in Pakistan that led to a conciliatory gesture from India in the form of Nehru-Liaquat

17
Ali Khan Agreement of 8 April 1950. The Agreement allowed return of those people to India
who had been deported till December 31, 1950.8 However, during the Sino-Indian War of 1962,
it was reported that some infiltrators were seen with Pakistani flags. This resulted in adoption of
the ‘Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan to Assam Plan (1964)’. But atrocities in East
Pakistan by Pakistani Punjabis in early 1970s led to the unchecked entry of Bangladesh (then
East Pakistanis) refugees into India on a large scale. Subsequently, the Indira-Mujib Agreement
of 1972 redefined the status of illegal immigrants in India as it declared that all those who had
come before 1971 were declared non-Bangladeshis. The Agreement was highly resented by the
natives of the north-east which resulted in large scale agitation led by the rebel groups.
Consequently, enactment of Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunal) Act or IMDT Act came
into force in 1983. The Act was meant to detect and deport illegal migrants through tribunals.
The IMDT Act could not resolve the perennial immigrant problem in the north-east.
Subsequently, the Assam Accord of 1985 was accepted. This accord fixed the cut-off date to
determine illegal migrants in Assam as March 25, 1971, the day Bangladesh was born. The
Accord mentioned that all those migrants who had come and settled in the state on or before this
date shall be regarded as citizens and those illegal migrants who are found to have arrived in the
state after this date are to be detected and expelled in accordance with the law. With the signing
of the Assam Accord, the rebel groups launched a militant struggle against the government as
they asked government to revoke the Accord and instead enact a law that deports all illegal
immigrants irrespective of their time of immigration.

As a matter of fact, soon after the signing the Assam Accord, the Bangladeshi Muslims who had
initially identified themselves as Assamese speaking started registering themselves as Bengali
speaking. It has been alleged over the years that the leadership of various political parties have
supported illegal immigration of Bangladeshi nationals because they constitute themselves as
committed voters for such leadership. These immigrants were clandestinely provided with ration
cards and their names were included in the voters’ list. Subsequent election results, that have
brought in considerable immigrant Muslim population in the state legislative assembly, have
reflected the growing overall clout of the Bangladeshi immigrants. However, Bangladeshi
infiltration remains unchecked and illegal immigration continues to be a sensitive issue,

8
Dr. Chandrika Singh, “North East India: Politics and Insurgency”, Manas Publications, 2003. pp. 45

18
exploited by vested political interests. It is widely believed that Islamic militancy has been
consolidating because of unabated Bangladeshi immigration. There are many extremist
organisations working in the region. Some of these organisations are directly raised by Pakistan’s
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), and thus, are the most fanatical with a clear anti-Indian stance.
To conclude, despite the serious demographic, economic, security and political ramifications of
the illegal immigrants in the north-east, these developments continue to remain substantially
outside the realm of the security discourse in the country.

Chapter-6

Nexus between China and Bangladesh

While India played a pivotal role in the independence of Bangladesh, it now witnesses a shift in
the priority given to its ties by its Eastern neighbour. Bangladesh has welcomed China to be one
of its most vital partners in the decades since 1971. The matrix of Beijing-Dhaka relations
permeates multiple avenues, ranging from strategic to commercial, from energy security to
infrastructural. China has helped to build Bangladesh’s military capabilities since 2002. Naval
defence is being given particular attention. In addition, Bangladesh set up a missile launch pad
near Chittagong Port with assistance from China in 2008. These developments make it clear that
Bangladesh fears perceived Indian hegemony. However, Sheikh Hasina has reassured Delhi that
her state will not be a base for anti-Indian manoeuvres. Such traditional military threats do not
exist, but there are non-traditional threats towards India. These include terrorist outfits operating
from Bangladeshi soil. This is one reason for which Bangladesh is keen to have strong military
alliance with China, apart from counter-insurgency cooperation with India. Nevertheless, China
is pushing ahead with its strategic and commercial forays in Bangladesh at full speed. 9

Chinese ventures into infrastructure building and port development are aimed at consolidating
Beijing’s vision for a maritime corridor extending from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean
via the Bay of Bengal. China also helped Bangladesh in building Chittagong Port. Chittagong is

9
Piyali Dutta, A Special Report on “India Bangladesh Relations”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

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some 242 km southeast of capital Dhaka. Chittagong, as the biggest port city of Bangladesh, is
the locality of both the Chittagong Base of Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Naval Academy.
In 2010 China agreed to finance the $8.7 billion port development in Chittagong, Bangladesh.
While China maintains that the ports are strictly commercial developments, India fears that the
ports have potential military application, thus sparking concern that China is slowly attempting
to encircle them. As China continues to expand and Indian fears continue to grow, the region is
trending towards instability. China’s construction of dams on the Brahmaputra river in Tibet, or
the Yarlung Zangbo river in Chinese, cause India’s Northeast and Bangladesh to face acute water
shortage. Infact, China has blocked a tributary of the Brahmaputra river in Tibet as part of the
construction of its "most expensive" hydro project which could cause concern in India as it may
impact water flows into the lower riparian countries. The Lalho project on Xiabuqu river, a
tributary of Yarlung Zangbo (the Tibetan name for Brahmaputra), in Xigaze in Tibet involves an
investment of 4.95 billion yuan (USD 740 million). Xigaze also known as Shigatse is closely
located to Sikkim. From Xigaze, the Brahmaputra flows into Arunachal Pradesh. It is not clear
yet what impact the blockade of the river will have on the flow of water from the Brahmaputra
into the lower riparian countries like India and Bangladesh There are also fears that the
Brahmaputra may be used as a political tool in Chinese foreign policy, via a stronger say in water
sharing discussions. Also, rapid development of infrastructure in the Northeast could create
social tensions with local tribes. That must be avoided to prevent China instigating Arunachal
Pradesh locals to agitate against India. Despite the consequences, India was seen to take a
cautious stand. The small state would be greatly impacted by Chinese activities on the
Brahmaputra, as it supplies 75 percent of the water to Bangladeshi rivers. However, China has
assured India that there would be no implications downstream.

The Chinese shadow over Bangladesh may have made the Indian Central government persuade
West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee to break the ice with Prime Minister Hasina
over the Teesta river water sharing issue on her recent visit to Dhaka. Bangladesh feels this lag in
its relationship with India, as it has not hesitated to cooperate with the Big Brother in many
spheres, but has seen no returns on the Teesta issue till recently. These areas of cooperation
include internal monitoring and curtailing of terrorist activity that could be directed at India and
handing over Northeast Indian insurgents operating out of Bangladesh.

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It is hence observed that progress needs to be made on several fronts to improve India-
Bangladesh relations. China’s military matrix with Dhaka is a source of immediate concern.
Bangladesh is a crucial part of India’s Act East Policy. It is time to relaunch India-Bangladesh
ties in a new way and culminate them in strong diplomatic, strategic and trade relations.

Conclusion
This study began with an attempt to study about the major issues between India and Bangladesh.
So, all that can be concluded is that India's links with Bangladesh are civilisational, cultural,
social and economic, but over the last 38 years or so, the relationship between the two countries
have not been sustained so far in a positive manner. The relationship did take off on a very
positive note in 1972, but has been strained since 1975, except for a short period of five years
from 1992 to 1996. The reason has been false apprehensions of India in the Bangladeshi minds,
fueled by anti-India elements.
As a lot of goodwill exists amongst the common Bangladeshi’s about India. It is India who needs
to take a bold and fresh initiative and offer an opportunity to Bangladeshi to remove her
apprehensions. The bilateral agreements and MoUs are certainly going to bring some freshness
in the relationship between India and Bangladesh. The economic development and social
progress of Bangladesh is in interest of India. They will certainly address many borderland
problems, which create tensions between the two countries. Simultaneously, efforts needs to be
made to resolve outstanding bilateral issues by mutual consultation, especially the Teesta river
dispute as it impacts lives of many people.
Since the joint operation in the Liberation War of 1971: a large reservoir of goodwill exists
between the Freedom Fighters and the Armed Forces of India. This needs to be utilized for
developing stronger and lasting ties between the two countries. More guided inter-actions
between the youth, common people and younger generations of intellectuals is also essential, so

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that the future generations of the two countries while carrying no burden of the Liberation War,
feels more confident in dealing with each other.
The two countries are intertwined in cultural and geographical ties. It is in the interest of their
political leaders that they develop more trust in each other: irrespective of their political
philosophies, they should use their skill to resolve bi-lateral issues, so that their people of both
Bangladesh and India can enjoy fruits of developments and live in peace and harmony.

Bibliography
Books:
1. Ghosh Peu, “International Relations”, PHI Learning Private Limited, New Delhi , 2013
2. Purohit S.K, “Indian Foreign Policy: New Dimensions and Directions”, Swastik
Publications, New Delhi, 2011
3. Umar Badruddin, “The Emergence of Bangladesh”, Foundation Books, New Delhi, 2017
4. Singh Chandrika, “North East India: Politics and Insurgency”, Manas Publications, 2003

Research Articles
1. Piyali Dutta, A Special Report on “India Bangladesh Relations”, Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies.

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