Media Power Media Politics PDF

Media Power,
Media Politics
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Media Power,
Media Politics
Edited by Mark J. Rozell
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC

Lunham Boulder New York Oxford
ROWMAN & LITTLEHELD PUBLISHERS. INC.
Published in the United States of America

by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
A Member of the Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowmanlittlefield.com
PO Box 317
Oxford
OX2 9RU, UK
Copyright 0 2003 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationData

Media power, media politics / edited by Mark J. Rozell.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7425-1157-X (cloth)-ISBN 0-7425-1 158-8 (paper)
1. Communication in politics. 2. Mass media-Political aspects. I.
Rozell, Mark J.
JA85 .M433,2003
320' .01'4-d~21
2002153221
BTM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO 239.48- 1992.
Contents
Preface vii
1 The Presidency and the News Media 1

John Anthony Maltese
2 Congress and the Media 25

Mark J. Rozell
3 The Supreme Court and the Press 45

Vincent James Strickler and Richard Davis
4 The Media and Civil Right and Liberties 75

Barbara A. Perry
5 Bureaucracy and the Media 97

Jan Vemeer
6 The Media in State and Local Politics 119

G. Patrick Lynch
7 Political Parties and the Media 141

C. Danielle Vinson
V
vi Contents
8 Presidential Elections and the Media 159

Mary Stuckey
9 The Media and Interest Groups in the United States 181

Ronald G. Shaiko
10 The Media and Public Opinion 207

Stephen K . Medvic and David A. Dulio
11 Global Media and Foreign Policy 235

Maryann Cusimano Love
12 Media Impact 265

Louis Klarevas
13 The New Media 297

Jeremy D. Mayer and Michael Cornjeld
14 Media Ethics and Political Communication 319

Dan Stout
Index 337
Preface
T h e chapters that follow provide a traditional American Govern-

ment textbook framework for understanding the role of the media in
U.S. politics. Chapters analyze the relationship between the media
and key institutions, political actors, and nongovernmental entities,
as well as the role of the new media, media ethics, and foreign pol-
icy coverage. Why study the intersection of the media and politics?
The media are a pervasive influence in American society and pol-
itics. The study of modern American politics thus requires an exami-
nation of the role of the media in legitimizing issues, framing debates,
and even altering outcomes. Many journalists insist that their role is
not to influence the political process, but merely to report events. Few
any longer truly believe that the media are such neutral actors.
Indeed, the study of media politics in the past generation has prolif-
erated tremendously. In the political science profession, as recently as
the 1970s and 1980s a relatively few prominent scholars, led by
Michael J. Robinson, pointed others in the direction of coming to
terms with the political influence of the U.S. media. Today there are
hundreds of scholars in the discipline and in the fields of communica-
tions and mass media studies devoting their research efforts to under-
standing the impact of the media in politics.
Journalists too have turned a critical eye toward understanding their
profession’s impact in the political realm. There are public affairs tel-
evision shows devoted solely to analyzing the role of journalists in
vii
viii Preface
covering political events. Many prominent reporters have written

books analyzing the impact of journalism on presidential campaigns,
on the politics of the White House, and on congressional activities.
Many large city newspapers, such as the Washington Post, have regu-
lar columns devoted to analyzing the media.
Numerous media “watchdog” groups also have developed in re-
sponse to the growing impact of the media in politics. Many of these
groups have political agendas and seek to neutralize the impact of the
media on key issues. The conservative Accuracy in Media perceives
the mainstream press as heavily tilted toward liberalism. The left
leaning Fairness and Accuracy in Media sees a national press too
heavily tilted toward the interests of corporate America. They are just
two of the many organizations that watch the media.
Public figures routinely take on the media, oftentimes to protest per-
ceptions of inaccurate or biased coverage. In some cases the role of the
media becomes a key issue in a campaign, as in 1992 when former
President George H. W. Bush’s most popular campaign bumper sticker
said, “Annoy the Media. Reelect Bush.” Political leaders, Republican
and Democrat alike, complain of unfair coverage and criticize the me-
dia in an attempt to gain public sympathy and support.
Criticism of the media seems to have worked. Opinion polls
show that the journalism profession today is generally held in low
regard. As public trust in political institutions declined in the 1980s
and 1990s, so did support for the media. Public trust in political in-
stitutions has increased in the past year, though the media have not
enjoyed a similar surge of support.
Why have the media lost the public trust? There are various ex-
planations that scholars and media observers have offered. One is
that the media have become too intrusive and obsessed with the sen-
sational, as evidenced by such cases as the saturation coverage of
the Clinton scandal in 1998-1999, or of the extramarital conduct of
presidential candidate Gary Hart in 1988. Second, some suggest
that media coverage tilts toward the trivial, especially in campaign
politics, and emphasizes such events as candidate pratfalls and mis-
statements while ignoring key issues. Third, as many journalists
have moved from straight reporting to also analyzing the news, the
public perceives them as just another set of self-interested players
Preface ix
in the political game. Fourth, some observers suggest that the rise of
“celebrity journalism,” which is characterized by certain prominent
reporters commanding large public speaking fees, has made the pro-
fession appear as tainted by money and conflicts of interest as the
political world.
Despite these criticisms, there is undoubtedly much to praise
about the U S . media and their handling of campaign and institu-
tional coverage. Whereas the public perception is that the media are
in decline, some scholars see contemporary political journalism as
more professionally oriented and complete in its coverage of key
events than ever before. The media received generally high marks,
for example, for their crisis coverage during and the first days after
the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S.
A number of commissions, think tanks, and university studies
have addressed the issue of improving the practice of journalism
and enhancing public trust in the profession. Understanding the role
of the media in U.S. politics is surely a first and necessary step in
that process.
M. J. R.
Washington, D.C.
1
The Presidency and the News Media
john Anthony Maltese
O n e of the most important changes of the modern presidency is the

degree to which presidents now engage in ongoing attempts to di-
rect public opinion. This practice of “going public”’ has been insti-
tutionalized through the creation of a number of White House staff
units designed to implement the tactic. This is but one part of a
tremendous growth of presidential staff that took place in the 20th
century. That growth reflected the emergence of a White
House-centered system of government and a complex bureaucratic
state. As Lester Seligman wrote in the 1950s, the growth of staff
“altered the behavior of the president in all signijkant aspects.”
Presidential leadership, he added, was no longer “a solo perfor-
mance, but part of a continuing line of executive action.”2
Congress was largely responsible for the emergence of the mod-
ern presidency. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 required
the president to submit a budget for the whole of government every
year and created the Bureau of the Budget to help him with that
task. As James Sundquist has written, this made the president a pol-
icy initiator and manager, whether he wanted to be or not.3 Soon,
presidents were using the Bureau of the Budget as a central clear-
inghouse of legislative proposals -a means of asserting their own
judgments, choices, and priorities in molding a legislative package,
rather than deferring to those of individual departments and agen-
cies in the Executive Branch! In the 1950s, President Dwight D.
1
2 John Anthony Maltese
Eisenhower created the Congressional Relations Office as a tool to

lobby members of Congress and secure the passage of legislation
that the president had proposed. By the 1990s, an array of staff units
designed to coordinate the flow of information from the Executive
Branch and to rally public support for presidential policies was
firmly entrenched. Together, these staff units have had a significant
impact on the president’s relationship with the media.
COMMUNICATIONS STAFF
Several staff units within the White House play a direct role in com-
munications. The most prominent of these are the White House
Press Office and the White House Office of Communications. Of
the two, the White House Press Office is the most well-known.
Formally created by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933, the Press Office
was an institutional response to the need to coordinate relations
with White House reporter^.^ Under the direction of the White
House press secretary, the Press Office (which now consists of
about twenty people) disseminates the news of the day and responds
to reporters’ queries. Located downstairs in the West Wing of the
White House, the Press Office is largely reactive and caters to
Washington-based reporters who frequent its domain? The most
visible part of the Press Office is the Briefing Room, where the
press secretary meets with reporters at regular intervals (usually two
daily briefings). An informal morning briefing (called the “gaggle”)
takes place without the intrusion of cameras, but the afternoon
briefing is now televised on C-SPAN, with transcripts and audio
available at the White House website (http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/briefings/). Junior Press Office staff have space next to
the Briefing Room, and George W. Bush’s press secretary, Ari Flei-
scher, was located just down the hall from the Oval O f f i ~ e . ~
The White House Office of Communicationsis less famous than
the Press Office. Created by Richard Nixon in 1969, the Office of
Communications was an institutional response to the need to coordi-
nate the flow of news from the entire Executive Branch and to com-
municate more directly with the American people through the use of
The Presidency and the News Media 3
town meetings, local media outlets, and other forms of direct appeal.
Its creation was a clear embrace of the tactic of “going public.”
Housed upstairs in the West Wing by George W. Bush, it is more
proactively concerned with building public support for particular
policy initiatives than the Press Office, and more concerned with
long-range communications planning and the coordination of the
line of the day among a wide range of presidential surrogates both in
and out of the Executive Branch. Originally, it was also designed to
serve as a liaison with local media-a function that now belongs to
the office of Media Liaison (which also arranges newspaper, radio,
and television interviews with administration officials and other pro-
administration surrogates). Indeed, the precise structure and func-
tions of the Office of Communications have changed from one pres-
idential administration to the next. In the Bush administration, the
Office of Communications “oversees message and communications
development and planning, and works with the Advance office on
planning and production of presidential events.”*A number of other
staff units work with (and sometimes under the jurisdiction of) the
Office of Communications. These have included the Speechwriting
Office (which writes the president’s speeches), the News Analysis
Office (which dissects how the media are covering the White
House), the Office of Foreign Affairs (which serves as a liaison
with foreign media), as well as the Office of Media Liaison?
Some administrations (such as Bill Clinton’s) have also had of-
fices of Research, Planning, and Policy Coordination that were
usually supervised by the Office of Communications. In addition,
several staff units that serve as liaison with specific constituencies
also play an important role in communicating the president’s
agenda and building support for his policies. These include staff
units designed to build support for presidential initiatives on Capi-
tol Hill (the Office of Congressional Relations), among interest
groups (the Office of Public Liaison), and among members of the
president’s own political party (the Office of Political Affairs).
George W. Bush appointed Dan Bartlett as communications di-
rector on October 2,2001. In that post, Bartlett continued to serve
as principal deputy to Karen Hughes, counselor to the president,
who supervised a wide array of communications-related operations
in the White House, including the Office of Communications, the

Office of Media Liaison, and the Speechwriting Office.1o Carl
Rove, Bush’s senior adviser for strategic initiatives, also worked
closely with Hughes and Bartlett, and oversaw the Office of Public
Liaison. Rounding out Bush’s communications team was Mary
Matalin, assistant to the president and counselor for the vice presi-
dent, who served as the senior communications adviser to Vice
President Dick Cheney. All had offices upstairs in the West Wing.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11,2001, and
the ensuing U.S. war on terrorism, the Bush administration also
created a special 24-hour communications operation called the
Coalition Information Center (CIC). Directed by James Wilkin-
son (and falling under the broader supervision of Karen Hughes),
the CIC was established as part of an effort to build public support
abroad for the war on terrorism-especially among Muslims in the
Middle East. Such attempts to “go international” are not new.”
One of the first presidents to use such a tactic in a systematic way
was Ronald Reagan, who used his Office of Communications as a
tool to build public support in western Europe for the U.S. decision
to deploy nuclear weapons there.12 Bush’s CIC, though, is the most
extensive operation of its kind, and one that reflects the ongoing
need for rapid response to breaking news around the world. As
Wilkinson explained: “This is the first war that has a never-ending
news cycle. It may be 3 o’clock in the morning in the United
States, but somewhere in the world, a journalist is on deadline. A
24-hour news cycle required the coalition to set up a 24-hour op-
eration to communicate the facts.”13
Wilkinson’s team (a staff of some two dozen) was housed in the
spacious Indian Treaty Room of the Eisenhower Executive Office
Building. From there, Wilkinson coordinated daily press briefings
at CIC offices around the world (including in London, Islamabad,
and Kabul), booked interviews of U.S. officials and other pro-
administration surrogates on international media (ranging from
the BBC to A1 Jazeera, the Arabic language satellite television
network), countered “misinformation” spread by opponents of the
U.S., coordinated a global line of the day, and generated photo
opportunities and long-range plans to build support for U.S. pol-
icy. For example, the CIC waged a campaign to focus worldwide

attention on how the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had repressed
women. The CIC used speeches by First Lady Laura Bush and
Cherie Blair, wife of the British prime minister, to highlight the
issue.14 It also led efforts to portray Osama bin Laden as a “false
prophet” and to distance him from the Islamic faith.15At the same
time, the CIC reached out to Muslims and took actions to high-
light U.S. sensitivity to Islamic tradition. It scheduled a meeting
between President Bush and ambassadors from 53 Muslim coun-
tries in the East Room of the White House in honor of the holy
month of Ramadan. There, the guests knelt and touched their
foreheads to the floor in prayer. The president then hosted an If-
tar dinner (a breaking of the dawn-to-dusk fast observed daily by
Muslims during Ramadan) in the State Dining Room. The CIC
also arranged for a Muslim, Yahya Hendi, to give the opening
prayer at the U.S. House of Representatives, and then distributed
videotapes of the prayer (in both English and Arabic) around the
world. It even worked with the U.S. State Department in the
printing and distribution of thousands of copies of a series of
posters, “Mosques of America.”16 Wilkinson said that the opera-
tion would continue “as long as there’s a war.’717
The many White House staff units discussed above actually rep-
resent only a small fraction of the overall communications staff of
the Executive Branch. Cabinet departments and Executive Branch
agencies and bureaus all have their own communications staff .18
This includes both press officers and other communications strate-
gists. News about the U.S. war on terrorism, for example, came not
only from White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, CIC director
Wilkinson , and other White House communications staffers such
as Mary Matalin, but from spokespersons in such departments as
State, Defense, and Justice. Some, such as Charlotte Beers, the un-
dersecretary of state for public relations in the State Department,
worked closely with the White House in its public relations war on
terrori~rn.’~Among other things, she spearheaded the “Rewards for
Justice” campaign-a series of ads run in the United States and the
Middle East that offered to pay rewards up to $25 million for infor-
mation leading to the arrest of terrorists?O
MULTIPLE STAFF AND THE PROBLEM

OF CONFLICTING MESSAGES
With so many staff units involved in communicating the president’s

message, tensions sometimes arise. At times, the interests or agendas
of the White House may be at odds with those of a particular depart-
ment or agency in the Executive Branch. For example, tensions arose
during the Nixon administration between the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the White House over how to portray crime statistics.
The FBI was eager to stress the negative-that the national crime rate
was up-in order to increase its chances of getting more money from
Congress to fight crime. The White House, on the other hand, wanted
to show that it was achieving success in its “War on Crime” by down-
playing the fact that the national crime rate was up and emphasizing
the fact that violent crime had actually decreased?l
One of the reasons that President Nixon created the Office of Com-
munications was to ensure that Executive Branch entities toed the
White House line. Nixon was suspicious of career bureaucrats, many
of whom were then Democrats. As a Republican, Nixon feared that
bureaucrats would thwart his policies through obstruction and nega-
tive publicity. In the end, Nixon’s Ofice of Communications con-
vinced the FBI to back down on the issue of how to portray crime sta-
tistics, but there are limits to how successfully the White House can
manage the flow of news from the rest of the Executive Branch. As
the Monica Lewinsky scandal unfolded in the Clinton administration,
the public statements of FBI director Louis Freeh conflicted with
those of the White House. Attorney General Janet Reno also dis-
tanced herself from White House communications strategies con-
cerning Lewinsky. Her interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the
Department of Justice required a different communications strategy
than one designed to keep Bill Clinton in office. Similarly, the Lewin-
sky affair led to conflicting communications advice from within the
White House itself. The president’s legal advisers in the Office of
White House Counsel urged the president to remain silent about the
issue, while his political advisers urged him to speak out.
Conflicts can also emerge because of turf wars. This was a par-
ticular problem for Bill Clinton because of his proclivity to set up
ad hoc communications units within the White House and to rely on

the advice of a wide array of different advisers both in and out of
the administration. With so many different individuals and staff
units sharing similar functions, personality splits, policy differ-
ences, and other self-interested motivations pulled at the fabric of a
seamless communications strategy. In Clinton’s first term, splits
within the White House between New Democrats and Old Guard
Democrats were legionF2 In the communications arena, this led to
bitter disagreements and mutual suspicion between the likes of
David Gergen (a former speechwriter for President Nixon, and di-
rector of communications for Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan) and
George Stephanopoulos (Clinton’s first communications director,
who became senior adviser to the president for policy and strategy
when Gergen arrived). Gergen’s appointment as counselor to the
president for communications in May 1993 stunned some Clinton
advisers, who wondered how a longtime Republican strategist
would fit into a Democratic administration.
The White House chief of staff often plays an important role in
overseeing and coordinating communications strategy. Some do so
very directly, as did Clinton chief of staff Leon Panetta. Others del-
egate some of the responsibility to colleagues, as did another Clin-
ton chief of staff, Erskine Bowles (who put his deputy, John
Podesta, in charge of communications oversight)F3 Bush chief of
staff Andrew Card also delegated much of the direct communica-
tions oversight, to Karen Hughes. The management styles of indi-
vidual presidents and their chiefs of staff can have a significant
influence on any given administration’s communications strategy.
Bush’s communications operation is more tightly organized and
disciplined than Clinton’s was in his first term, with an emphasis on
such things as a dress code and punctuality. Communications staff,
who are part of the president’s coterie of personal political advisers,
serve at the whim of individual presidents. There is all but complete
turnover of staff between presidential administrations (especially
when control of the White House shifts from one political party to
another), and there is often significant turnover of staff even within
administrations.A potentially dangerous by-product of this turnover
is that communications staff (especially at the beginning of a new
president’s term of office) can sometimes have little or no institu-

tional memory. Such inexperience badly hurt Bill Clinton’s com-
munications operation in the early part of his first term-a pitfall
that Bush managed to avoid.
CLINTON AND THE PRESS: LESSONS FROM

A HONEYMOON GONE AWRY
Problems of arrogance and inexperience on the part of White House

staff badly damaged President Clinton’s relations with the White
House press corps in the early days of his first term. Wounds in-
flicted during that period never fully healed. When Clinton took of-
fice in January 1993, his press secretary was Dee Dee Myers and his
director of communications was George Stephanopoulos . Myers
and the Press Office then fell under the jurisdiction of Stephanopou-
10s and the Office of Communications. Initially, Stephanopoulos
and Myers shared the responsibility for briefing reporters. Some re-
porters complained that not only had the press secretary post been
downgraded as a result of the shared briefing responsibilities, but
that Myers seemed to be out of the loop and therefore unable to an-
swer questions to their satisfaction. At the same time, they per-
ceived Stephanopoulos as aloof and unresponsive to their needs.
As we have seen, the press secretary serves as a liaison with a sta-
ble group of veteran reporters who cover the White House. These re-
porters are responsible for most of the stories about the White House
that go out on the wire services and appear in the major newspapers
and on network and cable television news shows. In short, they play
a major role in setting the tone of White House news coverage. One
reason President Nixon was eager to create an Office of Communi-
cations was to bypass these veteran reporters, who he felt were hos-
tile toward him. Local media, Nixon believed, were more conserva-
tive than the national media, and thus more receptive to his policies.
Moreover, he was eager to exploit ways of communicating informa-
tion directly to the people without having it filtered by the critical
lens of the White House press corps. Television, radio, the use of sur-
rogate speakers appearing in local communities, and the adroit use
of White House sponsored op-ed pieces were all part of this strategy
as used by Nixon’s Office of Communications and its de~cendants.2~
But, despite the importance of circumventing the press corps on
some Occasions, it is also important for the White House to maintain
a good working relationship with them. In its early days, at least, the
Clinton administration did not do that.
Both substantively and symbolically, Clinton began his first term
by turning a cold shoulder to the White House press corps. In the
1992 presidential campaign, Clinton had very effectively followed
a strategy of “narrowcasting”-using media outlets like MTV, the
Arsenio Hull Show, and Don Imus’s radio talk show to transmit di-
rect, targeted messages to particular constituenciesF5 Clinton’s
communications advisers felt that the rise of the “New Media” (the
Internet, cable, satellite technology, and the like) provided an un-
paralleled opportunity for direct communication between the White
House and the American people. Sidney Blumenthal, who later
joined the Clinton White House as a communications strategist,
touted the possibilities of unmediated communication in an article
in the New Yorker magazine. The “Old Media” (such as the big-
three network news shows) were “anachronistic,” he wrote, and
were “no more likely to return than are the big bands.”26
Thus, the Clinton White House focused its energy and attention
on the New Media as part of a strategy of avoiding the critical filter
of the Old Media. In the process, Clinton turned a cold shoulder to
the White House press corps. During his first two months in office,
he did not even hold a full-scale press conference for them. He did,
however, hold some 25 sessions with representatives of local media
as part of an effort to target messages to specific media marketsF7
First Lady Hillary Clinton followed a similar strategy. By mid-April
of 1993, she had granted interviews to 19 local television anchors,
but had granted only three interviews to members of the White
House press corpsF8Ann Compton of ABC News said that of the
five presidents that she had covered until then, Clinton was the only
one who “did everything in his power to go around, under, and
away from the White House press
There were other differences, too. Tom Rosenstiel has noted that
when Clinton took office, the West Wing of the White House was
transformed overnight from a place where President George Herbert

Walker Bush had enforced a dress code (men had to wear ties, women
skirts) to a place with a more youthful view of anything goes. Rosen-
stiel described the new director of Satellite Services, 23-year-old
David Anderson, as a young man with spiked hair who wore all black
and had not yet finished college (he was working at night after work
to finish up his degree at Oberlin). The director of Radio Operations,
Richard Strauss, was also 23, and also finishing up his degree (at
UCLA) at night by correspondence. According to Rosenstiel, 63 of the
roughly 450 full-time White House staffers were under the age of 24.
George Stephanopoulos had reached the ripe old age of 32. Veteran
White House reporters experienced a generation gap. The then 63-
year-old David Broder of the Washington Post was quoted by Rosen-
stiel as saying that covering the new Clinton White House was “like
coming home and finding that your kids got into the liquor cabinet.”3o
But, most importantly, the extent to which the Clinton White House
wanted to control the news and keep veteran reporters at bay stunned
the press corps. One of Stephanopoulos’s first decisions was to close
off access to the upstairs foyer in the West Wing where he and Press
Secretary Myers had their offices. For more than 20 years, reporters
had been free to wander that foyer in search of news. They could chat
informally with communications officials or poke their head into the
press secretary’s office to get a quick answer to a question. It was a
clear sign that reporters and officials were on an equal playing field.
Now, as Ann Compton put it, the foyer was a “no-fly zone,” symbol-
izing the hierarchical relationship between reporters and officials?1 In
the new arrangement, reporters complained that they had to wait to be
spoon-fed. Some complained that phone calls from downstairs were
not returned in time for reporters to meet their deadlines?*
The press corps reacted with fury. Stephanopoulos, who seemed
surprised by the reaction, refused to rescind his decision to shut off
the upstairs foyer. He did try to increase access elsewhere, however.
He assigned two communications staffers to the lower pressroom on
a permanent basis to handle reporters’ queries.33He also added an
extra press briefing each day?4 But the measures did nothing to
calm the irate press corps. They had lost their space and, with it, a
kind of access that was irreplaceable. In turn, the White House lost
the goodwill of reporters. “Put it this way,” said Karen Hosler,

Washington correspondent for the Baltimore Sun and president of
the White House Correspondents Association: “We’re not going to
cut them any breaks.”35 Stephanopoulos, the darling of the media
during the 1992 presidential campaign, now received a steady
stream of negative press. “Arrogant,” the media called him.36His
relations with reporters at daily briefings soured noticeably. He
earned a reputation for evading questions and withholding informa-
ti0n.3~In the American Journalism Review, Leslie Kaufman wrote
that during briefings the press corps showed “a snickering impu-
dence” toward Stephanopoulos that they had rarely directed toward
George H. W. Bush’s press secretary, Marlin F i t ~ w a t e r . ~ ~
What the Clinton team failed to recognize in this critical “honey-
moon” period was the extent to which the Old Media still mattered.
Despite all the new avenues of communication created by techno-
logical advancements, a 1998 Gallup Poll showed that most Amer-
icans still relied on the Old Media as their primary source of news.
Most importantly,Americans continued to trust the Old Media more
than the New?9 Far from being the anachronism that Blumenthal
had predicted it would become, the Old Media continued to play an
important gatekeeping role for most Americans. In the new envi-
ronment, narrowcasting and circumvention of the White House
press corps had their place-but so did the long-standing symbiotic
relationship between the White House and the Old Media. The re-
lationship only worked if the White House courted the press corps
and fed it information, rather than snubbing it.
Television news coverage of Clinton was decidedly negative dur-
ing his first 100 days in office: 60 percent negative according to a
study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs (compared to only
39 percent negative coverage of George H. W. Bush during his first
100 days, in 1989).@Public opinion polls taken during that period
were also troubling. Clinton pollster Stan Greenberg found that 70
percent of the American people rated Clinton in the fair to poor cate-
gories, while only 28 percent chose the excellent or good categories?1
In response to such problems, the White House thoroughly revamped
its communications operation. After only five months in his job,
Stephanopoulos was “promoted” to senior adviser to the president for
policy and strategy, and was replaced as communications director by

Mark Gearan. David Gergen became counselor to the president in
charge of all White House communications operations.
Gergen quickly set out to establish good relations with the press
corps. He reopened the upstairs foyer that Stephanopoulos had shut
off to reporters, quickly arranged for the president to hold a press
conference, and started making arrangements for the president to
meet informally with members of the press corps for dinner. He saw
to it that Press Secretary Myers was included on a more regular ba-
sis in senior staff meetings so that she could answer questions more
knowledgeably than she had previously been able to, and also made
sure that reporters’ calls were returned before deadline and that the
communications staff treated the press corps politely and with re-
spect.“* Gergen also gave backgrounders on a regular basis to
reporters and established a good working relationship with them. In
July 1993, a month after Gergen took over, network news coverage
was 40 percent positive (up from 27 percent in May)?3
Within the White House, though, serious rifts had emerged. Many
White House staffers were suspicious of Gergen, who had served so
many Republican presidents. White House chief of staff Mack
McLarty, who had orchestrated the changes, also came under suspi-
cion. Gergen attempted to mend fences with reporters by speaking
openly about what he viewed as problems in the Clinton White House.
As Washington Post reporter Howard Kurtz has written, Gergen would
“privately agree with reporters that the place was screwed up, that
Clinton had glaring weaknesses-and then use the credibility of these
confessions to make some positive point about the president.’”14While
this was popular with reporters, it exacerbated tensions within the
White House. Partly because of these tensions, Gergen could not get
the White House to fashion a consistent media message. He was eager
for the president to fashion a more conservative,centrist agenda, while
Stephanopoulosand others argued for a more liberal one.
Compounding the problem was Chief of Staff McLarty’s failure to
take hold of the reins and deal directly with the conflicting camps. He
was perceived as a weak leader, and given his corporate background
in Arkansas, had had little experience either with either Washington
or politics before becoming chief of staff. By October 1993, news
stories openly questioned McLarty ’s authority. Ann Devroy wrote in

the Washington Post that McLarty had “maintained an unusually
low-key role in the past several months, and there have been few
public indications that he plays a substantive role in policy-making
or communications. . . . [I]f he has a central role in the White House,
it has not been visible.”45 Then, publication of Bob Woodward’s
book, The Agenda, in June 1994 portrayed White House staffers as
inexperienced and largely out of control. That was the last straw.
McLarty was out by the end of the month, replaced by Leon Panetta.
Panetta brought leadership to the chief of staff position, and he did
much to bring discipline to the Clinton communications operation.
He immediately began efforts to get rid of Press Secretary Myers.
Initially, Clinton overruled Panetta, but Myers announced her resig-
nation in December 1994, after the previous month’s disastrous
midterm elections, in which Democrats lost control of both houses
of Congress. Clinton replaced her with State Department spokesman
Mike McCurry. David Gergen had already been forced out and, in
August 1995, Don Baer (previously the head of the Speechwriting
Office) replaced Mark Gearan as director of communications.
Chastened by the midterm election results, facing some of the
lowest public approval ratings of his presidency (as low as 39 per-
cent in September 1994), and gearing up for his own reelection bid
in 1996, Clinton became more disciplined in his dealings with the
press. Throughout his first two years in office, Clinton had often
treated reporters with contempt. Like Richard Nixon before him,
Clinton felt that the press were conspiring to undo him. Howard
Kurtz has written that Clinton’s staff felt that if he had an Achilles’
heel, “it was his tendency to go off half-cocked about the press.”46
Sometimes unable to control his temper in front of reporters who
antagonized him, Clinton had further damaged his relationship with
the press corps and fostered the image that he was petty.
Out of necessity, Clinton tried to repair the damage after the 1994
midterm elections. He asked the press corps for their forgiveness.
He opened up to them at informal bagel breakfasts, cultivated ties
with influential opinion makers like E. J. Dionne, and scrupulously
practiced his answers to questions in formal sessions with his staff
before any encounter with reporters. Known as “pre-briefs ,” these
sessions helped to focus the president’s responses, but some said

that they were also designed to limit his public displays of anger by
allowing him to vent to his aides in ~ r i v a t e . 4The
~ efforts finally
seemed to work. By the time Clinton won reelection in 1996, he
presided over a well-oiled spin machine and enjoyed high public
approval ratings. Much of his second term, though, was consumed
by the Monica Lewinsky affair!*
FACTORS THAT UNDERMINE THE PRESIDENT’S

COMMUNICATIONS AGENDA
George W. Bush learned from Clinton’s mistakes and instituted a

highly disciplined communications operation. Many of those in his
administration had a great deal of experience working with the
press. This was particularly true of Vice President Dick Cheney,
who had served in three previous administrations, including stints
as White House chief of staff (for President Ford) and secretary of
defense (for the first President Bush). Cheney explained to me in
1989 that it is essential for the White House to manage the news.
“That means that about half the time the White House press corps
is going to be pissed off,’’ he admitted, “and that’s all right. You’re
not there to please them. You’re there to run an effective presidency.
And to do that, you have to be disciplined in what you convey to the
country. The most powerful tool you have is the ability to use the
symbolic aspects of the presidency to promote your goals and ob-
jectives.” That means the White House must control the agenda.
“You don’t let the press set the agenda,” Cheney insisted. “They like
to decide what’s important and what isn’t important. But if you let
them do that, they’re going to trash your p r e ~ i d e n c y . ” ~ ~
In the first 100 days of the Bush administration, Vice President
Cheney played an important role as an administration spokesperson
on the television talk shows. He also gave weekly interviews to se-
lected media commentators outside of W a ~ h i n g t o n .Cheney ~~
wielded unprecedented power behind the scenes, as well, playing a
major role in both domestic and foreign policy?’ In contrast to Pres-
ident Clinton in his treatment of Dee Dee Myers, President Bush
made an effort to demonstrate Press Secretary Fleischer’s access and

status, giving him a large office on the first floor of the West Wing
(just down the hall from the Oval Office). Upstairs, Karen Hughes
presided over Bush’s overall communications operation. Bush rein-
stated his father’s dress code, and insisted upon a highly efficient
staff. But the controversial outcome of the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, a narrowly divided Congress, and initially tepid public approval
ratings (including, at 25 percent, the highest disapproval rating of
any incoming president since Gallup polling began) undercut the
president’s communications agenda. A study by the Center for Me-
dia and Public Affairs showed that television news coverage of Bush
during his first 100 days was only slightly more positive than it had
been for Clinton (43percent positive for Bush, as opposed to 40 per-
cent positive for Clinton, and 61 percent positive for George H. W.
Bush)?* Negative coverage seemed to increase in the summer of
2001, after Republicans lost control of the Senate. Even fellow Re-
publicans began to express concern about the admini~tration?~ A
Gallup Poll conducted September 7-10, 2001, showed Bush’s ap-
proval ratings at a new low: 51 percent. Not until the galvanizing
events of September 11,2001, did Bush’s stature
This serves as a reminder that even an efficient, experienced, well-
organized communications operation does not guarantee good media
coverage. White House efforts to manipulate the media are only half
the story.Although such efforts are well documented,the actual effects
of those efforts are not. The studies that do exist suggest that results of
the president’s attempts to influence media coverage are, at best,
~ of this is related to the media’s incentive structure: they
m i ~ e d . 5Some
are driven by a desire to increase ratings and boost profits. Among the
stories that sell best are ones focusing on scandal and conflict. The re-
sult has been a proliferation of “gotcha” journalism and a proclivity to-
wards what Larry Sabato has dubbed “feeding f r e n z i e ~ . ”This~ ~ has
helped to increase negative stories about the president. In addition to
this tendency toward “attack journalism,” the media are often guilty of
substituting style for substance. Stories are framed as simple dramatic
narratives with clear winners and losers. Less attention is focused
on policy details than whether the president “won” or “lost” the last
“battle” with Congress. The trend is especially apparent in television
news, where stories are often superficial and their pacing seems to be
influenced by the assumption that viewers have short attention spans.
By 1996, an average presidential sound bite on a network news story
lasted only seven seconds (down from 42 seconds in 1968).57
Confronted with such obstacles, presidents have sought ways to
communicate more directly with the American people. Presidential
travel has increased dramatically since the presidency of Ronald
Reagan. Such travel reflects the “permanent campaign” now waged
by presidents for public support?* Presidents use it to make targeted
speeches to local constituencies, but garnering local media coverage
is also an important part of such trips. For example, the Video Mon-
itoring Service reported that a single speech by President Bush at
Eglin Air Force Base in Florida on February 4,2002, generated
some 86 television news reports in seven different broadcast mar-
kets in the state (not to mention additional coverage in neighboring
state^)?^ Bush crisscrossed the country after his 2002 State of the
Union address to tout his policies, just as he had after his first ad-
dress to a joint session of Congress in February 2001
The New Media can also be used to target presidential appeals to
specific constituencies, but presidents have no monopoly on such
venues. The Clinton administration learned the hard way that its op-
ponents could also use the New Media to spread charges of presi-
dential scandal and ineptitude. Talk radio is a good example. Clin-
ton used it very effectively in the 1992 presidential campaign to
target messages to particular audiences. But, when Clinton was
president, talk radio came back to haunt him. By 1997, news/talk
was the most popular radio format in the United States, carried by
1,330 commercial radio stations (up from 308 in 1989).6l The 1987
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine spurred the growth, and conserva-
tive shows came to dominate the airwaves. During Clinton’s presi-
dency, they became a powerful tool for criticizing the administra-
tion. Some, including the mainstream media, blamed talk radio for
helping to mobilize the opposition that ultimately doomed Clinton’s
nomination of Zoe Baird to be U.S. attorney general in 1993.62
Democrats blamed talk radio for contributing to their disastrous
showing in the 1994 midterm elections, when they lost control of
both houses of Congress to the Rep~blicans.6~ President Clinton
publicly suggested in 1995 that conservative talk radio had fanned

the flames of societal unrest that led to the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing.@And Hillary Clinton dismissed the Monica Lewinsky story in
early 1998 as part of a “right-wing conspiracy,” of which talk radio
was supposedly a ~ a r t . 6 ~
At the same time, the New Media were changing some of the
norms of the Old Media in a way that also hurt the White House. For
example, the Internet altered the way that the Old Media responded
to breaking news stories. For years, the Old Media had served not
only as a filter of White House news, but as a more general gate-
keeper of other news. With the Internet, however, virtually anyone
could post a story. Not only did the “Drudge Report” on the Internet
break the story that President Clinton had had an affair with White
House intern Monica Lewinsky, but the Internet came to shape the
way the media covered the scandal. Most major media outlets had
followed an unwritten rule that they would not use their website to
break a story.& Instead, websites contained information that had al-
ready been reported in other venues. This changed with the Lewin-
sky scandal. As competing news organizations struggled to stay one
step ahead of the competition, websites became important. The first
mainstream coverage of the Lewinsky scandal appeared on the
Washington Post’s website, prompting Newsweek to follow suit on
theirs. In the drive to scoop the competition, errors were made. The
Dallas Morning Herald, for example, posted an erroneous story on
its website that a Secret Service agent was an eyewitness to a presi-
dential tryst. The editors subsequently pulled the story, but not be-
fore other news outlets, such as ABC, had reported Such situa-
tions prompted CNN senior analyst Jeff Greenfield to worry about
what he called an “echo effect”-news organizations picking up and
repeating without independent corroboration a story from a single
source. Regardless of the story’s reliability, the simple act of repeti-
tion by different news venues made the story more credible$*
Around-the-clock cable news networks also contributed to the
breakdown of the traditional news cycle. Bush’s Coalition Informa-
tion Center, discussed above, was a response to that phenomenon.
The need to fill airtime and the tendency of news networks to rely on
“talking heads” to discuss the news has reinforced the echo effect.
Fox News and MSNBC, in particular, relied heavily on talk shows

when they joined the cable news lineup in 1996. Both recognized
that talk shows were cheap and easy to produce. The proliferation of
talk shows helped lead to saturation coverage of the Lewinsky scan-
dal.69The story seemed to be “All Monica All the Time,” with pun-
dits endlessly repeating and analyzing the story-even if they had no
particular expertise in the matter?O MSNBC created a nightly show
called “The White House in Crisis” to discuss the scandal-even
when there was nothing new to discuss.
Cable, in general, has also undermined the ability of presidents to
manipulate the media. Political scientists Matthew A. Baum and
Samuel Kernel1 have argued that cable has taken away a president’s
ability to dominate the airwaves with a press conference or an Oval
Office speech. Those who were forced to watch a presidential speech
or nothing at all in the pre-cable era now have dozens of channels of
alternative programming to switch to. Keenly aware of the competi-
tion and concerned about their own ratings, the networks are in-
creasingly reluctant to relinquish airtime to the president?
CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions can we draw from all of this? First, it seems clear
that presidents must balance their desire to circumvent elite re-
porters with a recognition that such reporters are important. Despite
Sidney Blumenthal’s 1993 prediction that the White House press
corps and the three network news shows were “anachronistic” and
were “no more likely to return than are the big bands,” it is telling
that President Clinton left office in the midst of a swing dancing
rage and with a renewed appreciation for the value of the Old Me-
dia. President Bush seemed to recognize this when he came to of-
fice in 2001. He carefully cultivated his relationship with the press
corps, while at the same time taking full advantage of the opportu-
nities for narrowcasting and circumvention provided by the New
Media and other avenues of direct communication. In contrast,
Clinton squandered good relations with the media during his first
year. Arrogance, inexperience, lack of clarity about his agenda, and
internal conflict were rampant in his administration. Clinton should

have been able to forge a close working bond with the White House
press corps, yet he and his staff so alienated them that a rift contin-
ued throughout his presidency.
Second, it is clear that presidents must be disciplined in fashion-
ing and communicating their message. Here again, Bush learned
from Clinton’s mistakes. He not only presided over a very disci-
plined staff, but followed Ronald Reagan’s example by planning a
simple, clear-cut legislative agenda for his first 100 days in office.
He focused on a short list of priorities that included education re-
form, faith-based initiatives, tax cuts, and military preparedness,
and centered his communications agenda on those priorities?2 After
the terrorist attacks of September 11,200 1, he sought to convey a
disciplined message about the war on terrorism not only through
normal White House communications structures, but also through
the creation of the Coalition Information Center.
Finally, it is clear that the overall presidential-press relationship
is changing, largely as a result of the New Media. While seemingly
giving the president unparalleled opportunities for communicating
his message, the New Media may actually undermine the presi-
dent’s ability to manipulate the media. It has undercut the gate-
keeping role of the Old Media by allowing virtually anyone to post
information, sped up the pace with which news is reported, con-
tributed to saturation coverage of high-visibility stories, and dimin-
ished the ability of the president to dominate the airwaves. In the
process, “going public”-a once potent tool in the arsenal of presi-
dential power- has been diluted.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1 . What is “going public”? How does the White House Office

of Communications promote that tactic? How is the Office of
Communications different from the White House Press Of-
fice?
2. How has a 24-hour news cycle affected the way the White House
handles the media? Explain how the “Coalition Information
Center” was an attempt to adapt to the never-ending news cycle

created by the New Media.
3. What missteps did the Clinton administration arguably make in
its early dealings with the media? How did the Clinton admin-
istration’s handling of the media change over the course of his
administration?
4. Did George W. Bush learn from Clinton’s media missteps? If so,
how? What did he change or “fix”?
5. What is the New Media, and how has it altered the way news
is communicated? Does the New Media help or hurt presiden-
tial attempts to lead public opinion?
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Baum, Matthew A., and Samuel Kernell, “Has Cable Ended the Golden Age
of Presidential Television?’ American Political Science Review 93
(March 1999): 99.
Davis, Richard, and Diana Owen, New Media and American Politics
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Edwards, George C., 111, and B. Dan Wood, “Who Influences Whom? The
President, Congress, and the Media,” American Political Science Review
93 (June 1999): 328.
Kernell, Samuel, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership,
2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993).
Maltese, John Anthony, Spin Control: The White House Ofice of Com-
munications and the Management of Presidential News, 2nd ed.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
Tulis, Jeffrey K., The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1987).
NOTES
This chapter is based, in large part, on an earlier article of mine, “The

Presidency and the News Media,” Perspectives on Political Science
(Spring 2000): 77-83.
1. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential

Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986). See also
George C. Edwards 111, The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular

Support (New York: St. Martin’s, 1983).
2. Lester G. Seligman, “Developments in the Presidency and the
Conception of Political Leadership,” American Sociological Review 20
(1955): 707.
3. James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), 39.
4. Arthur Maass, “In Accord with the Program of the President,” Pub-
lic Policy 4 (1953): 77; Richard E. Neustadt, “Presidency and Legislation:
Planning the President’s Program,” American Political Science Review 49
(December 1955): 980.
5. Presidents prior to FDR had also recognized the need to coordinate
relations with reporters. Theodore Roosevelt ordered that a pressroom be
built for reporters in the new West Wing of the White House in 1902. He
also began the practice of having an aide, William Loeb, give daily press
briefings. Woodrow Wilson continued the practice, and became the first
president to hold regularly scheduled press conferences (starting in 1913).
Although every president since Roosevelt has assigned a staff member to
work with the press, Herbert Hoover was the first (in 1929) to make that a
staff member’s sole responsibility.The title “press secretary” was not offi-
cially bestowed until the Press Office was established in 1933.
6. Interestingly, the White House was not a regular beat for re-
porters until the 1890s. Prior to the 20th century, Congress was the fo-
cus of most of their attention. For a thorough treatment of the Press Of-
fice, see Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar,
Portraying the President (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981). See also: W. Dale Nelson, Who Speaks for the President?: The
White House Press Secretary from Cleveland to Clinton (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1998).
7. Bill Clinton had a total of four press secretaries during his eight
years in office: Dee Dee Myers (1993-1994), Mike McCurry
(1995-1998), Joe Lockhart (1998-2000), and Jake Siewert (2000-2001).
8. “Karen Hughes Announces Dan Bartlett as White House Communi-
cations Director,” press release, October 2,2001, at www.whitehouse.gov.
9. Since the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush, the White
House has had a television studio where White House spokespersons can
be linked by satellite with reporters from local television stations.
10. President Clinton had five communications directors during his
eight years in office: George Stephanopoulos (1993), Mark Gearan
(1993-1994), Dan Baer (1995-1997), Ann Lewis (1997-1999), and
Loretta Ucelli (1999-200 1).
11. Richard Rose used the term “going international” in his book The
Postmodem President, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ.: Chatham House, 1991), 38.
12. John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Ofice of
Communications and the Management of Presidential News, 2nd rev. ed.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 195.
13. Quoted in: Johanna Neuman, “Response to Terror: Public Diplomacy
Is Shaped in President’s Ornate War Room,” Los Angeles limes, December
22,2001, A3.
14. Neuman, “Response to Terror,” A3.
15. Elizabeth Becker, “A Nation Challenged: Public Relations,” New
York Emes, December 15,200 1, A 1.
16. Mike Allen, “Fighting the Image War to Gain Muslim Support;
Information Center Plans Prayer, Traditional Dinner,” Washington Post,
November 15,200 1, A32.
17. Quoted in: Neuman, “Response to Terror,” A3.
18. For an account of these operations, see Stephen Hess, The
GovemmentLPress Connection: Press Oflcers and Their Ofices (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).
19. Ann McFeathers, “Madison Avenue Veteran Leads US. Propa-
ganda Effort,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 25,200 1, A 15.
20. Becker, “A Nation Challenged,” A l .
21. Maltese, Spin Control, 2nd rev. ed., 113.
22. Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Oflce (New York: Random House,
1997), 195.
23. Martha Joynt Kumar, “The Office of Communications,” Presiden-
tial Studies Quarterly (December 200 1): 6 13.
24. For a full account of this, see Maltese, Spin Control, 2nd rev. ed.
25. Tom Rosenstiel, The Beat Goes On: President Clinton’s First Year
with the Media (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994), 7.
26. Sidney Blumenthal, “A Letter from Washington: The Syndicated
Presidency,” New Yorker (April 5, 1993): 42.
27. Blumenthal, “A Letter from Washington,” 42.
28. Rosenstiel, The Beat Goes On, 8.
29. Quoted in: Rita K. Whillock, “The Compromising Clinton: Images
of Failure, a Record of Success,” in The Clinton Presidency: Images, Is-
sues, and Communication Strategies, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr., and
Rachel L. Holloway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 126.
30. Rosenstiel, The Beat Goes On, 8-9.
31. Burt Solomon, “How a Leak-Loathing White House Is Putting the
Press in Its Place,” National Journal (February 13,1993): 416.

33. Leslie Kaufman, “The Young and the Relentless,” American Jour-
nalism Review (March 1993): 30.
34. Solomon, “Leak-Loathing White House,” 4 17.
35. Quoted in: Kaufman, “The Young and the Relentless,” 30.
36. Burt Solomon, “Even Clintonites Worry about Arrogance,” National
Journal (April 10,1993): 888.
37. Burt Solomon, “Clinton’s Rhetoric,” National Journal (March 27,
1993): 774.
38. Kaufman, “The Young and the Relentless,” 27.
39. Frank Newport and Lydia Saad, “A Matter of Trust,” American
Journalism Review (July-August 1998): 30.
40. Center for Media and Public Affairs, “The Disappearing Honey-
moon,” Media Monitor 15, no. 3 (May-June 2001), available online at
www.cmpa.com .
41. Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 226.
42. Rosenstiel, The Beat Goes On, 19-20.
44. Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycle: How the White House and the Media
Manipulate the News (New York: Touchstone, 1998), 143-44.
45. Ann Devroy, “Here’s What the White House Chief of Staff Does,”
Washington Post, October 12,1993, A17.
46. Kurtz, Spin Cycle, 69.
47. Howard Kurtz, “White House at War,” Vanity Fair (January
1999): 40.
48. For various accounts of this, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox,
eds., The Clinton Scandal and the Future of American Government
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000).
49. Dick Cheney, interview by John Anthony Maltese, in Maltese, Spin
Control, 2nd ed., 2.
50. Eric Schmitt, “Talk Show Debut Suggests Cheney Role,” New York
Emes, January 29,200 1, A 18.
51. For a more thorough discussion of this, see Joseph A. Pika, John
Anthony Maltese, and Norman C. Thomas, The Politics of the Presidency,
5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2002), 408-10.
52. Center for Media and Public Affairs, “The Disappearing Honey-
moon .”
53. Richard L. Berke and Frank Bruni, “Crew of Listing Bush Ship
Draws Republican Scowls,” New York Emes, July 2,2001, A1 1.
54. Overnight, Bush’s Gallup approval rating skyrocketed to 90 per-

cent and stayed over 80 percent into 2002. For up-to-date poll numbers,
see www.gallup.com.
55. George C. Edwards I11 and B. Dan Wood, “Who Influences
Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media,” American Political Sci-
ence Review (June 1999): 328,341.
56. Larry J. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has
Transformed American Politics (New York: Free Press, 1991).
57. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell, “Has Cable Ended the
Golden Age of Presidential Television?’ American Political Science Review
(March 1999): 99.
58. Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, eds., The Permunent
Campaign and Its Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 2000).
59. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Presidential Travel: It’s All about Local
News,” New York Emes, February 11,2002, A2 1.
60. In the two days following his February 27,2001, address to Con-
gress, Bush gave speeches in Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas,
and Georgia.
61. “Talking the Talk,” Insight on the News (February 9, 1998): 9.
62. Randall Bloomquist, “The Word According to Talk,” Adweek (May
3, 1993): 1.
63. Mark Hudis and Cheryl Heuton, “Talk Ratings Are Stronger Than
Ever,” Mediaweek (April 8, 1996): 4.
64. Laura Rich, “Liberals in the Land of Limbaugh,” Inside Media
(June 7, 1995): 1.
65. Ivo Dawnay, “Fightback at the White House: The Saving of a Pres-
ident,” Washington Post, February 1, 1998,22.
66. David Noack, “Clinton Sex Story Forces Print Media Changes,”
Editor & Publisher Magazine (January 3 1, 1998): 62.
67. Dan Trigoboff, “The ‘Source’ Heard ’Round the World,” Broad-
casting & Cable (February 2,1998): 62.
68. Trigoboff, “The ‘Source,”’ 62.
69. Alicia C. Shepard, “White Noise,” American Journalism Review
(January-February 1999): 20.
70. Robin Pogrebin, “Lewinsky Story Feeds Cable News Networks,”
New York Times, August 8, 1998, A10.
71. Baum and Kernell, “Golden Age of Presidential Television,” 110.
72. Mark Halperin and Elizabeth Wilner, “Bush 100 Days Marked by
Short List of Goals,” April 30,2001, at www.abcnews.com.
2
Congress and the Media
Mark 1. Rozell
As numerous studies have shown, political life for most Americans

is a mediated experience. People learn about our national institu-
tions and leaders through the news media. As a study by McCombs
and Shaw states, people “learn how much importance to attach to an
issue or topic from the emphasis placed on it by the mass media.”’
What does the public learn from the media about Congress? Usu-
ally either very little, or at least very little that is favorable to the in-
stitution. Numerous academic studies on the media’s coverage of
Congress arrive at the same conclusion: Congress receives very lit-
tle respect from the national media. The news either ignores much
of what goes on in the halls of Congress, or presents the institution
in the most unflattering light possible.
National opinion polls reflect generally negative perceptions of
Congress and of its members. The exception is during periods of crisis,
when Americans rally behind their government generally. Congress
rarely ranks ahead of presidents in national polls, even during times of
unpopular presidents. Although individual members of Congress may
fare well in polls of their own constituents, members of Congress as a
group almost always fare poorly in national opinion. One national poll
asked respondents to rank the honesty and ethical standards of people
by their professions. U.S. senators ranked 18 percent favorable, just
two percentage points better than lawyers and TV talk show hosts and
substantially worse than funeral directors and reporters?
25
26 Mark J. Rozell
Members of Congress bear some responsibility for the negative

image of the institution. Members are very astute at protecting their
own political interests by attacking the institution in which they serve.
Is it at all surprising that the public often holds Congress in low es-
teem when the members themselves bad-mouth the institution?
Scholars have long noted the phenomenon that people make differ-
ential judgments between their own member of Congress, on the one
hand, and members of Congress as a group, on the other. Also, can-
didates for Congress use negative advertising appeals to exaggerate
claims of impropriety on the part of their opponents. Imagine the es-
teem in which we would hold the airline industry if carriers fre-
quently ran ads accusing each other of losing baggage, missing ar-
rival times, and engaging in unsafe practices that endanger the public:
“Unreliable. Unsafe. You just can’t trust Eagle Airlines.” A public ex-
posed to a constant barrage of such campaign appeals cannot easily
be blamed for harboring negative views of their elected leaders.
There are other reasons for the public’s low opinion of Congress.
One explanation is that people expect conflicting things from the in-
stitution and its members. For example, citizens perceive Congress
as both too beholden to interest groups and out of touch with the
public it serves. People demand expensive government programs,
better-quality delivery of public services, and lower taxes. They
want Congress to be responsive, to articulate various constituents’
views, yet they implore members to put an end to partisan squab-
bling. Constituents demand an end to pork-barrel spending, except
when it benefits them.
An ABC News poll found that, despite widespread complaints
about such congressional perks as travel budgets and franked mail,
93 percent of respondents said that their own member should try to
keep constituents informed through district visits or newsletters.
And despite complaints about special interests and congressional
pork, 73 percent said that their own member should try to direct
more federal projects to their d i ~ t r i c t . ~
Another problem is that the public doesn’t know very much about
the Congress and its activities. In mid-1995, only half of the public
could identify Newt Gingrich as the Speaker of the House, even
though he had received enormous coverage. Yet two-thirds of the
Congress and the Media 27
public could identify Lance Ito, the judge presiding over the double-
murder trial of former football player 0. J. Simpson. Only four in
ten people were familiar with the Contract with America and only
one-half knew that Congress had passed the landmark North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)." It is not surprising that peo-
ple harbor inaccurate perceptions of an institution about which they
know very little.
Some data suggest that those segments of the public that have the
most knowledge of the Congress are often the most hostile to the in-
stitution. For years, pollsters had found that an educated segment of
the population provided a foundation of support for Congress and
representative government even when most of the public was skep-
tical. Yet a study by Asher and Barr shows that, while less-informed
citizens remain dubious of Congress, as people learn more about the
institution they like it even less?
HOW THE MEDIA COVER CONGRESS
If Congress is held in such low esteem, there is no doubt that much of

this condition can be attributed to highly negative press coverage of
the legislative branch's activities. To be sure, Congress has always
been a favorite target for critics and comedians. Stereotypes of legis-
lators who use public office for private gain and subvert the national
interest have been a press staple since the earliest Congresses. Indeed,
skepticism about the motives and activities of the nation's leaders has
long been considered a necessary, and even beneficial, element of rep-
resentative government. Yet some proportion is in order. In
2001-2002, the revelation that a missing person had previously been
having an affair with Representative Gary Condit (D-Calif.) resulted
in an avalanche of news coverage that made Condit the most recog-
nizable face in Congress. That some law enforcement officials had
openly criticized Condit for not being helpful to their investigation-
leading some to wonder whether the congressman knew more than he
was telling -certainly justified strong journalistic interest in the story.
But ultimately the intensity of the media coverage of this story pushed
out of the news many items of importance taking place in Congress.
28 Mark J. Rozell
What do many of the studies of media coverage of Congress

specifically reveal? Primarily that members of Congress are por-
trayed as incompetent, corrupt, or both, and that the legislative
process is shown not to work as it should. For example, Charles Tid-
march and John Pitney analyzed all items on Congress in ten news
dailies during one month in 1978 and found that journalists focused
on “conflict, malfeasance and breach of public trust.”6 “On the
whole,” they concluded, the press “has little good to report about
Congress and its membership.” Such coverage has tended to
“harden the image of Congress as a defective in~titution.”~
A major study of the impact of newspaper coverage on public
confidence in institutions, also focusing on the late 1970s’ found
that coverage of Congress was much more unfavorable than was
coverage of either the presidency or the Supreme Court.8 Michael
Robinson and Kevin Appel’s analysis of network news coverage of
Congress during a five-week period in 1976 found that all news sto-
ries that presented a point of view about the institution were critical
of it? Even the first post-Watergate Congress failed to receive a sin-
gle favorable assessment.1°
Robert Gilbert concluded that congressional coverage during the
spring of 1989 emphasized scandal and further contributed to the leg-
islature’s weak reputation.” And Norman Ornstein’s study of net-
work news reporting on Congress in 1989 concluded that two-thirds
of the coverage “concerned . . . three episodes of turmoil and scandal
that had little to do with the constitutionally mandated duties of Con-
gress.”’* Studies conducted in the 1990s also confirmed that press re-
porting of Congress was generally negative.13
Press coverage of Congress over the years has moved from
healthy skepticism to outright cynicism. When Congress enacted
a 25 percent pay increase for its members in 1946, for example,
both the New York Times and Washington Post commented that
the pay increase was needed to attract top-quality people to pub-
lic service and that political leaders must be paid a salary com-
mensurate with their responsibilities. The few press criticisms of
the raise emphasized either the principle of public service being
its own reward or the need for an even larger pay increase. The
press did not lead a drumbeat of criticism of Congress for enact-
ing a pay increase. More recently, however, the story has been far
different. To believe modem congressional coverage, the nation’s
legislators are egregiously overpaid, indulged, and indifferent to
the problems of constituents who lack six-figure incomes and
fantastic job perquisites. The press portrait of Congress members
is one of self-interested, self-indulgent politicians who exploit
the legislative process for personal gain.14
Many studies have speculated about the reasons for the intense in-
terest in scandal,rivalry, and conflict. A partial explanation is the emer-
gence of a more aggressive, scandal-conscious news media after
Watergate. Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler pointed to “a post-
Watergate code of ethics” in which journalists seek out scandal and
delve into the personal lives of public figures and other areas once con-
sidered off-limits to reporter^.'^ Norman Omstein also noted that a new
generation of investigative reporters, inspired by Watergate sleuths
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, had “accentuated and refocused
the media coverage of Congress” toward “scandal and ~10th.”’~
The journalists themselves confirm this tendency. A Times-
Mirror survey found that two-thirds of journalists downplay good
news and spend “too much time on the failures of public offi-
cials .” Many journalists fear being perceived by their colleagues
as “in the tank” with politicians, writes U.S. News’s Gloria
Borger. Consequently, “for the press, good news is not new^."'^
According to Ellen Hume, formerly of the Wall Street Journal,
“Journalists usually err on the side of negativity.”18
Furthermore, journalists are all too aware that conflict and scan-
dal interest the public. Intense competition within the print media-
which recently has seen declining revenues-has driven many jour-
nalists toward increased scandal coverage to satisfy what they
perceive as the public’s appetite for such news.
A great misfortune of this tendency has been the trend among
the elite press to exhibit some of the tawdry characteristics of the
tabloids. As Mann and Ornstein lament, “the prestige news out-
lets have adopted the sensationalist approach of their less rep-
utable counterparts. Coverage of the House bank scandal, for ex-
ample, was as overdone in the Washington Post as it was on radio
talk
30 Mark J. Rozell
At one point in the 1990s, some members of Congress decided to

strike back. Disgusted at constant media digging into their financial
affairs, the Senate passed a nonbinding resolution requiring re-
porters covering Capitol Hill to file financial disclosures. Senators
accused the correspondents of hypocrisy, because many who had
reported on conflicts of interests in Congress had themselves ac-
cepted honoraria for speeches before lobbying and corporate
groups?O The Senators knew that this resolution had no potential for
impact, other than to send a message to the press of a growing dis-
content with journalistic hypocrisy. The Senators were not alone in
this feeling, as many journalists themselves had begun to wonder
whether the practice of reporters’ accepting honoraria was hurting
the profession’s credibility with the public ?’
Scandal, rivalry, and conflict may also be emphasized because the
legislative process is tedious-“the very driest form of human en-
deavor,” as Senator Alan Simpson once said?2 Consequently, re-
porters avoid writing process and policy stories except when they are
related to interbranch conflicts, rivalries among colorful personalities
on Capitol Hill, or scandal. William Safire explained that editors in-
struct reporters to avoid “MEGOs”: stories that make “my eyes glaze
over.”23Stephen Hess examined 100 Congress stories in the New York
Emes in 1991. Only five were process-oriented st0ries.2~
David Broder admits that personal scandals are exciting and interest-
ing; stories about institutional reform will put reporters to sleep before
they get to the t~pewriter.2~ According to Broder, a reporter will have an
easier time selling to his editor stories of petty scandal than a good many
“stories of larger consequence.’’Junket stories sell to editors “because
they fit [editors’] stereotypes of graft and sin on Capitol
Both Broder and William Raspberry have written that the public
holds Congress in such low esteem, in part, because of the journal-
istic trend of emphasizing conflict and controversy over substance.
They cited the example of a vitally important job-training bill in late
1995 with little news coverage. The legislation attracted so little at-
tention because it lacked serious opposition and there was therefore
no conflict to report.27
The press thus has difficulty conveying the complexities of the
legislative process. The magnitude of coverage devoted to such im-
portant events as legislative reorganization efforts and ethics reform

almost never matches the number of stories devoted to a scandal in-
volving a single member of Congress. To the extent that the press
does cover procedural issues, it seems to do so when they are re-
lated to scandals and can be explained in terms of, and as reactions
to, interbranch, partisan, or personal rivalries.
According to Lichter and Amundson, this tendency well docu-
mented in studies of the print media is evident in television cover-
age of Congress as well. They examined comprehensively the three
major networks’ coverage of Congress during a period from the
1970s to the 1990s. They found that the coverage increasingly has
focused on scandal, with decreasing emphasis on process and pol-
icy. “The news,” they write, “has also increasingly emphasized con-
flict, both within Congress and between the institution and other
participants in political affairs. . . . [Tlhe tone of coverage was al-
ready derogatory a generation ago and has become worse .’728
The negative tone and narrow focus of coverage are particularly
important because, as Herb Asher commented, “everything that
people learn about Congress is mediated.”29And there seems to be
a link between the nature of congressional coverage and poor pub-
lic understanding of the legislative process. Charles 0.Jones looked
at media coverage of a particularly busy week on Capitol Hill and
found that even though the legislature had undertaken some impor-
tant activities, “the American people learned hardly a smidgen
about congressional action that directly affected them.”30“Turning
specifically to the committees, one does not have to wonder why the
public knows so little of this ceaseless activity on Capitol Hill. The
answer is that very little attention is paid to it in the press.”31
Dye and Zeigler described coverage of Congress as “almost with-
out exception demeaning. As a result, people regard the institution
of Congress with cynicism and mistrust.” Furthermore, “the public
knows very little about Congress in its abstract, institutional
form.”32Mary Russell also found the lack of public knowledge of
Congress due to sensational news and the failure of the press to
cover procedures,rules, and long-range a~tivity.3~
In addition to being less exciting than petty scandal, institutional
stones are more complicated for reporters and editors to understand
32 Mark J. Rozell
and to write about in single news stories and columns. Besides, the
presidency is the focus of Washington journalism. Journalists often
cover lawmaking from the vantage of how the legislature is respond-
ing to presidential initiatives. The press perceives Congress as gener-
ally incapable of leadership. Thus in normal circumstances Congress
works best under the guiding hand of a strong president attuned to the
national interest and willing to move the government in an activist,
progressive direction. Members of Congress, according to much of the
media coverage, are primarily concerned with parochial issues.
A partial explanation is the difficulty of identifying a focal point
in Congress. The presidency by contrast easily is personalized. The
focus is the president himself. Congress lacks a single voice. It pre-
sents a cacophony of perspectives, often in conflict. As political sci-
entist Richard Davis writes: “Its bicameral structure and the parti-
san divisions in both houses ensure that at least four leaders will
compete for the role of congressional spokesperson, and the profu-
sion of congressional committees and subcommittees . . . adds to the
confusion .’’34 Communications scholars Robert Denton and Gary
Woodward add that whereas the presidency can, if presented effec-
tively, appear unified, “the Congress, by contrast, is more a place of
arguments, political negotiation, and c ~ m p r o r n i s e . ” ~ ~
Congressional coverage also suffers because of intense media in-
terest in the horse race of presidential campaigning. In June 1995,
nearly eight months before the first presidential primary of 1996,
Howard Kurtz found that the media’s interest in the campaign was
high, whereas their interest in the governing process remained low,
despite the fact that there was little of real substance at that time to
report about the emerging campaigns. Reporter Gloria Borger can-
didly admitted that, “We don’t have anything very interesting to
write about these days. The other choice is covering the budget, and
nobody wants to write about that.”36Yet later that year, enormous
media interest turned to the budget stalemate-a story easily per-
sonalized as a rivalry between the GOP congressional leaders and
President Bill Clinton that oftentimes seemed petty.
The press’s image of what Congress should be is clearly incom-
patible with the traditional role of the legislative branch. There is a
strong press preference for a reform-oriented, progressive, policy-
activist Congress that works effectively with an activist, strong

president. During a 1993 congressional studies conference at the
American Enterprise Institute, a number of journalists confirmed
this finding. One argued that Congress deserves praise “when Con-
gress acts,” especially when the institution displays “heroism” and
policy innovation. Several colleagues agreed ?7
Yet the Constitution’s framers designed Congress to frustrate the
popular will as necessary, to not act in an efficient, innovative fash-
ion. Consequently, the drumbeat of press criticism, interrupted oc-
casionally by favorable coverage during unusual circumstances,
helps explain the disjunction between the legislature’s intended
constitutional role and journalistic expectations. No wonder Con-
gress is held in such low public esteem, when the press criticizes the
institution for behaving as the Constitution’s framers intended it to
and then focuses on petty scandal and members’ peccadilloes to the
exclusion of examining process and policy.
Nonetheless, not all the blame for Congress’s poor repute belongs
to the media. Congress needs to do a better job at educating the
press and the public about its activities-what it does and why it
does what it does. Otherwise, journalists and the public will con-
tinue to harbor expectations-routine efficiency, activist policy-
making, large-scale internal reform, strong leadership during crises
and when the president is under siege- that the institution generally
is not designed to live up to.
Congress indeed does a poor job of protecting its image. In
Richard Fenno’s classic argument, members “run for Congress by
running against Congress.”38In their districts they reinforce un-
favorable opinions of the institution so that they can distance
themselves from it and by implication assume the virtues that it
supposedly lacks. Even electorally safe incumbents do not edu-
cate constituents about the strengths of their institution. Instead,
they attack it as a way of protecting themselves p ~ l i t i c a l l y . ~ ~
Michael Robinson and Kevin Appel have also noted that mem-
bers of the legislature “complain about Congress and praise
themselves as individuals .”40 And James McCartney of Knight-
Ridder commented, “Congress does a lousy job in telling a re-
porter what goes on. The problem with Congress is that it has no
34 Mark J. Rozell
organization and is just babble. It needs to present its information

better, like the White
Individual members can also orient their own behavior in a way
that better protects the institutional reputation. Electorally safe
members-a large group indeed-have the leeway to educate con-
stituents properly about the Congress and take some responsibility
for its actions."2 Members could also do a better job of lowering
constituents' expectations of legislative performance and could
avoid perpetuating conflicts that generate short-term publicity and
political gain at the expense of Congress's image.
Finally, responsibility for presenting a balanced and realistic rep-
resentation of Congress lies with the journalists. In 1975 the former
senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) wrote that "the national press
would do well to reconsider its priorities. It has excelled in expos-
ing . . . the high crimes and peccadilloes of persons in high places.
But it has fallen short-far short-in its higher responsibility of
public education."43
It is difficult to imagine that congressional coverage will de-
emphasize controversy, scandal, and intrigue, and focus on process
and policy any time very soon. But reporters and editors can volun-
tarily do a better job of educating the public about Congress and
representative government. Whether they are motivated by concern
over fueling public cynicism toward the institution or by profes-
sional pride in factual and fair-minded reporting, journalists could
truly serve the public by covering the legislative branch in a man-
ner that befits the most representative institution of our government.
THE C-SPAN EFFECT
The Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) is an impor-

tant, though not clearly recognized or understood, influence on Con-
gress. Created in 1977,the network is funded by the cable industry as
a public service and provides direct and unedited coverage of con-
gressional proceedings, as well as interview programs with journal-
ists and scholars who follow Congress, live viewer call-in programs,
and interviews with book authors. C-SPAN began coverage of House
proceedings in 1979 and then Senate proceedings in 1986.
The audience for C-SPAN is not large-estimated at perhaps

50,000to 100,OOO people per day.44Because C-SPAN is privately
funded by the cable industry, the Nielson rating system does not mea-
sure its audience size. Nonetheless, the people who watch C-SPAN
tend to be highly politically interested and very inclined toward par-
ticipation in representative government. An academic study shows
that the typical C-SPAN viewer is well educated, has a good income,
and is knowledgeable about g0vernment.4~Perhaps more significant
is the fact that some of the most active C-SPAN viewers are members
of Congress and their staffs, executive branch officials, and political
party leaders and activists. An event covered by C-SPAN may not
have a large national audience, but it is seen by a substantial number
of members of the so-called political class in Washington. C-SPAN
has thus become a means by which political actors in Washington
keep a watchful eye on government. Examples may include White
House staff members’ observing how one of their colleagues is
performing as a witness at a congressional heating without having to
leave the office or rely on secondhand accounts. Or lobbyists inter-
ested in a bill can watch a House or Senate debate unfold. Or merely
interested citizens may become inspired by what they see happening
in Congress to make contacts with their representatives.
Putting Congress on television display full-time was a controver-
sial proposition at first. Created as a deliberative body, Congress
sometimes benefits from the opportunity to debate outside the pub-
lic limelight. It was easier to make the case initially for direct tele-
vision coverage of the House than the Senate. The House’s intended
constitutional role is to be “closer to the people” than the Senate and
thus more attuned to the constant shifts of public opinion. The con-
stitutional framers created the House-with its short terms and di-
rect election from relatively small constituencies-as an entity for
reflecting the opinions of the people. By contrast, the constitutional
framers created the Senate- with long terms and, initially, indirect
election-as a check against the potential excesses of the House.
The Senate was to be more insulated than the House from public
opinion, more capable of reasoned deliberation. It is no surprise
then that the Senate resisted for some time being put on display by
C-SPAN. Yet ultimately senators could see the benefits from such
television exposure to their own public profiles.
36 Mark J. Rozell
Some members of Congress worried that televised coverage

would harm the quality of debate in the legislative branch. In par-
ticular, some representatives expressed concern that certain col-
leagues would grandstand before the cameras rather than engage in
genuine deliberation. Others feared that the presence of television
would unnecessarily lengthen debates in Congress because of the
many members who would be eager for the opportunity for cover-
age. Yet the evidence suggests that there is probably no more grand-
standing than before C-SPAN and that debates in Congress have not
become longer. The exception is that more members than ever use
the period for special orders to deliver speeches."6 Indeed, some
have credited the rise of such figures as former House Speaker
Newt Gingrich (R) to the strategic use of special orders speeches to
raise their public profiles.
The major benefit attributed to C-SPAN is that it has provided a
different means by which citizens can keep in touch with their gov-
ernment. It provides the opportunity for citizens to view Congress in
action uninterrupted, rather than having to rely on the scattershot cov-
erage of the legislative process offered by the leading news media.
CONGRESS AND THE NEW MEDIA
The historic dichotomy in congressional reporting has been the

highly negative coverage of the institution by national media com-
bined with the relatively soft coverage of local Congress members
by local media. In a sense, this dichotomy has served well the elec-
toral interests of members while it has contributed to public dissat-
isfaction with representative government.
The new media today offer the potential for the institution of
Congress to communicate more effectively with the public -not
merely to service the electoral needs of individual members, but
also to enhance the broader institutional reputation. To date, Con-
gress has made advances in the uses of new media, although stud-
ies suggest that the institution could be doing much better than it
Congressional web pages, for example, vary substantially in
quality. Some offer very detailed and useful information that is up-
dated regularly. Some excellent member websites in the 107th Con-

gress are those of Representatives Henry Waxman (D), Jesse Jack-
son Jr. (D), and Dan Burton (R). Many member websites are not
very useful and are infrequently updated.
The use of e-mail has had an important impact on Congress. One
study reports that the typical Senate and House member offices re-
ceive 55,000 and 8,000 e-mails per month respectively. Many of
these e-mails are not constituent ones and are “blanket e-mails” that
go to numerous offices at one time. The Congress Online Project re-
ports that, once again, some congressional offices are much better
equipped than others to handle the new technology. Some offices
use available software programs to efficiently sift through and sort
e-mails and to even provide standard replies depending on the topic
of the communication. Yet many offices do not use this technology
and spend enormous amounts of staff time sifting through each in-
dividual e-mail communication. And in some cases, congressional
offices do not respond to e-mails, but only to traditional means of
communications, particularly letters.
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,2001,
along with the threat of anthrax in congressional offices that forced the
closing of some office buildings beginning in October of that year,
gave an additional incentive for Congress to rely on new technology
to communicate with the public. Due to the anthrax threat, a number
of congressional offices were closed for a period of time and congres-
sional mail service was seriously interrupted.Thus, e-mail became the
most reliable means for constituent contact for many members. For
example, one member whose office had been temporarily closed re-
ported setting up a remote e-mail system by using a secure ID and thus
remained regularly in touch with constituents. District staff members
scanned their regular mail letters into computers to be e-mailed to the
remote office and then responded to from there:*
Another positive development in congressional communications
technology is the growing public use of government and public organ-
ization websites that provide information for citizens on the workings
of government, the voting records of elected officials, and information
on how to contact legislative offices and federal agencies. Although
many Americans with a need for government assistance do not have
38 Mark J. Rozell
Internet access, more and more citizens are finding useful information
about their government through new means of communications.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty created by new means of commu-
nications is the increasingly competitive nature of a news industry
driven by the perceived need to deliver information to the public as
rapidly as possible. Various websites, perhaps most notably the
Drudge Report, have frequently "scooped" the leading mainstream
media outlets on big stories and thus precipitated a trend whereby
more and more of these outlets seek to outpace the Internet site
competition to break stories. An unfortunate result has been that
many respectable news outlets are not as careful as they used to be
in sourcing information before reporting to the public. Increasingly,
unconfirmed rumors about government officials and activities have
been reported, and little of this kind of information has helped to ed-
ucate the public about Congress and its members. If anything, much
of this current trend exacerbates the media tendencies toward sen-
sationalism and distortion of reality.
Another relatively new phenomenon is the rise of the talk radio
format, largely a vehicle for communications among conservatives.
Talk radio programs tend to be overwhelmingly negative toward
Congress, whether Democrats or Republicans control the institu-
tion. This information outlet is especially well suited to the presen-
tation of sensational and scandal stories. The audience share of talk
radio programs has grown dramatically in the past decade, at a time
when daily newspaper circulation and major network news audi-
ences have been shrinking.
Americans thus are relying on a greater variety of sources of in-
formation about Congress than ever before, but there is little evidence
that the quality of information has improved overall. Without a doubt,
for the motivated news consumer, good and reliable information
about Congress and its workings is available. The Internet indeed has
spawned an unfortunate rush by competitor news organizations to
produce stories, and thus the reliability of much information about
Congress has been compromised. The credibility of news organiza-
tions also suffers from this tendency to produce stories too quickly.
Yet the Internet is also full of excellent information about the work-
ings of government and is a vast resource for news consumers who
understand how to sift though the web for credible material.
CONCLUSION
Congress fares poorly in media coverage in comparison to the presi-

dency. The legislative process is messy, the institution lacks an iden-
tifiable leader, and it also lacks a mechanism for effective communi-
cations. Unlike the presidency, which often is able to control the
outflow of information, Congress is a very permeable institution, thus
allowing reporters to cover just about anything that they want. There
is no congressional Office of Communications or press secretary to
explain what the institution is doing. Ultimately what reporters say
about Congress conveys the messy nature of the legislative process as
well as the inevitable partisan squabbles, scandals, and other stories
that give a negative impression of the institution and its members.
Some observers see hope in the additions of C-SPAN and the new
media. Yet the audience for C-SPAN is limited and there is little ev-
idence that such new media as talk radio or the Internet have re-
placed the influence of the major news media. Furthermore, talk ra-
dio and the Internet appear to exacerbate the media tendency to
emphasize scandals, conflicts, and partisan rivalries in Congress.
Despite the poor coverage of Congress, members of the institution
continue to fare well electorally. If indeed members of Congress are
concerned first and foremost about reelection, there is little evidence
that negative coverage affects their incumbency advantages. The
public thus harbors a negative view of the institution and of its mem-
bers generally, but continues to reelect most incumbents anyway.
1. How has the nature of congressional coverage changed in the

past 15-20 years?
2. What are the most important implications of relentlessly neg-
ative congressional press coverage?
3. Why does Congress have such difficulty competing with the
president for media and public attention?
4. How important is accurate, high-quality coverage of the leg-
islative process to Congress’s ability to function as a repre-
sentative institution?
40 Mark J. Rozell
5. What are the leading causes of critical news coverage and

press commentary about Congress?
6. What, if anything, can Congress do to combat its prevailing
press image?
Broder, David S., Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News
Is Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).
Hart, Roderick, and Daron Shaw, Communication and US. Elections:
New Agendas (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
Hess, Stephen, Live! From Capitol Hill (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1991).
Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein, eds., Congress, the Press, and
the Public (Washington, D.C.: Brookings/American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1994).
Povich, Elaine S ., Partners and Adversaries: The Contentious Connection
between Congress and the Media (Arlington, Va.: Freedom Forum, 1996).
Vinson, C. Danielle, Local Media Coverage of Congress and Its Members
(Hampton Press, 2002).
NOTES
1 . Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting

Function of the Press,” in Media Power in Politics, ed. Doris A. Graber
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), 65.
2. Survey conducted by the Gallup Organization, July 19-21,1993, cited
in Karlyn Bowman and Everett Ladd, “Public Opinion toward Congress: A
Historical Look,” in Congress, the Press, and the Public, ed. Thomas Mann
and Norman Omstein (Washington, D.C.: Brookings/American Enterprise
Institute, 1994), 50.
3 . Richard Morin, “YOUThink Congress Is out of Touch?” Washington
Post, October 16, 1994, C1,4.
4. Howard Kurtz, “Tuning Out Traditional News,” Washington Post,
May 15,1995,Al, 6 .
5. Herb Asher and Mike Barr,“Popular Support for Congress and Its
Members,” in Congress, the Press, and the Public, ed. Mann and Om-
stein, 19.
6. Charles M. Tidmarch and John J. Pitney, Jr., “Covering Congress,”

Polity 17 (Spring 1985): 482.
7. Tidmarch and Pitney. “Covering Congress,” 481.
8. Arthur Miller, Edie Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring, “Type-Set Pol-
itics: Impact of Newspapers on Public Confidence,” American Political
Science Review 73 (March 1979): 70.
9. Michael J. Robinson and Kevin R. Appel, “Network News Cover-
age of Congress,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (Fall 1979): 412.
10. Robinson and Appel, “Network News Coverage of Congress,” 417.
11. Robert E. Gilbert, “President versus Congress: The Struggle for
Public Attention,” Congress & the Presidency 16 (Autumn 1989): 99.
12. Norman Ornstein, “What TV News Doesn’t Report about Con-
gress-and Should,” TV Guide 37 (October 21, 1989): 11.
13. See Mark J. Rozell, In Contempt of Congress: Postwar Press
Coverage on Capitol Hill (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
14. See Rozell, In Contempt of Congress, chapters 2 and 5.
15. Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Zeigler, American Politics in the Me-
dia Age, 2d ed. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1986), 212.
16. Norman J. Ornstein, “The Open Congress Meets the President,” in
Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and
Congress in the 1980s,ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1983), 201.
17. Gloria Borger, “Cynicism and Tanknophobia,” U.S. News and
World Report (June 5,1995): 34.
18. Quoted in Stephen Hess, “The Decline and Fall of Congressional
News,” in Congress, the Press, and the Public, ed. Mann and Ornstein, 149.
19. Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, introduction to Congress, the
Press, and the Public, ed. Mann and Ornstein, 8.
20. Howard Kurtz, “Senate Eyes Reporters’ Honoraria,” Washington
Post, July 21, 1995, C1,4.
21. On this point see James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Me-
dia Undermine American Democracy (New York: Vintage Press), 1996.
22. Quoted in Gregg Schneiders, “The 90-Second Handicap: Why TV
Coverage of Legislation Falls Short,” Washington Journalism Review
(June 1985): 44.
23. William Safire,“The MEGO News Era,” WashingtonStar (September
6,1973): A15.
24. Stephen Hess, “The Decline and Fall of Congressional News,” in
Congress, the Press, and the Public, ed. Mann and Ornstein, 150.
25. David Broder, Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the
News Is Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 216.
42 Mark J. Rozell
26. Broder, Behind the Front Page, 227.

27. William Raspberry, “Blow-by-Blow Coverage,” Washington Post,
October 30, 1995, A17.
28. S. Robert Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson, “Less News Is Worse
News: Television News Coverage of Congress, 1972-1992,” in Congress,
the Press, and the Public, ed. Mann and Ornstein, 139.
29. Herb Asher panel discussion comment made at “Congress, the
Press and the Public” (conference cosponsored by the Brookings Institu-
tion and the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., May 1993,
attended by the author).
30. Charles 0.Jones, The United States Congress: People, Place, and
Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1982), 48.
3 1 . Jones, United States Congress, 46.
32. Dye and Zeigler, Politics in the Media Age, 2d ed., 211-12.
33. Mary Russell, “The Press and the Committee System,” in Media
Power in Politics, ed. Graber (Washington, D.C .: Congressional Quarterly,
1984), 228.
34. Richard Davis, The Press andAmerican Politics: The New Media-
tor (New York: Longman, 1992), 161.
35. Robert E. Denton, Jr., and Gary C. Woodward, Political Communi-
cation in America, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1990), 284.
36. Howard Kurtz, “Hot Tips on the Horse-Race to Nowhere,” Wash-
ington Post, June 25,1995, C1,2.
37. “Congress, the Press and the Public” (conference cosponsored by
the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C., May 1993, attended by the author).
38. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Dis-
tricts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 168.
39. Fenno, Home Style, 246-47.
40. Robinson and Appel, “Network News Coverage of Congress,” 416.
41. Quoted in Richard Davis, The Press and American Politics: The
New Mediator (New York: Longman, 1992), 170.
42. Fenno, Home Style, 246.
43. Quoted in Broder, Behind the Front Page, 2 13.
44. Kenneth Adelman, “Real People: On C-SPAN Substance Can Be
More Interesting Than Style,” WashingtonianMagazine (December 1992).
45. Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 232.
46. Frantzich and Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution, 262-64.
47. See, for example, Matt Carter, “Speaking UP in the Internet Age:
Use and Value of Constituent Email and Congressional Websites,” Pur-
Ziurnentury Afluirs 52, no. 3 (July 1999); and the various studies posted at
www.congressonlineproject.org (accessed March 19,2002).
48. “How Is Anthrax Changing Congress and How Are Offices Using
Technology to Cope?’ Congress Online Project Newsletter, November 2,
2001, at www.congressonlineproject.org (accessed March 19,2002).
3
The Supreme Court and the Press
Vincent lames Strickler and Richard Davis
T h e relationship between the Supreme Court and the press is an un-

der studied area in the scholarly analysis of the mass media’s inter-
action with political institutions. This neglect may simply be a func-
tion of the limited attention paid to the Court by the media. Press
coverage of the Court is meager, particularly when compared to
coverage devoted to the president or the Congress.’ In a 1995 study,
Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki concluded: “In short, the presi-
dent receives 8.3 times as much coverage as the Court, and Con-
gress gets 4.1 times as much.”2Moreover, the limited coverage that
the Court receives has been criticized as superficial, often failing to
address important facts about the few cases that are covered? News
coverage tends to be driven by journalistic values rather than legal
salience? Given the scant and often superficial coverage, the lack of
scholarly interest is understandable.
But, despite inadequate media attention given to the Court, the
paucity of academic interest in the relationship is perhaps best ex-
plained by the myth of the Court’s disinterest in the press. Con-
ventional wisdom holds that the Court, sitting unseen and quiet, in
its ivory temple beyond the reach of television cameras, is not in-
terested in or influenced by the press. But this conventional view
fails to recognize the deep importance that press coverage has for
the Court-a court whose only substantial power is the power of
public persuasion.
45
46 Vincent James Strickler and Richard Davis
It is widely assumed that the Court has little interest in the press
and public opinion because its only constituency is the legal pro-
fession. Such a view implies that the Court has no need or desire to
communicate with the press. But Larry Berkson has identified two
separate constituencies of the Supreme Court: the legal profession,
as is generally assumed, and a less attentive but more important por-
tion of the general public? This second, more subtle, constituency
is the base of power for the Court.
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that because the Court
lacks the power of either sword or purse, it is the branch of govern-
ment least likely to injure: “It may truly be said to have nether FORCE
nor WILL, but only merely judgment.”6 Without formal constitutional
powers, the Court is potentially weak. It should rightly fear that the
president, Congress, and the states will not comply with its decisions
unless it can assert some authority that they will respect. “[Tlhe only
power that the Court can assert is the power of public ~pinion.”~ Thus,
to act with independent power, the Court must have the support of the
general public. The Court has even acknowledged this need. In the
Court’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and
David Souter wrote that “[tlhe Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy,
a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law
means and to declare what it demands.”*
The Court has been remarkably successful at maintaining popu-
lar support. Studies have generally found that aggregate support for
the Court consistently exceeds that of Congress and the executive
branch? In addition, the Court’s high level of support has remained
stable over time.1° Such support is not an accident, but is a product
of the Court’s carefully crafted reputation. To promote public re-
spect for it and its decisions, the Supreme Court attempts to project
images of expertise, unanimity, and independence.
The Court’s image of expertise is seen in its visual trappings, its
robes and rituals, and in the backgrounds of the justices, which sug-
gest the distance of an intellectual aristocracy. While other politi-
cians are expected to relate to the common man, Supreme Court jus-
tices are expected to be on a social and educational level above most
The Supreme Court and the Press 47
citizens.” Mediocrity is not tolerated. When G. Harrold Carswell

was nominated to the Court in 1970, despite his thin legal qualifi-
cations, Nebraska Senator Roman Hruska defended him by saying
that “there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers.
They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they.”12 Carswell,
not surprisingly, was not confirmed.
In addition to the expertise of individualjustices, the Court is per-
ceived as having a collective, institutional wisdom. It is the product
of the continuity of long-tenured justices, immersed in their work
and regularly interacting. This is particularly true with regard to
constitutional issues, wherein the Court is believed to “possess a
special competence.”I3
The Court’s image of unanimity is cultivated particularly when the
Court’s power is under attack from other institutions. Examples of the
Court’s tendency to close ranks when its power is threatened can be
seen in the unanimous opinions rendered in the civil rights cases of
Brown v. Board of Education and Cooper v. Aaron, wherein state gov-
ernments challenged the authority of the Court, and in U.S. v. Nixon,
wherein the president threatened to ignore the Court’s ruling. The im-
portance of unanimity is particularly evident in the Cooper opinion,
which, in an unprecedented show of solidarity,all nine justices signed
as coauthors.The intent of the Court to encourage public compliance
through its united opinion is hinted at in a memorandum that Chief
Justice Earl Warren circulated to the other justices, urging that the
Brown opinion be “short, readable by the lay public, nonrhetorical,
unemotional, and, above all, not accusatory.”14Even in the deeply di-
visive cases arising out of the 2000 presidential election controversy,
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing BoardI5 and Bush v. Gore,I6
the Court desperately tried to maintain the illusion of unanimity by is-
suing their rulings as unsigned “per curiam” decision^.'^
The image of the Court’s independence is acquired through creat-
ing the perception of distance from, and immunity to, the political
process. The Court’s apparent detachment from politics is made pos-
sible by its nonelective status. However, the image requires cultiva-
tion. As was admitted in a dissent in the case of Baker v. Carr: “The
Court’s authority -possessed of neither the purse nor sword-
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detach-

ment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements.”18
Thus, the Court must interact with the public to sense what it must
do to maintain public confidence and transmit appropriate messages
to its most important constituency. But it lacks the mechanisms
available to other political actors, such as commissioned polls, dis-
trict offices, newsletters, and town meetings, to both hear from and
speak to its public. The Court needs an information conduit to ac-
complish these purposes, and that conduit is the press. In this model,
the role of the press-based on the Court’s need to maintain its
power by maintaining public deference to its decisions-is to culti-
vate a positive image of the Court.
The potential effect of the press in promoting the needs of the Court
is enormous, since the public generally knows little about the Court or
its actions. Though a few major decisions may penetrate mass aware-
ness through saturation media coverage, and become a permanent part
of the mass political lexicon, most do not. Sometimes even the groups
most affected by decisions of the Court are unaware of them. A mid-
1970s survey of Florida high school teachers showed that only 17 per-
cent of them were aware of the Engel v. Wale decision, which disal-
lowed school prayer.19 Gregory Caldiera concluded: “Citizens, as
individuals, evince little or no knowledge of or concern for the Court;
to the extent that they express sensible opinions, they base judgments
on the vaguest and crudest of ideological frameworks.”20
The media, however, have the power to overcome such pervasive
ignorance and stimulate public awareness of even obscure issues, at
least temporarily. In a 1993 study, Charles H. Franklin, Liane C.
Kosaki, and Herbert Kritzer compared public attention before and
after the release of Supreme Court decisions involving six different
policy areas. They found that in five of six areas, including the dry
topic of taxation of interstate catalogue sales, mass awareness of the
policy area increased sharply immediately following the decisions.
This awareness, however, declined dramatically in the ensuing
months.21In a follow-up study, Franklin and Kosaki demonstrated
that these surges of awareness were a function of media coverage?*
The justices recognize the importance of the press in disseminat-
ing the views of the Court to the public. Earl Warren acknowledged
this relationship when he wrote that the issues handled by the Court
should be “well understood and intelligently appraised by the pub-
lic. Since the public cannot be expected to read the opinions them-
selves, it must depend on newspapers, periodicals, radio, and tele-
vision for its inf~rmation.”~~ In 1956, referring to a news clipping
about an opinion, Justice Harold H. Burton wrote to Warren: “This
shows that the opinion is being understood and taken as it was in-
tended to be taken-at least by the writer of this e d i t ~ r i a l . ”And
~~
in 1966 Earl Warren wrote to a reporter that he was “pleased beyond
words” with the reporter’s coverage of the Mirandu decisi0n.2~
There is ample evidence that justices pay close attention to the
press, not just when important decisions are at stake but on a regular
basis -with particular concern for how they are portrayed. ABC News
reporter Tim O’Brien related a conversation with Justice Antonin
Scalia in which Scalia made specific comments about O’Brien’s sto-
ries. Stuart Taylor, of American Lawyer magazine, received congrat-
ulatory personal notes from Justices William Brennan, Louis Powell,
and Sandra Day O’Connor after writing profiles of eachF6
The justices also take an interest in negative stories. Chief Justice
William Burger once called news correspondent Fred Graham into
his chambers to complain about a story Graham had done for the
CBS Evening News.27And Justice William 0. Douglas wrote a
scathing letter in response to a Washington Post story about the
Court; though he decided not to send it, it can be found in his pa-
pers. It reads in part: “It is amazing how little the press knows about
Supreme Court procedures. A country paper that we read at Goose
Prairie can be excused, but not the Washington Post, whose editors
could find someone to give them a seminar on judicial procedure
any time they choose.”28Later, in his autobiography,Douglas called
the press “depraved,” and he concluded that newspapers use the ed-
itorial page as “a club by the publisher against the Doug-
las and Burger were not alone in their anger. A biographer of Justice
Abe Fortas wrote that Fortas held a “hatred of the press,” and that
he called reporters “dirty” and “crooked .”30
Despite recognizing the press as a conveyer of their views and
images to the public, the justices generally do not acknowledge
that influence flows the other way. When asked in an interview
what influence public opinion has on justices’ opinions, Justice

William Brennan emphatically stated, “none.”31 But even with
such vehement disclaimers, the justices occasionally hint that they
do notice the political world about them. Justice Scalia, in his con-
curring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services wrote:
We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of
mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us-
their unelected and life-tenured judges who have been awarded
those extraordinary, undemocratic characteristics precisely in order
that we might follow the law despite the popular will-to follow the
popular will .32
Whereas Scalia admitted to noticing expressions of public opin-

ion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist more explicitly acknowledged
its possible impact during a 1986 speech, prior to his elevation to
chief justice:
Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no

more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than
can people working at other jobs. And if a judge on coming to the
bench were to decide to hermetically seal himself off from all man-
ifestations of public opinion, he would accomplish very little; he
would not be influenced by current public opinion, but instead by the
state of public opinion at the time that he came onto the bench.33
And one justice admitted in a background interview that public

opinion may at least influence the Court’s agenda, saying, “people
just demand that the Supreme Court resolve an issue whether we re-
ally ought to or not. That does affect us
Though justices may claim that they are not making their deci-
sions with the press or public in mind, there is evidence in their con-
duct that suggests otherwise. In a systematic study by David G. Bar-
num, the major Court actions of the 1960s on minority rights were
found to be prompted by public opinion, while the Court was un-
willing to act in areas such as busing and legalization of homosex-
uality where their decisions would be counter-maj0ritarian.3~Fur-
ther evidence is provided by Roy B. Hemming and B. Dan Wood,
who used a multiple regression analysis to show that Supreme
Court justices respond directly to changing public preferences by

marginally adjusting their own attitudes and decision outcomes?6 A
possible explanation for the justices’ sensitivity to public opinion
was put forward by James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and
Robert S. Erikson, who suggested that justices engage in “rational
anticipation.” They explain: “[I]nstitutionally minded justices will
want to avoid public defeat and the accompanying weakening of the
Court’s implicit authority: They will compromise in order to save
the institution. All this implies paying some attention to what the
public wants from g~vernment.”~~
Though the Court must be responsive to public will to achieve
deference to its decisions and maintain its power, it must not appear
to be responsive to public opinion, for to do so would cast doubt on
its independence and weaken its power. Thus a paradox exists for
the justices’ conduct-they must engage in image making while
denying that they do so. They resolve this dilemma by actively cul-
tivating an image of aloofness.
An example of such self-conscious aloofness was related by Tony
Mauro, a reporter for USA Today, when David Souterjoined the Court:
We had a reception at the press room for Justice Souter. . . . [Wlhen

a justice comes onto the court . . . [w]e invite all the justices down
for wine and cheese. . . . At the very end of it, Souter turned to us
and said, “Well, thank you for this. I enjoyed it. Let’s do it again
when I retire.” We realized as he walked away, [that] you just don’t
see them much. Once they get life tenure, they tend to get inaccessi-
ble-until they’re old and they want to adjust their obituaries?*
The reality is that the justices do engage in subtle maneuvering to

influence public opinion, but they do not wish to be seen doing so.
Stuart Taylor made the following observation about Justice Scalia:
Scalia is one of the most interesting [of the justices] because he is a ball
of energy. He writes very forceful opinions. He does the same in oral
argument. On the other hand, he doesn’t want to be a public figure, he’s
very conscious of that. When he’s giving a speech, he doesn’t want to
be televised. He doesn’t want anyone from the press to cover it. When
he’s making a speech somewhere if he sees a television camera, he’ll
go off stage and say “I’m not going back on until that camera is gone.”
52 Kncent James Strickler and Richard Davis
The explanation he gives is that he doesn’t think Supreme Court jus-

tices should be public figures, out on the hustings making arguments.
He can’t resist doing it; he just doesn’t want the image of what he’s do-
ing widely disseminated. I think there was an element that some of the
other justices felt he was getting a lot of attention, he was hotdogging
too much and so I think he has legitimate reasons for being concerned.
But there is a certain tension between his urge to assert himself and his
desire not to be perceived as asserting himself in certain ~ a y s . 3 ~
The Court’s near obsession with maintaining anonymity outside

of its written opinions can be seen in the details of a recent agree-
ment it reached to have the transcripts of its oral arguments posted
on the Internet. While the attorneys arguing a case are to be iden-
tified, and the chief justice may be identified when announcing the
name of the case, none of the questions are to be attributed to a
particular justice. Instead, the word “Question” is to be substituted
in the posted transcript for the name of the justice who is actually
asking the question.4O
In addition to cultivating respect through an image of aloofness,
justices sometimes actively engage the press to accomplish other
ends, such as protecting their personal images. In the past, Justices
Harry Blackmun and William Rehnquist granted interviews specif-
ically to correct what they considered mistaken views of their per-
sonalities*: While other justices, for example William Brennan
and Byron White, punished the press by cutting themselves off
from reporters when they felt they were treated unfairly (though,
after years of silence, Brennan embraced the press near the end of
his tenure, when his power on the Court was waning and his legacy
was in question)!*
A second motive for the justices to engage the press is to acquire
external assistance for internal disputes. Justices sometimes use
press interactions and public speeches as opportunities to express
their views to sympathetic audiences, and to criticize colleagues or
other 0fficials.4~But the more common avenue for such expressions
is the dissenting or concurring opinion. Dissents and concurrences,
which serve no authoritative function within the legal system, are
often designed to gain press and public attention for a particular jus-
tice’s view outside the Court. Dissents are much more likely to be
reported by the press than concurrences, probably due to the drama

of their inherent conflictP4
Justices increasingly have found dissents and concurrences use-
ful tools for expressing individual views separate from the majority
of the Court. The number of such individual expressions by justices
has increased over time. Up until the 1950s, the number of Court
opinions and individual opinions was roughly the same for each
term. Since the 1950s, the number of individual opinions has grown
to more than double the number of Court 0pinions.4~The increase
in the quantity of individual opinions in recent years caused David
O’Brien to conclude that “individual opinions are more highly
prized than the opinions of the
A third motive of the justices in their press interactions is to af-
fect the larger political environment as it touches the Court. Justice
William 0. Douglas publicly criticized oil companies!7 Justice
Clarence Thomas has spoken out against conservatives being in-
timidated from speaking their In 1986, Justices Brennan
and Stevens indirectly debated Attorney General Edwin Meese in
the press concerning original intent and judicial a~tivism!~
Justices sometimes even participate in the public debate over
Supreme Court nominees. Justice John Paul Stevens publicly en-
dorsed the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court,So
while Justice Thurgood Marshall publicly questioned the creden-
tials of David Souter?’
Thus the Court has an active but often subtle or hidden relation-
ship with the press. That relationship is essential for individual jus-
tices in reaching personal objectives and for the Court as a whole in
maintaining its power. To more fully understand the importance of
this relationship it is helpful to examine the mechanics of reporting
on the Supreme Court beat.
COVERING THE COURT
Approximately fifty reporters are assigned to the Supreme Court.

Twelve to fifteen work full-time or nearly full-time on the Court; the
rest cover other beats as well. The Court beat is high in prestige, due
to its proximity to power, but low in desirability as an assignment for

most reporters, due to the need to rely primarily on documents and
the relative paucity of interviews with sources?*
While many journalists are general assignment reporters and
move from beat to beat, Supreme Court reporters are unique in their
stability. In a survey of Court reporters in the early 1990s, half said
they had been on the beat for more than six ~ e a r s . 5Such
~ lengthy
experience is a relatively recent development. In 1974, tenure on
the Supreme Court beat averaged little more than 2.5 years.54
Longevity is an advantage at the Court because many legal issues
arise repeatedly, allowing journalists to accumulate expertise.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Court beat is the le-
gal background of many reporters. Some legal training is the norm
among Court regulars, several of whom have law degree^?^ Such
specialized training is another recent development. In 1964, Chester
Newland found that few Court reporters were trained in legal mat-
Legal training helps reporters to understand the Court’s
processes and communicate with legal experts as sources. Having a
legal background also provides additional access for some re-
porters. C N ” s Roger Cossack, as a privilege of his membership in
the Supreme Court Bar, was able to listen to the first half of the oral
arguments in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board from
the Court’s lawyers’ listening room, and then slip out to be the first
to report on the proceeding^.^^
Despite the prestige associated with their assignment, the spo-
radic nature of press coverage of the Court often relegates these re-
porters to the fringes of the journalistic community. “Face time”-
time on the air-tends to be lower for broadcast reporters covering
the Court than for other broadcast reporters. However, a few Court
regulars, such as Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio, Tony
Mauro of USA Today, Lyle Denniston of the Baltimore Sun, and
Tim O’Brien of ABC News, have become media personalities who
deliver speeches about the Court and even are interviewed by oth-
ers as experts on the Court.
At the beginning of each term, reporters select from the Court’s
“Order List” (cases accepted for oral argument in that term) a small
number of newsworthy cases on which to focus their limited re-
sources. Some reporters also read through the thousands of requests

made to the Court for cases to be heard (called certiorari petitions)
to target key cases as early as possible. One reporter commented that
“an increasing portion of my effort went into sifting through the
Supreme Court docket in search of whiz-bang fact situations that
might make it on [the Court’s agenda].’’58 Such selectivity drastically
reduces the number of cases that are given press attention. In 1989,
of the 144 decisions handed down by the Court, only 35 (24 percent)
received any network news coverage, and only 16 (1 1 percent) were
covered by all three major broadcast networks?9 Through this selec-
tion process, the media, while not necessarily dictating what the pub-
lic thinks, certainly influences what it thinks about. The quantity of
coverage devoted to a particular issue, or a particular case, is an im-
portant signal for the public in judging its importance.@’
Television coverage in particular imposes additional limits on
story choice and coverage. Tim O’Brien explained that “[olne of my
stories, if it runs a minute-forty . . . that might be one column in a
newspaper. Barely a column. . . . We can’t be as comprehensive as
you can in a newspaper simply because we do not have the time.”61
Broadcast journalists attempt to present Court stories as human
dramas. For example, in covering a case about victim impact state-
ments, Tim O’Brien traveled to Memphis to interview the family of
a woman and her daughter who had been stabbed to death. Toni
House, the late public information officer for the Court, once ob-
served that “what television is able to do is put a human face on the
decisions when they are allowed to. They go out and put the people
who were involved on camera.”62
Wire services reporters are also differentiated from the others be-
cause in most cases they file their stories first. One estimated that
he spent three minutes reviewing a decision before filing the lead,
and thirty minutes before filing the whole st0ry.6~Early wire stories
then shape the framing of stories by other reporters. Those cues be-
come particularly important when a decision is complex and the
implications of the decision may be unclear.
If a case is reported, typically it is at one or more of three stages:
when the certiorari petition is submitted, when oral arguments are
made, and when the decision is handed down. This process provides
multiple opportunities for coverage, particularly of a case dealing

with an already high profile issue such as abortion or school prayer.
Oral arguments often provide the best opportunity to show conflict
and introduce an issue. But, since they lack finality and tend to be
technical and dry, they can easily be skipped over in anticipation of
covering the decision. One reporter lamented: “Sometimes I come
out of an oral argument with hardly a quotable quote.”64 Even if a
story is not immediately filed, however, oral arguments can help the
reporter to understand the issues and may reveal the attitudes of
the justices, thereby hinting at the coming decision.
When a decision is announced, the Court’s Public Information
Office immediately distributes the opinions in printed f0rm.6~At
that point, reporters must read and begin to interpret the decision.
Interpretation is facilitated by extensive preparation before the
decision is announced. Court reporters spend the bulk of their time
reading documents related to cases. Frank Aukofer of the Milwau-
kee Journal explained:
Most of the stuff that you need is right there at the Court-you have
read the briefs, the amicus briefs. There isn’t much need to go out
and interview anybody. Sometimes to personalize it, to make a bet-
ter story out of it, I will go out and talk to the people involved or talk
to their lawyers. On a big case, when you have 20-30 amicus briefs,
you pretty much get the gist of what’s going on from the documen-
tation at the Court. It’s a nice, comfortable way to operate as a re-
porter because it’s all there right in front of y0u.6~
Because primary sources such as certiorari petitions and briefs are

readily available to reporters, the decisions and the reasoning be-
hind them are not usually a surprise for those who cover the C0urt.6~
Even with months of preparation, however, decision reading can be
a difficult task for reporters. Carl Stern observed that “[the justices
have] got too many clerks, so they write these horrendously long
law review articles for decisions. . . . The plain fact is that Supreme
Court decisions today look like the periodic tables in
The difficulty of converting a complicated, legalistic opinion into a
mass audience news story led New York Times reporter Linda
Greenhouse to describe herself as “a kind of tran~lator.,’~~ But in
filling this role, the reporters often need help, and they frequently
get that help from each other.
Supreme Court reporters operate in a competitive,but also collegial
atmosphere.They write stories independently, but they often compare
notes after oral arguments and As Carl Stern explained:
You cannot go to the principal actors and ask them what they meant.
You have to figure it out yourself. . . . We would frequently . . . put
our heads together and kind of ask each other, “What do you think it
means?”. . .I can’t think of any press operation that I’ve experienced
or did experience in almost thirty-four years of journalism that was
as collegial as the Supreme Court press
One part-time Court reporter explained that the regulars are impor-
tant to those who cover the Court as part of a much larger beat be-
cause “once in a while you get a complex decision with no clear ma-
jority. Then I would talk it over with some of my colleagues who
would have covered the case more closely.’772
This process was exposed for all the world to see when the com-
plicated decision in Bush v. Gore was handed down on live TV. Re-
porters, reading frantically, were obviously befuddled at first. One
asked a colleague, “Can you make heads or tails of it?” Another cor-
respondent admitted, “All us aren’t sure what is going on.”73Even-
tually, after the reporters had debated their initial interpretations on
air with each other and their anchors, and had managed to read the
opinions in more detail, they began rendering more enlightened
summaries of the decision.
Another solution to the problem of interpretation, since the justices
themselves refuse to clarify their written opinions, is to go to outside
sources. Interest groups happily volunteer to interpret decisions and
their implications. Some groups, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, keep offices near the Court building for easy access to news
conferences immediately after decisions. Several interest groups,
such as the National Organization for Women, the Legal Defense
Fund, and the Chamber of Commerce,hold briefings in the D.C. area
to inform reporters of their positions on upcoming cases.
Competition to be sources in Court stories is intense among in-
terest groups. Interest group representatives mill about the Supreme
Court plaza after a decision looking for opportunities to share their

spin with reporters. As a dramatic example, following his oral ar-
gument on behalf of A1 Gore in Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Board, attorney Lawrence Tribe “proved media-savvy,
storming the microphones [on the plaza] after the hearing so that he,
not [Bush’s attorney Ted] Olson, got on the tube [first].”74Elite re-
porters avoid the plaza and let the groups chase them. One reporter
related that “people are falling all over themselves to offer you in-
formation, offering stories, offering access to major players.”75
Linda Greenhouse commented that “I don’t make too many phone
calls. People call me.’776The most sought after sources are more
likely to return the call of an elite reporter.
Reporters also will turn to academic experts as sources for stories
or just for confirmation of the reporter’s interpretation of the deci-
sion. Court reporters surveyed said that legal experts are their most
frequent Legal pundits such as Lawrence Tribe of Har-
vard Law School and Kathleen Sullivan of Stanford Law School are
famous as sources, not only because they are experts, but because
they are quick to return calls and are good at translating the deci-
sions into lay terms.
Parties to a case also become sources. This is particularly true when
one party is an interest group or the U.S. government. Another source
is counsel in the case, who usually are willing to speak to the press.
Reporters keep lists of willing sources, categorized by issue. The
choice is often influenced by accessibility. One reporter admitted
that his sources are “people you can get through to.”78Reporters of-
ten solicit strong rhetoric in an attempt to get a good quote. One
news magazine reporter said, “I try to get a key quote to illuminate
the issue-a quote that is funny, or sexy, or unusual, or in a slightly
off beat way illuminates the Experts who can best meet the
sound bite imperative are most likely to be used again. Thus stories
about the Court often focus more on reactions to decisions than on
the decisions themselves.80
Two-thirds of Court journalists surveyed said that their editor’s
influence was important in their work.81 Because the Associated
Press and other wire services get their stories out first, they affect
the approach of editors to their reporters’ Editors rely on
wire service reports to monitor their reporters’ choices and use in-
formation from the wire in negotiating length and angle of stories.
If the approach of a nonelite reporter differs from that on the wire,
it is likely to be challenged by the reporter’s editor, and the reporter
will bear the burden of proof.
Editors exert control over the content of Court stories. Two-thirds
of reporters surveyed said that their editors want their stories
changed to better explain technical points. Such content concerns
can make stories more readable, but not necessarily more informa-
tive. Under editorial influence, many reporters omit much of the
reasoning behind the decisions, because their editors consider it be-
yond their audience. Carl Stern found that approach frustrating:
[A]ny words I used to describe the Court’s reasoning were rejected

as beyond the understanding of the average Joe. Analogies were usu-
ally substituted from sports or warfare. . . . There’s many a time . . .
that I took . . . if not a verbatim quote at least the essence of what a
justice had said and was told by a producer to change this or that.
And I would say, “But that’s not what he said,” and they would say,
“well that’s what he really meant.” And I would say, “No, that’s not
what he meant, and that’s not correct.” And then it came down to,
“Do you want to get on the air tonight or don’t you want to get on
the air tonight?”83
THE CONTENT OF COURT COVERAGE
Another wrinkle in the reporter’s job is the decreasing space and

time devoted to Court stories. News media organizations are forcing
reporters to explain the Court with more brevity. Lyle Denniston,
longtime Supreme Court reporter for the Baltimore Sun, observed
that in the mid-1980s he was given 28 to 30 inches of column space
for a story, but by the mid-1990s he was receiving only 16 in~hes.8~
The shrinkage of coverage has not just affected newspapers but tel-
evision as well. Using data from the Vanderbilt Television News
Archive, Doris Graber found the amount of network news time de-
voted to the Court had dropped from 3.9 percent to 2.4 percent over
a five-year period. While an average of 26 minutes a month was
given to the Court during 1990-199 1, only eight minutes was about
the Court during the 1994-1995 term.85
The decline in attention to the Court reflects the media’s emphasis
on newsworthiness. Court decisions that survive the filtering process
must reflect news valuesF6 Only those involving drama and conflict
and that seem proximate to the lives of viewers will be covered. In
Lyle Denniston’s words, a story is newsworthy if it is “an object of
contemporary fa~cination.”~~ Media critic James Fallows observed:
“Get the ratings and you’re forgiven all else. The sin there is not be-
ing inaccurate. The sin is being boring.”88 Fred Graham sarcastically
noted that it can be argued that Supreme Court “proceedings are so
dull that it is a public service to keep them off the tube.”89
The Court itself may have contributed to this decline in interest. The
Warren and Burger Courts made history with milestone cases on
school desegregation,obscenity,and abortion, but the Rehnquist Court
has been more restrained. Its restraint may be as much a matter of sub-
ject opportunity as it is of judicial choice. Lyle Denniston explained:
There is no such thing anymore . . . as a landmark precedent-setting

decision like Brown or . . . Roe v. Wade. The salami is sliced thinner
and thinner and thinner. In trying to cover a First Amendment case
now you almost have to be a Talmudic scholar to slice the difference
between the dogmatic principles the Court is going to follow.go
Another factor that discourages press coverage is the justices’ aver-

sion to personal stories. Stories about the Court are rarely about per-
sonalities, scandals, or the institution-they are about the cases. In
1989-1990, 74 percent of network stories concerning the Court
were about cases on the current docket. In 1994 the same figure had
risen to 84 percent?l The exceptions to docket-centered coverage
are almost always resignations and confirmations of justices ?2
The quest for newsworthiness produces a distorted picture of the
Court. Often the impression is of a Court dominated by social pol-
icy issues “to the exclusion of other types of Associated
Press coverage during 1989-1990 varied according to case content.
First Amendment and civil rights cases were overreported relative
to their percentage of the docket, while cases involving judicial
power, federalism, and the economy were underreported?4
Furthermore, what coverage there is of Court decisions tends to be

superficial.Elliot Slotnick and Jennifer Segal found that only 27 per-
cent of stories about Webster referred to the fact that a Missouri law
was being challenged, and that “a full 45 percent of Bakke stories
[concerning Regents of University of California v. B ~ k k e lacked
~~]
specific content about the nature of Bakke’s claim or the factual sce-
nario underlying it.”96 Slotnick and Segal concluded that reporting
on the Bakke and Webster decisions was “relatively ahistorical and
a~ontextual.”~~
Glossing over the details is not the only shortcoming of Court re-
porting. Justices are rarely mentioned by name?* The Court as an
institution and its members were nearly invisible in the coverage of
Bakke and Webstet-.%A content analysis of Court stories spanning
from 1984 to 1989 revealed that only one-third of Time magazine
stories and one-fifth of CBS news stories mentioned a justice by
name.lWIn fact, interest groups were noted by name more often in
Court stories than were the authors of Court opinions.lo1Moreover,
case votes (indicating how many justices did or did not endorse the
majority outcome in a particular case) are rarely reported. Slotnick
and Segal found that in 1989 the votes of the justices were reported
by the networks in about one-half of the cases. By 1994 such reports
almost never occurred.lo2
A striking example of selectiveness and inaccuracy can be seen
in the press coverage of certiorari petitions. Very few certiorari de-
nials are reported by the networks: only 18 out of 4,705 in 1989.
The few that are reported deal with issues such as abortion, equal
protection, and privacy.lo3But despite the small number of certio-
rari stories, covering such a narrow range of subjects, the stories are
fraught with error. In coding the Court’s decisions for their
1989-1990 study of network Court coverage, Slotnick and Segal
found news media coverage of merit decisions they could not locate
on the docket. Later they discovered that these phantom decisions
were actually certiorari denials.lWIn the 1989 term, 48 percent of
reports about certiorari denial were mistakenly presented as merit
decisions, 27 percent were presented ambiguously,and only 24 per-
cent were reported accurately.105Court Public Information Officer
Toni House said that the worst thing reporters do is misrepresent
certiorari denials, making them sound like decisions.lo6
In short, press coverage of the Court is minimal and superficial.

Biases and mistakes in reporting present the public with a distorted
view of the Court’s work. Given these realities, it is no wonder that
the Court attempts to influence press coverage.
THE DANCE BETWEEN THE COURT AND THE PRESS
Supreme Court justices seek to control press coverage of the Court

by leading the press in a shrouded dance-restraining it at one mo-
ment, directing it at another, and all the while holding shrouds be-
fore their faces to mask themselves and their efforts. One may ques-
tion whether there is enough contact between the justices and the
press to claim that they dance; but despite a lack of formal personal
encounters, such as interviews and news conferences, justices and
reporters do interact regularly.
The justices specifically shape press coverage by directing the
press to their written work, by being selective in their public interac-
tion, by providing background information, by attempting to shut off
other points of access, and by avoiding issues of contention, thereby
focusing attention on minor matters such as working conditions.
Such efforts are not new. The Court began to institutionalize its
relations with the press in the 1930s. In 1935 the Court opened a
Public Information Office with a Court employee designated to help
the press.lo7In 1947 the Court appointed a full-time public infor-
mation officer. The Court carefully chooses not to use terms such as
“press secretary” or “press office.” Although the Public Information
Office deals primarily with the press, the title implies that the office
simply gives information to the public, without acknowledging the
press as the obvious conduit of that information.
In other branches of the federal government a press secretary pro-
vides advice about how policy will play with the public, but the
Court’s Public Information Officer does not provide similar coun-
sel. Toni House, who served as public information officer through
the Burger and Rehnquist years, once said, “My job is peculiar in
Washington because this office doesn’t spin, it doesn’t flap, it
doesn’t interpret. Our job is to put the news media together with the
information that they need to cover the Court.”’o8
The Public Information Office provides official information,

available to the general public as well as the press, and nothing
more, thus reinforcing the Court’s message that they are uncon-
cerned with politics. In reference to crank calls and advocacy mail,
House remarked: “People don’t realize we [the Court] don’t care
what they think.”lo9Former Erne reporter Jerome Carter said that
the Supreme Court is “the only beat in the federal government
where if you ask them a question they stare at you and say, ‘That’s
your job. I’m not here to do that.”’”O
Despite these seeming barriers, as an institution, the Court says a
lot to the press-in official documents. The number of certiorari pe-
titions, Court orders, briefs, and opinions that a reporter is expected
to have a knowledge of is astounding. For example, Richard Carelli
of the Associated Press estimated that he spent 50 percent of his time
reading the four thousand certiorari petitions filed each year.”’ The
volume of material generated by the Court led Washington Post re-
porter Fred Barbash to say: “No other institution explains itself at
such length, such frightening length.”l12 By feeding the press an al-
most overwhelming volume of documents, the Court focuses press
attention on the justices’ work product. Thus, most news stories about
the Court are simply about the content of the justices’ opinions.l13
But the justices realize that their written communication may not
tell the whole story. Hence, they also interact with reporters in other,
more direct, settings. Regular reporters on the Supreme Court beat
occasionally are given off-the-record interviews with the justices.
The justices prefer such settings, in which they can direct the press
without appearing to. In these encounters they bind the press to
maintain the perception that they do not interact-as the price for
the interaction.
During these sessions, the justices usually refuse to discuss cur-
rent cases, and reporters know better than to ask. But they do dis-
cuss their roles in past decisions and offer insight on the Court’s in-
ner machinations. In an early 1990s survey of Court beat regulars,
only three surveyed said that they had never had an off-the-record
interview with a justice. Half reported such interviews with a ma-
jority of the justices, while two said they had interviewed every cur-
rent justice. Two-thirds said they had been granted off-the-record
interviews in every term.l14
But the justices do not just provide information; they also limit it.
The clerks who serve the justices each term are potentially valuable
news sources because they are privy to the Court’s handling of
current cases. However, the justices prevent such leaks. Clerks
are strongly warned by the justices not to talk to reporters and are
teased about the “20-second rule”-that if they talk to a reporter
they will be fired within twenty seconds.’15
Even when leaks occur, the justices can discredit them by simply al-
tering their plans. Tim O’Brien remarked that the Court can “make
you look foolish if you say decision on such and such day. . . . The
Court doesn’t like it when someone announces their decision before
they do.”116Because the Court eventually goes public with its deci-
sions, some Court reporters argue, it is not worth the risk of reporting
a leak that might be wrong or that might offend the Court. The Court
has been successful enough at plugging leaks that the reporters do not
expect them, nor do they try to cultivate them. Without reliable alter-
native sources, the reporters simply wait for the Court to speak-
through its written opinions.
The extent to which the justices care about the Court’s press ex-
posure is seen in their efforts to facilitate accurate coverage. In addi-
tion to providing a pressroom and issuing opinions promptly, and
other measures designed to accommodate the press, they sometimes
alter their procedures to help reporters get the story right. For exam-
ple, when Carl Stem told Chief Justice Burger that he had misre-
ported a decision on the air (thinking it had been the reverse deci-
sion), Burger ordered that clarifying headnotes be attached to future
decision^."^ In another case, the Court changed its former policy of
not announcing on what days decisions would be handed down, af-
ter reporters complained that they did not know when to come to the
Court to receive the decisions. The Court now announces on what
days decisions will be handed down, but not which decisions will be
released on a particular day.l18 The Court also changed a policy of
delivering all opinions on Mondays, after lobbying from reporters to
spread the load through the week.lI9 Those changes occurred be-
cause the Court realized that too many decisions were going unre-
ported, due to its unpredictable schedule and excessive volume on a
given day. They were clearly designed to make Court reporting eas-
ier and more complete. Thus, although the Court has occasionally
made changes to assist the press, these changes have always been de-
signed so that the Court benefits from more accurate and more ex-
tensive press coverage of its written work.
As part of its effort to restrict and control its coverage, the Court
also has resisted the televising of its arguments and decisions. Several
justices have publicly expressed their concerns that electronic access
to oral arguments would damage the Court. In 1996, Justice David
Souter told a House Appropriations subcommittee,“I think the case is
so strong that I can tell you the day you see a camera come into our
courtroom it’s going to roll over my dead body.”12oLess extravagantly,
Justice Stephen Breyer, in a November 2000 speech, argued that al-
lowing cameras in the courtroom would weaken the “public’s trust” in
the Supreme Court-perhaps because the justices’ unedited foibles
would be laid bare or they would appear to be playing to the camera.121
The Court’s reluctance to be on camera came to a head during the
Bush v. Gore legal battle in the Florida recount cases.122The Court
was faced with extraordinary pressure to open its doors for the first
time to television cameras. Television networks petitioned for access
and newspaper editorials criticized the Court for being unresponsive
to those requests.123Moreover, a threat from Senators Arlen Specter
(R-Pa.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.),to force cameras into the nation’s
highest courtroom through legislation, still hung in the air.124
The Court solved its dilemma by barring television access as it
had always done, to preserve its mystique, but while also allowing
audiotapes of the oral arguments to be distributed immediately fol-
lowing their conclusion, to diffuse the pressure for open access.
Though it was not nearly the degree of access that the networks had
sought, the Court’s “[qluickly releasing an audiotape was, by the
[Clourt’s 18th-century standards,
The Court’s handling of the Florida recount cases demonstrates
how tenuous the Court’s position is. There will be increasing public
demands for a more open and accessible Court to match a media-
driven political and social environment. What will be the next step
the Court will take to satisfy those demands? How will it maintain
its aloofness and mystique under intense public pressure to conform
to a media environment with which it is highly uncomfortable?
66 Encent James Strickler and Richard Davis
The dance between the justices and the press will continue. In-
deed, it must continue in order for the justices to maintain their de-
sired public image in an age that calls upon them to settle many
pressing political issues, such as the election of the president of the
United States. Yet, whether the Court will be able to continue to
hold up its shroud is the main question dominating the future rela-
tionship between the Supreme Court and the press.
1. Do the actions of the Supreme Court deserve more media

coverage? If so, whose fault is it that they don’t receive suf-
ficient press attention?
2. Should press coverage of Supreme Court decisions continue
to focus on cases involving personal rights and liberties (as it
currently does), or should more attention be given to cases
dealing with economic issues? If economic cases deserve
more attention, how can this be accomplished?
3. Despite the superficial nature of media stories about the
Supreme Court, is press coverage of the Supreme Court really
inaccurate? If so, are these inaccuracies extreme enough to be
worthy of public concern?
4. Is the general public capable of understanding the actions of
the Supreme Court? If not, is this a good reason to shield the
Court from intense press scrutiny?
5. Is the dependency of the press on interest groups and pundits to
flesh out its coverage of Supreme Court decisions problematic?
What other options are available to the press? Do these options
have significant problems as well?
6 . Would it be helpful or troublesome if Supreme Court justices
met with reporters to further explain their decisions beyond
what is found in their written opinions?
7. Should Supreme Court arguments be televised? What impact
might this have on the work of the Court? Should even currently
private Supreme Court deliberations -like similar congressional
hearings, debates, and accompanying votes -be televised?
Alexander, S. L., Covering the Courts: A Handbook for Journalists

(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999).
Davis, Richard, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1994).
Denniston, Lyle W., The Reporter and the Law: Techniques of Covering
the Courts (New York: Hastings House, 1980).
Grey, David L., The Supreme Court and the News Media (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1968).
Slotnick, Elliot, and Jennifer A. Segal, Television News and the Supreme
Court: All the News That’sFit to Air? (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
NOTES
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Perspectives on Political

Science, “The Invisible Dance: The Supreme Court and the Press,”
Richard Davis and Vincent James Strickler, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 85-92,
Spring 2000. Reprinted with permission of the Helen Dwight Reid Edu-
cational Foundation. Published by Heldref Publications, 13 19 18th Street,
N W ,Washington, DC 20036- 1802. Copyright 0 (2000).
1 . Dorothy A. Bowles and Rebekah V. Bromley, “Newsmagazine Cov-

erage of the Supreme Court during the Reagan Administration,” Journal-
ism Quarterly 69 (Winter 1992): 948-59; Richard Davis, “Lifting the
Shroud: News Media Portrayal of the U.S. Supreme Court,” Communica-
tions and the Law 9 (October 1987): 43-58; Michael Solimine, “News-
magazine Coverage of the Supreme Court,” Journalism Quarterly 57
(Winter 1980): 661-63.
2. Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, “Media, Knowledge, and
Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court,” in Contemplating Courts,ed. Lee
Epstein (Washington,D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 352-75.
3. Richard Davis, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the
Press (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1994); David Ericson, “News-
paper Coverage of the Supreme Court,” Journalism Quarterly 54 (Autumn
1977): 605-607; Ethan Katsh, “The Supreme Court Beat: How Television
Covers the U.S. Supreme Court,” Judicature 67 (June-July 1983): 6-12;
Elliot E. Slotnick and Jennifer A. Segal, Television News and the Supreme
Court: All the Naos That’s Fit to Air? (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 105.
4. Davis, Decisions and Images; Jerome O’Callaghan and James 0.
Dukes, “Media Coverage of the Supreme Court’s Caseload,” Journalism
Quarterly 69 (Spring 1992): 195-203.
5. Larry Berkson, The Supreme Court and Its Publics (New York:
Lexington Books, 1978).
6. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist
Papers (New York: Mentor, 1961), 465.
7. Philip B. Kurland, “‘The Cult of the Robe’ and the Jaworski Case,”
Washington Post, 23 June 1974, C2.
8. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833,865 (1992).
9. Jeffery J. Mondak and Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, “The Dynam-
ics of Public Support for the Supreme Court,” Journal of Politics 59
(November 1997): 1114-42,1119; Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion
and the Supreme Court (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
10. Roger Handberg, “Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court, 1935-1981 ,”International Social Science Review 59 (1984): 3-13;
Joseph Tanenhaus and Walter Murphy, “Patterns of Public Support for the
Supreme Court: A Panel Study,” Journal of Politics 43 (February 1981):
24-39; Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court.
11. John R. Schmidhauser, Judges and Justices: The Federal Appellate
Judiciary (Boston: Little Brown, 1979).
12. Richard Harris, Decision (New York: Dutton, 1971), 110.
13. John Brigham, The Cult of the Court (Philadelphia: Temple Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 7.
14. Earl Warren, “Memorandum to the Conference,” Earl Warren Pa-
pers, box 57 l , Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (5 May 1954).
15. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
16. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
17. There is a common misperception that Bush v. Gore was a straight-
forward 5-4 decision. In fact, the controlling opinion in that case was an
unsigned per curiam. In addition to the per curiam opinion, the decision
was accompanied by a concurrence signed by three justices (Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas) and dissents signed by four (Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Souter). (Interestingly, though Souter and Breyer are counted
as dissents, they agreed with the per curiam opinion that Florida’s recount
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, but they disagreed
about the appropriate remedy-so some observers even count it as a 7-2
decision.) From these concurring and dissenting opinions one can deduce
that the vote on the per curiam opinion was in reality 5 4 , with Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor, with the three concurring justices, completing
the majority. It is critical to note, however, that the per curiam opinion was
not signed as a five-vote majority, but was left anonymous. If the dissent-
ing justices had not chosen to make public their disagreement, the con-
trolling per curiam opinion would have offered no clues about how many
justices agreed with it. The issuing of the decision as a per curiam deci-
sion was obviously an attempt to project unanimity-an attempt that was
spoiled by the dissenting justices. This attempt by the majority to imply
unanimity when it did not exist can be best understood as an effort to
avoid appearing partisan. Obviously, at least two of the Court’s members
were concerned enough about how the decision would be received by the
public, if the Court’s 5-4 split were explicitly acknowledged, that they re-
fused to sign it (even though it is generally assumed that Justice Kennedy
was the author of the per curiam decision).
18. Baker v. C a v 369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (J. Frankfurter and J. Harlan
dissenting).
19. Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1989), 206.
20. Gregory Caldiera, “Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of
Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court,” American Political Sci-
ence Review 80 (December 1986): 1209-26,1223.
21. Charles H. Franklin, Liane C. Kosaki, and Herbert Kritzer, “The
Salience of United States Supreme Court Decisions” (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Wash-
ington, D.C., 2-5 September 1993).
22. Franklin and Kosaki, “Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court.”
23. Earl Warren to Louis H. Pollack, 23 June 1966, Earl Warren Pa-
pers, box 617, Library of Congress.
24. Harold H .Burton, memorandum, 15 April 1956,Earl Warren Papers,
box 349, Library of Congress.
25. Earl Warren to Edward P. Morgan, 25 June 1966,Earl Warren Papers,
box 617, Library of Congress; referring to Miranda v. State ofArizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
26. Davis, Decisions and Images, 112.
27. Fred Graham, Happy Talk: Confessions of a TV Newsman (New
York: Norton, 1990), 103.
28. Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., The Douglas Letters: Selectionsfrom the
Private Papers of Justice William 0.Douglas (Baltimore: Adler & Adler,
1987), 66-67.
29. William 0. Douglas, The Court Years, Z939-Z975 (New York:

Random House, 1980), 197,206.
30. Bruce A. Murphy, Fortas (New York: William Morrow, 1988),
229-30.
31. Baum, The Supreme Court, 129.
32. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,535 (1989)
(J. Scalia concurring).
33. R. W. Apple Jr., “Justices Are People,” New York Times, 10 April
1989, A l .
34. H. W. Perry Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States
Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991),259-60.
35. David G. Barnum, “The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial
Decision-Making in the Post New Deal Period,” Joumal of Politics 46
(1985): 652-66. See also Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court;
Richard Funston,“The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,”American Po-
litical Science Review 69 (September 1975): 795-8 l l . For an opposing view
see Jonathon Casper, “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making,”
American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 50-63.
36. Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan Wood, “The Public and the Supreme
Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods ,”
American Journal of Political Science 41 (April 1997): 468-98.
37. James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson,
“Dynamic Representation,” American Political Science Review 89
(September 1995): 543-65,555.
38. Davis, Decisions and Images, 1 13.
39. Davis, Decisions and Images, 1 1 1.
40. Charles Lane, “Full Court Press; Oral Arguments: Few Conces-
sions Online,” Washington Post, 6 November 2000, A33.
42. Davis, Decisions and Images, 106-107.
44. Elliot E. Slotnick, moderator, “The Media and the Supreme Court”
(roundtable panel discussion sponsored by the American Political Science
Association, in Washington, D.C., broadcast on C-SPAN, 4 September
1993), quoted in Slotnick and Segal, Television News, 185.
45. David M. O’Brien, Storm Center, 4th ed. (New York: Norton,
1996), 318-19.
46. O’Brien, Storm Center, 267.
48. Neil A. Lewis, “Justice Thomas Raises Issue of Cultural Intimida-
tion,” New York Times, 14 February 2001, A28.
49. Stuart A. Taylor Jr., “Meese v. Brennan,” New York Emes Maga-
zine, 6 & 13 January 1986,17-21.
50. Stuart A. Taylor Jr., “Justice Stevens, in Unusual Move, Praises
Bork as a Nominee to Court,” New York Emes, 1 August 1987, A1 .
51. “Marshall Says He Never Heard of Bush’s Nominee,” New York
Emes, 27 July 1990, A12.
52. Stephen Hess, The Washington Reporters (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1981), 18-19,58-59.
54. Everette Dennis, “Another Look at Press Coverage of the Supreme
Court,” Wanova Law Review 20: 765-99.
56. Chester A. Newland, “Press Coverage of the United States
Supreme Court,” Western Political Quarterly 19 (March 1964): 15-36,
17-18.
57. Peter Marks, “Without Pictures, TV Networks Were Scrambling,”
New York Emes, 2 December 2000, A9.
58. Graham, Happy Talk, 237.
59. Franklin and Kosaki, “Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court,”
352.
60.Franklin and Kosaki, “Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court,”
366. See also generally Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, News That
Matters: Television and American Opinion (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987).
61. Slotnick and Segal, Television News, 48.
62. Slotnick and Segal, TelevisionNews, 47.
63. David Shaw, Press Watch (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 125.
65. Elder Witt, Guide to the Supreme Court (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1990), 7 13.
69. Slotnick, “The Media and the Supreme Court,” quoted in Slotnick
and Segal, Television News, 29.
73. Megan Garvey and Bob Drogin, “On Cold Nights, Shedding Light
Isn’t Easy: Television Scrambles to Make Sense of the Complex Legal
Decision Live on the Air,” Los Angeles Emes, 13 December 2000, A24.
74. Howard Kurtz, “TV’s Court Watchers Put an Ear to the Closed
Door,” Washington Post, 2 December 2000, C 1.
80. Newland, “Press Coverage of the United States Supreme Court,”
15-36.
8 1. Davis, Decisions and Images, 94.
83. Slotnick and Segal, Television News, 67-73.
85. Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 3d ed.
(Washington D.C .: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 270-72.
86. Stephanie Larson, “How the New York Z h e s Covered Discrimi-
nation Cases,” Journalism Quarterly 62 (Winter 1985): 894-96.
88. James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine
American Democracy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996), 278.
89. Graham, Happy Talk, 102.
94. Davis, Decisions and Images, 136; Slotnick and Segal, Television
News, 226-28; and generally O’Callaghan and Dukes, “Media Coverage
of the Supreme Court’s Caseload.”
95. Regents of the Universityof California v. B a k , 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

107. Lewis Wood, “Press Needs Met by Supreme Court,” New York
Emes, 5 January 1936,7.
108. “Cameras in the Courtroom,” C-SPAN broadcast, 14 March 1996,
Washington, D .C .
111. Rorie Sherman, “The Media and the Law,” National Law Journal
(6 June 1988): 32-36,33.
112. Quoted in Mitchell Tropin, “What Exactly Is the Court Saying?’
Barrister Magazine 68 (Spring 1984): 14.
113. Solimine, “Newsmagazine Coverage of the Supreme Court,”
661-63; Davis, “Lifting the Shroud,” 43-58.
115. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1979), 417.
118. S e e Mark H. Woolsey, Fred Graham, and James E. Clayton, letter to
Earl Warren, 6 October 1965, and Earl Warren, memorandum for the clerk,
16 November 1966, Earl Warren Papers, box 666, Library of Congress.
119. David L. Grey, The Supreme Court and the News Media, 36-37;
and Davis, Decisions and Images, 36.
120. Quoted in Laurie Asseo, “And Now, the Supreme Court Live?’
Sun Diego Union-Tribune, 2 6 November 2000, G6.
121. Quoted in “TV and the Supreme Court; The Issue: High Court
Denies Coverage of Arguments Friday; Our View: Its Objections Treat
Americans Like Children,” Denver Rocky Mountain News, 28 November
2000, A34.
122. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70
(2000); and Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
123. See, for examples, “TV and the Supreme Court,” A34; “Court
Misses Opportunity,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 28 November 2000,
A 14; and “Opening the Hearing to Cameras,” San Francisco Chronicle,
29 November 2000, A26.
124. Lane, “Full Court Press,” A33.
125. Kurtz, “TV’s Court Watchers,” C1.
4
The Media and Civil Rights and Liberties
Barbara A. Perry
T h e phrase “civil rights and liberties” denotes a host of basic indi-

vidual rights that are constitutionally or statutorily protected and that
Americans possess in relation to the government or public entities.
Purists may point out that technically civil rights usually concern
matters of race, ethnicity, gender, age, or other social characteristics,
whereas civil liberties connote First Amendment freedoms (speech,
press, religion, assembly) or criminal rights that Amendments Four
through Eight of the U.S. Bill of Rights protect.’ This chapter fo-
cuses on how the media portray and cover civil rights and liberties
through sources of popular culture (films, television, and fiction), as
well as print and broadcast journalism.
POPULAR CULTURE
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has a flair for the dramatic, as

evidenced by the gold stripes that he added to his judicial robe in
1995 after seeing a similar costume in a Gilbert and Sullivan play.
He clearly relished the theatrical moment presented to him on June
26,2000, when he announced the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Dickerson v. United States: the case that offered yet another chal-
lenge to the famed Miranda rights. A palpable shiver of excitement
stirred the audience in the packed courtroom as Rehnquist began to
75
76 Barbara A. Perry
recite: “You have the right to remain silent. If you choose not to re-
main silent, anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law. You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided for you.” If the chief justice had
asked the spectators to join him in the recitation, the vast majority
could have obliged. The Miranda rights, so named for the defendant
in the 1966 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court prescribed that
the constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to an attor-
ney be read to all suspects as they are taken into custody, are now
known verbatim by viewers of televised crime dramas. Criminal de-
fendants in foreign countries are disappointed to learn that their
own country’s constitutional protections may not be as broad as
those they see portrayed in imported American TV programs?
From the early days of television in the 1950s, courtroom drama
series such as “Perry Mason” and “The Defenders” captivated
American audiences and introduced them to the basics of the judi-
cial process and criminal rights. Who could forget Perry Mason’s
weekly nemesis, prosecutor Hamilton Berger, leaping to his feet to
demand that the judge exclude Mason’s evidence as “incompetent,
irrelevant, and immaterial.” Viewers might not have been able to
pass the bar exam’s section on evidentiary rules, but at least they
had a sense that not all evidence was admissible.
A steady stream of TV law, police, and private detective series has
provided a staple of prime-time entertainment. In the 1970s these
shows were led by “Mannix,” “Cannon,” “Barnaby Jones,” “Hawaii
Five-0,” and “Kojak.” In the 1980s an ensemble cast on “L.A. Law”
paved the way for more recent hit dramas like “NYPD Blue” and
“Law and Order.” Even situation comedies familiarized Americans
with the lowest levels of the judicial process. “The Andy Griffith
Show” related the comedic exploits of a small-town sheriff who also
served as the justice of the peace. He could arrest Mayberry
scofflaws as a police officer and then try them as the judicial officer
of first resort. (Andy Griffith returned to the small screen some years
later to produce and star in “Matlock,” about a lawyer/private detec-
tive who helped to defend his predictably innocent clients.)
Most recently, pseudo-real television courtroom shows have pro-
liferated. Led by “The People’s Court,” “Superior Court,” “Divorce
The Media and Civil Rights and Liberties 77
Court,” and “Judge Judy,” these half-hour trials supposedly portray

real-life conflicts in a “small-claims court” atmosphere, that is, with
a scaled-down judicial process that eliminates issues of “jurisdic-
tion, notices to defendants, pleadings, discovery, and choice of a
judge or jury trial, all of which can be argued, replied to, and mo-
tioned again~t.”~ Clearly, such programs make an impact on their
viewers; a poll conducted in 1989 showed that while 54 percent of
respondents could name Judge Wapner as the then-presiding judge
on the “People’s Court,” only 9 percent of those polled could iden-
tify William Rehnquist as the chief justice of the United state^!^
The silver screen has also served as a conduit for images of the
law, justice, and civil rights and liberties. As political scientist Ernest
Giglio has noted in his recent book on politics and film, movies
serve as “visual opportunities for filmmakers to challenge the con-
ventional wisdom and established doctrine on particular legal issues
such as abortion and capital punishment.”6Some of America’s clas-
sic films, especially Westerns, address the importance of the rule of
law. The Ox-bow Incident (1943), starring Henry Fonda as a cowboy
who understands that law is the “conscience of humanity,” portrays
the ugliness of mob rule when a vigilante posse, ignoring Fonda’s
entreaties, serves as the judge, jury, and executioner of three men
who are wrongly accused of murder. In High Noon (1952) Gary
Cooper, a Western town’s sheriff, stands alone to duel outlaws who,
after serving jail sentences for which he is responsible, return to seek
their revenge. The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence (1962) pits James
Stewart, as a principled lawyer, against John Wayne, who represents
the frontier version of justice at gunpoint?
In different settings, other films have emphasized the necessity
for due process and the rights of the accused. As Giglio queries
rhetorically, “Could there be a more heroic lawyer than Atticus
Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird” (1962), the movie based on Harper
Lee’s semiautobiographical book of the same title? Played to per-
fection in an Oscar-winning performance by Gregory Peck, Finch
willingly accepts a judge’s request that he represent a poor black
man accused of raping a white girl in a sleepy, Depression-era Al-
abama town. “Atticus’ acceptance [of the hopeless case] is a lesson
to audiences that even marginalized groups are entitled to the best
78 Barbara A. Perry
defense possible under the American legal system.”8 Although

Finch stares down a lynch mob intent on killing his jailed client, he
is unable to save him from conviction by a prejudiced jury. Later,
the sheriff informs Atticus that authorities fatally shot his doomed
client as he tried to escape their custody.
If Atticus Finch is the paradigmaticfictional lawyerhero, the famed
criminal attorney Clarence Darrow played that role in real life and was
subsequently portrayed on stage and screen by no less than Spencer
Tracy, Orson Welles, and Henry Fonda. Inherit the Wind (1960), orig-
inally a successful Broadway play, is a highly entertaining depiction
(using fictitious names for Darrow and the other principle characters)
of the infamous 1925 Scopes “Monkey Trial,” in which a Tennessee
schoolteacher was tried for teaching Darwin’s theory of evolution
against state law. While introducing viewers to Darrow’s clever court-
room advocacy (as artfully portrayed by Tracy), in which he made his
opponent, William Jennings Bryan (played by Fredric March), look
foolish, Inherit the Wind also teaches lessons about First Amendment
freedoms of expression and religion. The 1959 movie CompuZsion,
based on the 1924 “thrill murder” committed by Leopold and Loeb,
provides a forum for Welles as Darrow to make a convincing oral ar-
gument against the evils of capital punishment. In fact, Darrow’s clos-
ing remarks at the LeopoldLoeb trial saved his clients from execu-
tion? By the 1970s, Darrow, long dead, still captured the imagination
of producers; Henry Fonda offered a superb portrayal of the great
criminal lawyer in a one-man stage play entitled simply “Darrow,”
which ultimately was filmed for television viewers.
On a larger scale, Judgment at Nuremberg (1961) raised universal
questions about human rights in its depiction of the post-World War
I1 Nazi War Crimes Trials. Media critic Steven Scheuer has de-
scribed the brilliantly acted film with an all-star cast as “searing” in
its exploration of “the degree to which an individual or a nation can
be held responsible for carrying out the orders of their leaders, how-
ever heinous the commands may be.”*oU.S. Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson, who served as the American chief counsel at the
Nuremberg Trials, opened his statement to the tribunal with these
words: “That four great nations [the United States, France, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union], flushed with victory and stung by in-
jury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason. . . . [Tlhe world yields
no respect to courts that are organized merely to Of the
twenty-two defendants -representing the highest levels of the Nazi
German war machine that had wreaked death and destruction on
Europe-twelve received the death penalty, seven were imprisoned,
and three were acquitted.12Media mogul Ted Turner produced an up-
dated version of the Nuremberg Trials for his cable television net-
works in 2000, complete with the improbable casting of Alec Bald-
win as Justice Robert Jackson. Apparently not finding the historic
plot sexy enough, the Turner version added an alleged affair between
Jackson and his secretary, who accompanied him to Germany.
Yet made-for-television movies can provide a direct lesson to view-
ers on civil rights and liberties. The 1980 TV production of Gideon’s
Trumpet is exemplary. With Henry Fonda in the title role, the film
(based on journalist Anthony Lewis’s book of the same name) tells the
true story of Clarence Earl Gideon, an illiterate drifter who in the early
1960s was arrested, tried without legal counsel (per Florida law at that
time), convicted, and sentenced to jail for breaking and entering a pool
hall and stealing money from its Coke machine. From his cell, Gideon
wrote as best he could in his own hand on tablet paper his “pauper’s
petition” to the U.S. Supreme Court. Amazingly, the Court (led by
Chief Justice Earl Warren) accepted Gideon’s appeal, assigned as his
counsel one of the finest legal minds in the country, future Supreme
Court Justice Abe Fortas, and ruled in his favor. There is hardly a stu-
dent in the United States who has not heard of the precedent estab-
lished in Gideon v. W~inwright’~-that,under the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel guarantee, states must provide all defendants, even in
noncapital cases, an attorney at trial. Three years after handing down
its landmark Gideon ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court would include the
guarantee of counsel in the Miranda rights that all suspects must be
read upon being taken into custody.
Popular novels, many of which have been produced for television
and the giant screen, have offered readers exposure to courtroom
drama, the criminal justice system, and the legal profession. From
Erle Stanley Gardner’s Perry Mason series to modern legal thrillers
80 Barbara A. Perry
by real-life attorneys-turned-authors, John Grisham and Scott

Turow, the entertainment industry has captured a significant audi-
ence with such books/films as The Firm, The Client, The Pelican
Brief, and The Brethren (all by the prolific Grisham) and Presumed
Innocent (by Turow). More recently, another lawyerbest-selling
novelist, David Baldacci, has struck gold with his legal thrillers,
The Simple Truth, Absolute Power, The Winner, Total Control, and
Saving Faith. The last one sold 25 million copies in 33 1ang~ages.l~
PRINT A N D BROADCAST JOURNALISM:

A U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE STUDY
In 1994-1995, I served as a judicial fellow at the Supreme Court of

the United States, which gave me the perfect opportunity to view
the entire body of the Court’s work from the inside, while follow-
ing media coverage of the tribunal and its decisions. Here I offer a
systematic analysis of how selected print and broadcast journalists
covered civil rights and liberties cases during the 1994-1995 term
of the highest court in the land. For an understanding of the print
medium’s coverage, I chose to follow the New York Times and the
Washington Post. Both are national newspapers read throughout the
country; in addition, their stories on the Supreme Court are reported
via wire services in local and regional newspapers. I also examined
a year’s worth of C-SPAN coverage of the Supreme Court.
Civil rights and liberties cases did not always hold prominent or
numerous positions on the Supreme Court’s docket. In 1935-1936
only 2 out of 160 signed written opinions were on issues involving
“basic human rights.” By 1979-1980 the proportion of civil rights
and liberties cases decided by the high court has more than doubled
(80 out of 149). In the 1990s the Court’s total case output declined
sharply, but the civil rights and liberties case ratio remained nearly
constant (in 1994-1995, 49 out of 94).15 Media coverage of the
Court’s 1994-1995 cases was typical in its emphasis on civil rights
and liberties issues, which resonate with the general public. Thus,
previews of the term by Linda Greenhouse (the New York Times’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter) and Joan Biskupic (then the Wash-
ington Post’s Court reporter, now with USA Today) summarized

cases on racial and gender discrimination, freedom of speech, and
the death penalty, as well as Congress’s authority to restrict posses-
sion of guns near schools. Labeling cases as “landmarks” at the out-
set of the Court’s term is problematic for journalists, because the jus-
tices have only selected half of their caseload for the term when they
meet for their opening oral argument on the first Monday in October.
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have both ac-
cused the press of ignoring genuinely precedent-setting cases in less
glamorous areas like banking, taxation, and administrative law.
By the time the Court hands down the cases with the most public
interest (particularly the civil rights and liberties decisions), usually
in the last few weeks of the term, the press knows which decisions
to showcase.Then the problem for journalists is analyzing numerous
complex decisions in literally a few hours, in order to make press
deadlines, and persuading editors to devote the necessary space or
airtime to afford thorough coverage of the outcomes. Nevertheless,
coverage of the denouement of landmark, or otherwise highly publi-
cized, decisions is generally thorough, accurate, and balanced in na-
tional publications like the Post and 7imes. Like C-SPAN, the three
major television networks are deprived of videotape of the Court’s
announcement of decisions; in addition, by virtue of their news pro-
gram formats, they usually devote less than several minutes to cases.
CN”s “Headline News” offers just what the name suggests on
Supreme Court decisions, but had in 1994-95 the option of providing
lengthier coverage on its “Burden of Proof ,” a half-hour treatment of
legal issues by lawyers Greta Van Susteren and Roger Cossack.
June 12,1995, was illustrative of news coverage at the end of the
Court’s term. That day the floodgates opened on the backlog of
cases awaiting decision before the justices’ summer recess. The jus-
tices announced eight rulings, the most important of which were
Adarand v. Peiia and Missouri v. Jenkins, two closely monitored de-
cisions on race. The Washington Post banner headline the next day
said it all: “Court Toughens Standard for Federal Affirmative Ac-
tion.” Biskupic’s article on the 5-4 Adarand decision was com-
mendable for sorting through the complexities of Justice O’Con-
nor’s majority opinion and explaining its technicalities in a manner
82 Barbara A. Perry
comprehensible to the average reader. (She avoided the mistake

made by a Time magazine reporter, appearing on PBS’s “Washing-
ton Week in Review,” who stated that the Court had struck down the
affirmative action plan at issue in Adurund.) Biskupic observed that
the ruling, which required that judges apply “strict scrutiny” to fed-
eral affirmative action programs, jeopardized all such programs.
The decision returned the program at issue to the lower court for ad-
judication using the “strict scrutiny” standard. Moreover, Adurund
overturned a 1990 precedent framed by retired Justice William J.
Brennan, signaling an ideological shift on the high court.16
According to Biskupic, the shift was also evident in the Jenkins
case. In that decision, the justices ruled by another 5-4 vote that a
federal judge had improperly attempted to integrate the public
schools of Kansas City, Missouri, by ordering massive expenditures
in order to attract students from surrounding suburbs. Biskupic also
added a portion of Justice Thomas’s stunningly emotive concurring
opinion, which took the Kansas City plan to task for trying to attract
white students in order to improve urban schools. Wrote Thomas:
“It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume
that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.”I7A sep-
arate article by two of Biskupic’s colleagues at the Post focused on
the political ramifications of the two rulings.18
Greenhouse folded more of the political implications of the
Adurund ruling into her lead article on the case, declaring that the de-
cision was “likely to fuel rather than resolve the debate over affir-
mative action” and noting that “the Supreme Court today cast doubt
on the constitutionality of Federal programs that award benefits on
the basis of race.” She elaborated: “By refusing to foreclose affir-
mative action as a constitutional option, the Court has done little to
relieve President Clinton, as well as other elected officials now con-
fronting the issue, of the need to make and defend their own policy
choices .”I9 Eventually, President Clinton would announce cutbacks
in, but not elimination of, federal affirmative action programs.
Greenhouse reflected more detail from the Court’s majority opin-
ion in Jenkins, and she also quoted directly from Thomas’s bitter
concurrence?o In addition, the Times ran a separate article labeled
“Reaction,” in which another of the paper’s reporters described re-
sponses to the Adarand decision among interest groups on both

sides of the issue and within the Clinton administration?l
The Post and Emes had their editorials ready to publish the day af-
ter Adarand and Jenkins came down. The Post was far less chagrined
over the two rulings, saying simply that “a sharply divided Supreme
Court is demonstrating the difficulty the entire government is having
with the future of affirmative action programs.”**The paper did not
see the two decisions as marking the end of an era but rather signal-
ing the need to find alternatives to traditional policies to remedy racial
discrimination. The Times took a much more pointed position,
announcing: “The Supreme Court, a place where minorities once
looked for racial justice, did what it could yesterday to halt the
progress its own decisions once sparked.” The New York paper an-
grily labeled Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, along
with the Chief Justice Rehnquist, a “constitutional wrecking crew,”
because their majority opinions limited remedial programs that ad-
dress the history of segregation in this c o ~ n t r y ?For
~ those who be-
lieve that the Emes and Post are cut from the same ideological cloth,
these editorials from the two papers reveal marked differences in their
responses to two controversial Supreme Court rulings.
Subsequent news analyses of Adarand speculated about the ram-
ifications of the decision along practical, political, and strategic
lines. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and James Fallows, former edi-
tor of U.S. News and World Report, have both criticized the press
for spending too much time engaging in such activity, but the arti-
cles that appeared in the Post and the Times were certainly moder-
ate and informative in theorizing about the impact of Adarand on
businesses, presidential politics, and public opinion?4
Predictably, George Will was less than pleased with the compro-
mise ruling penned by Justice O’Connor’s controlling opinion in
Adarand. He argued that the Court “would have made significant
history” if Justice Scalia’s concurrence, arguing that the govern-
ment can never justify racial discrimination against whites as a rem-
edy for past discrimination against minorities, would have set the
precedent in the On the other hand, William Raspberry, a
more liberal columnist, pointed out the irony of Justices O’Connor
and Thomas voting against affirmative action, when they both had
84 Barbara A. Perry
benefitted from it in their elevation to the nation’s highest court; and

Thomas had advanced throughout his academic and professional
career because of racial preference policies F6
Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer took yet another
approach to the case, arguing that Adarand was relatively insignifi-
cant because the Supreme Court would no longer be the major bat-
tleground for affirmative action cases. Rather, Krauthammer argued,
“it is best for democracy -indeed it is best for conservatism- that
such revolutionary decisions be made not by nine wise (wo)men in
black robes but by the people, in Congress and in their legislature^."^^
In Krauthammer’s view, nine justices in black robes, wise though
they may be, are the antithesis of democracy by the people. Indeed,
the unelected federal judiciary has often been portrayed as undemo-
cratic, but history demonstrates that the Supreme Court breathed life
into constitutional guarantees of rights to minorities and women,
whose voices had been excluded from electoral politics or so diluted
as to be ineffectual.
The most provocative decision of the 1994-1995 term produced
equally divergent editorial reaction, but news coverage of it was ac-
curate, if slightly sensational. Announced on April 26, 1995, U.S. v.
Lopez, in which the justices by a close 5-4 vote struck down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act as overstepping Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce, marked a departure from nearly 60
years of the Court’s jurisprudence. From the time of the announce-
ment of the decision until the following week, the newspapers and
airwaves were filled with stories on Lopez. Greenhouse was most
dramatic in her lead: “The Supreme Court today dealt a stinging
blow to the Federal Government’s ability to move into the realm of
local law enforcement.”28
Biskupic addressed the political relevance of the justices’ decision,
writing that “the Court added its voice to the nation’s increasingly
volatile debate over the size and roles of the federal government. . . .
The decision immediately acquired extra resonance because of the
Oklahoma City bombing,” only one week earlier, after which Resi-
dent Clinton and Republican leaders had called for more investigative
powers for the federal g0vernment.2~In a follow-up article the next
day, Biskupic included responses from a host of experts in the field,
who called the Lopez decision “breathtaking and historic.”30
The Washington Post, in a short editorial published two days af-

ter the announcement of the Lopez decision, agreed with the Court’s
majority that Congress had not met the standard of proving that the
guns it intended to ban from zones around schools had any relation
to interstate commerce. Rather than assuming a “the-sky-is-falling”
approach, the Post reasoned (incorrectly in hindsight) that the Lopez
opinion did not foreshadow a “fundamental restructuring of federal-
state relation^."^'
On the other hand, the New York Times waited another day to
ponder the case and then issued a longer and more strident response
to Lopez. It declared that the Court had “taken an unfortunate his-
torical turn and needlessly questioned previously settled law.” The
Times accused the justices of crippling Congress’s efforts to address
a national problem as they had done in the early days of the New
Deal and concluded that “to strip Congress of the power to function
is a throwback to the misguided rulings of earlier times.”32
One of the Court’s last decisions in 1994-1995 garnered the most
sensational headlines from the front page to the sports page. With two
frail members of the Court’s old liberal bloc (Justices Hany Black-
mun and William Brennan) looking on wanly from the audience, the
justices had announced their decision in Vernoniu School District v.
Acton. By a 6-3 vote the Court upheld the Oregon school district’s
policy of random urinalysis drug testing for middle and high school
student athletes. Biskupic’s narrative on the decision noted that the
Court’s ruling “could touch the lives of millions of schoolchildren.”
At the heart of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was the argument that
students are children who do not enjoy the same rights as adults and
who are committed to the custody of school officials acting in the
place of parents. Moreover, Scalia’s opinion for the Court returned to
the issue raised at oral argument-that drug testing cannot be consid-
ered a violation of student athletes’ right of privacy when they have
no expectation of privacy in school locker rooms and restrooms. As
Scalia succinctly expressed it, “School sports are not for the bash-
f ~ l . ’The
’ ~ ~Post also carried a brief excerpt of the majority’s opinion
and an article reporting that the Court’s ruling had strong support
from high school athletes in the Washington area. Nevertheless, the
Post’s editorial on the case sided with Justice O’Connor’s reasoning
in dissent, which argued that all searches are intrusive, especially
86 Barbara A. Perry
those that involve the person, as opposed to homes, papers, or per-

sonal effects. The newspaper maintained that millions of students
should not be exposed to such intrusive measures when the vast ma-
jority of them are innocent of wrongdoing.
As she often does, Greenhouse focused on the historical and strate-
gic oddities of the case, observing that for the first time the Supreme
Court had upheld random drug testing. She also reported that the vot-
ing lineup in the decision was “unusual,” with conservative and lib-
eral justices mixed on each side of the c a ~ e . 3The~ Times included
lengthier excerpts from the majority and minority opinions. Like the
Post, the Times reported that local high school athletes, their parents,
officials, and coaches endorsed the Court’s ruling. Unlike the Post,
however, the Times wrote that educators predicted that practical con-
siderations would prevent widespread testing of student athletes. The
Times editors agreed with those at the Post that the Supreme Court
had erred in permitting what the Times called “a needless and dan-
gerous relaxation of the Fourth Amendment’s safeguard against un-
reasonable In its sports section, the New York Times car-
ried another editorial questioning the constitutionality of the kind of
drug testing upheld by the Court in Vemonia?6
Although headlines and stories on Supreme Court decisions may
occasionally reflect modem media sensationalism and even hysteria,
oral arguments at the Court are more likely to provide grist for the
mills of journalists seeking the proverbial “Man Bites Dog’, story.
Vernonia, brought by fifteen-year-old aspiring football player James
Acton, was one such case. During the oral argument of Acton’s case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist opened the way for some locker-room hu-
mor with his reasoning that urinalysis is hardly a violation of privacy
when boys’ locker rooms are rarely private, with their rows of open
urinals and “guys walking around naked.” Justice Breyer added that
he did not think that providing a urine sample was necessarily an in-
trusion on privacy because urination is a fact of life. Or as Breyer put
it (betraying a male perception), “It isn’t really a tremendously pri-
vate thing.” The attorney for James Acton had to concede that every-
one urinates. Then, visibly nervous over the tough questioning he
was facing, the advocate also conceded, “In fact, I might do so here!”
That line brought down the house. Joan Biskupic reported the ex-
change word for word in her article on the oral argument in the next
day’s Post. She correctly observed that “the talk in the stately court-
room, ringed in red velvet and white marble, was decidedly uncere-
monious.”37 Biskupic’s inclination to report the humorous dialogue
is understandable; nevertheless, if the Court’s oral arguments were
televised, undoubtedly such atypical comments would be the only
sound bite from the dialogue included on the evening news.
Despite the media’s tendency to scour oral argument sessions for
atypical andor humorous events (which are becoming more typical
with wits like Justice Scalia on the bench), journalists tend to provide
adequate summaries of the dialogues that occur between justices and
counsel at these fascinating public spectacles. If the case is highly
controversial, protestors may gather on the front plaza to picket, and
they will be joined by the media, attorneys, and interest group advo-
cates attending the post-argument news conferences. C-SPAN is able
to portray the atmosphere outside the Court on such oral argument
days most accurately with its cameras trained on the parade of public
officials, attorneys, and interest group members who are all too happy
to oblige reporters waiting to solicit the perfect sound bite?8
Indeed, the exterior scenes after oral arguments can offer quite a
contrast to the quiet dignity of the actual courtroom drama. For ex-
ample, the impromptu press conference on the Court’s front plaza af-
ter argument in the case of U.S. v. X-citement video, which questioned
the interpretation of a federal child pornography statute, took on a cir-
cus atmosphere as reporters jostled for position and interrupted each
other’s questions. Pete Williams, NBC’s Supreme Court correspon-
dent, interjected in the midst of the comments of one of the attorneys
in the case that he should not use technical words like “scientei’
(even though that term, meaning “to act knowingly,” was crucial to
the statute’s interpretation) because “stations all over America will
turn off.” Williams also truncated a fellow reporter’s inquiry about
“strict liability” with the observation that CNN viewers would under-
stand the question’s meaning, but Nl3C viewers would n0t.3~It is rare
that we have the opportunity to watch the dumbing down of the news
by the American media before our very eyes.
With over 7,000 appeals arriving at its doorstep every year (and
acceptance of fewer than 100 annually), one of the most important
88 Barbara A. Perry
duties of the Supreme Court is determining which cases to reject. In

addition, the Court receives emergency appeals in death penalty
cases (usually as the time of execution draws ominously near) and
in other time-sensitive legal disputes (like the Watergate contro-
versy, national strikes in essential industries, the Clinton sex scan-
dal, and the 2000 presidential election). Obviously, the media can-
not report all denials of appeal; but when they do so, short broadcast
sound bites sometimes encourage the misperception that the
Supreme Court has made a substantive decision. In fact, such a de-
nial simply leaves intact the lower court’s ruling.
The print medium has the space to feature more details about de-
nied appeals in cases that capture readers’ interest-though, once
more, a fine line exists between simply reporting such details and sen-
sationalizing a case. One case from the 1994-1995 term is particu-
larly illustrative. It concerned the Court’s denial of the application for
a stay of execution in the case of one Jesse DeWayne Jacobs, con-
victed of murder by the state of Texas and sentenced to die on Janu-
ary 4,1995. The story burst on the national scene when the Court
voted 6-3 against Jacobs’s appeal of his impending execution. In a
rare dissent from such a denial of appeal, Justice Stevens argued that
“at a minimum” Jacobs’s death sentence should be stayed. Even the
Vatican newspaper, L’Obsewatore Romano, commented on the case,
writing that the execution was “monstrous and absurd”; it compared
the Supreme Court to Pontius Pilate, who washed his hands of Jesus
Christ’s trial before turning him over to the Jews for crucifixion.
The outrage over the Jacobs case was understandable.Authorities in
Texas had retreated from their original position that Jacobs had been
the triggerman in a plot with his sister to kill her rival in a love trian-
gle. In the sister’s subsequent trial, prosecutors decided that she actu-
ally had pulled the trigger and that Jacobs had been an accomplice.Yet
when the Supreme Court denied Jacobs’s appeal, his death sentence
went forward as scheduled. The next day Washington Post columnist
Richard Cohen analyzed the decision of the Court’s majority, which
apparently saw no matter of law to dispute in this case: “A jury had
made its decision, and even if it had been given information by the
prosecution that was later contradicted, it could not be overruled. This
[Supreme Clourt prefers to deal with law. It has little interest in jus-
tice.”40 Two weeks later, Nat Hentoff wrote in the Washington Post
that the Supreme Court had “appallingly” failed the defendant in the
Jacobs case and that the Court “had diminished itself.”41Although sev-
eral journalists and scholars have argued in recent years that the
Supreme Court’s sharply diminished case output and its efforts to re-
main aloof from the policy process have removed it from center stage
of the American governmental system, the conflict over a murder case
from Texas proves that at any moment the Court’s actions (or inaction)
can catapult it to the forefront of American consciousness via the me-
dia. (The U.S. Supreme Court’s crucial decisions in Bush v. Gore
should have permanently laid to rest the irrelevancy argument.)
Of course, acceptance of cases can prompt headlines, too. In Feb-
ruary 1995 the Supreme Court announced that it would hear during its
next term a Colorado gay rights case that raised the question of
whether the state’s constitutional amendment, barring all local mea-
sures protecting homosexuals against discrimination,violated the U.S.
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection of the law. Both the Post
and the Zmes noted that this case, Romer v. Evans, would offer the
Court the first opportunity to rule on gay rights in a decadeP2Paul Bar-
rett’s Wall Street Journal article on the granting of certiorari in Romer
focused more on the potential political fallout from the case, noting
that the anticipated ruling in the case would come in 1996, “practically
guaranteeing that it will become an issue in the presidential election
campaign.”43In its landmark 1996 decision, the Court struck down the
Colorado amendment that barred protective legislation for gays.
If the Court accepts an appeal early enough in its term, the case
will be argued and decided before the justices adjourn for the sum-
mer. In such circumstances, the media are likely to report in more
detail on the granting of certiorari, as they did in 1994 with accep-
tance of a majority-minority district case from Louisiana. The con-
solidated cases of Louisiana v. Hays and U.S.v. Hays would, as
Biskupic wrote in her Washington Post article, “test the constitution-
ality of congressional districts that were drawn to consolidate racial
minorities and enhance their political power.” Quoting from two
spokespersons on opposite sides of the case, the Post article captured
the essence of the debate. The attorney representing the Louisiana
voters who had brought suit in the case against the black-majority
90 Barbara A. Perry
district commented, “The civil rights movement was about bringing

people together. What’s happening now is that we are balkanizing
our society by carving up congressional districts based on race.” On
the other side, a member of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund countered, “The question is whether there will be any-
or hardly any as there are now-blacks in Congress.”“”C-SPAN also
covered the Court’s acceptance of this potential landmark case with
spokespersons from both sides of the dispute. At first, the guests
wanted to cut immediately to the heart of the substantive issue in the
case, but the moderator wisely kept bringing them back to proce-
dural matters before returning to the merits of the c a ~ e . The
4 ~ public
affairs network performs a public service by informing viewers of
how the Supreme Court operates as well as about cases and issues
that come before it. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Hays case
because the Louisiana voters bringing the suit did not live in the
challenged district and, therefore, lacked standing. The justices split
narrowly in a Georgia reapportionment case heard the same day, rul-
ing that when race was the “predominant factor” in establishing leg-
islative districts, they should be presumed unconstitutionalP6
With the exception of C-SPAN, television’s coverage of the U.S.
Supreme Court is sparse at best. Political scientist Doris Graber’s cal-
culation of evening network news coverage of the three branches of
the federal government (coincidentally during the same time period
as my case study) revealed that the president’s share of television
time amounted to roughly 80 percent, compared to 17 percent for
Congress, and 2 percent for the Supreme C0urt.4~Translated into ac-
tual airtime,ABC ,for example, presented approximately 17 hours for
presidential coverage, 5 for congressional, and a mere 34 minutes for
Supreme Court stories between August 1994 and July 1995. Never-
theless, Graber points out, when the media do cover the Court, they
are most likely to emphasize civil rights and liberties issues!8 Her
conclusions are buttressed by those of political scientists Richard
Davis, Elliot Slotnick,and Jennifer Segal.49While Slotnick and Segal
find that televised coverage of the famed affirmative action Bukke
case (1978) and the Webster abortion case (1989) was accurate if not
extensive, they are particularly concerned over the “dramatic decline
in the extent and nature of the [Supreme Court] coverage” (even of
civil rights and liberties decisions) between 1989 and 1994:O
BEYOND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
News coverage of crime and the criminal justice system provides an-
other means of increasing public knowledge of civil rights and liber-
ties. Within the last decade, the trial of 0.J. Simpson-the ex-football
star, sports commentator, and Hertz poster boy-for the high-profile
slaying of his ex-wife created a national obsession with criminal rights
and the judicial process. Many Americans made the trial a part of their
daily lives. (There were even bizarre stories of people who did noth-
ing but watch the trial and who worried about how their lives could go
on once a verdict was rendered.) An average of 2.3 million households
viewed the trial’s coverage every weekday from noon to 8 p.m. Dur-
ing the same time period one year earlier, CNN had averaged 470,000
households tuned in to its programming?l
Through the Simpson case the media discovered a public interest
in the judicial process and nurtured it. The Court TV network had
been covering state judicial proceedings long before 0. J. Simpson
went on trial, but new television programming geared toward public
interest in the law has developed in the wake of the Simpson case.
Roger Cossack and Greta Van Susteren, CN”s commentators
throughout the trial, went on to have their own daily program on the
network, “Burden of Proof,” which covers current legal issues in a
thirty-minute format. CN”s executive vice president Ed Turner con-
cluded, “The public has become far more educated about the way the
judicial system works. . . . The public has come to realize that they
have a right to see what one-third of their government is doing.”52
Graber has noted that “[gleneral news about crime and the work of
the justice system is also important in creating images of the quality of
public justice. Here a plentiful media diet is available, especially on lo-
cal television news where nearly 12.5 percent of the coverage is de-
voted to the topic.” Yet she fears that “[llike stories about other gov-
ernment activities, crime and justice system stories tend to focus on
sensational events, often at the expense of significant trends and prob-
lems in the legal system that might benefit from greater public atten-
t i ~ n . At
” ~least
~ some scholars are attempting to determine the impact
of local media coverage of crime, not on the public, but on actors in
the judicial process itself. David F’ritchard, a journalism professor, in-
triguingly, if not surprisingly, discovered in his study of Milwaukee
92 Barbara A. Perry
that the more extensive the newspaper coverage of a criminal case, the
less likely the district attorney’s office was to negotiate a plea bargain
in the case. In other words, increased publicity about a crime would
place political pressure on a D.A. to take the case to a jury trial?4
Criminal trials often raise the issue of media access. While the
media would like to have unfettered access to the judicial process,
most judges have erred on the side of protecting the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, which might be compromised by extensive
and/or adverse media coverage. In fact, courts have never ab-
solutely protected the media’s free press guarantees under the
First Amendment. Justice Hugo Black, in his last opinion before
retiring from the U S . Supreme Court in 1971, delivered the
staunchest argument for an unfettered press as a watchdog to pro-
tect the public from arbitrary governmental power. In the historic
Pentagon Papers Case, Black, who could garner only one other
vote (that of Justice William 0. Douglas) for his absolutist posi-
tion, argued that the Founding Fathers intended that “[tlhe press
was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would
remain forever free to censure the G ~ v e r n m e n t . ”Although
~~ a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court voted to allow the New York Times and
Washington Post to publish the top-secret papers prepared by the
Pentagon as a history of American involvement in Vietnam, the
press must still bow to other countervailing claims in performing
its duties; such claims include the right to privacy, shield laws,
gag rules, libel and slander laws, and national security. In the
realm of press coverage of public officials and public figures,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has given the media virtual
carte blanche to contribute to a robust public debate without fear
of liability for libel or slander.56
The new media, however, will prompt further controversy about
their role and freedoms in American society. For example, can Matt
Drudge, a self-proclaimed journalist who reports on political scan-
dals via his popular website, the “Drudge Report,” be sued for libel?
What about congressional and state legislative attempts to regulate
Internet pornography? The web, cable television, 24/7 news cover-
age, talk radio, and downloadable music may indeed be revolution-
izing the way Americans relate to media and vice versa, with in-
evitable, if as yet unpredictable, ramifications for the media’s links

to civil rights and liberties.
1 . Should popular culture (like TV shows) guide justices in decid-

ing on cases, for example, upholding the Miranda decision?
2. What is the impact of court shows (dramas and documentaries)
on people’s views of the judiciary?
3. Can coverage of crime in the “24/7” format of cable television
rob the accused of criminal rights?
4. Where should courts draw the line on opening trials to the
media?
5. Watch one of the movies listed in the chapter. How did it af-
fect your views of the law, lawyers, civil rights and liberties?
6 . Should cameras be allowed to cover Supreme Court oral ar-
guments in order to expand public understanding of civil
rights and liberties?
Davis, Richard, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994).
Giglio, Ernest, Here’s Looking at You: Hollywood, Film, and Politics
(New York: Peter Lang, 2000).
Graber, Doris, Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press, 1997).
Paletz, David L., The Media in American Politics: Contents and Conse-
quences. (New York: Longman, 1999).
Perry, Barbara A., The Priestly Tribe: The Supreme Court’s Image in the
American Mind (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).
Pritchard, David, “Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting
Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors” in Doris Graber, ed., Media
Power in Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000).
Segal,Elliot E ., and Jennifer A. Segal, Television News and the Supreme
Court: All the News That’s Fit to Air? (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998).
94 Barbara A. Perry
NOTES
1. Henry J. Abraham, “Civil Liberties: Rights and Obligations,” in

American Democracy: Institutions, Politics, and Policies, by William J.
Keefe et al. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1983), 74.
2. Dickerson v. United States, 530 US.428 (2000).
3. I actually heard of such cases from an Austrian lawyer who de-
scribed how criminal defendants in his native country demanded to have
their rights read to them!
4. Wende Vybomey Dumble, “And Justice for All,” in Television
Studies, ed. Gary Bums and Robert J. Thompson (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1989), 106, as quoted in David L. Paletz, The Media in American
Politics: Contents and Consequences (New York: Longman, 1999), 299.
5. Barbara A. Perry, The Priestly Tribe: The Supreme Court’s Image
in the American Mind (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 124.
6. Ernest Giglio, Here’s Looking at You: Hollywood, Film, and Politics
(New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 118.
7. Giglio, Here’s Looking at You, 119.
8. Giglio, Here’s Looking at You, 127.
9. Giglio, Here’s Looking at You, 130-31.
10. Steven H. Scheuer, Movies on TV and Videocassette, 1991-1992
(New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 552.
11. As quoted in Perry, The Priestly Tribe, 33.
12. Scheuer, Movies on TV and Videocassette.
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. Marie Arana, “David Baldacci: Double Exposure,” Washington
Post, “Book World,” February 18,2001,8.
15. Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and the Court:
Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford,
1998), 5.
16. Joan Biskupic, “Court Toughens Standard for Federal Affirmative
Action ,” WashingtonPost, June 13, 1995, A 1.
17. Joan Biskupic, “Desegregation Remedies Rejected,” Washington
Post, June 13,1995,Al.
18. John F. Harris and Kevin Merida, “Ruling May Sharpen Debate on
Preference Policies,” Washington Post, June 13, 1995, A6.
19. Linda Greenhouse, “By 5:4, Justices Cast Doubts on U S . Pro-
grams That Give Preferences Based on Race,” New York Times, June 13,
1995, A l .
20. Linda Greenhouse, “Justices Say Lower Courts Erred in Orders in

Desegregation Case ,”New York Times, June 13,1995, A 1.
21. Tamar Lewin, “5-4 Decision Buoys; For Others It’s a Setback,”
June 13,1995, D5.
22. “The Future of Affirmative Action,” Washington Post, June 13,
1995, A20.
23. “A Sad Day for Racial Justice,”New York Times, June l3,1995,A24.
24. See Peter Behr, “A Rush to the Defense of Affirmative Action,”
Washington Post,June 14, 1995,Al; John F. Harris, “For Clinton, a Chal-
lenge of Balance,” Washington Post,June 14,1995, Al; and Linda Green-
house, “In Step on Racial Policy,” New York Times, June 14, 1995,A5.
25. George Will, “ A f f i a t i v e Action: The Court’s Murky Ruling,”
Washington Post,June 14, 1995,A24.
26. William Raspbeny, “. . .And Americans’ Ambivalence,” Washing-
ton Post,June 14,1995, A24.
27. Charles Krauthammer, “Affirmative Action: Settle It out of Court,”
Washington Post,June 14,1995, A25.
28. Linda Greenhouse, “High Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a
School Zone,” New York Times,April27,1995, Al.
29. Joan Biskupic, “Ban on Guns Near Schools Is Rejected,” Wash-
ington Post,April 27,1995, A 1.
30. Joan Biskupic, “Court Signals Sharp Shift on Congressional Pow-
ers ,” Washington Post,April 28, 1995, A3.
31. “Federalism and Guns in Schools,” Washington Post, April 28,
1995,A26.
32. “The High Court Loses Restraint,” New York Times,April 29,
1995, A22.
33. Joan Biskupic, “Court Allows Drug Tests,” Washington Post,June
27,1995,Al.
34. Linda Greenhouse, “High Court Upholds Drug Tests for Some
Public School Athletes,” June 27, 1995,A5.
35. “Unwarranted Student Drug Testing,” New York Times, June 28,
1995, A18.
36. Ira Berkow, “No Cause, No Testing for Drugs,’’ New York Zimes,
June 28,1995, B9.
37. Joan Biskupic, “Supreme Court Looks into the Locker Room,”
Washington Post,March 29, 1995,A9.
38. “America and the Courts,” C-SPAN, December 3,1994.
39. “America and the Courts.”
96 Barbara A. Perry
40. Richard Cohen, “Justice Derailed,” Washington Post, January 5,

1995, A27.
41. Nat Hentoff, “The Court Has Diminished Itself,” Washington Post,
January l4,1995,A25.
42. Joan Biskupic, “Court to Consider Colorado’s Attempt to Negate
Local Gay Rights Laws,” Washington Post, February 22, 1995, A15;
Linda Greenhouse, “Supreme Court to Rule on Anti-Gay Rights Law in
Colorado,” New York Times, February 22, 1995, A l l .
43. Paul Barrett, “High Court to Decide Whether States May Ban Laws
Protecting Homosexuals,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1995, A4.
44. Joan Biskupic, “High Court to Rule on Race-Based Congressional
Districts,” Washington Post, December 10, 1994,A3.
45. “America and the Courts,” C-SPAN, December 17,1994.
46. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
47. Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 27 1.
48. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 307-309.
49. See Richard Davis, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and
the Press (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), chap. 4;and El-
liot E. Slotnick and Jennifer A. Segal, Television News and the Supreme
Court: All the News That’s Fit to Air? (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), chaps. 4-5.
50. Slotnick and Segal, Television News and the Supreme Court, 187.
5 1. “Trial Rewrites Media’s Rules on Coverage,” USA Today, October
4,1995,5B.
52. “Trial Rewrites Media’s Rules.”
53. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 310.
54. David Pritchard, “Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-
Setting Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors,” in Media Power in Politics,
4th ed., ed. Doris Graber (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
2000), 283.
55. New York Times v. U.S.,402 U.S. 713 (1971).
56. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Bureaucracy and the Media
]an Vermeer
Americans do not think much of government bureaucrats, and I

mean that in both its ambiguous senses: Most of us rarely think
about the federal bureaucracy, its employees, and the work it per-
forms. When we do, most of us do not think kindly of them, either.
During normal times, the work of the bureaucracy takes place be-
hind the scenes, virtually out of view of the public and, for that mat-
ter, of the news media. With scant coverage, the bureaucracy’s work
rarely shows up on citizens’ radar screens. Mistakes or problems,
however, give the press a reason to report on executive agencies. If
that is all the information about the bureaucracy people normally
come across, it is only natural that they treat those problems not as
exceptions but as typical. Hence, when Americans think of the bu-
reaucracy at all, they generally think of it negatively.
That is not new. For generations, public and politicians have railed
against shortsighted, misguided, and bloated bureaucracies in Wash-
ington. Mark Twain took one of his typically caustic tacks in an 1887
letter: “The departmental interpreters of the laws in Washington . . .
can always be depended on to take any reasonably good law and in-
terpret the common sense all out of it.”l Former Alabama Governor
George Wallace used to refer to decision makers in the various agen-
cies comprising the executive branch as “pointy-headed bureaucrats.”
Stories about the number of regulations one agency or another issued
to control cabbage growing or pickles for hamburgers reinforced
97
98 Jan Vermeer
images of people in Washington out of touch with the real world

making life miserable for everyone else. Legends persist that only by
filing form after form-in triplicate, at least-can one prove compli-
ance with bureaucratic regulations.
Some of the criticisms may be justified. When they are, the news
media do not hesitate to point out bureaucratic foolishness. For in-
stance, in 1994 the U.S. Department of Agriculture found itself hav-
ing to decide how to label poultry that had been briefly but not ex-
tensively frozen. They decided that, probably for food safety while
the meat was being transported, chickens could be labeled as fresh,
even though they had been frozen. Editors at the Fresno Bee railed
at this apparent absurdity: “How long can such nonsense remain
frozen in law?”2 Journalists think no more kindly of the federal bu-
reaucracy than the rest of us do.
When tragedy or calamity occurs, and government responds effec-
tively, however, news coverage portrays government personnel in
complimentary terms. Employees of state and local agencies, like their
counterparts at the national level, usually suffer from negative press.
But bureaucrats at all levels enjoyed widespread praise in the media
for their response to the events of the fall of 200 1. New York City fire-
fighters and police offcers, especially, were portrayed as heroic and
effective. Kids throughout the nation dressed up in NYPD and FDNY
costumes at Halloween. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) responded quickly and efficiently to the needs of victims of
the World Trade Center catastrophe and reaped media praise as well.
When the crisis passed its peak, however, criticisms in the media
returned. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in charge of
airport security, seemed unable to tighten security at the nation’s air
terminals enough, drawing fire in the press. The FBI, Department of
Justice officials, and the Center for Disease Control were taken to
task for their inability to deal quickly with the anthrax contamina-
tion that followed closely on the heels of the airplane hijackings.
Within several months after the September 11 tragedies, news treat-
ment of the bureaucracy returned, it seemed, to normal.
In the next section, I will outline some general considerations about
the federal bureaucracy that will help us understand the nature of press
commentary about governmental agencies. Then, a short discussion of
Bureaucracy and the Media 99
the work of others on news accounts of the executive branch will pro-
vide a lead-in to an examination of what editors of local daily news-
papers said in 1994 about federal offices in their editorials. Some con-
cluding comments will tie the ideas together for you.
POLITICS A N D ADMINISTRATION
Our negative views of the bureaucracy result in part from the de-
cidedly awkward and almost untenable position the federal bureau-
cracy occupies in the political system. While agencies are charged
with administering policy, they have limited authority to adjust
those policies to prevent problems. Bureaucrats must administer
programs fairly, which usually means uniformly across the nation,
even when circumstances differ. A policy that works well in most
places may not work well in some. In addition, when a federal de-
partment performs well, the White House takes credit; when it per-
forms poorly, the agency must take the blame. Further, sometimes
agencies seem to respond more to the constituencies most con-
cerned with their policies (clientele groups), even when those pref-
erences conflict with the “public interest .”
Although bureaucracies fit awkwardly into the U.S. system of rep-
resentative democracy, they nevertheless form a sigruficantcomponent
of the national government. They represent the element of government
with which people are most likely to come into contact. The Post Of-
fice delivers the mail, the National Weather Service provides forecasts,
and the Social Security Administration sends out checks. The negative
images of bureaucracy do not automatically extend to the transactions
people have with such agencies. Charles Goodsell reports that most
citizens evaluate the bureaucracies they deal with rather favorably?
Not only do people think they are treated well and properly, but gen-
erally they are also satisfied with the way the agencies handle their
complaints when problems do arise. In most day-to-day dealings with
the bureaucracy, people think well of government agencies. As Brian
Cook puts it, “when government bureaucrats serv[e] people’s wants
and needs, as is usually the case in close, specific, client-oriented en-
counters, public administration wins positive public judgments.’’4
100 Jan Venneer
The negative judgments about bureaucracies arise, it seems, more

out of the impressions the public forms about the operation of the
administrative apparatus of government generally. Cook suggests
that “the impact [administrative agencies] have on public policy”
presents a perspective that “violates basic expectations” people
hold? That contrast between expectations and reality arises out of
the disjunction between what programs are intended to do (e.g.,
maintain air quality) and what they accomplish (e.g., mounds of pa-
perwork and expensive testing).
Bureaucracies may not be able to overcome that gap in expecta-
tions. For an agency to adapt a policy, for instance, to every local-
ity may require more information than it has. So testing for certain
pollutants in drinking water makes sense for most locations but be-
comes inappropriate in areas where those pollutants rarely occur.
But agency personnel may have no way of knowing enough about
the circumstances in which their regulations are going to be applied
to make exceptions or may not have the authority to exempt some
localities from general requirements!As a consequence, bureau-
cracies wind up requiring people, businesses, and local govern-
ments to take sometimes onerous actions that will have no effect on
the problem the program is designed to alleviate.
These patterns make people unsure about whose interests agen-
cies pursue. It is a question of responsiveness. To whom is the bu-
reaucracy accountable? On one level, an easy answer for the public
is to no one, since bureaucrats working with civil service protection
enjoy considerable job security. On a deeper level, the answer is
more complex. Agency personnel are accountable to Congress, to
the president, to the public, and to the specific clientele they serve.
John T. Scholz and B. Dan Wood, for instance, found that “political
responsiveness” helped explain variation in the probability that the
Internal Revenue Service would audit a taxpayer’s return? How-
ever, the groups that agency personnel serve frequently have con-
flicting goals. The conclusion citizens draw is that agencies are less
concerned with the public good or the difficulties their regulations
cause than they are with protecting their power and their clienteles.
Agencies develop “political alliances,” which results in “a style of
policy making that emphasizes minority interests and muffles . . .
majoritarian interests.”* Because of such clientele politics, agencies
become spokespeople for special interests, as has happened with the

Department of Education and teachers and the FAA and the airlines,
to cite just two examples. Agencies’ concern with the public interest
is then easily questioned. “Red tape” and various delays inherent in
any large administrative agency simply become evidence of a reluc-
tance on the part of the bureaucracy to act expeditiously in the na-
tional interest.
No matter, then, how satisfactory citizens’ personal contacts with
the bureaucracy are, the overall impression of governmental agen-
cies being slow and unresponsive, imposing burdensome require-
ments, and working to protect special interests even at the cost of
the public good overwhelms the positives. But if it is not personal
experience that accounts for public opinion on the bureaucracy, then
the source must be elsewhere. Could it be media coverage?
BUREAUCRACIES IN THE MEDIA
Media attention to the federal bureaucracy is sporadic at best. In part,

this pattern reflects the needs of the agencies involved and therefore
how readily they make news available to reporters. David Paletz
points out that “departments vary considerably in their desire and need
for media c~verage.”~ “Some agencies, such as those responsible for
consumer protection,” says Stephen Hess, “need attention; others may
consider publicity counterproductive to their mission, as CIA director
William Casey concluded when he eliminated his agency’s separate
press operation.”10
Agencies that welcome media coverage run larger press opera-
tions, issue more press releases, and make it easier for journalists to
find and report the news emanating from the agency. The purpose?
“To keep Congress and the public informed about the good they and
their programs are doing.”” Agencies that find media coverage in-
trusive at worst and useless at best devote few resources to helping
reporters cover their work.
Studies of news coverage of the bureaucracy are relatively rare.
Stephen Hess’s work cited above, one of the most insightful on the
nexus between press and agency, includes the bureaucracy-news
media interaction as part of a larger study exploring reporters and
102 Jan Vermeer
government officials in Washington generally. As do journalists

themselves, he devotes more attention to the White House and to
Capitol Hill than to agencies that comprise the executive branch.
David Morgan, in his study of government press information offi-
cers (PIOs), notes significant differences between the more visible
and the less visible agencies.I2 His study, however, is so centered on
the activities of the PIOs and their relationships with reporters that
the overall pattern of agency press coverage does not emerge.
As a consequence, political communication scholars know com-
paratively little about media coverage of the bureaucracy. It is clear
that beat assignments and general newsworthiness will affect
whether news stories are filed and used. We lack, however, the de-
gree of specificity about attempts to influence content, to “manage
the news,” or to use media coverage as a political tool that we have
in our knowledge of White House and Capitol Hill news operations.
One can then only speculate about the tone and content of news
about the federal bureaucracy. Three suppositions seem appropri-
ate.13 First, stories about failures and conflict-or “a notable suc-
~ess”’~-arisingout of agency actions will appear often. The For-
est Service, for instance, probably received more coverage in the
spring of 2000, after its “controlled burn” around Los Alamos,
New Mexico, devastated the area, than it had in several previous
years combined. Second, the actions of the more familiar govern-
mental agencies (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Social Security Administration) or a well-known official (such
as C. Everett Koop or James Watt) will be reported more frequently
than the actions of more obscure agencies. Finally, agencies whose
actions affect the market area of the news outlet in question will be
in the news more than other agencies.
These three suppositions may indeed reinforce each other. A fail-
ure by a well-known agency affecting a local area will generate even
more substantial news coverage because it combines all three factors.
All other things being equal, the more newsworthy a story, the more
prominence and space a newspaper will give it. The most prominent
news stones about federal agencies average readers are likely to come
across in their local papers will then dramatize their shortcomings,
mismanagement, and disregard for what should have been done.
Are there reasons for journalists to comment favorably on federal

agencies? Yes. When an agency successfully accomplishes a mis-
sion or steps back from a mistake it had made, one would expect re-
sulting good press. Positive comments, however, presented as ex-
ceptions to a generally negative pattern do little to challenge general
perceptions of problems and bureaucratic mismanagement.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
As part of a larger study, I examined all the editorials in ten daily

newspapers from medium-sized cities across the nation. The papers
ranged from the Fresno Bee, which included numerous editorials
about national political affairs,to the Lansing, Michigan, State Jour-
nal, whose editors rarely addressed those matters. The editors devoted
considerable attention to the workings of the federal bureaucracy, al-
though they wrote more often about Congress and the president. As
expected, their commentary centered on dissatisfaction with agency
decisions or agency actions. Actions by familiar agencies-the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, the Forest Service, the Department of Agriculture, and the De-
partment of Defense-bore the brunt of the editorial criticism.
Unfamiliar agencies, such as the Departments of Commerce, Labor,
State, and Transportation, were virtually invisible in these editorials.
When agency actions affected local concerns, editors responded.
When agency actions offended editorial sensibilities, editors took
up their pens. When agency leaders transgressed ethical boundaries,
editors took to the pulpit. Occasionally, successes stimulated edito-
rial commentary, but rarely so. Editorial attention was reserved for
the bureaucracy’s mistakes and missteps, thereby reinforcing the
public’s image of problems and ineptitude that has plagued govern-
mental agencies for decades.
Local Concerns and Bureaucratic Action

Few concerns are more local in nature than the condition of the land
and the water in an area. The Environmental Protection Agency
104 Jan Vermeer
(EPA), charged with maintaining the quality of the environment, ran

into some editorial roadblocks in 1994 when its regulations or pro-
posed regulations collided head-on with local conditions.
Safe drinking water was one of those issues. The EPA proposed
a limit for radon in drinking water of around 200 picocuries per
liter. In New Mexico, where naturally occurring radon concentra-
tions reach over 2,000 picocuries per liter, meeting the EPA’s stan-
dards “could cost . . . communities hundreds of millions of dollars.”
Calling it a “ridiculously stringent standard,” the Albuquerque Jour-
nal editors called for “a dose of common sense and proportion” that
“the federal government too often lacks.”15 The Lincoln, Nebraska,
Journal similarly objected to an EPA water monitoring requirement
“for hundreds of substances that may or may not be present and may
or may not be harmful,” suggesting that it be postponed “until
[communities] found a foolish Swiss banker or a buried treasure big
enough to pay for it.”16
EPA procedures get a lot of criticism. The EPA’s air quality
proposals for California, for instance, were “drawn up in Michi-
gan by consultants who have had little or no contact with Cali-
fornia”- who, according to the Fresno Bee, “thought Sacramento
was a suburb of Los Angeles.”17 The Raleigh News & Observer
charged the EPA with failing to sponsor “research to supply [the]
facts” about the right way to protect the “coastal plain ecosys-
tem.” The problem, the paper noted, was that the EPA was “treat-
ing the likes of Weyerhaeuser Co. as if they were pioneers in
buckskins instead of corporate timber behemoths.”18 What many
people would consider typical bureaucratic bungling was the sub-
ject for a rare Lansing State Journal editorial about national is-
sues: the EPA “threatened to fine about 900 small water systems
in Michigan for neglecting to file drinking water test results.” In
fact, the reports had been submitted, but the EPA had lost them.
“Unbelievable,” the paper said; the situation “must have taxpay-
ers rolling their eyes with frustration as they watch another fed-
eral bureaucracy in action.”19
Boise Idaho Statesman editors voiced several concerns about the
bureaucracy’s management of wilderness areas around the state.
They opposed Forest Service proposals to limit jet boats on the
Snake River in the Hells Canyon area, calling it “unfair” to restrict

access before “the land, water quality, fishery and wildlife” had
been hurt?0 But editors were pleased with the “U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service’s sensible reintroduction plan” to bring the gray
wolf back to the Idaho wildsF1 They also applauded the Forest Ser-
vice’s “eminently sensible approach” for forest preservation, pro-
viding “the timber industry with a reasonable supply of trees to cut
down, while ending the destructive management practices of the
past.”22 The paper kept a watchful eye on wasteful spending,
though: it sharply criticized the expenditure of $70,000 on a “ski
playground” outside Yellowstone Park for the use of park employ-
ees, calling it “an arrogant misuse of public funds.”23
Similar examples from almost any one newspaper could be de-
veloped, in which local concerns affected by the national bureau-
cracy generate editorial comment. The Albuquerque JoumaE pub-
lished five editorials in five weeks about the Interior Department’s
policies in managing federal grasslands, concerned about what ef-
fect proposed increases in grazing fees would have on ranchers
in New Mexico. “It would be unconscionable for the Democrats in
Santa Fe and their fellow Democrat from Arizona [Interior Secre-
tary Bruce Babbitt] by way of Washington to collaborate in rewrit-
ing the grazing rules without hearing from and considering . . . the
needs of the people who have lived here for generation^."^^
One could readily write an editorial on almost any subject from
the perspective of these local newspapers: “Although the agency
has lofty goals in mind that we all appreciate and value, it suffers
from major difficulties in reaching the right decision. The right
decision for this area means taking into account what makes us
different. The agency has not done so, and as a consequence, it
will cause more problems than it will solve. If it would rid itself
of its bureaucratic blinders, it would recognize that the proper de-
cision is the one we are suggesting here.” Whether it is the impact
on North Carolina tobacco farmers of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s declaration that nicotine is a d d i c t i ~ e ?or
~ the difficul-
ties Nebraska farmers would have if their new pickup trucks had
less power in order to meet Department of Transportation fuel
economy the argument is the same. The bureaucracy
106 Jan Vermeer
has failed adequately to understand and therefore to address the

real problems people face.
The National Bureaucracy

Editors’ responses to actions taken by agencies in the federal bureau-
cracy understandably dealt with a large variety of issues, from immi-
gration and milk additives to the metric system and school lunches,
reflecting the range of concerns addressed by federal programs of one
sort or another. Local readers were affected by these issues no more
than anyone else was; editors therefore had no particular local inter-
ests to speak for or defend. As a result, their commentary departed
from the pattern we identified in the previous section.
Generally, editors criticized bureaucratic actions. For the most
part, the criticism contrasted agency decisions with basic values.
The release of the report detailing Federal Bureau of Investigation
actions in the Ruby Ridge affair resulting in the deaths of two peo-
ple led the Albany Times Union to charge the FBI with running
“roughshod over the lives of citizen^."^^ The FBI, it said, “should
not be in the business of executing suspected criminals in the field.”
Less dramatically, the Providence Journal disagreed with the Food
and Drug Administration’s refusal to require that milk from cows
treated with a synthetic growth hormone that increases milk produc-
tion be labeled as such. Labeling would let people themselves “decide
which risks they find acceptable”; otherwise, “the government
wrongly deprives citizens of this important choice.”28The Lincoln
Journal and the Albany Emes Union sided with the Providence paper.
Lincoln editors insisted that if consumers “want the information, they
should get the information. . . .Their government should not stand in
their way.’729Albany editors bluntly asked, “why should consumers
trust the government . . . on this matter? It’s not as if the government
has not counseled us falsely in the past on health matters.”30
These examples illustrate the extent to which editors view the re-
sults of bureaucratic decision making skeptically. Not only does it
reach results too frequently inconsistent with basic principles of this
society, but it is also slow and cumbersome. The FAA’s work is a
case in point, according to the Fresno Bee: “A cumbersome risk ben-
efit analysis process has delayed implementation of safety reforms

that have long been regarded as cost effe~tive.”~’ In hyperbolic fash-
ion, the Albuquerque Journal described the EPA’s Superfund causti-
cally: “as fast and effective in restoring the nation’s worst toxic
waste sites as Superman cleaning up an illegal kryptonite dump.”32
One would think that a slow process would enable agencies to
reach results consistent with shared values. According to the edi-
tors, that does not happen. When the Commission on Immigration
Reform proposed that a national identity card be issued to everyone
as a way of combating illegal immigration and its accompanying
problem, the hiring of undocumented aliens, several newspapers
jumped on the idea. Providence readers learned that the proposal
“has the potential for the invasion of privacy . . .Big Brother and all
that.”33The Emes Union in Albany compared it to “an internal iden-
tity card of the kinds that had become so infamous in Europe at one
time.”34When an agency withdraws a proposed rule that would, if
implemented, conflict with underlying civic principles, editors ap-
plaud. For instance, the Jackson, Mississippi, Clarion-Ledger pro-
nounced it “the wise thing” to do when the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission decided not to implement a guideline dealing
with religious expression in the workplace. The editors’ rationale?
“It is not the business of the federal government to decide what is
proper religious expression and what is not.”35
Surprisingly, relatively few editorials lambasted federal agencies
for stereotypical bureaucratic bungling. Several, however, fit the pat-
tern. Lexington, Kentucky, editors gave a “thumbs down” to the EPA
for granting $500,000to Utah State for “rounding up cattle and fit-
ting them with a device that will measure the amount of methane re-
leased when a cow belches.”36Raleigh editors labeled the building
of a new facility for the National Reconnaissance Office a “marble-
clad $304 million megaboondoggle.” Calling it “a child of Cold War
. . . secrecy-paranoia,” the paper decried the use of federal funds for
“exterior marble from Italy and Norway [and] a racquetball court as
well as aerobics and locker rooms.”37 When the Internal Revenue
Service printed half a million income tax forms in Spanish and only
718 had been used and submitted by May, the Providence Journal
gave “the IRS credit for at least trying,” but it called the targeting of
108 Jan V e m e r
non-English speaking populations “dubious .” People showed “those

well-intentioned IRS officials what an ordinary taxpayer could have
told them in a minute: In a country where 327 languages are spoken,
it makes sense to concentrate on English.”38
When agencies do something right, however, editors make note of
that, too. Both the Albuquerque Journal and the Raleigh News & Ob-
server applauded the Department of Agriculture’s proposed new stan-
dards for lower-fat school lunches, even though the changes would
not be met with “cheers in the l u n c h r ~ o m . ”Parents,
~~ according to the
Albuquerque paper, should support the “long overdue” changes and
“yank” school lunches “out of the past and into the present.’” When
the Food and Drug Administration, “after years of pressure from con-
sumer and health groups,” adopted new seafood safety rules, the
Fresno Bee said consumers would no longer be “playing roulette with
the fish course” in their meals.4l The Jackson editors liked the
Women, Infants and Children program (it “works for Mississippi’s
babies”) and urged the state’s representatives in Congress to protect
it. “The reduction in Mississippi’s infant mortality rate,” they pointed
out, “can be directly attributed to the WIC program.”42
To achieve objectives they agree with, editors are ready to compro-
mise what would in other contexts be overriding values. Regulating
secondhand smoke, for instance, which involves “even more govern-
ment intrusiveness in the lives of Americans,” is nonetheless accept-
able in light of “the potential lives saved.”43Despite the lack of a
“clear indication of a disease burden” caused by dioxin contamination,
the Albany editors wanted the EPA to “err on the side of caution” and
to “begin curtailing those activities that result in the production of
dioxins.”44 Even that usual bugaboo, too much regulation, can be
swept aside if the goal is worth it: Meeting the requirements of new
EPA landfill regulations may be “expensive,” and involve a “lot of fed-
eral regualation [sic],”but “those regulations are very much valid and
very much needed” to ensure “safer and cleaner drinking water.”45
Problem Children
For the most part, federal bureaucrats are faceless, nameless people.
Rarely does an editorial mention one by name, with two exceptions.
When heads of Cabinet-level departments take an action deserving

comment, the editors usually refer to them specifically. There is noth-
ing noteworthy here. But when a lapse in judgment occurs, editors
name names and fire when ready. These missteps can be readily ex-
plained and therefore avoided, editors suggest. Officials have lost
touch with basic values and have begun to think of themselves as spe-
cial. At the same time, officials need to realize that they have a re-
sponsibility to adhere to higher standards than the rest of us. They are,
after all, the public’s servants. Or so the editors would have us think.
In late 1994, President Clinton fired Surgeon General Joycelyn
Elders when her blunt remarks, especially about masturbation,
made her a liability to his administration. Seven newspapers ex-
plained the departure, all but one agreeing that “she was increas-
ingly ham-handed, and her clumsy brand of candor became a lux-
ury the Clinton administration could no longer Elders,
according to the editors, lacked the “subtle touch. She got her points
across with a ledgeh hammer,"^^ and she “broached serious and sen-
sitive subjects without seeming to recognize their seriousness and
~ensitivity.”~~ “Good riddance!” exclaimed the Jackson editors.
“Her opinions were far too extreme for average Americans to stom-
a ~ h . Her
” ~ “bumptious
~ public statements . . . all of which seemed
designed to give maximum were indicative of the fact
that she “never grasped the fact that the opinions of the surgeon
general . . . carried the weight of the office.”51In the opinion of the
editors, the problem was not simply Elders’s statements but her fail-
ure to recognize the higher standards an officeholder has to meet.
The exception? The Lincoln Journal editors thought “that Presi-
dent Clinton [had] been looking for a reason to fire” Elders, and
“apparently decided he had found The Providence editors
agreed that “the White House had been looking for a reason to fire
her,”53but none but the Nebraska editors thought her actions did not
warrant her dismissal.
An ethical cloud hung over Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy af-
ter disclosures that he had accepted gratuities from food processors
whose plants his department inspected. After a period of denying
that the gifts had influenced his decisions, Espy resigned his office.
This incident presented the stereotypical case bureaucracy-haters
110 Jan Vermeer
love to cite: special favors from special interests groups perhaps in-
fluencing officials’ decisions, and the officials in question bending
their ethics at the expense of the public interest.
Editorial criticism ran true to form. The Albany rimes Union called
the Espy incident “a wake-up alarm about the ethical conduct” of Clin-
ton a~pointees.5~ Lincoln readers were told that Espy “failed to keep
proper distance between regulating agency and regulated interest” and
that “his moral compass,” if he will “get it functioning . . .is pointing
toward the Only Espy’s home-state Jackson Clarion-Ledger
was restrained in its criticism when the story broke. “Espy,” it said,
“showed poor judgment. . . . He should have known better.”56But, it
said three weeks later, “accepting gifts and campaign contributions
from special interests is enshrined” in Congress. “Shouldn’t Congress
. . . be on the same footing regarding ethics?’57
By the time Espy resigned, the Raleigh News & Observer was
agreeing with its Jackson counterpart about the disparity between
the ethical standards acceptable in Congress and those applied to
the bureaucracy. Members of Congress, the paper pointed out,
“countenance the very behavior that cost Espy his job.”58Both Al-
bany and Lincoln editors regretted the need for the resignation:
Espy was “once a promising public servant with a strong record of
accornpli~hment,”~~ said the Times Union, and the Lincoln Journal
praised him for having “launched some commendable policy initia-
tives.”@’ The Albuquerque Journal claimed that the White House
shared the blame for having “failed to establish and enforce the high
ethical standards it promised for presidential appointees.”61
The arrest and conviction of Aldrich Ames for spying for the So-
viet Union and Russia while working for the Central Intelligence
Agency also stimulated a burst of editorials critical of the federal bu-
reaucracy. Although the papers generally deplored Ames’s treason,
which led to the execution of at least ten Russians working under-
cover for the CIA, the main thrust of the editorials was aimed at the
CIA itself, not the mole. How could the CIA have failed “to discover
the spy in its headquarters?’62“The far more important matter” than
Ames’s duplicity, the Albany editors said, was “how it was possible
for a CIA officer with top secret clearance to have peddled such sen-
sitive information for so long without having been found “Any
overworked narc working for a small county sheriff’s department

could have done better” than the CIA, said the Fresno Bee.64
Editors used the incident as an opportunity to criticize the CIA
and to imply that greater oversight of this agency was sorely
needed. The Fresno Bee questioned “the agency’s own internal se-
curity practices” and raised a “more basic” concern: “the poor per-
formance of U.S. intelligence concerning a range of major events,
from predicting Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to
understanding the fragile state of the Soviet economy in the years
preceding the Soviet Union’s collapse .”65 Albany editors agreed:
“the agency has failed almost every important test of intelligence
gathering put to it.”66
The Ames matter “may just shove Congress over the edge into
~ CIA, the editors of the Albuquerque paper
real ~ v e r s i g h t ”of~ the
hoped. “[A] complete restructuring” is needed, Albany editors ar-
gued, “SO that Congress has greater day to day oversight over what
the CIA is up to.”68 “It’s obvious,” said the Raleigh News & Ob-
server, “that the agency needs streamlining and refocusing,” so that
it no longer functions “in an absence of full public ac~ountability.”~~
CONCLUSION
Far from being invisible, the federal bureaucracy appears frequently

in local daily newspaper editorials. Most agency personnel, how-
ever, would no doubt prefer the commentary be more positive. Al-
though one should not characterize the editorials dealing with fed-
eral administrative agencies as uniformly negative, criticism and
disagreement appear much more often. This pattern resembles the
tone of news coverage generally, with journalists seemingly judging
negative news more newsworthy. Occasional complimentary dis-
cussion finds its way into the editorials, but not enough to affect
one’s overall impression.
Editors showed little hesitation in reinforcing stereotypes of the
bureaucracy. Mismanagement, wasteful spending, ethical lapses,
and just plain incompetence stimulated editorial responses regu-
larly. If readers thought federal agencies were out of touch with the
112 Jan Venneer
world they lived in, editorial commentary would back that idea up.
If readers felt that bureaucrats were more concerned with special in-
terests than doing what was right for the nation, editorials provided
examples. If readers worried that their tax dollars were not being
put to good use, editors told them they had good cause to worry.
By devoting as much editorial commentary to the federal bu-
reaucracy as they did, the editors subtly emphasized to their readers
the importance and relevance of these administrative agencies to
their lives. However, editors’ choices of topics highlighted offices
such as the EPA, the CIA, INS, and the Forest Service. Regulations
and restrictions emerging from the EPA, INS, OSHA, and other
such agencies stimulate comment, while the actions of many other
governmental departments pass unnoted. The image of the federal
bureaucracy thus generated is one of an intrusive government regu-
lating for its own sake.
By contrast, editors rarely devoted much space to agencies’ suc-
cess. Agencies that adopted regulations to protect the public re-
ceived little if any credit. Offices that successfully accomplished
their goals did so without notice. Editors provided no counterweight
to the heavy emphasis on bureaucratic ineptitude and mistakes.
Even though editors frequently admitted that agency officials were
acting conscientiously and in good faith, editors still criticized their
actions. Success, the normal outcome of agency action, did not
reach the editorial columns -not enough controversy there.
Bureaucrats were generally anonymous. With the exception of
well-known agency personnel (e.g., Attorney General Janet Reno),
editorials rarely mentioned individual officials by name. The mis-
takes editors called to readers’ attention were caused by someone
holding some position in the bureaucracy. By keeping bureaucrats
anonymous, editors reinforced the conception of a giant organiza-
tion in which real people and real interests get lost. Keeping bu-
reaucrats nameless also implied that the problem lay in the structure
itself, not in the people who staff it.
The criticisms embodied in the editorials carried an implicit valida-
tion of basic societal values. An individual’s right to choose, for in-
stance, outweighed bureaucratic convenience. Efficiency was worth-
while, but not if it involved a restriction on privacy. Not only did the
criticisms, then, reinforce the consensual societal values editors iden-

tified with, they also quietly distinguished the good people who read
the local paper from the bureaucrats in Washington who just did not
get it. The underlying theme that these contrasts between agency ac-
tions and widely shared values demonstrated was that government
personnel are indeed out of touch with what is important and right.
Unfortunately, as the survey of the editorials shows, editors did not
stick to that position. When editors liked proposals for governmental
action, then a conflict with basic values could be accommodated.
Then, a restriction on choice may be worth it; then, an increase in reg-
ulations may be a small price to pay. To put it differently, referring to
basic values in criticizing agency actions is a strategic choice. When
other outcomes seem more desirable, however, strategy calls for flex-
ibility, even when strongly held values come into play.
Attentive readers of these editorials would, over the course of the
year, recognize the extensive impact of executive branch actions on
their lives. They would have, however, little reason to change how
they view the bureaucracy, nor would they have any reason to dis-
agree with Ronald Reagan’s famous aphorism: government isn’t the
solution; government is the problem.
1 . In your local newspapers, does the news coverage of the fed-

eral bureaucracy parallel the editorial commentary on the bu-
reaucracy? Is the news coverage more likely to focus atten-
tion on bureaucratic mistakes and on personalities in the
federal agencies or accomplishments and successes?
2. Which federal agencies receive the most media attention?
Which receive the least? Do you think the amount of attention
an agency gets is connected to its importance? Or is it related
to other factors? What might some of those other factors be?
3. Find several stories in your local media that pertain to federal
agencies. Can you determine from the news accounts how the
story was generated? Did the agency issue a press release or
hold a news conference? Did interest groups or public officials
114 Jan Venneer
outside the agency do something to lead to the story? Did the

reporter himself or herself initiate the coverage? Can you for-
mulate some general explanations for what you discovered?
4. Although we think of the bureaucracy as located in Washing-
ton, D.C., a lot of federal employees work in offices scattered
across the nation. Would you expect news coverage and edi-
torial commentary about local offices of federal agencies to be
more favorable than coverage about the agencies’ central D.C.
offices? Why do you think so?
5. Should federal agencies pay attention to the news coverage
and editorial commentary they get? Why do you think so?
Defend your position both in terms of the needs of a function-
ing democracy and in terms of the efficient and effective ad-
ministration of governmental policies.
6. Is news coverage of federal agencies related to the tendency
of the media to find local connections to the stories they run?
If so, how does that affect the portrait of the federal bureau-
cracy the public sees?
Cook, Brian J., Bureaucracy and Self Government: Reconsidering the

Role of Public Administration in American Politics (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
Graber, Doris A., Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press, 1997).
Goodsell, Charles T.,The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration
Polemic, 3d ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994).
Hess, Stephen, The Government-Press Connection (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1984).
Paletz, David, The Media in American Politics: Contents and Conse-
quences (New York: Longman, 1999).
NOTES
1 . Quoted in “Twain’s Letters in Demand; Luckily, Supply Abundant,”

Omaha Sunday World Herald, 2 December 200 1 , 21A.
2. “Icy Hand of Bureaucracy,” Fresno Bee, 24 December 1994, B6.

3. Charles T. Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Ad-
ministration Polemic, 3d ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994),
esp. chap. 2.
4. Brian J. Cook, Bureaucracy and Self-Government: Reconsidering
the Role of Public Administration in American Politics (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.
5. Cook, Bureaucracy and Self-Government, 3.
6 . For an examination of a policy that allows bureaucrats to use their
discretion to reflect state differences, see Lael R. Keiser and Joel Soss,
“With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and the Politics of Child Sup-
port Enforcement,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (Octo-
ber 1998): 1133-56.
7. John T. Scholz and B. Dan Wood, “Controlling the IRS: Principals,
Principles, and Public Administration,” American Political Science Re-
view 42, no. 1 (January 1998): 141-62.
8. Jack H. Knott and Gary J. Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy: The
Politics of Institutional Choice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1987), 124,133.
9. David Paletz, The Media in American Politics: Contents and Con-
sequences (New York: Longman, 1999), 264.
10. Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), 101.
11. Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureau-
cracy, and Public Policy, 3d ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1984),96.
12. David Morgan, The Flacks of Washington: Government Informa-
tion and the Public Agenda (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986).
13. These suppositions are based on conventional conceptions of “news-
worthiness.” For two lists of factors that comprise newsworthiness, see Doris
A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 106-108; and Jan Pons Vermeer, “ForZm-
mediate Release”: Candidute Press Releases in American Political Cam-
paigns (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 17-18.
14. Paletz, The Media in American Politics, 265.
15. “Don’t Impose Stringent Radon Limits for Water,” Albuquerque
Journal, 31 July 1994, B2.
16. “Drinking Water: Testy about Testing,” Lincoln Journal, 16 Octo-
ber 1994,12B.
17. “Wrong Turn on Air Quality,” Fresno Bee, 5 August 1994, B6.
18. “Not Swamped with Facts,” Raleigh News & Observer, 3 Febru-
ary 1994.
116 Jan Venneer
19. “Leaky: EPA Water Reporting Defies Explanation,” Lansing State

Journal, 23 July 1994,4A.
20. “Hells Canyon for Everyone,” Boise Idaho Statesman, 7 July 1994.
21. “Wolf Reintroduction Plan Good Compromise for Idaho,” Boise
Idaho Statesman, 23 November 1994.
22. “Forest Ripe for Policy Change,” Boise Idaho Statesman, 14 De-
cember 1994.
23. “Decision $70,000 Too Late,” Boise Idaho Statesman, 4 Novem-
ber 1994.
24. “Hear All the Voices,”Albuquerque Journal, 23 January 1994, B2.
25. “Tobacco Woes Are Real,” Raleigh News & Observer, 4 August 1994.
26. “Pickups: A Power Trip,” Lincoln Journal, 13 September 1994,8.
27. “Questionable Tactics,” Albany Times Union, 25 December
1994, B-4.
28. “This Milk Needs Labeling,” Providence Journal, 6 February
1994, D10.
29. “Milk Hormone: Consumers Entitled to Labeling,” Lincoln Jour-
nal, 17 February 1994,16.
30. “Tell Us What’s in Our Milk,” Albany Times Union, 28 February
1994, A-6.
3 1. “How Safe Is Air Travel?’ Fresno Bee, 22 December 1994, B8.
32. “Superfund Super-snafu.” Albuquerque Journal, 7 February
1994, A6.
33. “A National I.D. Card,” Providence Journal, 5 August 1994, A12.
34. “We Don’t Need National ID,” Albany Times Union, 17 November
1994, A-12.
35. “Harassment: Forget Rule for Religious Harassment,” Jackson
Clarion-Ledger, 22 September 1994, IOA.
36. “Ups and Downs: Beaver Hits Middle Age; Methane Matters,”
Lexington Herald-Leader, 4 June 1994,A12.
37. “Here’s What They Hate,” Raleigh News & Observer, 14 Novem-
ber 1994.
38. “IRS’s Bilingual Flop,” Providence Journal,9 September 1994,A12.
39. “When the Carrot Sticks Fit,” Raleigh News & Observer, 25
June 1994.
40. “Get the Fat Out,” Albuquerque Journal, 18 July 1994, A6.
41. “Better Odds on Seafood,” Fresno Bee, 25 January 1994, B4.
42. “WIC: Mississippi Needs This Vital Program,” Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, 25 November 1994,14A.
43. “Clearing the Smoke,” Albuquerque Journal, 10 February 1994,A16.

44. “The Danger of Dioxin,” Albany Times Union, 17 September
1994, A-6.
45. “Garbage: New Regulations Costly but Needed,” Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, 11 April 1994,6A.
46. “Elders’ Exit,” Fresno Bee, 13 December 1994, B4.
47. “Dr. Elders’ Verbal Hemorrhages,” Albany Times Union, 13 De-
cember 1994, A- 18.
48. “Elders’ Fire Too Hot,” Raleigh News & Observer, 13 December
1994.
49. “Elders: Loose Cannon Clinton Could I11 Afford,” Jackson Clar-
ion-Ledger, 13 December 1994, 10A.
50. “Elders’ Nonmedical Leave,” Providence Journal, 13 December
1994, A12.
5 1. “Elders’ Brash Mouth Led to Her Removal,” Albuquerque Journal,
15 December 1994,A20.
52. “Joycelyn Elders: Victim of Damage Control,” Lincoln Journal, 13
December 1994,6.
53. “Elders’ Nonmedical Leave.”
54. “Spies and Mr. Espy,” Albany Times Union, 14 August 1994, E-4.
55. “Espy: Choose Door Marked ‘Exit,”’ Lincoln Journal, 17 August
1994,16.
56. “Espy: Example Telling, but Charges Weak,” Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, 10 August 1994,8A.
57. “Espy: Criticism Bounced Back to Congress,” Jackson Clarion-
Ledger, 30 August 1994,8A.
58. “From Espy to Lobby Reform,” Raleigh News & Observer, 7
October 1994.
59. “Mr. Espy’s Tattered Credibility,” Albany Times Union, 5 October
1994,A-12.
60. “Agriculture: Time for a Fresh Face,” Lincoln Journal, 5 October
1994, 14.
61. “Secretary of Agriculture Not Only One to Blame,” Albuquerque
Journal, 5 October 1994, A10.
62. “A Bizarre Tale of Greed,” Lexington Herald-Leader, 26 February
1994,A10.
63. “Fix the CIA,” Albany Times Union, 1 March 1994,A-14.
64. “The Keystone Spooks,” Fresno Bee, 5 March 1994, B4.
65. “The Questions after Ames,” Fresno Bee, 2 May 1994, B6.
118 Jan Vermeer
66. “The CIA Needs Watching,” Albany Emes Union, 16 August

1994, A-10.
67. “Ames Affair May Spark Congress to Rethink CIA,” Albuquerque
Journal, 3 October 1994, A6.
68. “Clean House at the CIA,” Albany Emes Union, 13 November
1994, B4.
69. “Smarter with Intelligence,”Raleigh News & Observer, 30 December
1994.
~~~ ~
6
The Media in State and local Politics
G. Patrick fynch
No one would have predicted it in the 1950s, but at the beginning of

the 2 1st century, scholarly attention within political science has once
again focused on the American states. State governments once again
have power over significant public policies. Governors, even those
who aren’t former professional wrestlers, are receiving the national
spotlight and helping to shape the national agenda on issues such as
education and health care reform. State legislatures are gaining
stature and resources. It’s now common and perfectly acceptable to
hear politicians, such as President Bush, answer questions about
public policy by saying, “Let the states decide for themselves.”
The current renaissance of interest in state politics has given po-
litical scientists an opportunity to explore topics that have been
studied extensively at the national level but not at the state level.
For example, scholars have now studied the possibility of economic
retrospective voting in state elections,l fiscal policy differences be-
tween Democrats and Republicans in state budgets? and models of
Supreme Court decision making in the states?
Despite these recent increases in both state political power and
scholarly research on the states, there is one very conspicuous gap
in our knowledge about state politics. While there has been a virtual
mountain of literature written about the impact of both the news me-
dia and paid political advertising on national politics, scholars have
largely overlooked the role of the media in the states. This oversight
119
120 G. Patrick Lynch
exists despite ample evidence that state campaigns are getting much
more expensive and media oriented.“ There may be a good reason
for this oversight. The structure of the news media works against
quality news coverage of state politics. Also, until recently, only gu-
bernatorial candidates regularly advertised on television.
I have three broad goals in this chapter. First, I outline what we
know about both news coverage of state politics and paid advertis-
ing during state political campaigns. Second, I discuss some of the
difficulties that state politicians face in getting fair and adequate
coverage of their activities reported to voters. Finally, project some
trends that should give governors, state legislators, and other state
officials more limelight in the next century.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE NEWS MEDIA

A N D STATE POLITICS?
There has been relatively little research on how the news media in-
fluence state politics. Most work in this area has documented how
little coverage the press gives to state politics. In the 1970s, William
Gormley showed that state governments suffered “from a serious
visibility pr~blem.”~ He found that newspapers devoted less than
18%of their stories about state and local news to politics. Television
was even worse, with less than 14%of all state and local news sto-
ries on television addressing politics and/or government- a policy
that Gormley called “benign neglect.”6Other observers, such as Tom
Littlewood, did not dispel the notion of an inadequately reported
state political system?
This trend in news coverage continued through the 1980s and
1990s. Doris Graber referred to news coverage of state politics as
“Swiss cheese journalism,” arguing that “Swiss cheese has more sub-
stance than holes while the reverse is true for the press” in their cover-
age of state government? Why does state politics get so little attention
from the media? Graber attributes the holes in state media coverage to
market failure-state political news appeals to only a small portion of
the news media’s readership or audience-and to shallow media ex-
pertise. I will address both of her points in more detail below.
The Media in State and Local Politics 121
With several of my colleagues, I have been looking at the per-

ceived impact of the news media on the daily politics and policy
making of American states. We have relied on surveys of state politi-
cians to get their impressions of the importance of the press in the
politics of their states. While political scientists may be ignoring the
role of the press in state politics, politicians certainly are not. They
have long viewed newspapers and the wire services as important
players in state politics? Surprisingly, state politicians have tremen-
dous respect for the importance of the wire services-particularly
politicians from rural districts. However, even politicians from urban
and suburban districts believe that wire service reporters are typi-
cally more experienced and write better stories then their counter-
parts in television, radio, and newspapers. In this way, the role of the
media is different in state politics then it is on the national level.
However, national trends in media coverage are beginning to be
felt in state politics. For example, television has begun to make its
presence felt in state politics. Between 1995 and 1998, the number
of politicians in our surveys who rated the political importance of
television as “high” had more than tripled.1° In fact more than 85%
of our respondents in 1998 rated the political importance of televi-
sion as either “high” or “medium,” placing it just behind the print
media in terms of political impact.” Our respondents were quite
critical of the quality of the coverage provided by television news,
but they acknowledged that state political television news reached
more people with more powerful images than the print media did.
There has been more work done on the impact of the media on
state campaigns. Gubernatorial races are now heavily influenced by
paid advertising. Gubernatorial campaign expenditures have in-
creased dramatically over the past 20 years, and those increases are
largely the result of larger media budgets.’* Gubernatorial cam-
paigns now spend millions of dollars, and much of that money goes
to television and radio ads and media consultants. We are even start-
ing to see greater reliance on campaign ads in state legislative races.
Hogan’s work shows that, while voter contact is still very important
in state house races, campaign ads are becoming a more
important part of state legislative campaign budgets, particularly in
larger, more populated states.I3
My survey research of state politicians is consistent with this

stream of research. In 1998,97% of state politicians surveyed agreed
that politicians in statewide campaigns used broadcast television ad-
vertising. In addition, more than half of those surveyed said that leg-
islative candidates were using cable television ads in their campaigns.
Cable television provides legislative candidates with relatively inex-
pensive and efficient ways to reach voters in their district^.'^
This recent heightened interest in campaigns and the growing
consensus that state politics is becoming more similar to national
politics may prompt more research on the media. However, virtu-
ally no scholar has examined what role the news media play in state
politics and government. Graber and Gormley point out a funda-
mental problem. The news media provide very little coverage to
state politics and government. Why is this so? If we consider the
factors that go into news selection, this neglect is not surprising.
The media like to focus on conflicts, major crises and disasters, ma-
jor figures, and Washington politic^.'^ Daily coverage of state poli-
tics fits none of these categories. Therefore, unless a governor is
caught in a scandal, such as Kirk Fordice in Mississippi, or state
legislators are selling votes, as in South Carolina in the early 1990s,
then state politics won’t receive national or local coverage. This is
particularly true for television, which needs visual images to pro-
duce stories. Education and welfare policy aren’t as visual as earth-
quakes and presidential press conferences.
WHAT IS NEWS?
Reporters do not arbitrarily select the news. Members of the news

media generally form a consensus on the “major” international, na-
tional, and local stories of the day. There is a substantial amount of
overlap among the various local and national nightly news pro-
grams. But how does this consensus on the news form? Why do re-
porters follow some stories but not others? What are the criteria that
editors and producers use in choosing the news?
Most reporters have “standard operating procedures” that dic-
tate what they cover, and most editors have similar procedures to
help them determine what will become news. Who are the news
“gatekeepers” and what do they look for in stories to make them
“newsworthy”?
GATEKEEPERS
Every half hour CNN’s Headline News promises to take you

“Around the World in 30 Minutes.” It is doubtful that any television
newscast or newspaper could provide complete “around the world”
coverage in 30 hours let alone 30 minutes. News organizations must
make decisions about what stories to run from the massive amount
of potential news available to them every day. Part of the potential
news comes from unplanned events, but a substantial part of the
news is also planned and structured. For example, many private and
public organizations hire public relations firms who solicit news
coverage by inviting reporters to events. Also, technology has made
getting information much easier. Therefore, editors and producers
have a lot of news to choose from.
Different media face different decisions in choosing their news.
For example, structuring a television newscast is fundamentally
different than laying out the front page of a newspaper. After com-
mercials, a television newscast has roughly 20 to 22 minutes to
broadcast news, weather, and sports. In some markets sports and
weather comprise more than 30% of the typical newscast.16 This
places a premium on brevity and simplicity. Robert MacNeil, for-
mer coanchor of the widely respected MucNeiULehrer NewsHour
on PBS, noted that even in broadcast journalism the emphasis is
“to keep everything brief, not to strain the attention of anyone but
instead to provide constant stimulation through variety, novelty,
action, and rno~ernent.”’~ In contrast, newspapers can present
many more stories, but most readers only notice and read promi-
nently placed stories. The process of making the “news” involves
the gathering of information by reporters, the sorting of that in-
formation by publishers and producers, and then the packaging
and presentation of that news in the newspapers we read and
newscasts we watch.
124 G.Patrick Lynch
Because of their control over the information that makes it onto

television newscasts and into newspapers, reporters, editors, and
producers can be thought of as “gatekeepers.”18 In short, they hold
back a flood of information-potential news-and allow a small
trickle of it-news-to be seen and read by their viewers and read-
ers. Unfortunately, most of the traditional standards used by gate-
keepers impede coverage of state politics.
Since networks and large newspapers must make money to sur-
vive, a premium is put on stories that appeal to readers and viewers.
Scholarly work on the content of most news stories has found, not
surprisingly, that the news focuses on conflicts, major crises and
disasters, major figures, and Washington politics .I9 These biases
steer the news media away from providing thorough coverage of
state government and politics. As states gain more political power
from the federal government, this may create significant problems.
Here are some of the criteria gatekeepers use to help decide what
news to let through the floodgates. As you will see, none of these
standards helps promote good coverage of state politics.
VIEWER INTEREST
Readers or viewers must first believe that news stories are interest-
ing, important, or relevant to their lives. To this end, journalists of-
ten “personalize” stories to make them seem real to the audience.
Gary Woodward calls this the “search for expressive ‘moments’ with
emotional intensity.”20 For example, a story about welfare might
combine a review of welfare policy and a profile of a welfare family
struggling to make ends meet. This gives the story a human face for
the audience, who can now link welfare with names and faces.
On the surface this practice would seem to benefit coverage of
state government and politics, because state governments now han-
dle welfare. Personalizing should increase awareness of the role that
state government plays in people’s lives. Unfortunately the practice
of “personalizing” often has the opposite effect. The news media are
trying to make ratings or sell newspapers. Editors and reporters
must present news that’s easily digestible to their audiences. There-
fore, the human side of the story, which appeals to mass audiences,
is often emphasized at the expense of detailed coverage about the
policy, which is viewed as dry and dull.
This is especially problematic for television news because of the
limited time available for each story. If a “personalized” story about
welfare reform in Wisconsin receives two minutes on a nightly
newscast-a fairly long block of time- then typically one-half of
that story will focus on a “personalized” family. This leaves one
minute to summarize welfare reform. “Personalizing” stories often
allows for coverage of important state political issues on the news,
but it can also leave readers misinformed about the details of these
state government policies.
THE “NON-TECHNICAL BIAS” IN THE NEWS
State politics can be more technical and appear less exciting than
national politics. For example, foreign affairs, which plays an im-
portant role in national politics, is much “sexier” to journalists than
state budgets. However, journalists not only view state politics as
less interesting, they are also generally not trained in the nuances of
state politics and government. For example, state political news
covers a wide range of public policies. Knowledge about education,
economic development, social welfare, and road construction aren’t
acquired overnight. It takes experience and savvy to report on state
government well. This is especially true when journalists cover sto-
ries that are more technical in nature.
Because many journalists lack the background to cover state pol-
itics and government, they often have to rely on information from
politicians and policy makers when they are writing and producing
state political stories. In these instances, politicians and policy mak-
ers are making the news. It is the politicians who are dictating the
spin of the story because they provide the “facts” necessary for jour-
nalists. In 1984, both state and local government officials in Wash-
ington State were pushing hard for Seattle to become the home base
for a U.S. Navy task force. To bolster support for the plan, then
Governor John Spellman released a study on the economic impact
of the proposed base construction. Based on that study, the Seattle

Times reported that if the task force were based in Seattle 10,000
jobs would be created in the metropolitan area. However the Times
failed to note one detail of the study-that 9,000 of those jobs
would be filled by military personal rather than locally unemployed
citizens. The reporter lacked the background in economic develop-
ment to sift through the numbers and accurately present the news.2l
CRISIS REPORTING
“Crisis” stories are regularly reported on by the news media. As Doris

Graber notes, stories involving either natural or man-made disasters,
violence, or conflicts are much more likely to receive news
Numerous studies of the content of broadcast and print news have con-
sistently found that coverage of violent crimes dominates the news. Of
course this is not a new development. The newspapers of the penny
press in the mid- 1800s began covering crime and scandal stories to in-
crease their readership. More recently, in his study of the most promi-
nent stories on the nightly local news in Indianapolis, Dan Berkowitz
found that accidents/disasters and crime were two of the top three top-
ics aired. Political stories were third, but as we shall see below, in large
cities most political stories do not involve state p0litics.2~
How does this emphasis on crime and violence impact coverage of
state government? Coverage of violent crimes usually involves local
law enforcement officials and focuses on local aspects of the crime,
squeezing out coverage of state politics. International conflicts and
wars are the business of the national government. Some disaster cover-
age may discuss state government officials. How well state government
responds to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and earth-
quakes is often measured in the press. This coverage still doesn’t pro-
vide the public with news of the normal business of state government.
MUCKRAKING/INVESTIGATlVE JOURNALISM
Unlike our previous criteria, muckraking can put state political

news in the limelight, but it does not always paint an attractive pic-
ture of state government to the public. Muckrakingjournalism is an-

tagonistic, investigative reporting of political events and figures.
The term muckraking was first coined by President Theodore Roo-
sevelt. He used it to describe the aggressive, scandal-seeking style
of newspaper reporting that was common during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. The best recent example of muckraking would
be the Watergate break-in scandal during the Nixon administration.
However, muckraking is not limited to coverage of national pol-
itics. State reporters have aggressively pursued investigative stories
about state political leaders since the advent of machine politics in
the late 19th century. The often cozy, but corrupt, relationship be-
tween machine politicians and state legislators received a lot of at-
tention from newspaper reporters anxious to sell papers in the
highly competitive markets of major cities. Muckraking has many
appeals for reporters and editors. Scandals get headlines and sell
newspapers, but “dry” reports about policies typically do not. Since
most journalists are “non-technical” in their backgrounds it is eas-
ier for them to write investigative pieces than technical ones.
However, reporters themselves often rightly see investigative
coverage as part of their civic responsibility. And such stories can
lead to coverage of state politics. Chicago Tribune columnist Eric
Zorn, who helped free two men wrongfully prosecuted by the Illi-
nois attorney general, argued that by “holding their feet to the
fire,”24the news media keep politicians on their toes and help to
prevent abuses by government officials.
In 1983, ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico was brutally murdered
during a break-in at her family home in DuPage County near
Chicago. Then DuPage County state’s attorney, Republican James
Ryan, prosecuted Roland0 Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez for the
crimes, despite serious questions about the quality and validity of
the evidence and testimony against them. Both men were convicted
for the crime and sentenced to die in the Illinois gas chamber.
Then in 1985 Brian Dugan, a man with a history of sex offenses,
confessed to raping and killing Jeanine Nicarico. Prosecutors, in-
cluding Ryan, held fast to their contention that Cruz and Hernandez
had been involved in the crime. At the time of the trial the Chicago
Sun-Times ran a series of articles questioning the conviction of the
two men, but the story soon faded from public view.
Enter Chicago Tribune columnist Eric Zorn. In 1994 Zorn began

researching the Cruz case. He was unconvinced that Cruz and Her-
nandez had had anything to do with Nicarico’s abduction and killing.
He began researching the details of the case and writing articles crit-
ical of State’s Attorney Jim Ryan’s handling of the case. At one point
Zorn even challenged Ryan to a public radio debate over the facts of
the case. Partially as a result of Zorn’s digging, both Cruz and Her-
nandez were granted new trials. During Cruz’s trial the judge granted
the defense’s motion that the charges be dropped, and Hernandez
was subsequently freed. The pressure on a Republican politician
from a writer for what had traditionally been a Republican newspa-
per also led to the appointment of a special prosecutor to examine
Ryan’s actions during the prosecution of Cruz and Hernandez.
The special prosecutor filed charges against Ryan and several
others involved in Cruz’s initial conviction. After a trial, which
spawned intense national media coverage, the police officers and
prosecutors involved in the Cruz case were acquitted by a DuPage
County jury in the spring of 1999.
”GOTCHA JOU R NA 1ISM”
However, overzealous or potentially misleading investigative re-

porting can be counterproductive. Our surveys found that many
state politicians believe that journalists are primarily interested in
pursuing what one state government official called “gotcha journal-
ism.” In contrast to investigative journalism, “gotcha journalism” is
when the news media try to catch politicians in embarrassing or
compromising positions taken largely out of context. “Gotcha jour-
nalism” usually has very little to do with government policies or
practices. Instead journalists focus on the lives of politicians outside
of the state house or governor’s mansion.
Recently, the nation’s governors have been a frequent target for
reporters pursuing “gotcha” stories. In Mississippi, Republican
Governor Kirk Fordice’s personal life became front-page news af-
ter it was revealed that he was involved with a high school sweet-
heart-who wasn’t his wife. A reporter saw the governor on a flight
from Atlanta to Memphis kissing his companion. He quickly

snapped photos, which created a statewide sensation, of the couple
with a disposable camera. Making matters worse, Fordice had
sharply criticized President Clinton’s behavior during the impeach-
ment proceedings. Fordice was also forced to resign from his post
as cochair of Dan Quayle’s presidential campaign F5
Or, consider the case of the annual meeting of the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The NCSL designs the confer-
ence to promote the exchange of new ideas among state representa-
tives and senators from all over the U .S. There are numerous lectures
and seminars to give legislators the opportunity to learn about new
trends in other states and improve the quality of their work. But lately
the conference has served as an opportunity for journalists to try to
catch legislators in compromising situations-playing golf, lounging
by the pool, drinking at bars, or yachting all afternoon-presumably
at taxpayers’ expense. The situation has gotten so bad that many state
legislators refuse to go to these trips, even if they pay for them with
personal funds, because of concern over adverse press coverage. For
example, many didn’t attend this year’s meeting, in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, because they didn’t want to receive the negative pressF6
Obviously, abuses of taxpayer dollars should be covered by the
press. However, many of these stories ignore important facts and
take legislators’ actions out of context. In recent years, television
stations and newspapers have sent reporters, often undercover with
false press credentials, to do nothing more than follow legislators
outside of the business sessions. In one instance KING-TV of Seat-
tle sent a camera crew with the sole purpose of photographing peo-
ple at the pool of the hotel where the conference was being held.
The crew never reported on the vast majority of the participants
who were diligently w0rking.2~Such reporting often leaves out im-
portant details and can be very misleading. In the case of the NCSL,
many state legislators do not make enough money to afford the
trip-the average annual pay of a state legislator is $18,500-and
must pay for it with personal fundsF8 Certain legislators may turn
the convention into a junket rather than an opportunity to work, but
the tendency of the media to ignore the constructive aspects of the
convention is just “gotcha” journalism.
POOR POLL COVERAGE
The news media also do a fairly poor job when it comes to report-
ing on polls. Instead of reporting the results of polls and how dif-
ferent types of respondents feel about problems, issues, candidates,
and government, the news media only broadly report the results of
polls. A recent analysis by the Mason Dixon Polling Organization
criticized news organizations that treat polls like football scores. It
provided several examples in which news organizations misled
readers by not interpreting or understanding polls correctly. For ex-
ample, in elections undecided voters tend to break toward incum-
bents, yet news organizations regularly ignore this fact-even if
there is a large number of undecided voters and the incumbent holds
a lead. As Mason Dixon noted, “[Iln a situation where an incumbent
leads 48%-36% a week before an election, it is not uncommon for
the challenger to eventually win 5 1%49%. Still, the headline or
lead story will scream, ‘Governor Jones leads by 12 points in re-
election bid .”’29
H O W THE ECONOMICS OF NEWS IMPACTS

STATE POLITICAL COVERAGE
For every source of news in the U.S., with the exception of the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting, journalism is a business, and busi-
nesses must make profits. To understand how the news media work,
we must consider how market forces influence news selection. The
drive for ratings decreases state political coverage in two ways. First,
as I have already discussed, state news is not “sexy” or crisis oriented
unless it is personalized or involves “gotcha” stories. Second, as we
shall see below, state political news does not have a natural audience.
However, market forces play another role in determining how the
news media cover state politics and government. In the past 30
years there has been an amazing change in the ownership patterns
of media outlets. There are now far fewer companies owning news-
papers, wire services, and television and radio stations than in the
past. Twenty-three companies now control the vast majority of the
more than 25,000 print and broadcast outlets in the United States. In
short, a few big corporations now dominate the media industry.
Within a single state, one or two firms may own many of the news
outlets and thus have effective control over much of the political in-
formation available to the public.
Despite the growth of Fox and cable alternatives there are still
three dominant networks (firms) in the television industry -ABC,
CBS, and NBC. There are now fourteen dominant chains (fms) in
the newspaper industry. And the demise of the UP1 wire service has
left AP as the predominant wire outlet in the United States. Further-
more some of these media corporations often own both electronic and
print outlets. The growth of web-based news services may eventually
provide individuals with a wider variety of news sources, but cur-
rently a person’s “corporate” news choices are extremely limited.
What are the ramifications of this change on state political news?
Let’s consider North Carolina. The Charlotte Observer is part of the
Knight-Ridder newspaper chain, which also publishes the Miami
Herald and the Philadelphia Inquirer. The Wilmington Star is
owned by the New York Times Company. The state’s “paper of
record,” the Raleigh News and Observer, was recently bought out
by the McClatchie newspaper chain, located in northern California.
The corporate ownership of all three newspapers is now located in
a different state. Decisions crucial to those papers, and their cover-
age of state political news, are now made by individuals without a
single tie to the state and almost certainly little knowledge about
North Carolina. Obviously editors will still retain a lot of authority
over what gets published in each paper, but “absentee” ownership
detracts from the quality of state and local coverage.
Some observers, most notably Ben Bagdikian, have bemoaned
this concentration of media ownership, arguing that corporate inter-
ests have begun to influence decisions made about news coverage.
While Bagdikian agrees that the days of blatant bias within the me-
dia have largely passed, he argues that a subtler type of bias has crept
into news coverage, supporting the views of the corporate owner-
ship. As more newspapers and television stations are owned by
fewer companies, the local flavor and traditions in news reporting
may vanish. Others have argued that the trend toward fewer media
companies has created more homogeneous local newspapers and tel-

evision newscasts. If these concerns are valid, such trends would fur-
ther limit quality state political news.
For national news outlets, business considerations strongly dis-
courage coverage of state politics. Typically, news about a particu-
lar state has limited national appeal. Therefore state news is un-
likely to generate higher ratings for national news broadcasts or
increase circulation for national newspapers. For local or even re-
gional news outlets, coverage of state politics is also an expensive
proposition with limited financial rewards. It is expensive to main-
tain a news bureau, or just one full-time reporter, in the state capi-
tal. Instead, many newspapers and television stations report on their
metropolitan area rather than about state politics.
There are alternative ways for news organizations to cover the cap-
ital. Television stations send remote crews to do live interviews and
broadcasts from the state legislature. Camera crews are normally sent
to react to breaking news. These types of stories help to fill the gap in
state news, but they don’t substitute for an experienced, knowledge-
able, full-time reporter. Full-time reporters have more experience in
and insight into state politics and break stories themselves.
A second, cheaper alternative is to use either wire services or news
services that write stories and then sell them to newspapers and televi-
sion newscasts. News services keep full-time reporters in state and for-
eign capitals and Washington, D.C.; these reporters write stories that
are printed in smaller papers throughout the U.S. For example, Cox
News Service-which is a part of Cox Newspapers (owner of 15
newspapers including the Atlanta Journal-Constitution)and Cox Com-
munications (which owns Cox Cable, Cox Digital TV,and Cox Digi-
tal Telephone)-provides coverage to other papers for a fee. News ser-
vices allow smaller papers to get state news more cheaply, but as you
can see, these news services are hardly independent, which again raises
the question of how absentee owners influence news selection.
METROPOLITAN NEWS
By 1920, the U.S. had become a predominantly urban nation, with

large, industrial cities full of foreign immigrants. In these cities dozens
of newspapers competed for readers. As the demographics of the

country have changed, newspapers and television news have also
changed. Millions of Americans left major cities for suburbs, and busi-
nesses followed. Now all U.S. cities have sprawling suburban areas.
Newspapers and television news now have metropolitan audiences
that encompass cities and suburbs rather than just cities. Readers from
different parts of a metropolitan area may not share the same interests.
Important news in the suburbs may be insignificant in the city.
Newspapers and television stations must maintain their circula-
tion and viewer base while balancing the interests of different audi-
ences. They also must attract advertisers to survive. Advertisers
want to reach both urban and suburban audiences. Suburban audi-
ences are particularly important to advertisers because a large per-
centage of the nation’s retail sales is now done in suburban areas.
However, most major newspapers are based in cities and have sub-
stantial economic interests in the central city area.
The news media have tried to deal with these changes in their au-
diences in three ways. First, journalists still use the central city area
as a unifying symbol for the metropolitian area. Despite the explosive
growth in suburban populations and declines in urban populations,
newspapers still allocate significant space to reporting on city news
because even individuals in suburbs are more likely to identify with
the central city than with another suburban area?0 The news media
focus on other “unifying” news. Professional sports stories are of in-
terest to people living in both the city and suburbs, and sports cover-
age in newspapers and television broadcasts is growing.
Second, newspapers and television news pay greater attention to
suburban news. Newspapers now engage in zoning. Zoning is when a
newspaper changes its content in the same edition for readers in dif-
ferent parts of the metropolitan area. The change is usually in the ad-
vertising, editorial, and news content of the local sections of the paper.
Zoning not only lets newspapers reach a broader audience, but it also
allows them to compete with suburban newspapers. Most major re-
gional newspapers, such as the Atlanta Journal-constitution, the Hart-
ford Courant, and the Los Angeles Emes, zone their paper every day?’
Third, newspapers have added sections that contain nontraditional
news. If you were to compare the newspapers of the early 20th cen-
tury with those of today, you would find that today’s newspapers
have many more sections that report on entertainment, art, automo-

biles, health issues, home repair and decor, and food “news.” News-
papers have done this to compete with the diversity of news pro-
gramming available on television. However, it takes resources away
from state political news.
While growing coverage of suburban and nontraditional news
helps the news media gain a broader metropolitan audience, it has
squeezed out news on state politics and government. This has led to
what Phyliss Kaniss calls “city myopia.”32Print, television, and ra-
dio reporters are far more likely to know city politics and, therefore,
will pursue and write stories that address metropolitan politics. As
suburbs continue to grow, suburban news will become more preva-
lent. Reporters aren’t going to travel to the state capital. There is
plenty of metropolitan news right outside their front doors. Major
cities produce the kind of crime and violence stories that help to ful-
fill a standard I mentioned earlier, and most news organizations
maintain their offices in central cities. If the state capital is a major
media market, that may partially offset the “city myopia,” but even
in those situations, it’s likely that state political news will play sec-
ond fiddle to metropolitan news.
Most urban radio stations also ignore state politics. Radio news re-
ceives its highest ratings during “drive time,” when commuters are
heading to and from work. In order to appeal to the broadest audience
possible, radio news coverage focuses on city issues. Regional talk
shows with a political flavor (hoping to tap into the popularity of Rush
Limbaugh, among others) deal predominantly with national political
issues. When they do address state political issues, radio talk shows
don’t necessarily provide the most objective coverage available.
THE TWO-NEWSPAPER TOWN
In the early 20th century, competition among newspapers in large

cities was cutthroat. The movie The Front Page depicts life in a
big-city newspaper office during the 1930s. Competition for stories
among the numerous papers in town was so intense that at one
point the movie’s main character, a seasoned newspaper reporter,
actually hid an accused murderer in his office in exchange for an

exclusive interview.
In recent years the number of papers in direct competition in the
same cities has declined dramatically. For obvious reasons more
news outlets is a good thing. The more choices that individuals have
for news the more likely they are to be well informed. Also, com-
peting papers fighting for readers will cover news more aggres-
sively and fully than a single newspaper. FCC regulations try to pro-
mote as much competition as possible in individual media markets,
but there are loopholes to these rules, in particular as they relate to
cross-ownership-ownership of both a radio station and newspaper,
for example. According to Ben Bagdikian, 98% of all American
cities now have just one daily newspaper. Most of the remaining 2%
are large cities with extensive metropolitan As I noted ear-
lier, newspapers in major cities have refocused their coverage on
metropolitan news and de-emphasized state news. Since the number
of newspapers is also declining, less state news is getting through to
readers in cities, suburbs, and small towns.
SOME CAUSE FOR HOPE
There are some glimmers of hope on the horizon. In some recent

elections, the news media in several states tried to provide voters
with more policy information about the candidates. Fearing that is-
sues had been lost among all the attack ads and charges, some news
outlets made an effort to cover how candidates stood on the issues.
For example, several papers in 1996 and 1998 sent questionnaires
to candidates for state executive and legislative offices. The papers
then printed the candidates’ answers in a forum prior to the election.
Rather then simply endorsing candidates, the newspapers tried to
give their readers tangible information about the candidates’ policy
positions. The Chicago Tribune asked the gubernatorial candidates
in Illinois about their views on education, gambling, airport con-
struction, and taxes. In California, the Sacramento Bee gave ex-
tended sketches of each incumbent state legislator and hisher chal-
lenger in its readers’ districts in 1996 and 1998. The news media can
also sponsor debates between the candidates and endorse candidates

through editorials.
Politicians are becoming more sensitive to the press and learning
how to work with reporters to improve coverage. All governors,
some state agencies, and a growing number of legislatures have es-
tablished press offices to work with-and even cater to-the news
media and its needs. This means each governor has a press secretary
or communications director. Many governors and state legislative
leaders now have weekly television or radio shows to maintain their
public profiles and promote their preferred policies.
State legislators have also recognized the need for a news media li-
aison who works either for a party caucus or the party leadership.
This means legislators try to slant the views of reporters by providing
information favorable to their own views. If legislators can scoop the
news media with press releases and pre-written stones, they can pre-
sent in a positive way the perspective they feel is most important.
CONCLUSION
For a variety of reasons, the American news media are ill equipped
to adequately cover state politics and policy. The news media have
inherent biases toward either local/metropolitan coverage or na-
tional political news. The policies that state governments follow re-
quire more experience and technical expertise than the typical state
political reporter may have. Furthermore, when the media do turn
their attention to state politics, it’s often to unearth scandal or pur-
sue “gotcha” journalism, not provide constructive coverage of state
politics. Many of these problems will not be improving soon. Verti-
cal ownership in the media business will further decrease the
amount of state political news audiences receive. As suburbs con-
tinue to grow, newspapers will have to zone their papers and further
dilute coverage of topics like state government.
But the news media are trying. As the examples from the Chicago
Tribune and Sacramento Bee show, newspapers are trying to pro-
vide voters with more practical political information about state
leaders. And as governors and state legislators gain more power, the
news media will focus more on state politics. But the biases in news
coverage present significant challenges to state politicians and vot-

ers. If voters can’t get useful political information about incum-
bents, how will they choose candidates in elections? How can
politicians try to rally public support for political issues without me-
dia coverage? These are significant challenges for the new genera-
tion of state politicians.
DISCUSSlON QUESTIONS
1. What might be some effects of the increasing use of television

ads in state campaigns?
2. Who are the “news gatekeepers’’ and what criteria do they use
to determine which stories they cover? In what ways do their
standards impede coverage of state politics?
3. How does the change in ownership patterns of news organiza-
tions affect coverage of state politics? Why?
4. How have newspapers and television stations adapted to the
increase in suburban populations? How do these changes af-
fect coverage of both state and metropolitan political news?
5. As states gain more political power, what are some potential
problems of limited state political coverage?
6 . How have the media and politicians tried to increase state po-
litical coverage? What more could they do?
Atkinson, Lonna Rae, and Randall W. Partin, “Economic and Referendum

Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections,”
American Political Science Review 89 (1995).
Bennett, W. Lance, The Politics uflllusiun, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman,
1988).
Flemming, Gregory N., David B. Holian, and Susan Gluck Mezey, “An
Integrated Model of Privacy Decision Making in State Supreme
Courts ,”American Politics Quarterly 26 (1998).
Gans, Herbert, Deciding What’s News (New York: Vintage, 1969).
Gormley, William, “Coverage of State Government in the Mass Media,”
State Government News 52 (1979).
Gray, Virginia, and Herbert Jacob, eds., Politics in the American States
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996).
Kanis, Phyliss, Making Local News (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991).
Woodward, Gary C., Perspectives on American Political Media (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, 1997).
NOTES
1. Lonna Rae Atkinson and Randall W. Partin, “Economic and Refer-

endum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections ,”
American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 99-107.
2. Robert C. Lowry, James E. Alt, and Karen E. Ferree, “Fiscal Pol-
icy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States ,” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 92 (1998): 759-74.
3. Gregory N. Flemming, David B. Holian, and Susan Gluck Mezey,
“An Integrated Model of Privacy Decision Making in State Supreme
Courts,” American Politics Quarterly 26 (1998): 35-58.
4. See, for example, Thad Beyle, “Governors: The Middlemen and
Women in Our Political System,” in Politics in the American States, ed.
Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar-
terly, 1996).
5 . William Gorrnley, “Coverage of State Government in the Mass
Media,” State Government 52 (1979): 46-5 1.
6. Gormley, “Coverage of State Government,” 46.
7. Tom Littlewood, “What’s Wrong with Statehouse Coverage?” Co-
lumbia Journalism Review 10 (1972): 3 9 4 5 .
8. Doris Graber, “Swiss Cheese Journalism,” State Government News
36 (1993b): 19-21.
9. Thad Beyle and G. Patrick Lynch, “Measuring State Officials’ Views
of the Media,” Comparative State Politics 14, no. 3 (June 1993): 3 2 4 1 .
10. G. Patrick Lynch, “The Media and State Politics: The View from
Political Elites” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, Savannah, Ga., November 1999).
11. Lynch, “The Media and State Politics.”
12. Beyle , “Governors .”
13. Robert E. Hogan, “Voter Contact Techniques in State Legislative
Campaigns: The Prevalence of Mass Media Advertising,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 4 (1997): 55 1-7 1.
14. Lynch, “The Media and State Politics,” 16.

15. Herbert Gans,Deciding What’sNews (New York: Vintage, 1969); and
W. Lance Bennett, The Politics oflllusion, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman,
1988).
16. Stephen Hess, Livefrom Capitol Hill! (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1991), 49.
17. Gary C. Woodward, Perspectives on American Political Media
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 44-45.
18. There is an ocean of research on this topic. For a good review from
the field of journalism see Dan Berkowitz, “Refining the Gatekeeping
Metaphor for Local Television News,” Journal of Broadcasting and Elec-
tronic Media 34 (1990): 55-68.
19. The literature here is vast. The classics include Gans, Deciding
What’s News; and Bennett, The Politics of Illusion, 2nd ed.
20. Woodward, Perspectives on American Political Media, 78.
21. Phyliss Kaniss, Making Local News (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 92.
22. Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1993), 118.
23. Berkowitz, “Refining the Gatekeeping Metaphor,” 60.
24. Eric Zorn, phone interview by author, July 1995.
25. Sue Anne Pressley, “Mississippi Scandalized by the Governor’s
Love Life ,” Washington Post, July 13, 1999, C 1.
26. Alan Rosenthal, “Ethics: Political Protocol,” State Government
News 39, no. 3 (1996): 35.
27. Peter Brown, “Gotcha Journalism: Journalists Efforts to Expose
Politicians,” State Legislatures 20, no. 5 (May 1994): 22.
28. Brown, “Gotcha Journalism.”
29. Mason-Dixon Polling Organization, Understanding “Undecided”
Voters, July 7, 1999, at www.mason-dixon.com/mason-1ine.htm.
30. Kaniss, Making Local News.
3 1. Kaniss, Making Local News, 60.
32. Kaniss, Making Local News, 74.
33. Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press,
2000), 8-9.
7
Political Parties and the Media
C. Danielle Vinson
In 1998, the Democratic Party ran an ad in South Carolina criticizing

Republican Senate candidate Bob Inglis’s record on education during
his time in the House of Representatives.The ad featured school-aged
children talking about several unpopular votes Inglis had cast on edu-
cation and concluded with the children asking, “Mr. Inglis, what were
you thinking?’ Although most of the country had never seen the ad,
it was significant-not so much because of what it did (Senator Ernest
F. Hollings, a 32-year incumbent, probably would have won without
it) but because of what it represented. In congressional and local races
across the country in 1998,party organizations actively ran these kinds
of issue ads in a variety of media to influence the outcomes of elec-
tions. This expanded a trend begun in 1996 and signaled a new chap-
ter in the interaction between political parties and the media.
Much has been made in recent decades of the decline of parties. In-
creasing numbers of split-ticket voters and people who identify them-
selves as political independents, a tendency toward divided govern-
ment, and some political candidates’ reluctance to attach themselves
too closely to a party label suggest that parties are less relevant to the
political system than they once were. Contributing at least in part to this
apparent decline in party power have been the media, because of their
growing role as an intermediary between public officials and citizens.
At their high point, parties connected citizens to candidates and to
government officials. Parties helped to recruit candidates, and party
141
142 C. Danielle Vinson
leaders often controlled nominations. Voters’ strong attachments to a

party often determined how they voted. In the 1970s, as voters gained
more of a voice in the nominating process through primaries, candi-
dates were forced to appeal directly to the public rather than rely on
the party. The media became an important tool for communicating
with voters.
Simultaneously, reporters found covering candidates rather than
parties more to their liking, because it suited the evolving journal-
istic formats that emphasized entertainment as much as informa-
tion. Candidate-centered coverage allowed the media to focus on
real people rather than abstract labels or faceless parties, person-
alities rather than intangible ideas and dry issue positions. The
combination of primaries and media coverage helped to create
more candidate-centered campaigns. And presumably, candidates
who won election with little help from the party felt less tied to the
party platform once they were in office. Furthermore, they contin-
ued to rely on the media and campaign tactics to enact their poli-
cies, rather than working through the parties in government. Thus,
the media arguably contributed to the decline of the parties.
However, the parties in the United States have always been adap-
tive. As the party-sponsored issue ads of the 1998 elections indicate,
political parties are finding new ways to play an important role in
the political system, and the media are a centerpiece of the new
strategy. Parties have evolved into communications organizations
that often act as a mouthpiece and communications strategist for
politicians both in campaigns and in government. This chapter
looks at how the media have enabled parties to secure their place
and influence within the political system. We begin by looking at
the parties’ emerging role in campaigns and then turn our attention
to the party in government. Finally, we will examine how trends in
media coverage of politics have helped to reinvigorate the parties.
CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION
In recent years, when we have heard about parties in campaigns,

they have been playing the role of fund-raiser. National and state
Political Parties and the Media 143
party organizations, along with the House and Senate party cam-
paign committees, raised hundreds of millions of dollars during the
2000 election cycle. Because of limits on direct contributions to
candidates, however, much of this money was raised in the form of
soft money- $158.9 million for the Republican National Commit-
tee (RNC) and $136.6 million for the Democratic National Com-
mittee (DNC) in the 2000 election cycle.’ This means that parties
can spend the money on so-called party-building activities, but they
are limited in how much they can coordinate explicitly with their
candidates. Traditionally, parties spent much of this money on
polling and get-out-the-vote activities.
Beginning in the 1990s, larger amounts of soft money have gone
toward issue advocacy through a variety of media-mailings as
well as advertising on television and radio. Parties discovered that
they could get around limits on express advocacy for a candidate by
simply avoiding words like “vote for” or “defeat .” Thus, in 1996 the
RNC created ads that talked about the life of Republican presiden-
tial candidate Bob Dole and noted that he valued discipline and hard
work, but did not actually tell people to vote for him. The RNC also
aired ads attacking President Bill Clinton’s record. The RNC’s $3
million ad campaign helped to keep Dole’s campaign going through
the summer after he had reached his preconvention spending lim-
its? Recognizing the growing importance of the media in political
campaigns -especially for presidential and congressional races -
parties have spent their money on issue ads to supplement the can-
didates’ own expenditures. In one study of 17 competitive House
and Senate races in 2000, researchers found that parties outspent the
candidates on radio and television ads?
Often the parties’ ads complement the candidates’ campaigns and
in some cases almost appear to be coordinated with them. For ex-
ample, in the 1998 South Carolina Senate race, the state Democratic
Party’s ads and mailings supporting incumbent Senator Fritz
Hollings reinforced the same issues and themes used in Hollings’s
own campaign, focusing on benefits to senior citizens, education,
and the environment? Many of the party ads used the same visuals
as ads paid for by Hollings. The result was a consistent message re-
peatedly delivered to voters through a variety of media channels.
In some circumstances, the party and its candidate may take on dis-
tinct but complementary roles through their ads and interaction with
the media. Candidates may emphasize their own qualifications and
records while party leaders attack the opponent. For example, in
Michigan’s Eighth Congressional District race in 2000, both parties
paid for attack ads against the opposing party’s candidate, at the same
time the candidates themselves tried to remain more cordial. Thus,
while the Republican Party attacked Democratic candidate Diane
Byrum for voting to borrow money from a state trust fund for veter-
ans and wondered if she could be depended on to protect the Social
Security trust fund if she were in Congress, the Republican candidate
appeared in a National Republican Congressional Committee
(NRCC) ad authorized by his campaign in which he claimed that he
“believe[d] in bringing people together, not tearing down other^."^ By
employing this strategy, parties may help their candidates distance
themselves from the possible backlash of going negative.
But even as issue advocacy by the parties has been welcomed by
many candidates, it has not been without problems. In a few cases, the
party’s message has unintentionally undermined its own candidate. In
the 1998 South Carolina Senate race, the state Republican Party’s
hard-hitting ads against the Democratic incumbent turned out to be a
major headache for the Republican candidate, Bob Inglis, who had
pledged to run a civil campaign. After one of the ads was played dur-
ing a debate between the two candidates, Inglis agreed with Hollings
that the ad was ridiculous in its claims and presentation, and he spent
much time denouncing the ads to reporters who used the party’s efforts
as an opportunity to question Inglis’s sincerity about his commitment
to a courteous campaign? And in one well-documented national ex-
ample in 1998, the NRCC and the RNC, hoping to help GOP con-
gressional candidates, cooperated in a nationwide campaign entitled
“Operation Breakout” only to see it fail to produce. The party spent
$10 million on a national ad campaign that reminded voters of Presi-
dent Clinton’s scandal with Monica Lewinsky in the final weeks be-
fore the election? However, the ads appeared to backfire, as Republi-
cans lost seats in Congress.
It is obvious from campaign fund-raising and spending reports over
the last decade that parties have reasserted themselves in elections even
as election coverage by the media has remained candidate centered.

But much of the parties’ resurgence has come from their willingness to
use the media, particularly for advertising, sometimes without much
emphasis on the party label itself? The results are most apparent in
congressional elections, in which the airwaves are often swamped by
political ads paid for not only by candidates but also by parties. The in-
volvement of the parties has made some races more competitive than
they might otherwise have been. In the Michigan Senate race in 2000,
incumbent Republican Spencer Abraham raised $3.6 million more
than his Democratic challenger, Debbie Stabenow. But more than $4
million in soft money expenditures by the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee, much of it in issue ads, supplemented
Stabenow early in the contest, allowing her to reserve her own funds
for the final weeks of the campaign? Despite trailing Abraham in the
polls for much of the fall, Stabenow eked out a narrow victory on elec-
tion day.
Under the right conditions, the ad campaigns made possible by the
resources of the national parties and their party campaign committees
in Congress can nationalize congressional campaigns. Both parties
have experimented with a common theme or agenda in congressional
elections. In 1994 House Republican candidates signed the “Contract
with America” in an orchestrated media event on the Capitol steps, and
the Contract was published in TV Guide. Even though fewer than 20
percent of voters were familiar with the Contract prior to the elec-
tion,I0 GOP candidates highlighted some of the issues in their own
campaigns, and ultimately, the Contract became the agenda for the
new Republican majority in 1995. In 1996,the Democrats demonized
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and his conservative revolution to pick
up seats in Congress. Even though Republicans did not lose their ma-
jority in Congress, the national campaign allowed congressional Dem-
ocrats to suggest that the election was evidence that Republicans
needed to expand their agenda and embrace more moderate policies.
While the national themes in 1994 and 1996 appeared to benefit
the respective parties, the failure of the Republicans’ 1998 Opera-
tion Breakout campaign reveals the limits of this communication
strategy. A national ad campaign seems to work best when the party
can put a face on the opposing party and link it to issues or policy
problems the public is concerned about. In 1994, the face was Pres-
ident Bill Clinton and the public concern was big government and
higher taxes and deficit spending. In 1996, the Democrats could
point to House Speaker Newt Gingrich as the face of the Republi-
can Party, which was attempting to go further in cutting or limiting
programs than much of the public wanted to go. Operation Break-
out in 1998 ran into the problem that Clinton was not as universally
disliked as Republicans had expected, and possibly more impor-
tantly, a large part of the public was either opposed to impeachment
or at least tired of hearing about it. Either way, it made for a weak
issue around which to try to rally support.
In 2000, with no individual to represent either party” and no sin-
gle issue arousing public concern, both parties retreated from a na-
tional campaign with common themes, even in the presidential elec-
tion. Both national party organizations focused most of their
attention on a handful of battleground states and tailored the ads for
the state. For example, in Iowa, the DNC ran an issue ad against
George W. Bush that mentioned Texas’s falling SAT scores, and
then said Iowa (second in SAT scores) “doesn’t need a Texas plan
for its schools.”12 In Florida, the Democrats talked about toxic
chemicals dumped into Texas waterways and then asked Floridians
to “imagine Bush’s record in Florida’s everglade^."'^ For their part,
in the congressional campaigns, Republicans not only stuck to local
issues, they even paid for some ads that praised Republican mem-
bers of Congress for voting against their party on some issues.14
GOVERNING
In government, the parties have become very visible communica-

tors increasingly adept at using media to focus on their agendas and
frame policy debate. This strategic use of the media can be seen in
the efforts of congressional party leaders to capture media coverage
by coordinating the communication of their membership. It can also
be seen in the national parties’ availability to national media and ex-
perimentation with their own party-produced media. We will look
in some detail at each of these developments.
While party leaders have traditionally been among the most cov-
ered members of Congress in the national media, they have in re-
cent years shown a greater willingness to go public through the me-
dia to accomplish their party's goals. Since 1981, party leaders in
Congress have become more visible in the media, with a majority
of their media appearances related to legislation in Congress.I5This
is in stark contrast to earlier eras in Congress, in which legislation
was worked out behind closed doors.
As they have increasingly gone public, party leaders have not
merely tried to carry out their own personal agendas. Rather, they
often seem to shape their messages around issues "owned" by the
party-that is, issues about which there is consensus within the
party.I6 Doing this has allowed them to gain more credibility and
power as spokespersons in Congress. News coverage of coordinated
efforts to go public-that is, a group in Congress or an individual
speaking on behalf of a group attempting to gain media attention-
reflects the growing power of party leaders to speak for their mem-
bers. News coverage of Congress in 198 1 reveals that even though
party leaders were active in seeking and gaining media attention for
the legislative agenda, committee chairs and ranking minority
members, speaking for their cohorts on their committee and some-
times for their party, seemed most successful in communicating
through the press. Party leaders were responsible for only 24 per-
cent of the coordinated efforts to go public, and committee chairs
accounted for most of the other successful attempts to gain cover-
age. However, by 1993, almost 45 percent of the cases in which the
press covered coordinated public strategies in Congress were led by
party leaders.17 That percentage increased even more when the Re-
publicans gained control of the House of Representatives in 1995.
Using the media to promote the party's agenda, party leaders not
only improve their own credibility and visibility as spokespersons for
their parties, but they make it more likely that other members of the
party will work with them to publicize the message.'*To this end, we
have seen both parties in both houses of Congress pay more attention
to involving their members in coordinated communication.From call-
ing press conferences on the Capitol steps with many members of the
party participating, to lining up special orders speeches on a common
theme, to orchestrating deliberate obstructionist tactics, party mem-

bers in Congress have found ways to cooperate with each other to at-
tract media coverage that helps them accomplish their goals.
But the party caucuses, particularly in the House, have tried to
extend their influence even further by institutionalizing their com-
munications apparatus. In the House, the Democratic Policy Com-
mittee, under the auspices of the Democratic leader, defines the cau-
cus’s message and attempts to disseminate it.19 For the House
Republicans, this falls under the duties of the chairman of the Re-
publican Conference, with considerable input from the other
Republican leaders. In the Senate, these responsibilities largely fall
on the party leaders, though the policy committees and particularly
the Republican conference chairman have begun to play more of a
communications role. In addition to keeping members informed
about the party’s message, these leaders and groups provide party
members with talking points and themes to emphasize on trips back
to their districts or states during weekends or congressional re-
cessesFO For example, as members headed back home for the
Memorial Day recess in 200 1 , Senate Republican leaders suggested
a “Gas Price Busters Tour” in which members would “travel to gas
stations around their states, highlight the skyrocketing price of
gasoline and make the pitch for the [Bush] administration’s energy
plan”; the leadership provided talking points, a sample press re-
lease, and a sample op-ed on the issueF1
As party leaders in Congress and their rank-and-file members
have found new ways to utilize the media to accomplish their policy
goals, the national party organizations have not been idle. They too
have become more active in communicating their parties’ messages
publicly, and the media have been a centerpiece of this strategy.
In 1993, when Haley Barbour became chairman of the RNC, he
made it clear that his job was not just to raise money, but to be a
spokesperson for the party and its agenda. Evidence of the enhanced
communications role of the chairman can be seen in New York Times
coverage of party chairs. Barbour averaged nearly 31 mentions a
year in the Times during his four years at the helm of the RNC, more
than three times the average yearly coverage of his four predeces-
sors. Barbour also became a frequent guest on news talk shows and
even hosted his own satellite television show.
While Barbour took the lead in making the Republican Party aware
of the importance of a communications strategy, the Democrats have
also recognized the potential of the party chair to be a chief
spokesperson of the party. During most of the 1990s, the Democrats
divided the party chairman’s responsibilities between two people-
one who would manage the day-to-day operations of the party and
fund-raising and another who would be the chief spokesperson. Usu-
ally a behind-the-scenes party activist such as Don Fowler, who
served from 1995 to 1997, was given the first position, while a
media-savvy elected official such as Senator Christopher Dodd
(1995-1997) or Colorado Governor Roy Romer (1997-1 999) took on
the more visible job of party general chairman to deal with the media.
Most recently, the Democrats restored both roles under one title, but
they chose Terry McAuliffe, who appears equally comfortable with
fund-raising and media relations, to fill the position.
In addition to incorporating media relations into the job of party
chairman, the party organizations have taken advantage of the fairly
recent concept of governing as a permanent producing
issue ads to influence congressional and public debate and to gen-
erate public support or opposition to particular policy proposals.
Around Memorial Day weekend in 200 1, the Democratic Congres-
sional Campaign Committee (DCCC) paid for television ads in Cal-
ifornia that blamed President George W. Bush’s energy policy for
the blackouts in C a l i f ~ r n i aThose
. ~ ~ ads were followed up by radio
ads paid for by the DCCC and the DNC that ran in Republican dis-
tricts around the country and suggested Bush’s plan would do noth-
ing to help families who faced the possibility of canceling summer
vacations because of the high price of gasolineF4
The parties and their related organizations have also experimented
with new media, including satellite television and the Internet, to
communicate their message and to coordinate their members. During
Haley Barbour’s tenure as chairman, the Republican National Com-
mittee had a weekly television program called The Rising Tide. In ap-
pearance, it followed the format of a combination news/talk show,
with reports on current events in Washington, D.C., and a segment
hosted by the party chair that included commentary. The stories were
done from a Republican perspective, relying primarily on Republican
sources. The reports on the program and additional stories put
together by the show’s staff were made available via satellite to local
television stations around the country.
More recently, the parties have paid more attention to the Inter-
net as a way to communicate their message to the public and to
party members. Both the RNC and DNC have websites that include
links to the party platforms, information about issues in the news,
contact information for national and state party organizations, and a
way to register to receive e-mail updates from the parties. Recog-
nizing that the Internet is an important medium for young people,
the Young Republicans and the Young Democrats ,extensions of the
national parties, have their own websites with information about lo-
cal chapters of these organizations and other party res0urces.2~
While the party organization websites are primarily designed to
connect the public to the party, the congressional party websites try
to equip congressional members to carry the party7smessage to the
public and to the media. The Senate Republican Conference and the
House Democratic leader have websites that include a focus or
message of the week, and the House Republican Conference web-
site includes an issue focus complete with fact sheets (some local-
ized for different states), talking points, current news on the issue,
and speeches others have made on the issue.
PARTIES IN THE NEWS MEDIA
To this point, the chapter has focused on how parties have used the
media to reassert themselves in the political system. But this is not
just a story of the parties figuring out the media. The way the news
media cover politics, particularly in this age of 24-hour news chan-
nels and televised political punditry, has helped to reinvigorate the
parties. Often when we think of parties and the media, the discus-
sion devolves into whether there is a partisan bias in the press. Al-
though there may never be agreement or conclusive evidence that
the political preferences of reporters , editors, or publishers and
owners create a consistent political bias in political coverage, there
is a clear trend (bias?) across all news media from CNN (derisively
labeled the Clinton News Network by conservatives for its alleged
liberal leanings) to FOX News (“fair and balanced,” but in a con-

servative sort of way?). All of them “exalt contr~versy.”~~
Since the 1970s, journalists have engaged in a brand of reporting
that has alternately been called adversarial, critical, or attack journal-
ism. Rather than simply reporting what political elites say and do,
journalists have questioned public officials and their motives, looked
for opportunities to catch them in wrongdoing, and highlighted con-
flicts among them. According to Patters~n?~ journalists have been
careful to avoid appearing partisan by having the criticisms and attacks
on politicians come from their political adversaries.And this is where
the parties have benefited. Democrats are the natural adversaries of
Republicans. “The media look to the two political parties as the
‘teams’ that are competing in the game of national politics . . . [and
present] every situation as Republicans versus the Democrats. . . .
Thus, from the public’s point of view, the parties still play a meaning-
ful role in structuring policy debates.”**
In addition to seeking out conflict, the media have added more in-
terpretation to their reporting and pr0gramming.2~Newspapers now
include “news analysis” stories, and network and cable television sta-
tions now have panels of experts and pundits to discuss the top stories
on their newscasts and political talk shows. Often these formats pair
supporters of each party to discuss (or yell about) current issues. Party
chairs frequently appear opposite each other, as do media-friendly
members of Congress from opposing parties. Presumably, the pres-
ence of a representative from each party insures balance. Although this
tends to oversimplify issues, and may ignore intra-party divisions and
bipartisanship, it does enhance the perception that the parties are cen-
tral in policy debates. Furthermore, as the national party organizations
and the party caucuses in Congress work more closely to create their
messages, their members are able to use the new media formats to
publicize the parties’ agendas and positions on issues.
Finally, the media coverage of parties has helped the parties ex-
tend their influence beyond what their resources would otherwise
allow, particularly in campaigns. Media coverage of political ad-
vertising during campaigns has increased in the last two decades?O
Therefore, when party organizations launch an ad campaign,
whether it is issue advocacy to prop up their candidates during an
152 C. Danielle Wnson
election or, in a nonelection year, an attempt to influence policy de-

bate, they can target the ads to a few major media markets, confi-
dent that the news media will cover the ads and broaden the reach
to the rest of the country. In the 2000 presidential campaign, both
parties paid for advertising in a handful of battleground states, but
thanks to ad watches meant to evaluate the ads, people all over the
country saw the ads replayed on news shows or described in detail
in their local newspapers, thus extending the parties’ reach.
News coverage of the parties, though giving them more visibility
and a way to disseminate their message, may not be all good news
for the parties. Because the parties have become the de facto repre-
sentatives of political conflict for journalists, they may be blamed
for what the public perceives to be wrong with the system. People
often associate terms such as “partisan bickering” and “gridlock”
with the parties. Thus, while the parties have used the media to re-
assert themselves in the political system, and while media coverage
has made the parties more visible in public debate, the image the
public has of the parties may not necessarily be favorable.
Furthermore, media coverage of minor parties is virtually nonex-
istent. Coverage of the parties in the New York rimes reveals this
marginalization. It is not uncommon for the Democratic and Re-
publican parties each to be mentioned prominently (in the headline
or first paragraph) in more than 400 stories a year in the Times. In
contrast, between 1995 and 2000, the Reform Party drew prominent
attention in more than 100 stories in only three years-only once in
a nonelection year, during Reform Party Governor Jesse Ventura’s
first year in office. The Green Party received this extensive cover-
age only in 2000, when well-known government watchdog Ralph
Nader ran as the party’s nominee for president. In the other years,
these parties gained prominent notice in fewer than 30 stories, and
the Libertarian Party was never mentioned prominently in more
than 12 stories during a year. Unless a third party has a high-profile
candidate or elected official who can command media attention on
his own-such as Ross Perot, who had money to buy his own ad-
vertising and make himself a credible candidate, and Ventura, a for-
mer wrestler, and Nader-the party is unlikely to gain notice and be
taken seriously by the media as a player in policy debate.
CONCLUSION
Not long ago, there were whispers that the parties were in danger of
becoming irrelevant in American politics, in part because the media
had become a more important intermediary.However, we have seen
in this chapter that the parties have redefined their place in the po-
litical system by taking advantage of opportunities the media afford.
Issue advocacy has been an effective tool for parties to aid their can-
didates during political campaigns and to frame policy debates be-
yond the context of elections. Better media relations and coordi-
nated communication among party members both within Congress
and in the national party organizations have allowed the parties to
capitalize on the media’s willingness to discuss policy in the context
of party conflict.
But even as the parties have used the media to reassert their po-
litical importance, several questions about the relationship between
American parties and the media exist. The first of these relates to re-
cent political developments and their consequences. At the time of
this writing, it appears that some form of campaign finance reform
limiting soft money contributions and the use of issue advocacy
during an election will be passed by Congress and signed into law.
How this will affect the parties’ communications role depends on
two things: first, how successful the parties and potential contribu-
tors are in adapting to the new fund-raising requirements, and sec-
ond, whether or not the courts decide that restrictions on issue ad-
vocacy are constitutional. It seems likely that parties will continue
to find ways to raise large amounts of money, but restrictions on
election-year issue advocacy may force the parties to do more issue
ads outside the campaign window or find other forms of media than
broadcast advertising to communicate their messages.
In addition to the questions raised by coming political develop-
ments, there is a lack of knowledge about the effects of party com-
munications on the public or political officials. Do issue ads influ-
ence debate, and does coordinated communication of the party
message in Congress affect public opinion or policy outcomes?
There is also little research on how the media cover parties-not in
the sense of political bias that favors one party over another, but in
the sense of what the public learns about parties from the media and
what kind of perceptions coverage creates about the parties and
their role in the political system. Answers to these questions await
further scholarly research, which should bring us a better under-
standing of how political parties influence political communication,
political processes, and policy outcomes in the end.
1. How has the media enabled parties to reassert themselves as

important participants in the political system?
2. How can party advertisements in campaigns benefit a party’s
candidates? How might party ads create problems for candi-
dates? Without coordinating with their candidates, what can
parties do to ensure their ads help rather than hurt their own
candidates?
3. In congressional and presidential campaigns, what are the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of party ads focusing on national
issues or themes rather than local concerns?
4. What challenges do parties and their leaders face in commu-
nicating through the media? How have party leaders in Con-
gress attempted to overcome these challenges?
5. How have parties used new media such as the Internet? How
might these new tools be effective ways to enhance the role of
parties in the political system?
6. How does the media cover political parties? What do we learn
about parties from the media and what kind of perceptions
about parties might coverage create?
Harris, Douglas B., “The Rise of the Public Speakership,” Political Sci-
ence Quarterly 113 (Summer 1998): 193-213.
Lipinski, Daniel, “The Outside Game: Communication as a Party Strat-
egy in Congress,” in Communication and US.Elections: New Agen-
das, ed. Roderick Hart and Daron Shaw (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001).
Magleby, David B .,ed ., Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy
in the 1998 Congressional Elections (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Little-
field, 2000).
, The Other Campaign: SoftMoney and Issue Advocacy in the 2000
Congressional Elections (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
National Democratic Committee Website. www.democrats.org .
National Republican Committee Website. www.rnc.org.
NOTES
1. Paul S. Herrnson, “The Congressional Elections,” in The Election

of2000,ed. Gerald M. Pomper (New York: Chatham House, 2001), 167.
2. James Bennet, “The Ad: New GOP Drive, New Finance Debate,”
New York Emes, 31 May 1996,A20.
3. David B . Magleby, Election Advocacy: Soft Money and Issue Ad-
vocacy in the 2000 Elections (Provo, Utah: Center for the Study of Elec-
tions and Democracy, Brigham Young University, 2001), 30.
4. Bill Moore and Danielle Vinson, “The 1998 South Carolina Senate
Race,” in Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998
Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby (Lanham, Md.: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2000), 100.
5. Eric Freedman and Sue Carter, “The 2000 Michigan Eighth Con-
gressional District Race,” in Election Advocacy, ed. Magleby, 195-97.
6. Moore and Vinson, “1998 South Carolina Senate Race,” 99-100.
7. Karen Foerstel, “Parties, Interest Groups Pour Money into Issue
Ads,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (3 1 October 1998): 2948.
8. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Everything You Think You Know about
Politics . . . And Why You’re Wrong (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 15.
9. Michael W. Traugott, “The 2000 Michigan Senate Race,” in Elec-
tion Advocacy, ed. Magleby.
10. Clyde Wilcox, The Latest American Revolution? The 1994 Elec-
tions and Their Implications for Governance (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1995), 2.
11. Neither presidential candidate in 2000 seemed particularly eager to
hitch his campaign to the congressional contests, and in many cases, con-
gressional candidates were happy to keep their distance from the presidential
candidates. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, The Pei$ect Ee: The
True Story of the 2000 Presidential Election (Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Lit-
tlefield,200 1).
12. Peter Marks, “The 2000 Campaign: The Ad Campaign,” New York
Times, 17 October 2000, A l .
13. Marks, “The 2000 Campaign.”
14. Ceaser and Busch, The Pei$ect Tie, 224-26.
15. Douglas B. Harris, “Going Public and Staying Private: House Party
Leaders’ Use of Media Strategies of Legislative Coalition Building” (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion, Chicago, Illinois, 2000).
16. Patrick J. Sellers, “Leaders and Followers in the U.S. Senate” (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999).
17. C. Danielle Vinson, “Going Public Congressional Style: When
Congress Appropriates a Presidential Strategy” (paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta,
Georgia, 1999).
18. Sellers, “Leaders and Followers.”
19. Daniel Lipinski, “The Outside Game: Communication as a Party
Strategy in Congress,” in Roderick Hart and Daron Shaw, Communica-
tion and US.Elections: New Agendas (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Little-
field, 200 1).
20. Lipinski, “The Outside Game.”
21. A1 Kamen, “In the Loop: The Sore Corps,” Washington Post, 16
May 2001.
22. Timothy E. Cook, Governing with the News: The News Media as a
Political Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
23. Mike Allen, “Democrats Turn Energy on Bush,” Washington Post,
20 May 200 1, A9.
24. Howard Kurtz, “Daschle on Jeffords’s Switch: It’s the Demo-
graphics,” Washington Post, 27 May 2001, A4.
25. For examples of party and leadership websites, see www.mc.org;
www.dnc.org; www.youngrepublicans.com; www.yrock.com; www.yda.org;
www.gop .gov; and www.house.gov/democrats/welcome.html.
26. Thomas E. Patterson, “Bad News, Period,” PS: Political Science &
Politics 29 (March 1996): 17-21.
27. Patterson, “Bad News, Period.”
28. L. Sandy Maisel, “Political Parties in a Nonparty Era: Adapting to
a New Role,” in Parties and Politics in American History, ed. L. Sandy
Maisel and William G. Shade (New York: Garland, 1994), 275.
29. Darrell M. West, The Rise and Fall of the Media Establishment
(Boston: Bedfordst. Martin’s Press, 2001).
30. Darrell M. West, Air Wars: TelevisionAdvertising in Election Cam-
paigns 1952-1 996,2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
1997).
Presidential Elections and the Media
Mary Stuckey
Research and commentary on the influence of the media in presiden-

tial elections has become a minor cottage industry.’ The consensus of
opinion is both clear and consistent: the media are responsible for the
weakening of the national political parties and a concomitant increase
in the influence of journalists over that of professional politicians.2
The media thus have contributed to the shallowness of political dis-
course, undue attention to “image” over “substance,” and an impover-
ishment of our national politics generally. Like the asteroid in Deep
Impact or the aliens in Independence Day, in short, the media are
looming “out there,” plotting the destruction of civilization as we
know it. Their window of opportunity for the accomplishment of this
destruction occurs with regularity, every four years. And with regular-
ity, every four years, scholars and pundits appear- usually on national
media-warning us that the sky is falling and that the polity cannot
long sustain the potential damage. Miraculously, however, we manage
to survive yet another election cycle, and although our politics are ever
more wounded, still we struggle on.
This is, of course, hyperbole. But it is not altogether inaccurate,even
so. Public discourse about the media tends toward the apocalyptic,and
the media are convenient scapegoats for the myriad ills that are thought
to assail us. Often, academics are little better, and often bring judgment
as well as analysis to the study of media influence in elections. There
are three main areas of research on media influence in presidential
159
160 Mary Stuckey
campaigns: studies that focus on the structural aspects of campaigns

and the media’s influences on those structures; those that focus on the
relative power of the media; and examinations of the content of cam-
paign communication. In general, they are pessimistic, and, in my
view, are all based on common misperceptions about political com-
munication in general and campaign communication in particular?
The most important of these misperceptions are: that when it
comes to campaigns, the media matter more than anything else; that
there was a golden age of political communication, and that we
have fallen from grace; that television is both different and separate
from culture; and finally, that voters are passive and imprisoned vic-
tims of television. All of these perceptions have a grain of truth in
them; this chapter is by no means a defense of the media. It is, how-
ever, an effort to put the media coverage of campaigns into a larger
context. Consequently, I will discuss some of the trends of mediated
campaigns, question the general understanding of how the media
operate with reference to a broader context, look with particular at-
tention at the last presidential election, and reflect on whether the
events of the last election alter these trends and this understanding
in significant ways.
COVERING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
The media in the United States are businesses, and follow the dic-
tates of business practice: These dictates mean that the media will
perform in predictable ways, and will follow routines of news-
gathering, production, and presentation. Successful campaigns are
generally those that understand and use these routines, and that
derive themes ‘that resonate through them. These processes are not
neutral; they are widely considered to have clear, and often delete-
rious, effects on campaigns and on politics in general?
Campaigns are important elements of media political coverage.
During an election year, campaign news comprises between 13 per-
cent (newspapers) and 15 percent (television) of news stories: and
the content and style of such stories is remarkably uniform? Such
uniformity is the product of routines and incentives that demand ex-
Presidential Elections and the Media 161
citing, dramatic events; change within a thematic context; and sto-

ries that can be presented in a “balanced’ and “objective” manner.
Thus, coverage of complicated issues and events will be reduced to
an easily dramatized conflict between personalities, and “both
sides” given equal time and roughly equal coverage.
Candidates, of course, play to these routines, and coverage is a ma-
jor (if not the major) consideration of the contemporary campaign.
Nearly everything a candidate does is geared toward the media, espe-
cially television! Not only have mediated events, such as the now
obligatory appearance on Larry King, various other talk shows, and
televised “town hall meetings” become campaign standards, but
nearly all personal appearances are orchestrated with television in
mind. “Media events” are campaign staples, and a failure to respect
deadlines, the need for interesting video, and the demand for fresh
news is certain to relegate a campaign to the status of “also-ran.”
It is also problematic, however, for a campaign to engage in too
much “news management.” Events that are seen as too orchestrated,
too contrived, too “unrealistic” do not receive much air time. The po-
litical conventions are prime examples of this. When policy was actu-
ally made on convention floors, when controversy was possible, the
conventions received “gavel-to-gavel” coverage. But the more the par-
ties tried to control conventions, to present precise, clearly defined,
and contrived images to the public through the media, the less cover-
age they received. Now, with the onset of cable as competition, the
networks simply cannot afford to risk losing the audience; they pro-
vide coverage of key speeches and summaries of events, and leave the
bulk of convention coverage to cable channels such as C-SPAN.
The relationship between the media and political candidates has
become so intertwined that veteran political journalist Robert Shogan
asserts that the media “have been reduced to filling the role of en-
ablers without fully realizing it or intending it, they allow and some-
times abet the abuse of the political process by the candidates and
their handler^."^ According to Shogan, the media need the candidates,
the candidates need the media, and the political process is damaged
by the relationship that therefore develops between them. This per-
spective, of course, rests on a somewhat rarefied notion of what the
political process requires for its integrity and proper functioning.
162 Mary Stuckey
The need for candidates to court the media is directly related to the
phenomenon most often associated with the rise of the media-
specifically television- the weakening of political parties. The me-
dia have, in many ways, replaced the parties as sources of political
information, as providers of political ideology, and as winnowers of
candidates.1° Through both news and entertainment fora, the media
are powerful sources of what issues are on the national agenda, and
how those issues will be understood and framed. While this research
overwhelmingly indicates that the media are important as sources of
what the public will think about, there is also good evidence that they
have little influence over specific positions on those issues. That is,
the media tell us what to think about, but not what to think."
This can, however, be taken too far. Voters rely on many sources
for their political information, including peers and family,12 and
process mediated information in a variety of ways, all of which
lessen the media's ability to force an agenda on an unwilling pub-
lic.13 In addition, political parties remain the best predictor of the
national vote, and of an individual voter's political preferences. Par-
ties in the U.S. have always been weak, and the fact that they are
further weakened may or may not be disastrous. Finally, the weak-
ness of political parties is not solely the fault of the media; structural
developments, such as the reforms of the McGovern-Fraser Com-
mission in 1968, and the consequent initiation of primaries, have
had much to do with weakening the parties. It remains true, how-
ever, that in the absence of strong and popular parties, the media
presently fill a void.
But they do not fill this void particularly well. As Tom Patterson
insightfully notes:
The proper organization of electoral opinion requires an institution
with certain characteristics. It must be capable of seeing the larger
picture-of looking at the world as a whole and not in small pieces.
It must have incentives that cause it to identify and organize those
interests that are making demands for policy representation. And it
must be accountable for its choices, so that the public can reward it
when satisfied and force amendments when dissatisfied. The press
has none of these characteristics. The media has its special strengths,
but they do not include these strength^.'^
The weakening of the political parties as organizing entities has con-

tributed to the rise of candidate-centered campaigns.15 Candidate-
centered campaigns have contributed to the fragmentation and lack of
coherence that characterizesour national politics, and that makes those
politics more difficult for citizens to assimilate and understand. The
more confusing politics becomes, the more necessary are the media as
interpreters. The cycle, once established, becomes self-reinforcing.
The media, especially cable and most especially the Internet, are
also viewed as furthering the fragmentation of our national politi-
cal life. The idea here is that there is-or once was-a common
culture, and that cable and the Internet allow smaller, more frac-
tured groups to participate in smaller, more narrow cultures. Con-
sequently, the media further the interest-group politics that are seen
as increasingly dividing and not unifying the diverse groups that
comprise the national polity.16 Cable and the Internet are seen on
the one hand as potentially enabling democracy17 and on the other
as contributing to its demise as a viable form of political organiza-
tion.’* What we know about how the Internet and other forms of
new media will affect our politics is that we don’t yet know how
the Internet will affect our politics.
In terms of the more traditional media, given the absence of
strong partisan leaders, journalists and pundits have become the
voice of political authority. Where the Sunday morning talk shows
and other venues dedicated to political chat used to be devoted
solely to interviews and discussions with political actors, they now
also include analysis by journalists. Commentators often interview
one another in the effort to derive political understanding. Whereas
the point used to be exclusively to cover political events, there is
increasing concern over journalists’ tendency to become part of
those events .19 This self-referential tendency, disturbing in all po-
litical contexts, is particularly important in campaigns, in which
voter information tends to be low (especially in the early stages),
and in which such commentary can have correspondingly greater
effects. Take, for instance, the example of Bill Clinton, in 1992 the
undeclared winner of what political consultant turned commenta-
tor Paul Begala dubbed the “pundit primary.”20Clinton benefited
in numerous ways from the media’s attention, not least of which
164 Mary Stuckey
was an increase in his ability to raise money, accompanied by a

drop in the fund-raising potential of his rivals.
Punditry is an increasingly visible element of the coverage of na-
tional campaigns, as once and future aides to officials and candidates
take to the airwaves in what are supposed to be “objective” roles as
analysts rather than producers of policy. Often, as in the case of
George Stephanopolous, their role is to provide “inside” knowledge
of the workings of the White House or the campaign. They fill air
space-often considerable amounts of air space-but it is question-
able whether they fill that space with politically meaningful infor-
mation?l This assertion, of course, rests on the notion that only pol-
icy information is politically relevant, that gossip and process
information are somehow less worthy than the “real” information we
fondly suppose was once the province of political parties.
The media fill more than an informational void, however; as the
Clinton example indicates, the media also have supplanted the po-
litical parties as winnowers and kingmakers. Surely, the campaign
coverage of “media darlings” like George W. Bush, Jimmy Carter,
and Colin Powell would not have been likely in a context dominated
by parties rather than journalists. Coverage of candidates like Joe
Biden and Gary Hart has also contributed to this process by remov-
ing candidates from contention, often before primary voters are
given an opportunity to express their preferences.
This phenomenon is most apparent in “frontloading,” or dispro-
portionate coverage given to early primariesF2 As of June 1999,for
instance, the electorally meaningless straw polls in Iowa were
touted as the first salvo in the campaign wars, and their impact on
the Elizabeth Dole and Pat Buchanan campaigns were thought to be
all but definitive. For such a conclusion to be widely aired long be-
fore the election, and long before the majority of voters are even
willing to begin thinking about starting to pay attention, would be
laughable if it didn’t have such clear consequences.
Important among these consequences is the tendency to search
for small inconsistencies, which are then used to discredit a candi-
date in what is conventionally termed “gotcha journalism.” This
“need” to find flaws rather than focus on basic reporting of facts
tends more often to eliminate potentially viable candidates than to
uncover real malfeasance F3
A major instrument of such kingmaking/winnowingis the cover-

age of polling. Most often associated with “horse race” coverage,
polls tend to become benchmarks for campaigns; position in the
polls is the definitive marker of the success or failure of a campaign.
Certainly, they affected Elizabeth Dole’s ability to garner funds and
attention in the 2000 preprimary season. The effects of polls are not
limited to the fates of particular candidates, but have policy impli-
cations as well. Negative coverage of George Bush’s ability to “get
it,” surely had an effect on the election of 1992, as did coverage of
the ineptness of the Carter administration in 1980.
Polls, as Kathleen Frankovic says, “not only sample public opin-
ion, they define it.”24While polls have long been an integral part of
political coverage, they are now more necessary to the media than
ever and are thought to create rather than merely to define
or report public opinion. Polls increase the attention reporters give
the horse race, and determine the nature and extent of candidate
coverage. According to this view, polls deepen the debasement of
political processes?’Yet polls also underline the importance of pub-
lic opinion, and in so doing, may actually increase voter interest and
involvement in ~ampaigns.2~ The cumulative effects of polls thus
remain ambiguous.
Despite the fact-or because of it-that election 2000 was “too
close to call” for weeks before the actual election, the polls became
the story of the campaign, as “Americans were polled, polled, and re-
polled. And the media reported what were often two- and three-point
statistically insignificant leads faithfully.”28Because these polls car-
ried no “news,” they contributed nothing but tension and drama to the
campaign-but tension and drama make for “good” stories, and so
the polls were covered incessantly.Certainly, the influence of polls on
election night 2000 created enormous difficulties, both for the candi-
dates and for the political ~ystem.2~ We are so dependent upon the na-
tional media for our political information, the argument goes, and are
generally so ignorant of how to interpret that information, that greater
care in the use of polls is certainly called for.
Largely as a result of polling, but also because of the visual na-
ture of television, modem campaigning is sometimes blamed for the
further debasement of political discourse?O Despite the evidence
that most presidential candidates make policy-oriented promises
166 Mary Stuckey
and, if elected, try to keep those promises,3’ scholars and pundits in-
sist on the hollowness of candidate appeals, the shallowness of can-
didates themselves, and the emptiness of political discourse?2 Cer-
tainly, the tendency to cover events such as debates as if they are
about performance rather than policy-focusing on sighs or stam-
mers, shrugs or smirks33-while perhaps revealing something of
candidate character, can hardly be said to contribute to public un-
derstanding of policy.
But some elections- 1988 is a notable example-are simply
empty of meaningful issue discussion, and the media cannot cover
what is not there to begin with. Other elections -and 2000 is a good
example-are notable for the amount of policy that is discussed.
The 2000 election had enormous amounts of issue content, and was
neither reducible to jokes about “lock boxes,” nor was it so reduced
by the media. If there i s substantive issue discussion, the media do
cover it; they may do so in fragmented, personalized, and poten-
tially trivializing ways, but it is also true that politics has always
been full of the fragmented, the personal, and the trivial.
Nonetheless, the very fact of the media is considered to have an
impact on the ways in which political communication is structured
and pre~ented?~ an impact that is not necessarily positive, if one
wants a rational, well-informed electorate who are interested in
issue-based information as a basis for making knowledgeable deci-
s i o n ~ ?Held
~ up to anything approaching that standard, American
election communication is woefully lacking. The question is
whether or not that is either an appropriate or a realistic standard for
political practice.
CAMPAIGNS IN CONTEXT
The crucial point made by critics of the media’s roles in national

elections is that media influence matters more than anything else as
a determinant of the vote. There is considerable evidence that this is
not the case. In his analysis of the 1980 campaign, for instance, for-
mer speechwriter and now journalist Jeff Greenfield details the
shattering of various myths about election coverage. He concludes
that “television and the media made almost no difference in the out-
come of the 1980 presidential campaign. The victory of Ronald
Reagan was a political victory, a party victory, and victory of more
coherent-not necessarily correct, but more coherent-ideas, better
expressed, more connected with the reality of their lives, as Ameri-
cans saw it, than those of Reagan’s principal opponent, a victory
vastly aided by a better-funded, better-organized, more confident
and united party.”36In Greenfield’s view, while the campaign was
transmitted through the media, the campaign, not its mediation, de-
termined the winner and loser.
Yet the idea of media dominance is still very much with us, and
still hampers our understanding of elections. No campaign can suc-
ceed without the media, just as no campaign can succeed without
organization, money, some semblance of issue positions, and a host
of other factors. But the media are not the sole determinant of cam-
paign success. They may not even be the primary determinant. That
we often talk as if they are is a tribute to the self-referential nature
of election coverage, which tends to place media in the center of
campaigns, not to the actual processes of campaigns and elections.
Voters, for instance, have myriad and important resources. Selec-
tive exposure affects how voters get information, and selective per-
ception helps to determine how that information will be
processed.37 Predispositions, the opinions of peers, social status,
race, gender, and other demographic considerations are significant
indicators of how mediated information will be received ?* Voter in-
difference to media may also be an important filter; there is consid-
erable evidence that voters do not agree with what the media con-
sider important issues, the ClintonLewinsky scandal being the most
obvious recent example.
In at least one area, the voters are influenced by the media with-
out agreeing with them. If nothing else, we know that voters do not
like negative campaigning, but that it w0rks.3~Negative campaign-
ing not only separates voters from the opposition, however; it may
also separate voters from the political process, and may be related
to the increase in voter disenchantment with the electoral process.40
The assumption that the media have contributed to the demise of
substantive political communication in campaign contexts is based,
168 Mary Stuckey
however implicitly, on the notion that there was a golden age of po-
litical communication, and that political discourse has since been on
a long, downhill slide. This tendency is most notable in Roderick
Hart’s work, in which he urges citizens to “just say ‘No”’ to televi-
sion,l” but it is a prominent strain throughout media research.“2The
problem is that, in its simplest form, the assumption is simply not
accurate. Not only is it difficult to make clear distinctions between
“symbol” and “substance ,” but campaign communication has al-
ways relied on image, and has often been trivial, prurient, and
downright shallow. There was, for instance, little substance in
torchlight parades, campaigns based on whiskey jugs in the shape
of log cabins, or in slogans such as “Tippecanoe and Tyler too.”
Negative campaigning is also not a recent phenomenon. While it
is often argued that negative politics are either a relatively new de-
velopmenp3 or are at least a qualitatively different one,4 there is
considerable evidence that “going negative” has been around for
some time, and that the practice has long involved personalization,
distortion, and misinterpretation of issues. In 1864, for example, a
variety of racist themes were conflated into accusations that Re-
publicans advocated miscegenation, which would “be of infinite
service to the Irish.” Democrats labeled Abraham Lincoln “the wid-
owmaker,” and referred to him as “Abraham Africanus the First,”
implying that he was “tainted” with “negro blood.”45 Next to this,
the claims concerning Grover Cleveland’s illegitimate child, not to
mention Jimmy Carter’s alleged “meanness ,” seem trivial.
Furthermore, the assumption that television has demeaned and
trivialized politics erroneously treats television as unprecedented in
popular culture history. Historically, the dominant media (from
books to vaudeville to movies to television and computer games)
have always been blamed for the deterioration of popular culture.“6
It is probably more sensible to understand television’s place in pop-
ular culture in more restrained terms. The media alone are neither
panaceas for our political ills nor the causes of them.
Blaming the media is also tantamount to arguing that voters are
somehow dupes, incapable of recognizing the efforts to manipulate
them that are so obvious to scholars and to media critics. This argu-
ment gives us the image of voters trapped in “news prison,”47unable
to break free (or able to do so only with great difficulty) of the ideo-
logical and informational chains with which the media bind them. As
media critic Bonnie Dow notes in a different context,
[Vliewers are likely to interpret television according to the dominant

codes available to them as members of American society and as con-
sumers of American media. This perspective assumes that viewers out-
side the white, middle-class,heterosexual “mainstream”to whom tele-
vision always presumes it is speaking still understand the “rules” for
preferred readings, even as they might work to deconstruct themP8
Voters, in other words, may know little about American politics,

about the prevailing issues, or about the processes of campaigns.
But they are very smart about what makes “good” television, and
are capable of interpreting it in terms of what makes “good” poli-
tics. That voter turnout continues to decline is, at least potentially,
evidence that voters are also capable of discerning the difference.
They may watch so-called “trash television,” and they may vote for
empty candidates, but it is at least possible that in doing so they are
responding to the trivialization of politics by politicians and those
who cover them, not failing to recognize that politics is, to many of
them, trivial. What does not matter may as well be entertaining.
This is not to deny that the media have important effects on cam-
paigns. It is to argue that we need to be more careful about analyz-
ing the nature of those effects. It is likely, for instance, that, as
Greenfield argues, the content and nature of media coverage con-
tribute to voter a ~ a t h y . 4The
~ reluctance of pundits to believe what
candidates say, their pervasive (if entirely reasonable) cynicism,
their unwillingness to attribute to political action motives that tran-
scend the purely opportunistic, and their fascination with the
“game” elements of politics strip, in Greenfield’s words, the voters
of reasons to care about election outcomes.
In times of stronger partisanship, voters could determine the stakes
of an election through the simple referent of party identification.
Lacking that now, it falls to the media to explain the actual differences
among and between candidates, and the implications that those dif-
ferences hold for individual voters. It is this that media singularly fail
170 Mary Stuckq
to do, focusing instead on style, on political tactics and strategy,

and-to the extent that issues are covered-on issues as a reflection
of that style and/or those strategies and tactics.
REFLECTIONS ON CAMPAIGN 2000
Out of the myriad possibilities for analysis that stem from the most
recent presidential election, two things from campaign 2000 are
particularly relevant to this discussion: Ralph Nader’s campaign
and its attacks on the political parties and the coverage of election
night. Nader’s third party challenge to the major parties was
premised on the notion that the prevailing processes of campaign-
ing are corrupt, mostly because of the infusion of money into poli-
tics, but also because of the media that money can be used to
The coverage of Nader’s campaign focused, predictably enough, on
the affect it would have on the Bush and Gore campaign^;^' on the
novelty of the challenge;52 and on the personalities of those in-
v01ved.~~ Thus, this coverage was pretty much what we would ex-
pect, emphasizing the horse race, personalizing issues, and con-
tributing to the sense of electoral politics as trivial.
Equally predictable, the coverage of the 2000 elections revealed
many of the problems with media coverage of campaigns. Through-
out the campaign, there were the usual charges of shallow coverage
that trivialized the campaign and biased reporting that skewed voter
perception^.^^ These perennial problems, however, paled in com-
parison to the election night fiasco.
During election night, described by journalist Terence Smith as
“a nightmare,”55 news anchors and commentators became increas-
ingly confused and incoherent amid the various projections, retrac-
tions, and apologies ?6 Television news has rarely looked worse than
it did that night. As Marvin Kalb noted, “Television news, like all
of contemporary journalism, is supposed to cover the news fairly
and accurately. It is not supposed to be the news or make the
Yet that is exactly what happened.
The network news predictions for the pivotal state of Florida,
based on a combination of statistical machinations and exit polling,
proved to be considerably more accurate in terms of voter intention

than in terms of voter behavior, as problems with ballots led nu-
merous Gore supporters to vote for Pat Buchanan instead. The situ-
ation was further complicated by some bad data and misjudgments
about how that data should be In essence, each net-
work wanted to be first to call Florida and thus the election, and sac-
rificed accuracy for immedia~y.5~
Analyst Robert Kuttner had this to say about the media perfor-
mance on election day:
I don’t just mean miscalling Florida twice. The aftermath was

even worse. The networks and most print analysts convinced
themselves that A1 Gore had lost, that he was a sore loser, that the
public was panicking, that a perilous interregnum was at hand,
that court involvement would mean a constitutional crisis, and
that an instant resolution was necessary for the good of the Re-
public. But each of those conceits was proven overheated and
wrong. . . . The voters turn out to be more mature than the media.
. . . Far from panicking, the voters are getting a fascinating civics
lesson. Anyone who thinks this is just O.J. all over again is a vid-
iot, so media-besotted as to be unable to distinguish spectacle
from substance.m
Perhaps only the American media can by comparison render the

American voter a model of democratic virtue.
No media analyst, of course, could have foreseen the legal com-
plications that after five tortuous weeks finally dragged the election
into the United States Supreme Court. There is also little chance
that the coverage of the events of those five weeks affected the re-
sults in any significant way.6l But the on-air chaos did much to un-
dermine the credibility of the national media, and will doubtless
lead to reforms and changes in the processes of media coverage of
national elections .62
What cannot be changed, however, is the pressure, exacerbated
by the Internet, to be first with the n e ~ s . What
6 ~ will not be changed
are the organizational and structural factors and incentives that
cause news to be produced as it is currently produced. Looking into
the future, things are likely to continue very much the same.
172 Mary Stuckey
INTO THE FUTURE
In general, we can expect that the media will continue to act in ways
that insure audiences, ratings, and profits. When the audience for
PBS’s highly regarded NewsHour exceeds that of the Jerry Springer
Show, and when viewers demand issue-laden content, political can-
didates will respond with that sort of information. Until then, we
can expect dramatization, personalization, an emphasis on the horse
race, and an overall trivialization of electoral processes.
In the aftermath of 9- 11, the next election will be a difficult one in
which to campaign and a difficult one to cover, as themes of patriot-
ism appropriate to a nation at war are uneasy companions to the sorts
of scandal-ridden sensationalized coverage of the horse race that
characterize election news. We cannot expect either the candidates or
the media to find comfortable ways of dealing with this dilemma
quickly. We can, however, expect a plethora of self-referential stories
detailing how these themes and issues are covered; we can also ex-
pect stories on how the media are too powerful, too determinative,
and too likely to focus on all of the wrong things. Much of this cov-
erage can be safely ignored. And, from the evidence of past elec-
tions, voters will indeed ignore most of this coverage.
The media do matter. But they matter within a specific context,
and without due attention to that context, the roles of the media will
not be properly understood. The most important role that the media
occupy is that of winnower, for they have tremendous influence on
the viability of campaigns, especially early in the process. This is
particularly important when one examines the tendency for the me-
dia to equate fund-raising with political success, especially in the
primaries. Despite evidence (John Connally, Michael Huffington)
that campaigns are not bought and that money does not guarantee
success, the media’s equation of fund-raising and political viability
is disturbing. The Enron scandal, however, will give particular po-
tency to this equation, and perhaps impetus to coverage of cam-
paign financing and the issue of campaign finance reform.
The media are also important as agenda setters. The media not only
exercise influence over who will survive the election, but also over
which issues the election will turn. Agenda setting is a complicated
business, however, for the media and the candidates will focus on the
issues that seem to resonate with voters. There is a reciprocity here that
is often overlooked in popular discussions of media influence.
That influence relies on standardization, on what is often referred
to as “pack journalism,” the tendency of all members of the media to
cover the same story in the same way. There is some question as
to whether this standardization is threatened by the growth of the In-
ternet, which is radically decentralized, and which, it is often thought,
will be taking on increasing influence in future campaigns.@
Three things bear noting here: the first is that those who use the
Internet as a source of information seem to avail themselves of elec-
tronic access to mainstream news sources. That is, instead of read-
ing the New York Times or watching NBC, they access the Times’s
web page, and log on to MSNBC. Thus, the sources of news remain
substantially the same, although the means of accessing those
sources are different.
Second, those who use the Internet as a news source seem to be
adding it to their other media. That is, they are not exchanging the
New York Times for news.com; they are adding Internet sources to
the New York Times. This means that those people who are already
information rich, who follow politics consistently, and who are in-
terested in and likely to participate in politics are likely to become
even more aware, have more information and more up-to-the-minute
news. Those who are indifferent to politics, or who are only margin-
ally interested in and involved in political processes, are not likely to
become more involved or interested simply because they have a
computer in their home. To the extent that they use that computer to
access the Internet, it will most likely be to find information on the
things that interest them, not to become more aware of politics.
Finally, there is considerable overlap between the Internet and
“mainstream” news. As Matt Drudge and the tabloids have made
clear, what appears first in an “illegitimate” venue will quickly be
reported in the more “legitimate” news. There is no evidence that
this process will work to improve the coverage of issues above sym-
bols or of “legitimate” versus “illegitimate” or tabloid news.
In sum, the future of campaigns looks very much like the past. Is-
sue information is out there for those who seek it; the candidates
174 Mary Stuckey
will dedicate themselves to mediated campaigns, and there will be

much wailing and gnashing of teeth (especially in the mainstream
media) about the debasement of our politics. There will also be con-
siderable speculation about the effects and impact of new commu-
nication technologies. And the result of this election will be much
like those in the past: fewer people will vote; they will be dispro-
portionately middle-aged, middle-class, white, and educated; and
the media will be blamed for the downward spiral of our politics as
we wait to be rescued by a president or presidential candidate who
can save the world h la Bill Pullman. It will be a long wait.
1. Much of the criticism of the media assumes that political debate

was once “better” than it is now. How do these critics define
“better,” and when was this golden age of political debate?
2 . Why do media scholars insist that mass-mediated argumentation
is bad for democracy?
3. Are voters simply passive receivers of media messages?
4. Why is it important to understand media routines, and to un-
derstand media as a business?
5 . How would elections be different if the media were overtly
partisan rather than objective?
6 . What is the relationship between media strength and the de-
clining importance of political parties?
7. Why are polls so important to the coverage of elections?
Entman, Robert, Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay of

American Politics (New York: Oxford, 1989).
Hart, Roderick P., Seducing America: How Television Charms the Ameri-
can Voter (New York: Oxford, 1995).
Just, Marian, et al., Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates, and Media in a Pres-
idential Election (New York: Greenwood, 1991).
Patterson, Thomas, Out of Order (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

Pfau, Michael, and Henry Kenski, Attack Politics: Strategy and Defense
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1990).
NOTES
I would like to thank John M. Murphy, Greg M. Smith, and Mark Rozell
for comments that substantially improved this chapter. Rasha I. Ramzy
provided important research assistance.
1. A quick search on amazon.com revealed over 14,000 books on the

media; this number of course does not include the plethora of academic
and journalistic articles on the subject.
2. See,for example, Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens: Me-
dia and the Decay ofAmerican Politics (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989); Garret J. O’Keefe, “Political Malaise and Reliance on the Media,”
Journalism Quarterly (1980): 122-28.
3. I would include much of my own work in this category.
4. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press,
2000).
5. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent:
The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 2002);
Robert Waterman McChesney, Corporate Media and the Threat to De-
mocracy (New York: Seven Stars, 1997); Darrell West, The Rise and Fall
of the Media Establishment (New York: St. Martin’s, 2001).
6. Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), 244.
7. Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communi-
cation: Principles and Practices, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1991), 91-92.
8. David Paletz, The Media in American Politics: Contents and Con-
sequences, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001); Martin Plissner, Control
Room: How the Media Calls the Shots in Presidential Elections (New
York: Free Press, 1999).
9. The quotation is from Shogan’s book, Bad News: Where the Press
Goes Wrong (New York: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), as quoted in NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer transcript, August 21,2001.
10. Anthony Broh, “Polls, Pols, and Parties,” Journal of Politics 45
(1983): 7 3 2 4 .
176 Mary Stuckey
11. On agenda setting, see Shanto Iyengar, “Television News and Cit-
izens’ Explanations of National Affairs,” American Political Science Re-
view 81 (1987): 815-31; Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How
Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991). On framing, see Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification
of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43 (1993): 5 1-58;
Doris Graber, “Framing Election News Broadcasts: News Context and Its
Impact on the 1984 Presidential Election,” Social Science Quarterly 68
(1987): 552-68; Henry Kenski, “From Agenda Setting to Priming and
Framing: Reflections on Theory and Method,” in The Theory and Prac-
tice of Political Communication Research, ed. Mary E. Stuckey (Albany,
N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1996), 67-83.
12. Pamela Johnston Conover and S . Feldman, “Candidate Perception
in an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues, and Inference Processes,”
American Journal of Political Science 33 (1989): 912-40; Doris Graber,
Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide (New York:
Longman, 1984); Marion Just, Ann Crigler, Dean Alger, Terence Cook
and Darrell West, Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates, and Media in a Presi-
dential Election (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
13. R. Behr and Shanto Iyengar, “Television News, Real-World Cues,
and Changes in the Public Agenda, Public Opinion Quarterly 49 (1985):
38-57; Diana Owen, Media Messages in American Political Elections
(New York: Greenwood, 1991).
14. Thomas Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1993), 36.
15. Scott Keeter, “The Illusion of Intimacy: Television and the Role of
Candidate Qualities in Voter Choice,” Public Opinion Quarterly 5 1
(1987): 344-58.
16. For examples, see W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman, eds.,
Mediated Politics: Communication and in the Future of Democracy (New
York Cambridge University Press, 2000); Trudy Lieberman, Slanting the
Story: The Forces That Shape the News (New York: New Press, 2000); Nor-
man Miller, Environmental Politics: Interest Groups, the Media, and the
Making ofPolicy (New York: Lewis Publishers, 2001); West, Rise and Fall.
17. Thomas Benson, “Desktop Demos: New Communication Tech-
nologies and the Future of the Rhetorical Presidency,” in Beyond the
Rhetorical Presidency, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 1996); David Brin, “Disputation Arenas: Har-
nessing Conflict and Competitiveness for Society’s Benefit,” Ohio State
Journal on Dispute Resolution 15 (2000): 597-617; Dan Johnson, “Poli-
tics in Cyberspace,” Futurist 33 (1999): 14.
18. See, for example, Hal Berghel, “Digital Politics,” Association for
Computing Machinery 39 (October 1996): 19; Dana Milbank, “Virtual
Politics,” New Republic 221 (July 5 , 1999): 22-27.
19. The most glaring example of this in recent times is Newsweek re-
porter Michael Isikoff’s relationship with Linda Tripp. Michael Isikoff,
Uncovering Clinton: A Reporter’s Story (New York: Crown, 1999),
58-60,168.
20. Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, Mad As Hell: Revolt at the Bal-
lot Box, 1992 (New York: Warner Books, 1993), 103.
21. On punditry in general, see Eric Alterman, Sound and Fury: The
Meaning of Punditocracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Come11 University Press, 2000).
22. David Castle, “Media Coverage of Presidential Primaries,” Ameri-
can Politics Quarterly 19 (1991): 33-42.
23. Marvin Kalb, “The Rise of the ‘New News’: A Case Study of Two
Root Causes of the Modem Scandal Coverage” (discussion paper D-24,
presented at the Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics, and Public Pol-
icy, October 1998);NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, August 21,2002.
24. Kathleen Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling,” in The Politics
of News, The News of Politics, ed. Doris Graber, Daniel McQuail, and
Pippa Norris (Washington,D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 150-70.
25. Frankovic, “Public Opinion,” 156; Owen, Media Messages, 89.
26. Owen, Media Messages.
27. Frankovic ,“Public Opinion ,” 167.
28. Lori Robertson, “Polled Enough for Ya?’ American Journalism
Review (JanuaryFebruary 200 1): 29-33.
29. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, November 8,2000.
30. Frankovic ,“Public Opinion ,” 167.
31. Jefhy Fishel, Pmidents and Pmmises (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quaaerly, 1985).
32. Roderick P. Hart, Seducing America: How Television Charms the
Modem Voter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Roderick P.
Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Mod-
ern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Kathleen Hall
Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Amer-
ican Political Speechmaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
33. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, August 2 1,2001.
34. Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham,
N.J.: Chatham House, 1991).
35. Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age.
36. Jeff Greenfield, The Real Campaign: How the Media Missed the
Story ofthe I980 Campaign (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 15.
178 Mary Stuckey
37. Gina M. Garramone, “Motivation and Selective Attention to Polit-

ical Information Formats,” Journalism Quarterly 62 (1985): 37-44.
38. Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Per-
suasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1991).
39. Michael Pfau and Henry Kenski, Attack Politics: Strategy and De-
fense (New York: Praeger, 1990).
40. Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Trans-
formed American Politics (New York: Free Press, 1991), 26.
41. Hart,Seducing America.
42. Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens: Media and the Decay
of American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Kathleen
Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jamieson, Eloquence in an
Electronic Age; Joshua Meyrowitz, “Visible and Invisible Candidates: A
Case Study in ‘Competing Logics’ of Campaign Coverage ,” Political
Communication 11 (1994): 145-64; William L. Rivers, The Other Gov-
ernment: Power and the Washington Media (New York: Universe, 1982);
Sabato, Feeding Frenzy.
43. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy.
44. Jamieson, Dirty Politics.
45. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 789-90.
46. See, for example, Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,”
Partisan Review 6 (Fall 1939): 34-49.
47. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman,
1988).
48. Bonnie Dow, Prime-Time Femisnism: Television, Media Culture,
and the Womens Movement since 1970 (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1996), 18.
49. Greenfield, Real Campaign, 27.
50. See, for example, Angie Cannon and Roger Simon, “The Making
of a Political Spoiler,” U.S. News and World Report 129 (November 6,
2000): 20; John Colapinto, “Ralph Nader Is Not Sorry,” Rolling Stone 887
(September 13,2001): 64.
5 1. See, for example, Jackie Calmes, “Nader Not Likely to Reach 5%
Threshold,” Wall Street Journal 236 (November 8, 2000): A17; Cannon
and Simon, “Political Spoiler.”
52. See, for example, James Bradley, “Nader, Schmader,” Village Voice
45 (November 7,2000): 28.
53. Most of the coverage was concerned with issues of personality.

See, for example, Geoffrey Leon, “Blame Ego-Politics, Not Eco-Politics,”
New Statesman 130 (July 16,2001): 22; Paul Magnusson, “The Punishing
Price of Nader’s Passion,” Business Week 3708 (November 20,2000): 44;
Godfrey Sperling, “Mystery Men,” Christian Science Monitor 92 (No-
vember 7,2000): 9; Lenora Todaro, “Ralph Nader Lashes Back,” Village
Voice 45 (December 26,2000): 29.
54. Daphne Eviatar, “Murdoch’s Fox News: They Distort, They De-
cide,” Nation, March 12,2001; Alicia C. Shepard, “How They Blew It,”
American Journalism Review 23 (JanuaryFebruary 2001): 20-28; Sharyn
Wizda, “Playing Favorites?” American Journalism Review 22
(JanuaryFebruary 2000): 34-39.
55. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, November 8,2000.
56. Robert Kuttner, “Two Bad Calls: The Faulty Ballots, the Bumbling
Press,” Boston Globe, 3rd ed., November 19,2000, C7; NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer transcript, February 13,2001.
57. Marvin Kalb, “Election 2000: What Does It All Mean? A Big Loss
for Network News,” Boston Globe, November 9,2000, A19.
58. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, February 13,2001.
59. Shepard, “How They Blew It.”
60. Kuttner, “Two Bad Calls.”
6 1. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, February 13,200 1.
62. Associated Press, “Voter News Service Opts to Carry On, but Re-
vamp,” WashingtonPost, June 1,2001, A4.
63. On the continuing importance of such pressure, see remarks by news
anchors that appear in NewsHour with Jim Lehrer transcript, February 13,
2001; and in Kathy Kellogg and Terry Frank, “Media Fixture Finds Much
to Say about the Election,” Buffalo News, November 30,2000,3B.
64. Benson, “Desktop Demos.”
9
The Media and Interest Groups in the United States
Ronald G. Shaiko
T h e relationship between the American news media and organized

interest groups and their lobbyists in Washington is a schizophrenic
one -simultaneously antagonistic and symbiotic; it is also qualita-
tively different from the relationships between the media and the in-
stitutions of governance in Washington discussed in earlier chapters.
In the American political system, the news media and organized in-
terests are components of civil society, serving as institutional inter-
mediaries in the political space between the citizens and the state.
While both the media and organized interest groups are regulated, to
a limited extent, by the federal government, they are autonomous in-
stitutions, constitutionally protected from excessive interference by
the government. As such, both the news media and interest groups
may serve as institutional checks on the political system and as insti-
tutional advocates for democratic governance. Nonetheless, neither
the news media nor organized interests have responsibilities for gov-
ernance in the American political system. Therefore, the political ac-
countability of the news media and of organized interest groups is less
clear. In theory, interest group leaders are accountable to their mem-
bers, whether employees and stockholders in corporations, union
members, or citizens who join collective action groups. The news me-
dia, in the 21st century, are increasingly accountable to the corporate
conglomerates that own the media outlets, and secondarily, to the
readers, listeners, and viewers who consume their news products.
181
182 Ronald G. Shaiko
MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Two decades ago, Ben Bagdikian wrote about the “media monop-
oly” that was emerging in the industry. At the time, he found
roughly fifty media conglomerates dominating the media market.’
In the most recent edition of The Media Monopoly, the author low-
ered the figure to around ten mega-media companies and another
dozen conglomerates as second-tier competitors .* More recently,
several major research efforts have documented the dramatic con-
centration of media outlets in the corporate hands of a compara-
tively small number of media conglomerates. Robert McChesney
identifies Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, Seagram, Rupert Mur-
doch’s News Corporation, Sony, General Electric, and AT&T as the
first-tier media conglomerates. “These media empires have been
constructed largely in the 199Os, with a rate of growth in annual rev-
enues that is staggering.” From 1988 to 1998, Disney grew from a
$2.9 billion company to a $25 billion media conglomerate; during
the same time frame, Time and Warner Communications saw an-
nual revenues of $4.2 billion and $3.4 billion, respectively, jump to
$28 billion in Time Warner revenues. Viacom grew exponentially
from a $600 million company to a $14.5 billion media giant;
other first-tier media corporations saw similar growth trends .3 The
second-tier media corporations include the large newspaper-based
conglomerates such as Gannett, Knight-Ridder, and the New York
Times Company, along with cable conglomerates Comcast and Cox
Enterprises and CBS, a broadcast corporation. These second-tier
corporations, while not as comprehensive in media scope, have wit-
nessed similar profits during the decade of the 1990s:
The paradox of such financial profitability in the media sector is
what Penn Kimball has labeled the “downsizing of the news .”5 With
the concentration of the media in the hands of a relatively few cor-
porate giants, the value of news gathering and dissemination is now
counterbalanced by the value of corporate profitability. As a result,
the major television networks as well as the large newspaper chains
have cut back significantly on news reporting workforces. Kimball
found that “the drastic budget cuts experienced by the three net-
works since being taken over by new corporate management in
The Media and Interest Groups in the United States 183
1986 have hit the Washington bureaus substantially, but less drasti-
cally than elsewhere. NBC, CBS, and ABC have all closed down or
downsized most of their bureaus overseas and across the country.”6
These cutbacks, along with the proliferation of alternative infor-
mation sources, via cable outlets and the Internet, have produced a
qualitatively different media system for the 21st century, one that
Bill Kovach and Tom Rosensteil identify as “the new Mixed Media
Culture.” This culture has five major characteristics, each of which
has consequences for the relationship between the news media and
organized interests in the United States: (1) never-ending news cy-
cles make journalism less complete; (2) sources are gaining power
over journalists; (3) there are no more gatekeepers; (4) argument is
overwhelming reporting; and (5) the “blockbuster” mental it^.^
Instant journalism, as practiced by the 24-hour cable networks,
produces a never-ending news cycle that influences the decisions of
television network executives and newspaper editors. Journalism-
on-the-cheap, a result of paradoxical staff cutbacks at the major net-
works and on newspapers in the face of huge corporate profits, has
made journalists far more reliant on sources as the primary means
of developing stories. Due to the proliferation of media alternative
outlets, there is no longer a journalistic consensus regarding “news-
worthiness ,” resulting in lowest-common-denominator reporting.
Related to these changes in the media culture, the culture of argu-
ment has supplanted the culture of news gathering and verification.
“The economics of these new media, indeed, demand that this prod-
uct be produced as cheaply as possible. Commentary, chat, specula-
tion, opinion, argument, controversy, and punditry cost far less than
assembling a team of reporters, producers, fact checkers, and edi-
tors to cover the far-flung comers of the world.”* And, finally, the
BIG story sells!
MEDIA COMPETENCE AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
Each of the characteristics outlined above offers an avenue for or-

ganized interests and their representatives to influence the news me-
dia in ways that benefit the organized interests, often at the expense
of the collective interests of the general public. These changes in the

media culture have also affected the relationship between organized
interests and the news media. This love-hate relationship has devel-
oped over time and has become even more complex in recent years.
In the past, one would be hard-pressed to characterize news me-
dia portrayals of interest groups and lobbyists as anything other than
negative. Phrases such as “special interests,” “hired guns,” and “in-
fluence peddlers” are widely used to characterize interest groups and
lobbyists. Jeffrey Birnbaum, Washington bureau chief for Fortune
magazine and author of two books on lobbyists and lobbying, when
asked to characterize the relationship between the news media and
the lobbying profession at a meeting of the American League of Lob-
byists in Washington, replied, “in general, it is an tag on is ti^."^
On one level, the antagonism is mutual. Lobbyists and leaders of
interest groups, particularly those not held in high esteem by the jour-
nalistic community (e.g ., corporate representatives, conservative
group leaders), feel as though the news media do not present a fair
and accurate portrayal of interest groups and lobbyists in general and
in their specific roles in the public policy-making process. In a 1998
membership survey conducted by the American League of Lobbyists,
a national association of government relations and public affairs pro-
fessionals, 76%of the respondents responded negatively to the ques-
tion “Do you believe that the press generally portrays lobbying and
lobbyists fairly?’ Only 19% felt that the press is fair in its coverage
of lobbyists and lobbying activities. When asked which publication
generally portrays the lobbying profession the most objectively, only
National Journal, a weekly politics and policy magazine, garnered
more than 25% of the responses. Conversely, while most respondents
reported reading the Washington Post and the New York Times on a
daily basis, less than 5% of the respondents selected either newspa-
per as the most objective portrayer of the lobbying profession.1°
Journalists tend to view lobbyists as easy targets for derision. Un-
like policy makers in Congress or in executive agencies, lobbyists
have little recourse against attacks by journalists. Since members of
Congress as well as presidents often use “special interests” as
scapegoats in the policy-making process, journalists are free to fol-
low the lead of government officials in targeting organized interests
and their representatives as part of the problem rather than part of

the solution. No president in modern history was as inextricably
linked to organized interests and their political contributions as
President Bill Clinton, yet that did not stop him from lamenting the
ills of special interests in Washington. So, if the president can do it,
why not the press?
Despite the negative characterizations often presented by the me-
dia of interest groups and lobbyists, the general public perceives
that journalists are too often influenced by such groups. In a 1997
national survey conducted by the Roper CentedGannett Newseum,
63% of the respondents believed that the news media are too ma-
nipulated by special interests.” In many ways, such findings fuel
the antagonism between these two institutional intermediaries.
Yet, on another level, there is a growing symbiotic relationship
between interest groups and the media. The events of the last
decade in Washington have injected a dose of pragmatic compro-
mise to this otherwise hostile relationship. Thomas Boggs, one of
the elder statesmen of the lobbying industry, identified three impor-
tant occurrences that have led to a greater willingness on the part of
organized interests to engage the press in policy dialogues.12First,
in the early 1990s, Congress, with the assistance of President
George H. W. Bush, passed the Budget Enforcement Act, creating a
pay-as-you-go mechanism in the budget process. This act, you may
recall, broke the Bush “read my lips, no new taxes” pledge and
likely assisted in his defeat in 1992. Its longer-term impact was to
pit interest group against interest group. Advocates for Group X had
to defend their existing government program from attack by Group
Y, who wished to kill the Group X program and use those saved rev-
enues to fund the Group Y program. While the battle for policy
ground continued as usual within the halls of Congress, interest
groups began to take their messages to the media to articulate the
comparative advantages of their programs. So, after decades of giv-
ing the press the silent treatment for their negative characteriza-
tions, interest group leaders and lobbyists began to contact journal-
ists with new information on ongoing policy issues.
Second, the 1994 elections and the subsequent Republican revo-
lution in Congress so changed the balance of power and upset the
internal lobbying relationships between lobbyists and policy mak-

ers that interest group leaders and lobbyists had to develop new
lines of communication to members of Congress and their staffs.
More than half of the current members of Congress were not in
Congress in 1990; old lines of communication would not work with
new occupants of the House and Senate. For lobbyists, the media
served as an important new conduit through which issues could be
communicated. And third, related to the first two occurrences, but
more broad in scope, was the emergence of grassroots lobbying as
one of the key elements in any interest group strategy. Organized in-
terests must demonstrate to policy makers that policy proposals or
changes to existing policies have demonstrably positive or at least
no detrimental impact on the folks back home. To the extent that the
news media can assist in delivering such a message, organized in-
terests will engage the media to serve their ends. Rarely do con-
temporary interest group strategies not include a media or “outside
lobbying” c ~ m p o n e n t . ’ ~
From the media perspective, the pragmatic compromise and en-
gagement with organized interests comes out of necessity, for all of
the reasons outlined above regarding increasingly limited resources
and the proliferation of alternative media. Journalism-on-the-cheap
requires a reportorial shorthand. Just as members of Congress and
their staffs rely on interest groups for information and, more impor-
tant, intelligence (information in political context), so, too, must the
news media. But, as with institutions of governance and interest
groups, there is a potential danger with an increased media engage-
ment with organized interests.
More than a half century ago, Jesse Unruh, the architect of the
modern California legislature, reached the following conclusion
regarding the relationship between organized interests and the
legislature: lobbyists and interest group leaders “have influence
in inverse ratio to legislative competence. It is common for a spe-
cial interest to be the only source of legislative information about
itself. The information that a lobbyist presents may or may not be
prejudiced in favor of his client, but if it is the only information
that the legislature has, no one can really be sure. A special inter-
est monopoly of information seems to be more sinister than the
outright buying of votes that has been excessively imputed to

lobbyists .',14 In constructing the modern legislature in California,
Unruh sought to build a competent institution, one that would not
be solely reliant on information generated by organized interests.
As a result, the California legislature is a full-time, professional-
ized, fully staffed institution, capable of generating its own in-
formation or able to check the validity of information provided
by organized interests.
Today, the same relationship exists between the news media and
organized interests -interest groups and lobbyists have influence
in inverse ratio to media competence. To the degree that the news
media, through both newspapers and television news reporting ,
are institutionally ill equipped to analyze and verify information
independent of outside sources, the influence of organized inter-
ests and their representatives will grow significantly in years to
come. And, in many ways, the stakes are higher for the media than
they are for modern legislatures. For in the legislative setting, or-
ganized interests are far more constrained in presenting informa-
tion to policy makers than they ever will be in presenting infor-
mation to journalists. There is an old adage among lobbyists in
Washington-you can't make the same mistake once. That is, you
cannot afford to give a member of Congress, congressional staffer,
White House staffer, executive official, or any other policy maker
a single piece of untruthful information. The second that a mem-
ber of Congress uses that information in the policy-making
process and the information is found to be erroneous, the lobbyist
who provided the information might as well pack his or her bags
and leave town, because his or her lobbying career is over. Do lob-
byists advocate for particular positions? Yes. Do they present their
position in the best light possible? Yes. But, the best lobbyists
present all sides of the issue, including the strengths and weak-
nesses of their positions and the potential positive and negative
consequences for the support of a member of Congress. In the re-
lationship between organized interests and their representatives
and journalists, there are no such constraints placed on lobbyists.
Lobbyists are free to spin journalists; but lobbyists spin policy
makers at their peril.
SPIN AND NEWS MEDIA SOURCES
Spin is a word that has crept into the American political vernacular
in recent years, yet the idea of spin has been around for a long time.
The idea of spin was articulated by George Orwell in his classic,
1984, in the form of “newspeak.” In his totalitarian state, thought
was controlled by controlling language. Today, signs of political
language control are everywhere. We don’t have proabortion or
antiabortion groups in the United States; we have Pro-choice and
Pro-Life groups. Organizations on the Left and the Right battle for
supremacy in issue framing. Sometimes the Left wins and some-
times the Right. For example, a gold star should be awarded to the
person who labeled the antiunion movement in the United States the
National Right to Work Committee-brilliant. Who could be
against the right to work? Interest groups of all political and ideo-
logical stripes seek to control the language of political debate, to
force the opposition to use their words, and to convince the media
to adopt their words as well.
Bill Press, in his new book, Spin This!, offers the following suc-
cinct definition: “Spin (n): something between truth and a lie.”15 Or-
well, in his powerful essay “Politics and the English Language,” of-
fers a more nuanced approach to spin, arguing that “political
language . . . is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder re-
spectable, and to give the appearance of solidity to pure wind.”16
The final phrase is most appropriate to the contemporary political
environment -spin as giving the appearance of solidity to pure
wind. Under the current conditions, the news media, and the broad-
cast and cable outlets in particular, are increasingly susceptible to
being spun by interest groups and their lobbyists seeking to promote
their own organizational agendas. With comparatively limited time,
brought on by never-ending news cycles, and limited resources, due
to significant cutbacks in staffs, travel, and support, the news media
will have an increasingly difficult task of distinguishing facts from
spin. For if the news media fail in discerning the difference, they are
responsible for giving substance and legitimacy to pure wind.
Ultimately journalists must rely on sources to provide the sub-
stance to stories and articles. Judgments made by journalists re-
garding the validity of sources are based on experience, verifiabil-

ity, and corroboration, according to Jack Fuller, president and pub-
lisher of the Chicago Tribune, in his book News Values. But, funda-
mentally, “the basis of news reporting is a kind of trust. It begins
with trust between a journalist and his sources of information and
from there builds to the trust he wants to establish with his audi-
ence. No rule of thumb can describe the complex factors that go into
a judgment of trust.”17
From the relationships between lobbyists and journalists pre-
sented thus far, it is difficult, at an institutional level, to identify any
systematic pattern of trust established between these two elements
of civil society. Rather, it is likely that relationships have developed
and will continue to develop in a piecemeal fashion, with trust rela-
tionships forming in particular policy niches (e.g., between envi-
ronmental lobbyists and environmental beat reporters or between
defense lobbyists and Pentagon correspondents), with marriages
(perhaps trysts is a better word) of convenience developing on an
episodic basis. For if only one thing is true in Washington from an
interest group perspective it is this-there are no permanent friends
and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. As a result, in-
terest groups and their lobbyists are primarily, if not solely, obli-
gated to their own political interests and will use whatever means
necessary to advocate those interests, including spinning the news
media when useful in their advocacy strategies. To the degree that
the news media are institutionally competent, they will resist being
spun and report the news in a balanced and accurate fashion. Of
course, in the current media culture identified above, this is easier
said than done.
FIVE CASES OF ADVOCACY IN THE MEDIA
Interest group advocacy through the media in the United States ap-
pears in two basic forms. First, organized interests may simply pur-
chase commercial airtime on televisiodradio or place advertise-
ments in newspapers. This approach is often referred to as paid
media, that is, interest groups craft the messages on their own and
190 Ronald G.Shaiko
simply buy airtime or advertising space in order to disseminate their

messages to wider audiences. For the most part, the news media
have no part in such activities, although news media outlets have in-
creasingly sought to perform a watchdog role on political advertis-
ing, particularly in the context of elections.
One of the best examples of recent paid media campaigns is the
series of “Harry and Louise” commercials aired by the Health In-
surance Association of America (HIAA) during the debate over the
Clinton Health Care Plan in 1993-1994. Expertly crafted, these “is-
sue advocacy” television commercials cut through the clutter sur-
rounding the complex debate and drove home a message that res-
onated with citizens. The enduring legacy of “Harry and Louise”
led to their resurrection in 2002 in the context of the congressional
debate on cloning and fetal tissue research, much to the dismay of
HIAA leaders, who did not take a position in the debate. Second, in-
terest groups and lobbyists attempt to persuade the news media that
the issues that they are advocating are sufficiently newsworthy to
warrant coverage in major newspapers and on network and cable
news programs. This approach is referred to as earned media or free
media, that is, interest groups receive news coverage and, as a re-
sult, have their messages disseminated to wider audiences at no cost
to the organizations. If interest groups are really lucky, they can
convert paid media into free media, as was the case with the Willie
Horton ad during the 1988 presidential election.
1. Converting Paid Media into Free/Earned Media-Willie Horton

For college students reading this volume, the 1988 presidential elec-
tion may seem like ancient history. In this election, the elder George
Bush defeated Michael Dukakis in a rather lackluster race. Nonethe-
less, the election will take its place in history for two visual occur-
rences, both of which worked against Michael Dukakis. First, the
Democratic candidate was captured on video and in photography
donning an overly large army helmet while riding atop a tank. The
rather ridiculous image did little to secure additional votes for him in
the November election. A second, far more controversial, image ap-
peared in the 1988 election-the Willie Horton ad.
Michael Dukakis, as governor of Massachusetts, had maintained a

prison furlough program. Willie Horton, a black convict in the Mass-
achusetts prison system, was furloughed under the program. On fur-
lough, Horton stabbed a white man and raped a white woman. As a re-
sult, Willie Horton became the image representing the consequences
of misguided liberal programs. Interestingly, it was not the Republican
Party that uncovered the Willie Horton story. No, a Democratic candi-
date for president named Al Gore first raised the prison furlough issue
in the 1988 Democratic primary campaign.
Once Dukakis had garnered the Democratic nomination, however,
an interest group allied with the Republican Party sought to capital-
ize on the unearthed evidence that Gore had presented earlier in the
primary season. Floyd Brown, executive director of Citizens United,
a conservative interest group with about 100,000 members, was also
affiliated with a political action committee, National Security PAC,
as political director. It was Brown who transformed the Willie Hor-
ton story into the now infamous Willie Horton commercial. With a
comparatively limited production budget and an even smaller budget
for buying airtime to run the commercial, Brown crafted the com-
mercial spot for roughly $25,000. He then ran the spot on a subur-
ban Washington, D.C., cable channel at minimal cost. To say that the
commercial was controversial would be an understatement. The
commercial was not without significant racial overtones. Within 24
hours of the initial airing, a news media feeding frenzy had begun.
Over the next several weeks, the major networks were running the
commercial as “news.” It was estimated that the commercial re-
ceived the equivalent of $1 million in national airtime, all for free.
From the perspective of Brown, the mission was accomplished; he
had successfully transformed paid media into free media.I8
2. Interest Group Advocacy-

Natural Resources Defense Council and Alar
In the year following the election of the elder George Bush, the envi-
ronmental community engaged in battle against what it viewed as
the continuation of Reagan policies by the Bush administration. The
news media responded with a growing attentiveness to environmental
issues, after a degree of dormancy during the Reagan years.19 One is-
sue in particular caught the attention of the news media-Alar. Alar
was the trade name for the chemical diaminozide; it was used on be-
tween 5% and 15% of apples grown in the United States in the late
1980s to retard ripening and improve the appearance of apples?O
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) launched a
comprehensive media campaign to end to use of Alar in February of
1989, despite the fact that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), under pressure from NRDC since 1984 on the issue, had an-
nounced the phase-out of Alar by July 3 1,1990. NRDC enlisted the
services of Fenton Communications, a public relations firm, to or-
chestrate its attack on Alar. The group also enlisted the support of
CBS and its news magazine show, “60 Minutes.” On February 26,
1989, “60 Minutes” aired a segment called “A is for Apple,” hosted
by Ed Bradley. Using the services of NRDC scientists, CBS con-
cluded that the claims made by NRDC were newsworthy. Immedi-
ately after the airing, scores of other media outlets picked up the
story. Fenton Communications lined up interviews for NRDC lead-
ers and scientists as well as for Hollywood actress Meryl Streep and
her newly formed group, Mothers & Others for Pesticide Limits. A
total media blitz ensued. Streep and NRDC spokespersons were on
all of the daytime talk shows as well as weekend political talk
shows. As a result, “apples lost their shine almost immediately.”21
The apple industry attempted to respond to what they (and many
in the scientific community) believed were faulty claims and, in
essence, were beside the point, as the EPA had already announced
the phase-out. Their efforts, handled by the public relations giant
Hill & Knowlton, fell on deaf media ears. “The Alar controversy,
many later agreed, was a masterful strategy by the NRDC, although
it raised questions about the group’s credibility as well as how the
media handled the issue. Some observers believed the press had
been duped by the environmental group through manipulation of
the release of the story at news conferences and in interviews with
celebrities. Others argued that the publicity brought the issue to the
attention of both the public and policymakers, with the means justi-
fying the end result.”22The end result was that the total economic
damages to the apple industry approached $250 million, according
to the Apple Institute, a trade association for the apple industry, in-
cluding the loss of tons of apples never treated with Alar, due to
plummeting demand?3
Cynthia Crosson, in her book Tainted Truth: The Manipulation of
Fact in America, concludes: “The great Alar alarm of 1989 was a wa-
tershed in the history of sponsored research not because the research
was right but because it so quickly and effectively changed people’s
beliefs and behavior about one of their favorite foods: apples.Alar was
banned not because of a cool and informed appraisal of the best sci-
entific evidence but because of the coinciding interests of an advocacy
group, a celebrity, a public relations company and the media.”24Paul
Heyne, in an essay entitled “Economics,Ethics, and Ecology,” reaches
a more damning conclusion: “The NRDC, ‘60 Minutes,’ Ed Bradley,
and the others who orchestrated the national hysteria over Alar showed
no concern for the apple growers who had to bear the cost of their pub-
licity-seeking. This was inexcusably unfair behavior that was under-
taken to promote the institutional interests of the NRDC and the CBS
network.”25
3. Governments as Advocates-
C N N and Child Slavery in West Africa
Much like interest groups, governments also formulate advocacy
campaigns and attempt to mobilize news media support for their
causes. While the relationships between governing institutions
and the media in the United States are presented elsewhere in this
volume, in the interest group context, foreign governments and
international governing bodies may be viewed as special types of
organized interests. While the major television networks and ma-
jor newspapers across the country are constantly barraged with
story ideas, the global cable outlets such as CNN (the Cable
News Network) field requests from interests around the world.
And, with its instantaneous news cycle, CNN can and will ac-
commodate a wide array of interests in order to fill its airtime.
CNN International and its programming and news coverage have
contributed yet another new phrase to the political vernacular-
the CNN Effect, the idea that globally televised news may exert
an instantaneous impact on foreign policy making. Since the late

1980s, CNN has served presidential administrations as an impor-
tant conduit through which political signals and overt communi-
cations between world powers may be relayed.
Such conduits, however, are also susceptible to manipulation when
the global agenda is crowded and is often driven by events rather than
institutional policies. Regina Lawrence, in her analysis of media cov-
erage of police brutality, refers to this phenomenon as “event-driven
problem definition” as opposed to “institutionally driven problem
definition.” In the former context, “news focuses on unusual, unex-
pected, unplanned events: terrorist attacks, ship groundings, airplane
crashes, police violence, etc.” As a result, problem definition tends to
be “variable and volatile, depending on the story; problem definitions
may tend to favor advocates of
Foreign governments, perhaps seeking the assistance of the
United States government or other international assistance, will turn
to the global media (e.g., CNN, BBC) with their pleas. Savvy for-
eign government officials are aware of what Susan Moeller has la-
beled “compassion fatigue ,” the limits on the collective capacities
of the United States government and its citizens to address or even
care about all of the global societal ills.27As a result, such govern-
mental advocates search for or create “events” in order to facilitate
news media coverage of their issue or cause.
On March 30,2001, such an “event” was created in West Africa.
Government officials from Benin and Gabon reported that a Nigerian-
registered ship, the MVEtireno, that had left the Beninois port of Coto-
nou for Gabon, carrying 250 child slaves, was seeking a port of entry
and was turned away in Gabon and Cameroon. UNICEF officials re-
ported that the ship was turned away in Gabon and was headed out
into the Atlantic Ocean. CNN picked up the story and provided
around-the-clock coverage for more than a week. Interviews were
conducted with government officials, international human rights
workers, and affected citizens in Benin and throughout the region.
They all spoke of the problem of child slavery in West Africa. To date,
most international news coverage of child slavery had focused on East
Africa, and on Sudan in particular, where human rights workers were
attempting to “buy back” slaves from Sudanese warlords.
For more than a week, CNN provided comprehensive coverage

of the child slave ship off the coast of West Africa. The problem for
CNN and for its viewers was that such a ship filled with 250 child
slaves did not exist! In the end, when the MV Etireno docked in
Cotonou on April 17,2001, there were 40 children and teenagers on
board, none of whom was unaccompanied. On April 21,2001, Jim
Clancy, host of CNN’s weekly program, “Inside Africa,” opened the
show with what one can only assume was a media mea culpa: “This
week on ‘Inside Africa,’ the rumors of a slave ship carrying children
into servitude are proved false. But an hour from the docks, vil-
lagers in Benin say child trafficking is no rumor.”28
From the perspective of the governments and human rights
groups seeking to raise awareness of the issue, they could not have
asked for more-no sanctions and continued reporting on the issue.
Later in the CNN program, a field reporter continued with coverage
“not on the rumors but the reality.”29
4. Foundation Advocacy-NPIZ, PBS, and News Coverage

In the United States, public television (Public Broadcasting System,
PBS) and public radio (National Public Radio, NPR) are often
viewed as separate and distinct from commercial broadcasting. After
all, they are supported by viewers and listeners like you. In part, they
are unique in the media. Nonetheless, they are not “public” in the
sense that they are immune to economics. For more than 30 years,
public television and public radio have functioned with the limited
assistance of the federal government (less than 20% of their annual
budgets are derived from government support) as well as with sup-
port through contributions from citizens and corporations across the
nation, revenues generated from the contracting of programming to
local public television and radio stations, and, in recent years, from
the support of a growing number of foundations?0 Support from the
government, corporations, and from citizens comes with virtually no
strings attached. But, while some foundations provide financial as-
sistance without linking such support to specific policy concerns, a
growing number of foundations are providing support to public tel-
evision and radio for specific news coverage, whether it be health
policy, children’s issues, the media itself, or coverage of specific re-

gions of the world.
For fiscal year 2000, PBS received more than $1 million in support
from each of the following foundations: Alfred P. Sloan Foundation,
the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, the California Wellness Foun-
dation, Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Park Foundation,
the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and
W.K. Kellogg Foundation. Twelve additional foundations, including
the Florence and John Schumann Foundation, each gave between
$500,000 and $1 million to PBS in 2000, and 26 other foundations
gave between $100,000 and $500,000?’
While some of these foundations provided truly philanthropic
support in the form of unrestricted grants for public television and
radio (e.g., the current three-year, $10 million Ford Foundation
grant to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting), a significant mi-
nority of foundation supporters link contributions to specific activ-
ities or coverage to be delivered by PBS.
Foundation support for public radio is equally significant. In fiscal
year 2000, NPR received 22.9 percent of its support from founda-
tions; when one includes support from its own NPR Foundation, NPR
received over one-third of its annual funding from foundations,more
than three times the national average for foundation support of non-
profit entities. As with public television support, many NPR founda-
tion supporters provide assistance for targeted activities?* In an
analysis of NPR contributors conducted by the Foundation Center, a
national clearinghouse for foundations, “National Public Radio re-
ceived 36 separate foundation grants of $10,000 or more in 1998.
That included $200,000 from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation ‘to cover
stories on issues currently of interest and importance to philanthropy
and the nonprofit world and particularly those related to Kellogg
Foundation programming .’ (An NPR spokesperson disputed that the
grant was actually used that narrowly).”33
Kellogg is not the only foundation to provide support to NPR with
strings attached. The Annie E. Casey Foundation provides support
only for news coverage of issues affecting children; the Pew Charita-
ble Trusts supports arts and religion reporting; the Soros Foundation/
Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation support news cover-
age of central and eastern Europe; the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion and the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation support health policy
reporting; and Pew also supports coverage of the media. NPR devotes
several pages of its news policy manual to the issue of foundation-sup-
ported journalism, including: “Restricted grants must not be so narrow
in concept as to coincide with the donor’s area of economic or advo-
cacy interest.” Even so, it is difficult to miss the agenda-setting func-
tion served by targeted foundation support to NPR.34
PBS has actually gone a step further than NPR in intermixing the
agendas of foundation supporters with news reporting. According to
Rick Edmonds of the Poynter Institute (a nonprofit journalism training
entity and owner of the St. Petersburg irimes),less than three years ago,
the “NewsHour with Jim Lehrer” “inconspicuously crossed the line: It
accepted explicit foundation sponsorship of two reporting units .”35
Health reporting is no longer sponsored by viewers like you; rather Su-
san Dentzer and her team of health reporters are sponsored by the
Kaiser Family Foundation. Similarly, media reporting by Terrence
Smith and this research unit is brought to you by the Pew Charitable
Trusts. Beyond the “NewsHour,” PBS maintains a strong relationship
with Bill Moyers,himself a mini-media conglomerate.Not only does
he produce a variety of programs aired on PBS, he also serves as pres-
ident of the Schumann Foundation,mentioned earlier. A number of his
programs are funded by the Schumann Foundation-characterized by
former environmentalist turned conservative activist Ron Arnold, in
his book Undue Influence, as “rabidly anti-~apitalist.”~~
Many foundations have clearly defined policy agendas; as such,
they closely resemble interest groups. Perhaps their methods of in-
fluencing public policy are more subtle and indirect. Nonetheless,
to the extent that they have infiltrated public radio and television
and have significantly altered the issue agendas of the news gather-
ing and reporting operations to reflect their internal policy priori-
ties, rather than those of the general public, they have made public
radio and public television a little less public.
5. Advocacy Journalism-Homelessness in America

Beyond being influenced by outside interests or private founda-
tions, the news media have their own journalistic values and issue
198 Ronald G.Shaiko
agendas. Bernard Goldberg, a former CBS reporter, in his new book

Bias, provides an uneven accounting of the biases he encountered
during his three decades of reporting at CBS. One of the strongest
cases he presents, supported with empirical evidence, is his argu-
ment regarding advocacy journalism in the national news media. He
focuses his attention on the issue of homelessness and its coverage
by the major newspapers and television networks over the past two
decades. Goldberg addresses the issue of the number of homeless in
America and compares government and reputable think tank figures
with those presented by the media. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the
U.S. Census Bureau set the number of homeless in the United States
at 230,000. The General Accounting Office, a support agency of the
U.S. Congress, found that there were between 300,000 and 600,000
homeless persons; the Urban Institute, a Washington think tank spe-
cializing in urban public policy, estimated the number of homeless
to be between 355,000 and 462,000 people nati0nwide.3~For the
sake of argument, one-half million homeless persons in America
would seem to be a fair estimate.
The national news media arrived at very different figures. In 1989
on CNN, Candy Crowley reported that “winter is on the way and
three million Americans have no place to call home.” In 1993, on
NBC , “Weekend Today” anchor Jackie Nespral found that “nation-
ally, right now, five million people are believed to be homeless.” Fi-
nally, Charles Osgood of CBS was willing to predict the future of
homelessness: “It is estimated that by the year 2000, nineteen mil-
lion Americans will be homeless unless something is done, and done
While advocates for the homeless had a hand in skewing the
numbers dramatically upward, the media willingly accepted the fig-
ures and even went a step further to advance the cause.
Beyond the wild numbers presented by the media, the face of
homelessness was skewed as well by the media. According to Gold-
berg, the network news media framed the issue of homelessness
around two themes: (1) the homeless are just like us; and (2) they
are homeless because of cutbacks in government programs previ-
ously in place under Democratic administrations, but cut by the
Reagan administration in favor of increased defense spending. He
makes a good case for both themes. Homeless advocates were less
comfortable with these approaches than they were with fudging the
numbers of homeless. Consistently the media sought out a sanitized
version of homelessness -“White was better than black. Clean was
better than dirty. Attractive was better than unattractive. Sane was
better than insane. And sober was better than addicted. So when the
TV people went looking for just that right kind of homeless face to
put on their news programs, they went to people like Robert Hayes,
who ran the National Coalition for the Homeless in New York. In
1989, Hayes told the New York Times that when congressional com-
mittees and TV news producers contact him, ‘they always want
white, middle-class people to inter vie^.'"^^
Robert Lichter, of the Center for Media and Public Affairs, a
Washington think tank focused on the media, analyzed over 100
stories on homelessness in the late 1980s aired by ABC, NBC, and
CBS, as well as 26 stories written in Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report. Lichter concluded that the findings “pro-
vide a blueprint for advocacy journalism. . . . Only one source in
twenty-five blamed homelessness on the personal problems of the
homeless themselves, such as mental illness, drug and alcohol
abuse, or lack of skills or motivation. The other 96 percent blamed
social or political conditions for their plight. The primary culprit
cited was the housing market, including forces like high mortgage
interest rates, high rents, downtown redevelopment, etc. Next in
line was government inaction , especially the government’s failure
to provide adequate public h o u ~ i n g . ” ~
The timing of such media accounts also drew the attention of
Goldberg. Again, empirical evidence supports his claim that the
homelessness advocacy of the media has been targeted at Republi-
can administrations. Journalist Philip Terzian reported in a 1999 col-
umn in the Village Voice that the New York Times ran 50 stories on
homelessness, including five on page one, in 1988.A decade later, in
1998, only ten stories on the homeless appeared in the newspaper,
with none appearing on page one. The Media Research Center, a
conservative media watchdog group, found a similar pattern of cov-
erage. In 1990, when George Bush was president, ABC, CBS, NBC,
and CNN ran 71 homelessness stories on evening newscasts; by
1995, when Bill Clinton was president, the number had dropped to
only nine stories?l With these findings and the patterns cited earlier,
Goldberg sarcastically titled the chapter dealing with advocacy jour-
nalism “How Bill Clinton Cured Homelessness.”
THE MEDIA AND ADVOCACY:

THE MISGUIDED INSTITUTION?
Almost a decade ago, Thomas Patterson, in his cogent analysis of the

role of the media in the American electoral process, Out ofordel;
concluded that the news media are a “miscast institution,” ill
equipped to assist citizens in their electoral choices. “The problem of
the modern presidential campaign,” he wrote, “lies in the role as-
signed to the press. Its traditional role is that of watchdog. . . . This
vital function, however, is different from the role that was thrust on
the press when the nominating system was opened wide in the early
1970s.The new role conflicts with the old one. The critical stance of
the watchdog is not to be confused with the constructive task of the
coalition-builder. The new role requires the press to act in construc-
tive ways to bring candidates and voters together.”42
Outside of the electoral context, the news media are performing
an even wider variety of roles: signaler, alerting the public to im-
portant political developments; common-carrier, channeling mes-
sages from policy makers to the public; watchdog, protecting the
public from government and its occupants; and public representa-
tive, spokesperson for and advocate of the public. The media are in-
creasingly susceptible to the influence of organized interests in the
performance of each of these r0les.4~To the extent that the influence
of organized interests in news gathering and reporting is significant,
the news media in the United States will become an increasingly
misguided institution.
Historically, the news media have performed the first three roles
outlined above fairly well. Yet, even in these instances, the influence
of organized interests on news gathering and reporting raises some
question as to the capacity or competence of the media to perform
these tasks. Regarding the first role of signaler, the case of child slav-
ery in West Africa certainly highlights the circumstances under which
The Media and Interest Groups in the United States 20 1
the media might be signaling “nonevents.” In addition, the transfor-

mation of the Willie Horton ad into news was a conscious effort on
the part of the news media to signal the “newsworthiness” of such an
advertisement, giving credence to the controversial. Performing the
common-carrier role necessitates conscious resistance to spin, both
from policy makers and from organized interests likely to be brought
into the news stories. In the Alar case, the Environmental Protection
Agency had made its decision regarding removal of Alar from the
marketplace, yet the media, spun by the NRDC to great effect, failed
to perform their common-carrier role.
Regarding the media’s watchdog role, the agenda-setting efforts
of foundations in public radio and television bring into question the
policy priorities of these media; as a result the watchdog function
may be skewed toward (or away from) the policy domains funded
by these outside sources of support. It should be noted that founda-
tions have not limited their support efforts to PBS and NPR. To the
contrary, foundations are providing support with strings attached to
newspapers, commercial television stations, magazines, and even
the Columbia Journalism Review.* Finally, the news media have
taken on the role of public representative virtually on their own.
Traditionally, elected officials, political parties, and the institutions
of governance performed the public representative role. Vietnam
and Watergate changed the political equation, at least for the news
media. Since that time, journalists have viewed themselves, at least
in part, as advocates for their versions of good public policy. The
homelessness in America case lays bare the shortcomings of such a
role being performed by the news media.
Interest groups and their representatives view the news media as
useful tools in their advocacy strategies. To the extent that their
causes and issues will be well served by positive media or their op-
ponents will be ill served by negative media, they will engage the
necessary media outlets to serve their purposes. Spin is more than
fair game for organized interests. Given the myriad of outlets from
which to choose and the shrinking resources available to the news
media, burning a media bridge with orchestrated spin has few neg-
ative consequences. Only an increasingly competent news media in
the United States will be equal to the challenge of the ever-growing
barrage of organized interests seeking to use the institution for their

own purposes. Without such redoubled efforts to perform the first
three roles -signaler, common-carrier, and watchdog -and perhaps
to jettison the fourth role of public representative, the news media
will be destined to become more than a miscast institution; it will
become a misguided institution.
1. How does the concentration of media outlets in the hands of a

few media conglomerates affect the ability of organized inter-
est groups to influence the reporting of political news?
2. Can a streamlined, downsized media remain “competent” to
gauge the veracity of interest group information sources? If
so, how? If not, what recourse do media outlets have in deal-
ing with interest groups as sources?
3. How can media outlets protect themselves from “spin” by or-
ganized interest groups?
4. What should the role of the media be in covering interest
groups engaged in political campaigning?
5. Should public television and public radio outlets accept foun-
dation support for specific types of news reporting? Why?
Why not?
6. How might the media prevent itself from becoming a “mis-
guided” institution?
Baker, C. Edwin, Media, Markets, und Democracy (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2002).
Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Interest Group Politics, 6th
ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002).
Hermson, Paul S., Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest
Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Wash-
ington, 2nd ed. (Chatham, N J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 2003).
McChesney, Robert W., Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication

Politics in Dubious 7imes (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
Moeller, Susan, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, War
and Death (New York: Routledge, 1999).
Sparrow, Bartholomew H., Uncertain Guardians: The Media as a Politi-
cal Institution (Baltimore,Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
NOTES
1. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon, 1983).

2. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon,
2000).
3. Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communica-
tion Politics in Dubious Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1999), 19-20; see also Dean Alger, Megamedia: How Giant Corporations
Dominate Mass Media, Distort Competition, and Endanger Democracy
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Bartolomew H. Sparrow,
Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); c. Edwin Baker, Media,
Markets, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
4. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy, 20.
5 . Penn Kimball, Downsizing the News: Network Cutbacks in the
Nation’s Capital (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
6. Kimball, Downsizing the News, 23.
7 . Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, Warp Speed: America in the Age
of Mixed Media (New York: Century Foundation, 1999), 6-7.
8. Kovach and Rosensteil, Warp Speed, 7.
9. “Lobbying and the Media” (American League of Lobbyists Forum,
Washington, D.C., 1998, C-SPAN Videotape 115402). Birnbaum’s per-
sonal antagonism toward the lobbying profession was made evident by the
title of his second book on the subject-The Lobbyists: How Influence
Peddlers Get Their Way in Washington. The subtitle on the softcover edi-
tion to the book was changed by the publisher after lobbyists complained
that the substance of the book was not reflected in the title. Lobbyists who
were subjects in the book rightly argued that, in many instances, they did
not “get their way” on the issues portrayed in the book. Hence, the subti-
tle on the paperback version became: How Influence Peddlers Work Their
Way in Washington. The lobbyists remained influence peddlers, much to
204 Ronald G. Shaika
the dissatisfaction of the lobbying community, but the change was made
regarding their relative success.
10. American League of Lobbyists, 1998 Membership Survey
(Alexandria, Va: American League of Lobbyists, 1998), 6-7.
11. Cited in Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians, 120.
12. “Lobbying and the Media.”
13. See William P. Brown, Groups, Interests, and US.Public Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 95-102; Ken
Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strate-
gies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27-57.
14. Cited in William K. Muir Jr., Legislature: California’s School of
Politics (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982), 136.
15. Bill Press, Spin This!All the Ways We Don’t Tell the Truth (New York:
Pocket Books, 2001), xxiii.
16. Cited in Press, Spin This!, xvii.
17. Jack Fuller, News Values: Ideas for an Information Age (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1996), 39.
18. Ronald G. Shaiko, “Le Pac, C’est Moi: Brent Bozell and the Con-
servative Victory Committee,’’ in Risky Business? PAC Decisionmaking in
Congressional Elections, ed. Robert Biersack, Paul Hernnson, and Clyde
Wilcox (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 181-95.
19. Ronald G. Shaiko, Voices and Echoes for the Environment: Public
Interest Representation in the 1990s and Beyond (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), 35-38.
20. Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, Green Backlash: The History and
Politics of Environmental Opposition in the US.(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1997), 85.
21. Jonathan Adler, Environmentalism at the Crossroads: Green Ac-
tivism in America (Washington, D.C.: Capital Research Center, 1993),
36-37; Switzer, Green Backlash, 85.
22. Switzer, Green Backlash, 85.
23. Adler, Environmentalism at the Crossroads, 38.
24. Cynthia Crosson, Tainted Truth: The Manipulation of Fact in
America (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 58.
25. Paul Heyne, “Economics, Ethics, and Ecology,” in Taking the En-
vironment Seriously, ed. Roger E. Mieners and Bruce Yandle (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 38-39.
26. Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the Con-
struction of Police Brutality (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000), 174.
27. Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Dis-
ease, Famine, War and Death (New York: Routledge, 1999).
28. “CNN InternationalInside Africa,” April, 21,2001, at http://www.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIFTS/O104/21d-if ,00btml .
29. “CNN International Inside Africa.”
30. PBS 2001 Annual Report, “Fiscal,” 2002, at http://www.pbs.org/
insidepbs/annualreport/text/fiscal.html.
31. PBS 2001 Annual Report, “Supporters,” 2002, at http://www.pbs.orgl
insidepbs/annualreport/text/supporters-texthtml .
32. NPR Financials, “Financials,” 2002, at http://www.npr.org/
about/place/corpsupport/Financials.html.
33. Rick Edmonds, “Special Issue: Foundations’ Role in Journalism,”
Poynter Report (Spring 2001): 14.
34. Edmonds, “Foundations’ Role in Journalism,” 24.
35. Edmonds, “Foundations’ Role in Journalism,” 18.
36. Ron Arnold, Undue Influence: Wealthy Foundations, Grant Driven
Environmental Groups, and Zealous Bureaucrats That Control Your Fu-
ture (Bellevue, Wash.: Merril Press, 1999).
37. Bernard Goldberg, Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media
Distort the News (Washington, D .C .: Regnery, 2002), 66.
38. Quoted in Goldberg, Bias, 66-67.
39. Quoted in Goldberg, Bias, 65.
40. Quoted in Goldberg, Bias, 69.
41. Goldberg, Bias, 73.
42. Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Knopf, 1993; New
York: Vintage, 1994), 51.
43. See Thomas E. Patterson, We the People: A Concise Introduction to
American Politics, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 29 1-300.
44. Edmonds, “Foundations’ Role in Journalism.”
10
The Media and Public Opinion
Stephen K. Medvic and David A. Dulio
Poll, poll, poll. Try reading a news story or watching one aired
on TV without encountering the word.
-Christopher Hitchens, “Voting in the Passive Voice”’
There is little doubt that the media’s reliance on public opinion as a

source of news has exploded in the last decade. One can hardly turn
on a network news broadcast or open a newspaper without being sub-
jected to hearing about “a recent survey” or “the latest polling data.”
The near omnipresent nature of public opinion in the media’s report-
ing of news depends on continuous measures of public sentiment in
the form of public opinion polls. In this chapter we address issues and
concerns related to public opinion in the media. We examine the
sources of public opinion that the media rely on for news, and the role
of that information in news stories. We also critically evaluate the
news media’s reporting of public opinion data in terms of information
the public needs in order to be good consumers of the news. In addi-
tion, we consider the range of topics for which poll results are used,
from individuals and institutions to issues and elections. We conclude
with a case study of one specific measure of public opinion that
caused a great deal of controversy-the exit polling conducted on
election day 2000. As exit polls may be the most significant measure
of public opinion the media take, the circumstances surrounding how
they are conducted and reported deserve careful attention.
207
208 Stephen K. Medvic and David A. Dulio
In the year 2000, network news broadcasts (ABC, CBS, NBC, and
CNN) included over 230 separate stories that referenced or referred
to poll andor survey results, an increase from about 150 in 1999.2
The same is true for print media outlets. For example, one estimate
“reveals that public opinion polls served as an integral part of about
one-third of all the cover stories” in major U.S. news magazines (i.e.,
Newsweek and US.News and World R e p ~ r t )The . ~ range of topics on
network news programs for which poll results were used during
1999 and 2000 varied from recreational drug use, driving safety, and
potential Y2K problems to racial discrimination, terrorist threats,
and the elections in Israel, Chile, and the United States. Of course,
the frequency with which public opinion data is reported is only
heightened during an election year. The focus on polls during a cam-
paign is more pointed than ever. The result of this, however, is that
“[p]olls are not only part of the news today, they are new^."^
This raises a number of important issues with regard to the nature
of the media’s use of public opinion. The first pertains to the role that
the information plays in the news broadcast. As Kathleen Frankovic
hints, public opinion data can either be used by the news media to
report news, or it can be used to create news? The second relates to
who conducts the opinion polling. In the modem context of public
opinion and news coverage, there are two main sources of surveys
and polls for the media to tap-the major news outlets and media
organizations themselves (internal), and academic or commercial
polling outfits (external). These two issues-the role of public opin-
ion in the news and its source-are intimately intertwined. In utiliz-
ing either type of source (internal or external) the media can either
simply report a newsworthy story or they can create a news story.
SOURCES AND FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

IN THE MEDIA
Increasingly, media outlets rely on their own internal abilities to

construct, conduct, analyze, and report survey research on the pub-
lic’s attitudes. Each of the major television networks has created a
mutually beneficial partnership with a print source to sponsor and
The Media and Public Opinion 209
conduct polling that they can both use to generate news stories.
These affiliations include: CBS News and the New York Emes,ABC
News and the Washington Post, NBC News and the Wall Street
Journal, and CNN and USA Today. When major news services cou-
ple their resources they are often able to support an independent
polling entity that handles all aspects of the survey research process.
This is in contrast to other news outlets that rely on outside f m s to
conduct their polls. For example, Fox News retains Opinion Dy-
namics as its survey research partner. Newsweek frequently uses the
services of Princeton Survey Research Associates, and U.S. News
and World Report has employed a political consulting fm-Lake,
Snell, Perry and Associates- for its public opinion polling. More-
over, while CNN has created a partnership with USA Today, they
employ the Gallup organization to conduct their research; they also
team up with Time magazine, relying on Harris Interactive to do the
polling. The difference between these relationships and the partner-
ships between major news networks and print sources is that the lat-
ter control the polling process from start to finish, while the former
contract their polling work out to a firm.
That said, those outlets that contract polling out to a separate fm
still control the topics of surveys that are done, as well as the ever-
important question selection. This gives the media a great deal of
power in terms of what stories come out of their research. But the ma-
jor partnerships created by the networks and newspapers go one step
further. The dissemination of survey results that come from a net-
workhewspaper poll not only give a great deal of visibility to both
outlets, but the networks’ print partners can lend credibility and pres-
tige to a poll and can also keep the results in the public eye for an ex-
tended period of time.6 In the era of a 24-hour news cycle, if a network
relied only on its own broadcast to report its survey findings, the story
would quickly come and go. But with a newspaper also reporting the
same findings, the story has more staying power and can be reported
in much more detail, as the space constraints for a print outlet are less
strict than the time constraints for a network news program.
A media outlet that conducts or commissions its own polls can ei-
ther report or create news with its survey research. Major issues and
events are often the impetus behind network stories focusing on public
opinion. The economy, abortion, tax cuts, foreign policy, presidential

nominations, and especially elections are topics often covered by me-
dia polls that are done in-house. In these cases the issue or event is al-
ready on the national agenda; here news networks add value to the
story by reporting the public’s views on important issues.
The networks and their print partners can also create news by re-
porting their own measures of public opinion. Many times this is in
the context of an election, when their polling shows a change in the
public’s evaluation of one or more candidates. Even the slightest
change in a candidate’s standing in the polls over the course of a
few days or a week, say from 57 percent support to 53 percent, is
sometimes taken as a sea change in the public’s attitudes. Similarly,
if the president’s job approval is shown to slip, the media may take
this as an opportunity to reinvestigate the progress of an adminis-
tration or how the president is performing generally. As will be dis-
cussed later, in many cases like these, the media are “making moun-
tains out of mole hills” and may be inaccurately reporting the actual
meaning of poll results.
“The proliferation of polls corresponds to the proliferation of
available information generally and to the ever-faster news cycle.”7
While television news programs, newspapers, and magazines all
look to their own polling or their contracted polls for stories, they
dispense a voluminous amount of information focusing on the pub-
lic’s attitudes and beliefs that they themselves do not collect. The
availability of information is supplemented by sources that are not
affiliated with any news organization, but, instead, are organizations
looking to gain some attention or increased visibility for their own
reasons. The use of external public opinion polling by media outlets
can also either simply report newsworthy information or it can cre-
ate news for the benefit of both the news organization and the spon-
sor of the poll. The media, in fact, must rely on some outside sur-
veys in order to fully report on influential and important events and
issues. For example, an outlet like the Washington Post or CNN is
not likely to devote its own resources to conduct a poll on Israeli
elections or on the state of the economy in the former Soviet Union.
Instead, these outlets rely on other sources for the information they
report to the public in the U .S.
The Media and Public Opinion 21 1
However, many media outlets do not stop there. Because there is

fierce competition between news organizations for their audience,
keeping the public’s attention is at a premium? Many news organi-
zations rely on external sources to provide interesting survey results
to their audience. The potential sources of public opinion data are
literally endless. News programs and newspapers have relied on
sources from the American Nurses Association (NBC News) and
the American Association of Retired Persons (NBC News) to
Quicken.com (NBC News) and MTV (CBS News). Academic in-
stitutions are also often cited. The information included in this type
of survey result serves two purposes. First, for the sponsor of the
poll, it delivers much-sought-after attention. For instance, when its
survey is reported on network news, the American Association of
Retired Persons not only connects with its current members but it
gets media attention that may attract new members. A poll done by
a corporate entity such as Quicken.com is likely done to increase
sales of a product.
REPORTING ON POLLING METHODOLOGY
With the use of outside and external sources comes another set of is-
sues centering on both sponsorship and quality of the opinion polling.
The partnership between a network and print media outlet adds some
credibility to the results of a poll, but not all media-sponsored polls are
the same. This is also true for surveys done by entities outside the
media organization that is running the story. While we can be rela-
tively confident in the procedures and practices of polls done by CBS
News and the New York 7imes, for example, other media-sponsored
polls may not be so credible. This is because many times the proper
techniques, methods, and standards are not applied to what the media
may call public opinion.
While most polls done by media organizations are scientific in
nature, “pseudo-polls” are becoming more prevalent? Pseudo-
polls are not really polls at all, but rather are “straw polls” of opin-
ion that are gathered when a media organization invites viewers,
listeners, or readers to call or write them with their opinion. In the
era of 24-hour news cycles and cable news channels, interest in im-
mediate reaction to an event, such as a presidential debate or a
politician’s press conference, has increased dramatically. The use
of a call-in or online poll can seriously mislead news audiences as
to the true opinions of their fellow citizens, since the polls are not
conducted scientifically- that is, they are not random samples of
the public and, therefore, are not likely to be representative of the
general population.
Additionally, journalists often make reference only to “the polls”
when reporting a story, with no mention of any specific aspects of
the survey that was conducted. A study by the Annenberg School of
Communication found that in the 1988,1992, and 1996 election cy-
cles, the generic term “polls” was cited as evidence more frequently
than any specific measure of public opinion done by a news orga-
nization or an external group.l0 Clearly, not all polls reported by the
media are created equal.
Because the media do rely on external sources for a good portion
of the polling data that they report, and because the general public
is not well versed in the intricacies of statistical sampling, question
wording and ordering, or data analysis, there is some basic infor-
mation that must be identified before any trust or confidence is
given to a poll done by a media organization or a news story that re-
ports polling data. Fortunately, the two major professional organi-
zations of pollsters and survey research, the American Association
for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) and the National Council on
Public Polls (NCPP), provide a number of guidelines for both the
press and the public.
Both journalists and the public must take care in evaluating the
quality of a survey that reports public opinion before considering
the results of that survey. The general public should be aware of cer-
tain aspects of opinion polls because they are the consumers of in-
formation and are the targets of poll sponsors. Journalists, too, must
be aware of some polling intricacies if they are going to accurately
interpret poll results in a story.
The NCPP has published a list of “20 Questions a Journalist
Should Ask about Poll Results” to aid reporters and editors in de-
ciding what poll results are worthy of being reported on television
or in newspapers. The NCPP guidelines are designed to help jour-

nalists weed out unscientific polls that are conducted by nonmedia
sources that are simply looking to gain some visibility by reporting
bogus or unreliable poll results. By asking themselves these ques-
tions, “the journalist can seek the facts to decide how to handle
every poll that comes across the news desk each day”” (see table
10.1). These guidelines focus on the who, what, where, when, and
why of polling and are the bare essentials of what to look for in the
results of public opinion research. By paying attention to these is-
sues, which are at the heart of quality public opinion research, jour-
nalists can ensure that the polls that do get reported are of high qual-
ity and will be of use to the general public.
While the NCPP list of questions focuses on the polls that come
to media outlets from external sources, the AAPOR “Standard for
Table 10.1. National Council on Public Polls-20 Questions a Journalist Should Ask
about Poll Results
1. Who did the poll?
2. Who paid for the poll and why was it done?
3. How many people were interviewed for the survey?
4. How were those people chosen?
5. What area (nation, state, or region) or what group (teachers, lawyers, Democratic
voters, etc.) were these people chosen from?
6. Are the results based on the answers of all the people interviewed [and not just a
subgroup of those interviewed]?
7. Who should have been interviewedand was not?
8. When was the poll done?
9. How were the interviews conducted?
10. What about polls on the Internet and World Wide Web? [In other words, do not
report any pseudo-polls.]
11. What is the sampling error for the poll?
12. Who’s on first? [Take care in reporting that one candidate is leading another in an
election poll.]
13. What other kinds of factors can skew poll results?
14. What questions were asked?
15. In what order were the questions asked?
16. What about ”push polls”?
17. What other p o l l s have been done on this topic? Do they say the same thing? If they
are different, why are they different?
18. So I’ve asked all the questions. The answers sound good. The poll is correct, right?
19. With all these potential problems, should we ever report poll results?
20. Is this poll worth reporting?
Source: “20 Questions a Journalist Should Ask about Poll Results,” www.ncpp.org
214 Stephen K.Medvic and David A. Dulio
Minimum Disclosure” applies to what the media report from their

own internal polls as well as those external polls they cover (see
table 10.2).12These few criteria represent the most critical elements
of public opinion research; they can verify and validate the credibil-
ity of a poll that is reported on television or in a newspaper. They are
designed to help journalists “present material so that readers and
viewers have the necessary information to evaluate the quality of
the poll results being reported.”I3 AAPOR has even gone so far as
to censure one pollster, Republican Frank Luntz, because he failed to
provide thorough background information on survey research he did
for the Republican Party’s “Contract with America,” which received
a great deal of media attention prior to the 1994 midterm election^.'^
These guidelines can also be used by the general public as a check
on how a media organization reports public opinion polls. In other
words, they can help the viewer or the reader decide whether to be-
lieve what is being reported and can help the public be critical con-
sumers of public opinion research that is reported in the media. “Just
as customers in a supermarket often inspect the list of ingredients in a
product, so too should consumers of public opinion question what
went into a poll before accepting its result^."'^ By knowing what to
look for in a news story that uses polling results, the public can be-
Table 10.2. American Association for Public Opinion Research, Standard for Minimal
Disclosure
1. Who sponsored the survey, and who conducted it.
2. The exact wording of questions asked, including the text of any preceding
instruction or explanation to the interviewer or respondents that might reasonably
be expected to affect the response.
3. A definition of the population under study, and a description of the sampling frame
used to identify this population.
4. A description of the sample selection procedure, giving a clear indication of the
method by which the respondents were selected by the researcher, or whether the
respondents were entirely self-selected.
5. Size of samples and, if applicable, completion rates and information on eligibility
criteria and screening procedures.
6 . A discussion of the precision of the finding, including, if appropriate, estimates of
sampling error, and a description of any weighting or estimating procedures used.
7. Which results are based on parts of the sample, rather than the entire sample.
8. Method, location, and dates of data collection.
Source: The American Association for Public Opinion Research, “Code of Professional Ethics and Practices,”
part 3, Standards for Minimal Disclosure, www.aapor.org.
come active rather than passive consumers of public opinion and make
an informed judgment on the quality of a poll. “In the course of be-
coming better consumers of public opinion research, citizens need not
become experts at drawing samples, constructing questionnaires, and
analyzing data.”16Rather, individuals simply need to be aware of some
of the different criteria that constitute a sound and scientific poll.
The question becomes, do the media provide this type of informa-
tion when they report the results of polls they have conducted them-
selves or that come from external sources? The short answer to this is
not very well. Several studies have shown that neither newspapers nor
television news programs do a very good job of reporting the criteria
set forth by AAPOR.I7News outlets usually do better when they cover
election polls versus nonelection polls,’* and newspapers are usually
more complete in their reporting of polling intricacies than are televi-
sion news program^.'^ The difference in reporting practices between
television stations and newspapers is likely due in part to the fact that
newspapers have less stringent time and space constraints than do tel-
evision programs, allowing them to report factors such as question
wording, sample size, sampling procedure, and selection criteria.
Herbert Asher contends, however, that not all the blame should
be placed at the feet of news organizations?O He points out that the
AAPOR and the NCPP standards are aimed at the “survey organi-
zations and pollsters who release the results rather than to the me-
dia that are covering the results.”21While national news organiza-
tions do have their own in-house polling operations, many of the
polls they report still come from external sources, which may or
may not provide the requisite information. Additionally, Asher ar-
gues that some of the standards are unclear and subjective?2For ex-
ample, “different polling organizations might very well disagree
about the meaning of ‘instruction or explanation . . . that might rea-
sonably be expected to affect the response”’23(see table 10.2).
THE CONTENT OF PUBLIC OPINION COVERAGE
While the issues raised above focus on how the media report public
opinion and the care they take to make sure their audiences are
properly informed, another concern is what they report and whether

it is an accurate representation of public opinion. If the results of a
poll are taken out of context, or are presented in a misleading way,
it makes no difference how well a survey is conducted or how much
a newspaper or television program reveals about the details of the
poll. These concerns apply to whatever the media are reporting on,
whether it be an issue like abortion, a political actor or institution
such as the president or Congress, or an election campaign.
A full discussion of the complexities and issues of question word-
ing in polling is beyond the scope of this ~hapter.2~ However, as
both the AAPOR and NCPP standards indicate, public opinion can
be misrepresented if the full wording of a question is not reported.
Furthermore, public opinion can be misunderstood if the media se-
lectively interpret findings from a poll.
Very often, a survey, whether it is conducted or commissioned by
a news organization, or is from an external source, asks a number of
different questions about the same topic. Asking about the same is-
sue or phenomenon multiple ways may produce multiple sets of re-
sults that can indicate different things about the public’s beliefs and
attitudes. The leeway this gives the media can cause difficulties for
both reporters and editors (and producers in the case of television),
as they are constrained by the space and time limitations of modem
journalism as well as the intense competition among news organi-
zations today; they all worry about ratings or the number of papers
they sell. As Asher points out, “Even simple description can pose a
problem if time and space constraints force the media to cover only
a subset of the items on a topic.”25Does the reporter write the story
that is most memorable, or does he/she report each of the different
sets of results? The logic of space and time constraints and compet-
itive pressures would say that the most alluring and captivating of
the results will be reported.
As an example of the power and force of question wording in
defining how a story is reported, one has to look no further than a
2000 Washington Post poll that asked a sample of 1,225 registered
voters a number of different questions about education reform (see
table 10.3). The results of the survey clearly show that the public
was deeply divided over the issue of school vouchers. However,
Table 10.3. Selections from a Washington Post Poll on Educational Reform

Provide parents of a child in a failing public school with a $1,500 federal voucher to
send their child to another school. Would you favor or oppose this program?
Favor 48%
Oppose 49%
Don’t know 3 ‘/o
Do you favor this suggestion for how the federal government might improve education:
Provide parents with more alternatives such as private or charter schools if they don’t
want to send their child to a traditional public school.
Strongly favor 3 6%
Somewhat favor 27%
Somewhat oppose 12%
Strongly oppose 21%
Don’t know 4%
This poll was of 1,225 registered voters and was conducted by telephone between May 11 and 22,2000. The
results were taken from www.washingtonpost.com, 0 2000, The Washington Post. Reprinted with permission.
there was strong support for educational choice in the form of char-
ter or alternative schools; 63% of the public supported the idea of
some type of school choice.
These data represent two important points. First, question word-
ing can influence the responses to a survey item. Second, and more
important for our purposes, the results from the survey can present
a dilemma to the reporter or editor. If the results from the question
using the term “vouchers,” a hot and divisive topic in the 2000 cam-
paign, were to be reported, the story would have a completely dif-
ferent slant than if only the question asking about “alternatives”
were mentioned. Moreover, a completely different story could be
written if both questions were discussed.
Examples of potential conflict between various interpretations of
public opinion are common in the reporting of polling data. The dis-
crepancy between President Clinton’s personal approval (consistently
low ratings) and his job performance evaluation (consistently high
ratings) was a recurring topic during the last two years of his presi-
dency. As an illustrative case here, imagine the story that could have
been reported if only one of these figures were mentioned. Only half
the story would be covered if just Clinton’s personal approval were dis-
cussed or only his job approval ratings were mentioned. Fortunately,
for the most part, the media reported both sides of this story through-
out Clinton’s last months in office.
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTION COVERAGE
Finally, a similar phenomenon is witnessed during an election cycle.

From nearly the beginning of any campaign until the final weekend
before election day, the media report preelection polls that ask poten-
tial voters about their choice of candidates. Whether they ask a generic
question (i.e., “If the election were held today, would you vote for the
Democratic candidate or the Republican candidate?’) or a question
that names specific candidates, the media seem to have a fascination
with polls that try to assess who is ahead and who is behind at a cer-
tain point in a campaign. The fixation on the “horse-race” aspect of a
campaign has led to a great deal of criticism of the media.
Critics argue, among other things, that there is a lack of attention
to issues in modern coverage of campaigns. Thomas Patterson ar-
gues that the media use a “game schema” when reporting on elec-
tionsF6 That is, the media cover elections as if they were a game, in
which strategy and the score (i.e., poll results) are more important
than issues and whether “candidates play the game well or
poorly.”27The game schema is opposed to the “governing schema,”
in which policies matter and candidates or parties are judged ac-
cording to their issue positionsF8
The media’s use of the game aspect of public opinion returns us
to some of the concerns mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
Asher points out that this is another way in which the media can cre-
ate news rather than simply reporting itF9 Again this stems from the
constraints under which media outlets operate-both the space lim-
itations and the competitive market they face. The horse-race aspect
of election coverage allows any media outlet to quickly gain atten-
tion in very little space or time. In addition, the results may contain
what appear to be tantalizing characteristics if new data show any
change from the last poll that was done. Even the slightest shift
from one candidate to another or from one party to another seems
to elicit great reactions from even the most respected media outlets.
But this type of reporting can be suspect in that the “shift” in pub-
lic opinion may not be a shift at all but merely the result of sampling
error. If, for example, the margin of error in a poll is 3 percentage
points and the media report a shift in support that is only 2 percent-
age points, there are no statistical grounds to assume that there has
been a significant change in support for either candidate?O
Despite the fact that preelection polls are often reported in a
somewhat misleading way, the accuracy of those polls is usually
quite impressive. Even in the razor-thin election of 2000, the results
of the final preelection polls fell within the margin of error (see
table 10.4). Of course, media polling does not stop when voting
starts. Polls are also conducted in key precincts on election day.
Table 10.4. Final Poll Results from Various Media Outlets for 2000
Questiona: If the presidential election were held today, would you vote for Democrat Al
Gore, Republican George W. Bush, Green Party candidate Ralph Nader, Reform Party
candidate Patrick Buchanan, or someone else?
Bush Gore Nader Bush lead

Washington Post! 48 45 3 +3
ABC Newsb 48 45 3 +3
{11/3-5; 1,801; +/-2.5)‘
CBS News/New York Times 44 45 4 -1
{11/4-6; 1,091; +/-3)
CNN/USA Today/Callu p 48 46 4 +2
{11/5-6; 2,350; +/-2)
I6 D/CSM/TIPpd 48 46 4 +2
11 1/4-6; 1,292; +/-2.8)
Reuters/MSNBCnogby 46 48 5 -2
(1 1/4-6; 1,200; +/-3}
Fox Newdopinion Dynamics 43 43 3 0
(1 l/l-2; 1,000; +/-3)
NBC/Wall Street Journal 47 44 3 +3
(1 1/3-5; 1,026; +/-3.1)
Averages 46.3 45.3 3.7 +1
Actual results 47.87 48.38 2.73 -0.51
a Question wording varies slightly from poll to poll. For example, some mention vice-presidential candi-
dates, while others do not. Furthermore, some polls give the respondent an option of being “unsure,” while
others only record uncertainty if it is volunteered by the respondent.
b ABC News and the Washington Post shared data collection, then independently applied their own mod-
els to arrive at likely voter estimates.
c Numbers in brackets represent the dates of the poll, the number of likely voters surveyed, and the margin
of error.
d Investor’s Business DailyKhristian Science Monitor/TlPP
Exit polls are self-administered questionnaires given to voters as

they leave the polling place. The precincts in which exit polls are con-
ducted are chosen based on “past voting behavior, geographic regions
(within or across states), urban vs. rural counties, percent foreign
stock, type of voting equipment, or poll closing times.”31Specific vot-
ers are selected at random according to a “sampling interval”; for ex-
ample, every 20th person might be asked to participate?* In recent
years, exit polls have been conducted for the media in every state and
the District of Columbia (in addition to separate, national exit
The results of exit polls are used for two purposes. First, demo-
graphic information can be coupled with vote choice to explain
which groups voted for which candidates and to what extent. Ques-
tions that tap the reasons for a person’s vote choice can also help ex-
plain why an election turned out as it did. Second, the results of the
election can often be determined from the results of the exit poll.
When entered into a statistical model along with actual vote counts
throughout the day (as well as other variables), the exit poll results
make it possible to project the winner of the election. The use of exit
polling on election day means that the media change course from
trying to predict what will happen to explaining what did happen.
Arguably, exit polls are the most important measure of public opin-
ion the media will conduct because of the uses of that information.
The failure of the media to accurately make projections based on
exit polls caused a great deal of consternation on election night
2000. It should be noted, however, that while anger about exit polls
might be justified with respect to election projections, the other pur-
pose of exit polling is to help us understand the complex dynamics
surrounding elections. To that end, we need careful thought about
how to improve the reporting of exit poll results, not sweeping con-
demnation of the use of exit polls generally.
ELECTION NIGHT 2000: WHAT WENT WRONG?
“[Ilf we say somebody’s carried a state you can pretty much

take it to the bank, book it, that that’s true.”
-Dan Rather, CBS Anchor, early evening, November 7,2000
“I’m always reminded of those west Texas saloons where they

had a sign that says, ‘Please don’t shoot the piano player; he’s
doing the best he can. . . .’ That’s been pretty much the case
here tonight over this election.”
-Dan Rather, approximately 3:45 a.m., November 8, 200034
The problems with using exit polling to report on elections and their
outcomes-or at least the problems with the way the media cur-
rently use exit polling- became patently obvious on election night
2000. Media “projections” that Vice President Gore had won the
state of Florida, and their subsequent retractions, along with further
proclamations of a Bush win in Florida (including the designation
of the Texas governor as “President-Elect Bush”), and the retraction
of those projections, combined to give the U.S. media the biggest
collective embarrassment they have, perhaps, ever faced.
Mistakes of this sort are not unprecedented. In 1936, after four
stunningly correct presidential election predictions, the Literary Di-
gest blundered by forecasting a landslide for Republican Alf Landon
(who lost by over 23 percentage points to President Franklin Roo-
sevelt) ?5 Similarly, but for different reasons, pollsters incorrectly
predicted a victory for Thomas Dewey over President Harry Truman
in 1948?6 Yet what makes these cases different from the 2000 elec-
tion is that the media used exit polls to make the call in the latter,
whereas the previous mistakes were based on preelection polls.
While one might assume that exit polls are more accurate than
polls taken before the election (since the former measure how peo-
ple report having voted versus what they claim are their voting in-
tentions), exit polls themselves have been wrong before. In 1989,
Douglas Wilder won the Virginia gubernatorial election by less than
one percentage point, though exit polls suggested a ten-point win;
in 1992, exit polls indicated that Patrick Buchanan would finish just
six points behind President George Bush in the New Hampshire pri-
mary, but he lost by sixteen points; and in 1996, Senator Bob Dole
was projected to come in third in the Arizona primary, behind Steve
Forbes and Pat Buchanan, when, in fact, he finished a close second
to F0rbes.3~In each case, it should be noted, the eventual winner
had been correctly projected, a fact that helps erase from memory
222 Stephen K . Medvic and David A. Dulio
the mistaken margins of victory. Given the importance of the race

and the magnitude of the errors, however, few will soon forget the
media blunders of election night 2000.
By now, the details of that night are familiar to most people. Six
news organizations-CNN, Fox News, NBC, CBS, ABC, and the
Associated Press-use the Voter News Service (VNS) to gather exit
poll data and conduct analyses for projecting election outcomes. On
election night, NBC was the first to project a Gore win in Florida,
at 7:48 p.m. EST, based on the VNS “CALL GORE’ determina-
tion.38 “Call” status “is not yet an actual projection of a . . . victory
by VNS, but is an alert to its clients to examine the data and to con-
sider whether they wish to call the state.”39CNN and CBS (which
used a joint “decision team” to evaluate VNS results) followed
NBC minutes later, and just before 8:OO p.m. VNS moved Florida
to the “WIN GORE’ category. This was clearly a significant devel-
opment; most observers knew going into the election that Florida
would be close and that the winner of that state would be in a com-
manding position to capture the White House. Of course, there were
other states that would be central to a winning combination of elec-
toral votes. Michigan and Pennsylvania were among them, and
Gore was called the winner of those states at 8:OO p.m. and 8:47
p.m., respectively.@ At that point, had the Florida projection been
accurate, it would have been nearly impossible for Bush to win.
At 9:38 p.m., however, “VNS sent a message [to its clients] that
read, ‘We are canceling the vote in Cnty 16-Duval Cnty, FL-vote
is ~trange.”’~’ CNN and CBS retracted their calls for Gore in
Florida at 9 5 4 p.m., and by 10: 16 p.m. VNS had retracted its deci-
sion to place Florida in the “WIN GORE” category!* Interestingly,
just as VNS was reversing itself on the Florida call, it was awarding
New Mexico to Gore; hours later, New Mexico would again be con-
sidered “too close to call,” only to end up in Gore’s column weeks
later. Similarly, VNS projected a victory for Maria Cantwell in the
Washington Senate race, when, in fact, the election was not decided
until December 1 following a recount. Though some of the hasty
calls made by VNS were “correct” to the extent that the eventual
winner had been projected, it would be hard to say those calls were
“accurate,” at least at the time they were made!3 In the end, VNS
exit poll results for the presidential race were incorrect in eight
states, and VNS calls were wrong in three.44
For nearly four hours, the nation waited as real votes were tallied
in Florida. At 2:08 a.m. on November 8, VNS determined that Bush
had a 5 1,000-vote lead in Florida, with roughly 180,000 votes left
to count. According to VNS calculations, Gore would need 63 per-
cent of the remaining votes to win Florida. Fox News gave
Florida-and the presidency-to Bush at 2:15 a.m., followed by
NBC at 2:16 a.m., CNN and CBC at 2:17 a.m., and ABC at 2:20
a.m. Interestingly, VNS and the Associated Press never officially
made the call for Bush in Fl0rida.4~
At around 3:OO a.m., Vice President Gore phoned Governor Bush
to congratulate him on his victory. Yet the actual vote count was
showing an incredibly close election. Apparently, Bush's supposed
5 1,000-vote lead had been based, in part, on erroneous information
from Volusia County."6 By 3: 15 a.m., sources began to tell reporters
that there would likely be an automatic recount of the Florida vote.
Less than 45 minutes after conceding to Bush, Gore called Bush
again to retract his concession. Shortly after 4:OO a.m., those net-
works that had made a second projection in the Florida presidential
race retracted their call once agai11.4~
The big question, of course, is why did these mistakes occur?
Oddly enough, the problems on election night 2000 were caused by
too much and too little competition between news organizations. In
many ways, the seeds for this debacle were planted in 1990,when the
network news organizations, the Associated Press, and CNN formed
Voter Research and Surveys (VRS). Prior to that point, the media had
used a pooling arrangement called News Election Service (NES),
which simply gathered actual voting results from precincts and pro-
vided those results to the member news organizations. Exit polling,
which had begun in 1967, was done individually by the various news
organizations at a tremendous cost. With the creation of VRS ,the me-
dia would share the costs of data gathering by producing one set of
exit poll results. The analysis of those results, however, remained the
responsibility of the individual news outlets. Then, in order to cut
costs even further, NES and VRS were merged in 1993."8 Voter News
Service, the new consortium, would continue to conduct exit polls
and gather data, but would also analyze exit poll responses in combi-
nation with actual vote counts to provide subscribers with projected
election re~ults.4~ This monopoly on information, some argued, was
bound to eventually cause a problem?O
Indeed, many of the errors on election night stemmed from the
fact that all of the news organizations relied on the same source for
data and primary analysis. Among the specific problems at VNS,
according to a report commissioned by CNN, were a serious lack of
communication between VNS and the member news organizations,
and poor quality control of the data, allowing multiple errors in vote
counting to enter the VNS system.s1 Generally speaking, however,
the problem was that only one source gathered and had primary re-
sponsibility for analyzing the data. Steven Brill, former publisher of
the media watchdog magazine Brill s Content, argued,
The simple fact is that the news media’s election-night fiasco hap-
pened because the press seems to have violated antitrust laws by or-
ganizing a cartel called Voter News Service that was guaranteed to
eliminate competition for a quality product-and, therefore, des-
tined one day to produce a defective product that no one could tell
was defective because there would be no alternative products to
compare it to?*
Ultimately, however, the news organizations themselves were re-

sponsible for making a call on the air. In fact, they all had hired their
own team of analysts to double-check the conclusions made by
VNS. As the authors of the CNN report note, “after ABC used its
own personnel during the 1994 congressional elections to make
calls, sometimes ahead of VNS and thus ahead of its competitors,
the other networks created their own decision desks or decision
teams to analyze data received from VNS on Election Night.”53
Thus, despite the lack of competition with respect to data gathering
and primary analysis, there remains fierce competition among the
networks to be first in calling an election. The result is that networks
are “driven by what appears to be a compulsion, both because of
competition and because of the desire to satisfy perceived audience
demands, to provide an election result.”s4 As the CNN report con-
cludes, “a news environment that cultivates the urge to a definitive
conclusion impelled CNN, and the other networks, in such a way as

to contribute to the inaccuracy of the reporting that evening and the
resulting confusion that followed the election.”55 Indeed, VNS
never made a second call in Florida; the networks made that deci-
sion themselves, though admittedly it was based on what seemed
like fairly solid evidence from VNS. Nevertheless, some argue that
it was precisely the desire to avoid being “scooped,” or beaten to a
story, that forced the networks to quickly follow Fox’s lead once it
projected a Bush win?6
Exit polls are very difficult surveys to administer. Though many
of the mistakes made on election night 2000 were specific to this
particular evening, there are many sources of error that plague exit
polls, and their use to project outcomes, generally. Sampling error,
which exists in all polls and surveys, increases with exit polls be-
cause the sampling design is more complicated than the simple ran-
dom sample typically used in telephone polls ?7 Nonresponse poses
another problem for exit polling. Potential respondents may either
refuse to participate or may simply be missed by the interviewer
(because, for example, the respondent does not leave the polling
place in the area where the interviewer is stationed). While some
research suggests that exit poll respondents do not differ signifi-
cantly from nonrespondents, the potential for bias does exist, par-
ticularly because older voters have been found to refuse more than
younger voters .58
Similarly, some voters may be systematically excluded from exit
polls (that is, there is coverage error) because they either voted early
or by absentee ballot or because they voted during a part of the day
when the exit poll was not being c ~ n d u c t e d Indeed,
.~~ VNS esti-
mated that 7.2 percent of the total 2000 Florida vote would be ab-
sentee ballots, whereas such voters actually accounted for 12 per-
cent of the votes cast.60As more and more voters choose to vote in
ways that make them physically absent at the polls on election
day -in Oregon, for instance, the entire presidential election was
conducted by mail -exit polls will become increasingly difficult, if
not impossible, to undertake. Finally, at least with respect to the ad-
ministration of exit polls, measurement error-or the amount of er-
ror caused by things like question wording, format, and order-
must be considered.6l
Once obtained, exit poll data are used in models that project elec-
tion outcomes. The development of these models requires a sophisti-
cated understanding of both elections and statistics. Because the as-
sumptions used to construct an election night model are based, in
part, on a previous, comparable election, the choice of the compari-
son election is crucial to the success of the model. In 2000, VNS used
the 1998 Florida gubernatorial election as the comparison election.
As it turns out, according to an analysis by VNS, the 1996 presiden-
tial race in Florida or the 1998 Florida Senate election would have
been a better comparison for 2000.6*In the end, we may never know
exactly what went wrong in Florida. In 1996, VNS had to retract an
incorrect projection for the Democratic challenger in the New Hamp-
shire Senate race and “years later it was still trying to figure out how
that happened.”63Nevertheless, recommendations for future elections
are already numerous. The American Antitrust Institute has urged the
Justice Department to break up the VNS Lawmakers in
several states are considering implementing (or increasing) a buffer
zone-of up to 1,000 feet according to a Nebraska proposal-
between a polling place and where exit pollsters may stand. Others
want exit polling banned altogether. Still others would like to make it
illegal to call an election before the polls cl0se.6~Finally, there is
widespread interest in a uniform poll-closing time, though multiple
time zones make this idea difficult to translate into practice.
The First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press would likely
mean that most of this legislation (with the exception of a uniform
poll-closing time) would be declared unconstitutional if it became
law. Even a uniform poll-closing law might face constitutional ob-
jections on federalism grounds. Thus, news organizations will be left
to police themselves. But that does not mean nothing will be done.
For example, CNN has promised the following policy changes?
Major reforms of VNS as a condition of CNN’s involvement

(including rewritten projection systems and statistical models,
better estimates of absentee and early voting, and upgraded
technical capabilities)
A second source of exit poll data in states with the closest races
No use of exit polls to project close races (i.e., those that can-
not be called immediately when the polls close)
No calls in elections in which the vote count shows a margin of

less than 1 percent
No projections in a state until all the polls are closed in that state
“Behind the scenes” reporting of how exit polls and the net-
work’s decision desk operate
A change in language to indicate the lack of certainty inherent
in projections based on exit polls (e.g., “CNN calls Candidate A
the winner in Florida” will be replaced with “Based on exit poll
estimates, CNN projects that Candidate A will win Florida”)
The use of more outside expertise at VNS
Support for a uniform poll-closing time
In all likelihood, some version of VNS will be in place in 2004 and

beyond. Whether or not two years is enough time to fix the prob-
lems that were exposed in the 2000 elections remains to be seen.
Of course, it is not entirely clear that the mistakes of 2000 had any
real impact on the electoral process. Republicans claim that the call for
Gore in Florida, before all the polls had closed there, may have de-
pressed turnout in the panhandle. Furthermore, some wonder whether
the early calls for Gore in Florida, Michigan, and Pennsylvania had a
negative effect on turnout in other states where voting had not yet
ended. On the other hand, Democrats argue that the second call in
Florida-making George W. Bush the president-elect-gave Bush an
unfair advantage during the recount phase by establishing him as the
presumptive winner. Regardless of whether these consequences can be
demonstrated, it has become clear that every effort must be made to
preserve the right of the voters-and only the voters- to determine the
outcome of elections. Furthermore, the media’s use of public opinion
in the form of exit polls on election day should fulfill their obligation
to report the news rather than create news.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the media’s role in measuring, reporting,

and interpreting public opinion. We have argued that the media no
longer simply report the news; they can also create it. They do so,
by and large, by conducting public opinion polls, the results of
which become news in and of themselves; the media also rely on

external sources for public opinion data that may or may not be
newsworthy. Yet, reporting on poll results often falls short of the
ideal set by professional polling associations. Critical consumers of
the news should be able to determine the credibility of a poll or sur-
vey based on basic information provided by the media (e.g., the
sample size, the dates a poll was conducted, the question wording,
the margin of error, etc.).
When it comes to covering elections, the media have come to rely
extensively on public opinion. Polls are ubiquitous in election re-
porting, and horse-race coverage now predominates over policy
considerations. Indeed, polling continues into election day in the
form of exit polls. But exit polls are subject to various forms of er-
ror, and in close elections those errors can lead to mistaken projec-
tions of the winner. That is precisely what happened in the historic
election of 2000. Though we may never know exactly what went
wrong, we can reform the election day reporting process so as to
never face a disaster like that again.
1. What sources of polling data are more reliable, valid, and/or

credible-external polls or internal media polls? Why?
2. What are “pseudo-polls” and how useful are they in gauging
public opinion on a given topic? Why do you think the media
relies on them so much?
3. Scan today’s newspaper or television news for stories that cite
public opinion data. How were poll results used (e.g., was it the
focus of the story or did it support a conclusion)? How much in-
formation about the methodology was reported? Did you have
enough information to evaluate the credibility of the poll?
4. Thomas Patterson says the media uses a “game schema” for
election coverage. What is the “game schema” and in what
ways is such coverage problematic?
5 . What lessons should the media have learned from what tran-
spired on election night 2000?
6. Ultimately, does a heavy reliance on public opinion polling (and

the media’s reporting of it) enrich our democracy or damage it?
Explain.
Lavrakas, Paul J., and Michael W. Traugott, eds., Election Polls, the News
Media, and Democracy (New York: Chatham House/Seven Bridges
Press, 2000).
Mann, Thomas E., and Gary R. Orren, eds., Media Polls in American Poli-
tics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1992).
National Council on Public Polls, www.ncpp.org.
“Polls and the News Media: A Symposium,” Public Opinion Quarterly
44,no. 4 (Winter 1980).
Robinson, Matthew, Mobocracy: How the Media’s Obsession with Polling
Twists the News, Alters Elections, and Undermines Democracy (Roseville,
Calif .: Forum/Prima, 2002).
1. Chistopher Hitchens, For the Sake ofArgument (London: Verso, 1993).

2. The Vanderbilt Television News Archive is the source of informa-
tion on news story topics discussed in this paragraph.
3. Herbert Asher, Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should
Know, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998), 3.
4. Kathleen A. Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling,” in The Politics
o f N m s , ed. Doris Graber, Denis McQuail, and Pippa Norris (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998), 150.
5 . Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling .”
6. Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling.”
7. Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling ,”163.
8. Frankovic, “Public Opinion and Polling.”
9. Barry Orton, “Phony Polls: The Pollster’s Nemesis,” Public Opinion
5 (JuneIJuly 1982): 56-60; Asher, Polling and the Public.
10. Annenberg School of Communication, “Using the Annenberg Pres-
idential Campaign Discourse Archive,” Version 1.O (Annenberg School for
Communication, Annenberg Public Policy Center, Philadelphia, 1997).
11. National Council on Public Polls, “20 Questions a Journalist Should

Ask about Poll Results,” 2001, at www.ncpp.org/qajsa.htm.
12. American Association for Public Opinion Research, “Code of Pro-
fessional Ethics and Practices,” 1986 at www.aapor.org/ethics/code/html.
13. Michael W. Traugott and Elizabeth C. Powers, “Did Public Opinion
Support the Contract with America?” in Election Polls, the News Media,
and Democracy, ed. Paul J. Lavrakas and Michael W. Traugott (New York:
Chatham House, 2000), 101.
14. Richard Morin, “A Pollster’s Peers Cry Foul,” Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, April 28, 1997, 35; see also Traugott and Pow-
ers, “Contract with America.”
15. Asher, Polling and the Public, 15.
17. M. Mark Miller and Robert Hurd, “Conformity to AAPOR Stan-
dards in Newspaper Reporting of Public Opinion Polls,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 46 (1982): 243-49; Michael B. Salwen, “The Reporting of Pub-
lic Opinion Polls during Presidential Years, 1968-1985 ,,’ Journalism
Quarterly 62 (1985): 272-77; David L. Paletz, Jonathan Y. Short, Helen
Baker, Barbara Cookman Campbell, Richard J. Cooper, and Rochelle M.
Oeslander, “Polls in the Media: Content, Credibility, and Consequences,”
Public Opinion Quarterly 44 (1980): 495-614.
18. Miller and Hurd, “Conformity to AAPOR Standards.”
19. Paletz et al., “Polls in the Media.”
20. Asher, Polling and the Public.
23. Asher, Polling and the Public, 9 1.
24. See Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 9th ed. (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth, 2000); Earl Babbie, Survey Research Methods, 2nd ed.
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1990); Asher, Polling and the Public; Pamela
L. Alreck and Robert B. Settle, The Survey Research Handbook, 2nd ed.
(Burr Ridge, Ill.: Irwin, 1995); Floyd J. Fowler, Survey Research Methods,
2nd ed. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993).
26. Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Vintage, 1994).
27. Patterson, Out of Order, 57.
28. Patterson, Out of Order, 59.
30. As election day approaches, most media outlets conduct tracking
polls. Such polls are conducted daily with 250 to 500 people. The re-
sponses of those 250 to 500 individuals are then added to those from the
previous two days. In other words, tracking polls are rolling polls that
drop one-third of the respondents every day but add another third to the
total. Thus, a two percentage-point change in each of three consecutive
days would, in fact, signal a significant change in opinion.
3 1. Mark R. Levy, “The Methodology and Performance of Election Day
Polls,” Public Opinion Quarterly 47 (1983): 56; see also Daniel M. Merkle
and Murray Edelman, “A Review of the 1996 Voter News Service Exit
Polls from a Total Survey Error Perspective,” in Election Polls, the News
Media, and Democracy, ed. Paul J. Lavrakas and Michael W. Traugott
(New York: Chatham House, 2000).
32. Levy, “Methodology and Performance of Election Day Polls,” 59;
Merkle and Edelman, “1996 Voter News Service Exit Polls,” 69.
33. Merkle and Edelman, “1996 Voter News Service Exit Polls,” 69.
34. Rather quotes are found in Seth Mnookin, “It Happened One
Night,” Brill’s Content (February 2001), 98, 152.
35. For an examination of the problems in the 1936 Literary Digest
poll, see Peverill Squire, “Why the 1936 Literary Digest Poll Failed,”
Public Opinion Quarterly 52 (1988): 125-33. Incidentally, the Literary
Digest, once a very popular magazine, went out of business the year fol-
lowing its election poll mistake. Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How
Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), 70.
36. See Robert S . Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opin-
ion, 5th ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1995), 31.
37. Asher, Polling and the Public, 118. The Wilder mistake stems from
the willingness of white respondents to say they voted for Wilder, a black
candidate, when in fact they did not. Michael W. Traugott and Vincent
Price, “Exit Polls in the 1989 Virginia Gubernatorial Race: Where Did
They Go Wrong?’ Public Opinion Quarterly 56 (1992): 245-53. In the
Republican primary cases, it appears that Buchanan voters were more
willing to participate in exit polls than Bush or Dole supporters. Asher,
Polling and the Public, 118.
38. Though most of the polling places in Florida closed at 7:OO p.m.
EST, those in the Florida panhandle, which are in the central time zone, did
not close until 8:OO p.m. EST. Many felt that the premature call for Gore
may have discouraged turnout in the panhandle, which is solidly Republi-
can. That charge seems dubious given that the call was only twelve min-
utes before the polls closed. Nevertheless, the networks say they do not call
an election before the polls close in a state and this was a clear violation of
that policy. In the weeks following the election, the panhandle dispute
would fuel much of the Bush supporters’ anger about the Gore call.
39. Joan Konner, James Risser, and Ben Wattenberg, “Television’s Per-
formance on Election Night 2000: A Report for CNN,” 2001, at http://
a388 .g.akamai.net/f/388/2 l/ld/www.cnn.com/200 l/ALLPOLITICS/
stories/02/02/cnn .report/cnn .pdf, 11.
40. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,” ap-
pendix 4, i.
41. Mnookin, “It Happened One Night,” 150.
42. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,” 13.
43. Mnookin, “It Happened One Night,” 150-51.
44. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance ,”
appendix 3, ii; Mnookin, “It Happened One Night,” 15 1.
45. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,” 16;
Mnookin, “It Happened One Night,” 151.
46. There were, in fact, even more inaccuracies. Nearly 400,000 votes,
not 180,000, remained to be counted at the time of the Fox News call for
Bush. Furthermore, Brevard County was showing a vote total that under-
counted the Gore vote by 4,000. Thus, what had appeared to be a 5 1,000
Bush lead was actually a 27,000-vote lead, with 400,000 votes to be
counted, including many in the heavily Democratic counties of Broward,
Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Televi-
sion’s Performance,” 15.
47. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,” 16-17.
48. Fox News joined the VNS arrangement in 1996.
49. Steven Brill, “Fixing Election Night,” Brill’s Content (February
2001), 26.
50. To be fair, the news organizations still used their own analysts to
evaluate the information coming from VNS. Under most circumstances,
however, the pressure to “call” a state before the competition led these an-
alysts to essentially defer to VNS’s judgment. The Konner, Risser, and
Wattenberg report for CNN illustrates that conclusion.
5 1. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,’’ 18.
52. Brill, “Fixing Election Night,” 26.
53. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,’’ 19.
55. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg, “Television’s Performance,’’ 19.
56. Adding yet another bizarre twist to the story, John Ellis, the head of
Fox’s decision desk and a cousin of George W. Bush, was responsible for
Fox’s call for Bush. Needless to say, that fact angered Gore supporters, even
though decision makers at other networks vehemently deny simply jumping

on Fox’s bandwagon. See Mnookin, “It Happened One Night,” 152.
63. Leo Bogart, “Politics, Polls, and Poltergeists: A Critical View of the
1996 Election ,” in Election Polls, the News Media, and Democracy, ed. Paul
J. Lavrakas and Michael W. Traugott (New York: Chatham House, 2000),
305; see also Mike Mokrzycki, “Exit Pollsters Investigate Blown Call in
Senate Race in New Hampshire,’’Associated Press, 6 November 1996.
64. Brill, “Fixing Election Night,” 28.
65. “Weighing Election Turmoil, States Target Media,” 15 February
2001, at CNN.com.
66. “Statement of CNN Regarding Future Election Coverage,” 2 Feb-
ruary 2001, at CNN.com.
I1
Global Media and Foreign Policy
Maryann Cusimano Love
Do the media affect foreign policy in a positive or negative direction,

or not at all? Under what specific circumstances are the media more
or less likely to impact foreign policy, and how? The debates are not
new. The press in the U.S. colonies actively fostered the Revolution-
ary War against Britain, while the French press did not advocate for
democracy during the French Revolution; some argue this was key to
both outcomes. Yet the speed, reach, and intensity of media coverage
of foreign policy are relatively new. News is instant and global, as
fast and accessible as text and digital photos downloaded on the In-
ternet, and satellite-uplinked coverage broadcast in real time. The
cheapness and wide dispersion of information technology means that
a wider audience can access media products more quickly. Broad-
casts and print reports are no longer national, and national govern-
ments have decreased control with fewer state-owned media.
THE POSITIVE VIEW THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY
During the Cold War, when Germany was divided, approximately

90% of East German households tuned into free television and ra-
dio broadcasts from the democratic West. The people watched So-
viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev enact his perestroika and glasnost re-
forms of greater openness, while their ruler in East Germany, Erich
235
236 Maryann Cusimano Love
Honecker, steadfastly resisted any reforms to the failing communist

system. In 1989, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union
would no longer use force to prevent democratic transitions in its
satellite states, while pro-democracy groups in Poland and Hungary
negotiated transfers of power away from the communists, and Hun-
gary removed the barbed wire and guard towers that separated it
from noncommunist Austria. East Germans followed these events
closely through the Western media, and over the summer thousands
traveled to Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and to West German
diplomatic posts, attempting to flee to the West. When these states
announced they would no longer stop East Germans from leaving,
more than 100,000 East Germans emigrated to the West. When Gor-
bachev arrived in East Berlin to celebrate the 40th anniversary of
the establishment of East Germany on October 6-7, he warned Ho-
necker to change with the times, but Honecker resisted. Thousands
of protesters took to the streets, and their cries of “Gorby, save us”
could even be heard on state-controlled East German television,
which was unable to filter out the sound on their broadcasts. This
emboldened the resistance, and over the next few weeks over a mil-
lion East Germans protested in the streets. The communists tried to
respond to the crisis. During a televised nightly news briefing at 7
p.m. on November 9, 1989, Politburo member Guenter Schabowski
made an offhand announcement that reforms would soon allow East
Germans to travel freely to the West. The news spread instantly, and
huge crowds gathered at the wall demanding their right to leave.
Caught unaware, the guards initially resisted, but as the numbers
swelled the Politburo did not want a bloody battle. The Berlin Wall
fell, and shortly thereafter, so did East Germany and the Soviet
Union.
Did the global media cause the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end
of the Soviet Union’s control over other countries? Some argue yes.
British scholar Anthony Giddens believes that “[tlhe ideological
and cultural control upon which communist political authority was
based could not survive in an era of global media. The Soviet and
the East European regimes were unable to prevent the reception of
Western radio and television broadcasts. Television played a direct
role in the 1989 revolutions, which have rightly been called the first
Global Media and Foreign Policy 237
‘television revolutions.’ Street protests taking place in one country

were watched by television audiences in others, large numbers of
whom then took to the streets themselves.”’
According to this argument, real-time media broadcasts directly
affected public opinion and public action. Cheap and easy access to
technologies such as radio, television, and the Internet make possi-
ble access to information that is not censored or controlled by gov-
ernments. The information revolution, which the media facilitate, is
empowering individuals, and making it harder for oppressive
regimes to manipulate information and perceptions, and thereby to
control their citizens.
“The information revolution is thus profoundly threatening to the
power structures of the world, and with good reason. In Prague in
1988 the first protesters in the streets looked into CNN cameras and
chanted at the riot police, ‘The world sees you.’ And it did. It was
an anomaly of history that other Eastern Europeans watched the
revolution on CNN relayed by a Russian satellite and mustered
the courage to rebel against their own sovereigns.”2
Following this logic, the spread of a free and independent press is
important to secure the democratic transitions now taking place
around the globe. Since established democracies tend not to go to war
with one another? the spread of free media not only helps to depose
autocratic regimes but may also increase the chances for peace, as the
world witnesses a rise in the number of democratic states. Independent
media may help the growth of civil society, an important component
of democratization. Globalization is marked by an increase in the
number and power of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), some
of which are devoted to furthering the spread of independent media,
such as the National Press Institute, which focuses on assisting the de-
velopment of independent media in the former Soviet Union.
Finally, media coverage may help states to publicly debate and as-
sess foreign policy, the very hallmark of democratic process. The idea
is that foreign policy is improved by congressional scrutiny and pub-
lic debate: Many military leaders, such as President Reagan’s secre-
tary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, and his then-assistant, Colin
Powell, felt strongly that these were some of the clearest lessons
learned from the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In articulating the
WeinbergerPowell Doctrine, now taught at all U.S. military acade-

mies, they advised that there be strong public and congressional sup-
port (among other preconditions) before committing U.S. troops
abroad. Thus media coverage can be an important component of con-
ducting a successful, publicly supported, military intervention.
THE NEGATIVE VIEW: THE MEDIA AND A LOSS OF

FOREIGN POLICY CONTROL
Others disagree with this argument that free, independent media

may encourage positive foreign policy developments. These skep-
tics point out that the media can influence foreign policy in a nega-
tive way, by hijacking the foreign policy agenda around whatever
issues are in the media’s spotlight, by forcing policy makers into ill-
advised foreign policies that the media favors, by decreasing the se-
crecy needed for delicate foreign policy initiatives, and (in state-
controlled media) by being a tool of carrying out war or genocide.
According to this argument, the media shape public opinion in
ways that decrease public support for key foreign policy objectives.
This makes the conduct of foreign policy by experienced foreign pol-
icy experts more difficult. Many members of the U.S. military used
this reasoning and blamed the media for the U.S. public’s declining
support of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which
led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. According to this
view, the media were not patriotic and presented distorted images of
U.S. casualties, losses, and war atrocities in order to deliberately end
the US.presence in Vietnam or at least to increase their own ratings.
Reporter Morley Safer broke a story about the U.S. marines burning
civilian villages in Vietnam in an attempt to flush out supporters of
the communist Viet Cong guerrilla group. Safer was criticized by
then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk for supposedly inventing the story
and bribing marines to lie on camera, and for insufficient patriotism,
since he was a Canadian citizen. According to Safer, Rusk’s untrue
criticism is an example of blaming the messenger for telling unpleas-
ant truths about failed foreign policies? The U.S. was not able to pre-
vail in a violent, internal war in Vietnam at a cost that was acceptable
to the American Congress and public, as the French had failed before.
The media did not create this situation; they merely reported it.
But what about when media coverage creates the conditions for fail-
ure, specifically, when media coverage erodes the secrecy needed for
delicate foreign policy negotiations? During the Iranian Revolution in
1979,the U.S. Embassy compound was taken over by student extrem-
ists loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, and 66 U.S. citizens were taken
hostage. U.S. diplomat Ramsey Clark headed to Iran for secret negoti-
ations through back channels to come up with a face-saving release
for the hostages. NBC broke the news of the supposed-to-be-
secret negotiation mission, and in the glare of the television cameras
the Iranians broke off the talks. Would Ramsey Clark have been able
to broker a deal to release the U.S. hostages if the press had not ex-
posed the behind-the-scenes negotiations? While some hostages were
released or escaped, 52 hostages were held for 444 days, a story the
press covered nonstop using their newly acquired satellite technolo-
gies. The three major television networks devoted about one-third of
their weeknight news programs to the hostage story. Every night ABC
ran a --minute program on the situation, The Crisis in Iran:
Americu Held Hostage, which launched the career of Ted Koppel and
was renamed as the Nightline program. The intensity and volume of
media coverage made government efforts to release the hostages diffi-
cult. Generally, terrorists commit actions in order to gain publicity for
their causes. While the media were giving the hostage takers ample
free publicity for their concerns,what incentive did they have to release
the hostages? After the exposure of the Ramsey Clark mission, the
Carter administration believed it could not expect secrecy for its for-
eign policy initiatives. It wanted to conduct a military rescue operation,
but fear of media exposure led it to cancel any practice training and re-
hearsal exercises for the military operation. The military rescue effort
failed, and eight U.S. servicemen died in the Iranian desert. Did the
media coverage contribute to these failed U.S. foreign policy efforts?
In countries where the media are state controlled, the media may
bear particular responsibility for foreign policies of war or geno-
cide. In Rwanda, radio was skillfully used as an integral part of car-
rying out the genocide. Radio broadcasts not only incited people to
violence generally, but also announced specific lists of people to be
killed and instructions for doing so. Shutting down the hate media
can be an important step in stemming conflict.
In Western, privately owned media, the media’s role in causing
foreign policy failures has been of particular concern since the end
of the Cold War. Without the Cold War conflict as a guiding star
to foreign policy, it is argued, the media have an increased ability to
set the foreign policy agenda through their coverage of international
affairs. The concern is that extensive media coverage forces quick
and poor foreign policy decisions, dubbed “the CNN e f f e ~ t . ” ~
Since the world watched the Gulf War live on the Cable News Net-
work (CNN) in 1991, the rise of CNN and other 24-hour news
networks (and Internet sites) has intensified debates over the media’s
effect on foreign policy. People and policy makers sense CNN and the
new real-time media are important, but they are not sure exactly how
important. Different definitions also complicate the debate. Some de-
fine “CNN effect” as public diplomacy. For example, during the Gulf
War, presidential press secretary Marlin Fitzwater used CNN to speak
directly to both Saddam Hussein and coalition allies in real time, us-
ing the television broadcasts to try to influence their positions. Others
use “CNN effect” to denote the smaller time window for government
reaction forced by the real-time reporting of an event. Some, such as
former assistant secretary of state Rozanne Ridgway, speak of “a
‘CNN curve,’ which she describes as CNN’s ability to prompt popu-
lar demands for action by displaying images of starvation or other
tragedy, only to reverse this sentiment when Americans are killed
while trying to help.”8 This is similar to another use of the term by
veteran U.S. diplomat George Kennan, suggesting “a loss of policy
control on the part of government officials supposedly charged with
making that policy,” in which control is wrested from the government
by the media or likewise by the public?
THE SKEPTICAL V I E W MEDIA EFFECTS WHEN FOREIGN

POLICY I S ILL DEFINED O R CONTESTED
A third view critiques both previous arguments on the power of the me-
dia to affect foreign policy, either positively or negatively. The skeptics
Global Media and Foreign Policy 24 1
point out that these events are overdetermined; many other factors
brought about the end of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and the end of the Vietnam War. In Russia, free media tended to fol-
low, not lead, the democratic transition; conflict continues today in
Russia over media independence.1°In the late 1960s, press coverage of
the Vietnam War followed congressional and public opinion; it did not
lead it.” Only after Congress and the public became more skeptical
about and outspoken against the war in Vietnam did the media cover
these viewpoints and actions, but the press coverage followed, and
therefore did not cause, the change.I2A scant 2% of television cover-
age showed actual bloodshed, so media pictures were not predomi-
nantly bloody, and thus graphic pictures could not have caused the de-
cline in public and congressional resolve to fight the war.13
And as for the so-called CNN effect, studies suggest these media
effects in foreign policy are over~tated.’~ Most publics abroad don’t
have access to television (let alone CNN), therefore they do not see
or understand the English-language broadcasts. Further, media cov-
erage tends to follow, not precede troop deployments. Media cover-
age does not guarantee a policy response. For example, despite me-
dia coverage of the genocide in Rwanda, none of the major Western
powers intervened. The media showed Bosnian atrocities on televi-
sion for years with no U.S. re~p0nse.l~ The studies suggest that when
the government has a clear policy in place, the media can not force
an easy policy reversal or loss of government control over the policy,
and instead the government may be able to use the media to gain free
“advertising time” to sell its policies to the U.S. public. IJ howevel;
a policy vacuum exists (as is often the case when crises arise in less-
powerful and less-important countries in the developing world in the
post-Cold War period), then the media can exert an influence to raise
an issue to the foreign policy agenda or to frame the issue, in the ab-
sence of another position.16 According to this argument, any media
effects during the Vietnam War were caused by the Johnson admin-
istration’s failure to explain to the American public and Congress
why U.S. troops were fighting in Vietnam, and to clearly convince
them of what was at stake. In the vacuum created by an administra-
tion’s failure to set and explain its policy, the media may be able to
affect the foreign policy agenda. The media cover the viewpoints of
242 Maryann Cusimano Lave
government foreign policy elites; news coverage is heavily indexed

to official conflict. If officials agree about foreign policy, the media
cover that unity, and public opinion tends to agree with that official
consensus. If officials are in conflict about foreign policy, the media
cover that conflict among foreign policy elites, and public opinion
becomes more split over foreign policy options. Thus the media can
communicate and amplify the existing unity or disunity, creating
openings for foreign policy shifts or closing ranks around existing
policy. Media effects may be shown in specific cases to influence
public opinion, agenda setting, and the framing of an issue,17but me-
dia coverage alone does not guarantee a particular effect on foreign
policy. Effects vary with the content and context of the coverage.
However, regardless of how or whether the media affect mass pub-
lic opinion, the media may exert a direct effect on policy-making elites
both at home and abroad.18Thus media coverage can influence foreign
policy independent of whether the public is mobilized on particular
foreign policy issues. For example, President George H. W. Bush was
affected by media coverage of the famine in Somalia. After reading a
New York Times story on the humanitarian crisis there, he wrote in the
margins of the article, “This is terrible. Isn’t there something WE CAN
DO?’ and passed this note along to the State Department. For months
electoral concerns prevented President Bush from acting. But after los-
ing the 1992 presidential election to Bill Clinton, Bush intervened,
sending 20,000 U.S. troops into Somalia in his last days in office.
There was no loud outcry of public or congressional concern over So-
malia. Foreign policy was barely a factor in the 1992 election, and
Congress was on recess when the president initiated the troop deploy-
ment. But Bush admits that the media coverage of Somalia alerted him
to the problems there and mobilized his action.19
Further, many of the arguments concerning media effects are in-
consistent and self-serving. Reporters who claim credit for bringing
about democratic transitions abroad claim to have little effect on the
foreign policy process at home. The media minimize their own effect,
claiming that they merely report on the foreign policy process; they do
not affect it. Policy makers, in contrast, tend to exaggerate media ef-
fects, blaming the media for foreign policy failures (the Vietnam War,
the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt). But government officials do
not credit the media for rallying public support around successful for-
eign policies, for instance when the media played a role in rallying al-
lied, congressional, and public opinion behind the Gulf War. Further,
while U.S. policy makers decry irresponsible media coverage of gov-
ernment policy here, they suggest that foreign governments should
open themselves up to greater media scrutiny abroad.
Media effects can be difficult to prove empirically, since correla-
tion is not causation. Showing that media coverage occurred before
a foreign policy action does not mean the media coverage caused
the foreign policy action (just as your brushing your teeth this morn-
ing may not have caused the events that followed in your day). Gen-
eral laws are difficult to posit, since media effects vary depending
on the type of coverage and the context created by other interven-
ing variables, such as elite consensus. Thus all three views continue
to provide arguments, while scholars sort out the mixed evidence
for and against the various claims (although more scholars hold to
the skeptical view, of limited effects in specific circumstances).
PERCEPTIONS MATTER
While scholars debate under which specific circumstances the media

may exert particular influences, leaders believe that the media aflect
foreign policy and act accordingly to try to influence media coverage
of international affairs. Whether or not the media affect the content or
conduct of foreign policy, they can affect the image and perception of
foreign policy. Governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) and corporations believe that media coverage of international
affairs matters, and thus devote significant resources to media man-
agement strategies. Why? With global media, images spread far and
quickly, and perceptions matter. Sixty percent of the world’s countries
are now ruled by democratic governments, meaning that perceptions
of the ruling regime’s efficacy can now influence whether the rulers
will remain in office. More of the world’s economies are now market-
oriented, capitalist systems than ever before. This means that private
investors and individual consumers decide where to put their money,
and their perceptions of international affairs affect those investment
244 Maryann Cusimuno Love
decisions. As the Asian financial flu has shown since 1997, investors
may pull their monies out of sound and weak economies alike, if they
perceive their investments to be at risk. Advances in information and
communications technologies allow the media to broadcast informa-
tion instantly around the globe. Thus images can be passed to a wide
audience quickly and cheaply. As democracy has spread around the
globe, greater freedom of the press has spread also, while government
ownership and censorship of the media declines. The spread of capi-
talism also brings more private ownership of the media. Together these
trends -of more open societies, economies, and technologies-mean
that governments no longer have a monopoly on information about
foreign policy, while media images move quickly and globally.
Even nondemocratic states are now more concerned about interna-
tional perceptions and are more vulnerable to Western media reports,
given the increased importance of international investors in a global-
ized economy and the fluidity of global financial markets, which al-
low investors to easily pull their capital out of a country. Thus, while
Chinese leaders may not be interested in their own public’s opinions,
they are interested in courting foreign investors, and thus are more at-
tentive to Western media reports and public relations than they were
when their economy was not linked to the global economy.
Besides economic investing, military policy can be affected by
media-generated perceptions. For example, the media proclaimed
the Patriot missile defense system a success in the Persian Gulf
lending momentum to the push in Congress to spend more
money on missile defense systems and to scuttle the ABM treaty?l
The fact is that not a single attacking Iraqi Scud missile was inter-
cepted by the Patriot system**-but the media perception still
stands. As Lieutenant General William Odom noted,
A key debate emerging from the Gulf War [and in the military
generally] is the familiar one over the possibility of “victory
through air power” alone. . . . The image of the war conveyed by
the media has left this [pro-air power/pro-surgical bombing] im-
pression in the public mind, but appearances do not square with
realities . . . the number of tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting
vehicles destroyed as the war progressed from the air phase to the
land-air phase in Kuwait . . . were not very high until the ground
component of the war began . . . clearly ground forces destroyed
the majority . . . the issues are complex, and the television images
from the war can be mi~leading.2~
MEDIA COVERAGE OF FOREIGN POLICY
Leaders believe media coverage matters and act accordingly. But how
does the media cover foreign affairs? There are nearly two hundred
countries in the world. Each day events occur in all countries that af-
fect their relations with other states and nonstate actors, and vice versa.
Clearly, limitations on broadcast time and print space mean that not all
events that happen internationally each day receive media coverage.
Despite its motto, the New York Emes does not publish “all the news
that’s fit to print,” but rather, all the news that fits. How do reporters
and media organizations select which events receive coverage and
construct “stories” from the barrage of data, and how do these deci-
sions, patterns, or “biases” of media coverage affect foreign policy?
Two parameters influence media coverage of foreign policy. One is
that reporters are professionals. What and how they report on foreign
policy is influenced by their professional training and the “industry
standard” practices of their peers. We never see all the news on foreign
affairs.We see all that reporters believe is newsworthy, based on their
judgments as influenced by what they were taught in journalism
school or learned from their peers (as well as by their cultural and per-
sonal knowledge base). The second parameter is that media organiza-
tions are businesses. They do not exist to discover and disseminate
“truths”; they exist to turn a profit. If news organizations cannot earn
enough money by selling their product and selling advertising space to
sponsors, they close their doors. Therefore news coverage is influ-
enced by what editors believe will sell, by what reporters believe their
readers and viewers want to know, and even by what the owners of
media organizations believe should and should not be broadcast.
Reporters learn basic definitions of what is news in journalism
school. One popular definition contends that news events impact many
people or prominent people, the events are proximate to the broadcast
area, bizarre, timely (especially occurring within the last news cycle),
or at least are currently being talked about. Reporters learn to follow
the inverted pyramid concept that the “leads” or beginnings of their
stories should contain answers to the basic questions of “who, what,
when, and where?’ The “why and how” information, as well as fur-
ther elaboration of a story, follow, and may be cut due to space con-
straints. Since reporters do not know how much space or broadcast
time their editors will grant them, following this basic formula allows
a standard way to construct news stories and makes editing easier
(as the most vital information will be in the first sentences).
Given these standard practices, how do reporters tend to cover for-
eign affairs? Who is covered? Government sources top press coverage.
Heads of state are covered automatically, with the U.S. president re-
ceiving round-the-clock coverage by the U.S . media. The French me-
dia tend to cover the heads of major parties, whereas the U.S. media
tend to focus coverage on the “Golden Triangle,” sources from the
White House, Pentagon, and State De~artment.2~ Each country covers
the activities of government officials in its own state, neighboring
states, and states of key allies or adversaries. Former imperial states
cover events in their former colonies, and vice versa. In developed
countries, the activities and statements by the heads of the richest G-8
countries receive more media coverage than events in poorer and less
powerful states. Following heads of states, most coverage goes to
other government officials and known actors, including former gov-
ernment officials and the heads of the United Nations and other im-
portant IGOs, to whom reporters have the easiest access. Herbert
Cans, in his studies of who gets media coverage, found stories about
“known” actors such as government officials to outnumber stories
about “unknown” people 4 to 1F5 People not in government or pow-
erful positions, poor people, women, and nonwhites tend not to be
covered. People in poor countries generally only receive coverage in
the media of rich countries when there is war, famine, or disaster to re-
port in their states. In practice these trends also translate to gender and
racial biases. Nine out of ten experts quoted on ABC,NBC,and CBS
are men. Nine out of ten experts quoted are also white. More than two-
thirds of experts quoted are “baby boomers,” although the 1945-1960
generation makes up less than one-third of the U.S. population?6 Only
17% of news stories feature women at all, while women make up the
majority of the world’s population. The stories that do cover women
are more likely to be arts and entertainment or celebrity news features;
women rarely appear as news subjects in stories on politics (12%), in-
ternational crises (11%), or national defense (6%)?7
What gets covered? In general, the media cover what they think
their audiences will be interested in and buy. The media cover dra-
matic actions. War, conflict, disasters, and things that go boom re-
ceive media coverage, the foreign policy equivalents of car chases
and Arnold Schwarzenegger films. Not all wars or terrorist actions
are covered due to space and broadcast time limitations, creating a
dynamic in which conflicts and terrorist attacks compete against
each other for coverage. In the U.S., conflicts that involve U.S.
troop deployments, key allies, or neighbors receive more coverage
than conflicts in poor and distant countries (especially African
states). Terrorist actions that affect U.S. citizens receive steady cov-
erage. Middle Eastern terrorism is more likely to be covered than
other terrorist acts.28Colombia, Greece, and India have the highest
numbers of terrorist incidents (in 1999, over 100 incidents per coun-
try), far more than the Middle East, but terrorism in those three
countries receives little c0verage.2~Because most conflicts since the
end of the Cold War have been civil wars, and since most poor
countries receive little media attention except when there is conflict
or disaster, the media presents a false impression that all poor coun-
tries are marked by unending war and natural disasters. Peace and
reconciliation are underreported in the media. Unexpected events
and events that provide dramatic pictures receive media coverage,
whereas expected events that do not lend themselves to photos do
not get covered (which is why we don’t read headlines such as “In-
ternational Law Is Obeyed”). Western media show pictures of vol-
canic explosions in Sicily and of children with their limbs hacked
off in Sierra Leone, but do not show pictures of advancements
against AIDS in Brazil, or of improvements in the Italian legal sys-
tem. This leads to an underreporting of “good news” in international
affairs, and a persistent media bias toward cynicism.
Events that reporters have access to cover, that can be simplified
to clear “good guy versus bad guy” story lines, and that affect the
media outlet’s target audience receive top billing.3O This can lead to
nationalism and ethnocentrism in news reporting. As Associated
Press reporter Mort Rosenblum explains, “The closer news is to
home, the greater its import. A British press lord once tacked up a
memo in his Fleet Street newsroom: ‘One Englishman is a story.
Ten Frenchmen is a story. One hundred Germans is a story. And
nothing ever happens in Chile.’ The old Brooklyn Eagle had it: ‘A
dogfight in Brooklyn is bigger than a revolution in China.”’31Glob-
alization has changed some of these trends; China and Chile receive
more news coverage than earlier this century, now that they are key
Western trading partners. But the underlying dynamic would remain
true if you were to substitute an African state in the statement. For
example, when the U.S. embassy complexes in East Africa were
bombed in August 1998, U.S. media coverage focused more on the
12 dead U.S. citizens than the 289 African fatalities and over 5,000
African casualties from the explosions.
Primarily, the media cover what is easy to cover and what they
have always covered, which leads to a status quo bias in media cov-
erage, and a repeat of similar stories. This is very economical and
conservative, the argument being that if the public bought these news
products before, they will buy them again. However, it can lead to fa-
miliar scripts that present distorted images of the world. For example,
when the U.S. federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed on
April 19, 1995, the media immediately reported that Middle Eastern
terrorists were likely to blame. CBS featured a terrorism “expert”
who speculated that the bombing bore all the earmarks of Middle
Eastern terrorism. The New York Emes, hypothesizing about why ter-
rorists would have struck in Oklahoma City, noted that the city is
home to three mosques?2 The bombers turned out to be entirely
homegrown. Timothy McVeigh was U.S. born and bred, and had
served in the U.S. military. Distorted press coverage concerning the
Middle East and Muslims can add friction to the conduct of U.S. for-
eign policy. For example, after the September 11,2001, terrorist at-
tacks in the U.S., media coverage focused on “Islamic fundamental-
ists” as the culprits. However, fundamentalist Muslims, like
fundamentalist Christians or Orthodox Jews, hold to a more conser-
vative or literal interpretation of their faith. They do not drink alcohol
or behave promiscuously, and they do not endorse violence. In con-

trast, many of the men who conducted the attacks frequented strip
bars. They may cite religious reasons for combating the U.S. (U.S.
military bases in Saudi Arabia defile Islamic holy lands), but the me-
dia is incorrect in categorizing the terrorists as fundamentalists; they
are radicals or extremists. What may seem like a semantic point to
Western ears is an important distinction elsewhere in the world. Many
Middle Eastern and Muslim states are important Western allies
(Egypt), or control strategic oil reserves (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait), and
Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the world. Overplayed
and flawed, but familiar, media scripts can make media innovation
difficult and can strain diplomacy.
With regard to the “when” question, the increasing speed and
number of global media outlets, including the Internet, means that
reporters face a shrinking time horizon for coverage of foreign af-
fairs. Reporters have always reported on events they could cover by
their deadlines. Generally, stories tend to focus on events that hap-
pened within the last news cycle (since the last broadcast, or the last
newspaper or magazine edition). But the Internet and CNN are fur-
ther shrinking the news from the typical 24-hour news cycle, giving
reporters even shorter deadlines. This leads to an underreporting of
long-term trends, events that happen gradually, and a lack of histor-
ical perspective in foreign policy news stories, such as immigration
trends or global warming. Current anniversaries of past historical
events are one way reporters compensate for the media’s bias to-
ward the present tense.
Where do the media cover? Concerns for keeping costs down
have led to more stories’ being filed from the capital cities, which
thus intensifies the focus on heads of government and stories fea-
turing government sources, decreasing reporting from other areas.
For example, most reporters filing stories on the conflict in North-
ern Ireland are based in London, a fact that may affect the way they
cover the story and their access to information. The Irish Times has
one reporter charged with covering all of North America. He is
based in Washington, D.C., which affects his coverage of events
outside of Washington, especially in Mexico and Canada. Gener-
ally, the “where” in foreign affairs coverage is affected by where
reporters can access, which increasingly means where their editors

and bosses will allow them to go, based on how much it will cost.
Cost consciousness has led to a decrease in the number of foreign-
based reporters, an increase in reliance on wire service reports, and
an increase in “parachute journalism,” stories filed by reporters
flown in to cover a particular story, who may have little feel for,
knowledge of, or contacts in a country.33This leads to more stories
written in hotel compounds frequented by other reporters, or based
on conversations with cab drivers or other reporters, on people who
can speak English, rather than stories benefiting from a reporter’s
more in-depth knowledge of a place and its language. The media
are also constrained by where it is safe for them to operate, and
where governments will allow outside reporters. Coverage of
events in Sudan has suffered for these reasons.
The “why” and “how” questions are the most difficult ones for the
media to answer, and require the most expertise, knowledge, experi-
ence, and time to construct. Reporters’ time is in especially short sup-
ply in the Internet age. For these reasons, and reasons of cost and
space, they are the most frequently cut components of news cover-
age?4 Why and how may also be given less emphasis because of re-
porters’ fears that answering these questions borders on offering their
own opinions and analysis, rather than merely describing empirical
data. Answering the how and why questions is harder to do, and the
media usually focus on covering what’s easy. So why and how per-
spective stories are generally done in feature stories or news series, but
are often cut from the regular news stories, significantly watered
down, or reduced to familiar, but flawed, scripts. For example, ex-
plaining why and how genocide broke out in Rwanda in April 1994
required an explanation of the political, economic, and historical dis-
tinctions between the Tutsi and Hutu groups, the dynamics of “divide
and conquer” practiced during French colonization, and the ramifica-
tions of those divisions in Rwandan society today. Instead, most why
and how explanation was omitted from media coverage of the dra-
matic bloodletting. When U.S. media outlets did offer an explanation
it was an erroneous, ethnic script. “‘Pure tribal enmity’ (4/18/94) was
Erne magazine’s explanation for the ‘tribal carnage’ (4/25/94).”35This
explanation was false (the divisions between Hutus and Tutsis are not
tribal or ethnic in nature). The media have erroneously applied the

same flawed script to describe conflict in Bosnia and Somalia. Yet
even in countries where conflict correlates to ethnic or racial identities,
those identities are constructed and manipulated by leaders to bring
about conflict. Past civil conflict does not make future violence in-
evitable?6 Especially in coverage of foreign policy, which by its very
nature is often less familiar to audiences, cutting the why and how
questions damages the public’s ability to glean meaning from the rush
of daily description. Perspective and context for the dizzying list of
daily actions is often lost, leaving the public not only wondering why
certain foreign policy actions were taken, but also why the story is im-
portant, and why they should care. This can lead to a vicious circle in
U.S.reporting on foreign policy. Poor or spotty media coverage of for-
eign policy, which focuses on the same “bad news” stories and pres-
ents the world as a hostile and hopeless place, may make the public
less likely to tune in to foreign news reporting. Did the news stories
cause the public apathy, or is public apathy the reason why many edi-
tors and media owners are unwilling to devote greater resources to me-
dia coverage of foreign policy? This “which came first: the chicken or
the egg” question vexes citizens and journalists interested in under-
standing and improving media coverage of foreign affairs.
WHO MANIPULATES WHOM? STRATEGIES TO MANAGE

MEDIA COVERAGE AND SELL FOREIGN POLICY
Feeling that media images matter, and knowing how the media typi-
cally cover foreign policy, governments, NGOs, IGOs, and corporate
leaders try to influence media coverage of international affairs to sell
their foreign policy preferences. The media, in turn, try to use govern-
ment, NGO, IGO, and corporate news briefings and press releases for
their own purposes: to produce and sell their product. Picture blank
newspaper pages, or empty broadcast time, with each party jockeying
over how to fill that space. While often presented as conflictual, the re-
lationship between the media and governments, NGOs, IGOs, and
corporations is also symbiotic. The media could not exist without in-
formation. The more media budgets are cut and owners scrutinize the
bottom line, the more the media rely on actors’ press releases and
briefings for their stories. Governments, NGOs, IGOs, and corpora-
tions need to disseminate information in order to generate support for
their activities. Governments, NGOs, IGOs, and corporations provide
information to the media, but try to do so in a way that privileges their
interests and sells their foreign policy viewpoints.Who prevails in this
tug of war for releasing and shaping information varies by situation
and issue. In general, for any topic over which one party has a mo-
nopoly or can control the information flow, that party will have the ad-
vantage in how information is released or presented to the public. For
any situation in which the media has independent access to informa-
tion or can easily and cheaply access reliable information from many
separate sources, the media will have greater choice and control over
what, when, and how information is presented.
For example, the U.S. government exhibited great skill in shaping
media coverage during the Gulf War. It used several means to do so.
Reporters were restricted to the pool system. The government chose
which reporters and news organizations had any access to battlefield
coverage. The government escorted the media to sites of the govern-
ment’s choosing, and even then the media had to submit their reports
to government censorship. Most of the media spent most of the Gulf
War in hotel rooms in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia, reporting on govern-
ment press briefings, and rebroadcasting the Pentagon’s footage of
perfect bombing runs and surgical air strikes. The media had little in-
dependent ability to confirm or deny these rosy pictures and reports,
and no ability to track down stories that the government did not want
shown, such as stories about Iraqi and civilian casualties, missed
bombs, or failures to strike Saddam Hussein.
Not surprisingly, the media complained loudly about the pool
system restrictions. Yet the major media organizations all volun-
teered to abide by these restrictions. Why? Because from a media
organization’s viewpoint, the only thing worse than restricted ac-
cess to an important story is no access at all. The media feared that
if they did not voluntarily agree to the restricted access of the pool
system, the government would shut them out of the news flow en-
tirely, as the Reagan and Bush administrations did in Grenada and
Panama. The media also agreed to the pool system in the Gulf War
because they had been led to believe they would have greater au-
tonomy and access to information than actually turned out to be the
case. Objections to the Bush administration’s use of the pool system
to deny reporters access during the key first three days of the U.S.
invasion of Panama had been met with a series of negotiations be-
tween the media and the Pentagon. The media said they had been
given assurances of reforms to the system that did not materialize in
the Gulf War. Pentagon officials argued that in wartime national se-
curity concerns lead them to release information as they believe it
advisable. They believed they offered a great deal of information
and access to the media, and that security concerns overrode any
public right to know information other than what the government
chose to release. Reporters who chose not to abide by the pool sys-
tem risked arrest by the U.S. military, or the Saudi or Iraqi govern-
ment. Clearly, this was an example in which the U.S. government
controlled the battle space and therefore could control the informa-
tion flowing from that space. If the media wanted to cover the story
cheaply and reliably, they had to play by the U.S. government’s
rules. Since war sells, market dynamics made the media vulnerable
to elite manipulations and framing of the story.
In contrast, when the media is in place before conflict breaks out,
they are less dependent on the government for access to the story.
Also, when elite opinion is divided, the media will cover the con-
flict among officials, limiting the government’s ability to manage
the news.37For example, the conflict in Vietnam broke out in suc-
cessive stages over decades. Reporters were in Vietnam before U.S.
troops were. Since the battle space was broad, changing, never
sealed off or controlled by only one party; because the conflict was
never officially declared a war and occurred over a longer time
span; and because U.S . government officials were themselves di-
vided over the war, the government was not able to manage media
reports, as it was during the Gulf War.
In wartime governments have greater control over information if
the conflict is confined in time and space, if one side controls the
battle space, and if official debate is limited. Then independent ac-
cess to the battlefield may be too expensive or risky, or simply un-
available to the media, and they may therefore have to content
themselves with weaving their news products from unified official

press briefings and government-supplied film footage. When the
conflict takes place over time or in a wide swath of space over
which no one side has total control, and when official opinion is di-
vided, the media are more able to present information that differs
from government reports.
As the ease and cheapness of accessing information on a story in-
dependent of government briefings increase, governments will have
less ability to control the flow of information. Thus, generally, during
peacetime, government news briefings face greater competition from
information from other sources. Similarly, democratic governments
face more competition in shaping the news on foreign policy than non-
democratic governments. The media are generally state owned or state
controlled in nondemocratic states, and even private media from dem-
ocratic states may have dificulty garnering information to verify or
contrast nondemocratic governments’ releases of information. For ex-
ample, in democracies, the media have access to at least the opposition
party’s critique of any government foreign policy or economic report.
The media may often have easy access to several critical voices and
sources of alternative information on events. But when autocratic
China reports a healthy 7% economic growth rate, who can the media
consult to check this story? It can be dangerous, expensive, or impos-
sible to contact opposition sources of information within China. The
media may raise skepticism about the government figures by noting
that economic growth has been stagnant or declining over the last
decade in neighboring Japan and Russia, and that the rest of Asia has
experienced difficult economic circumstances since the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 1997. But the Chinese government figures could be true,
as China has a vast and growing domestic market and increasing rates
of foreign direct investment into China, which could be buoying the
Chinese economy whilst all around them stumble. It is more difficult
for reporters to access information challenging the Chinese govern-
ment’s economic forecasting than it is for them to compare and con-
trast the economic figures released by open, democratic states.
There are two exceptions to this generalization concerning the
media in democracies. One is that emerging democracies fall in be-
tween this continuum of more and less government control. Emerg-
ing democracies with longer traditions of independent media and

with media with greater access to financial backing have stronger
media outlets less subject to government control (Poland, Hungary),
than transition states with no history of independent media and
where the media have less-secure financial standing (Russia).
The second exception is reporting on terrorist incidents. The laws
in democratic states vary widely over how much the media are cen-
sored in their coverage of terrorist incidents. Britain has very strong
censorship laws that severely limit the media’s coverage of the con-
flict in Northern Ireland. Until the Good Friday Peace Accords mel-
lowed the conflict, British media were not allowed to broadcast the
voices of Irish Republican Army leaders or even the leaders of the
political party Sinn Fein, affiliated with the IRA. Viewers of U.S.
media broadcasts could listen to the voice of Gerry Adams, while
British viewers listened to the voices of actors or media anchors,
giving voice-overs to the words of the Sinn Fein leader. In some
countries, such as Japan and Israel, self-censorship and cultural and
market considerations may constrain media coverage of terrorist
acts more than legal restrictions.
Governments are not the only actors trying to influence media
coverage of foreign policy. NGOs, IGOs, and corporations also de-
vote considerable time, money, and attention to media management
strategies. Just as governments in certain wartime situations may
have a greater ability to control the flow of information from the bat-
tle space, there are rare situations in which NGOs, IGOs, or corpo-
rations may be able to control the information space. For example,
on February 16,1995, the British government approved Shell Oil’s
plans to dump the Brent Spar floating oil storage platform in the
North Sea. The plan was greeted with opposition from neighboring
states and environmental groups, including the environmental NGO
Greenpeace. Their members boarded the Brent Spar platform, and
organized an all-out media campaign against Shell and the dumping
of the Brent Spar platform. Shell responded in the courts, trying to
obtain a legal injunction against the group for trespassing. Green-
peace used sophisticated satellite-to-digital video feeds to provide
the media with pictures of their story. In addition, “independent jour-
nalists covering the incident at sea were ‘forced’ to report from the
Greenpeace ship, as it was the only available point of access. Shell

never offered to supply journalists with either ships or aircraft.”38
Opposition to Shell and Britain’s plan grew throughout Europe, and
Shell products were boycotted. Shell and Britain abandoned the plan
to dump the Brent Spar at sea, and neighboring countries enacted a
ban on sea disposal of decommissioned oil installations throughout
the North Atlantic and the North Sea. In this incident Greenpeace
had considerable control over the broadcast space (in part because
Shell did not pursue an effective media strategy) and was able to pre-
vail to change foreign policy. NGOs often rely on attracting media
coverage to help in their private fund-raising efforts, as well as in
their struggle to mobilize government res0urces.3~In practice, media
access may be difficult for NGOs to leverage into influence because
the NGO community is diverse and pluralistic; since there is often
no NGO “consensus” on an issue, the media finds diverging view-
points and information within the NGO community. Of course, the
same may be true of government, IGO, or corporate viewpoints, de-
pending on the issue. Since the media cover conflict, internecine dis-
putes are likely to attract media attention, thus fracturing an actor’s
ability to bring attention to its cause.
Corporate control of media outlets has led many to question
whether media reporting on foreign affairs can be unbiased, or
whether corporate interests will always shape media coverage of for-
eign policy, due to the bottom-line business concerns for media out-
lets to sell their products. This concern is nothing new. In the early
days of television news, Camel cigarettes sponsored the CBS evening
news. Edward R. Murrow had to have a Camel cigarette burning at
all times during the news broadcast, and intersperse coverage of the
Korean War with announcements that Camel was supporting U.S.
troops abroad by giving them cartons of free cigarettes (the broad-
casts never noted that these “contributions” were creating lifetime
customers by addicting soldiers to nicotine). Reporters had to ask per-
mission of the tobacco company for showing film footage of Winston
Churchill,who habitually smoked a cigar, not cigarettes.What is new
today is the concentration of corporate control in a very few hands,
due to mergers and acquisitions. While the advent of new technolo-
gies (cable and satellite television, the Internet) appears to have
opened up new media venues, in fact many of these various stations

and publications are owned by the same companies and carry the
same news products. For example, in 1945,80% of American news-
papers were independently owned. By 1982,50 corporations owned
almost all of the major media outlets in the United States, including
1,787 daily newspapers, 11 ,O00 magazines, 9 ,OOO radio stations,
1,OOO television stations, 2,500 book publishers, and seven major
movie studios. Today, nine corporations own it alLa How might cor-
porate ownership patterns affect foreign policy coverage, and influ-
ence foreign policy? Corporate concern for profits has cut the num-
ber of foreign correspondents, and made news organizations rely
more heavily on news services and stringers. This creates more repe-
tition of fewer views. All the major U.S. television networks are
owned by multinational corporations that benefit from globalization
and institutions such as the World Trade Organization, NAFTA, and
other free trade regimes. Simultaneously,their coverage of globaliza-
tion has tended to be positive, and coverage of antiglobalization pro-
testors has been negative.4l When two out of the three networks
(NBC and CBS) are owned by major defense contractors, can the me-
dia be unbiased in their coverage of national missile defense plans,
which would funnel billions of dollars their wayY2Corporations that
do not own media outlets can also exert influence, by threatening to
pull advertising dollars from programs or news products they find ob-
jectionable. While governments try to control the information flow to
shape media coverage of foreign policy, and NGOs and IGOs try
to tempt the media with attractive stories, corporations can get the
media where it counts: in their pocketbooks.
In general, governments, NGOs, IGOs, and corporations practice
similar strategies in trying to control or manage media coverage of
foreign affairs. If the actor can control the information space and the
media cannot independently access the story or information, the ac-
tor can have greater control in shaping the media coverage. If the
actor can provide the media with compelling pictures and emotional
stories that the media judges will sell news products, the media will
be more likely to air the actors’ images. The media are more likely
to air the views or information provided by government officials
(those in power and key opposition leaders), celebrities, powerful or
monied organizations or individuals (generally men), and groups lo-

cated in the capital city or who make media access easy. If courted,
local media may ask less difficult questions and be more likely to
run favorable coverage than national media outlets, but local media
outlets devote less coverage overall to foreign affairs than to local
news. Actors’ abilities to get their message across externally are
compromised by divisions internally. If the actor cannot “speak
with one voice,” media coverage will focus on the internal conflicts
and muddy the external message the actor seeks to project. Timing
is crucial. The media have broadcast and print space to fill each day,
but only a finite amount. Thus on “slow” news days, actors will
have an easier time placing stories with the media than on “heavy”
news days (during crises, wars, elections). Actors savvy about and
responsive to what the media wants and tends to cover are more
successful in using the media to disseminate their views and infor-
mation. Actors who do not make themselves accessible to the me-
dia or do not understand how to make their information “fit” media
parameters are more likely to find their views and information on
the cutting room floor.
Who manipulates whom in coverage of foreign policy in the
post-Cold War world? On the one hand, the globalization of the me-
dia means that stories travel farther and are rebroadcast more widely
than when there were fewer media outlets and more state-controlled
media. This makes a more complex target for government media
management strategies. Additionally, the greater importance of eco-
nomic, environmental, and humanitarian foreign policy stories, and
the decrease in international wars, means that the issues over which
governments have more opportunities for censorship or control
(wartime coverage), are not the most salient foreign policy issues
today. The rise in nonstate actors offers competing views, informa-
tion, and foreign policies to government views, information, and
foreign policy. These trends may undermine states’ ability to influ-
ence media coverage of foreign policy.
On the other hand, even in military affairs, the change from the
larger draft army of the World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam eras to
today’s smaller, all-volunteer U.S. force means fewer U.S. reporters
have military experience than in previous decades. The same is true
internationally, as an era of downsized militaries and democratic

peace means fewer reporters with military experience. Reporters
with less military experience may have less ability to critique gov-
ernment information on military affairs, and may thus be more sub-
ject to government manipulation. Some of the strongest critics dur-
ing the Gulf War were reporters with military experience, whereas
in some cases the most malleable reporters were those without it.
Ironically, due to global market dynamics, more media outlets
does not mean more news, and fewer state-controlled media means
more market-controlled media. More centralized media ownership
patterns, fewer foreign reporters, more reliance on pooled news ser-
vice reports, and an overall smaller news “hole” (meaning more
time for entertainment, sports, lifestyle, business coverage, and ad-
vertising), may translate into greater media reliance on press re-
leases, and more opportunities for savvy actors to influence media
coverage of foreign policy. Actors attempt to use the media to sell
their foreign policies, while the media attempt to use foreign policy
to sell their products.
1. How does media coverage affect international politics? Sum-

marize the positive, negative, and skeptical views. Which do
you agree with and why?
2. Who, what, and where tends to receive the most coverage in
the international news media? Who, what, and where tends to
receive the least coverage? How does this affect the public’s
perception of global politics?
3. Why are the “why” and “how” dimensions often left out of
news stories? What effects do these oversights have?
4. When do policy actors have more control over what is re-
ported? When does the media have more control?
5 . The news media have been criticized for broadcasting tapes
from a1 Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Should such broadcasts
be allowed or should the U.S. media have restrictions similar
to the British media?
6. How might corporate ownership patterns affect foreign policy

coverage, and influence foreign policy?
Bagdikian, Benjamin H., The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 2000).
Giddens, Anthony, Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our
Lives (New York: Routledge, 2000).
Leeden, Michael A., “Secrets,” in The Media and Foreign Policy, Simon
Serfaty, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
Neuman, Johanna, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving In-
ternational Politics? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
Rosenblum, Mort, Who Stole the News? Why We Can’t Keep Up with
What Happens in the World, and What We Can Do about It (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1993).
Strobel, Warren, Lute Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influ-
ence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: The United States Insti-
tute of Peace, 1997).
NOTES
1. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshap-

ing Our Lives (New York: Routledge, 2000), 32-33.
2. Walter B. Wristen, “Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy,” Foreign Agairs
(September/October 1997): 175-76.
3. Michael Brown, Sean Lynn Jones, and Steve Miller, eds., Debating
the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass .: MIT Press, 1996).
4. Benjamin Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992).
5. Morley Safer interview, “From Newsreels to Nightly News: A His-
tory,” part 4,the History Channel, 1997.
6. Raphael F. Perl, “Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Per-
spectives, Trends, and Options for Policy Makers” (Washington, D.C .:
Congressional Research Service, October 22, 1997); Michael A. Leeden,
“Secrets,” in The Media and Foreign Policy, ed. Simon Serfaty (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 121-23; John P. Wallach, “Leakers, Terrorists,
Policy Makers, and the Press,” in The Media and Foreign Policy, 81-93;
Robert B. Oakley, “Terrorism, Media Coverage, and Government Re-
sponse,” in The Media and Foreign Policy, 95-107.
7. Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas Weiss, The News Media,
Civil War;and Humanitarian Action (Boulder, Colo .: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
8. Warren Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s
Influence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace, 1997), 4.
9. Strobel, Lute Breaking Foreign Policy, 4.
10. Robert Karl Manoff, “Testimony on the Russian Media Crisis be-
fore the House Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee” (Washing-
ton, D.C., March 4, 1999); David Hoffman, “Russian Media Fight to
Live,” Washington Post, June 28,2000, A16; Sharon LaFraniere, “Russian
Media Fear for Their Independence: Under Putin, Journalists Feel Increas-
ingly Misused, Mistreated,” Washington Post, February 21,2000, A19.
1 1 . John E. Mueller, Wac Presidents, and Public Opinion (Lanham,
Md: University Press of America, 1985), 107; Strobel, Lute Breaking For-
eign Policy, 30-37.
12. Jonathan Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of
U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1999); Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media
and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
13. James F. Hoge Jr., “Media Pervasiveness,” Foreign Afairs (July
1994): 141; Strobel, Lute Breaking Foreign Policy, 30.
14. Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Dri-
ving International Politics? (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996); Strobel, Late
Breaking Foreign Policy; Nik Gowing, “Real Time TV Coverage from
War: Does It Make or Break Government Policy?” in Bosnia by Televi-
sion, ed. James Gow, Richard Paterson, and Alison Preston (London:
British Film Institute Publishing, 1996), 81-91.
15. Gow, Paterson, and Preston, eds., Bosnia by Television.
16. Strobel, Lute Breaking Foreign Policy; Ted Koppel, “The Global In-
formation Revolution and TV News” (address to the U.S. Institute of Peace,
Managing Global Chaos Conference, Washington,D .C.,December 1,1994).
17. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Cri-
sis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Fram-
ing,” in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Gulf Wac ed. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
18. Michael Dobbs, “The Amanpour Factor: How Television Fills the
Leadership Vacuum on Bosnia,” Washington Post, July 23,1995, C2.
19. Maryann Cusimano Love, “Operation Restore Hope: The Bush Ad-
ministration’s Decision to Intervene in Somalia” (Washington, D.C.: In-
stitute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995).
20. Serfaty, ed., The Media and Foreign Policy; John R. MacArthur,
Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993).
21. John D. Steinbruner, “Unrealized Promise, Avoidable Trouble,”
Brookings Review (Fall 1995): 8-13; Lawrence J. Korb, “Who’s in Charge
Here? National Security and the Contract with America,” Brookings Re-
view (Fall 1995): 4-7.
22. Steinbruner, “Unrealized Promise, Avoidable Trouble,” 8-1 3;
MacArthur, Second Front.
23. Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, America’s Military Revolution: Strat-
egy and Structure after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: American Uni-
versity Press, 1993), 56-57.
24. Timothy E. Cook, “Domesticating a Crisis: Washington Newsbeats
and Network News after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” in Taken by Storm.
25. Herbert Gans, Deciding What’s News (New York: Vintage, 1980),
8-10.
26. Andrew Tyndall, Who Speaks for America? Sex, Age and Race on
the Network News (Washington, D.C.: 10th Annual Women, Men and Me-
dia Study, conducted by ADT Research in conjunction with the Freedom
Forum, October 20,1998).
27. George Spears, Kasia Seydegart, and Margaret Gallagher, Who
Makes the News? The Global Media Monitoring Project 2000 (London:
World Association for Christian Communication, 2000).
28. One study of U.S. media coverage of suspected terrorism in the
month before the millennium found a bias toward focusing on foreign-
inspired terrorism over domestic terrorism.
[The study] compared the coverage of three different news stories: 1. The re-
cent arrest of an Algerian man who allegedly tried to smuggle bomb-making
materials into the United States. 2. The arrest this month of two suspected
militia members accused of plotting to blow up a California propane plant.
(Officials say the resulting firestorm could have killed as many as half the
people within a five-mile radius of the plant and was intended to spark an up-
rising against the government.) 3. The arrest on Tuesday of an American Air-
lines mechanic who was charged with possessing bomb-making material af-
ter potential explosives and assault rifles were found in his home. White
supremacist and anti-government publications were also found. In the case

of the Algerian suspect, a search of Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones Interactive
databases produced 129 (113 print, 16 broadcast) stories on the day of and
the day following the announcement of the man’s arrest. Twenty-one stones
ran on page one. The California propane plant case search produced 5 1 (5 1
print, 0 broadcast) stories on the day of the arrest and the following day. Only
one of the stories ran on page one. Many of the stories ran as news briefs. A
similar search of stories related to the American Airlines mechanic produced
a total of 10 articles.The New York Zimes ran the story on page 20. The Wmh-
ington Post ran it on page eight. None of the propane plant or American Air-
lines stories highlighted the alleged perpetrators’ race or religion.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations, Washington, D.C., December

29,1999. Similarly, a survey of national media outlets by the Muslim Inter-
net news service iViews.com, found that linkage of Islam and Muslims with
terrorism in national news stories increased 51% in December of 1999.
29. The Middle East ranks in the middle or bottom of regions whether
measured by number of terrorist attacks, casualties from terrorist attacks,
or anti-U.S. terrorist attacks. Department of State, Global Patterns of Ter-
rorism I999 (Washington, D.C., May 2000).
30. Carlin Romano, “The Grisley Truth about Bare Facts,” in Reading
the News, ed. Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson (New York:
Pantheon, 1986).
31. Mort Rosenblum, Who Stole the News? Why We Can’t Keep Up
with What Happens in the World, and What We Can Do about It (New
York: Wiley, 1993), 9.
32. Melinda Henneberger, “Muslims Continue to Feel Apprehensive,”
N a o York Ewes, April 24, 1995,A9; Mathieu Deflem, “The Globalization
of Heartland Terror: The Oklahoma City Bombing” (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Toronto, June 1995).
33. Daniel C. Hallin, “Where? Cartography, Community, and the Cold
War,”in Reading the News; Rosenblum, Who Stole the News?
34. James W. Carey, “Why and How? The Dark Continent of Ameri-
can Journalism,” in Reading the News.
35. Jane Hunter, “As Rwanda Bled, Media Sat on Their Hands,” Extra!
(July/August 1994).
36. Maryann K. Cusimano, ed. Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a
Global Agenda (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000).
37. W. Lance Bennett, “The News about Foreign Policy,” and John Za-
ller, “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf
War,” in Taken by Storm.
38. Samuel Passow, “Sunk Costs: The Plan to Dump the Brent Spar,”
Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case
Number CR1-974369.0, 1997,9. Later disclosures indicate that Green-
peace scientists miscalculated the environmental danger from dumping
the Brent Spar, and Shell scientists were closer to the mark in estimating
the environmental impact.
39. Minear, Scott, and Weiss, The News Media.
40. Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communi-
cation Politics in Dubious Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1999); Eric Barnouw and Todd Gitlin, Conglomerates and the Media
(New York: New Press, 1998); Benjamin H. Bagdikian, The Media
Monopoly: With a New Preface on the Internet and Telecommunications
Cartels, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon, 2000).
41. Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, “Media Distortion of World
BanWIMF Protests Starts Early,” April 11,2000. Corporate bias is not the
only explanation for proglobalization media coverage. Unity among offi-
cial sources in favor of globalization policies limits media coverage of op-
position viewpoints, since the media tend to cover government sources
and intragovernment conflicts.
42. Michelle Ciarrocca, “Holes in the Coverage: What’s Left Out of
Reporting on Missile Defense,” Extra! (November/December 2000);
Mark Crispin Miller, “Free the Media,” in We the Media: A Citizen’s
Guide to Fighting for Media Democracy, ed. Don Hazen and Julie
Winokur (New York: New Press, 1997).
12
Media Impact
Louis Klarevas
T h e mass media serve the American political sector in a significant

capacity. So important, in fact, is the role of the news media that
they are often referred to as the “fourth estate” of government. This
chapter provides an overview of the various ways the news media
impact the American political process. In particular, the first part of
this chapter reviews the various functions the media play in the pol-
icy process. The second part of this chapter then highlights some of
the more prominent media effects in the political sector. Because
the news media play a variety of roles in the decision-making arena
and because they affect the policy deliberations of both the general
public and government elites, the “fourth estate” has a notable im-
pact on politics.’
MEDIA FUNCTIONS
The news media play at least seven roles in American politics: pro-
viding political and policy information to society; providing raw in-
telligence to policy makers; conveying public opinion; serving as a
forum for debating policy alternatives; serving as a channel of in-
tragovernmental and intergovernmental communication; checking
government in a watchdog capacity; and being used as a pawn or
scapegoat in political showdowns.
265
266 Louis Klarevas
Providing News
One of the three major television networks in the United States
claims that more Americans get their news from it than from any
other source. While it is unlikely that this network is the leading
source of news, what is not debatable is the fact that most Ameri-
cans get their political and policy-related information from the news
media. For years, the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press (formerly known as the Times-Mirror Center for the People
and the Press) has been conducting biannual Media Consumption
Surveys. These surveys are regular checks on how the public uses
and perceives the news media.
What the Pew Center has found is that most Americans get their
news from television sources. In fact, 75% of those surveyed in-
dicated that they watch television news programs regularly. By
comparison, 63% read daily newspapers regularly and only 46%
listen to the news on the radio regularly. Another important find-
ing of the Pew survey is that Americans are more likely to turn to
local television news programs for news on a regular basis than
any other medium. This correlates with a closer following of local
news than either national or international news. One important
change in recent years is that more Americans turn to online
sources for their news, with 61% of the respondents surfing the
net for news at least once a week-a twofold increase since 1995,
when the question was initially asked. Still, in a crunch involving
a major, breaking, political news story, two-thirds indicated that
they would turn to television for information-with 22% of all re-
spondents specifically identifying CNN as their preference for
late-breaking political news?
As the Pew survey shows, in the past decade, these trends have
begun to change thanks to the advent of cable television and the In-
ternet. Increasingly, Americans are turning to 24-hour cable news
networks and the Internet for news. At present, there are five cable
news channels broadcasting around the clock in the United state^.^
Every major American news outlet now also maintains a website
that provides the latest news (and in some cases video streams to ac-
company news text).
Media Impact 267
A quarter century ago, the only way to get regular, up-to-the-

minute news updates was to listen to news radio stations. Other-
wise, Americans got regular news updates only three times a day: in
the morning when the newspapers were delivered, in the early
evening when local and national television network news programs
were broadcast, and in the late evening when the local television
stations broadcast an update of their early evening stories.
Today, the news wires post their stories on the Internet at roughly
the same time they are sent to subscribing news media outlets. Most
major news websites are updated at least once every 30 minutes
(some even update them once every ten minutes). In other words,
Americans who “surf the web” are able to monitor news stories as
they are breaking. Moreover, given their extensive networks of cov-
erage and their satellite links, 24-hour news channels are able to re-
port a news story from anywhere in the world to anywhere in the
world within an hour of its development-usually with televised
images accompanying the reporting.
Perhaps the most interesting consequence of these technological
changes is that Americans who “surf the web” or watch cable news
channels often learn of political news before even relevant policy
makers learn of it.
Regardless, in the 21st century, not only does the news media
continue to be the largest source of information for the American
public and society at large, but the extent of news available to
Americans is now larger than ever: both in terms of news topics and
news sources.
Providing Raw Intelligence

When we speak of raw intelligence, we often assume that it is gath-
ered and disseminated to policy makers by government intelligence
agencies. Part of this assumption stems from another assumption:
the intelligence community’s reach is unlimited due to technologi-
cal innovations , particularly in communication and satellite tech-
nology. Often, however, some of the most important raw informa-
tion comes from the news media. This is because journalists are at
times in places that government representatives ,including members
268 Louis Klarevas
of the intelligence community, are unable to access. Three examples

from the post-Cold War era should help illustrate the point.
One of the clearest examples comes from early in the Clinton ad-
ministration. On June 26, 1993, President Clinton ordered a missile
strike against Iraq for its alleged involvement in a conspiracy to kill
former president George H. W. Bush while he was visiting Kuwait.
The president was scheduled to address the nation on the use of
force that evening at 7:OO p.m. and needed to know the results of the
attacks so that he could report them to the country. The president
and his closest advisers sat in the White House, unable to get con-
firmation on whether the strikes had been successful. Despite a frus-
trated Clinton's demanding a report from intelligence sources, high-
level policy advisers were unable to confirm the outcome. As
George Stephanopoulos observes, at the last minute, the news me-
dia stepped up and filled the role:
Although our intelligence sources wouldn't confirm the attack, the

news was starting to break all around the world. CNN went live from
Baghdad. . . . In a case study of preemptive punditry, CNN's Capital
Gang assessed the political impact of Clinton's military strike before
we even knew where the missiles had landed.
But that was somehow appropriate, because CNN served as the
president's intelligence agency that night: David Gergen got word
from CNN's president, Tom Johnson, that several missiles had hit
the target. . . . The president delivered his speech, and his first mili-
tary attack was a qualified success."
In the spring of 1994, extremist Hutu citizens of Rwanda engaged

in organized genocidal massacres. In six weeks, approximately
SO0,OOO Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered in the Great
Lakes region of Africa. While American intelligence agencies were
certainly aware of what was occurring in Rwanda, a good deal of in-
formation was disseminated back to the United States by reporters and
stringers in Africa (many of whom were there covering the South
African elections)? In fact, as a result of their ability to broadcast tel-
evised images via satellite back to the United States, American policy
makers at the highest levels were able to get a visual understanding of
exactly how widespread and horrific the civil strife was?
Media Impact 269
Most recently, the United States has been plagued by the Al-
Qaeda terrorist network, which is led by Osama bin Laden. Since
launching a war on terrorism in response to the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Amer-
ican armed forces have been engaged in a manhunt for bin Laden.
With the U.S. military chasing him from cave to cave in
Afghanistan, some of the best intelligence on bin Laden (includ-
ing his whereabouts and his role in the September 1 1 attacks) has
come from media clips aired by the Arabic television station Al-
Ja~eera.~
In the past decade, government officials have come to the real-
ization that global news networks like CNN are an important re-
source for up-to-the-minute information. As a result, crisis centers
like the Army’s Operations Center in the Pentagon usually keep at
least one television tuned in to CNN at all times. As one former
chief of the “Ops Center” put it:
This is one of the few places in the Army where people watch tele-
vision as part of their duties. CNN does get its information some-
times before we do. . . . We get a lot of information from our own in-
telligence assets . . . but we don’t get the same feel for what’s going
on as we do when we listen to [CNN correspondent] Christiane
Amanpour or somebody like that. That helps us predict what our
next requirement will be?
In fact, the intelligence community has established its own global

television network to broadcast top-secret intelligence updates to
various military facilities. As one high-ranking Pentagon official
urged, “We’ve got to do to intelligence what CNN has done to
news.”9The stimulus for the Defense Intelligence Network (DIN) is
that “U.S. intelligence agencies have been finding their printed re-
ports going unread by policymakers who have already watched
events unfold on CNN.” Therefore, in addition to improving the
quality and dissemination of intelligence, the DIN has the objective
of “sometimes even scooping CNN.”’O
As all of these examples show, in difficult times and in complex
conditions, the news media is one of the government’s best sources
of raw intelligence.
270 Louis Klarevas
Reflecting Public Opinion

Measuring and expressing public opinion is another important po-
litical function of the news media. In a democracy, public opinion
serves a variety of important functions. Traditionally, the news me-
dia have been at the forefront of measuring and reporting the
“pulse” of the American people.
The most prominent way the news media cover public opinion is
through the use of polls. The news media are substantial sponsors
of public opinion surveys in the United States. These surveys,
which are usually representative samples of American households,
provide policy makers with an awareness of the general mood of the
country as well as with an understanding of how they might wish to
proceed in handling a certain policy matter. Such surveys are also
useful in informing members of the mass public of the sentiments
of their fellow citizens.
Another common, albeit subtle, way that the media convey pub-
lic sentiments is through regular news stories. A great number of
newspaper articles, radio reports, and television news stories draw
on the opinions of different people to help frame their narratives.
Often, the people quoted are experts on a particular region or issue.
Occasionally, though, the news media run “man on the street” re-
ports that reflect the opinions of small, random samples of citizens
on certain matters.
Public opinion is also expressed through editorials and
opiniodcommentary pieces. Every major newspaper has an editorial
page that reflects the views of the editorial staff. In addition, both news
radio stations and television news channels have commentators who
are charged with airing critical opinions on politically relevant topics.
Media outlets also solicit the opinions and comments of outside ex-
perts. Theoretically, the press is an objective voice that is representa-
tive of its respective community. By printing or broadcasting a variety
of informed opinions, the media familiarize the public with the intri-
cacies of policy issues while at the same time acquainting politicians
with public attitudes and views. The press outlets furthermore provide
their respective communities with an added public opinion service:
during election periods, newspapers often endorse a particular politi-
cal candidate that the editors believe will serve the polity best .I2
Media Impact 27 1
The news media also frequently provide forums for public dis-
cussions of newsworthy issues. The print media largely do this
through their letters to the editor pages and through topic-based chat
rooms on their web pages. Radio media usually engage the public
in discussion through call-in talk shows. Recently, television news
channels have begun drawing on the successes of their print and ra-
dio colleagues-creating shows that combine telephone calls, in-
studio audience participation, and e-mail. A good example of such
a multimedia forum is CN”s Talk Back Live.
By sponsoring polls, running opinion-based news stories, pub-
lishing and broadcasting editorials and commentaries, and provid-
ing discussion forums, the news media provide a vital democratic
service: measuring and conveying public opinion.
Debating Policy Options

Related to reflecting public opinion, the news media provide forums
for debating competing policy alternatives. In the print press, policy
options are debated in the form of opposing opinion pieces. USA To-
day’s “Pro” and “Con” pieces, which are positioned across from each
other, are good examples of this. In broadcast media, experts and of-
ficials are usually invited to discuss their differing viewpoints on ra-
dio and television news programs. These news programs have be-
come something of a cottage industry recently in the television news
sector. The plethora of shows being produced at present includes one-
person interview shows like Nightline and Hardball, two-person
cross-examination programs like Hannity & Colmes and Crossfire,
roundtables like the McLaughZin Group and Capital Gang, and Sun-
day morning news forums like Meet the Press and This Week.I3
By publishing op-eds and appearing on news programs, experts
and advocates are able to debate the advantages and disadvantages
of rival policy alternatives in hopes that the general public and the
politicians that represent them will make informed policy decisions.
Channeling Governmental Communications

When time is of the essence, utilizing the news media is the most
effective way for key decision makers to communicate with the rest
272 Louis Klarevas
of government. For example, millions of Americans work for the

United States government. There is simply no easy way for the
leaders of government to address everyone in the bureaucracy di-
rectly. Occasionally, however, the need to convey a timely message
to government employees arises. The most efficient manner in
which to contact the federal workforce is to employ the media as a
channel of communication.
Such a situation, requiring frequent notification from the leadership
in Washington, arose in the winter of 1995-1996 when a showdown
between President Clinton and the Congress over the budget resulted
in an emergency shutdown of the federal government. The leadership
utilized the media to keep government employees informed of their
work status on a daily basis. While the leadership could have used
other means to communicate with the federal workforce, the media
was obviously the most efficient (and effective) means.
As a result of recent advances in information and telecommuni-
cation technologies, the media have broadened their role from in-
tragovernmental channels of communication to intergovernmental
channels. This new process of using the media to send signals and
messages indirectly to foreign audiences and governments is known
as virtual diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy, which involves the use
of official diplomatic channels to transmit messages to foreign gov-
ernments, is often extremely slow, given the numerous layers of bu-
reaucracy involved. Moreover, in some crises, the leaders of gov-
ernment are not able to communicate directly with foreign leaders
because of the absence of formal diplomatic ties. Rather than going
through a cumbersome bureaucracy and using third parties to com-
municate with unrecognized governments, the leadership can make
televised statements that, because of satellite technology, will be re-
ceived by the message targets. As former State Department
spokesperson Nicholas Burns described:
I sometimes read carefully calibrated statements to communicate
with those governments with which we have no diplomatic rela-
tions-Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. . . . Given the concentra-
tion of journalists in Washington and our position in the world, the
U.S. is uniquely situated to use television to our best advantage, with
our friends as well as our ad~ersaries.'~
Media Impact 273
The most prominent example of such virtual diplomacy was the use
of CNN by George H. W. Bush and Saddam Hussein to communi-
cate with each other during the Gulf War.I5
Given their abilities to reach almost any audience, domestic or
foreign, instantaneously, the news media have become one of the
most efficient and effective channels of governmental communica-
tion in the 21st century.
Investigating Government
For a large part of this country’s history, the news media was affil-
iated with particular political parties. In the 20th century, the media
became increasingly independent. However, it was not until the late
1960s that the news media emerged as a serious check on govern-
ment. With the number of American journalists witnessing events in
Vietnam firsthand, it started becoming clear that what was actually
occurring in the field was largely different from what government
sources back in the United States were describing. The disconnect
between the story government officials were portraying and the real
story that war correspondents were experiencing marked the rise of
investigative journa1ism.l6
In the 1970s, the press publicized two major stories pertaining to
the Vietnam War: the My Lai massacre and the Pentagon Papers.”
Both stories exposed a side of the war to the American people that
had, until then, been largely undisclosed. It was also in the 1970s
that arguably the most notable case of investigative journalism oc-
curred. Two metro reporters for the Washington Post aggressively
pursued the background to what seemed at the time like a low-level
break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at
the Watergate complex. What the two reporters, Bob Woodward and
Carl Bernstein, uncovered was a scandal of corruption and decep-
tion that reached to the highest level of government: President
Nixon.” Because of investigative reporting of these incidents, ille-
gal abuses of authority were publicized. This led to some of the
most significant reforms in government in the mid-1970s.
In the past quarter century, the media has continued its role as gov-
ernment watchdog, helping uncover such scandals as Iran-Contra,
274 Louis Klarevas
Whitewater, Travelgate, and the Lewinsky affair. Because the media

play the important role of holding government accountable to the
law and to the public, they are also known as the fourth estate.
Getting Played
If one were to ask ajournalist to name the different functions that the
media play in the American political system, serving as a pawn and
scapegoat in governmental politics might not be offered as an answer.
However, the media are undeniably players in the game of politics.
Not only are journalists placed in an adversarial role, at times, against
government -as the previous section on investigative reporting made
clear-the media are also used by politicians for political gain. An ob-
vious example is the strategic dissemination of previously unknown
political information. Journalists are quick to run with a leak because
it gives them a scoop over their competitors. However, leaks are of-
ten selective, allowing politicians either to build support for their par-
ticular policy positions or, at least, to undermine competing policy al-
ternatives. Returning to the Pentagon Papers example, these were
leaked to the press by officials who had become wary of the Vietnam
War. By leaking the documents, they knew they would probably un-
dermine support for the Nixon administration’s policies in Vietnam.
Ultimately, this is exactly what happened.
The other major way in which journalists are used in politics is as
scapegoats. Again, this stems from the often adversarial relationship
that exists between government officials and the media. Arguably,
one of the masters of shifting the focus of criticism was President
Bill Clinton. During the campaign of 1992 as well as during his
eight years of rule, President Clinton was continuously under fire
from the media for his political and personal actions. On numerous
occasions, rather than recognize the criticisms (or at least rebut
them), Clinton and his advisers instead tried to “spin” them to his
political advantage by laying the blame on a hawkish and biased
media. For instance, during his first campaign for the presidency,
Clinton was hounded by accusations of an affair with Gennifer
Flowers. Through focus groups, the Clinton team discovered that
“people quickly came to dislike what the media people were doing
Media Impact 275
to the candidate.” When Clinton-“not backing down a bit’,-

blamed the media, the public became more favorably responsive to
his campaign.I9 The lesson of the 1992 campaign was one that the
Clinton team seemed never to forget. By making the media the
scapegoat, the Clinton administration was able to shift public per-
ceptions of the president from guilty culprit of poor behavior to in-
nocent victim of a biased media. In other words, by playing the me-
dia to its advantage, the Clinton administration was often able to
score political gains despite engaging in problematic behaviors.
It is exactly because the media is involved in the processes of pol-
itics and governance that one of its functions in American society is
to be a tool in the game of governmental politics.
MEDIA EFFECTS
Generally, when we speak of media effects, the emphasis is on how

mass media psychologically influence members of society into per-
ceiving things a certain way. In American society, media effects are
most pronounced and most prevalent in consumer-oriented adver-
tising. A classic example is the use of underlying sexual themes to
sell products. The ultimate goal is to use subtle media influences to
produce a desired behavior or effect. While the mass media play an
enormous role in the commercial sector, news outlets also sway the
views and actions of the public and the political leadership. In par-
ticular, there are four kinds of general media effects that impact, in
differing degrees, the American political process: agenda setting,
priming, framing, and policy driving.
Agenda Setting
Writing in 1963,Bernard Cohen observed that the “press may not be
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.’720
The business of reporting involves tough decisions and trade-
offs. On any given day, there are thousands of interesting news
stories that can be reported. But most half-hour television news
276 Louis Klarevas
broadcasts-which are usually divided into 21 minutes of news

reporting and 9 minutes of commercials-can only cover between
15 and 30 news stories. Choosing which stories get covered has a
tremendous impact on what issues and problems concern the pub-
lic and the political leadership the most.
Agenda setting is the effect whereby the news media establish
what are the most salient policy matters facing a polity. In particu-
lar, there are two types of media agenda effects: indirect public
agenda setting and direct policy agenda setting. While both involve
influencing the policy agenda, the former does so by first influenc-
ing the views of the public at large and then having the public press
politicians and policy makers into addressing journalists’ top con-
cerns. The latter refers to those situations in which the media incline
leaders to address issues that journalists feel deserve attention.
In terms of news media effects, the agenda-setting effect is the
most researched and documented.2’ One of the most prominent
studies in this area was the examination of media coverage and
public priorities conducted by Maxwell McCombs and Donald
Shaw. The two scholars found a strong correlation between the five
issues most reported in news media coverage relating to the 1968
presidential campaign and the five issues considered to be the most
important to voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. This led the au-
thors to conclude that the media have a strong impact on setting the
public agenda?2
Another important finding is that stories appearing in the first
segment of television newscasts or on the front page of newspapers
(i.e., the most salient issues) are those often considered by the pub-
lic to be most important.23A sampling of single-issue areas which
have made the public’s agenda as a result of intense media coverage
include AIDS, global warming, civil rights, Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War, drug control, and crime contr01.2~
The media also directly influence the policy agenda. By focusing
on certain issues in their news stories, reporters force the govern-
ment to address those issues as top priorities. Many analysts with
public service experience have advanced this argument. Take, for
instance, former diplomat and former magazine editor Charles
William Maynes, who maintains: “It has become clear to anyone
Media Impact 211
who cares to notice that in Washington the real agenda-setters for

foreign policy sit not in the White House but in editorial rooms and
press cubicles.”
In the past decade, because of the active role of the United States
in highly publicized international humanitarian crises, commenta-
tors have been quick to credit the media with setting the foreign pol-
icy agenda. In the words of Jessica Matthews, “The process by
which a particular human tragedy becomes a crisis demanding a re-
sponse is less the result of a rational weighing of need or what is re-
mediable than it is of what gets on the nightly news s h o w ~ . Or,
”~~
as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft confessed,
“We focus on humanitarian crises where the press is. . . . [I]n Sudan,
Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone . . . the press wasn’t at any of those
places and therefore there was no pressure to do something.”26
Despite such proclamations, a great deal of research shows that
decision makers play a larger role in setting the media’s policy
agenda than do the media in setting the decision makers’ policy
agendaF7As Steve Livingston and Todd Eachus have asserted, “of
the findings of the last 20 years of media and foreign affairs re-
search, the most important . . . is that officials, not media, set and
maintain the news agenda.”28Still, there are instances in which and
ways that the media influence the policy docket. Reporter Warren
Strobel’s detailed account of the press briefing process pertaining to
American foreign policy captures this agenda-setting phenomenon:
The daily press briefing at the State Department illustrates how the
news media for decades have helped set the agenda and force foreign
policy decisions. Throughout the morning hours of almost every work-
ing day, public affairs representatives . . .develop “press guidance,” ap-
proved statements of policy to be used by the spokesperson at the brief-
ing, based on anticipated questions from reporters. These policy
statements often are drafted in response to events worldwide. But just
as often they are reactions to stories in the morning newspapers or the
network newscasts the night before. Thus, agenda and actions are in-
fluenced,and sometimes policy is made in the process. . , .The process
works in the negative too: if reporters pepper the spokesperson with
questions that he or she is not prepared for, that issue rapidly makes it
onto the department’s agendaF9
278 Louis Klarevas
This description of the give and take between reporters and policy
makers is a great example of how the media can help set the policy
agenda.
Priming
Related to agenda setting, the media also “prime” the criteria that
are to be used in judging and evaluating political leaders’ perfor-
mances. Again, the relationship is a function of media attention. The
more salient an issue is in media news coverage, the more likely
that that issue will serve as a chief criterion by which citizens judge
their government officials.
The idea behind priming is filtering. With regard to political mat-
ters -which are often multifaceted and complex- individuals sim-
plify their understandings so that they can make snap judgments.
Researchers speculate that people make these judgments by draw-
ing on relevant information that is on top of their minds-usually
put there by recent media coverage.30
In a series of experiments, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder
showed different groups of subjects television news stories. The news
broadcasts were different, with each one emphasizing -priming-
a specific issue. Iyengar and Kinder found that the subjects placed
significant weight on the issue to which they had been primed in eval-
uating the performance of the president. For instance, those who had
seen news stories that emphasized inflation were most likely to judge
the president on how well they felt he was handling the economy.
Iyengar and Kinder’s strong findings led them to conclude that media
priming plays a vital role in determining the criteria by which the
American people judge politicians at any given moment?l
Jon Krosnick and his colleagues have also found that the issues
most heavily covered by the news media are usually the same issues
by which the American public judges the overall performance of the
president (measured through opinion surveys in terms of overall ap-
proval ratings). Three examples uncovered by Krosnick are partic-
ularly illuminating. In 1990,prior to the Gulf War, President George
H. W. Bush had an approval rating of around 55%. By 1991, fol-
lowing the heavy and favorable news coverage of the Gulf War, his
Media Impact 219
approval rating had skyrocketed to nearly 90%. Similarly, despite

his at one time having such a high approval rating, when media at-
tention shifted to a heavy emphasis on negative economic condi-
tions in the United States prior to the 1992 presidential election, the
president’s approval rating fell dramatically -preventing him from
being reelected. Finally, Krosnick has shown how once-popular
Ronald Reagan fell from an approval rating of approximately 70%
to one of approximately 40% following a period of intense media
coverage focusing on the negative consequences of the Iran-Contra
scandal. All three of these cases document how the media, by fo-
cusing on particular issues, prime them in the minds of the Ameri-
can people?2 The public, then, recalls the information on these few
salient matters to help it reach judgments regarding leaders.
Research into priming effects makes a compelling case that the
media have a powerful affect on the political judgments reached by
the American people.
Framing
Another important effect that, in part, is evident in priming research
relates to framing. How the media frames a particular political issue
or incident affects the way the public reacts to it. As Robert Entman
explains, “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation, andor treatment recommendation for the item de-
scribed.”33Entman points to foreign affairs coverage during the Cold
War as an example. Numerous stories on civil wars that were re-
ported by American journalists during the Cold War era were largely
couched in terms of communist forces-regardless of whether or not
communism was a major force behind the ~trife.3~
Experimental research conducted by Shanto Iyengar has also
found strong evidence of framing effects. Iyengar has found that the
news media often frame stories in “episodic” or “thematic” terms.
The former refers to storytelling in terms of a specific individual
event. In other words, not much context or background is reported,
just the bare facts, often accompanied by images. The latter involves
280 Louis Klarevas
more abstract or general coverage, often providing some sort of his-

torical or societal b a ~ k g r o u n d ?Shanto
~ Iyengar and Adam Simon
argue that episodic coverage dominates television news broadcasts:
Given the nature of television news -a twenty-one minute “headline

service” operating under powerful commercial dictates-it is to be
expected that networks rely extensively on episodic framing to report
on public issues. Episodic framing is visually appealing and consists
of “on-the-scene” live coverage. Thematic coverage, which requires
interpretive analyses, would simply crowd out other news items. In
fact, television news coverage of political issues is heavily episodic.36
Iyengar has found that episodic framing tends to be common in sto-

ries on war, poverty, and, in particular, ~ r i m e . 3 ~
How a news story is framed directly impacts how the public as-
signs responsibility for a given political problem. When a story is
couched in thematic terms, as is often the case with stories on un-
employment, people have a tendency to blame the economy and
governmental policies for the problem. When an item is presented
in an episodic manner, as is often the case with crime, people usu-
ally blame the specific individual(s) involved -rather than societal
factors -for the problem. The policy implications are noteworthy:
Confronted with news coverage describing particular instances of

complex issues, people reason accordingly: poverty and crime are
caused not by deep-seated economic conditions, but by dysfunc-
tional behavior. The appropriate remedy for crime is not improved
job training programs and economic opportunity, but harsh and un-
conditional punishment .38
Therefore, just as priming affects the salience of an issue and the

criteria by which leaders are judged, framing affects the presenta-
tion of a story and the policy response that is advocated.
Policy Driving
As discussed so far, the media play a powerful and important role
in the American political process. Some commentators have gone so
far as to argue that the news media are so powerful that they actu-
Media Impact 28 1
ally drive policy. In the words of Jessica Mathews, “televised events

that stir emotions have an unprecedented ability to manipulate pol-
icy” in certain situations?9
There seems to be a perception, especially amongst pundits and
some policy elites, that news stories -particularly image-based tel-
evision news stories -often drive the policy process and determine
political outcomes, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. Once
upon a time, this ability of the press to drive pollicy was called “yel-
low journalism.” Today, while the idea remains similar, it is more
euphemistically referred to as the “CNN effect.”
CNN Effect
In 1898, the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph
Pulitzer ran series of emotionally charged articles describing the abuse
of Cuban people at the hands of the Spanish. Portraying the Spanish
as oppressive patrons and the Cubans as heroic victims, the “yellow
journalists” were able to muster support among Americans for an in-
terventionist foreign policy. When the U.S.S. Maine, docked in Ha-
vana, mysteriously exploded, the cry of the papers became: “Remem-
ber the Maine and to hell with Spain!” Sensing the media frenzy,
President William McKinley took Hearst up on his advice and asked
Congress for a declaration of war. And he got it.40
The “yellow journalism” behind the Spanish-American War is of-
ten considered the classic example of the media’s driving policy. No
doubt, Hearst came to believe in the omnipotent powers of the press
following the Maine incident. As he wrote:
The force of the newspaper is the greatest force in civilization. Un-

der republican government, newspapers form and express public
opinion. They suggest and control legislation. They declare wars1:
Today, the media are no longer limited to newspapers, but their

impact is often thought to be similar-with one major excepti0n.A~
Nik Gowing observes:
The lens of a single television camera-the “one eyed man”-has often

provided images that leave enduring impressions which no diplomatic
282 Louis Klarevas
cable or military signal can ever convey. The television image fre-
quently speaks where words or government telegrams and reporting
do not P2
It is this newfound power of moving images and televised footage

that makes the CNN effect the more potent evolution from “yellow
journalism.”
The modern-day exemplar of such image-based policy driving is
President Bush’s decision to intervene militarily in Somalia in 1992.
The day after American troops landed in Mogadishu, Somalia, as
part of a military operation aimed at securing the delivery of relief
supplies to famine-stricken Somalis, George Kennan, one of Amer-
ica’s Cold War “wisemen,” made the following entry in his diary:
There can be no question that the reason for this acceptance lies pri-
marily with the exposure of the Somalia situation by the American
media, above all, television. The reaction would have been unthink-
able without this exposure. The reaction was an emotional one, occa-
sioned by the sight of the suffering of the starving people in questi0n.4~
Others concurred. For instance, the New York Newsday editorial

staff wrote:
Beware of the power of CNN to drive foreign policy. The stark im-
ages of starving children and refugees driven out of their villages by
civil war, transmitted day after day by the Cable News Network (and
later by other news media that flocked to cover the famine in the
Horn of Africa), were among the most potent factors in President
Bush’s decision to intervene.&
Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer not only blamed

the media for policy in Somalia-“We went into Somalia because
of pictures”-he also insisted that the decision to threaten air strikes
against Serbs in Bosnia “was made on the basis of TV images. What
changed American policy was coverage of the massacre at the
[Sarajevo] market” on February 5 , 1994.45
If this phenomenon of journalists’ driving policy is truly at work,
its implications are powerful. As Kennan further noted in his diary:
Media Impact 283
If American policy, particularly policy involving the uses of our armed

forces abroad, is to be controlled by popular emotional impulses, and
particularly ones provoked by the commercial television industry, then
there is no place-not only for myself, but for what have traditionally
been regarded as the responsible deliberative organs of our govern-
ment, in both the executive and legislative branches!6
Kennan’s comment begs the questions: Does the media drive pol-
icy? Is there a CNN effect actually at work in the policy process?
The answers are not quite as simple and straightforward as Kennan
and others imply. The bottom line is that sometimes the news me-
dia drives policy; other times it does not.
In the past decade, several scholars have systematically researched
the CNN effect-focusing on the case that is supposedly the strongest
evidence of such an effect: the 1992 Somalia intervention. Three in-
dependent studies all found that claims of a CNN effect in the Soma-
lia case were grossly exaggeratedP7 On the contrary, these scholars
find support for the counter-thesis of Jonathan Alter, who, within a
week of the arrival of U.S. troops in Somalia, argued:
For starters, the intervention in Somalia was not dictated by pictures.

The painful images of starving children began to appear several
months ago on “60 Minutes,” the cover of Time magazine and else-
where, but didn’t have much direct effect. These pictures generated
sympathy-and some contributions-but no groundswell for mili-
tary intervention!*
Because these data-intense analyses argued that the cameras fol-

lowed the officials and soldiers, not the other way around, the CNN
effect in Somalia has been recently discounted in a~ademia.4~
But before the CNN effect can be rejected, it is important to note
that there is a key piece of evidence that these studies cannot effec-
tively dismiss: President Bush himself. The former president is on
record as saying that his decision to order a military intervention in
late 1992 was driven by televised images of “those starving kids . . .
in quest of a little pitiful cup of rice.” In fact, President Bush recalls
telling his top Pentagon officials at the time, “I-we-can’t watch
this anymore. You’ve got to do something.”50
284 Louis Klarevas
There are other incidents that also advise against dismissing the
CNN effect-at least in the area of foreign policy.
Somalia 1993 The case of Somalia provides another, less dis-
putable, instance of a major CNN effect. As made famous in the
movie Black Hawk Down,on October 3, 1993, American soldiers
trying to capture a Somali warlord were caught in an urban gunfight
in downtown Mogadishu. The outcome was 18 American service-
men killed and 78 injured. But what seems to be most memorable
about this firefight was the footage of the naked corpse of a dead
American serviceman being dragged through the street by Somalis.
On October 5, dozens of congressmen took to the floor of Con-
gress to protest the continued U.S . military presence in Somalia and
to call for an immediate withdrawal. On October 7, just three days
after the images had aired on American television, President Clin-
ton met with several congressional leaders. Later that day, he an-
nounced that the United States would withdraw from Somalia by
March 31, 1994.51
This case indicates that when a most sensitive national security
matter, such as the incursion of fatalities by American soldiers, is
broadcast on television, its impact can be somewhat powerful. In
this case, television coverage definitely put withdrawal from Soma-
lia on the Clinton administration’s immediate agenda. Arguably
more important, however, it led to a significant strategic policy
change: a sudden end to the nation-building mission.
But what if these images were not caught on film? While there is
not enough information to provide a concrete answer to this ques-
tion, the evidence seems to indicate that casualties incurred by
American soldiers are not as influential in setting agendas and al-
tering policies when they are not broadcast. For instance, two
months before the October 3 incident, four U.S. soldiers were killed
when a bomb destroyed their vehicle. That evening Somalis al-
legedly displayed a piece of flesh they claimed belonged to one of
the dead servicemen. Journalist Michael Maren of the Village Voice
videotaped the incident, but his video was never shown in the
United States. It is left to one’s imagination as to what would have
happened had this tape been shown on American television. Fur-
thermore, on September 25, Somalis shot down a U.S. helicopter,
Media Impact 285
killing three American soldiers and injuring two others seriously.

Toronto Star journalist Paul Watson, who was in Mogadishu’s main
market later that day, saw what were evidently body parts of the
dead soldiers on display. These images were not videotaped and,
therefore, like the August carnage, never broadcast in the United
States. As a result, it might be argued that the impact of the media
in determining policies is significantly more pronounced when their
stories are accompanied by graphic images ?*
Haiti 1994 On September 19, 1994, United States troops ar-
rived in Haiti as part of a peace operation to oversee the transition
of power from the authoritarian military regime of General Raoul
CCdras to the democratically elected regime of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. Two separate incidents related to this peace-
building endeavor in Haiti offer insights into how televised images
can directly put issues on the agenda and lead to policy adjustments.
On September 20, just one day after U.S. troops landed in Haiti,
Haitian police were videotaped viciously beating Aristide support-
ers, killing one person. American soldiers were also captured on
film-standing close by, looking on, but doing nothing to stop the
beatings. That night, network evening news broadcasts ran the
footage. Within 24 hours, the White House announced that U.S.
military police officers were being sent to Haiti and that the rules of
engagement would be changed so as to allow American soldiers to
intervene with authorization from a senior commander, as long as
such an intervention did not imperil the safety of U.S. tr00ps.5~
On September 30, paramilitary forces known as attaches attacked
crowds of Haitians participating in a pro-democracy march, killing
at least eight protestors and injuring several others. Again, footage
of this incident was broadcast in the United States. Three days later,
on October 3, U.S. forces raided the headquarters of the main at-
tache organization in an arms search and seizure 0peration.5~
What these two examples from Haiti suggest is that-when no
clear standard or policy is in place (i.e., when the elements of a pol-
icy are in flux)-there is a vacuum that the media can exploit. By
televising graphic images that imply a policy change is needed, the
media are able to drive such adjustments. In Haiti, this is exactly
what happened: tactics changed.
286 Louis Klarevas
Bosnia 1992-1994 As the case of Haiti showed, television

newscasts certainly have the power to change elements of policy.
The conflict in Bosnia, which waged for several years, offers plenty
of such examples as well. The sudden NATO ultimatum to launch
air strikes against Serb forces following the mortar attack on the
Sarajevo marketplace in February 1994 is an obvious e ~ a m p l e . 5 ~
But the Bosnia case is replete with examples of policy driving me-
dia effects-examples that show that the power of the CNN effect
is not limited to the United States.
For instance, United Nations High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR) officials and officers of a British regiment in Bosnia
have detailed how a story by BBC correspondent Kate Adie on the
miserable conditions in a mental hospital in Tarcin, which aired in
the fall of 1992, led them “to drop everything” and do something to
provide humanitarian assistance to the patients of the hospital. Sim-
ilarly, on November 15, 1993, senior United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) officers saw a BBC report on the situation in
Mostar. The officers were so moved by the images that within a
week they led a small team into Mostar “at great risk,” ultimately
securing the arrival of a mobile field hospital donated by South
Africa to aid the people of M o ~ t a r . ~ ~
UN peacekeepers were, in fact, aware of the power of the camera
and exploited it. For example, when Croat forces seized the 400-
vehicle “Convoy of Joy” near Novi Travnik in the summer of 1993,
British UNPROFOR troops trying to secure its release brought
along a camera crew, which filmed Croats shooting and torturing
convoy personnel. After the images aired, the Croat leadership, em-
barrassed by the televised events, ordered the convoy relea~ed.5~
One of the most well-known examples of a media-driven policy
response occurred in 1993. That summer, the BBC reported on a
five-year-old girl named Irma Hadzimuratovic who had been seri-
ously injured by a mortar attack in Sarajevo. What followed was a
barrage of phone calls to 10 Downing Street calling on the British
government to help Irma. British Prime Minister John Major, who
reportedly saw the televised newscasts, immediately responded by
organizing a military airlift for Irma and 40 others. Moreover, as a
result of the Irma case, many Western governments began offering
Media Impact 287
hospital beds to those injured in Bosnia. In light of the minor policy

adjustments brought on by the little girl’s plight, “IRMA” has be-
come an acronym among the British press: Instant Reaction to Me-
dia Attention?8
One theme that runs through all of the examples mentioned so
far in support of the CNN effect thesis is foreign policy. That is
because the CNN effect is most pronounced in foreign affairs. But
do CNN effects occur in domestic politics? This is a misleading
question because leaders are almost always forced to deal with a
domestic crisis, whereas they have the option of not responding to
international events. Moreover, it is rare that a major domestic cri-
sis (or its aftermath) is not caught on film. As a result, domestic
problems do not lend themselves to the same kind of analysis that
foreign crises do.
Still, there is evidence that the emphasis of domestic problems
through television images does promote policy responses. A promi-
nent example is crime. Shanto Iyengar has shown that crime is one
of the most prevalent news stories covered by the television news
media. Because local television news programs are Americans’
biggest sources of news, the mass public receives a large dose of
crime-related news. Moreover, as most of these stories are framed
episodically, they leave most people feeling that crime is a dys-
functional behavior that demands harsher punishments and stronger
deterrents against social deviants. The policy driving effect materi-
alizes when politicians push such agendas. And there is evidence
that they do:
The perennial newsworthiness of crime has forced all candidates for
elective office-no matter their political leanings- to address this
issue. Given the state of public opinion (with large majorities favor-
ing a “tough” approach to crime), it is no coincidence that increas-
ing numbers of public officials advocate the death penalty and strin-
gent law enf0rcement.5~
It is this kind of evidence that permits the conclusion that televised

images also drive domestic policy.
All of the examples above offer proof that television plays an
important role in the policy process. To the extent that there is a
288 Louis Klarevas
CNN effect, the media, particularly the television media: (1) read-
ily drive changes in policy tactics; and (2) on certain occasions-
through televised images of issues most sensitive and controver-
sial (e.g., troop fatalities) -force changes in overall strategic
policy.
Reverse CNN Effect

When most analysts speak of the policy driving power of the me-
dia, they are referring to the ability of news organizations to force
certain political actions. But sometimes media reports have the op-
posite effect: they cause policy inaction. This phenomenon can be
thought of as the reverse CNN effect.
To date, there has been little systematic inquiry into this effect.
There is, however, some anecdotal evidence to support the exis-
tence of the reverse CNN effect. In the early 1990s, American
television screens were bombarded with images of Yugoslavia’s
violent disintegration. Yet, military engagement to stop the war in
the Balkans was looked upon with disfavor by both the public and
the political leadership in the United States. Even graphic images
of Bosnians held in concentration camps -memorable as they
were-only managed at most to get the issue of ethnic cleansing
onto the Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda. The images
were not powerful enough to dictate a different overall policy. On
the contrary, the images often served to support assumptions that
ethnic conflict is a way of life in the Balkans-always has been,
always will be. Against such a backdrop, intervention on any-
thing short of a massive scale seemed futile. Observations from
former Bush administration officials seem to support this argu-
ment. According to former National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft , “there was a real consensus -and I think probably an
unshakable consensus -[that] to make a real difference . . . would
require an American or a NATO intervention that we did not see
j u ~ t i f i e d . ”Warren
~~ Zimmerman, a former ambassador to Yu-
goslavia, concurs: “It wouldn’t have mattered if television was
going twenty-four hours around the clock with Serb atrocities
[encouraging a U.S. response]. Bush wasn’t going to go in.”61
Media Impact 289
Commenting on this inaction in the face of heavy media cover-

age, Warren Strobel has written:
Graphic images of the worst human rights abuses in Europe in forty

years did not have the power to move governments in directions in
which they were determined not to be moved?*
But the Bosnia case begs the question: Did the images-counter
to their intention-have the effect of promoting policy inaction?
There is another case from that time period that arguably sheds bet-
ter light on this question. In the spring of 1994, genocide occurred
in Rwanda. A massive slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutus was
undertaken, resulting in over 800,000 murders. Much of this
tragedy was captured on film and broadcast by the US.television
networks, at a rate much heavier than the Somalia crisis prior to the
December 1992 depl0yment.6~Yet, despite all of this footage,
Americans remained wary of intervening to help stop the genocide.
Public opinion polls taken at the time found that most Americans
were opposed to military action.64In the words of Warren Strobel,
“the images from Rwanda of ethnic warfare and its grisly results
held no power to move the U S . administration to intervene or to
move the public to demand that it do In other words, there
was no CNN effect in this case.
But could there have been a reverse CNN effect? Could Americans
subjected to the heavy coverage of the fighting have simply been
turned off to the conflict? There is perhaps an argument to be made
that the horrific images of violence- women being chopped up with
machetes, children left to starve on the side of the road, corpses float-
ing down rivers-simply led Americans to conclude that there was
little that could be done to help this war-torn country-at least little
that could be done without Americans bearing intolerable costs. In
other words, oversaturation of negative media images leads to feel-
ings of helplessness and pessimism. In such a media induced context,
the favored action becomes inaction. And this seems to be what hap-
pened in 1994, This is exactly the kind of sentiment expressed by a
U.S.Army officer who served in the subsequent humanitarian opera-
tion in Goma, Zaire (after the fighting had largely subsided): “It’s
290 Louis Klarevas
disheartening. It’s really disheartening. But I know the military can’t

solve that civil war. And I know the American people wouldn’t want
us to solve that civil war. Is that selfish? No.”66
Warren Strobe1 offers a similar perspective:
Policymakers probably read the public mood correctly. Julia Taft,

president of InterAction [a coalition of nongovernmental organiza-
tions] . . . said that when pictures were shown of Rwandans being
hacked to death, private relief groups “got virtually no money what-
soever” from the viewing p~blic.6~
This led Strobe1 to conclude, “In this environment, the news media
themselves were an additional factor in keeping the United States out
of Rwanda in anything more than a highly circumscribed way.”68
While it is still speculative at this stage, whether or not media
coverage drives policy action or inaction seems to be related to
whether or not important issues or vital interests are at stake. When
the media raises the most significant concerns, CNN effects become
possible. When issues of lesser concern or interests less than vital
are the focus of the media, CNN effects become possible if the per-
ceived costs (as suggested by the images and reporting) are mini-
mal, whereas reverse CNN effects become more likely if the costs
are seen as potentially equaling or outweighing the benefits. Again,
this thesis is based largely on anecdotal evidence, but it is certainly
worthy of further investigation.
CONCLUSION
What this chapter makes clear is that the media’s impact on politics
is multifaceted. Whether they inform the public of newsworthy
events, provide breaking intelligence, or keep government officials
in line, the media are an integral part of the policy sector. The me-
dia also impact governance by affecting the way Americans per-
ceive events and issues. In some cases, especially those involving
graphic images of the most important political problems, the media
are even able to drive policy. The media are, in short, a powerful
and pervasive force in American society.
Media impact 29 1
1 . How has the advent of new news sources changed the way
Americans get their news? What are some effects of these
changes?
2. Summarize the seven main roles the news media plays in the
American political process.
3. What are the four ways in which media affects the American
political process? Are any of these more prevalent than others?
4. What is the “CNN effect?” Does it exist? If not, why not? If
so, how does real-time footage affect politics?
5. Does the media reflect public opinion or shape it? Why?
Cohen, Bernard, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton
University Press, 1963).
Halberstam, David, The Powers That Be (New York: Knopf, 1979).
Hallin, Daniel C., The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Iyengar, Shanto, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political
Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder, News That Mutters: Television
and American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Iyengar, Shanto, and Richard Reeves, eds., Do the Media Govern? (Bev-
erly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1997).
Strobel, Warren P., Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Zn-
j7uence on Peace Operations (Washington,D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1997).
NOTES
1. While the news media are part of the much larger mass media, here-
inafter, references to the media will be references to the news media un-
less otherwise indicated.
2. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Media Con-
sumption Survey 2000,” available at www.people-press.org/mediaOOque.htm.
292 Louis Klarevas
3. The five major 24-hour cable news channels are Cable News Net-
work (CNN), CNN International, CNN Headline News, MSNBC, and
Fox News.
4. George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education
(New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 164-65.
5. Many reporters happened to be in Africa at the time covering the
election in South Africa. See Steve Livingston and Todd Eachus, “Rwanda:
U.S. Policy and Television Coverage,” in The Path o f a Genocide: The
Rwanda Crisisffom Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri
Suhrke (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997).
6. Warren P. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Me-
dia’s Influence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States In-
stitute of Peace Press, 1997), 14346.
7. See, for example, Michael Dobbs, “Qatar TV Station a Clear Chan-
nel to Middle East,” Washington Post, October 9,2001, C1. See also Wal-
ter Pincus, “New Videotape Features Pale Bin Laden,” Washington Post,
December 27,20Ol,A16; and Walter Pincus, “Bin Laden Fatalistic, Gaunt
in New Tape,” Washington Post, December 28,2001, A1 .
8. Army Lt. Col. Jeffrey Anderson, quoted in Steve Vogel, “Army
‘Fire Department’ Keeps Watch on World,” Washington Post, August 25,
1995, A21.
9. Quoted in George Lardner Jr. and Walter Pincus, “On This Net-
work, All the News Is Top Secret,” Washington Post, March 3, 1992, A1 .
10. Lardner and Pincus, “Top Secret”
11. See, for example, Carroll J. Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garrett J. O’Keefe,
and Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999).
12. See, for example, Robert S. Erikson, “The Influence of Newspaper
Endorsements in Presidential Elections: The Case of 1964,” American
Journal of Political Science 20, no. 2 (May 1976): 207-33; and Michael
Bruce MacKuen and Steven Lane Coombs, More Than News: Media
Power in Public AfSairs (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981).
13. Journalists are also the primary moderators and questioners in de-
bates between candidates for public office.
14. Nicholas Burns, “Talking to the World about American Foreign
Policy,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 1, no. 4 (Fall
1996): 10-14.
15. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 82-85. Strobel uses the
term “tele-diplomacy” in lieu of “virtual diplomacy.”
16. See, in particular, David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New
York: Knopf, 1979); and Daniel C. Hallin The “Uncensored War”: The Me-
Media Impact 293
dia and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For other
overviews of media coverage relating to the Vietnam War, see Peter
Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and TelevisionReported and
Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1977); Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War:
Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and
William Prochnau, Once upon a Distant War (New York: Times, 1995).
17. See, respectively, Seymour M. Hersh, M y Lai 4: A Report on the
Massacre and Its A f e m t h (New York: Random House, 1970); and Martin
M. Shapiro, ed.,The Pentagon Papers and the Courts: A Study in Foreign
Policy-Making and Freedom of the Press (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972).
18. Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, All the President’s Men (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).
19. David Halberstam, War in a 7ime of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the
Generals (New York: Scribner, 200 1), 118-20.
20. Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1963), 13,
21. For overviews, see Everett M. Rogers, “The Anatomy of Agenda-
Setting Research,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 2 (Spring 1993):
68-84; Gerald M. Kosicki, “Problems and Opportunities in Agenda-Setting
Research,” Journal of Communication43, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 100-27; and
Everett M. Rogers, William B. Hart, and James W. Dearing, “A Paradig-
matic History of Agenda-Setting Research,” in Do the Media Govern? ed.
Shanto Iyengar and Richard Reeves (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1997),
225-36.
22. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Func-
tion of Mass Media,” Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (Summer 1972):
176-85.
23. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters: Television
and American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). See
also Lutz Erbring, Edie N. Goldenberg, and Arthur H. Miller, “Front-Page
News and Real-World Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media,”
American Journal of Political Science 24, no. 1 (February 1980): 16-49.
24. For overviews, see Iyengar and Kinder, News That Matters; and
Iyengar and Reeves, eds., Do the Media Govern?
25. Jessica Mathews, “Policy vs. TV,” Washington Post, March 8,
1994,A19.
26. Quoted in John Riley Jr., Defining a Crisis: A Case Study of the
US.Foreign Policy-Making Process during a Humanitarian Emergencies
(Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 2001).
294 Louis Klarevas
27. Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive For-
eign Policy?’ Review of International Studies 25, no. 2 (April 1999):
30 1-309.
28. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises and
U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered,” Politi-
cal Communication 12, no. 4 (October 1995): 415.
29. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 62.
30. Iyengar and Kinder, News That Matters; John R. Zaller, The Nature
and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992); and Maxwell McCombs and George Estrada, “The News Media
and the Pictures in Our Heads,” in Do the Media Govern? ed. Iyengar and
Reeves, 23747.
3 1. Iyengar and Kinder, News That Matters.
32. These studies are reviewed in Joanne M. Miller and Jon A. Kros-
nick, “Anatomy of News Media Priming,” in Do the Media Govern? ed.
Iyengar and Reeves, 258-75.
33. Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 52; em-
phasis in original.
34. Entman, “Framing.”
35. Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames
Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
36. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Cri-
sis and Public Opinion,” in Do the Media Govern? ed. Iyengar and
Reeves, 25 1.
37. Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?
38. Shanto Iyengar, “‘Media Effects’ Paradigms for the Analysis of Lo-
cal Television News” (paper prepared for the Annie E. Casey Foundation
Planning Meeting, 17-1 8 September 1998).
39. Mathews, “Policy vs. TV,” A19.
40. Douglas V. Johnson 11, The Impact of the Media on National Secu-
rity Policy Decision-Making (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War Col-
lege, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 1-7.
41. Quoted in Johnson, National Security Policy, 1.
42. Nik Gowing, Real-Erne Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts
and Diplomatic Crises: Does It Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Deci-
sions? Working Paper 94- 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Joan Shorenstein Center
on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Harvard University, 1994).
43. George F. Kennan, “Somalia, through a Glass Darkly,” New York
Emes, September 30,1993, A25.
Media Impact 295
44. “A Lesson of Somalia: Don’t Let TV Drive Policy,” Newsday,

March 28,1994, A24.
45. Charles Krauthammer, “Intervention Lite: Foreign Policy by
CNN,” Washington Post, February 18,1994, A25.
46. Kennan, “Somalia, through a Glass Darkly,” A25.
47. Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises”; Strobel, Late-
Breaking Foreign Policy; and Jonathan Mennin, Debating War and Peace:
Media Coverage of U.S.Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
48. Jonathan Alter, “Did the Press Push Us into Somalia?’ Newsweek,
December 21,1992,33.
49. This academic literature is reviewed in Robinson, “The CNN Effect.”
50. Quoted in Cragg Hines, “Pity, Not US. Security, Motivated Use of
GIs in Somalia, Bush Says,” Houston Chronicle, October 24, 1999,A1 1.
51. See Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 166-84; and Louis J.
Klarevas, Ell Death Do U.S.Part? American Public Opinion toward the
Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (forthcoming book manuscript).
52. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 175; and Klarevas, Ell
Death Do U.S. Part? Similarly, in Haiti, on January 12, 1995, an Ameri-
can soldier was gunned to death and another seriously wounded at a
checkpoint near GonaYves. Again, as there were no cameras around to
videotape the incident, there was no impacting footage and therefore no
policy alteration. See Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 193-94; and
Klarevas, Ell Death Do U.S.Part?
53. See Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 190-91.
55. See Krauthammer, “Intervention Lite,” A25. For a contrary view
relating to the mortar attack on Sarajevo, see Nik Gowing, “Inside Story:
Instant Pictures, Instant Policy; Is Television Driving Foreign Policy?’
(London) Independent, July 3,1994,14.
56. Gowing, Real-Eme.
57. Gowing, Real-Erne.
58. Gowing, Real-Time.
59. Iyengar, “‘Media Effects’ Paradigms.”
60. Quoted in Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 14748.
61. Quoted in Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 148.
64. Klarevas, Till Death Do US.Part?
296 Louis Klarevas
66. Quoted in Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy.

67. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy.
68. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 146; emphasis in original.
Another factor that probably promoted inaction was the disastrous out-
come of the Somalia peace operation.
13
The New Media
Jeremy D. Mayer and Michael Cornfield
[I]t is clear that the feast or famine mentality dominates popular

conceptions of the Internet-either there is a giddy elation
which causes people to overlook obvious problems, or there is
an obsessive focus on the obvious problems which causes peo-
ple to magnify potential dangers out of all proportion.’
Today, while television remains the most influential medium in

American politics, in terms of number of consumers and campaign
dollars spent, it is clear that television has a challenger on the scene:
the Internet. By the end of 2001,200 million Americans were using
the Internet? A study by the Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press found a precipitous fall in the number of Americans who
followed politics through broadcast news, and a rapid rise in the use
of the Internet for that purpose? Candidate websites proliferate, and
many politicians are even receiving the “mother’s milk” of politics,
money, through online donations. As a political medium, the Internet
has risen faster than any previous method of communication, from
introduction to the public to mass utilization in a decade.
The arrival of the Internet challenges us to reimagine media pol-
itics. What can be done through e-mail, the Web, wireless messag-
ing, and modes of networked-computer communication yet to come
to improve the ways in which we get news, form opinions, cam-
paign for causes and candidates, cast votes, and comprehend our
public rights and responsibilities? What, in short, is our wish list for
297
298 Jeremy D. Mayer and Michael Cornfield
public life in the digital age? Some of the items on our wish list
come preloaded, like software packages bundled into a new com-
puter. For those of us devoted to ideals of political communication
associated with “democracy,” “the republic ,” and “freedom,” the
God terms of the American civic religion, a Net-inspired reimagi-
nation of media politics involves adapting the new medium to cher-
ished ideas, institutions, and processes. This chapter explores what
cyberpolitics has already done specifically to change American me-
dia and public life, and looks at where the medium is heading.
Before we discuss the effects of the Internet as a medium on
American politics, it will be useful to be clear about what we mean
by “Internet.” As with interstate highways, 19th-century railroads
and canals, and modem airports, government played a key role in
the creation of the modem “information superhighway.” In the late
1960s, scientists working for the Defense Department’s Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA, later DARPA) created the very
first connection between computers that could exchange packets of
information: As more and more defense and university computers
joined the network, it became a national, decentralized method of
exchanging data. The widespread availability of personal comput-
ers forever changed the Internet, as more and more individuals be-
gan to access and use the burgeoning network. In this chapter, when
we refer to “Internet” we intend to include both the “World Wide
Web” of graphic sites, some with downloadable content, as well as
e-mail and file exchange programs like Napster? The Internet, how-
ever, is extraordinarily dynamic, and is evolving even as these
words are read. Consumers are not only finding new uses for it, but
the Internet may be on the verge of absorbing other media or at least
merging with significant aspects of them. For example, although the
telecommunications industry has suffered spectacular setbacks, the
percentage of American homes with broadband connections to the
Internet quadrupled between 2000 and 2002.6 One-fifth of U.S.
home Internet users (24 million Americans) switched to the higher-
priced connection so that they could move at higher speeds, see
more multimedia messages, and remain online without having to tie
up their telephone lines. The advent of online radio, downloadable
videos, and audio file exchanges only hints at what may be coming
The New Media 299
next. The ramifications of the ongoing expansion in the scope of the

Internet will be dealt with at the close of the chapter.
THE PROMISE OF THE INTERNET:

INTERACTIVITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND DEPTH
Each method of communication has properties that confer advan-

tages on its users. The rise of the Internet as a major force in the
American media offers three promising changes in politics: interac-
tivity, independence, and depth.
lnteractivity
When television broadcast news is the main source of political in-
formation, and when Americans learn about politicians and their
stances through televised presidential debates and campaign ads,
there is little opportunity for individual citizens to feel involved in
the process. As anticipated by critical theorist Walter Benjamin, the
viewers of video discourse are removed from the immediacy of pol-
itics, and their attitudes towards politics are also changed. As with
art and religion, politics experienced through the chilly refraction of
a camera eye will never be the same as politics live? The New Eng-
land town hall democracy and the classic democracy of the Greek
city-states allowed for more interactivity between governed and
governors. The citizens could guide the discussion towards matters
of concern through questions and speeches. Television does not di-
rectly allow for any interactivity between the viewers and the
viewed, the citizens and their leaders. This empowers the gatekeep-
ers of the media, who are given the power to set the nation’s agenda
by what they cover, and perhaps more importantly, what they do not
cover.
Now, two-and-a-half millennia after Pericles, some feel that
technology will allow us to have an interactive exchange with our
leaders. While reading a story on the Internet, or watching a
streaming video of an interview with a journalist or a politician,
a citizen can shoot an e-mail off to a federal agency, or make a
contribution directly to the politician. Newspapers and broadcast

stations conduct online political polls at their websites, and report
the unscientific results. Media companies like online polls even
though they are of dubious accuracy, because they are amazingly
cheap. Interactivity between journalists and consumers becomes
far easier. Consider the ease and immediacy of shooting an e-mail
off to Bill O’Reilly at Fox News versus writing a letter to Walter
Cronkite in 1974. Media companies even monitor from day to
day which pages of their websites are looked at, and by how
many people. The consumers of online journalism vote with
every mouse click and download about what issues they want the
media to cover. While newspapers and television stations con-
ducted market research and polling before the Internet, these did
not approach the amount of information given by online monitor-
ing of media consumption.
The Internet may also bring about higher levels of interactivity
between citizens and the government itself. Arizona and other states
are exploring voting online. Enthusiasm for computer voting went
even higher after the debacle in Florida during the election of 2000,
in which 19th-century voting technology was exposed as deeply
flawed and widely utilized. All 50 state governments and many lo-
calities distribute information on the Web, and every month more
government services are available online, from paying parking tick-
ets to applying for government contracts. A website and e-mail net-
work made it possible for presidential candidate and maverick Re-
publican John McCain to raise and spend more than $6 million in
hard money donations in the early months of 2002, enabling him to
stay in the race for the Republican nomination a few extra weeks?
Interest groups, new and old, have rushed to exploit the possibilities
of the Internet. In the classic model of pluralism, power in America is
distributed unequally, with groups that are able to organize more ef-
fectively wielding disproportionate power. The ability to organize was
previously highly correlated with income, education, and political ef-
ficacy (the sense that your views mattered). The Internet allows far-
flung individuals with little political experience to coalesce around a
cause with remarkably little financial outlay. For example, in 1998, a
husband-and-wife team formed moveon.org , a political action com-
The New Media 30 1
mittee that capitalized on citizen outrage with both President Clinton's

dissembling about his affair with Monica Lewinsky and those House
Republicans who tried to impeach him for the offense. Moveon.org
exists solely online, yet it attracted hundreds of thousands of members,
who signed petitions and spent millions of dollars to defeat Republi-
can members of the House Judiciary Committee? The interactivity of-
fered by the Internet will, in the view of some, ameliorate one of the
chronic problems in American politics during this century: low levels
of citizen participation, particularly in voting. By making information
more readily available, by lowering barriers to citizen input and inter-
action, and by making voting and donating easier, cyberpolitics may
enhance citizen interest, influence, and participation.
Independence
The Internet may also weaken the media's control over what citi-
zens learn about politics. Citizens are more independent of the
power of media gatekeepers in the age of the Internet. Compare a
daily newspaper to a 30-minute evening news broadcast to a CNN
website. The 100,000 words of text available in the newspaper rep-
resent the editors' view of what an educated citizen should know
about current events that day. There is some degree of indepen-
dence; for example, a committed Republican could choose not to
read any reports about Bush's stock dealings in the oil business. By
contrast, in watching an anchor deliver the few thousand words of a
typical news program, the viewer is passive; he cannot dart ahead,
or jump back in the newscast to follow his interest.1° But the Inter-
net consumer of news is in control. She may click only on the sto-
ries that interest her, and can even arrange a website to show her
only stories on topics of concern.
Independence also applies to the number of media outlets avail-
able today. Throughout this century, concern among political scien-
tists and media analysts has grown about the concentration of me-
dia power in fewer and fewer hands." By some estimates, ten
multinational corporations control the most influential media out-
lets in the country. The Internet may well change that. While the
most popular sites on the Web are often those affiliated with major
media corporations (CNN, MSNBC, Yahoo, AOL, etc.), some of the

most influential websites, such as the Drudge Report, are run by in-
dividuals. Anyone with a computer and Internet access can set up a
website with his or her own political views. “Blogs” or “weblogs”
are sites set up by individuals to publicize their experiences and
their opinions. They are often vulgar, unsourced, and by definition
nonauthoritative. However, one of the leading public intellectuals of
the day, Andrew Sullivan, has set up his own website, where his
thoughts and essays are available to readers without the filter of ed-
itors or the delay of publishing.12 As Dan Gilmour, a newspaper
editor, sees it, some day news coverage itself will be shaped by the
reaction of thousands of “bloggers”:
I think we’ve moved profoundly from the older period in which news
was a lecture. Now the job is that we tell you what we have learned,
you tell us if you think we are correct, then we all discuss it.13
The Internet may also contribute to nonconformist thought in

politics. During the height of television’s media dominance, some
feared that the media were contributing to a “spiral of silence.” Be-
cause those with minority views would see no support for their
opinions in the media, which emphasized conformist and majoritar-
ian views, they would keep silent for fear of social o s t r a ~ i s m .To-
’~
day, thanks to the Internet, almost no opinion (or fetish or prefer-
ence, for that matter) is so isolated that it cannot find at least one
kindred spirit somewhere on the Web. The Internet exceeds the con-
nective power of any other medium, because strangers who share
political ideas can use it to find and contact each other.
The Internet fosters independence by providing more points of
access to political information, both to consumers and producers.
The network is practically limitless in its capacity to send, store, and
grant access to information. In October 2001, for example, the
search engine Google fielded 130 million inquiries a day across its
indexed portion of the Internet, which encompassed three billion
documents.I5 An online document, it is important to note, can be
text, image, sound, data, or any combination thereof. On the day
this paragraph was composed, Google’s reach extended over two
The New Media 303
billion Web pages, 330 million images, and 700 million messages
posted in discussion forums. And Google underestimates the
breadth of the Internet, since it does not index e-mail, a medium that
has been widely used for political purposes.
Thus, the Internet allows more people to engage in journalism,
campaigning, and less-public modes of politics (such as leaking,
lobbying, and administrating). In the mass media era, publicly
available messages about, say, the United States Senate essentially
came from the Senate offices, registered lobbyists, and journalists
with permission to enter the Senate Press Gallery. Today, if you, the
online citizen, have something to tell the world about the U.S. Sen-
ate, you can express yourself in any number of Net forums. Your
declaration will not be amplified by the New York Times, in all like-
lihood. But it could well be indexed by Google, especially if you are
wise to the ways of online publicity.
Clearly, the Internet has expanded the boundaries of the playing
fields of politics. That is not the same as leveling the field: wealthy
and official voices still hold advantages. But marginal presence on
the new field confers an extra shot at influence previously unimag-
inable for many aspiring players.
Depth
Political scientist Lance Bennett identifies fragmentation and per-
sonalization as two of the key defects in modem political cover-
age.16 Journalists present issues episodically, without context, and
often in a simplistic manner that ignores historical and institutional
forces. This is particularly true of televised news. Bennett believes
these institutional biases in the way information is presented are a
threat to the health of our democracy. The Internet, however, has the
potential to redress at least certain aspects of these ills.
For example, even if the streaming videos available on the Web
reproduce the fragmented and personalized coverage of televised
journalism, the Internet adds depth in two ways: access and context.
First, voters can now determine the shallowness (or substance) of a
30-second radio or television spot much more easily because the In-
ternet archives those spots. Second, sustained examinations of the
history of many issues and candidates referenced in “drive-by” ads

are now only a click away on many news and even some campaign
websites. These websites, along with such civic nonpartisan web-
sites as www.vote-smart.org (Project Vote Smart) and www.dnet.org
(Democracy Net), often contain thousands of words on issues, tran-
scripts of debates, and links to legislation.
Thus, consumers of politics on the Web may be initially presented
with a fragmented and incomplete picture of an event or a candidate,
but they are given the tools to put the issue into a deeper context.
Whether they choose to do so or not is their decision. Of course, one
might note the same about an article in Erne magazine or a story on
the CBS news. It was never impossible for a consumer of the news,
intrigued by a particular issue, to become educated on it, through a
trip to the library if nothing else. What the Internet changes is the
ease with which depth is available. Context is just a click away.
THE DEFECTS OF THE INTERNET FOR MEDIA POLITICS:

ACCESS, OVERLOAD, FILTERLESSNESS, AND COCOONING
Each of the positive changes wrought by the introduction of the In-

ternet can be subjected to cross-examination. Not only may the Inter-
net fail to rectify existing problems in American media politics, it
may create new ones.
Access
The digital divide is real, and it limits the Internet’s effects and leads
to greater inequality in our society. The term became fashionable
during the mid-1990s to describe the unequal access to the Internet
that was emerging. From its birth until this moment, the Internet has
been a medium far more often used by the wealthy, the educated,
the male, and the white citizens of this country than by others. The
skew in usage on each of those factors has lessened since 1996, but
has not vanished. Similarly, the first schools to get wired were the
wealthier ones, and this remains true today.
One could complacently observe that similar patterns were evi-
dent at the dawn of radio and television, and those “electronic di-
The New Media 305
vides” rapidly disappeared. The digital divide is certainly getting

smaller. According to a Pew Center poll, home computer ownership
went from 36% to 59% and venturing online at least occasionally
went from 21% to 54% in just the four years from 1996 to 2000.17
Unequal access may also not be as large a problem, or at least as
new a problem, as some see it. Even newspapers in the colonial era
were not equally distributed, with many in the lower classes lacking
either the literacy to appreciate papers or money t o buy them. As
compared to the early days of the Republic, when the government
did not even attempt to teach the poor how to read, the government
is taking steps to address the digital divide. State and federal pro-
grams are in place to make computers more available to public
school children.
However, there is reason to think that this divide will be more
resilient than previous ones. First, many of the educated and
wealthy who frequently use the Web do so from their workplaces.
It is unlikely that autoworkers, butchers, bus drivers, and
plumbers will soon be granted worksite access to the Internet.
(And persons accessing the Internet for politics from the work-
place must consider the possibility that their movements, words,
and activities will be monitored by their employers, if not the
government. This could deter workplace use of the Internet for
politics.) Second, the cost of access is continually changing, and
while basic access (cost of a computer plus cost of an Internet
service provider) may have declined in price, the cost for DSL or
broadband access is much greater. Many features on the Internet
are increasingly geared towards those who can download large
amounts of data quickly. The divide in access to that quality of
service is very great. In terms of access, the Internet is more akin
to cable television than to broadcast television, and even today,
millions of Americans cannot afford or choose not to pay a
monthly fee for television. Third, even with more Americans
learning how to use computers with each passing moment, there
remains a generational gap in Internet usage. A 65-year-old in
1960 had little difficulty plugging in a television and watching
the Kennedy-Nixon debates. But many senior citizens today still
find computers daunting and confusing. For these reasons, if the
Internet becomes the most important form of political discourse,
it will be a conversation that leaves millions of Americans out of

earshot for years to come.
Overload
The media are commonly referred to in government textbooks as a
“mediating institution” between the governed and the governors.
Among the many functions the media performed in this role were
informing citizens of government actions, and informing elites of
the public’s reactions and desires. The media told citizens what was
important in the political world, and told elites what the public felt
was important. If the “gatekeeping” or “agenda-setting” power of
the media has been reduced, this may actually serve to lessen citi-
zen influence on elites. When there were only three television news
networks, and only a few leading nationally influential newspapers,
the major media outlets had tremendous power to focus the atten-
tion of citizens and elites on a given topic. Today, with so many di-
verse outlets, there may be far less of a sense of a unified national
agenda to which politicians have to react and the public has to pay
attention. The citizen, presented with the chaotic, shifting, and mas-
sive amount of political information available on the Web, may sim-
ply retreat from the overload of data.
The overload of data also comes at Americans at an increasingly
dizzying pace, making politics rapid and dynamic. Because the In-
ternet conveys information almost without discernible delay, there
are, in hotly competitive political, media, and medidpolitical situa-
tions, more cycles of action-reaction communication. This affects
political elites as well as ordinary citizens. To illustrate: On Sep-
tember 17,2000, the Bush and Gore campaigns for president strafed
the reporters on their press e-mail lists (consisting of 2,000 and
1,200 names, respectively) with 56 e-mails. Most of these con-
cerned a 16-page “Blueprint for the Middle Class” issued by the Re-
publican nominee. The Democrat’s pre-buttal (for it was released
prior to the Bush document) was 24 pages long. The 56 e-mails
spun, re-spun, and meta-spun (if that is a word adequate to describe
commenting with intent to persuade on another’s efforts at com-
menting with intent to persuade) around the topic of which candi-
date had the better economic plan for America.’*
The New Media 307
Many refer to this phenomenon as the “24-hour news cycle,” but

that is something of a misnomer. While an action-mediation-reaction
cycle can occur at any hour of the day, not just during working hours
in one time zone, the phrase can also be interpreted as implying that
it takes 24 hours for reactions to an action to register in public. That
was in the old days. “Real time” is a much better phrase at conveying
the current compression of the interval between action and reaction.
Not all politics and mediation occurs in real time, nor is that likely
to develop. But thanks to the Internet, more segments of the mediated
politics world can speed up to occur in real time for a while. The In-
ternet permits two candidates for city council to blitz local reporters
over an accusation that one is in the pocket of a real estate magnate.
It allows two interest groups to urge supporters to show up on the
steps of the Supreme Court for competing demonstrations, each
group issuing e-mails warning about the size of the turnout expected
from the other side. When real-time political moments crystallize in
the digital age, the increase of cycles comes with more players, more
messages, and also, note well, less time for any single person to di-
gest all that is being said, and shown, and perhaps substantiated.
No wonder, as Maltese writes, the White House has expanded its
communication operations to cope with real-time politics. As care-
takers of the reputation of the politician whose daily activity auto-
matically makes news for more people than anyone else on earth,
the communications staff must try to keep pace. Indeed, they must
try to get ahead of the pace, and anticipate reactions. While govern-
ment’s response to the news cycle’s expansion has been to acceler-
ate, the response of the citizen to this rapid overload of competing
claims may well be exhaustion and even alienation.
The overload may also expose interactivity with government of-
ficials as a sham and a false hope. See what ensues when you send
an e-mail to a public official you’ve watched at C-SPAN.org, for in-
stance. (Hint: not much.) Perhaps in 1992, when Ross Perot advo-
cated an “electronic town hall” in which all of America would de-
bate and then vote on the issues of the day, Americans might have
imagined that technology could take us back to New England town
hall democracy. But the overload problem with regard to interactiv-
ity is even greater than it is with regard to information; there are too
many of us for government to process our inputs on issues beyond
the shallowest up or down opinions. The dream of a restoration of a

direct democracy is not new in American public life; pollster
George Gallup imagined in 1939 that public opinion polling would
lead to a responsive and participatory democracy, and that certainly
has not o c ~ u r r e d .Cyberpolitics
’~ has not magically erased the clas-
sic problem of the “one and the many”; the overloaded circuits of
the Internet may have actually exacerbated it.
FiI terlessness
If the Internet grants us independence from the centralized power of
the mass media, this independence is inextricably tied to the problem
of filterlessness. Political, civic, and media institutions use filters to
improve the quality of the information they depend on and release to
the public. They check facts, revise sentences, rearrange photos, and
so forth. The Internet’s virtue of no authoritative control permits dis-
sidents and eccentrics to promulgate their views to the world, but this
quality is also a significant weakness. A book that was released by a
reputable academic press could be expected to have undergone
lengthy peer review by knowledgeable experts. A story printed in the
New York Times underwent careful and redundant fact checking. As
the anecdote has it, a reporter should not print a story about how
much his mother loves him unless he can verify it with two indepen-
dent sources. The rapid pace of the media in the era of cyberpolitics
has removed much of the filtering process; rumor, falsehood, and in-
nuendo quickly move into public discourse. Matters about the private
sex lives of public officials that would never have been printed in
previous eras are now fodder for Web gossips like Matt Drudge.
One can point to examples of the media’s abusing its gatekeeping
authority in the past, such as its refusal to inform the nation of phi-
landering presidents whose preoccupation with illicit sex arguably
raised questions about national security and judgmentF0 However,
the loss of gatekeeping power by the mass media has made politics
a less appetizing field of endeavor, both for citizens and politicians.
The first story on the Monica Lewinsky affair appeared on the
Drudge Report, because an “old-media” editor at Newsweek refused
to run it. Similarly, during the ensuing impeachment proceedings,
The New Media 309
the Drudge Report ran a controversial account of an alleged rape

committed by Clinton decades ago, an account that no mainstream
media outlets would cover because they did not believe it had been
fully sourced. Pressured by the coverage on websites and in chat
rooms, the mainstream media eventually ran both stories. It should
be noted, however, that the gatekeepers of the mass media do retain
some filtering power. A lurid and false rumor about Clinton father-
ing an interracial child with a prostitute circulated on the Web for
years, but never broke into mainstream media sources, and re-
mained unknown to most Americans.
The permeability and universality of the Internet raises questions
about the nature of truth itself, in a way that postmodernists may
welcome, but that poses challenges to more traditional researchers.
Who is an authority, and how do we know? Professors across the
country lament that students conducting research for term papers
often mistake cranks and kooks for reputable scholars, based on the
professional presentation of their thoughts on a website. A colleague
of one of the authors received a paper that cited the website of a
Holocaust denier as a source on Nazism and its goals. Of course,
fringe groups who deny the Holocaust or assert anti-Semitic ca-
nards as fact have been publishing books and magazines for cen-
turies. However, librarians had acted as a filter to most of these ma-
terials, separating out legitimate challengers to conventional
wisdom from irrational ideologues. The Internet puts the laughable
claims of the Nation of Islam or the Aryan Nations only a click
away from any college student, a student who may lack the intel-
lectual training and critical tools to assess and reject many of these
groups' counterfactual assertions.
Cocooning
We live in self-imposed exile from communal conversation and
action. The public square is naked. American politics has lost its
soul. The republic has become procedural, and we have become
unencumbered selves. Individualism has become cancerous. We
live in an age of narcissism and pursue loneliness..21
-Philosopher Albert Borgman
Although Borgman wrote these words while the Internet was in its
infancy, they capture many of the most far-reaching problems some
see inherent in the new medium. The growth of technology’s role in
American life may contribute to a sense of hyper-individualism, as
we all cocoon ourselves away from not only politics but real-world
human connections. While champions of the Internet’s possibility
rave about the potential for spacially separated individuals to form
interest groups through the Web, perhaps such groups fail to provide
community, solidarity, and other group benefits that are necessary to
civil society. Consider the difference between a union hall gathering
of workers in 1950 and an Internet chat room on politics today. The
union hall meeting requires physical presence, and interactions be-
yond the level of typing and reading. Those present see each other
as complete beings, who have left their private domains to enter into
public discourse. The patterns of listening and speaking, of debate
and discussion, probably would not be unfamiliar to a colonial Vir-
ginian or an ancient Greek. By contrast, the denizens of a chat room
or the readers of a bulletin board may hide behind pseudonyms;
they may misrepresent their true selves or opinions with careless
abandon. Most importantly, they may not feel the same sense of
connection to each other as do people who meet in the fleshF2
Thinkers as diverse as T o q ~ e v i l l ein~the
~ 19th century and politi-
cal scientist Robert Putnam in the late 20th century have emphasized
that America’s civil society rests on the health of voluntary associa-
tions among citizens. Civic activities that build up “social capital”
have been declining rapidly in the last forty years, and this troubles
many scholars, politicians, and citizens. One of Putnam’s more in-
triguing findings in his influential 2001 book, Bowling Alone, was
that for every hour of newspaper reading, civic engagement in-
creased, while for every hour of television watching, it de~reased.2~
While comparable data are not yet available for Internet usage, it
seems plausible that local “real” activities decline as Internet usage
expands. Thus, it becomes important to find out whether the “com-
munal” activities on the Web can produce the same connectedness
that characterized traditional groups. As one recent article asked:
“When it comes to . . . building community, is the Internet more like
a Girl Scout troop or a television set?” Unfortunately, given current
The New Media 311
patterns of usage, it seems that the Internet is far more similar to the
dreaded idiot box than to a meeting with other citizens.25
Thus, “cocooning” may represent the most subtle and insidious
danger in cyberpolitics. Even before the Internet, many worried that
Americans were increasingly unconnected to each other. More and
more of the upper classes live in gated communities, send their chil-
dren to private schools, and fail to interact in any meaningful way
with less wealthy Americans. Demonstrations and marches and ral-
lies declined in effectiveness, as Americans ceased congregating in
public spaces, replacing downtowns with privately owned malls.
With the dawn of Internet shopping, telecommuting, and Web-based
entertainment, leaving home becomes almost superfluous. Perhaps
the new media possibilities of the Web will provide Americans with
access to new and unfiltered information about politics. But if we
do not have a sense of community, of shared obligation and values,
will we care about political news from home or abroad? Instead of
“Thinking globally and acting locally” will we now “Entertain in-
dividually and disappear locally”? In this sense, the Internet may be
the apotheosis of what America’s first great media critic, Walter
Lippmann, described as “pseudo-reality.”26In Lippmann’s original
conception, the media provided the citizen with a useful simplifica-
tion of the complex real world. The citizen’s reaction to that
pseudo-reality would eventually have real-world implications.
However, the Internet may create a “virtual reality” all its own, in
which behaviors and interactions that never leave cyberspace be-
come an end in themselves.
Cocooning will surely be more of a threat tomorrow than it is to-
day. The trend in the Internet is towards more and more integration,
both of content and of methods of transmission. Broadband tech-
nology offers the potential for a grand unification of all media into
a single giant data stream. The future American home may have one
connection to the outside world, and through that broadband cable
will stream news, movies, telephone, e-mail, websites, votes, polit-
ical donations, shopping orders, bills, banking, and everything nec-
essary for life save water, food, and air (and our orders for all those
things may be encoded in the pipeline as well). The effects that this
will have on America’s political culture are incalculable at present.
312 Jeremy D. Mayer and Michael Comjeld
Perhaps the unified media will be more subject to centralized con-

trol. Perhaps the Web will retain the virtue of independence, and
Americans will take advantage of greater choices in sources of po-
litical information. Whatever happens in this brave new world of
unified media, the incentives to leave home will become fewer, and
the tendency to cocoon in one’s own space more comm0n.2~
CONCLUSION: THE INEVITABLE INTERNET

VS. THE RESILIENT STATUS QUO?
There is no way to unring the bell of technological change. The In-

ternet expanded by leaps and bounds during the last ten years be-
cause it filled needs that Americans had, even if they did not know
they had them: interactivity, faster news, easier contacts, greater in-
dependence. It has changed the way Americans learn about politics,
and it has begun to change the way they participate in The
ordinary citizen can now readily correct for media biases of many
varieties in being able to see politics more fully than before the In-
ternet arrived. But the improved capacity for political vision is not
the same as an improved capacity for political action. Protesters,
dissenters, opponents can get their message out, and the sympa-
thetic can find it. But there’s quite a psychological road to travel be-
tween perception and action: the viewers must believe they have a
chance at victory before they will organize to act, and the Internet,
through encouraging cocooning, may act as a barrier to political ac-
tion. Furthermore, the Internet also has sinister implications for
government and corporate surveillance of our actions and thoughts.
Allied with video cameras, the Internet can be used to monitor citi-
zens in public spaces. “Cookies” can track where viewers have
browsed. Post 9-1 1 legislation gave the government new powers to
read e-mails at home and abroad.
So we are left where we began: Will the Internet be a source for
positive political change, or will it exacerbate existing ills in Amer-
ican media politics, as well as adding its own? A third possibility
suggests itself; perhaps the Internet will not alter American politics
all that much. The status quo has a resiliency that should not be un-
The New Media 313
derestimated. Television affected many aspects of American poli-

tics, but few would argue that politics and journalism changed be-
yond recognition. Such potentially isolating forces as cocooning
do not alter the constitutional structure. So long as we remain in a
winner-take-all system, a winner must get at least a plurality, and
usually more, and this impels campaigners for office and for legis-
lation to reach out via the Net and other media to form coalitions.
Similarly, those who speak of “the information revolution” hap-
pening as a result of the Internet are not looking carefully enough at
the political situation into which the new media has been piped. For
example, a fallacy in the information overload concept is that it is
not automatic with the new technology, but set off by the need to ab-
sorb a lot of disorganized information in a short time. By one mea-
sure, there has been no information revolution because “revolution”
denotes a swift redistribution of power, and the Internet has not
done that yet, not even in the technical sense of power. While the
Internet provides more information and computing/processing
power, those are not automatically convertible into political power,
as steam is into electricity and so on. Information is only convert-
ible into political power or its cousins-intellectual, artistic, and
scientific power-when it answers a question in such a way as to
put the questioners under the influence of the answerer. Again, this
is not automatic, but situational.
There is much for the online politics media analyst to study, and
much data yet to be examined before we even know that the Inter-
net has altered the fundamental nature of American media politics.
Once we know for sure that the Internet has produced broad sys-
temic changes, we will be closer to judging the longterm implica-
tions of those changes.
1. Compare a town hall meeting that would take place in person

to a meeting that would take place over the Internet. Do we
lose something if we shift to “virtual” meetings to resolve lo-
cal political issues? Do we gain anything?
314 Jeremy D. Mayer and Michael Comjeld
2. Should we worry about the “digital divide” or the fact that

most Internet users today are wealthier and better educated
than nonusers? If the Internet becomes the most important
form of political discourse while the cost of access remains
high, will this be a problem for our democracy?
3. It costs hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to
produce and broadcast a single national television ad. It costs
almost nothing to set up a basic Web page, if you have access
to a computer and an Internet service provider. Does the In-
ternet empower political dissidents, nonconformists, and
those without access to vast sums of money?
4. By one estimate, more than 80 percent of the American pub-
lic begins a Web search through one of three portals: AOL,
MSN, or Yahoo. Compare and contrast the gatekeeping func-
tions of an Internet portal with a television network and a lo-
cal newspaper. How does a portal, a network, and a newspa-
per shape what a citizen can see of the public world?
How well can the average person assess the credibility and au-
thority of a Web page? Again, compare and contrast that ca-
pacity to check and rely on a Web news source with an indi-
vidual’s capacity to check and rely on a television network
and a local newspaper.
Select one or more of the political institutions discussed in
other chapters of this volume, and evaluate how well the in-
stitution has incorporated the Internet into its operations in
terms of the following proposition: “The more an official in a
political institution needs the support of public opinion, the
better that official’s Web site.”
Davis, Steve, Larry Ellin, and Grant Reeder, Click on Democracy: The Zn-
ternet s Power to Change Political Apathy into Civic Action (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 2002).
Ebo, Bosah, ed., Cyberghetto or Cybertopia?: Race, Class, and Gender
on the Internet (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998).
Everard, Jerry, virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-
State (New York: Routledge, 2000).
The New Media 315
Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic,
2000).
Saco, Diana, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
Wilhelm, Anthony G., Democracy in the Digital Age (New York: Routledge,
2000).
www.ipdi.org, the website of the George Washington University Institute
for Politics, Democracy, and the Internet.
NOTES
1. Chris Toulouse, “Designing Cyberspace: Voluntarism, Commercial-

ism, Academia, and the Future of the World Wide Web,” working paper,
Hofstra University, 1997, at http://gramercy.ios .corn/-urbsoc/Cyber-
space/Design.html.
2. The UCLA Internet Report 2001, www.ccp.ucla.edu.
3. Pew Research Center, “Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audi-
ence,” June 11,2000, at www. People-press.org/mediaOOrpt.htm.
4. The Internet Society, “A Brief History of the Internet,” 2000, at
http://www.isoc .org/Internet/history.
5. The definition of the Internet remained so troubling that, in 1995, the
Federal Networking Council passed a resolution attempting to settle the
question. They concluded: “Internet” refers to the global information system
that: (i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based
on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;(ii) is
able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons,
and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses, or makes ac-
cessible, either publicly or privately, high-level services layered on the com-
munications and related infrastructure described herein. “A Brief History of
the Internet” (Version 3.31), 2000, by Bany M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf,
David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon
Postel, Larry G. Roberts, and Stephen Wolff.
6. Pew Internet & American Life Project, “The Broadband Differ-
ence,” June 23,2002, at www.pewinternet.org.
7. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction,” trans. Harry Zohn, in Film Theory and Criticism, ed. Gerald Mast
and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 612-34.
8. Michael Cornfield, Politics Moves Online: Campaigning and the
Internet (New York: Century Foundation, 2003; forthcoming).
9. Cornfield, Politics Moves Online.

10. At least he cannot without using a VCR or a TIVO machine. And
of course, with the ubiquitous remote control, he can now surf to another
news channel quite easily. And cable has changed television as well, since
a conservative can watch Fox News, while a liberal can stick with PBS.
11. Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon, 2000).
12. www.andrewsullivan.com. Sullivan is a particularly interesting case
of a “blogger” because, unlike the vast majority of online writers, Sullivan
has had an illustrious and influential career in the traditional media, both
print and, more recently, television. Sullivan is also quite an iconoclastic
figure, as a gay Catholic conservative Brit writing on American politics.
Sullivan’s blog got him in trouble with a traditional publication; when he
criticized the New York Emes Magazine one time too many online, they de-
cided not to carry his pieces anymore. If Sullivan remains influential despite
this, it will signify a true lessening of centralized media power.
13. Ben Hammersley, “Time to Blog On,” Guardian (UK), May 20,2002.
14. E. Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion-Our
Social Skin (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984).
15. SearchEngineWatch.com.
16. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics ofZllusion, 4th ed. (New York:
Longman, 200 1).
17. Pew Research Center, “Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audi-
ence,” June 11,2000, at www. People-press.org/mediaOOrpt.htm.
18. Bob Davis and Jeanne Cummings, “Hot Buttons: A Barrage of E-
Mail Helps Candidates Hit Media Fast and Often,” Wall Street Journal,
September 21 , 2000.
19. George Gallup, “Polling the Public,” in Public Opinion in a De-
mocracy, ed. Charles William Smith (New York: Prentice Hall, 1939).
20. Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John E
Kennedy (Rocklin, Calif.: Prima, 1992).
21. Albert Borgman, Crossing the Postmodern Divide (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 3.
22. It should be noted that at least one analyst worries that the Internet
may actually provide a sense of connection to extremists and terrorists. In
his 2001 book Republic.com (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press)
Cass Sunstein argued that the Internet could be used by terrorists to con-
nect a far-flung conspiracy. Sunstein’s warnings today look prophetic,
now that it is known that the men who plotted the tragic attacks of 9-1 1
used the Internet to stay in touch. Had the terrorists been forced to meet
in person, or use more traditional forms of communication, it is possible
that American intelligence would have detected their conspiracy.
The New Media 317
23. Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (1840; reprint, New

York: Signet, 2001).
24. Robert h t n a m , Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmer-
ican Community (New York: Touchstone, 2001).
25. Margie K. Shields, Susan E. Linn, and Stephen Doheny-Farina,
“Connected Kids,” The American Prospect Online, December 26,2000.
26. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922; reprint, New York: Free
Press, 1997).
27. Cocooning can be exaggerated as a threat. The Internet can be a
medium for civic connection, in which two or more people come to see
the world from each other’s perspective, and so mature, as classic liberal
Enlightenment theory would have it. Online communities can promote di-
alogue between citizens of differing views. Additionally, they can knit
families and other necessary social groupings closer together. A Harris
poll found that 48% of U.S. Net users said they communicate more often
with family and friends than before. Michael J. Weiss, “Online America,”
American Demographics (March 200 1).
28. The Internet has also changed the way scholarship is conducted.
The two authors of this piece, in addition to using the Internet extensively
for research, have never met in person, and exchanged drafts online. All
of us can collaborate with colleagues and anchor our imaginations in the
work of others far more readily and expansively, if not more competently,
than before the medium arrived.
14
Media Ethics and Political Communication
Dan Stout
I t is difficult to study the political process without attention to

mass media. From televised debates to campaign advertising on
the Internet, the present age is characterized by new information
technologies, which can both enhance and frustrate political ac-
tivity. On the one hand, it is through the media that people be-
come informed citizens and voters, a requisite for a thriving de-
mocracy. On the other hand, when one candidate has more money
for advertising than another, or when news media ignore impor-
tant issues of the day, media criticism ensues. These situations
make necessary the study of media ethics, a field within moral
philosophy and social science concerned with whether media are
used optimally in terms of social equity, responsibility, and
morality. This chapter introduces the field of media ethics and
identifies a number of situations in which such analysis can be
applied in political contexts.
Nightly newscasts often raise controversies about media and their
role in politics. Should television reporters pry so much into the per-
sonal lives of candidates? Is it fair when only two presidential can-
didates are included in a televised debate when six have declared for
office? According to media ethicists, such questions deserve deeper
and more thorough analysis than the emotional, anecdotal, and often
knee-jerk responses that characterize many living room conversa-
tions. Media ethics is a field grounded in classical moral philosophy
319
320 Dan Stout
and encourages systematic and principle-based moral reasoning

rather than casual and inconsistent modes of decision making.
In this chapter, we define ethics and identify political dilemmas
related to media. How new technologies are creating future ethical
concerns will also be addressed. Perhaps the most salient element of
the chapter, however, is the identification of foundational princi-
ples, the keys to more cogent and coherent ethical analysis. Three
case studies are provided in order to practice the application of var-
ious ethical concepts and principles.
THE MEDIA-POLITICS INTERFACE
As we begin a new century, political communication is becoming

more broad based and complex. For example, during the 2000 presi-
dential campaign, Democratic and Republican candidates reached vot-
ers in specific demographic groups through prerecorded phone mes-
sages from automated direct-marketing databases. Citizens are also
downloading political information from Internet websites. Today’s
voters are reached in ways that were unimaginable even 20 years ago.
The contemporary field of media ethics can only be understood within
the context of the informution society, an era in which mediated infor-
mation plays a vital role in politics and culture.’ In an information so-
ciety, information is often sold as a commodity, and multiple commu-
nication technologies are used routinely in everyday life. The
information society gives rise to a number of ethical dilemmas as well.
News Reporting of Politics

Media coverage of political polls, debates, and conventions are ar-
eas of considerable controversy. While political information is vital
to an informed citizenry, we might ask whether media cover politics
ethically; this goes to the core question about whether media are im-
pacting political processes in optimal or prosocial ways. With this
in mind, ethicists explore media’s agenda-setting function and its
effects on society when some issues get media attention and others
are ignored. These journalistic choices can have significant impact
Media Ethics and Political Communication 321
if, say, newspaper space that could have summarized a governmen-

tal study on automobile tire safety is used for a story on whether a
political candidate wears boxers or briefs. Ethicists raise questions
about the factors influencing decisions to cover certain stories and
examine the social, economic, and moral roots of such decisions.
The idea is that political systems function best when the electorate
is informed on a wide range of issues.
News coverage of politics is also tied to economics and the need
to attract large audiences. Ethicists raise concerns when the enter-
tainment dimension of political news is overemphasized, leading to
sensational or incomplete stories. Reporting of exit poll results and
projecting election winners while people are still voting, for exam-
ple, may reflect the desire to achieve high TV ratings and not nec-
essarily be in the public interest.*
Political Advertising and Propaganda

Political propaganda is also an important focus of media ethicists.
The use of advertising by candidates, for example, raises a number of
ethical questions ranging from exaggerated claims to excessive levels
of campaign spending. In fact, references to an opponent’s inaccurate
television commercials are frequent in political speeches today.
Propaganda techniques used in World War I and World War I1
helped create the belief that public opinion could be manipulated by
mass media. In 1917 George M. Cohan wrote the popular patriotic
tune “Over There” to drum up support for the war effort; such songs
contributed to the evolving development of political advertising,
which combines helpful information with persuasive techniques
such as music and short, catchy slogans that appeal to complex
emotions? A group of scholars, therefore, is concerned with the
ethics of persuasion; they seek to define more closely the nature of
responsibility when it comes to truth and deception in mass media.“
Which specific issues do these ethicists deal with? The focus is on
the controversial nature of propaganda itself. First, are such cam-
paign ads accurate? In the 1980s, for example, Michael Dukakis
complained that George H. W. Bush’s television commercial depict-
ing criminals convicted of major crimes exiting prison through a
322 Dan Stout
continually revolving door was an exaggeration and distortion of the

facts. In a more recent presidential election, George W. Bush
claimed that Bill Clinton’s commercials about his education record
as Texas governor were mostly false.
The question of whether political advertising relies too heavily on
images that create emotional appeal is worthy of future study. That is,
political advertising doesn’t just “give the facts.” Instead, it uses sym-
bols and language that are only indirectly related to the issue being
communicated. A classic example is Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 televi-
sion commercial depicting his opponent, Barry Goldwater, as a mili-
tary “hawk” bent on getting the country into nuclear war. The spot
shows a little girl innocently picking flowers in a field when a mush-
room cloud from a nuclear explosion suddenly erupts. A forerunner to
the highly dramatized commercials of today, this commercial raises
the question of how far politicians should go in using images whose
effects on psychological emotions are not fully understood.
Impact of Media Ownership on Political Process

How owners of media companies influence or bias the content of po-
litical coverage is also an ethical issue of profound importance. Does
the fact that a newspaper owner is a liberal or conservative affect the
type of political information that is disseminated and ultimately used
in voting decisions? If the CEO of a television network stresses prof-
its over social responsibility, will the political discourse be directed
more toward the sensational and away from other important, although
less exciting problems? Media ethicists raise questions about the
moral implications of media ownership and whether the filters of po-
litical information are equitable and balanced. In the U.S., for exam-
ple, 23 corporations own and control 50% of the business interest of
all media companies? The point of view coming out of such corpo-
rations, media scholars argue, is a key area for ethical analysis.
FUTURE ETHICAL CONCERNS
While news coverage, political advertising, and media ownership

are key areas of ethical study, additional concerns are emerging.
One issue that will be explored later in the chapter is that of infor-
mation haves and have-nots. Healthy democracies occur when all
citizens have necessary information to make informed decisions.
But what happens when some can’t afford cable TV or the Internet?
The concept of information equity has ethical dimensions that must
be addressed as the U.S. cultural fabric becomes increasingly di-
verse. Latino, Asian, and Middle Eastern communities have ex-
panded, for example, but because these subcultures differ in terms
of information access, analysts must consider the ethics of policies
that do not provide for equal distribution of political information.
Another issue for the future is that of privacy. The increasing use
of databases and websites to collect and store personal information
about voters raises new concerns, as does the perceived encroach-
ment by journalists into politicians’ private lives. Beyond the issue
of intrusion on private time, the ethics of how personal information
will be used in the future has created considerable anxiety among
citizens. There are also fears about whether such information will
be sold to businesses for advertising purposes:
Defining Ethics: Foundations and Terminology

for Moral Reasoning
Ethics refers to moral principles regarding right and wrong; it is a term
associated with standards or norms of moral conduct. Derived from
the Greek ethos, meaning character, the word has come to be associ-
ated with codes of conduct and the inner conscience. Ethics is also a
branch of moral philosophy and was addressed in seminal ways by an-
cient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
Ethics is tied to the activity of moral reasoning, which is a
thoughtful, systematic, and analytical approach to moral issues. It
shouldn’t be confused with moralizing, which is a more casual and
offhanded approach? With moralizing, assumptions about right and
wrong are made without coherent or consistent rationale. Classical
moral philosophy, however, is based on the idea that the most de-
fensible ethical decisions come out of dialectical reasoning that
stretches the intellect, rather than the more superficial and anecdotal
analyses that we all fall victim to at one time or another. The pur-
pose of this section, then, is to lay out some of the foundational
324 Dan Stout
terms and principles necessary in making the leap from moralizing

to moral reasoning.
Types of Ethics
Within the field of moral philosophy, a number of distinctions are
helpful in thinking about the multifaceted nature of ethics. Norma-
tive ethics is that branch of moral reasoning anchored in the expec-
tations and norms of society. Grasping the distinction between the-
oretical and applied ethics is also useful, the former consisting of
the use of analytical concepts to explain ethical behavior and the lat-
ter concerning itself with applying theory to practice. The two main
categories of ethics to be discussed in this chapter, however, are de-
ontological and teleological. Deontological approaches assume a
“universal right” in all situations. This type of ethics recognizes an
inherent good in a moral action or intention; the consequences of
the action are less important. With teleology, on the other hand, it is
the consequence of the action that is vital in the ethical decision.
The key is how the decision ultimately affects society, not the in-
tention of the actor.
EthicaI Principles
In addition to types of ethics, there are also ethical principles, or
well-reasoned frameworks or guides in making moral decisions. Such
principles are the result of thorough analysis and study. Some of these
include Aristotle’s golden mean, Kant’s categorical imperative, Mill’s
utilitarianism, and Durkheim’s cultural ethical relativism.
Aristotle’s Golden Mean Based on the idea that ethical behav-
ior is found in the moderation between two extremes, Aristotle
posited the concept of a golden mean. Ethical problems, including
those concerning political communication, should be solved by
finding a “just-right point between excess and defect.”* Although
recognizing that a mean position isn’t always possible, Aristotle be-
lieved that good should be the goal of all behavior, and that virtue
is an important element of what is good. In media ethics, this prin-
ciple is helpful in considering balanced approaches to news cover-
age. Parents of a juvenile accused of robbing a convenience store,

for example, may ask a newspaper editor not to publish the story in
order to protect the teen’s privacy and future opportunities. In lo-
cating a middle position, the editor may choose to run the story, but
withhold the name of the youth.
Kant’s Categorical Imperative The 18th-century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant grounded his ideas on ethics in what he
termed the categorical imperative. “Act as if the maxim of your ac-
tion were to become through your will a universal law of n a t ~ r e . ” ~
In other words, never behave in a manner that could not be univer-
sally applied. This principle is relevant in media ethics with respect
to the phenomenon of campaign TV commercials. If a candidate
feels such ads should be universally truthful, she or he must also be
held to this standard of truth and not make an exception.
Mill’s Utilitarianism As a social reformer, John Stuart Mill
made an indelible impact on the politics of mid-19th-century En-
gland. His contributions to moral philosophy revolve around his
meditations and writings on utilitarianism. Greatly simplified here,
this approach states that moral decisions are those which create the
greatest happiness for the greatest number. The consequences of an
act, he argued, outweigh the intention motivating the act.1° Re-
porters embrace this form of utilitarianism when they go under-
cover to obtain corporate or government documents, claiming that
the publication of such is a greater benefit than obeying the law in
a particular case.
Durkheim ’s Cultural Ethical Relativism Emile Durkheim was
a pioneering contributor to the field of sociology as well as a sig-
nificant contributor to the study of ethics.” According to his view,
ethical behavior can only be understood within the context of the
larger society, which creates normative ethical standards. As soci-
eties evolve, so do their ethical standards; such standards also differ
from society to society. This view has come to be known as cultural
ethical relativism. When John F. Kennedy was president, for exam-
ple, reporters considered it unethical to disclose details of his pri-
vate life such as extramarital affairs. Today, however, most reporters
consider it unethical not to cover such stories, as in the case of Bill
Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.
326 Dan Stout
The Difference between Ethics and law

Despite considerable confusion on the subject, there are important
distinctions between ethics and law. The role of government in the
study of politics makes this distinction particularly relevant to our
discussion. That is, does the statement “I’m not breaking any cam-
paign laws so therefore I’m ethical’’ capture the full essence of what
it means to be moral in the political environment? As Rushworth
Kidder puts it, “Obeying the law . . . is not enough to earn the ‘eth-
ical’ label.”I2 Ethics is grounded in moral reasoning and cannot be
achieved only by adhering to rules, codes, or institutional expecta-
tions; it stresses the beneficial activity of working through moral
dilemmas in analytical ways, placing emphasis on the intellectual
capacities. According to Kidder, ethics should concern itself with
finding the “golden mean” between regulation and free will and
thus achieve a deeper understanding of their complex inter~1ay.l~
Applying Ethical Reasoning to Political Communication

To this point, we have identified a number of ethical problems in
mass communication; several relevant terms have also been de-
fined. The study of media ethics, however, also examines the
ways moral reasoning is actually applied in everyday situations.
One thing our students express time after time is that while ex-
amples of ethical problems in media abound, specific strategies
for dealing with such situations are rarely discussed in the class-
room. This is partly due to the highly personal nature of ethical
approaches. Strategies, however, are not necessarily final deci-
sions, but frameworks or sets of questions that simply help or-
ganize thoughts and weigh options according to relevant princi-
ples and concepts. One such strategy is that of Ralph PotterI4 of
the Harvard Divinity School, who suggests four basic steps in an-
alyzing ethical dilemmas:
1. Clearly define the situation in which the dilemma emerges.

2. Identify the competing values in the ethical decision.
3. Use principles in analyzing the ethical problem.
4. Assess where loyalties lie and the conflicts these raise.
Using Potter’s strategy, we now turn to three prevalent categories

of ethical issues in political communication: (1) Access, or deci-
sions about who receives information and who does not, ( 2 ) Advo-
cacy, which has to do with bias and the moral implications of how
political issues are framed by media, and ( 3 )Accuracy, or the extent
to which media content is truthful, deceptive, or exaggerated. To il-
lustrate these categories of ethical problems, a brief case study is
provided for each.
Access
“Access,” or infomuztion equity, as it is commonly referred to,
promises to be one of the most important media issues of the new
century. Information is the sine qua non of a functioning society,
whether it be in families, corporafions, or political parties. To have
information is to have power, and in a democracy, it is vital that in-
formation be available to all citizens. Note the following case study:
CASE ONE
Members of the Board of Directors of a major network affiliate
TV station in Southern California are discussing a proposal signed
by 3,000 viewers requesting a political talk show in Spanish. The
population of the city is over 30%Latino and proponents argue such
a program is necessary, especially since it is an election year and
15% of the population speak little or no English. Several members
of the board, however, are concerned about low ratings and fear that
a single show in Spanish will confuse English viewers; the national
Spanish cable channels already cover politics for Spanish-speaking
citizens, they argue. The proposal is defeated by majority vote.
The Sitrcation Applying Potter’s framework, an ethicist begins

by analyzing the situation. What are the main facts of the case? Who
are the key players? How committed are they to their position?
What do we know regarding the strength of the arguments? Do we
need to know more? If we were to interview those involved, what
would we ask them? Deep and thorough analysis of ethical situa-
tions must begin by digging out the details and getting a sense that
the assumptions made are indeed based in fact. The question of
328 Dan Stout
whether the new show would lower ratings, for example, might be
conjecture rather than a sound prediction. In analyzing the situation,
the ethicist accepts nothing at face value; she or he must verify de-
tails and validate claims on both sides of the issue.
Competing Values After thoroughly reviewing the facts of the
situation, the ethicist is ready to identify competing values. In this
case, the values of equal opportunity and financial security com-
pete. Like all social values, both are positive and valuable things to
pursue. It is the job of the ethicist, however, to dig deeper and weigh
the consequences of emphasizing one value over another in a par-
ticular situation. In this case, which value represents the greatest
good for the most people? Does one value have greater conse-
quences in terms of long-term effects than the other? Here, the ethi-
cist must consider how the decision not to air the show might con-
tribute to “marginalized voices”15 of a large segment of the
population and whether possible loss of advertising revenue would
have a social impact of comparable magnitude.
Application of Principles Only after the competing values are
identified and discussed can the ethicist apply some of the princi-
ples discussed earlier in the definitions section. Aristotle’s golden
mean might be useful in thinking about a middle position or com-
promise, for example. Perhaps the Spanish program could be aired
but not as frequently, or possibly closed-captions could be used to
translate the program into Spanish.
Choosing Loyalties Lastly, an examination of loyalties is neces-
sary to better understand the biases of decision makers and how per-
sonal interests cloud clear judgments. Some would say that in this
case, loyalties are split between community and business. Do you
agree? This part of the analysis gets at the issue of power and how it
can dominate and undermine fairness in ethical decision making.
Advocacy
When editors and journalists show favoritism and partisanship,
the issue of advocacy arises. There is a place for advocacy in media
(e.g., editorials, news documentaries, letters to the editor, etc.), but
in terms of general news content, there is some expectation of neu-
trality, balance, and fairness. Ethical issues emerge when main news
is used not just to inform, but to indoctrinate.
CASE TWO
The Tribune is the only daily newspaper in a northern Michigan
city of 75,000. Handi-Mart, a discount department store, is the
largest advertiser, spending over $350,000 a year with the paper. A
bill before the state legislature, however, would require the company
to provide health benefits to part-time employees, which would put
Handi-Mart out of business, according to the company president.
Sensing a threat to its bottom line as well, the CEO of the Tribune
publishes an endorsement of a gubernatorial candidate who opposes
the bill. In addition, she makes a $100,000 donation to the candi-
date’s campaign on behalf of the Tribune. Although reporters for the
paper have not been told how to cover the story, some complain and
express anxiety about working for a paper that has taken a public
stand on a political issue.
The Situation When a media ethicist examines a situation in-

volving advocacy, a particular set of questions are asked. Do re-
porters seem pressured in ways that might impede objectivity? If so,
what is the nature of those pressures? In the above case, the situa-
tion must be examined in terms of the validity and strength of the
forces that threaten the writer’s ability to be expository and non-
doctrinaire. According to the case, reporters feel a degree of “anxi-
ety” about the company’s endorsement of a candidate. Are there
valid reasons for such anxiety?
Competing Values How would you analyze this case in terms of
competing values? On the surface, it seems to be a classic case of jour-
nalistic fairness versus profits, but are these adequate descriptors of the
complexity of the situation? At first glance, it appears that lost revenue
is the CEO’s only concern. Some might argue, however, that both the
management and reporters are ultimately interested in the same thing,
which is preserving an editorial voice into the future. That is, the CEO
might argue that if the paper goes out of business due to the loss of
Handi-Mart as an advertiser, all newspaper coverage will be lost. First
Amendment absolutists might disagree, though, insisting that this is
the quintessential example of the inevitable incompatibility of press
330 Dan Stout
freedom and free markets. According to this view, the values of busi-
ness are never as essential as those of free speech.
Application of Principles Which ethical principles could you
apply to this case? Kant’s categorical imperative seems applica-
ble in terms of whether the CEO’s behavior would be universally
accepted at all newspapers. Or, perhaps this is a case in which
teleological ethics are more relevant. Does the potential conse-
quence of the newspaper going out of business justify the actions
of management?
Choosing Loyalties Who will ultimately benefit from the ac-
tions of the reporters and the CEO? The CEO might claim that her
actions are in the best interest of citizens because the newspaper
cannot continue as a public service without a healthy bottom line.
Ethicists might probe further in terms of this claim, however. Per-
haps the CEO’s loyalty to political candidates and parties is also an
important variable. How would you choose loyalties in this case?
Accuracy
The final issue for analysis is accuracy, which has a number of
ethical dimensions in both political news and advertising. Journal-
ists are expected to get the story right through well-researched de-
scription and properly attributed quotes; political advertising should
also be accurate in its claims. In the case below, some of the com-
plexities of the ethics of accuracy are teased out.
CASE THREE
The two candidates for one of the US. Senate seats in Utah are
engaged in an intense and sometimes bitter campaign. Given that the
state is very conservative politically, the Republican refers to his op-
ponent, the Democrat, as “just another tax-and-spend liberal” in his
TV appearances and commercials. Noticing that the Democrat re-
duced taxes while mayor of Salt Lake City and took conservativepo-
sitions on most issues, a news reporter asks the Republican’s cam-
paign staff to clarify and substantiate the use of liberal. At a press
conference, the campaign manager is somewhat defensive and de-
fends the label based on the fact that the Democratic Party is the
more liberal of the two, and by direct affiliation, it is a defensible
claim. He argues that “we are entitled to our own view on what it
means to be a liberal.” The commercials continue throughout the
campaign and the Republican is victorious.
The Situation Ethical situations relating to accuracy and falsity

are often difficult to analyze, and Case Three is no exception. First,
it must be determined whether there is outright deception (e.g.,
when a political candidate falsely claims to have fought in Vietnam
or when a news reporter mistakenly identifies a candidate as a con-
victed felon) or puflery,l6 which is an exaggerated claim that cannot
be proven either way. Case Three is clearly puffery because what is
meant by liberal is a matter of interpretation, or so the participants
claim. Puffery situations require more complex analysis than the
more straightforward deception cases, which are cut and dried. To
the reporter, a liberal is something defined by concrete behavior like
a voting record, but to the Republican candidate, it can be deter-
mined by other criteria such as political party affiliation.
Competing Values With the situation more clearly defined, the
values of the reporter and those of the candidate can be more pre-
cisely distinguished. An accurately informed voter is what the re-
porter is after, but the response of the candidate’s staff focuses more
on the right to express opinions than past behavior. This is a com-
mon value-conflict in puffery cases. The problem some ethicists
have with the “we are entitled to our own view” argument is that
voters are simply unaware that this is the basis for the claim; they
often make the same assumption as the reporter, that what defines a
liberal is the candidate’s past behavior and views expressed.
Application of Principles A number of ethical principles could
be applied here, but Mill’s principle of utility seems particularly rel-
evant. What are the possible consequences of labeling the opponent
a liberal versus not doing so? Which action does the most good for
the greatest number of people?
Choosing Loyalties How are audiences affected by the loyal-
ties chosen in this case? Who is more loyal to the voters, the re-
porter or the Republican candidate? The Republican expresses
strong party loyalty. How important should this type of loyalty be in
a case like this?
332 Dan Stout
CONCLUSION: THE PRAGMATICS OF MEDIA ETHICS
With regard to media ethics of political communication, every

decade brings new challenges and prospects. From accuracy in
news reporting to information equity for all citizens, the ability to
engage in cogent moral reasoning can be of great value in the fu-
ture. Whether it be a deontological approach or one based in teleol-
ogy, a knowledge of media ethics can enhance our experience as cit-
izens, voters, politicians, and media professionals. Perhaps the most
salient part of this chapter is that which deals with principles and
strategies for analysis; they help break down complex ethical prob-
lems into conceptual frameworks that organize our thinking.
Besides principles and strategies, there is one more aspect of me-
dia ethics that is worthy of note. This is the area of pragmatics, or
the specific ways ethical analysis actually impacts or benefits soci-
ety. At the level of families, a knowledge of ethical principles en-
courages more sophisticated media criticism and interpretation. In
other words, the study of ethics contributes to media literacy, which
is the ability to use media optimally in everyday life. Many chil-
dren, for example, benefit from basic discussions of the ethical di-
mensions of political advertising and how to better understand its
persuasive techniques.
For those pursuing careers in politics and the public sector, ethi-
cal study can be of prime importance. The years ahead will bring
even greater dependence on media to disseminate political informa-
tion. Strategies for using media are not only matters of political suc-
cess, however, but can have social impacts on society. As media be-
come more dominant in political fields, so will the need for those
with a deeper understanding of media ethics. In concluding this
chapter on media ethics and politics, the reader is left to ponder a
few final questions. What is the relationship between the study of
ethics and a person’s actual behavior in political life? Which ethical
principles are the most useful in this digital age of media conver-
gence? Will the information society require new frameworks of eth-
ical analysis? Not only is there a need to address such questions, but
also a need to take them more seriously.
1. Summarize the four ethical principles outlined in this chapter.

How does each relate to media ethics?
2. What is information equity? What are some problems that can
arise without information equity?
3. What are the three prevalent categories of ethical issues in po-
litical communication discussed in this chapter? Give an ex-
ample of an ethical dilemma in each category (besides the one
discussed in the chapter).
4. Analyze the following case study using the four basic steps
described in the chapter:
A prominent newspaper, The World Times, is owned by the defense

contractor WAR-Co. While a World Times reporter is working Oil a
story about a new missile technology, the publisher of the paper
mentions to the reporter that WAR-Co is developing that technology
and without a government contract will go out of business. When
the story is printed, it clearly emphasizes the importance and possi-
bilities of the new technology but does not mention that the missiles
have failed to achieve their objectives in testing. Shortly thereafter,
a government contract is awarded to WAR-Co to develop and pro-
duce the missiles.
Baker, Sherry, “Five Baselines for Justification in Persuasion,” Journal of

Mass Media Ethics 14, no. 2 ( 1999).
Christians, Clifford G . , Kim B. Rotzoll, and Mark Fackler, Media Ethics:
Cases and Moral Reasoning, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1991).
Kidder, Rusworth M., How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving
the Dilemmas of Ethical Living (New York: William Morrow, 1995).
Leslie, Larry Z., Mass Communication Ethics: Decision Making in Post-
modern Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).
Preston, Ivan L., The Tangled Web They Weave: Truth, Falsity, and Adver-
tisers (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).
334 Dan Stout
Schement, J. and T. Curtis, Tendencies and Tensions of the Znformation

Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1995).
Stout, Daniel A., “Advertising,” in Media Now: Communications Media
in the Information Age, ed. J. Straubhaar and R. LaRose (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth, 2000).
NOTES
1. For an in-depth discussion of the information society, see J. Sche-

ment and T. Curtis, Tendencies and Tensions of the Information Society
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1995).
2. For a detailed discussion of how journalists report results of polls,
see Kenneth Harwood, “Reporting the Polls,” Media Ethics 12, no. 2
(Spring 2001): 10,28.
3. A short history of advertising and its roots in war propaganda can
be found in Daniel A. Stout, “Advertising,” in Media Now: Communica-
tions Media in the Information Age, by J. Straubhaar and R. LaRose (Bel-
mont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2000), 346-81.
4. A framework of ethical justification for professional persuasive com-
munications can be found in Sherry Baker, “Five Baselines for Justification
in Persuasion,” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 14, no. 2 (1999): 69-8 1.
5. These and other statistics on media ownership can be found in
Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media (companion book
to the film), ed. Mark Achbar (Montreal: Necessary Illusions, 1994), 62.
6. For a thorough discussion of citizen concerns about privacy and
fear about storage of personal data, see S. Ashley Grainger, “Privacy: A
Big Problem with a Simple Solution,” Integrated Marketing Communica-
tions Research Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 26-32.
7. According to Black, Barney, and Deaver, moralizing is the antithe-
sis of moral reasoning. See their discussion in “Media Ethics and Issues”
(unpublished manuscript, Brigham Young University, Provo, 1996).
8. Abraham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1982), 270.
9. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421/89, as quoted in
Mass Communication Ethics: Decision Making in Postmodern Culture,
Larry Z . Leslie (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 76.
10. For a more detailed discussion of Mill’s utilitarianism and media
ethics, see Maria B. Marron, “Mass Communication Ethics: The Central
Issue in Decision-Making,” in Mass Communication in the Znfomuztion

Age, ed. D. Sloan et al. (Northport,Ala.: Vision, 1996).
11. See Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals, trans.
C. Brooktield (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).Also see Larry 2. Leslie,
Mass Communication Ethics: Decision Making in Postmodem Culture
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).
12. Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices:
Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living (New York: Morrow, 1995),73.
13. Kidder, Good People, 69.
14. Potter’s model for ethical decision making can be found in Ralph
B. Potter, “The Structure of Certain American Christian Responses to the
Nuclear Dilemma” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1965). It has been
adapted and presented visually in four circular quadrants as “The Potter
BOX”in many articles and books. An excellent application of this model
to media ethics can be found in Clifford G. Christians, Kim B. Rotzoll,
and Mark Fackler, Media Ethics: Cases and Moral Reasoning, 3rd ed.
(New York: Longman, 1991).
15. The term marginalized voices is considered one of the “tensions” of
the information society in Jorge Schement and Hester Stephenson, “Religion
and the Information Society,” in Religion and Mass Media: Audiences and
Adzptations, ed. Daniel A. Stout and Judith M. Buddenbaum (Thousand
Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), 261-89.
16. For a thorough discussion of “puffery” in advertising, see Ivan J.
Preston, The Tangle2 Web They Weave: Truth, Falsity, and Advertisers
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).
Index
Abraham, Spencer, 145 Biden, Joseph, 64,164

Acton, James, 86 bin Laden, Osama, 5,269
advocacy, 153,189-200,328-30 Birnbaum, Jeffrey, 184
Alter, Jonathan, 283 Biskupic, Joan, 80-82,84,87
American Association for Public Black, Hugo, 92
Opinion Research (AAPOR), Blackmun, Harry, 52,85
212-13,215-16 Blumenthal, Sidney, 9, 18
Ames, Aldrich, 110 Borger, Gloria, 29,32
Amundson, Daniel R., 31 Borgman, Albert, 309-10
Appel, Kevin, 28,33 Bork, Robert, 53
Aristide, Jean Bertrand, 285 Bowles, Erskine, 7
Aristotle, 324 Bradley, Ed, 192-93
Asher, Herbert, 27,31,215-16 Brennan, William, 49-50,52-53,82,
Aukofer, Frank, 56 85
Breyer, Stephen, 64,86
Bagdikian, Ben, 131,135, 182 Brill, Stephen, 224
Barbour, Haley, 148-49 Broder, David, 10,30
Barnum, David G., 50 Buchanan, Pat, 164, 171,221
Barr, Mike, 27 Budget Enforcement Act, 185
Barrett, Paul, 89 bureaucracy, 97, 101, 103-6, 108,
Bartlett, Dan, 3 4 110-1 1 1. See also media
Begala, Paul, 163 Burger, William, 49,64
Benjamin, Walter, 299 Bush, George H. W., 10-14,185,191,
Bennett, Lance, 303 221,242,252,268,273,278,
Berkowitz, Dan, 126 282-83
Berkson, Larry, 46 Bush, George W., 2-8, 14-19, 119,
Bernstein, Carl, 273 1 4 6 4 9 , 164-65, 170,221-27
337
338 Index
Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network Durkheim, Emile, 325

(C-SPAN), 34-36,39,80-81,87, Dye, Thomas, 29,3 1
90,161
Carelli, Richard, 63 editorials, 103-6, 112-13
Carswell, G. Harrold, 47 Elders, Jocelyn, 109
Carter, Jerome, 63 elections, 159-74,221-23
Carter, Jimmy, 164,168,239 Environmental Protection Agency
Casey, William, 101 (EPA), 1034,192
Cedras, Raoul, 285 Erikson, Robert S., 51
Cheney, Dick, 4,14 Espy, Mike, 109-10
Churchill, Winston, 256
Clark, Ramsey, 239 Fallows, James, 60,83
Cleveland, Grover, 168 Federal Aviation Administration
Clinton, Bill, 6-9, 11-19, 109, (FAA), 98
143-46,163-67,268-75,284, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
301,309 98
Clinton, Hillary, 9, 17 Fitzwater, Marlin, 11,240
CNN effect, 281-90 Fleischer, Ari, 5, 15
Coalition Information Center, 4, 17, Food and Drug Administration, 108
19 Fordice, Kirk, 112, 128-29
Cohen, Bernard, 275 Fortas, Abe, 49,79
Cohen, Richard, 88 Franklin, Charles, 45,48
Compton, Ann, 9-10 Frankovic,Kathleen, 165,208
Congress, 26-27,32,36-39. See also Fulbright, J. William, 34
media
Connally, John, 172 Gearan, Mark, 12-13
Cook, Brim, 99-100 Gergen, David, 7,12-13
Cossack, Roger, 54,81,91 Gideon, Clarence Earl, 79
Crosson, Cynthia, 193 Gingrich, Newt, 145-46
Crowley, Candy, 198 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 83
Cruz, Rolando, 127-28 Goldberg, Bernard, 198,200
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 235-36
David, Richard, 32,90 Gore, Al, 170,191,221-25,227
Denniston, Lyle, 54,59-60 Gormley, William, 120,122
Denton, Robert, 32 Graber, Doris, 49,59-60,90-91, 120,
Dole, Bob, 143,221 122,126
Dole, Elizabeth, 164-65 Graham, Fred, 49,60
Douglas, William O . ,49,53,92 Greenfield, Jeff, 17,166-69
Dow, Bonnie, 169 Greenhouse, Linda, 56,58,80,82,84,
Drudge, Matt, 92,173,208 86
“The Drudge Report,” 92,301,309
Dugan, Brian, 127 Hearst, William Randolph, 281
Dukakis, Michael, 19691,321 Hernandez, Alejandro, 127-28
Index 339
Hess, Stephen, 30,101 Mauro, Tony, 5 1,54

Hollings, Fritz, 1 4 3 4 Maynes,Charles William, 276
Honecker, Erich, 235-26 McCain, John, 300
Horton, Willie, 190-91,201 McCombs, Maxwell E., 25,276
House, Toni, 55,61-63 McLarty, Mack, 12-13
Hughes, Karen, 3 4 , 7 , 1 5 media, 237,241; biases of, 136,
150-51; and bureaucracy, 97-101,
information equity, 323,327-28 102-13; and civil liberties, 75-80,
Inglis, Bob, 141, 144 82-87,88-93; coverage, 60,120,
interest groups, 57,181-202 122,245-53; and economics, 130,
intergovernmental organizations 1 3 2 , 2 4 3 4 ; and elections,
(IGOS),243,251-52,255-57 159-63, 164-74; and ethics,
Internet, 36-38,150,163,266-67, 319-24,325-32; and foreign
297-3 13. See also New Media policy, 23541,242-250,25 1-59;
Iyengar, Shanto, 278-80,287 and interest groups, 181-190,
191-202; and local politics,
Jackson, Robert, 78-79 119-24,125-29,130-37; and
Jacobs, Jesse DeWayne, 88-89 political parties, 14147, 148-54;
Johnson, Lyndon, 322 and the presidency, 1-10,ll-19;
journalism, 164,173,197-200; and public opinion, 207-16,
investigative, 126-27,273 2 17-28,270-7 1; roles of,
200-201,265-90; and state
Kant, Immanuel, 325 politics, 119-24,125-37. See also
Kennan, George, 240,282-83 Congress, Supreme Court
Kennedy, Anthony, 46,83 Mill, John Stuart, 325
Koppel, Ted, 239 Myers, Dee Dee,8,10,12-14
Kosaki, Liane, 45,48
Krauthammer, Charles, 84,282 narrowcasting,9 , l l
Krosnick, Jon, 278-79 National Council on Public Polls
Kurtz, Howard, 12-13,32 (NCPP), 212-13,215-16
New Media, 9, 17, 19,26-28,
Lewinsky, Monica, 6, 17-18, 14, 144 297-305,306-3 13. See also
167,301,308 Internet
Lichter, Robert, 31, 199 New York Emes, 80-8 1,83,85-86,
Littlewood, Tom, 120 89,92,152,184
lobbyists, 184,187, 189 News Election Service (NEB), 223
newspapers, 133,266
Major, John, 286-87 Nixon, Richard, 2,8-9
Marshall, Thurgood, 53 nongovernmental organizations
Mason Dixon Polling Organization, (NGOS),237,243,251-52,
130 255-57
Matalin, Mary, 4-5 North American Free Trade
Mathews,Jessica, 277,281 Agreement (NAFTA), 27,257
340 Index
O’Brien, Tim, 49,54-55,64 Schabowski, Guenter, 236

O’Connor, Sandra Day, 46,39,81,83, Scheuer, Steven, 78
85 Scowcroft, Brent, 277, 288
Old Media, 9, 11, 17, 19 Segal, Jennifer, 6 1 , 9 0
Ornstein, Norman, 28-29 Seligman, Lester, 1
Shaw, Donald L., 25,276
Panetta, Leon, 7, 13 Souter, David, 46,5 1,53,64
parties, political, 1 4 1 4 3 , 147-48, Specter, Arlen, 64
150,152, 162. See also media spin, 187-88
Patterson, Thomas E., 151, 162,200, Stephanopoulos, George, 7-8, 10-12,
218 164,268
Pew Research Center for the People Stem, Carl, 56-57,59,64
and the Press, 266,297,305 Stevens, John Paul, 53,88
polls, 130,165,207-10,219,270; and Strobel, Warren, 277,289-90
elections, 2 18,220-2 1,225-27; Supreme Court, 45-5 1,52-59,60-66,
methodology, 2 11-15 87-88,90
popular culture, 75-80 surveys. See polls
Potter, Ralph, 3 2 6 2 7
Powell, Colin, 164,237 Taylor, Stuart, 5 1
press information officers (PIOs), television, 76, 121, 133, 1 6 8 4 9 , 196,
102 255,266,287-88; cable, 163,
propaganda, 321-22 26667
Public Information Office, 56,62 Terzian, Philip, 199
Pulitzer, Joseph, 28 I Thomas, Clarence, 53, 81-84
Tidmarch, Charles, 28
radio, 239,266; public, 196 Totenberg, Nina, 54
Raspberry, William, 83 Truman, Harry, 22 1
Reagan, Ronald, 4, 16,19, 113, 167, Turner, Ed, 9 1
252,279
Rehnquist, William, 50,52,75,81, Unruh, Jesse, 186-87
83,86
reporting, 126,132. See also Supreme Van Susteren, Greta, 8 1,91
Court, journalism Vietnam War, 237-39,273-74
reverse CNN effect, 288-90 Voter News Service (VNS), 222-24,
Robinson, Michael, 28,33 22627
Roosevelt, Franklin, 2, 221 Voter Research and Surveys (VRS),
Rosenstiel, Tom, 9-10, 183 223
Ryan, James, 127-28
Warren, Earl, 47-49,79
Safire, William, 30 Washington Post, 80-89,92, 184
Scalia, Antonin, 49,5 1,83,85,87 Watson, Paul, 285
Index 34 1
Weinberger, Caspar, 237 Wood, B. Dan, 50, 100

White House Office of Woodward, Bob, 13,273
Communications, 2-3,6,8-9 Woodward, Gary, 32,124
Wilder, Douglas, 22 1
Wilkinson, James, 4-5 Zeigler, Harmon, 29,31
Will, George, 83 Zimmerman, Warren, 288
wire services, 58-59, 121, 132 Zorn, Eric, 127-28

Media Power Media Politics PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Media Power Media Politics PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Media Power Media Politics PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Media Power,

Edited by Mark J. Rozell

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC

Published in the United States of America

Copyright 0 2003 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationData

1 The Presidency and the News Media 1

2 Congress and the Media 25

3 The Supreme Court and the Press 45

4 The Media and Civil Right and Liberties 75

5 Bureaucracy and the Media 97

6 The Media in State and Local Politics 119

7 Political Parties and the Media 141

8 Presidential Elections and the Media 159

9 The Media and Interest Groups in the United States 181

10 The Media and Public Opinion 207

11 Global Media and Foreign Policy 235

12 Media Impact 265

13 The New Media 297

14 Media Ethics and Political Communication 319

T h e chapters that follow provide a traditional American Govern-

covering political events. Many prominent reporters have written

john Anthony Maltese

O n e of the most important changes of the modern presidency is the

Eisenhower created the Congressional Relations Office as a tool to

in the White House, including the Office of Communications, the

icy. For example, the CIC waged a campaign to focus worldwide

MULTIPLE STAFF AND THE PROBLEM

With so many staff units involved in communicating the president’s

ad hoc communications units within the White House and to rely on

president’s term of office) can sometimes have little or no institu-

CLINTON AND THE PRESS: LESSONS FROM

Problems of arrogance and inexperience on the part of White House

transformed overnight from a place where President George Herbert

the goodwill of reporters. “Put it this way,” said Karen Hosler,

policy and strategy, and was replaced as communications director by

stories openly questioned McLarty ’s authority. Ann Devroy wrote in

sessions helped to focus the president’s responses, but some said

FACTORS THAT UNDERMINE THE PRESIDENT’S

George W. Bush learned from Clinton’s mistakes and instituted a

made an effort to demonstrate Press Secretary Fleischer’s access and

publicly suggested in 1995 that conservative talk radio had fanned

Fox News and MSNBC, in particular, relied heavily on talk shows

internal conflict were rampant in his administration. Clinton should

1 . What is “going public”? How does the White House Office

Center” was an attempt to adapt to the never-ending news cycle

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

This chapter is based, in large part, on an earlier article of mine, “The

1. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential

George C. Edwards 111, The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular

32. Rosenstiel, The Beat Goes On, 10.

54. Overnight, Bush’s Gallup approval rating skyrocketed to 90 per-

As numerous studies have shown, political life for most Americans

Members of Congress bear some responsibility for the negative

HOW THE MEDIA COVER CONGRESS

If Congress is held in such low esteem, there is no doubt that much of