Globe Telecom v.

NTC 435 SCRA 110 ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by substantial
evidence.
FACTS:
RULING:
On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent
NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars
Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent
malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS. determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with
proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; the assailed
Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing
Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for
grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with
the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and
the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum
for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite
Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-
the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the
Forum Shopping.
right to present evidence on its behalf.
On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and
cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No
interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the cost.
present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition
of value-added service or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their implementation of SMS
interconnection is mandatory. The NTC also declared that both Smart and
Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it.

Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from
taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its previous
arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. They
claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no
authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an
issue before it at all. They alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it
imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor
Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due
process. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe
called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom,
holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the
prior approval of the NTC.
1
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 implementation. Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus filed petition for
review [of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as
amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of jurisdiction.
profession”.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said charter, right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law.
PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued Administrative Order 04-92
RULING:
[PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating
that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments
to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and
a term of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its
performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling discipline implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03- PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders
85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots must have a license and are declared null and void;
train as probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, are
given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA
harbor pilot age until they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04- Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and
92 only after publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Orders.
Association of the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the No costs. SO ORDERED
DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, recall or
annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President, which first
issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA-AO,
and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted said
order, stating, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato
C. Corona, that the PPA-AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance
is an act of PPA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not
forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property
right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to
consult only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding
affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-
AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA on its

2
 NPC v. Zozobrado 437 SCRA 16
FACTS:
Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein respondent, is a permanent employee of
petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) assigned as Pilot in the
aviation group, received a letter from NPC President Frederico C. Puno,
informing him that he was being dropped from the rolls.
Zozobrado filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPCs implementation
of dropping him from the rolls.
CSC dismissed Zobrado’s appeal and MR.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and was granted.
Petitioner filed for MR but was denied.
Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from the rolls due to
Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
CA ruled in favor of herein respondents finding that the separation was
made with utter lack of due process.
ISSUE:
WON due process was followed in dropping respondent from the rolls.
RULING:
NO. Both the substantive and procedural aspect of due process were
violated by petitioner in dismissing respondent.
As to the procedural aspect, not even one requisites laid down by
Memorandum Circular No. 12 has been complied with. Respondent was
never notified in writing of his unsatisfactory rating within 30 days from the
end of the semester when the unsatisfactory rating was given.
Respondent was never warned in writing that a succeeding unsatisfactory
performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Even the
allegation of the oral notice itself (that petitioner claims and respondent
categorically denies) is clearly an afterthought, having been utilized for the
3
first time in the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Court of Appeals
decision and was never used as an argument in the administrative
proceedings. The proof of such notice, a self-serving affidavit of the very
individual who unilaterally gave the apparently groundless rating, deserves
scant consideration.
As to the substantive aspect, evidence shows that petitioner never denied
that respondent’s unsatisfactory rating was due to respondents testimony
in court concerning the graft charges against NPC employees. On the day
respondent was supposed to testify in court under pain of contempt, Gen.
Lagera suddenly sent him to fly the NPC President despite the fact that
another pilot was assigned to such mission.
Moreover, Gen. Lagera’s ill motive is further proved by the fact that
respondent was kept in the dark as to the status of his employment even
though the same had already been terminated two months earlier. It
appears that the sad news was relayed to respondent only on his natal day
affair. We can see no reason for the two months delay other than the
devastation Gen. Lagera expected to cause by imparting the shocking news
on respondents birth anniversary, during a celebration and in front of other
people.
As further found by the Court of Appeals, when respondent brought to the
Grievance Committee the matter of his unsatisfactory ratings, the Grievance
Committee recommended a review thereof to take into account
respondent’s quantity of flying hours. Pilots have traditionally been rated by
the number of flying hours spent in their career, and respondent had more
than double the flying hours of the two other pilots of the Aviation Group
combined. However, Gen. Lagera blocked such review, claiming that he had
already considered the same, albeit minimally. This is a clear indication that
Gen. Lagera really wanted to take it upon himself to solely give the
unsatisfactory ratings to respondent, in violation of the approved
Performance Appraisal System (PAS) of the NPC.
 Salaw v. NLRC 202 SCRA 7 September 27, 1991
FACTS:
Espero Santos Salaw was a credit investigator-appraiser of herein
respondent Associated Bank.
His duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and identifying the
company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real properties and
verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of the titles of properties
mortgaged to the respondents.
Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have conspired in selling
twenty (20) sewing machines and electric generators which had been
foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide Garment and L.P.
Money Garment, for P60,000.00, and divided the proceeds thereof in equal
shares of P30,000.00 between the two of them. The Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted Sworn Statement from
them without the assistance of a counsel.
Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, requested petitioner to appear before the
bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) which
petitioner attended and 3 months after, his termination became effective
for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful
breach of the trust reposed on him by the private respondents.
Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent and likewise
submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement before the CIS.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. Private respondents
appealed to the NLRC and reversed the LA’s decision. Petitioner’s MR was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s dismissal was legally justified.
RULING:
NO. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and
the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized
4
cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but
the rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing — must
also be observed before an employee may be dismissed. One does not
suffice; without their concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the
law, be illegal.
As to the LA’s finding, petitioner was terminated without the benefit of due
process of law. The respondents' initial act in convening their Personnel
Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) to investigate complainant
(after the CIS experience) would have complied with the demands of due
process had complainant been given the opportunity to present his own
defense and confront the witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence
against him. But as the records clearly show, the complainant was denied
that constitutional right when his subsequent request refute the allegations
against him was granted and a hearing was set "without counsel or
representative.
The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank' investigating
committee violated his constitutional right to due process, in as much as he
was not given a chance to defend himself, as provided in Rule XIV, Book V of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code governing the
dismissal of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires."11
(Emphasis supplied.) Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance
of counsel during the investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No reasons
preferred which vitiated the denial with irregularity and unfairness.
As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents premised their
action in dismissing the complainant on his supposed admission of the
offense imputed to him by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in its
interrogation in November 1984. The said admission was carried in a three-
page Sworn Statement signed by the complainant. Aside from this
Statement, other evidence was presented by the respondents to establish
the culpability of the complainant in the fraudulent sale of respondents'
foreclosed properties. Even the minutes of proceeding taken during the
investigation conducted by respondents were not presented. ... This is a
glaring denial of due process.
Considering further that the admission by the petitioner which was
extracted from him by the Criminal Investigate Service of the Philippine
Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the assistance of counsel
and which was made the sole basis for his dismissal, cannot be admitted in
evidence against him, then, the finding of guilt of the PDIC, which was
affirmed by the public respondent NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was
characterized by undue haste. The law is clear that even in the disposition of
labor cases, due process must not be subordinated to expediency or
dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee will be tainted with
illegality.
5
Castillo-Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717 June 16, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is a Governor of Quirino. Congressman Junie Cua
filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor
Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against
the public treasury and malversation. (Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of
the Revised Penal Code.)
Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was
reconditioned instead of brand new as required by resolutions of the
provinces Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities
claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of public
bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in violation of
Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an attempt to cover up such
irregularities.
A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial
Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension for a period of six
(6) months.
Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Director, and approved by
Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both
motions were denied in a Joint Order signed by Director Gonzales and
approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero.
Petitioner file for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, seeks
to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her preventive
suspension and claiming that the Deputy Ombudsman has no authority to
issue the preventive suspension against them.
ISSUE:
WON the Deputy Ombudsman has authority to issue the preventive appropriate, as indicated by the word or between the Ombudsman and his
suspension Deputy. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. The
WON petitioner was denied due process because she was not afforded the
law does not require that only the Ombudsman himself may sign the order
opportunity to controvert the evidence against her before the order of
of suspension.
preventive suspension was issued.
2. NO. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an official
RULING:
under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
1. YES. Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, only the are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty,[13] but merely a
Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing officials with a 27 preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor, under preventive
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his
suspension. In this case, the suspension order was neither signed nor
answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension
approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather, said order was signed by
was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct
Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
in office, but only as a preventive measure. A suspension is a preliminary
Jesus Guerrero.
step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest that charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order preventively warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an
Moreover, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule III of the opportunity to prove his innocence.
Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman similarly provides:
The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint was
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. -- The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The immediate issuance of
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in
such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the suspension
his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in
performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to:
(c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or
him. Xxx
those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well
SEC. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent may be as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.
preventively suspended without pay for a period of not more than six (6) months, if,
in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. xxx

Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman or
his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or employee, where
6
 American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409 May 23, 1991 Respondent GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto
Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter into joint
FACTS:
venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner
On April 27, 1984, respondent Glorious Sun Fashion (GLORIOUS) was found AIFC which were allowed to service respondent GLORIOUS' export quotas
guilty of dollar-salting (occurs when dollars are removed from the and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment.
Philippines without approval from the Central Bank and transferred to an
On September 4, 1987, the GTEB denied the petition of respondent
account outside the county) and misdeclaration of importations by the
GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken on October 5, 1987 to the Office of
Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) in OSC Case No. 84-B-1 and, as a
the President, docketed as OP Case No. 3781.
result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.
At this point, petitioner AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and
Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, respondent GLORIOUS filed a
filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal on November 27, 1987, claiming
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
that the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has long become final, and that
67180, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that
a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export
the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
quotas which were legally allocated to it.
Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court
On September 7, 1989, the Office of the President ruled in favor of
issued a resolution on June 4, 1984, ordering GTEB to conduct further
respondent GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984
proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS.
irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings.
However, on July 25, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of
The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied on
its intention to withdraw the petition. On August 20, 1984, the Court
February 20, 1990. Hence, this petition.
granted respondent GLORIOUS' motion for withdrawal.
ISSUE:
Respondent GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice,
which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution dated September 10, WON the final judgment in G.R. No. 67180 constitutes res judicata to the
1984. instant case on the ground that the final judgment in G.R. NO. 67180 was a
judgment on the merits.
More than two years later, on October 15, 1986, respondent GLORIOUS
filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota WON private respondent Glorious Sun was not denied due process during
allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated the hearings held in GTEB.
April 27, 1984.
RULING:
Once again, respondent GLORIOUS alleged that the charges against it in OSC
1. NO. The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private
Case No. 84-B-1 were not supported by evidence. Moreover, it alleged that
respondent Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly made
the GTEB decision cancelling its export quotas was rendered as a result of
itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a decision which had become
duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former
final and executory more than three years earlier. The petitioner
Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to
asseverates resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the
"Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
matter.
Corporation [DSA] and petitioner American Inter-fashion (AIFC).

7
The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to be
a bar to a subsequent case is that it must be a judgment on the merits. A
judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as
to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate
fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon
which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or
dilatory objection or contentions.
Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a
judgment on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact,
when the court heard the parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not
able to present any showing of misdeclaration of imports.
The motion to withdraw the petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio
Co that not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed
by the martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was
based solely on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The
dismissal of the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than
on the merits of the petition.
Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata.
2. NO. The Petitioner contends that Glorious Sun was not denied due
process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose
to Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that
Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent
disclosure in 1987, where relevant documents were given to Glorious and
that the latter was given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the
defect.
This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is misleading. The SC recognized
that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the GTEB.
AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence
used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution.
The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to
disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.
8
Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced
the charge that the former was denied due process.
Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for
ways and means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC claims that it is
an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it
and also, none of the members of the committee would agree that there
was any pressure or instruction from Minister Ongpin.
The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not
agree that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was
not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did not
state that the members of the investigating panel were pressured. Mr. Puno
was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in
view of his position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is
every reason to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a
decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their
administration had already been made.
The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be
disregarded if they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are
initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead
to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or
when grave abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly manifests that in
canceling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the
cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted to it
since 1977. In effect, the private respondent’s export quota allocation which
initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which
should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to
hurriedly confer it on another.
 United States v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85 January 26, 1910
FACTS:
Toribio was found by the trial court of Bohol violating Sections 30 and 33 of
Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of
Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural
work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
Appellant Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered his carabao
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the
animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel
for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act
No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a
permit of the municipal treasure.
Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but
was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for
agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a
place other than the municipal slaughterhouse.
Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which
states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.
Appellant also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for
public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment
of their private property.
ISSUE(s):
WON the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited
only to the slaughter of large cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.
WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
9
RULING:
1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 applies
generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere,
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically
to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without
such permit.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected
which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to
defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large
cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
2. NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with the rights of the publics. All property
is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as
to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interests of the community.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an
epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaoes. The Supreme
Court also said that these animals are vested with public interest for they
are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the
requisites of a valid exercise of police power
Finally, SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of
eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of carabaoes
for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of
these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest.
 Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
FACTS:
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order
No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-
provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
(NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these
shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI)
may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of
the above order.
Petitioner sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be
produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on
the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of
authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from
invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause.
RULING: YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following
must be present:
(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.
10
In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has
a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the
order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the
slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if
female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of
those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident
depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to
observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of
the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure
is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving
them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming
there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the
penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a
chance to be heard.
Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as
forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when
notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary
abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are
justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is
present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property
also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the
officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively)
are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable
guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are
nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit.
Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580 December 21, 1915
FACTS:
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite
distance from the road and strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the
people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or
deleterious to the morals of the community.” However, defendant Rafferty,
Collector of Internal Revenue, decided to remove the billboards after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls.
Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to remove
after due investigation, any billboard exposed to the public view if it decides
that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs
"admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the
sight."
The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant
and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and
their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of
section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or
removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and
decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the Government?
HELD:
YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be
suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly populated
districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power of the state, as
long as it is justified by public interest and safety.
11
Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy
social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and
convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything
which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power of
the State.
People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443 August 29, 1958
FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of
Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur
which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permit from the
mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside
the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied
due to the reason that it “hinders the view of travelers from the National
Highway to the public plaza”.
Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a
permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been
living on leased property. Appellants were charged and convicted by peace
court of Baoo for violating such ordinance.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its
regulation of property.
HELD: NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of
power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor’s action. The standards of the ordinance are
entirely lacking making it unreasonable and oppressive, hence, not a valid
ordinance. While property may be regulated to the interest of the general
welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the
state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for
urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and
they must be given an opportunity to be heard. An ordinance which
permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property. Hence, the conviction of herein
appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Ermita-Manila Hotel 7 Motel Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA
849
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
for being violative of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance
is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite
and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it
fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. imposition of P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels
4.It is unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours.
5. Automatic cancellation of license for subsequent violation of the
Ordinance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Ermita-Manila Hotel. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
WON the ordinace is against the due process clause.
RULING:
12
1. YES. The ordinance was a regulatory measure. It did not prohibit motels.
It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order
precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. The ordinance is aim to minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than
legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned.
2. NO. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being
reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face.
Hence, judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith.
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
FACTS:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that
prohibits hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
“wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City of Manila.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the
ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner. CA reversed the decision and asserted that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for
wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity
sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to
a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Carlos Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan Del Norte 163 SCRA 182 June 30, 1988
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan pass an ordinance penalizing any
person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and
twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended
for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.
The Petitioners, theater owners, aggrieved by said ordinance, they file a
complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City assailing the constitutionalit of Ordinance No. 640.
exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to
fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute
of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process
clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most
for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could
stay away.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference
was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown
that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as
valid.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of
Butuan constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:

YES. Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject
of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of
regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police
power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful

13
 Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD GR No. 16649 June 29 2007
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand,
include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the
law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act
states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of
twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners
and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and
capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5%
to 10% on branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE: WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD: YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.
It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
14
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of
the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a
financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether
or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will
incur losses. However, petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed. For
purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount
shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from
all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net
income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis,
which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting
of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period
could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income.
Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim
that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In
addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that
their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate
is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment
of property rights in the process.

15
NDC Agrix v. Philippine Veterans Bank 192 SCRA 257 December 10, 1990
FACTS:
The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which
ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
administered mainly by the National Development Company.
The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix
Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims.
Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1)
thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to
any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.”
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent
Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over
three parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna.
During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the
expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the
aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX
Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, the
New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development Company, petitioners herein,
invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor
of the private respondent. For its part, the private respondent took steps to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a
second case with the same court to stop the foreclosure. The two cases
were consolidated
After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the trial
court rendered the impugned decision. Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero
annulled not only the challenged provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the entire
Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that:
(1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the
principle of separation of powers;
16
(2) The law impaired the obligation of contracts; and
(3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. The motion for
reconsideration of this decision having been denied, the present petition
was filed.
The Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order
and instructed the respondents to cease and desist from conducting a public
auction sale of the lands in question.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now estopped from
contesting the validity of the decree.
The Court, after noting that the petitioners had already filed their claims
with the AGRIX Claims Committee created by the decree, had simply
dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent also
invoked the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the
AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get results, it sought to foreclose the
real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had been
extinguished by the decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the
foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the private
respondent attacked the validity of the provision. At that stage, however,
consistent with Mendoza, the private respondent was already estopped
from questioning the constitutionality of the decree.
ISSUE:
WON Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for
payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
HELD:
YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes
under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as
penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private
property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to
another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is
plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract
between Agrix and the private respondent without justification. While it is
true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the
principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the
legislature in the interest of greater number.

Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power,
not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of
the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix
constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by
the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured
creditors in violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new
corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the government, should
have been created only by general and not special law. And in so far as the
decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an
impairment of the obligation of the contract.

17
 AgustIn v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 February 2, 1979

FACTS: ISSUE:

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due
which requires an early warning device to be carried by users of motor process.
vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process
HELD:
and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power
and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation
respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact
Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and regulations of the said
legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to
instruction.
promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the
assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally
as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country
Commission," to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s
word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently
Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .
illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers
instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude
a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.
per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the
part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative
road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early
Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on

streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads caused
by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without
appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled
vehicles are recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic
safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna
Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.
18
 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255 July 20, 1994
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased
a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.,
renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino
during the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil
organizations of the City of Cagayan de Oro denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City enacted two (2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business
permit and canceling existing business permit to establishment for the
operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting
the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE
NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed
for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of
police power.
HELD:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene
a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National
Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by
19
Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher
than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it
cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court
stressed that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of
the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are
not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative
and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the
constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.
 Dans v. People 285 SCRA 504 January 29, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda R. Marcos
and then Transportation and Communications Minister Jose P. Dans, Jr.,
petitioners herein, entered into several contracts involving the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General Hospital Foundation,
Inc. (PGHFI). Concurrently and respectively, Marcos and Dans served as ex-
oficio Chairman and ex-oficio Vice-Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman
and Director of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI.
By virtue of these agreements, which were authorized and in fact ratified by
the LRTA Board of Directors, two vacant LRTA lots located in Pasay City, and
lot in Sta. Cruz, Manila, were leased out to the PGHFI.
Specifically, the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and Marcos,
respectively, approved three deeds, namely, an Agreement for the
Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit System Stations
and the Management and Operation of the Concession Areas Therein,[1]
and two lease agreements[2] dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the
Pasay and the Sta. Cruz lots.
The terms of the lease agreements were identical except as to the price: the
lease would be good for 25 years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%.
PGHFI had the right to sublease the lots; and the monthly lease was
P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz lot.
Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by PGHFI, through
Marcos, to Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC) for P734,000.00
a month, while the Sta. Cruz lot was allegedly subleased to Joy Mart
Consolidated Corporation (Joy Mart) for P199,710.00 per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged of crimes in violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
A total of Five (5) separate cases were filed against petitioners. Marcos and
Dans were separately charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452
for accepting employment in and/or acting as Chairman and Director,
respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease
20
agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to
the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453, the
accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they signed
in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly
entered into under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.
Before trial could commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of
defense witness Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., a real estate broker, appraiser and
friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a position to inform the
court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were
fair based on standard industry valuation standards.
The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was allowed to testify on
August 12, 13, and 19, 1992. During this time, Marcos never questioned
Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further examine him.
The court issued an order admitting all the exhibits except Exhibits D and E
as to Dans, who challenged the two sublease agreements, and Exhibit E-1 as
to Marcos, who, while accepting the validity of said sublease agreement,
nevertheless questioned the authenticity of her signature thereon.
Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss but the court denied the same, as well as his
motion for reconsideration thereof.
By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos had neither
submitted a formal offer of evidence, despite notice of the courts orders to
do so, nor the required memorandum. She did file a motion for inhibition of
the justices of the Sandiganbayans First Division on the ground of pre-
judgment of her case based on the courts denial of Dans demurrer to
evidence, but this was denied in the courts
On September 24, 1993, The court a quo rendered judgment, acquitting
petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451, and 17452, but convicting
them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453.
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration which
respondent court promulgated two resolutions, one denying the motion of
Dans, and another denying that of Marcos and modifying the assailed
September 24, 1993, decision with the addition of a sixth paragraph in the
dispositive portion which dealt with the civil liability of petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to SC for a review.
The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raise
similar issues and seek the same reliefs.
One of the few issues raised by Imelda Marcos is the constitutionality of Sec
3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to her, the section is
vague and superfluous. She claims that the phrase manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government is vague for it does not set a definite
standard by which the court will be guided, thus, leaving it open to human
subjectivity. Petitioners were charged with and found guilty of violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. It states thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
a public officer in entering into a particular contract is, indeed, gross and
manifest.
The personal circumstances of an accused are, in this regard, also
immaterial, because of the nature of the statute. As the Court declared in
Luciano,
. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a
malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law,
not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance
with the announced purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was
enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private
persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are
unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in
graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be
first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.

ISSUE:

WON Sec 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is unconstitutional on

the ground of vagueness

HELD:

NO. There is, however, nothing vague about the statute. The assailed
provision answers the basic query What is the violation? Anything beyond
this, the hows and the whys, are evidentiary matters which the law itself
cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case. The
disadvantage in this instance is something that still has to be addressed by
the States evidence as the trial progresses. It may be said that the law is
intended to be flexible in order to allow the judge a certain latitude in
determining if the disadvantage to the government occasioned by the act of

21
 People v. De la Piedra 350 SCRA 163 January 24, 2001
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal recruitment in
large scale by promising an employment abroad Maria Lourdes Modesto y
Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, a job to
Singapore without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment
and overseas placement of workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had
already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in
consideration of the promised employment which did not materialize. Thus
causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum.
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring
about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol
Figueroa. Ramos. An entrapment was then planned by the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. Mendoza and successfully
arrested the accused-appellant.
Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol
Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie
Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and
Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the accused offer
them a job to Singapore.
The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.
ISSUE:
WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is
void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
HELD:
NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.
22
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that
constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by
merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of
illegal recruitment.
Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt
quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis case, merely bemoaned
the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.
The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive
at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in
criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself.
Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in
imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void
for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and
uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the
legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot permit reference to
the rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of
uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support
and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on
the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for
which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and
provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution
are within the reach of those entrusted therewith.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as
customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral
(referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a
prospective employer) does not render the law over broad. Evidently,
appellant misapprehends concept of over breadth.

A statute may be said to be over broad where it operates to inhibit the

exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded
statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally
punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible
and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute

In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,for instance, we struck

down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election
propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the
common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the
challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of
his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and
information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it
covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for over
breadth.

In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of
recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally
over broad.

23
 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

FACTS: ISSUE:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused
by RA 7659. On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received to due process.
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or
RULING:
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum
people and the Republic of the Philippines. of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him: (1)
necessary to constitute a crime.
it suffers from the vice of vagueness, (2) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions, and (3) it abolishes the element of What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
mens rea in crimes already punishable under the RPC. number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Informations against petitioner. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the
information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
grounds of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
gotten wealth.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused. Estrada moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same
was denied.

Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.

24
 GSIS v. Montesclaros 434 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso, who
was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an
application for retirement benefits under the Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole beneficiary.
GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 17 February
1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a
monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because,
under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a special
civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD
1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the trial
court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for
services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through
monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement
benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits
are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18
of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code,
a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or
impair vested rights.
25
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the Family
Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has
accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. However,
the Court will still resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros
because social justice and public interest demand the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:
W/N the provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process
and equal protection clause.
RULING:
Yes. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section
18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court
holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the
law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses
claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage
to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive
members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
differences to distinguish one class from another. spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
legislation.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is void
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner protection of the law.
more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to
prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons
the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension
and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest
on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those
marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to
avail of pension benefits.

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the

reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291),
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law
revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of
RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately
before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension
unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
solely to receive the benefit.

Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham

26
 Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318

FACTS:

Petitioners filed for TRO for DPWH Administrative Order 1, Series of 1968
(prohibiting bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not
motorized) to drive in limited access facilities) and DPWH Department Order
74, Series of 1993 (Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway from
Balintawak to Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols to
Alabang as Limited Access Facilities). Whilst this is pending, DPWH acting
thru TRB issued Department Order 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities.
Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide “scientific” and “objective”
data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack
this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Trial court
dismissed the petition but declared DO 123 invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AO1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional on the ground of

violating equal protection law?

RULING:

Petition partly granted. DO 74 / 215 / 123 declared void and AO 1 valid. The
sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. What is
“reasonable” is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No
all-embracing test of reasonableness exists for its determination rests upon
human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It
merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users
must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.

DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546

has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of
authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

27