Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
17. PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958; June 30, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner, Phil Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), is engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.”
It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order
does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
Additional info:
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
— rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants,
amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is
called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with
an identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should
act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male
chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was
largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted
in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this
Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned.
There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as
classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
18. Tatad v. Secretary
G.R. No. 124360; November 5, 1997
FACTS:
Prior to 1971, no government agency was regulating the oil industry. New players
were free to enter the oil market without any government interference. There were four (4)
refining companies at that time. SHELL, CALTEX, BATAAN REFINING COMPANY and FILOIL
MARKETING and six (6) petroleum marketing companies: ESSO, FILOIL, CALTEX, GETTY,
MOBIL and SHELL;
In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to
remedy the same the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was enacted REGULATING the oil
industry. The then President Marcos created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) t
break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry.
In 1984, Pres. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956 created the OIL PRICE
STABILIZATION FUND (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil
caused by the exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices crude oil and
imported petroleum products. Only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country.
These are: CALTEX, FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC;
Pres. Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the ENERGY
REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of importing, exporting, shipping, transporting,
processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources “WHEN WARRANTED AND
ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES”. The Board was empowered to “fix and
regulate the prices of petroleum products and other related merchandise;
Congress enacted RA 8180 deregulating the Oil Industry not later than March, 1997.
The law requires that the implementation of the regulation, shall as far as practicable be made at
a time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD
ARE DECLINING AND WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE
US DOLLAR; IS STABLE;
Executive Order No. 372 was issued by President Fidel Ramos implementing full
deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED;
The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8180 on the following grounds;
with one of them that Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the oil industry and even
bars the entry of other players in the oil industry but instead effectively protects the interest of
the oil companies with existing refineries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
HELD:
The provisions on 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and inventory requirement
blocks the entry of other players and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to
monopolies or unfair competition. This is so because it would take billions for new players to
construct refineries, and to have big inventories. This would effectively prevent new players.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and controlled
by an oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. As the
dominant players, SHELL, CALTEX & PETRON boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% works to their immense advantage. Yet, this is only one edge on tariff
differential. THE OTHER EDGE CUTS AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR
COMPETITORS. IT ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NEW PLAYERS. New players in order to
equalize must build their refineries worth billions of pesos. Those without refineries had to
compete with a higher cost of 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the advantage of PETRON, SHELL AND CALTEX against
prospective new players. The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory requirement in
view of their numerous storage facilities. Prospective competitors again find compliance of this
requirement difficult because of prohibitive cost in constructing new storage facilities. The net
effect would be to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
19. International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 128845; June 1, 2001
FACTS:
International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires. In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires
including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a
salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. The Union
claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos
and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity.
HELD:
Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work
with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is
not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
20. DECS v San Diego
G.R. No. 89572; December 31, 1989
FACTS:
Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S.
Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take
another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the
fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education
(equal protection).
HELD:
No, the equal protection clause was not violated. NMAT is a measure intended to limit
the admission to medical schools to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of
achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools”
and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country”
It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also
qualified are denied entrance. The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent
court has been reversed.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
21. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado
G.R. No. 105371; November 11, 1993
FACTS:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35
of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land
Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is
discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the
same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.
Additional info:
Franking privilege: Mail matter transmitted without payment of postage under the autographic or
facsimile signature of officials to whom this privilege is extended by law, and under
such rules promulgated by the Corporation to prevent the unauthorized use thereof. (RA 7354
Section 15

RA 7354: An act creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Defining its powers, functions and responsibilities,
Providing for regulation of the industry and for
Other purposes connected therewith
Section 35: All franking privileges authorized by law are repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265 (An Act to grant complete postal and telegraph franking
privileges to the Commission of the Census), Republic Acts Numbered 69 (Senators and
Members of the House), 180 (COMELEC), 2087 (Widows of former Presidents of the
Philippines) and 5059 (Former presidents of the Philippines). The Corporation may continue the
franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President,
under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
22. Fariñas v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 118127; April 12, 2005
FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA
9006 or “The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of
candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election
Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials,
thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one
which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his
certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for
reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repeal of Section 67 is violative of the equal protection clause
HELD:
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal
protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable
classification between an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupies their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another
substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote.
Requisites of Valid Classification: Substantial Distinctions
23. PHILRECA v. Secretary of DILG
G.R. No. 143076; June 10, 2003
FACT:
A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric
cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and registered with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA). Accordingly, petitioners enjoy Assistance,
Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance from the National Power Corporation.
Petitioners contend that they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real
property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their
tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn.
Petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground
that the said provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause.
Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the
obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States Government.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisions of the Local Government Code violate the rights of
the Petitioners to the Equal Protection clause by unreasonable classifying them and withdrawing
their Tax exemption
HELD:
There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
law based on reasonable classification. The court hold that there is reasonable classification
under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric
cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No.
6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least two
material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and
which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative associations created under P.D.
No. 269, as amended.
1. Capital Contributions by Members
2. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is
germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government unit
shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power by local governments is
beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is granted the power to
create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion
to determine the extent of the taxing powers of local government units consistent with the policy
of local autonomy.
(May also be applicable to the next topic)
Germane to the purpose of the law
24. People v. Cayat
G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian
tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating
liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called
native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is
an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
HELD:
No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications.
The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification
rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief,
but in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low
grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the
non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of
highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third,
the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature
understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same
class.
Germane to the purpose of the law
C. Dumiao v. COMELEC, supra (Dissent of J. Teehankee)
FACTS:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52
as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.
Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has
received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run
for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision
amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other
similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in
any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence
of such fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and
thus, should be declared null and void
HELD:
With regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case,
employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of
the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace.
Dissenting opinion, J. Teehankee
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official
from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and
from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated
are not similarly treated.
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special
disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar
65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor
reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood"
because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not
disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-
governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective
office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other
branches of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office.
And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they
have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which
amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of
the judiciary). The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and
is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the
special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective
local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the
office they seek as those who are differently situated." Such presumption is sheer conjecture.
The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that
he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petitioner who
has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most
physically fit.

Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the
most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a
modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age has
ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of the
people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always
been recognized as supreme.

The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection

clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and, in the liabilities, imposed.
The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one
hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned
provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would
disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.