Navarosa v. Comelec G.R. No. 157957 RTC: granted Esto’s motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond.
d Esto’s motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. RTC also
September 18, 2003 Carpio, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Execution of Judgment Digest By: Bries
SUMMARY: Navarosa won as mayor of Libacao by 3 votes over Esto. Esto filed a
protest with the Kalibo, Aklan RTC alleging irregularities in canvassing. RTC:
Esto won by 42 votes, he is the proclaimed winner, Navarosa’s proclamation
annulled. Navarosa appealed to COMELEC, and Esto filed a motion for execution
of the judgment pending Navarosa’s appeal with the RTC. Navarosa offered to file a
supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the RTC grant Esto’s
motion. RTC: granted Esto’s motion subject to the filing of a bond. However RTC
also granted Navarosa’s prayer to stay the execution pending appeal, upon filing a
supersedeas bond. Esto filed a petition for certiorari with COMELEC. COMELEC
affirmed the RTC Order granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of
the execution. COMELEC En Banc denied Navarosa’s MR. SC: The supersedeas
bond Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the RTC’s ruling ordering
her to pay to Esto actual damages, attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot
secure execution of that portion proclaiming Esto duly elected.
DOCTRINE: On the assumption that the filing of the supersedeas bond applies in
an election protest case, the practical considerations dictate that it cannot secure
the performance of or satisfy the judgment rendered in an election protest which
basically involves the right to hold a public office and the performance of its
functions, except re: the monetary award provided in the order. Such bond cannot
answer for the deprivation of a duly elected candidate of his post, and constituents
of their leader, such deprivation being unquantifiable.
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: election protest filed by Esto with RTC,
then appealed by Navarosa to COMELEC Second Division. Esto filed a
petition for certiorari with COMELEC En Banc. Navarosa filed MR to
COMELEC En Banc, which was denied, hence this petition for certiorari
FACTS: Charito Navarosa and Roger Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao,
Aklan. The COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed
Navarosa as mayor, winning by 3 votes. Claiming irregularities marred canvassing
in several precincts, Esto filed an election protest in the Kalibo, Aklan RTC.
Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a
counter-protest in the same case. After revision of the contested ballots, RTC
declared Esto the elected mayor of by a margin of 42 votes and annulled the earlier
proclamation of Navarosa. RTC also ordered Navarosa to pay Esto actual damages
and attorney’s fees.
Navarosa appealed to COMELEC. Esto filed with the RTC a motion for execution
of the judgment pending Navarosa’s appeal. Navarosa opposed Esto’s motion.
Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal,
should the RTC grant Esto’s motion.
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granted Navarosa’s prayer to stay the execution pending appeal, upon filing a
P600,000 supersedeas bond. Both Navarosa and Esto sought reconsideration but
the RTC denied their motions.
Esto filed a petition for certiorari with COMELEC against the Order. In her
memorandum to the petition, Navarosa raised for the first time the issue of the
RTC’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because of Esto’s
failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee.
The COMELEC Second Division, through a Resolution, affirmed the RTC Order
granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. It found
that Esto duly paid the COMELEC filing fee, stating that it is for COMELEC, in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction
elevated on appeal, and not the trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the
immediate execution of the decision pending appeal granted by the trial court of
general jurisdiction in an election contest. Except when the trial court reversed
itself in a motion for reconsideration of its order granting immediate execution, it
cannot later on stay or restrain the execution thereof in the guise of allowing the
losing party to file a supersedeas bond. The issue before the RTC where a motion
for execution pending appeal is filed is to determine WON there are good reasons
to justify the immediate execution pending appeal, not whether there are good
reasons to stay the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal.
It also stated: “The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its substantial finding of
good reasons by a rule of procedure which does not strictly apply in election protest
cases when it allowed the filing of a supersedeas bond under Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To allow the application of the said procedural relief
would defeat the right of the winning candidate in an election protest to hold the
public office by virtue of the people’s mandate expressed through the ballot and to
perform the functions of the said public office.”
Navarosa sought reconsideration, but COMELEC En Banc denied her motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
execution pending appeal of the trial court’s decision
HELD: NO. PETITION DISMISSED. To grant execution pending appeal in
election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a
motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be
good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting
execution pending appeal must state the good reasons. Navarosa contests the
RTC’s finding that there are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its
decision.
In Ramas v. COMELEC, the SC gave the circumstances qualifying as good reasons
justifying execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or the will of the
electorate; (2) shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office;
and (3) length of time that the election contest has been pending.
RTC here invoked two good reasons to justify its order allowing execution pending
appeal. First, the order will give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate.
Second, more than 10 months (1/3 of the 3-year term of the office) had already
lapsed. COMELEC found these good reasons sufficient. Being consistent with
Ramas, there is no grave abuse of discretion.
Unlike the Election Code of 1971, which expressly provided for execution pending
appeal of trial courts rulings in election protests, the present election laws are silent
on such remedy. Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the RoC applies in suppletory character to
election cases, allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court. As
explained in Ramas:
“In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by
courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which
are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending
appeal under Sec. 2 of Rule 39 are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of
Court, which is now Sec. 4, Rule 1: SEC 4: These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.”
Sec. 3 of Art. IX-C of the Constitution vests COMELEC with authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure. Sec. 52(c), Art. VII of the Omnibus Election Code
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of the Code or other laws which it is required to enforce and administer.
Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provides that in the absence of any applicable
provision in said Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
A primordial public interest to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected
candidate as determined by the RTC lies behind the present rule giving suppletory
application to Sec. 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy consideration can
prevent suppletory application of Sec. 2. In insisting that the simple expedient of
posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, Navarosa neither
claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she
merely contends that Sec. 3 of Rule 39 applies also in a suppletory character
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because its Siamese twin provision, Sec. 2, is already being so applied. A
supersedeas bond under Sec. 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing
party in election protest cases. Sec. 3 provides:
“Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon
approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom it
is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to
be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus
given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.”
A supersedeas bond secures performance of the judgment or order appealed from in
case of its affirmation. Sec. 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the
interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and thus, of
protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Sec. 3 states: The bond thus
given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. Consequently,
it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include
orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office
and perform its functions.
As observed by the COMELEC Second Division in the present case: The
supersedeas bond, as used under Sec. 3, Rule 39, refers to a bond, either in cash or a
surety bond, filed by the losing party in an ordinary civil action to secure the
performance or to satisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed on
appeal in favor of the prevailing party. This is filed for the performance of the
judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed by the appellate court. On the
assumption that the filing of the supersedeas bond applies in an election protest
case, the practical considerations of the matter dictate that it cannot secure the
performance of or satisfy the judgment rendered in an election protest which
basically involves the right to hold a public office and the performance of its
functions in accordance with the mandate of the law, except insofar as the monetary
award provided in the special order. By allowing the filing of a supersedeas bond to
stay the execution of a judgment in an election protest declaring the protestant as
the winning candidate who is entitled to the right to hold and perform the functions
of the contested public office, would render the judgment in an election protest
illusory. While this bond ensures that the appealed decision if affirmed is satisfied,
in an election protest case, this, in the event the appealed case is affirmed and the
execution pending appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot answer for the
deprivation of a duly elected candidate of his post, and his constituents of their
leader of choice, such deprivation being unquantifiable.
The supersedeas bond Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the RTC’s
ruling ordering her to pay to Esto actual damages, attorneys fees and the cost of
the suit. It cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming Esto duly elected.
This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of the supersedeas
bond in the first place.