G.R. No.

182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG VS THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD

DOCTRINE: Rules on Electronic Evidence do not apply to criminal cases

FACTS: Rustan Ang was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the
Anti-Violence Against Women filed by her ex-girlfriend Irish Sagud. The facts revealed that Rustan, via
multimedia message service (MMS) sent a picture of a naked woman to the complainant with the latter’s face
superimposed on the figure.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message was one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. The
accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On appeal, the CA
rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. It likewise denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held: Yes. The RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the
Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

FALLO: the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeal

G.R. No. 100599 April 8, 1992
AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and NAPOLEON M. MALBUN,

DOCTRINE: Rules on Evidence do not apply in Administrative proceedings.

Respondent/Appellant Malbun was a Branch Manager in Cagayan de Oro city and was formally charged for
Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency and Incompetence arising from the alleged unauthorized and illegal encashment
of commercial checks drawn against uncleared and unfunded deposits.

The PAB Board of Directors, found him guilty of Neglect of Duty with an imposable penalty of "Forced
Resignation without prejudice to Reinstatement."

On appeal to the MSPB, the Commission finds Malbun guilty not only of "Gross Neglect of Duty," which is a
less grave offense under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 8, s. 1970 but also of "Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" which are grave offenses under the same
Memorandum Circular. Be that as it may, considering the existence of the two (2) mitigating circumstances of
length of service in the government service and first offense and the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence, the minimum of the penalty for grave offense of suspension of one (1) year is imposable

The petitioner bank filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the circumstance of prior conviction of the
private respondent in 1979 for "neglect of duty as charged and upon suspension from the service for four (4)
should be considered in determining the proper penalty (which should be dismissal) to be imposed on the
private respondent

The CSC, however, refused to consider this "prior conviction" of the private respondent on the ground that this
is not a newly discovered evidence and that the petitioner in its exercise of reasonable diligence could have
discovered and produced the document during the hearing conducted or could have presented the same in its
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) as well as in the Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on evidence should be stringent in application to the present administrative
case?

HELD: The Supreme Court said that "prior conviction" should have been considered by the Commission in
imposing the proper penalty on the private respondent although it was presented only in the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration/motion for new trial.

It is true that the document showing the private respondent's prior conviction in 1979 is not a newly discovered
evidence but "forgotten evidence" considering that the same already existed or was available before or during
the trial which was known and obtainable by the petitioner bank and could have been presented were it not for
the oversight or forgetfulness of the petitioner and therefore, applying rigid technical rules, such document is
not admissible as evidence against the private respondent. However, administrative agencies like the Civil
Service Commission exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements. The Court ruled that in the case of the document showing prior conviction of the private
respondent, such should have been admitted considering that it is a public document and within the judicial
notice of the Commission as provided in Section 12(4) of Chapter 3, Book VII of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987.

FALLO : WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent NAPOLEON M. MALBUN is ordered
DISMISSED from the government service with forfeiture of benefits.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-873 December 14, 1994
LILY MOCLES vs. JUDGE MABINI M. MARAVILLA

DOCTRINE: Rumors are not evidence

FACTS: Respondent Judge Maraviila of the MTCC General Santos City issued a writ of execution with respect
to the restoration of possession in a civil case despite the fact that it was already on appeal with Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City. This prompted the defendant in that civil case and
herein complainant Lily Mocles filed a complaint before the OCA thru a sworn letter-complaint alleging
ignorance of the law for issuance of such writ and bribery in that the respondent was rumored to have received
P20,000.00 in connection with such execution.

The respondent avers that he issued the writ of execution in compliance with the order of the RTC directing his
court to cause the execution of the judgment with respect to the restoration of possession. He states that there
is no truth whatsoever to the unsubstantiated rumor that he received P20,000.

The OCA found that there is no evidence to support the charge of bribery.

ISSUE: Whether or not rumor can be admitted as evidence for bribery?

HELD: No. Rumors are not evience

The Supreme Court agrees with the OCA that there is no evidence of the alleged bribery. The complainant
herself states in her complaint that her charge is based on a rumor. She did not even disclose the source of the
rumor and the occasion, place, and time when she heard it. Instead of subsequently establishing the truth of
the rumor by volunteering to offer some evidence, the complainant agreed to submit this case on the basis of
the pleadings. Rumors are not evidence and the complainant was grossly irresponsible when she imputed
upon the respondent, under her solemn oath, the commission of a grave offense solely on the basis of a rumor
with the full awareness that she could not prove it. The lawyer who assisted her in the preparation of the
complaint should have, under his oath as a lawyer, prevented her from making the wild accusation.

FALLO: DISMISSING, for utter lack of merit, the charge of bribery against the respondent; and
G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka TOTONG

Doctrine: While evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all

Facts: Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with rape of his neighbor 13-year-
old Escelea Tabada. The victim was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside
the heir house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her
second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door.Turco, with the
use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they
reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant
lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty
and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite
Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell her
brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his
daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical
examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile,
alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts. The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant
actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue:
W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit

Held:

Yes. With regards to appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate could be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it
could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative
value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules
or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility
is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid
down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids
its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it
has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said
that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the
victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled
that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by
a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand
convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO

Doctrine: apparent illegality of evidence

Facts: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to
search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, QuezonCity. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of
shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room.

The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At
about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The search team found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance,
and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams

Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu
and marijuana were filed. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in both
criminal cases. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds of: (1) The admissibility of the
shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid; (2) The admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to
the "plain view"doctrine; and (3) The employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the
warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”

Held: Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. [35] For this doctrine
to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellants
person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid.

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This
case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM
agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its content

In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have
been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were
discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

FALLO: Roberto Salanguit y Ko is acquitted In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358

GR No. 15632014 February 2007
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN vs. HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 

Doctrine: Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances

FACTS: Rodolfo Abenes, a Barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered firearm
and its ammunitions during the election period. Two Information were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms
and its ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The firearm was confiscated from
Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was asked to alight the same for routine
inspection. The police saw the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When
Abenes could not produce one, the police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was neither a
registered nor a licensed firearm holder. The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges. Abenes
appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and thathis
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA affirmed thetrial court

ISSUE: Is the evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
In the violation of PD 1966

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower courts that the police found in plain view a
gun tucked into the waist of the petitioner during the Gun Ban period enforced by the COMELEC. The Court
upholds the validity of the checkpoint. Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a Search Warrant, the policemen
validly seize the firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the peitioner pursuant to the "plain
view doctrine. These findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence in the record.

However, the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the negative allegation in the Information that the
petitioner possessed no license or permit to bear the subject firearm. While the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of the petitioner,
without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not
conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not
relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned. Thus, for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a firearm without prior authority,
license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.

In the violation of Omnibus Election Code,

While it is well-settled that under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that
the accused has no license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution; under the Omnibus Election
Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with
the accused. On this point, the petitioner failed to present any form of such authority, and, therefore, his
conviction must be affirmed.

FALLO: Rodolfo Abenes Y Gacutan is ACQUITTED from the charge of illegal possession of firearm under
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond unreasonable doubt.
Charges on Violation of Omnibus Election Code is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS